Argumentative Essay

The standard of justice depends on the equality of power to compel and in

fact the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept

what they have to accept (Thucydides, 1972 [c. 404 BC]).

Are the Athenians correct: does realism still provide

the best explanation for international relations?

9 April 2015

The standard of justice depends on the equality of power to compel and in fact the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept (Thucydides, 1972 [c. 404 BC]).

Are the Athenians correct: does realism still provide

the best explanation for international relations?

Introduction

In 1975, in the United States Department of State (US DoS) was prepared the docu-

ment named ‘The Lessons of Viet-Nam’ which later has been declassified. In one of

the paragraphs of this document is stated,

[s]ince our ability to understand the politics of countries such as Viet-Nam is limited, it follows that our attempts to manipulate political forces may well fail. We should not assume, as we did in 1963, that we know what is best for a country and proceed, as in the overthrow of Diem, to precipitate a situation with unknown and possibly disastrous consequences. Nor should we take the opposite tack—allying ourselves too rigidly with a leadership whose diminish-ing mandate we may not be able to perceive (US DoS, 1975).

Since then some time has passed. Have the lessons identified been learned? The

question reflects the actual debate of International Relations (IR) between principal

rivals: realism and liberalism. Different realism’s theories are associated with ancient

Greek philosopher Thucydides, author of the Peloponnesian War, and this essay is

going to use primarily his pristine explanation. Therefore, realism acknowledges the

dominant role of power politics in international relations, but as well that unhindered

power is acting to defeat its own purpose (Lebow, 2013: p. 59). Realism’s main sup-

positions are that the international system is anarchic, composed of self-interested

states pursuing national interests, and the only important actors are powerful states

which shape international relations. On the other hand, different liberalism’s theories

of international relations are relatively new, with roots in the Enlightenment, and its

main assumptions are that democratic governments within states, economic interde-

pendence, and international law and institutions will make the world more peaceful

(Russet, 2013: p. 95). This essay argues that despite the existence of international

institutions and organisations, international law, and growing economic interdepend-

ence, international relations remain a place of power politics defined by realism.

Moreover, it argues that promoting democracy by force harms both realism’s and lib-

eralism’s assumptions in their pursuit for more peaceful world. The essay is divided

into three main parts. Part one seeks to examine international relations’ actors,

namely states and international institutions; it shows that important actors are the

most powerful states, and international institutions and organisations, and interna-

tional law does not much restrain them. Part two focuses on the economic interde-

pendence in international relations and includes, inter alia, how states exercise

power politics in pursuit of national interests, and the economy as a non-military

means (Walt, 2012) used by powerful states to achieve their national interest. Finally,

the last third part subsequently focuses on the defence of liberal democracy, and

how the dangerous ‘amalgam’ (Snyder, 2009) of misinterpretation of liberal and real-

ist theories damages both theories in their pursuit for more peaceful world.

Actors of international relations and international law

The state is going to survive globalization. Decolonisation, the reunification of Ger-

many, the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, different separatist move-

ments, even the latest events in the Middle East with claims for an Islamic state are

examples of the desire to create own country or ‘secure political space - i.e., territory’

(Jackson and Sorensen, 2013: p. 72) despite growing interdependence. Humans are

social animals and from ancient times people have lived in groups and have attrib-

uted themselves to them. People continue to live in states, and it is rare for a human

being not belong to any state. The problem is that states inevitably will compete

between them and have conflicts. First of all, states are not in equal position. They

have different geography, existence of resources, climate conditions and so on. All

those conditions influence development and welfare of the countries. First liberals, as

John Locke, did not refuse importance of the state in preserving a favourable envir-

onment inside of the state from external threats, and liberals agree that states protect

citizens from ‘undue interference from other people’ (Sorensen, 2011, p. 149). Not to

forget that states (including neighbouring states) consist of people, it means that very

existence of states shows us not tendency of people to cooperation but rather their

tendency to separate. The European Union (EU) is an example used by liberalism’s

supporters, but it is not an exception. Every country sought to join the EU seeking the

relative gains, and the only driver was national interest. EU members preserved the

necessary degree of sovereignty. Despite the EU membership, there is growing na-

tionalism, and separatist movements in Scotland and Catalonia have not disap-

peared. When confronted with setbacks, some major contributors for the EU eco-

nomy (as, for example, the United Kingdom (UK)) questioned their membership.

