Arctic Update

Current as of: 18 Nov 2014

This Briefing is ClassifiedUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

Purpose, Background and AgendaPurpose: Provide an update on J5 Arctic efforts.

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Background:•Consulted with trusted partner•Previous CDR’s Estimate for the Arctic

(Feb 12) (USNORTHCOM only)•New Strategic Guidance•N-NC Plans•CAN-US Threat Assessment (2012)•CAWG White Paper (Mar 12)•Arctic Collaborative Workshop (Apr 14)•CAN-US Arctic Intelligence Forum (Apr 14)•Commander’s Testimony (HASC – 26 Feb 14,

SASC – 13 Mar 14)•Exercises (FACETED EAGLE, Arctic Zephyr,

etc)•Canada’s Northern Employment & Support Plan

(Nov 12)•NADSA •Arctic OWG

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Agenda•Recent CDR Guidance•Situation/Threat•History/Vignette•Commander’s Intent•Facts & Assumptions•Requirements and Gaps•Way Ahead

Recent CDR Guidance

Clarify Threat• There is an Arctic defense threat and we must be ready for it (Northern

approaches)

• We have forces on alert every day for the threat

• We need to start building more defense forces now

• At what point does presence equate to perception of sovereignty?

• Any competition for resources is bad

Response• We can’t be late to need for civil support missions

Advocacy• We have to plan now for what we will need to be relevant in the Arctic in the

future – very long acquisition times

Partnerships• Partnerships are key to our success – we can’t do it alone

• Get services moving

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Situation / Threat

(U) Estimated 25% of world’s undiscovered hydrocarbon resources may lie beneath the Arctic. 80% in uncontested areas.

(U) There is an increase in human activity in the Arctic; increase in N-NC missions.

(FOUO) There is a requirement for deterrence against emerging threats. Consistent presence and demonstrated capability to respond will reduce the likelihood of a threat emerging.

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History / Vignette

• (U) Wrangel Island Dispute• (U) 22% of Russia’s GDP dependent on Arctic resources• (U) Flag on ocean floor of North Pole• (U/FOUO) Increased LRA• (U/FOUO) Increased naval activity• (U) Ukraine / Crimea• (U) Troop and base build up in the Arctic

------------------------------------------------------------• (U/FOUO) Sanctions in other areas of the world squeeze Russia

to look for resources in the Arctic with no resistance• (U/FOUO) Russia makes pact with China; China will buy Russian

oil and have limited access to other Russian resources• (U/FOUO) Russia limits Freedom of Navigation in Arctic waters

and claims extended sovereignty rights

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Arctic Commander’s Intent

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Purpose: The Homelands are defended in depth and risk to our National Security Interests remains low. Civil Support is provided on time.

Method (Key Tasks):•Execute NORAD’s missions of aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning; and USNORTHCOM’s primary mission of homeland defense and, when directed by the SecDef, provide civil support. •Center our efforts on defense, security and safety. •Work hand-in-hand with CJOC, USEUCOM, and, where possible, other cooperative partners in order to synchronize our terminology, objectives, and operations and to most efficiently leverage our combined Arctic capabilities to meet anticipated contingencies.•Execute our UCP responsibilities as DOD’s capability advocate for the Arctic. •Raise the level of awareness of Arctic issues within DOD, and seek efficient ways to draw DOD enterprise activities into a Whole-of-Government effort. •Increase our all-domain awareness in the Arctic, to include participation in Canadian exercises and maritime presence when possible.

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End State:

•Adversaries are deterred, and if deterrence fails, attacks are defeated.•Conditions are set for civil support.•US allies and partners in the USNORTHCOM AOR contribute to the peaceful opening of the Arctic in a manner which strengthens international cooperation.

