ARE CHINESE MIGRANTS A THREAT?

Territorial Insecurity, Economic Incentives an dInterethnic Relations in Primorskii Kra l

Mikhail A. AlexseevAppalachian State University

The National Council for Eurasian and East European Research910 17th Street, N.W.

Suite 300Washington, D .C. 20006

TITLE VIII PROGRAM

Project Informatio n

Sponsoring Institution :

Appalachian State Universit y

Principal Investigator:

Mikhail A. Alexseev

Council Contract Number :

814-17g

Date :

April 19, 2000

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The work leading to this report was supported in part by contract or grant funds provided by th e National

Council for Eurasian and East European Research, funds which were made available by the U'S 'Department of State under Title VIII (The Soviet-East European Research and Training Act of 1983, a s

amended)' The analysis and interpretations contained herein are those of the author'

Executive summar y

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the opening of the Ruassian-Chinese border has resulted i n

the cross-border migration of thousands of ethnic Chinese and Koreans most of them citizens of th e

People's Republic of China) into the Russian Far East . This paper looks at theories of ethnic conflict t o

identify factors that might spark anti-Chinese hostility among Russians . and uses public opinion polling

and event analysis to identify the actual level of ethnic tension in the region' It concludes that, whil e

Chinese migrants are at no immediate risk of massive hostility from local Russians, continuing economi c

decline in the region is likely to increase the perception of relative deprivation and territorial insecurit y

among Russians and raise the likelihood of interethnic conflict'

Territorial security and chinese migration : essentialist, realist and instrumentalist view s

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the opening of Russian-Chinese border resulted i n

thousands of ethnic Chinese and Koreans (most of them citizens of the People's Republic of China (PRC )

migrating between Primor'e and China in the 1990s . And whereas the number of PRC nationals i n

Primor'e on any given day in 1998 and 1999 was low (most likely fluctuating from 0'3 to 1 .1 percent o f

the average krai population of about 2'2 million ethnic Russians and Ukrainians), ' theories of ethni c

conflict suggest several factors that could spark anti-Chinese activism in the Russian Far East .

First, from the essentialist perspective, ethnic Chinese and Koreans in Primor'e comprise a

racially distinct and readily Identifiable minority with a culture and history that local Slavic resident s

understand little' These "essential " racial and cultural differences between the Russians and the PR C

migrants would set the stage for potential violent confrontations' The continuing (and long) history o f

territorial disputes that erupted m an armed conflict over Damanski island as recently as 1969 would

nurture deeply seated perceptions of threat to physical security and cultural traditions of ethnic Russians . '

Second, as constructivists would argue. the rise of oligarchic government in Primorskii krai in th e

1 990s under Governor Yevgenii Nazdratcnk o3 sets the stage for political oppression and persecution o f

minorities . From this perspective, distinct and readily identifiable ethnic minorities (such as PRC

nationals in Primor'e) are likely to be "constructed " by nationalist Russian politicians as adversaries ,

competitors' scapegoats or undesirables . The traditions of the Russian frontier, the absence of stron g

democratic institutions, a border dispute with China and Nazdratenko ' s conflicts with both the federa l

government and the mayor of Vladivostok all favored a strong nationalist position in the local power

struggle .

Third, political realists have argued that if the ratio of nationalisms to states rises, so does the

probability of violent conflict' From that perspective, cross-border migration of an ethnically distinc t

group, such as the PRC nationals in Primor'e . creates a de facto nation-bisecting interstate border an d

increases demographic intermingling . As a result, societal and intergroup tensions are likely to rise sinc e

1

both nation-bisecting borders and demographic intermingling, as Stephen van Evera put it, "entrap part s

of nations within the boundaries of states dominated by other ethnic groups . The "truncated nation"

(represented by PRC nationals) thus gets incentives for expansionism and the "entrapping nation " faces a

security dilemma favoring pre-emptive coercive action against the cross-border migrants .6 As hostility

perceptions spiral on both sides, interstate relations are prone to deteriorate without warning . And with

2.2 million ethnic Slays in Primor'e facing approximately 70 million ethnic Chinese in the neighborin g

Heilongjiang province, one would expect this security dilemma to have a strong impact on Russia n

policymakers (both in Primor ' e and in Moscow)' In this situation, the state representing the "truncated

nation" (in this case, China) would find it problematic to send credible signals of peaceful intentions t o

actors controlling means of violence in the "entrapping natio n " (in this case . Russia) --- a situation known

as the "commitment problem

While these factors make Primor'e more prone to interethnic conflict than, for example, region s

in Russia's European core, they hardly represent the full range of necessary conditions and are by n o

means sufficient conditions for intergroup violence . Recent studies show that latent hostilities and ethni c

activism rooted in cultural differences, histories of intergroup conflict, and deficiencies in social an d

political systems in most cases do not engender organized interethnic violence .' At best, these factors

contribute to what Ronald Suny described as the "Sleeping Beauty " and the "Son of Frankenstein "

theories of ethnic conflict . That is, they are primarily structural, force-of-nature type factors that ar e

readily evoked ex post facto to explain violent cases, whereas cases when these factors fail to result i n

violent conflict are ignored .

In the spring and fall of 1909 . having systematically combed miles of areas where ethnic Chines e

trade, work, and reside in Primor'e . I observed that interactions between ethnic Russians and Chines e

nationals were predominantly peaceful .9 Street observations suggest that these interactions ar e

cooperative by virtue of both mutual economic necessity (e .g ., facing the same gangsters or the same rent -

seeking officials) and isolation of (rather small and dispersed) Chinese communities from the local Slavi c

population .

These observations also suggest that economic incentives constrain anti-Chinese activism in th e

Russian Far East . Whereas such an instrumentalist view would fail to explain why so many people in the

Russian Far East define Chinese migration as the "yellow peril " despite clear-cut economic benefits to

the region . this view does suggest that economic incentives can help constrain potential agents of ethni c

mobilization, especially among the elites . 10 Moreover, these incentives must be potent in the politica l

environment such as Primor'e's, where the rule of law and ethical norms are weak and offer fe w

restrictions on purely instrumental behavior .

But how would economic incentives mitigate ethnopolitical activism that may result from cultura l

and political insecurity in Primor'e'? Specifically, how would the amount of resources (especially in th e

form of tax revenues, profits, payoffs, and availability of goods) affect attitudes of Primor'e's politica l

and business elites and the public toward PRC migrants and visitors? Is a relatively low volume, or a los s

of such resources (actual or expected) associated with greater hostility (expressed or implied) toward

ethnic Chinese in Primor'e'? Conversely, do higher levels of resources obtained from cross-border

economic activities translate into greater acceptance and cooperative accommodation of PRC migrants?

Or . on the contrary, are lower levels of revenue from cross-border economic activity perceived a s

beneficial since they imply fewer Chinese migrants and, hence, less demographic pressure? Are these

material incentives – in whichever direction they work -- affecting both elites and the public in Primor'e?

