are we winning 2007

8/3/2019 Are We Winning 2007

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September 2007 Report

Measuring Progress in theStruggle Against Violent Jihadism

Bernard I. Finel with Holly Crystal Gell

Are We Winning?


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Te American Security Project is organized aroundthe belie that honest public discussion o nationalsecurity requires a better-in ormed citizenry onethat understands the dangers and opportunities o thetwenty- rst century and the spectrum o available policy responses.

Security is a undamental responsibility o government.In the new millennium, however, U.S. nationalsecurity policy has not kept pace with rapidly changing threatsto American interests. Globalization has quickened, butthe United States has not built alliances or institutionsto protect and advance American security. erroristshave expanded their reach and lethality, but the moralauthority o the United States is at an all-time low.Changes in the Earths climate are more evident every day, but the United States has ailed to act, alone or with allies, to avoid disaster.

America needs a new national security vision or thisnew era and a dialogue at home that is as robust as itis realistic. Yet the quality o our discussion on nationalsecurity has been diminished. Fear has trumpedconversation. Arti cial di erences have been createdand real di erences have been le t unexamined.Techaracter o our national dialogue has grown increasinglyshrill while the need or honest discussion has grownmore urgent.

Only by developing real analysis and thought ul answerscan a genuine oreign policy consensus be rebuilt oa dangerous and decisive age. Only then will Americaagain marshal all her resources military, diplomatic,economic and moral to meet the challenges o acomplex world.

Mission of the American Security Proje

Board of Directors of the American Security Project: op Row: Te Honorable Gary Hart, Chairman, Te Honorable Richard L. Armitage, Lael Brainard, Stephen A. Cheney, USMC (Ret.), Lieutenant General Daniel Christman, USA (Ret.), Second Row: Gregory B. Craig, Nelson Cunningham, Vice Admiral LLieutenant General Claudia Kennedy, USA (Ret.), Te Honorable John Kerry, Tird Row: Te Honorable George Mitchell, Susan E. Rice, Te Honorable WarDavid Torne, General Anthony Zinni, USMC (Ret.)

2007 American Security Project


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Measuring Progress in the Struggle Against Violent Jihadism

Are We Winning?

Since the terrorist attacks o September 11, 2001, U.S. oreign policy has ocusedlargely on con ronting the violent jihadist threat worldwide. Tere have been

numerous successes and ailures over the past six years in this so-called war onterror.

Te American Security Project has developed ten criteria to measure progress orlack o progress in the struggle against violent jihadism. Tese metrics are designedto be both reproducible and as objective as possible. Tey are intended to comprise aholistic approach, examining causes and processes associated with violent jihadism, inaddition to outcomes.

On balance, these metrics indicate that the United States is not winning the war onterror. Te lack o measurable progress on most indices, the collapse o internationalpublic support or the United States, and the dramatic increase in jihadist violencesince 2003 paint a bleak picture.


4/32 AMERICAN SECURITY PROJECT

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The metrics in this report are presented in order of importance.

They are judged against this question:

I. NUMBER OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS

There has been a massive and dramatic increase in Islamist terrorism since 2003. Terror attacks byIslamist extremist groups have increased signifcantly during this time, even when excluding attacksin Iraq, A ghanistan, and those related to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute.

II. HEALTH OF THE JIHADIST MOVEMENT

The jihadist movement remains vibrant and dynamic. Early claims about disruption o the al Qaedanetwork were dramatically overstated. Only fve o the twenty-two most wanted terrorists in 2001have been captured or killed. Though some high ranking al Qaeda members have been eliminated,the organization has been able to promote or recruit members to replace losses.

III. AL QAEDA AFFILIATED MOVEMENTS Al Qaeda has expanded its reach globally by orging closer relationships with previously autonomousgroups.

IV. STATE SPONSORSHIP OF TERRORISM

Active state sponsorship o terrorism has diminished worldwide.

V. PUBLIC ATTITUDES IN THE MUSLIM WORLD

U.S. oreign policy is perceived throughout the Muslim world as an aggressive, hostile, and destabilizingorce.

Do trends in this indicator demonstrate progress in the struggle against violent jihadism?