Facts and Assumptions

Facts:1. (FOUO) Arctic summer ice extent has decreased by 40% since 1979

2. (FOUO) Interest in the Arctic, by both Arctic and non-Arctic nations, is increasing

3. (FOUO) There has been an increase in human activity in the Arctic

4. (FOUO) North American Arctic is different than the Eurasian Arctic (ice, weather)

5. (FOUO) Maritime traffic has increased in the Arctic

6. (U) The Arctic is an austere and harsh environment

Key Strategic Assumptions:1. (FOUO) Human activity/resource development will continue to increase in the Arctic

2. (FOUO) Russia is committed to increasing its influence in the Arctic

3. (FOUO) Current budgetary pressures will limit investment in Arctic capabilities

4. (FOUO) Miscalculation of the threat, capabilities, personnel, equipment, environment could be catastrophic

5. (U) Personnel and equipment should be capable of operating at conditions as cold as -60 degrees F for extended periods of time

Classified Additions

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Requirements and Gaps

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Communication•Information Sharing•High Latitude Coverage•Wide Area Coverage•C2•Sat Comms•More Bandwidth•Mobile capability•Secure Capability•Reliable•Survivable

Infrastructure•Information Sharing•C2•Runways•Hangars•Deep Water/Draft Port•Icebreakers•Base/FOB in location that enables timely response - opening & sustainment•Expeditionary•Surge capable

Presence•C2•Deployable C2•Sustainability•Exercises•Trained & equipped forces•Exercised forces•Maritime charted

Domain Awareness•Aerospace•Land•Maritime Surface•Maritime Subsurface•Greater range•Wide area surveillance•Better weather observations/ forecasting•ISR•Info Sharing Policies

Proposed Way Ahead

• Socialize / Refine Commander’s Estimate for the Arctic

• Continue to influence N-NC Theater Strategy and plans

• Establish recognized requirements across components & subordinates

• Develop force utilization COAs

• Advocate for required Arctic Capabilities

• Shape Objectives for Exercises

• Identify Key Leader Engagement opportunities for the Commander

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Back-Up

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Current Systems• NTM (NSA, NGA ADF-CO and WMD/sanction enforcement)• ONI SeaLink Advanced Analysis (S2A) (Capability to find, fix, track dark

uncooperative vessels of interest in Arctic)• HF Radar Remote Power Module (University of Alaska Fairbanks)• Stateside Affordable Radar System (STARS) • Enhanced Polar System• Operationally Response Space (ORS) (TACSAT 4)• Satellite and terrestrial based Automatic Identification System (AIS)• Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT)• RADARSAT Constellation Mission (RCM)• Canadian Polar Communications & Weather (PCW) satellite• Cruise Missile Launch at Sea Alert Warning System (CLAWS) (S&T)• Canadian Tactical Narrowband SATCOM (TNS)• Phone, Email, Fax (primary SAR means)• Battle Control System Fixed (BCSF)• Iridium• Automated Weather Observation System (AWOS)• Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS)

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Potential Solutions• NTM (NSA, NGA ADF-CO and WMD/sanction enforcement)

• ONI SeaLink Advanced Analysis (S2A) (Capability to find, fix, track dark uncooperative vessels of interest in Arctic)

• N-NC S&T Arctic Over the Horizon Radar (CWP with Canada, using NSWC Crane as site)

• N-NC S&T Mobile Sensor System (CWP) (Working with U of Alaska and NRL)

• N-NC S&T and US Army Cold Regions Research and Engineering Lab (CRREL)

• N-NC S&T Arctic “Thunderstorm” Rapid Reaction Technology Office

• HF Radar Remote Power Module (University of Alaska Fairbanks)

• Stateside Affordable Radar System (STARS)

• Enhanced Polar System

• Operationally Response Space (ORS) (TACSAT 4)

• Satellite and terrestrial based Automatic Identification System (AIS)

• Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT)

• RADARSAT Constellation Mission (RCM)

• Canadian Polar Communications & Weather (PCW) satellite

• Cruise Missile Launch at Sea Alert Warning System (CLAWS) (S&T)

• Canadian Tactical Narrowband SATCOM (TNS)

• Phone, Email, Fax (primary SAR means)

• Battle Control System Fixed (BCSF)

• Iridium

• Automated Weather Observation System (AWOS)

• Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS)

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Plan of Action and Milestones

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Lit Review

System Gap Analysis

Future System(s) Analysis

JTF-AK/D17Workshop

10 Sep

N-NC Commander’s Arctic Estimate will prepare commands for timely and effective response.