Economic incentives and interethnic relations in Primor'e : the role of corruptio n

Resources derived from cross-border economic activities between Primor 'e and China shape

incentives for interethnic cooperation through a number of channels . First, domestic and foreign trade

generates taxes and other payments for local . krai, and federal budgets' Businesses and traders generat e

income and profit taxes ; customs dues; visa or entry permit fees ; bus, train, or boat fares and cargo

charges; space use fees; the value added and sales taxes ; environmental tax and fees ; sanitary license fees ;

and other officially prescribed payments. Since the provision of federal funds is routinely delayed, th e

economic benefits resulting from trading PRC nationals, who deal and make payments in cash, increase .

The city of Ussuriisk, where the Chinese trade center has become one of the three major contributors t o

the city budget, along with the sugar factory and the Ussuri Balsam (herb vodka) factory, is a tellin g

example of a local government receiving significant economic benefits from cross-border migration . "

Second. cross-border travel and trade offer local businesses and individuals the opportunity t o

make money and create jobs, thus enhancing interdependence with Chinese counterparts and decreasin g

job competition . Third, with more resources, local governments have greater opportunities to maintai n

infrastructure and the public sphere in general (which also helps win elections), as well as have mor e

resources to provide sanitation and security at Chinese markets (reducing potential socioeconomi c

grievances on both sides)' Also, since local governments have to use local funds for stop-gap measure s

(such as payments to the military) when federal payments fail to arrive . local revenues obtained fro m

Chinese traders and businesses increase the local government capacity to control state agents of politica l

coercion, such as police and the military '

Finally, a flow of resources from Chinese cross-border activities gives government officials th e

incentive to benefit personally by Illegally privatizing or cashing a part of that flow . or by manipulatin g

rule-making institutions to help them appropriate public revenues as a matter of legal "exceptions " from

the law' Incentives to get Involved in corrupt activities accrue to border guards, customs and immigratio n

officials, police officers working the Chinese market beats, and officials overseeing licensing, taxation ,

regulations, and permits .

Hence. revenues from cross-border trade In Primor'e both enhance the local tax base and benefi t

the public, and give political and economic elites opportunities to use public office for privatizing some o f

these revenues' This, in turn . suggests the following interplay of political and economic incentives fo r

suppressing anti-Chinese mobilization' Under the best case scenario – given the economic hardship i n

present-day Russia and in Primor'e particularly – both the public and the elites would benefit sufficientl y

f r om cross-border exchanges to favor accommodation of ethnic Chinese traders' However, if the

economic benefits to the public are small . while the perception of threat from Chinese migration is large ,

the political elite will come under pressure to implement measures restricting Chinese migration an d

4

economic activity . In this case, those elites that have few opportunities to benefit economically from

cross-border exchanges are likely to promote aggressive anti-migration measures, while those who hav e

many opportunities for personal gain would face a dilemma . Should such actors take a strong anti -

migration position resonating with the public opinion so as to maximize political benefits, or should the y

continue to promote cross-border migration and economic activity so as not to loose an important sourc e

of revenue? As for public opinion, one of the questions is whether attitudes toward Chinese migrant s

depend in any way on what people think about the scale of Chinese migration and whether people make

linkages between political security and economic benefits or treat those issues separately '

For elite actors, a balancing strategy would be one rational solution to this dilemma . The strategy

would be to make symbolic statements addressing economic and security concerns of ethnic Russian s

arising from Chinese migration and border disputes . but at the same time restrain potential agents o f

ethnic mobilization and accommodate Chinese traders . investors . and businesses' Another approach

would be to exercise restrained activism . such as measures to increase control over entry, movement ,

registration, and trading by Chinese migrants without advocating entry quotas or deportations . If the

economic benefits to the political elites decrease . however, this balancing strategy could quickl y

degenerate into anti-Chinese activism with the political leaders having few incentives to restrain ethni c

mobilization and a lot of incentives to benefit from politicizing migration and ethnic differences . In this

sense, corruption would help restrain ethnic mobilization in the short term, while in the longer run i t

would contribute to sudden destabilization of interethnic relations in Primor'e . If so . in districts and citie s

with higher than average Chinese ethnic presence (especially . in Ussuriisk), migrants and visitors fro m

PRC would be at a higher risk of formal and informal anti-Chinese activism over time .

Estimating the scale of revenues available for privatization by public officials in Primor'e i s

especially important in determining economic incentives for ethnic activism or restraint . First ,

economists analyzing Russia ' s post-Soviet transitions generally agree that cronyism and corruption ar e

endemic .12 In addition, as Judith Thornton argues, corruption and cronyism have evolved int o

institutional traps in post-Soviet Russia in a sense that they have become "stable institutionalized norms

which impose high transaction costs on an economy" and "may come to dominate other institutiona l

arrangements ." These traps emerge when policymakers "are able to block or distort changes in the rule s

of the game that threaten to reduce the value of their existing control rights" — which is particularly th e

case under the current administration in Primor'e.13 Political uncertainty resulting in short-term tim e

horizons reinforces propensity for corruption . 14 Second, a number of studies have shown that material

interests account for a larger variation in political orientation of elites than do symbolic interests .15

Table 1 . Primorskii Krai Budget : Select Expenditures for Government Operations (000' USD) 16

Line Item 1995 1996 1997 1998

Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, Primorskii krai Administration fo rInternal Affairs (UVD)

- - 24,449 15 .670

Executive agencies of Primorskii krai' total 4'630 8,319 20,575 7,90 6

Primorskii krai administratio n

Primorskii Krai Administration Programs :

2 .941 4,629 10,565 4,00 2

Support for nature preserves 138 7 2

"Amur Tiger" - 1 4

"Primor' e Borders " - 15 9

Equipment and resources for nature protection

-

- - 7 2

Special purpose fund for the Prosecutor' s Office, tax inspection, an dDepartment of Finance

-

- 2 .039 50 7

Total : programs and special purpose fund 2 .177 824

The population and economy in the Russian Far East declined in the 1990s, whereas the Chines e

population and the economy have been steadily growing . From 1996 to 1997 . the population of the

southern part of the Russian Far East " declined by 40,000 and GNP dropped by 8 percent, while in th e

neighboring Chinese provinces of Heilongjiang, Jiling, and Liaonin the population increased by on e

million and the GNP rose by 13 percent . From the relative deprivation perspective, the GNP in th e

6

southern part of the Russian Far East declined by 19 percent relative to the GNP of the neighborin g

Chinese provinces just in one year . '

Against this background, state capacity to regulate cross-border exchanges also declined in th e

late 1990s . As Table 1 demonstrates, the collapse of the ruble in the wake of the August 1998 financia l

crisis decreased by about one half the dollar value of budgetary spending for executive agencies an d

police in Primor ' e . The amount of spending on programs supporting nature protection, border security ,

and tax inspection decreased nearly four times in dollar terms . In the same way, funding available to

government officials in Primor'e declined more than twofold relative to the revenues from dollar -

denominated illicit transactions' In 1998 and 1999 . Chinese smugglers generated an estimated $3 millio n

in revenues annually for themselves and about the same amount for local Russians, according to th e

Office of the Prosecutor for En vironmental Protection of Primorskii krai' This estimate is conservative ,

for it excludes revenues from illicit trade in fish, frogs, sea cucumbers, sea urchins, bear parts. and mus k

deer glands .19 Thus, conservatively estimated revenues from illicit trade in sensitive bioresource s

amounted to nearly one third of funding for the knit executive agencies in 1997 . but more than two thirds

in 1998'

Whereas most common people in Primor'e accept it as an axiom that government official s

regulating cross-border trade receive "additional revenues " (or bribes), systematic and specific

information is lacking' However, a pilot survey of 100 Chinese migrant traders in Primor'e in the winte r

of 1999 provides circumstantial evidence supporting this popular axiom' In answer to the question, "Wh o

do you pay for your security? " government officials were named by 62 percent . police by 80 percent ,

border guards by 55 percent, and transportation service providers by 60 percent of Chinese respondents .