Apart from this, the last elections to the European Parliament also displayed the rise

of Eurosceptic parties. The commitment to preserve the state system in the ongoing

globalization strengthens realism’s assumptions.

However, liberalism argues that there are other actors of IR—international institutions

and organisations, and international law—which can shake state sovereignty. In

practice, international institutions and organisations, and international law do not

much restrain powerful states. Starting with international non-governmental institu-

tions and organisations (INGOs), primarily of democratic states, (role of intergovern-

mental institutions (IGIs) will be discussed later) they do not have as a scope to sub-

stitute states. As for example, ‘hybrid’ and ‘a class of its own’ (Rona, 2004) the Inter-

national Committee of the Red Cross ‘has a limited mandate’ and ‘tied as it is to

states and the state system of international relations’ (Forsythe, 2005). Also in this

case, it is interesting the assessment of international relations of another important

INGO, Amnesty International. Their 2003 report emphasises a ‘slightly’ different trend

than those expected by liberalism. They notice that against a backdrop of increasing

globalisation, there is growing concern of powerful states to defend national interests

by using their military, political and economic means. Also, it is underlined that IN-

GOs may be easily targeted as propagandists of interests of an opponent state (Am-

nesty International, 2003). Regarding international law, it theoretically has potential to

stabilize forces of international relations, and it can end impunity and promote justice.

But in practice powerful states have maintained their sovereignty in that domain, pro-

tecting their citizens and engaging in support of international law when it is consistent

with advance of their interests and values. For instance, the US is not a party to the

International Criminal Court’s (ICC) Statute and is supporting only ad hoc interna-

tional tribunals and hybrid courts (US DoS, no date). Other major powers such as

China, Russia and India are also reluctant towards the ICC. International law faces

political challenges mainly by constraints imposed by the major powers, caused by

rivalry between them. Moreover, the application of international law has potential

negative impact on the peace process between opponents (Royal African Society,

2008).

The most important actors in international relations are great powers. As a result of

the anarchic competition there are alternately emerging powerful states, ‘largely re-

sponsible for shaping the most important international events’ (Jackson and

Sorensen, 2013: p. 94). The most significant part of their power is military might, but

the use of military means is not only a single way how states exercise power. The ex-

ample of the work of power politics is the UN Security Council (UNSC), which ‘has

primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security’ (UN,

1945), and particularly its five permanent members (P5). Liberals argue that the UN

is an example of IGIs as potential peace promoter. However, the UNSC has not once

failed to stop outbreak of violence in international relations when particular P5 mem-

ber’s interests were at stake. Secondly, the UNSC membership has not preserved P5

to express their power in third countries (including sustainment of proxy conflicts) as

it was in Afghanistan in 1979, Grenada, Panama, Iraq in 2003 and Ukraine. Thirdly,

since the end of the Second World War, the real pacifier has been nuclear capability,

thus present great powers are concerned about proliferation of nuclear capabilities.

Fourthly, there is struggle to maintain power by P5, opposed to reforms of the UNSC,

which is not exactly representing real division of power among states (UN, 2013). Be-

sides, despite reducing military spending in the West, there are also different trends,

especially in rising powers such as China and India (Jeppesen, 2014; IISS, 2015).

Lastly, the potential inability of the UNSC to prevent the outbreak of violence is em-

bodied in the UN Charter, which has preserved the right of countries to self-defence

and was used by the UK, the P5 member, during the Argentinian invasion of the

Falklands. The role of intergovernmental institutions in promotion of peace is exag-

gerated; in reality, the world remains a place of power politics, and intergovernmental

institutions do not much restrain great powers.