NO UNCERTAIN YES


5/32SEPTEMBER 2007

VI. PUBLIC ATTITUDES IN THE UNITED STATES

American citizens remain very concerned about the terrorist threat. Signifcant numbers ear attacks onthemselves or their amily and riends. Increasing numbers o Americans believe the U.S. is losing the waron terror.

VII. ECONOMIC PROSPERITY AND POLITICAL FREEDOM

Broad measures o economic prosperity and political reedom show slow but steady improvement throughoutmost o the Muslim world.

VIII. UNGOVERNED SPACES

There has been minimal progress on reducing ungoverned spaces. Iraq and A ghanistan are no longer state

sponsors o terrorism, but vast ungoverned areas within both o those states make them homes to vibrant jihadist movements that are less vulnerable to traditional instruments o statecra t.

IX. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AGAINST TERRORISTS

The number o countries committed to combating terrorism has increased since 9/11.

X. TERRORIST FINANCING

International cooperation has led to some successes in curtailing terrorist fnancing, but there is no clearevidence that Islamist terror groups are being starved o resources. Trends in A ghan poppy production suggesta disturbing new source o terrorist fnancing.



NUMBER OF TERRORIST INCIDENTSI.There has been a massive and dramatic increase in Islamist terrorism since 2003. Terror attacks by Islamistextremist groups have increased signifcantly during this time, even when excluding attacks in Iraq, A ghanistan,and those related to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute.

Incidents of Terrorism January 1996 - September 2006

Incidents Attributed to Known Islamist Terrorist Groups

[Source: RAND-MIPT Data1 ]

N

u m

b e r o

f I n c i

d e n t s

Quarter-Year

9/11ATTACKS

IRAQ WARBEGINS


7/32SEPTEMBER 2007

Incidents Attributed to Islamist Terrorist GroupsExcluding Attacks in Israel, Iraq, and Afghanistan


N u m

b e r o

f I n c i

d e n t s

Quarter-Year

9/11ATTACKS IRAQ WARBEGINS


N u m

b e r o

f I n c i

d e n t s

Quarter-Year

9/11ATTACKS

IRAQ WARBEGINS

All Terrorist Incidents



Distribution of IslamistTerrorist Attacks:

Oct. 2001 - March 2003


April 2003 - Sept. 2006

[Source: RAND-MIPT Data ]




Jan. 1996 - Sept. 2001

Average Attacks Per YearYellow = 0.1-0.9Orange = 1.0-9.9

Red = 10.0+


9/329SEPTEMBER 2007

Measured by the number o terrorist incidents, the jihadist threat is more signi cant now than it was prior September 11, 2001. It is, most notably, signi cantly worse even than in the immediate a termath o the 9/attacks when the American response ocused on al Qaedas in rastructure in A ghanistan. Even when excluattacks in A ghanistan, Iraq, and those related to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, there are more attacks by jihadgroups on an annual basis than at the beginning o the Iraq war. Tis is a stunning nding given the tremendouactivity o jihadist groups in those three theaters. Tis nding undamentally undermines the Bush Administratioclaim that we are ghting them there so we dont have to ght them here.7 In reality, the ghting in Iraq and A ghanistan exists in addition to the broader threat posed by Islamist violence. Worse, the spillover e ects oand A ghanistan will likely mean that when those con icts do end, there will be a much larger pool o battletrained ghters capable o bolstering the global jihadist movement.8 In short, the war in Iraq has not noticeably reduced the numbers o jihadists outside o Iraq; rather it has created many more ghters to join the movement9

Between January 2001 and September 2001 there were 1,188 terrorist incidents around the world, including ththree separate 9/11 events which have become in amous in the memory o Americans.10 Attacks within Israel aloneaccounted or 238 terrorist incidents, with Iraq and A ghanistan contributing our. Counting only those incide

attributed to Islamist extremist groups, there were 61 incidents globally with 40 occurring outside o Israel, Irand A ghanistan. Te comparison with the same time period in 2006 is stark. Worldwide, there were 5,188 terrorisincidents, 1,437 excluding Israel, Iraq, and A ghanistan.11 O those remaining incidents, 490 were attributed toIslamist terrorism, o which 92 were extraneous to the con icts in Iraq, A ghanistan, and Israel.