In other words, without payments for "security" to officials, police, and the border guards most Chines e

nationals would not be doing business in Primor ' e . Despite fear of reprisals, 8 percent of Chinese traders

mentioned "bribes to the police" when responding to the question, "What other expenses do you hav e

apart from the cost of merchandise?" When asked what government measures in Russia impede thei r

trade, 65 percent of Chinese respondents named high import tariffs, 86 percent pointed to "strict control

over Chinese immigration ." 73 percent mentioned the ban on trading in the streets . 23 percent marked

visa control and 17 percent mentioned fines . 20 To the extent that these perceptions arise from payoff -

seeking behavior of government officials, these responses imply that "protection" payoffs are activel y

sought by government officials In Primor'e '

Anecdotal evidence suggests that officials are willing to bend the rules for personal economi c

gain' (In fact, these rules provide opportunities for extracting "protection " payoffs in the first place .) The

business weekly . Zolotoi Rog, reported in April 1999 that 13 new Chinese markets and two whole-sal e

trade bases opened in Vladivostok . operating efficiently but illegally . The same article cited source s

saying that 30 Chinese families had been t r ading from $400,000 to $500,000 worth of fruits and

vegetables at the wholesale food products base at Fadeyeva Street in Vladivostok without registering thei r

businesses or paying taxes . And in Ussuriisk . where city revenues increased threefold as a result o f

Chinese trade in the late 1990s . the local customs office blocked the city sanitation department from

inspecting the quality of Chinese goods stored at the customs warehouse . fearing a decrease in the

customs income.21 Olga Proskuriakova, head of the foreign trade department at the committee fo r

international and regional economic relations of the Primorskii krai government, estimated that cross -

border "shuttle" trade by individuals (both Russian and Chinese nationals) is three times the volume o f

the officially reported trade between Primorskii krai an d China.22

Economic incentives and attitudes toward Chinese nationals in Primor'e, 1991-98

Elites and the public have different economic incentives to support or oppose cross-borde r

exchan ges with China' These incentives also vary across cities and counties of Primorskii krai '

Government elites have realistic opportunities for enrichment, while the public's priority is survival unde r

general economic decline' Therefore, the elites can be expected to be more sensitive to rise or decline o f

enrichment opportunities arising from Chinese trade, whereas the general public will be more affected b y

general economic conditions (affecting job opportunities and provision of public goods) and less b y

fluctuations in revenues from cross-border exchanges .

8

The economic impact of Chinese trade and business across Primor 'e and concomitan t

opportunities for privatization of cross-border money flows by local officials can be assessed by fiv e

indicators : Chinese investment, the number of Russian-Chinese joint ventures (JVs), foreign trad e

turnover of Russian-Chinese JVs, domestic sales . and the volume of goods produced and service s

rendered by the same joint ventures (Table 2) .

Table 2' Cumulative impact of cross-border economic exchanges between Primorskii krai and China ,

1993-199823

Indicators :

Change on the previous rear

1993-94 '94-95 '95-96 '96-97 '97-98

Investment from PR CRussian-PRC joint ventures :

NumberForeign trade by revenu eDomestic sale sGoods produced & services rendere d

Central tendency

n/ an/a

Whereas no data was available for foreign trade turnover and domestic sales of Russian-PRC

joint ventures in 1998, the decline in the number and output of these joint ventures suggests that foreig n

trade and domestic sales also declined at the time . Thus. the overall economic impact of legal cross -

border transactions with China on Primor'e increased in 1993-96 . then declined in 1996-98 . This declin e

of legally available revenues coincided with the almost twofold decrease in public financing o f

government agencies in Primor'e in dollar terms (Table 1 ).

These trends are likely to have contradictory effects on attitudes by Primor'e's Russians towar d

PRC migrants . On the one hand . one would expect a larger numbers of Russians, both among the elite s

and the general public, to become disillusioned about economic conditions improving as a result o f

economic exchanges with China . Frustrated expectations would then open the gates for more negativ e

attitudes toward Chinese nationals and for rising nationalist activism by individuals and groups seeking

political power and for increasing public hostility toward Chinese migrants' On the other hand, the sam e

9

economic trends may result in public demands for greater accommodation of Chinese nationals an d

policies enhancing cross-border economic opportunities' Given these contradictory motivations, th e

political elites could also be expected to play a two-level game by vowing to prevent an alleged "creepin g

Chinafication" (kitaizatsiia) of Primor'e (to exploit public disillusionment), yet also by increasin g

restraint of radical nationalist groups and promoting regulated cross-border exchanges (to increase publi c

and private payoffs) .

Surveys conducted in Primorskii krai by the Public Opinion Research Center at the Institute o f

History, Archeology, and Ethnography of the Peoples of the Far East (Russian Academy of Sciences )

provide descriptive statistics for evaluating shifts in attitudes of Primor'e residents toward China an d

Chinese nationals (Table 3)' The surveys were based on random population sampling (using officia l

residency lists) stratified by age, income, education, occupation . and location' Changes in public opinion

in Primor ' e on the "Chinese question" from 1991-1994 (when economic benefits from cross-borde r

exchanges increased) to 1997-98 (when these benefits decreased) are summarized in the far left-han d

column in Table 3' Scores twice exceeding the estimated average margin of error for the surveys ar e

considered significant and displayed in bold type' The following trends appear noteworthy :

1. Close to half of respondents expected that Russia would lose territory due to Chines e

expansion in the region (the slight increase is within the margin of error) . Asked in 1998 how this feared

Chinese expansion would take place, 16 percent of respondents said it would result from bilatera l

negotiations between Moscow and Beijing and 12 percent expected China to take Russian territory b y

force' The largest number of respondents, however . (28 percent) said territory would he lost due to a

"peaceful infiltration" of Primor'e by Chinese nationals . The questionnaire defined "peaceful infiltration "

as migrant labor, trade, tourism, and marriage.24 . ' '

2. The number of Primor'e residents who liked the presence of Chinese nationals remained unde r

5 percent, with 4 percent fewer respondents (close to the single margin of error value) approving visits b y

Chinese nationals for "specific purposes" defined as migrant labor in industry and agriculture . Indirectly ,

this low acceptance of non-ethnic Russian nationals in Primor'e is confirmed by a low number o f

10

respondents supporting restoration of historic ethnic Korean settlements . (Even though the number o f

opponents of Korean settlements also decreased, all of those former opponents must have turned into th e

undecided' )

Table 3 . Atittudes toward China and Migrants from PRC in Primorskii krai, 1991-1998 2 5