National interest and non-military means to exercise power

Concerning economic interdependence, the answer of the realism is that this is not

something new; thus, it cannot be seen as an argument in favour of liberalism, which

tends to overestimate the positive side of economic globalisation. History often re-

peats itself and remains the best prophet of the future. International trade has been a

necessary attribute of states to enhance the wealth and welfare of countries for cen-

turies. In the second half of nineteenth century the developed world knew of the high

growth of trade, which did not prevent the outbreak of the Great War. Again, after

this, despite optimistic discourses of liberals the world was going to the next world-

wide war, and great powers were using their economy to build war machines. The

globalisation of economy is believed by liberals as a challenge to the existence of the

state system. They sincerely hope that people will forget longstanding conflicts and

be concerned about profit through honest commerce, as the US president Thomas

Jefferson stated, ‘peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, en-

tangling alliances with none’ (1801). The trouble with this view is the issue of insur-

ance of fair trade. There is misunderstanding of differences between the intrastate

environment and the realm beyond state's borders, in the world where there is no

sovereign higher authority, and relations are governed by principles of power. One of

the realism’s assumptions is that self-interested states pursue national interest, and

commercial interest (sometimes subnational) can become part of national interest in

pursuit of balance of power (Morgenthau, 1950: p. 835). Economic rivalry in the

global economy is high, and free market brings not only benefits. Economy has tied

states together, making them interdependent, but the increased interdependence

gave more levers of power for leaders of international relations. Moreover, growing

number of population in the world related with the scarcity of resources and food

shortages hardly will make economy a pacifier of international relations.

States pursue national interest, and economy remains a place of power politics. Let

us take a look on an example how commercial (or economic) interest is becoming a

national interest of a state. Since the end of nineteenth century, the US has had per-

manently growing interest and involvement in the East Asia (mainly China) and

named at that time ‘Open Door’ policy. The initial meaning of this policy was simply

commercial. However, after other powers, especially Japan, threatened the US com-

mercial interest militarily, the principle was interpreted not for commercial, but for

political reasons (US DoS, no date; Morgenthau, 1950: p. 835). Since then, interna-

tional relations have modernized, and talk about economic interest of a state is un-

popular. However, power politics did not leave economic relations. Alan Greenspan,

ex-Chairman of the US Federal Reserve stated, ‘I am saddened that it is politically in-

convenient to acknowledge what everyone knows: the Iraq war [2003] is largely

about oil’ (2009). For sure the US remains the world’s strongest military power, but

the US economic status is going to be challenged by rising mainland China. China

continues to grow and already started to secure resources for its economy in the

South China Sea (EIA, 2013; Chilcoat, 2014; The Economist, 2015). Smaller coun-

tries also do not remain behind. France is concerned about its business-related is-

sues in West Africa (Baig, 2013; The Economist, 2014), and there is continued con-

frontation among the UK and Argentina concerning the Falkland Islands, where were

found considerable reserves of crude oil (Stanley, 2014). The reciprocal influences of

economy and geopolitics remain central concern for governments of states, which

are continuously adjusting their security strategies. For instance, Norway observing

melting ice already developed a strategy ‘to take advantage of the opportunities in

the High North’ (Norwegian Government, 2006). Similar with Greenspan’s opinion

has former UK Government’s Chief Scientific Advisor Sir David King, who added,

‘[u]nless we get to grips with this problem globally, we potentially are going to lead

ourselves into a situation where large, powerful nations will secure the resources for

their own people at the expense of others’ (Randerson, 2009).

Next, the economic interdependence made from the economy a powerful tool in the

hands of great powers. However, the non-military exercise of power remains backed

by the military might of the countries. The example of the Russian Federation can be

the most illustrative. Recent political developments in post-Soviet countries are

strongly related to economy, or more precise, to Russian politico-economic pressure

(Birnbaum, 2014). One of the useful tools of Russian policy is natural gas price. An

analysis of gas prices for the abroad consumers revealed an interesting ‘anomaly’.