Current System Analysis/Limitations

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Internal JPT

Aug 14

CJOC Workshop

14 Aug

Draft Commander’s Estimate

Sep 14 Oct 14

Define Requirements

Jul 14 Nov 14 Dec 14

N-NC J5/D IPR

ND IPR

CDR IPR

DC IPR

Final Commander’s Estimate

O-6 Staff Coord GO/FO Staff Coord

SituationStrategic GuidanceTasksMission StatementCommander’s IntentFacts & AssumptionsEnd StateAdvocacyWay Ahead

Huddle

Strategic Guidance U.S. National Strategy for the Arctic Region (May 2013)

1. Evolve Arctic Infrastructure and Strategic Capabilities

2. Enhance Arctic Domain Awareness

3. Preserve Arctic Region Freedom of the Seas

4. Provide for Future United States Energy Security

Implementation Plan for the U.S. National Strategy for the Arctic Region (Jan 2014)1. Prepare for Increased Activity in the Maritime Domain

2. Sustain and Support Evolving Aviation Requirements

3. Develop Communication Infrastructure in the Arctic

4. Sustain Federal Capability to Conduct Maritime Operations in Ice-impacted Waters

5. Promote International Law and Freedom of the Seas

DOD Arctic Strategy (Nov 2013)End State: A secure and stable region where U.S. national interests are safeguarded, the U.S. homeland is

protected, and nations work cooperatively to address challenges.

Supporting Objectives:

1. Ensure security, support safety, and promote defense cooperation.

2. Prepare for a wide range of challenges and contingencies.

Objective tasks:

1. Exercise sovereignty and protect the homeland.

2. Engage public and private sector partners to improve domain awareness in the Arctic.

3. Preserve freedom of the seas in the Arctic.

4. Evolve Arctic infrastructure and capabilities consistent with changing conditions.

5. Supporting existing agreements with allies & partners - pursue new ones to build confidence with key regional partners.

6. Provide support to civil authorities, as directed.

7. Partner with other departments, agencies, and nations to support human and environmental safety.

8. Support the development of the Arctic Council and other international institutions that promote regional cooperation.

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NC TCP Tasks SummaryTCP-11 (30 Sep 2011)

IMO 5.1 – DefenseDefense

•Develop a visible, deterrent military presence in the Arctic•Develop an Arctic CONOP in coordination with CJOC•Advocate for Arctic capabilities via the USNORTHCOM Integrated Priority List •Provide actionable intelligence and situational awareness on threats/issues affecting the Arctic•Develop a plan to protect DOD critical Arctic infrastructure

IMO 5.3 – Safety

•Develop policies and conduct planning for SAR operations with combatant commands, IA and partner nations•Advocate for and provide Arctic navigational support•Provide mobility for SAR operations•Support capabilities demonstrations to improve Arctic Domain Awareness and all-weather, 24/7 Arctic rapid response—especially for SAR missions•Conduct HA/DR exercises with IA and partner nations•Support DHS’s ability to protect non-DOD critical Arctic infrastructure

IMO 5.2 – Security

•Respond to short-notice requests for support•Provide interoperable C4 in the Arctic•Integrate other combatant commands, IA, and partner nations into USNORTHCOM’s exercise programs•Advocate for DOD and USCG Arctic national asset capabilities•Advocate for and provide Arctic ISR for MDA

IMO 5.4 – Cooperative Partnerships

•Develop Arctic Engagement Strategy to enable a cooperative, collaborative environment in the Arctic•Develop means/methods with Canada, Russia, Denmark, combatant commands and USG to conduct surveillance enhancing Arctic All/Integrated Domain Awareness•Develop strategies, policies, plans and MOUs with Canada, Russia, and Denmark to ensure cooperative security arrangements within the NC AOR and along its boundaries, in coordination with USEUCOM•Build relationships and normalize processes to integrate information and intelligence with IA

End State #5: US allies and partners in the USNORTHCOM AOR contribute to the peaceful opening of the Arctic in a manner which strengthens international cooperation.