Summary Table 1991 1992 1994 1997 1998 1991-94 vs 1997-9 8(N=1610) (N=1200) (N=869) (N=620) (N=522)

Q1 : Chinese expansion/loss ofof territory to neighbors is likelyAgree 45 47 2

Disagree 26 23 - 3

Hard to tell 26 28 2

Q2: Attitude to presence o f

Chinese nationals in Primor' e

Approve 4 - 1Approve for specific purposes 53 49 -4

Don't approve 33 38 5Hard to say 6 6 0

Q3 : Attitude to relatives marrying

Chinese national sApprove 1 2 1Don't approve 33 46 1 3Personal issue 58 36 -22

Hard to say 4 9 5

Q4 : Places in Primor'e wher e

ethnic Koreans settle can b e

Considered traditionally Korea n

Yes 9 5 7 - 3

No 67 60 56 -9Don't know 22 34 35 12 .5

Q5 : Mass deportation of ethni c

Minorities (Koreans, Crimea n

Tatars, Chechens, Volga

Germans, etc .) was :

Act of tyranny and lawlessness 65 56 61 -6' 5

Manifestation of leaders' wisdom 10 18 20 9Hard to say 25 25 18 -3 . 5

Q6 : Most typical characteristic s

of ethnic Chinese individual sHard working 50 83 70 26 . 5Aggressive 5 20 27 18 . 5Selfish 5 5 7 1

1 1

Entrepreneurial 17 3-1 33 16 . 5Generous 1 1

Responsible 8 5Savers 13 1 6

Honest 4 4

Polite 7 4

Sly 40 43

3. Among social groups featured in the surveys, Chinese occupation of Primor 'e was viewed as

more likely in 1998 than in 1994 by respondents with vocational-technical education (mostly, blue-colla r

workers), high-income recipients, owners of private businesses ("New Russians " ), and the military . At

the same time, fewer government employees and people with higher education believed Primor'e woul d

lose territory to China' Similarly . lower levels of education and higher levels of income translated into

significantly larger opposition to Chinese presence in Primorskii krai (even for short visits) . These result s

are consistent with the contradictory impact of changing economic trends in 1993-1998 . which brough t

about a decrease in benefits available to the general public, while increasing the utility of cross-borde r

trade to government officials (most of whom also have higher education) .

4. The significant (13 percent) increase from ] 994 to 1998 of the share of respondents wh o

opposed their relatives marrying Chinese nationals coincided with an even more sizeable (22 percent )

drop of the number of respondents who considered such a decision to be their relatives' personal issue .

These numbers warn about the rising racist sentiments among Primor'e residents and the growin g

perception of Chinese nationals as "ethnic others" '

5. Concurrently . the number of people who considered mass deportation of ethnic minorities b y

Stalin as the "manifestation of the leader's wisdo m" doubled, comprising one fifth of survey respondents .

Thus, latent racist sentiments in Primo r 'e increased from 1994 to 1998, in synch with public support fo r

massive state violence against ethnic minorities .

6. Shifts in perceptions of "typical characteristics " of ethnic Chinese migrants also reflect

increasing potential for interethnic hostility in Primor'e . From 1994 to 1998, few Russians saw Chines e

migrants as honest, polite and responsible . While viewed as increasingly hard working and

1 2

entrepreneurial, Chinese migrants were also viewed as more aggressive and sly' These trends ar e

consistent with the logic of conflict escalation under relative economic deprivation ."

To summarize, the opinion data suggest that security concerns in the Russian Far East arise fro m

growing perceptions of ethnic distance and from a growing sense of economic aggressiveness of Chines e

nationals conducting business in Primor'e . A nontrivial implication of these public attitude shifts is tha t

one would expect both bad demographic trends and good economic trends to induce interethnic hostility

and anti-Chinese security mobilization '

A tale of two counties : patterns of security mobilization on the Russia-China borde r

Are growing security concerns of Primor'e residents translating into security mobilization ,

understood as a combination of activities (such as public events, coercive capacity building, and hostil e

acts) aimed at increasing the security of members of a nation state or group relative to members of

another state or group'? To address this issue, 1 have conducted a plausibility probe analysis of security

mobilization in Dal'nerechenskii and Khasanskii counties of Primorskii krai .

As Table 4 shows. in both counties demographic trends from 1993 to 1998 have been poor . Both

counties are located along the Russian-Chinese border and have a history of border battles (Damansk i

Island in Dal'nerechenskii county and Lake Khasan in Khasanskii county)' While Khasanskii county ha s

a higher population density, it is also a major transit area for Chinese nationals going to Primor'e's mai n

trade and industry' centers In Vladivostok and Ussuriisk' At the same time . Dal'nerechenskii county in

1996-98 generated more income from cross-border exchanges with China, such as joint ventur e

production . sales, and export-import operations . Dal ' nerechenskii county's greater remoteness fro m

Primor'e's main urban centers, its sparser population, and higher availability of tradable natural resource s

(notably timber) also make it more attractive for illicit natural resource trade .

1 3

Table 4. Demographic and Socioeconomic Conditions in Dal'nerechenskii and Khasanskii Counties of

Primorskii Kral"

Demographic Conditions

Dal'nerechenskii Khasanski i

Population change (1993-98, percent )Ratio to Primorskii border counties average declin e

Natural population reproduction chang eper 1,000 residents

(1990-97 )

Population density per square km (1997 )Ratio to Primorskii border counties averag e

Chinese migrant workers (registered) :199 6199 7199 8

Chinese migrant traffic to Primor'e three largest citie s

Economic Condition s

Number of Russian-Chinese joint ventures

-7'51 . 4

-11'3

2 . 70 .2 7

11 84 88 5

No

- 7 ' 01' 3

-11 . 4

10'41' 0

26 342

Ye s

1995 1 1

1996 3 1

1997 4 11998 1

Goods produced and services rendered by Russian-PRC JVs

(by volume, S, '000s )1996 0 (0 )1997 49 .1 (0 )

1998 295'1 (0 )

Foreign trade turnover of Russian-PRC joint ventures($,'000s )1995 0 (0 )1996 310'8 (0 )

1997 1946 .4 (0 )

Domestic sales by Russian-PR(

joint venutre s(S . '000,000s )1995 0 (0 )

1996 219 (0 )

1997 0 (0) *

Average monthly wages, 1993-97 change (in constant 1991 prices) -14 -1 4

Job applicants per job vacanc y1995 5S 5

1996 86 1034

1997 47 72 7

Smuggled bioresources (intercepted) ++++**

1 4

* Not significant for Primorskii krai statistics committee to report .** See Mikhail Alexseev, "Chinese Migration in Primorskii krai : An Assessment of Its Scale, Socioeconomi cImpact, and Opportunities for Corruption :' Working Paper, NCEEER, November 1999, Table 8 '

To compare patterns of security mobilization in the two counties, I compiled an event-data se t

based on articles from newspapers published by the local government and retrieved for me by Tamar a

Troyakova, a Russian scholar based in Vladivostok . The county press was chosen as the best availabl e

source of regular reporting of local events' For each county articles were selected from three time period s

during which anti-Chinese mobilization is more likely in the counties : (1) January 15-March 15, coverin g

the anniversary of the border battle with China in 1969 over Damanskii Island (located i n