The prices for gas for faraway countries can be significantly lower than for more prox-

imate countries to Russia, or countries situated at the same distance of transporta-

tion have significantly different prices (Kates and Luo, 2014). The similar tool of Rus-

sia’s economic power is Rospotrebnadzor (the service responsible for supervision of

Russian consumers rights), which allows Russia to ban some particular imported

items using different alleged pretexts (Cenusa et al, 2014). However, similar eco-

nomic tools were used by the West against Russia as an answer to its actions in

Ukraine. The result of the imposed sanction is Russia’s ongoing economic downturn

(The Economist, 2014). However, liberals are right that actual economic interdepend-

ence is high because sanctions against Russia affected its small neighbours (Reck-

nagel, 2014). Likewise, China, which is well-known for its opposition to the use of

sanctions, does not shun using unilateral sanctions to advance its interests over

Taiwan or Tibet (Reilly, 2012). Those examples show that economy also can be tar-

geted or used as tool of economic warfare. Chinese militaries envision economic

means of warfare as part of new generation of wider ’unrestricted warfare’ (Liang and

Xiangsui, 2002). Going back to the role of international organisations, the World

Trade Organization (WTO) cannot do much to prevent sanctions imposed by states

for security reasons (WTO, no date). As it is seen, economy, envisioned by liberalism

to pacify international relations, plays the role of a new powerful tool in the hands of

great powers searching for their national interests.

Defending liberal democracy in realism’s world

Liberal democracy should be protected, and it should be protected by realism’s

means. No matter how paradoxical it may sound it is true. Thucydides, the ‘father’ of

realism, in his writing about the Peloponnesian War by the Pericles’ funeral oration

praises democracy, despite the fact that he was less enthusiastic about it. After cen-

turies, Winston Churchill once said that democracy is ‘the worst form of Government,

except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time’ (Langworth,

2008). Since the time of ancient Greeks, democracy has undergone long trip, and it

will be very sad if a setback occurs again. However, the realm beyond state's borders

is different. The attempt to strangle the young Ukrainian democracy is the most egre-

gious breach of security in international relations. The Russian-Ukrainian armed con-

flict (unfortunately, denied) should be a wake-up call for those who do not observe

reality in international relations. However, previous Russian actions in other former

Soviet republics have not awakened liberals (UK Parliament Website, 2014). The

world remains a dangerous place, and rogue autocratic states (sometimes with

pseudo democratic governments) present a danger for liberal democracy. Si vis

pacem, para bellum. In this way, liberal democracy should be seen as a child of real-

ism that should be protected. The Ukrainian case has resurrected such terms

claimed by realism as ‘anarchy’, ‘state’, ‘national interest’, ‘power politics’, ‘balance of

power’ and so on. At the same time, things envisioned by liberalism to pacify, such

as international law and international institutions, played little role, and economy was

used by power politics as non-military tool to curb Putin’s desires. At one fell swoop

NATO relevance was confirmed, together with its reliance on American hegemony.

Theories are good in checking on each other. Realism is first of all a theory of sur-

vival. If protected by realism’s means liberal democracy becomes the unique form

government, liberalism will have opportunity to check realism theory in practice, an-

swering the question if democracies will fight democracies in completely Kantian

world.

However, if liberal democracy is the best known form of political organisation of the

state, it does not mean that democracy should be promoted by force. This is a dan-

gerous amalgam of misinterpretation of liberal and realist theories. Realism is re-

served about the imposing of will on other nations, whatever they are—religious, so-

cio-economic and so on. Realists see it as a dangerous endeavour which threatens

peace and security in international relations. First of all, it can cause an honour-

based resistance to invaders (Lebow, 2007: p. 396) of indigenous inhabitants as it

was, for instance, during colonisation (and decolonisation). And it is still harder to

convince people that the real enemy is their own government, when they are being

bombed by foreign aircraft. Secondly, such interventions cause a balancing of antag-

onistic states against the invader and open or covert ‘intervention on behalf of tar-

gets’ (Wang and Ray, 1994: p. 139). The results can be prolonged conflicts, as it

was, for instance, in Afghanistan starting with the late 1970s, where the interest of

the US, the Soviet Union and others collided (US DoS, 2013; Wilson Centre, no

date). As a consequence, promotion of democracy by force can become a Sisyphean

task. By the words of Richard Ned Lebow, ‘[realism] stresses […] the need to base

influence, whenever possible, on shared interests and persuasion’ (2013: p. 59). The

concept Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is considered as the achievement of liberal

policies, but it will be hardly applied on great powers. Moreover, the study on the

R2P, conducted by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sover-

eignty (ICISS), concluded that the military intervention should be proportional and the

last resort for protection of population. It should be authorised by the UNSC, with no

intention to defeat a state. The intervention should be ‘clearly supported by regional

opinion and the victims concerned’, ‘with the consequences of action not likely to be

worse than the consequences of inaction’ and ‘maximum possible coordination with

humanitarian organizations’ (ICISS, 2001).