I anything, this data understates the growth o Islamist violence. Most o the terrorist attacks o the past six yas tracked by RAND-MIP , are unattributed to any particular group due to competing claims o responsibilitlack o claims or evidence, or other reasons. As a result, some attacks are not counted as Islamist even though tlocation and targets make it likely that Islamist groups were responsible.



HEALTH OF THE JIHADIST MOVEMENTII.The jihadist movement remains vibrant and dynamic. Early claims about disruption o the al Qaeda network were dramatically overstated. Only fve o the twenty-two most wanted terrorists in 2001 have been capturedor killed. Though some high ranking al Qaeda members have been eliminated, the organization has been

able to promote or recruit members to replace losses.

22 MOST WANTED TERRORISTS AS OF 2001

[Source: Multiple Sources 12 ]

At Large (Amnesty disputes)


1. Osama bin Laden

2. Ayman al-Zawahiri

3. Abdelkarim Hussein Mohammed al-Nasser

4. Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah

5. Muhsin Musa Matwalli Atwah

6. Ali Atwa

7. Anas al-Liby

8. Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani

9. Hasan Izz-al-Din

10. Ahmed Mohammed Hamed Ali

11. Fazul Abdullah Mohammed

12. Imad Fayez Mugniyah

13. Mustafa Mohammed Fadhil

14. Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan

15. Abdul RahmanYasin

16. Fahid Mohammed Ally Msalam

17. Ahmad Ibrahim al-Mughassil

18. Khalid Shaikh Mohammed

19. Mohammed Atef 20. Ali Saed Bin Ali El-Hoorie

21. Saif al-Adel

22. Ibrahim Salih Mohammed al-Yacoub

22 MostWantedTerrorists as of 2001

At Large

At Large

At Large

At Large

Killed, Oct 2006

At Large


Captured

At Large

At Large

At Large

At Large

Captured/Disappeared


At Large

At Large

At Large

Captured

Killed, Nov 2001At Large

At Large

At Large


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Although the United States and its allies have captured or killed signi cant numbers o top al Qaeda operativevidence suggests that al Qaeda and afliated groups have been able to replace leaders as ast as they can eliminated. Te inability o the United States to success ully pursue the most senior al Qaeda leaders has becoa signi cant policy ailure. Tough the Bush Administration has tried to minimize the importance o Osambin Laden through public statements,14 his continued de ance o the United States serves as a beacon to jihadisaround the globe. Te U.S. decision to rely on Pakistan to police its own territory has led to the establishment osa e haven or al Qaeda on the border with A ghanistan, allowing the organization to re-establish terrorist traicamps and other acilities. Tis nding underscores the July 2007 National Intelligence Estimate assessment thal Qaeda has largely reconstituted all the capabilities that made it such a threat in 2001.15

[Source: BBC News13 ]

Abu Hamza al-Muhajir

Sheikh Said

Abu Mohammed al-Masri

Sulaiman Abu Ghaith Thirwat Salah Shirhata

Abu Faraj al-Libbi

Abu Zubaydah

Ramzi Binalshibh

Adb al-Hadi al-Iraqi

Moh ammed Haydar Zammar

Ali Abdul Rahman al-Ghamdi

Mohamedou Ould Slahi

Zacarias Moussaoui

Richard Reid

Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri

Abu Musab al-Zarq awi

Amjad Farooqi

Ali Qaed Senyan al-Harthi

Abu Hazim al-Shair

Omar al-Farouq

Senior al Qaeda Leaders and Operatives

At Large

At Large

At Large

At Large At Large

In Custody

In Custody

In Custody

In Custody

In Custody

In Custody

In Custody

In Custody

In Custody

In Custody

Killed

Killed

Killed

Killed

Killed



Tere has been an increase in the number o jihadist websites, but there is no reliable way to measure the actureach o the jihadist movement.16 Public attitude surveys are a blunt instrument, and we remain woe ully ignorao the dynamics o the violent jihadist ideology in Muslim populations. Nonetheless, the size and sophisticao the jihadist media apparatus suggests a vibrant, dynamic movement.