Dal'nerechenskii county) and the Day of Defenders of the Fatherland ( formerly, Soviet Army Day ,

February 23): (2) May 1 — June 15 . covering the Border Service Day in the last week of May ; and (3 )

August I-September 30 . covering the anniversary of border battles over Lake Khasan in 1938 . The

impact of these anniversaries on nationalist mobilization in Primor'e was demonstrated by governo r

Nazdratenko in August 1998' The governor protested the landing of U .S. marines in Vladivostok durin g

the Russian-U .S. naval exercises because it coincided with the 60th anniversary of fighting around Lak e

Khasan, "when a foreign invasion had to be beaten back'

And during my visit to Primor'e in May

1999, two special election-year issues of a local government newspaper were posted in the main corrido r

of the city administration building in Ussuriisk featuring articles about the 60th anniversary of the battl e

at Damanskii Island and reports about the governor's visit to the site of th e battle.30

All articles dealing with China . Chinese nationals, border security, local economic an d

demographic trends were summarized . Summaries focused on key actions . actors, and circumstances '

With few exceptions most articles were coded as a single event' For the purposes of this study, I singled

out the action types defined as cross-border cooperation and security mobilization' Cooperation was

coded as economic (ECCOOP), security (SECOOP), and cultural (CUCOOP) . Three types of security

mobilization directed against China or Chinese nationals were identified and coded as "focusing events "

(FOCEVENT), such as anniversaries or staged public events ; "coercive capacity building" (COCAP) ,

1 5

such as recruitment of border guards or Cossacks: and "hostile acts" (HOSACTS), such as arrests .

deportations, and hostile speech' Actors were coded as governmental and non-governmental an d

military-related and non-military . For example, I coded a report about an anti-Chinese slogan at a n

entrance to a local market as a hostile act performed by a non-governmental, non-military actor . A

recruitment campaign by Cossacks in one of the counties was coded as coercive capability building by a

non-governmental, military-related actor . "

Table 5' Reported Levels of Anti-Chinese Security Mobilization and Cross-Border Cooperation wit h

China in Dal'nerechenskii (DK) and Khasanskii (KN) Districts, 1996-1999 '

1996/97 1998:99 Tota lEvent Classification DK KN DK KN DK

KN

All events (N) 10 22 22 19 32 4 1

Cooperation (total) 0 7 4 7 4 1 4

(% of all events) (0) (32) (18) (37) (13) (34 )

Economic 0 5 2 3 2 8

Security 0 1 2 2 2 3Cultural 0 1 0 2 0 2

Security Mobilization (total) 10 15 18 12 28 2 7of all events) (100) (68) (82) (63) (87) (66 )

Focusing events 3 3 10 7 13 1 0

Coercive capability building 3 0 2 6 5Hostile acts 1 9 8 4 9 1 3

Governmental 6 11 6 7 12 1 8

Non-governmental 7 S 12 8 19 1 6Military-related actors* 8S 8 5 16 1 3Non-military _2 11 11 10 13 2 ]

Government with nongovernmenta lmilitary-related actors**

2 4 1 2 3 6

*

Some events were coded with more than one actor '**

Cossacks, radical nationalist groups, youth organizations, and criminals (actor codes 602-605) '

Given a relatively small number of events in this data set for two counties and their varyin g

significance, inferences must be made with caution . Several large differences in the number of event s

1 6

across counties and over time, however, do suggests a number of preliminary conclusions that can b e

drawn from this data :

I' Levels of hostility appear to be related to levels of cooperation and coercive capacity building .

Nine hostile acts were reported in Khasanskii county in 1996, but only four in 1998/99 . This drop in

hostile acts happened under similar (and substantial) levels of reported cross-border cooperation ,

including an increase in security cooperation, and with continuing reports about coercive capacity

building in the county . By contrast, only one hostile act was reported in Dal'nerechenskii county in 1997 ,

but eight such acts were reported in 1998/99 . This rise in the number of hostile acts happened after cross -

border cooperation increased (bringing with it an increased influx of Chinese nationals that becam e

targets of such acts), while coercive capacity building in the county declined' Also . most of hostile acts

reported in Dal'nerechenskii county (5 out of 8) were performed by military-related actors (border guards ,

Cossacks, violent criminals)' In Khasanskii county, - out of 9 hostile acts were by military-related actor s

in 1997, declining to 2 in 199899 '

2. In Dal'nerechenskii district, the rise of cross-border economic exchanges from 1996 to 199 9

has been associated with increasing levels of cooperation, while economic cooperation has bee n

associated with security cooperation in both counties . The impact of economic incentives on securit y

cooperation is illustrated by two reports published in Dal 'nrech 'e newspaper in 1999' In February, a

Russian delegation from Dal'nerechensk led by the county police chief, a deputy head of the local publi c

security service, and chief of the local department of general government security visited the neighboring

Chinese city of Hulin. The Russian security chiefs were impressed by a marble-and-glass polic e

headquarters in Hulin. Half a year later, a police department delegation from Hulin paid a return visit t o

negotiate the construction of a similar police headquarters in Dal'nerechensk . Local Russian and Chines e

police chiefs also discussed measures to improve security at the Chinese wholesale warehouse i n

Dal'nerechensk'"

3. At the same time, the increase of the number of anti-Chinese hostile acts in Dal'nerechenski i

county after 1996 suggests that initiation of economic interactions with China has destabilizing effects on

1 7

Russian areas with negative economic and demographic trends, at least in the short term . Much as th e

opinion data, the event data for Dal'nerechenskii county shows that common Russians are likely to b e

responding to the mere presence of Chinese nationals on their territory rather than to the economic impac t

of cross-border exchanges . The dilemma facing Primorskii krai is that this economic impact will have t o

increase substantially and become associated with economic recovery to give cross-border exchanges a

positive image. Yet, the increased presence of Chinese nationals in this case is likely to aggravate

interethnic tensions before such profound economic effects can take place '

4 . That opportunities to activate any such tensions abound in Primorskii krai is suggested by the

increase of the number of symbolic hostile acts in Dal'nerechenskii county, and a sharp rise from 1996/9 7

to 1998/99 of the number of reported focusing events in both counties' The use of anniversaries of border

battles to mobilize the Russian nationalist vote in the run-up to elections in Russia and in Primorskii kra i

represented one such political act' In Dal 'nerechenskii district in 1999, local politicians exploited the

30th anniversary of the battle with China over Damanskii Island — and these acts accounted for most o f

the increase in the number of anti-Chinese focusing events' If anything, the newspaper reports failed t o

convey the massive scale on which the Primorskii krai governor played the nationalist mobilization car d

with distinct anti-Chinese undertones . In his glossy, well-illustrated book issued prior to the electio n

campaign in the fall of 1999 with a suggestive title . "And All of Russia behind My Back'''," the governo r

raised the spectrum of "Asian Balkans" arising from interethnic and interstate disputes . In most of the

photos in the hook,

was featured posing with war veterans, Damanskii battle veterans, and Cossacks i n

military regalia, not with Chinese traders and tourists '