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NCP Tasks Summary(30 Sep 2013)

LOO 1 - Aerospace WarningIMO 1.1 – Process, assess, and disseminate intelligence and information related to man-made objects in the aerospace domainIMO 1.2 – Detect, validate, and warn of threats and attacks against North America whether by aircraft, missiles, or space vehicles

LOO 2 - Aerospace ControlIMO 2.1 – Monitor, control, and prosecute all unwanted and unauthorized activity approaching and/or operating within North American airspaceIMO 2.2 – Conduce surveillance of the airspace of, and defend against manned or unmanned air-breathing attacks against North America

LOO 3 – Maritime WarningIMO 3.1 – Process, assess, and disseminate maritime intelligence and information related to North America IMO 3.2 – Warn of maritime threats to, or attacks against North America to enable identification, validation, and response by national commands and agencies responsible for maritime defense and security

LOO 4 – PartnershipsIMO 4.1 – Foster partnerships to enhance and integrate intelligence and operational capabilities, to synchronize operations, to facilitate mission partner unity of effort, and to ensure Command Continuity of OperationsIMO 4.2 – Protect C4ISR capabilities and respond to cyberspace threats and incidents in cooperation with USSTRATCOM, USCYBERCOM, USSOCOM and CJOCIMO 4.3 – Conduct strategic communication activities to deter and dissuade adversaries, inform the public, foster partnerships, and advocate for requisite authorities and resources

LOO 5 – Strategic AgilityIMO 5.1 – Develop a culture of innovation in order to adapt to changes in the strategic environment and to outpace the threatIMO 5.2 – Identify concepts and capabilities in order to counter emerging and future threats, and advocate for requisite authorities and resources

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Commander’s Vision of the Arctic• Climate change necessitates our urgent and responsible attention; should the US fail

to adequately address inevitable challenges, we will not be prepared for the Arctic to open if it occurs sooner than predicted

• Because everything takes longer in this environment and unique capabilities are required, we need to look ahead now in this theater

• Because security interests can follow economic interests, emerging Arctic challenges require a deliberate preparation to ensure economic access and freedom of maneuver, and deter transnational criminal threats

• Clearly defined and achievable near-, mid- and long-term goals to shape capabilities, partnerships, presence, messaging, and training will enable achievement of the theater strategic end state

• The United States is an Arctic nation with unique challenges that require a whole-of-government and international approach

• While national interests are diverse, a peaceful opening is in the interest of the community of Arctic nations

• We will continually enhance collaborative partnerships with non-governmental, intergovernmental, Federal, State, local, and tribal organizations and countries that share the Arctic commons

• We will be the DOD advocate for Arctic capabilities, and the respected leader in Arctic expertise

17 DOD must anticipate today the Arctic operations that will be expected of it tomorrow.

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Arctic Situation• Climate – Human access is increasing but highly variable & challengingo Arctic coastal waters are “ice free” for only a few weeks each summero Shifting permafrost adds to the cost & challenges of Arctic infrastructure

• Economics – Development will be slow with limited competitiono Hydrocarbons – >80% of estimated Arctic oil and gas reserves are under

uncontested waters and territory – therefore little competition for resourceso Minerals – most known mineral deposits are under sovereign territoryo Protein – fish stocks are slowly moving north, management is becoming an Arctic

Council priorityo Shipping – coastal transport shipping will increase to support extraction –

intercontinental container shipping will grow more slowly

• Political/Military – Arctic nations have incentives to cooperateo The likelihood of military conflict in the Arctic is lowo Shortest air route from Asia to North America is over the Arctic o Non-Arctic nations are exploring ways to gain greater access to resources

In the near future, while we can’t discount potential geopolitical wildcards, accidents (safety) are the most likely driver of DoD/DND activity.

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Arctic Mission AreasSafety (Most Likely) – DOD/DND in support

• SAR / Mass Rescue Operation

• Environmental Response / Oil Spill

• Civil Support – Massive earthquake, massive flood, massive forest fire, volcano eruption

• HA / DR (Other Arctic Nations)

Security (Likely and potentially dangerous) – DOD/DND probably in support• Vessels of Interest/Dark ships

• Fisheries violations (USCG Ops)

• CT and CWMD-T

Homeland Defense (Most Dangerous) – DOD/DND in lead• Aerospace warning, aerospace control, maritime warning

• Maritime Defense, Missile Defense, DCIP, CI Protection

• CT and CWMD-T

Domain Awareness enables all missions.19

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Arctic Mission EnablersDomain AwarenessAssessment:

- Adequate short range

- Limited bandwidth

Need:

- Greater range

- Wide area surveillance

-Better weather observations/ forecasting

CommunicationsAssessment:- Limited bandwidth- Limited high north

Need:- Sat Comms- Bandwidth- Mobile capability

PresenceAssessment:-Limited trained & equipped forces

Need:- Trained & equipped forces- Exercised forces-Maritime charted-Deployable C2