[NOTE: Screenshots rom websites listed by the SITE Institute and MEMRI]



AL QAEDA AFFILIATED MOVEMENTSIII. Al Qaeda has expanded its reach globally by orging closer relationships with previously autonomous groups.

Al Qaeda has mitigated U.S. success in capturing or killing top al Qaeda operatives by building institutional ti with groups in North A rica, Iraq, and Southeast Asia.18 In addition to ormal statements o allegiance to al Qaedthere is also clear evidence o in ormation sharing and parallel learning processes within the jihadist moveme19

Groups are learning rom past operations. Teir lessons are being disseminated through personal connections anthrough various media including the Internet, training manuals, pamphlets, and videos. Te role o personaconnections in the spread o the violent jihadist ideology and tactics is shadowy, but in many operations in t West there is evidence o groups acquiring training and guidance rom outside sources.20 Tis should not besurprising. Te jihadist movement is sel -consciously transnational. Jihadists speak with pride about travels various hotspots o activity, including A ghanistan, Chechnya, Bosnia, Iraq and elsewhere.21

The Global Reach of al Qaeda

[Source: RAND Corporation and U.S. Department o State1 ]

Red = Location of significant al Qaeda affiliated insurgencies or terrorist organizationsYellow = Location of significant al Qaeda affiliated terrorist cells



U.S. Government List of State Sponsors of Terrorism:2001 and 2007

Independent List of State Sponsors of Terrorism:1991 to 2007

AFGHANISTAN

GREECE

IRAN

IRAQ

LIBERIA

LIBYA

PAKISTAN

SUDAN

SYRIA 1991 1992 1993 199 199 199 199 199 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 200 200 200

State sponsorship o terrorism that is, states that provide active logistical and nancial support to terrororganizations has declined signi cantly over the past decade. In addition to the elimination o the regimes A ghanistan and Iraq, Libya and Sudan have also increasingly renounced terror.22 Te level o state sponsorshipo terrorism is lower today than at any time since the early 1970s.

[Source: U.S. Department o State 23 ]

[Source: Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections 2 ]

By Date o Initiation/Termination o Sponsorship

IV. STATE SPONSORSHIP OF TERRORISM Active state sponsorship o terrorism has diminished worldwide.



PUBLIC ATTITUDES IN THE MUSLIM WORLDV.U.S. oreign policy is perceived throughout the Muslim world as an aggressive, hostile, and destabilizing orce.

Increasing numbers o Muslims declare themselves opposed to attacks on civilians.25 However, large numberscontinue to express admiration or Osama bin Laden and sympathy or al Qaedas goals.26 Support or attacks onU.S. orces in Iraq and A ghanistan ranges rom substantial to overwhelming in the Muslim world.27 Fear andsuspicion o U.S. motives and policy are prevalent.

Approval of the United States

[Source: Pew Global Attitudes Project 2 ]

Favorable views o the United States in percentage o respondents. Countries are shaded according to 2007 r



Percentage of Muslims Who ViewSuicide Bombing as Justified

Often/Sometimes

Support for Attacks on Civilians:

How justified are attacks on civilians that arecarried out in order to achieve political goals?

Percentage of Muslims Who Express ALot or Some Confidence in

Osama bin Laden

Morocco

Egypt

Pakistan

Indonesia

2

7

1

1

6

8

4

3

19

6

8

7

57

77

81

84

Strongly Justified Justified: Weakly Not at all

Groups Using Violence Against Civilians:

Groups that use violence against civilians, suchas al Qaeda, are violating the principles of Islam.Islam opposes the use of such violence.

Morocco

Egypt

Pakistan

Indonesia

66

88

30

65

19

7

35

21

Agree Disagree





Jordan

Lebanon

Indonesia

Palestinian Ter.

Turkey

Pakistan

Kuwait

56

20

59

72

15

46

20

20

1

41

57

5

38

13

-36

-19

-18

-15

-10

-8

-7

2003 % %

A lot/some confidence:

Countries with available trends shown. Based on Muslim respondents.

Muslims in: 2007 Change



Allies and Threats

Bangladesh

Indonesia

Malaysia

Pakistan

IndiaChinaU.S.

JapanMalaysiaChina

ChinaJapanU.S.