Concurr ently . a colleague at the Vladivostok Institute of History reported increased sightings o f

Russian National Unity (or "Slavic fascist ") small group gatherings in public places. In late October

1999, this author observed at least a dozen freshly printed RNU posters on lampposts in downtow n

Vladivostok in places where they were absent in May . 1999' At that time, I found only one RNU poste r

in downtown Vladivostok after systematically searching the streets by car and on foot '

IS

5. A combination of statistical and event data also warns against making linear projections about

both economic cooperation and security (or nationalist) mobilization in Primorskii krai and, by extension ,

throughout the Russian Far East . In Khasanskii county, where only one Russian-Chinese joint busines s

venture was officially registered from 1996 to 1998 without much impact on the local economy, the even t

data showed more reports about local attempts to improve economic cooperation with China than i n

Dal'nerechenskii county where joint ventures had an economic impact (Table 4) . In other words, lack o f

economic cooperation (following, in part . earlier restrictive measures such as Operation Foreigne r

launched in 1994) gave rise after a period of continuing economic decline to the search for cross-borde r

cooperation that could in future make Khasanskii district a more active zone of Russian-Chinese busines s

activity' A sign that this is plausible was given by county manager, Anatolii Mel'nichenko who in lat e

May 1999 supported the plan to set up an International Peace Park under the auspices of the Unite d

Nations, with headquarters in a Chinese border town of Fanjung . A multilateral agreement was signe d

about setting the park on 330 hectares spanning Russian, Chinese, and Korean territories . On the Russia n

side . construction plans envisioned the conversion of the former military settlement of Maiachnoe into a

medicinal mud spa at and the construction of an international airport in the city o f Kraskino.

Once cooperation increaases, however . the concurrent perceptions of demographic and territoria l

insecurity would once again warrant restrictions on cross-border exchanges making anti-Chines e

mobilization politically attractive' The strength of these views was evident in memoranda written fo r

Primorskii krai government and for the Kremlin by the then representative of the president of the Russia n

Federation in Primor ' e, arguing that developing this United Nations ' cross-border project would give

China a chance to build its own oceanic port in the area, detract international cargo business from Russia n

ports, give rise to a Chinese naval base . and increase Chinese pollution of Russian waterways ."

6. Despite such views expressed by high level officials, the newspapers in the two countie s

reported no organized violence or mobilization directed against Chinese nationals despite opportunitie s

for mobilizations presented by focusing events and some official rhetoric' The reports, however, capture d

a number of coercive capacity building and hostile acts by Cossacks, one capacity building episode by the

1 9

fascist Russian National Unity and a number of reports about quasi-military patriotic youth group s

sanctioned by the government' While relatively small in scale, these activities indicate the presence o f

ideologically committed actors that could serve as mobilizing agents in interethnic disputes . More

security mobilizing activities by such groups and greater levels of government support for them wer e

reported in the Khasan county where Chinese traffic was larger but economic benefits from Chines e

exchanges lower than in Dal'nerechenskii county' While the overall levels of reported activities by suc h

groups were weak, their very existence is a major warning sign' Such organized groups do not have to b e

numerous or even popular to destabilize interethnic relations at the time of a political crisis . An analysi s

of opinion poll data in 1993 established that in Primorskii krai approximately 5-10 percent of th e

population "has a proclivity for populism and political demagoguery, still adheres to the principles o f

command-administrative [Soviet] system . and supports the pseudoethnic entity, the Cossacks ." At the

time of political instability this segment of Primorskii krai population is likely to play the role of politica l

catalyst for organized nationalist if not fascist ) activism.34

Primor'e Cossacks . represented by chieftain of the Ussuri Cossack Army, Vitalii Poluianov ,

have voiced strong organized opposition to Chinese economic activities in the Russian Far East .

Poluianov said that he proposed to establish a Khasan Free Economic Zone on 15,000 hectares i n

Khasanskii county . By "free ." Poluianov explained, he meant the area would be free of cross-border

exchanges and international business, with a self-sufficient farming economy of Cossack communities .

This, he said . would prevent Chinese traders from establishing compact settlements in the area -- a vital

security issue: "The 'yellow peril' is rising . We see the overpopulation of the neighboring nation . They

will come here, give birth to multitudes of squint-eyed people and then claim political autonomy [fro m

Russia] . . . Even if we shoot and kill a million Chinese a year, this problem won't go away."35 To dea l

more effectively with the threat of kitaizatsiia, Poluianov would like to see membership in the Ussur i

Cossack Army grow in years to come from the currently estimated 5 .000 to 45,000 ("as before th e

revolution") . My event data set, however, contains only a few reports suggesting a rather modest Cossac k

membership growth in the two borderline counties .

2 0

Conclusio n

Chinese migrants in Prmiorskii krai are at no immediate risk of mass hostility on behalf of loca l

Russians . Besides, Chinese m i grant population is mobile and has a viable and quick exit option from th e

area . Absent a general economic recovery, however, one that can be credibly attributed to increasin g

cross-border interactions . interethnic tensions and anti-Chinese mobilization in Primorskii krai are likel y

to gradually increase given current demographic and economic trends . These conclusions reflect a

preliminary assessment of the Impact of economic incentives on interethnic relations in this study '

First . the theoretical analysis . the opinion data and the event data s uggest that when cross-borde r

exchanges fail to reverse general economic decline . the economic benefits from such exchanges hav e

little impact on perceived threats to security and identity associated with cross-border migration' Thus ,

the number of respondents in sur v eys who expect Primorskii krai to lose territory to China was high an d

changed insignificantly from 1994 to 1998 . consistent with long-term economic and demographic trend s

that favor China . Moreover . opinion data (questions 3-6) also suggests that under general economi c

decline . Increasing cross-border interactions are likely to result in growing ethnic alienation and hostilit y

despite economic benefits from these interactions - the outcome consistent with relative deprivatio n

theory' Preliminary event data also supports this argument' The number of reported hostile acts agains t

Chinese nationals in Dal'nerechenskii county increased sharply after cross-border exchanges increased i n

1997 and generated tangible economic benefits '

Second . limited economic benefits (with plentiful opportunities for diversion of public funds for

private gain), appear to have a disproportionate impact on perceptions of interethnic security an d

proclivity for security mobilization among government officials . business elites, and the general public '

Opinion data shows, for example, that, in 1994-98, government employees within non-military agencie s

in Primor'e (best positioned to benefit from corruption opportunities) were less likely to fear Chines e

occupation and more likely to support Chinese presence in Primorskii krai than the military and the blue -

collar workers (major non-elite segment) . Polarization of incentives between civilian government elites ,

2 1

the military, and the general public would also explain why in 1996/97 more official cooperation wit h

China and more hostile anti-Chinese acts were reported in Khasanskii county than in Dal'nerechenski i

county. While in neither county significant economic activities with Chinese businesses were reported a t

the time, transit Chinese trade and tourist traffic gave Khasanskii county officials the opportunity t o

extract private gains that their counterparts in Dal'nerechenskii county' lacked . This Chinese traffic

(mostly absent in Dal'nerechensk) also generated targets for hostile acts in Khasan . It may also be the

case that anticipation of greater economic benefits from cross-border cooperation accounted for a drop o f

reported acts of government support for non-governmental nationalist groups with military capabilitie s