Finally, promoting democracy by force undermines liberalism’s agenda by harming

democracy itself. Democracy cannot be hurried up. It took time for countries to be-

come liberal democracies. Historical events made liberal democracy to win in the US

(however, there is room for improvement). The leading states are also a role model

for other states, and the US is a leader. However, unrestrained by the membership of

the UNSC and without the resolution of the latter, the US invasion of Iraq in 2003

drastically damaged the US’s soft power (CSIS, 2007). Additionally, the dichotomy

between speech and deed of the US officials, on the one hand, stressing on demo-

cracy promotion, and, on the other hand, having good relationship with authoritarian

regimes also played its role. Moreover, the issue of the breaching of human rights

and civil liberties in occupied countries, at homeland and elsewhere was raised up in

the context of the world-wide counter-terrorism (UN, 2006). The importance of soft

power or, in other words, winning of hearts and minds of the people in other countries

should not be underestimated. The 2003 watershed year damaged position of liberal

democracy in the entire world, working to the advantage of the political adversaries of

the US in other countries, associating liberal democracy with America’s self-interest.

Some countries previously quite benevolent towards the US gradually shifted to-

wards potential opponents (Samuels, 2007). It is remarkable that Francis Fukuyama

clarified his position towards promoting democracy after received criticism on his

earlier writing. He already argues that ‘coercive regime change was never the key to

democratic transition’ (Fukuyama, 2007). The US is not the first great power and

most likely not the last one which by its actions demonstrated realism’s claim that

‘great powers to be their own worst enemies’ (Lebow, 2013, p. 60). The Iraqi cam-

paign backfired against the US, and, as it was pointed out by many, the proverb ‘if

you break it, you own it’ is the best description of the situation. However, realism is

not a theory of despair, and it is necessary to learn lessons taught by it.

Conclusion

International relations are complex, and no single theory is perfect in explaining

them. Nevertheless, the Athenians, represented by Thucydides, are right, and real-

ism still provides the best explanation for international relations. Realism describes

how the world actually is in comparison with its counterpart liberalism, which de-

scribes how the world is ought to be. And the world remains a place of power politics.

International relations are still bound to the state system, and powerful states are

strengthening their positions. Intergovernmental institutions are dominated by power-

ful states, and international non-governmental institutions and organisations do not

much restrain them. International law, designed to bring justice, is still having discrim-

inating applicability between winners and losers in international relations. Despite the

growing economic interdependence, powerful states are driven by national interest

and enabling their economy to become a non-military means to exercise a state’s for-

eign policy.

However, power politics has also the negative side, and great powers remain their

own enemies. A great deal of the misunderstanding and misperception of realities

further exacerbates international relations, and liberal democracy itself is caught in a

trap of the realities of international relations. Power politics has multiple facets. It is,

of cause, hard military and economic powers, which are backing one another. But it

is also underestimated soft power—or ability to lead and influence, which, accompa-

nying its fellow hard part, can do much more than all of them alone. The promotion of

democracy by force with the coercive replacement of a government in order to insure

peaceful relations represents a dangerous enterprise which harms peace and secur-

ity, and undermines the basics of democratic rights and freedoms. Practitioners of

foreign policies should understand that whenever possible hard power politics should

come after and accompanied by negotiations, searching common ground and con-

sensus with all interested actors, and with a discourse supplemented by correlated

conduct. As the leader, the US is responsible for the defence of liberal democracy

outside but also inside of the country, and not letting democracy regress. But it does

not mean to impose it. Liberal democracy should itself become attractive for others

and not to be associated with bombing and torture. America should learn the lessons

identified in Vietnam and confirmed in Iraq. And eventually democratic peace will be

achieved through the realistic means of realism. Finally, it is necessary not to forget

that theoretical debates have real-world consequences.

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