S. ArabiaChinaEU

544544

413624

393215

605825

U.S.IndiaPakistan

U.S.ChinaRussia

U.S.Abu Sayyaf N. Korea

U.S.IndiaIsrael

724732

631713

4676

644532

Closest Allies % %Biggest ThreatsASIA



Percentage of Respondents Identifying a Given Country as an Ally or a ThreatAFRICA

Ethiopia

Mali

Nigeria

Senegal

Tanzania

U.S.ChinaEU

U.S.ChinaFrance

U.S.BritainChina

FranceU.S.China

U.S.ChinaBritain

585340

564948

584027

504530

373222

EritreaNigeriaal Qaeda

al QaedaU.S.Ivory Coast

U.S.IranChina

U.S.Gambiaal Qaeda

al QaedaU.S.Iran

866929

311512

321412

15128

272313

Closest Allies % Biggest Threats %



Allies and Threats (continued)

Data indicates that terrorism is becoming increasingly delegitimized in the Muslim world, yet many Muslimcontinue to believe the goals o terrorists to be legitimate. Te picture is particularly discouraging i one taa holistic view o public attitudes. While the vast majority o Muslims considers attacks against civilians the abstract as contrary to Islam, other questions reveal much greater ambivalence. On the whole, very larnumbers o Muslims around the world believe the ollowing arguments:

Te United States seeks to weaken and divide the Muslim world.36

Te goal o the United States in the war on terror is something other than sel -de ense.37 Te attacks o 9/11 were committed by a group other than al Qaeda.38

Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden are pursuing generally legitimate goals.39

Ultimately, the issue is not whether individuals support terrorism in the abstract, but whether attacks on U.Sinterests can be justi ed by individuals on the basis o sel -de ense. Te United States is making progresdelegitimizing terrorism, but at the same time it is increasingly viewed as an aggressive and hostile power by mo the Muslim world a act that complicates counter-terrorism e orts.


Egypt

Jordan

Kuwait

Lebanon

Morocco

Turkey

S.ArabiaPalestinian Ter.Syria

S.ArabiaEgyptSyria

U.S.S.ArabiaBritain

S.ArabiaFranceIran

FranceU.S.Spain

S.ArabiaIranEgypt

PakistanGermanyS.Arabia

441916

424121

544823

575323

361814

21139

11109

IsraelU.S.Iran

IsraelIranU.S.

IranIraqU.S.

IsraelSyriaIran

U.S.IsraelAlgeria

IsraelU.S.Britain

U.S.IraqRussia

863927

814625

523026

744342

171515

604816

64139

Closest Allies % Biggest Threats %

MIDDLE EAST

Palestinian Ter.



Te e ectiveness o terrorism can be measured, in part, by the reactions it prompts. Regardless o what terror

do, they cannot be success ul i their targets are not terrorized. One indicator o progress in the war on ter would be that Americans eel less threatened. An increase in anxiety would indicate ailure.

Americans continue to demonstrate a high level o concern about the threat o terrorism. As numerous analhave demonstrated, ear o terrorism is out o proportion given the multiplicity o other risks Americans their daily lives.41 Te consequence o this high level o insecurity is not just increased vigilance, which is a positoutcome, but also the possibility o counter-productive policies driven by ear rather than rational assessment

How worried are you that you, or someone in your family, will become a victim of terrorism?

Blue = Very or Somewhat Worried

American citizens remain very concerned about the terrorist threat. Signifcant numbers ear attacks onthemselves or their amily and riends. Increasing numbers o Americans believe the U.S. is losing the waron terror.

[Source: The Gallup Organization 0 ]

P e r c e n t o

f R e s p o n

d e n t s

2002 2003 200 200 200 200

VI. PUBLIC ATTITUDES IN THE UNITED STATES



Green = US and its Allies

Yellow = Neither side

Red = Terrorists

P e r c e n t o

f R e s p o n

d e n t s

2002 2003 200 200 200 2002001

Who do you think is currently winning the war against terrorism?



P e r c e n t o

f R e s p o n

d e n t s

2002 2003 200 200 200 200

Blue = Very or Somewhat Likely

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0



ECONOMIC PROSPERITY AND POLITICALFREEDOM

VII.