InfrastructureAssessment:- Limited bases

Need:- Base/FOB in location that enables timely response, opening & sustainment- Expeditionary- Surge capable

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Arctic Missions & Requirements (1 of 2)Mission Requirements Preparation

SAFETY

Civil Support / DSCA • Maintain the ability to provide DSCA during domestic events, emergencies, and disasters

• Exercise C2 capabilities annually• Determine prepositioned support

SAR • Primary mission for USCG on the high seas

• Continue to integrate SAR capability with the Arctic nations to include exercises

SECURITY

MDA • Monitor global maritime domain• Access and maintain data on vessels,

facilities, and infrastructure• Collect, fuse, analyze, and

disseminate information to decision makers

• Determine sensor requirements necessary to support MDA

• Capitalize and employ MDA sensor network

Regional Security Cooperation

• Strengthen U.S. security posture in the region

• Advance security initiatives and build partner nation capacity and capabilities

• Develop Tri Command domain awareness COP for the Arctic

Maritime Security • Protect sovereignty and maritime resources

• Freedom of navigation and access

• Deploy US Navy vessels in support of freedom of navigation

Some requirements cross-cut Safety, Security, and Defense

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Mission Requirements Preparation

DEFENSE

Power Projection • Deploy and sustain forces in response to crisis, to contribute to deterrence, and enhance regional stability

• Deploy US Navy vessels in support of freedom of navigation

Sea Control • Protection of vital sea lanes• Destruction of enemy naval forces• Suppression of enemy sea commerce• Establishment of military superiority in areas of

naval operations

• Deploy US Navy vessels in support of freedom of navigation

Strategic Deterrence

• Influence an adversary’s decision-making in order to prevent hostile actions against U.S. vital interests

• Continue support of active air defense operations of NORAD

Air and Missile Defense

• Protect U.S. deployed and multinational forces as well as critical assets and areas of vital interest or political importance from attack by air and missile threats

• Detect and target aircraft, unmanned aerial systems, and missiles

• Detect, target, and warn of aircraft, UAS, and missile overflights or transits of the AOR

• Continue to support and refine active air and missile defense capability

Arctic Missions & Requirements (2 of 2)

Some requirements cross-cut Safety, Security, and Defense

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Arctic Partners

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USCG

CJOC

JTF-ALASKA

SOCOM

US NAVY

US NAVY: Working with USNORTHCOM to define Arctic maritime requirements. Developed Arctic Roadmap. •Near Term: undersea and air•Mid Term: expand surface operations•Far Term: sustained operations surface, subsurface, and air

SOCOM: Very capable U.S. Arctic force. Experience in the Arctic a little dated but working hard to hone skills.

JTF-ALASKA: Developed Arctic Domain Security Orientation course with UAF. Developing SAR Conops. Working ALCOM and C2 issues. Helping define Arctic requirements.

CJOC: Defining Arctic requirements. Working to mitigate Arctic capability gaps. Helping define domain awareness requirements and improve capabilities.

USCG: Most capable U.S. maritime domain force in the Arctic.May 2013 Arctic Strategy•Improving Awareness•Modernizing Governance•Broadening Partnerships

EUCOM: Multi-lateral coordination for stability in its Arctic AOR. Works to ensure regional stability with many Arctic nations. Co-sponsor with USNORTHCOM for Exercise ARCTIC ZEPHYR. Active with Northern CHODS and other Arctic key engagements.

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EUCOM

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Arctic Partners and Stakeholders

• DHS• USCG• Can Coast Guard• Public Safety• FAA• Nav Canada• NOAA• Transport Canada• NRCAN• First Nations/Native

People/Dept for

Aboriginal Affairs• Joint Rescue

Coordination Centers• AK ANG• AK State Troopers• Canadian Rangers• FEMA• NAVSUPSALV

• DHS• USCG• Can Coast Guard• RCMP• MSOCs• CSEC• Public Safety• Transport Canada• CBSA• CBP• CSIS• DOT/MARAD• FBI• ICE• CIC

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We need to synergize respective effortsto shape Arctic outcomes.

DefenseSecuritySafety

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Enablers