(such as the Cossacks) from 1996/97 to 1998/99 in both counties '

Third. these selective incentives also explain a differentiation of government activities wit h

regard to Chinese nationals' On the one hand, officials have increased the use of nationalist symbolism –

evident during 1999 in Nazdratenko's election campaign and in the increased number of anti-Chines e

focusing events reported in Khasanskii and Dal'nerechenskii counties' On the other hand, the sam e

officials continued cooperation and somewhat reduced interactions with nationalist groups . For example,

much coercive capability building was reported in Dal ' nerechenskii county in 1996, but none in 1999 '

And in January 2000 . Vladivostok City government announced that it would allow employment in th e

city of up to -1,000 foreign workers – a more than threefold increase from 1999's quota of 1,300 .36 A t

about the same time. courts in Primorskii krai banned public advertising by the neo-fascist Russia n

National Unity '

Without a turnaround in general economic and demographic conditions in the region, however .

this policy bifurcation is likely to he destabilizing' While increasing the number of Chinese migran t

traders and workers (which is, in many cases, an inescapable economic imperative), Primor'e officials ar e

also increasing symbolic activities focusing the (already suspicious) general public on potential securit y

threats of increased Chinese presence . These trends will undermine the current equilibrium between

slowly growing economic gains and slowly growing ethnic hostility .

Finally, these findings have a major policy implication : if cross-border exchanges becom e

associated with economic revival of Primorskii krai (through increased investment and local economi c

development) then the selective incentives that currently soften nationalist positions of government

officials will also be likely to spread to the general public, inducing more benign and cooperative attitude s

toward Chinese nationals . If not, the interethnic equilibrium is likely to become more fragile, giving ris e

to more hostile acts . At present, despite some negative trends in interethnic relations in Primor'e, th e

window of opportunity exists to promote the benign scenario, for the following reasons :

• Most government elites in Primorskii krai have experienced economic benefits from cross-border

cooperation with China' Even in a county with historically contested territories, such as Khasan ,

local government officials have recently expressed support for the International Peace Park under th e

UN auspices (subject to international investment) at the juncture of Russian, Chinese . and North

Korean borders in the Tyumen river basin '

•

Ideologically committed nationalist groups. such as the Cossacks and the Russian National Unity, still

lack substantial membership and organization to conduct systematic anti-Chinese activities .

•

While hostility toward Chinese nationals increased in the 1990s . public support for cooperation stil l

remains strong '

The study suggests that this window of opportunity is likely to he slowly narrowing, unless th e

Russian government at various levels, major non-governmental actors . outside powers, internationa l

organizations, and businesses recognize both the perils and the promises arising from the curren t

economic-versus-security equilibrium and act to create economically effective transborder regions alon g

Russia-China border'

Notes

Mikhail Alexseev. "Chinese Migration in Primorskii Krai : An Assessment of Its Scale, Socioeconomi c

Impact and Opportunities for Corruption ." Working Paper, The National Council for Eurasian and East

European Research (grant contract #814-17g) . November . 1999 '

In this view, intellectuals are the first to realize such threats and to activate nationalist symbol s

mobilizing public support and leading to collective action directed at another ethnic group . See Harold

Issacs, Idols of the Tribe : Group Identity and Political Change (New York: Harper and Row, 1975) and ,

especially, Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986) ;

Anthony D' Smith, "The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism' " in Ethnic Conflict and International Security ,

edited by Michael E' Brown (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1993) . Hudson Meadwell, in

''Cultural and Instrumental Approaches to Ethnic Nationalism," Ethnic and Racial Studies 12 (July 1989) :309-28 refers to this view as "expressivist culturalism'" For a practical and politically influentia l

exemplar of essentialism, see Robert D' Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts : :1 Journey Through History (New York :

St . Martin's Press, 1993) .

Peter Kirkow, Russia's Provinces : Authoritarian Transformation Versus Local Autonomy (New York :

St' Martins Press, 1998) '

See Benedict Anderson . Imagined Communities : Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism ,

(London: Verso, 1983) . John Chipman, "Managing the Politics of Parochialism . " in Ethnic Conflict and

International Security, edited by Michael E . Brown (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1993) argue s

that pathological social systems rapidly lead to "total " ethnic violence, since "everyone is automatically

labeled a combatant - by the identity they possess - even if they are not" (p . 240) '

Stephen Van Evera, "Nationalism and the Causes of War . " in Charles A . Kupchan, ed., Nationalism

and Nationalities in the New Europe (Ithaca : Cornell University Press . 1995), pp' 146-47 .

Barry R . Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict, " in Ethnic Conflict and Internationa l

Security, edited by Michael E' Brown (Princeton . NJ : Princeton University Press, 1993), pp . 103-125 .

James D . Fearon, "Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict . " in David Lake an d

Donald Rothchild, eds. The International .Spread of Ethnic Conflict : Fear, Diffusion, and Escalatio n

(Princeton University Press . 199S), pp' 107-127 '

David L . Laitin and James D' Fearon . "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation . " American Political

Science Review (December 1996) : Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Preventin g

Deadly Conflict : Final Report (New York, 1997), p' 3' Individual instances of interethnic violenc e

would still occur validatin g prophecies of ancient hatreds, but so would violent acts such as crime that ar e

not ethnically motivated' At the same time, when mass violence does break out among ethnic groups ,

"ancient hatreds" and conflicting ethnic motivations enter the stage as the most obvious and immediat e

explanations of death and destruction '

Two major exceptions happened in the border town of Pogranichnyi . At the local central market I

witnessed a heated row between a Chinese trader and a Russian customer (a young male who was no t

sober) . The Russian customer accused the trader (without deleting expletives) of bringing in inferior

products, threw some of the wares displayed at the stand in the Chinese national's face, and tried to tak e

the Chinese person's peanuts without permission . Another Chinese trader came to help and slapped the

Russian customer forcefully on the hand' The two traders removed the peanuts from the customer's han d

by force . The second episode Involved Russian railroad security officials who stopped a Chinese woma n

near the public latrines by the railway station and demanded a fine for unauthorized walking on th e

railroad track . The Russian officials were armed and they removed the Chinese woman's passport . A

dozen, or so members of the Chinese tourist delegation (from Harbin) surrounded the security official s

2 4

and passionately argued the woman's case' After a heated row, several members of the Chines edelegation went to settle the case into a building housing the Special Security Detachment for th eProtection of the Far Eastern Railways .

° Nathan Glazer and Daniel P . Moynihan . Ethnicity : Theory and Experience (Cambridge, MA : Harvar dUniversity Press, 1975) ; Milton J. Esman . Ethnic Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994) .

11 Alexseev, "Chinese Migration in Primorskii Krai . "

12 Anders Aslund, "Russia ' s Collapse . " Foreign Affairs (September October . 1999) : 64-77 ; Clifford G .Gaddy and Barry W' Ickes . "Russia's Virtual Economy," Foreign Affairs (September/October, 1998) :53-67 .