Broad measures o economic prosperity and political reedom show slow but steady improvement throughout most

o the Muslim world.

Political Freedom and Civil Liberties in the Muslim World

On the economic ront, there has been gradual economic growth in most Muslim countries, without noticeabnegative consequences in income distribution. Gross national income per capita has grown by over our percent year throughout the Middle East and North A rica since 2000.46 Foreign direct investment has tripled.47 Debt burdenhas declined.48 Secondary measures, such as in ant mortality rates and access to health care, have also improved.49 Tiseconomic growth has been in part a unction o higher oil prices and increased U.S. support or countries deemallies in the war on terror, but it also re ects increased investment in the economies o Muslim countries. Teconomic growth correlates with generally higher levels o satis action with local governments.50

Tough these statistical measures are generally positive, economists remain very concerned about dynamics th

Over the past six years, there has been slow and steady progress ameliorating some o the actors identi ed as causes o terrorism. Political progress has been slow, but generally positive. According to Freedom House da44 measures o political reedom and civil liberties have improved in the Muslim world, though the region remhighly repressive compared to the developed world.

[Source: Freedom House ]

Green = ImprovingYellow = UnchangedRed = Worsening



are not being addressed.51 Tese include a continued lack o e ort to integrate women into the work orce andisregard or the education o women. Economists also remain concerned about the e ects o guest workeseveral Arab countries, most notably in the Gul states. Finally, there has been relatively little progress in movtoward diversi ed economies that are less reliant on oil exports.

Economic Growth in the Muslim World Average Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Growth for 2001 - 2006

[Source: United Nations Statistical Division 2 ]



UNGOVERNED SPACESVIII.

Tough the problem o ungoverned spaces has been extensively discussed, there has been little progress on reduco political vacuum. Indeed, over the past ve years we have seen the growth o two signi cant ungovernedIraq and A ghanistan. In the case o A ghanistan this remains a net improvement replacing an active terrori with an ungoverned space is likely a worthwhile trade-o . Iraq is much more troubling. Given its location in tho the Middle East, the establishment o an ungoverned space in Iraq must be counted as a major ailure in theterror.

Te record is decidedly mixed on ungoverned spaces that existed be ore 9/11. Greater military-to-military contatraining in West A rica, combined with a gradual reduction in intrastate violence, have had some positive e ec53 Butthe lack o government capacity, low levels o technological penetration, porous borders, and ethnic cleavages havcontrol spotty across the region. We see similar dynamics in most other ungoverned areas, including the tri-bordein South America (between Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay) and numerous islands in the Philippines and Indone

Te situation in northwestern Pakistan is an unmitigated disaster.54 Since the autonomy agreement between Islamaband tribal leaders in the region took e ect, jihadist groups have been able to solidi y their sa e haven in the area2007 National Intelligence Estimate highlights the role o this region in a resurgent al Qaeda.55

There has been minimal progress on reducing ungoverned spaces. Iraq and A ghanistan are no longer statesponsors o terrorism, but vast ungoverned areas within both o those states make them homes to vibrant jihadistmovements that are less vulnerable to traditional instruments o statecra t.

[Source: World Bank ]

Government Effectiveness



INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AGAINSTTERRORISM

IX.

The number of countries committed to combating terrorism has increased since 9/11.

Te number o countries committed, either ully or nominally, to combating terrorism has increased since Septemb11, 2001. However, perceptions o American unilateralism and contempt or existing standards o internatiolaw under the Bush Administration, and the war in Iraq, have undermined the ability o even riendly statescooperate closely and openly with the United States on counter-terrorism issues.57

Since 9/11, the international community has gone to great lengths to establish the legal instruments and agencienecessary to combat global terrorism. While this is one o the areas o greatest activity, it would be an overstatemto call it unprecedented. Te United Nations, or example, has 13 conventions aimed at mitigating terrorismdating back to 1963. Only one o these was adopted a ter 9/11, and it has not yet come into orce.