13 On institutional traps, see Judith Thornton . "Has Russian Reform Failed?" National Bureau of Asia nResearch working paper, 1999 (hap :// www.nbr.org/members/thornton.pdt). For a case study of politica lelites' ability to block or distort economic reform in Primor'e see Peter Kirkow, Russia 's Provinces :Authoritarian Transformation versus Local Autonomy? (New York : St . Martin ' s Press, 1998) .

14 Stephen E . Hanson, "Breaking the Vicious Cycle of Uncertainty in Postcommunist Russia . " Programon New Approaches to Russian Security, Policy Memo #40 (1999) '

15 Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man. The Social Bases of Politics (Garden City, NY : DoubledayBooks, 1963) ; W. Lance Bennett . The Political Mind and the Political Environment: An Investigation ofPublic Opinion and Political Consciousness (Lexington, MA : D.C. Heath and Co ., 1975) ; Donald L .Horowitz . Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley : University of California Press, 1985) : 132 .

"Zakon Primorskogo kraia o kraevom biudzhete na 1995 god ." Vedomosti Dumy Primorskogo kraia ,no. 8 (1995) : 4-21 ; "Zakon Primorskogo kraia o kraevom biudzhete na 1996 god, " Vedomosti Dum yPrimorskogo kraia, no . 23 (1996) : 2-25 : "Zakon Primorskogo kraia o kraevom biudzhete na 1997 god, "Vedomosti Dumy Primorskogo kraia, no. 44 (1997) : 2-25 ; "Zakon Primorskogo kraia o kraevo mbiudzhete na 1998 god . " Vedomosti Dumy' Primorskogo kraia, no' 13 (1998) : 2-37 . Ruble values wereconverted into dollar values at half-year average exchange rate increments and the January 1998 three -digit ruble denomination was taken into account (the denomination is reflected in the original documents) .

Primorskii and Khabarovskii krai . Yevreiskaia (Jewish) Autonomous Oblast, and Amurskaia oblast .

N P . Ia . Baklanov, "Geographicheskiie, sotsial'no-ekonomicheskie, i geopoliticheskiie faktory migratsi ikitaiskogo naseleniia na yug Da l 'nego Vostoka . " paper presented at the roundtable . "Prospects for the Fa rEast Region : The Chinese Factor," Institute of History, Archeology, and Ethnography of the Far EasternBranch . Russian Academy of Sciences . Vladivostok . July 9 . 1999 . p . 3 .

19 Interview with Andrei Kopayev, senior investigator at the same office . Vladivostok, May 25, 1999 '

20 Institut Istorii, Arkheologii I Etnografii Narodov Dal'nego Vostoka DVO RAN, "Migratsii a

inostrantsev v Primorskom krae I vo Vladivostoke . Anketa dlia kitaiskikh torgovtsev . " (Vladivostok,1999), pilot survey results . pp . 5-6 '

"Administration Does Not Know How to Resolve the 'Chinese Question' in Primor'e," Zolotoy Rog,April 1, 1999 .

22 "Ob istinnykh masshtabakh torgovli mozhno tol'ko dogadyvat'sya ." Zolotoi Rog, March 2, 1999 '

Based on Alexseev, "Chinese Migration in Primorskii Krai . "

24 Plaksen, "Sotstium Vladivostoka: Osen, - '98", p . 2 .

2 5

25 Plaksen, Yevgenii' "Sotstium Vladivostoka : Osen'- '91, '92, '94, '97 . '98" [Vladivostok opinio nsurvey results : autumn, 1991, '92, '94, '97 . '98], Interim Report . Institute of History, Archeology an dEthnography of the Peoples of the Far East, Russian Academy of Sciences, Far Eastern Branch, 1998 .

26 See T.R. Gun', Why Men Rebel (Princeton University Press, 1970), Edward L . Azar and John W .

Burton . International Conflict Resolution : Theory and Practice (Lynn Reinner, 1986) . Relativedeprivation occurs when economic growth in sectors associated with a different ethnic group (e .g . ,Chinese migrants) threatens to accentuate and aggravate ethnic grievances, especially amidst genera leconomic decline and scarcity, as in Russia . Groups are likely to "conclude that they can improve thei rwelfare only at the expense of others" (David Lake and Donald Rothchild, eds . The International Sprea dof Ethnic Conflict : Fear, Diffu sion, and Escalation [Princeton University Press, 1998], 10) and opt fo rnationalism (Milica Zarkovic Bookman, Economic Decline and Nationalism in the Balkans [St . Martin ' s .1994]) '

For the definition of these concepts see my "Codebook : Monitoring Anti-Chinese SecurityMobilization in Primorskii krai, 1993-1999," Addendum 2 to this working paper .

28 Based on the data reported in Mikhail Alexseev, "Chinese Migration in Primorskii Krai," (revise dversion, November 1999), tables 2-5 . 7 . 8 , Al . A l 1 .

Interfax, "Governor Wants US Marine Landing in Vladivostok Canceled, " (July 31, 1998), in ForeignBroadcast Information Service FBIS), reported August 5 . 1998 '

30 Tvoi vybor, Nos . 5 (February 16) and 8 (March 27), 1999 .

31 I have adapted the basic actor-action coding scheme used by the Global Event-Data System (Universit yof Maryland) for this particular test, with specific types of actors and actions . listed in the "Codebook "(Addendum 1) . Available newspaper stories for Dal'nerechenskii county covered years 1996, 199 8(January 15 to February 3 only), and 1999 ; and years 1997, 1998 (February I to March 12 only), an d1999 for Khasanskii county . Even though articles for Dal'nerechenskii county for 1997 were unavailable ,this data set appears suitable for comparing changes in security mobilization in these counties fro m1996/97 to 1999, considering little difference in socioeconomic and demographic trends from 1996 t o1997 and no major intervening political factors (such as a major shift in Sino-Russian relations o rpolitical leadership change within Russia and Primorskii krai) .

32 Irina Aleshina, "Our People in China, " Dal'nerech'e (February 4 . 1999) . p' 2 : "A Visit of Polic eOfficers, " Dal 'nerech 'e (August 31 . 1999) . p . 2 .

Vladimir Ignatenko, "Spravka : k voprosu o demarkatsii rossiisko-kitaiskoi granitsy v Primorsko mkrae" [Memorandum : on the issue of Russian-Chinese border demarcation in Primorskii krai], 1996 'Vladimir Ignatenko as chairman of the committee on regional affairs at the Primorskii krai duma . Thecommittee has jurisdiction over all issues dealing with Chinese migration and cross-border exchanges . Acopy of this memorandum, bearing no date, was obtained directly from Vladimir Ignatenko wh oestimated it was written in May of 1996 . Interview, Vladivostok, June 1 . 1999 .

Yevgenii Plaksen, "Integratsiia Primorskogo kraia v ekonomicheskuiu strukturu ATR : obshchestvennoemnenie naseleniia i osobennosti vzgliadov rukovodstva," [Integration of Primorskii krai into the econom yof the Asia Pacific region : public opinion and characteristics of elite opinion] Rossiia I ATR 2 (1993) : 49 .

Interview, Vladivostok . June 1 . 1999 '

36 Rossiia. Regiony. Novosti . (January 10, 2000) (www.regions.ru/news/ 160287 .htm) .

2 6