Nonetheless, great strides have been made, especially at the regional level, to create more e ective bodies conventions, even though their e orts may be duplicative. Furthermore, existing orums have assumed a greapriority or more nations. Prior to the attacks in 2001, only two countries had rati ed all 12 then-existing Uconventions against terrorism, but they are now joined by an additional 28 member states.58 In some cases, theincreased attention being paid to terrorism has mobilized organizations which have been hereto ore marginaliz

and lacking in resources. Rhetorical commitments to counter-terrorism continue to ar exceed the commitmeo resources, yet a general increase in the importance o anti-terrorist activities can be seen globally.

Counterterrorism Committee

Counterterrorist Action Group

3+1 Group on Tri-Border Area Security

Counter Terrorism Task Force Counter Terrorism Co-Ordinator

African Center for Study and Research on Terrorism

Convention on the Prevention ofTerrorism

Convention on Counter Terrorism

United Nations

G8

Argentina, U.S., Brazil, Paraguay

APEC EU

African Union

Council of Europe

ASEAN

2001

2003

2002

2003 2004

2006

2005

2007

Association

New Cooperative Institutions

Agency/Organization/Position Created




[Source: United Nations 0 ]

UN Conventions onTerrorism

Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft ("Tokyo Convention," 1963--safety of aviation)

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft ("Hague Convention," 1970--aircraft hijackings)

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation ("MontrealConvention," 1971--applies to acts of aviation sabotage such as bombings aboard aircraft in flight)

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons (1973--outlaws attacks on senior government officials and diplomats)

International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages ("Hostages Convention," 1979)

Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material("Nuclear Materials Convention," 1980--combats unlawful taking and use of nuclear material)

Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts ofViolence at Airports Serving International CivilAviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (1988--extends and supplements the Montreal Convention on Air Safety)

Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (1988--applies to terrorist activities on ships)

Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (1988--applies to terrorist activities on fixed offshore platforms)

Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection (1991--provides for chemical marking to facilitate detection of plastic explosives, e.g., to combat aircraft sabotage)

International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing (1997)

International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999)

International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of NuclearTerrorism (2005)



TERRORIST FINANCINGX.International cooperation has led to some successes in curtailing terrorist fnancing, but there is no clear evidencethat Islamist terror groups are being starved o resources. Trends in A ghan poppy production suggest a disturbing newsource o terrorist fnancing.

International nancial regulation and e orts to curb money laundering have had some impact on terrorisnancial networks. According to White House reports, 167 countries have issued orders reezing terror

assets, and others have requested U.S. help in improving their legal and regulatory systems so they can me ectively block terrorist unds.61 Additionally, the White House claims that as much as $200 million hasbeen blocked rom terrorists since 9/11.62

Un ortunately, there is no clear evidence that Islamist terror groups are being starved o resources, in pbecause the dramatic resurgence o poppy production in A ghanistan is likely more than sufcient to o sany bene ts that accrue rom better control over nancial transactions and the activities o charities.

Terrorist Finances: Comparative Metrics


$14,000 $500,000$200,000,000

$4,000,000,000

$0

$500,000,000

$1,000,000,000

$1,500,000,000

$2,000,000,000

$2,500,000,000

$3,000,000,000

$3,500,000,000

$4,000,000,000

7/7/2005 (London) 9/11/2001 Terrorist Assets Seized Street Value of AfghanPoppy as Heroin, 2006Cost to Launch Attacks

Cost to Launch Attacks


27/32

I. NUMBER OF TERRORIST INCIDENTSTe United States must abandon the notion that victory on any central ront will lead to an elimination o the jihadisthreat. Te challenge is global and growing, and policies based on an oversimpli cation o the threat are likely to produ

unintended negative consequences that might actually strengthen the jihadist movement as the war in Iraq has done.II. HEALTH OF THE JIHADIST MOVEMENTTe jihadist movement has two primary strengths a dynamic ideology that is appealing to millions in the Muslim worldand iconic leaders whose de ance o the international community makes them heroes to their supporters. A successtrategy in the struggle against violent jihadism will ocus on these centers o gravity.

III. AL QAEDA AFFILIATED MOVEMENTSo de eat violent jihadism, the United States must balance stability with justice by securing cooperation rom leader

the Muslim world while maintaining a distance rom repressive regimes. Making allies o oppressive authoritariagimes has the e ect o pushing those governments domestic opponents into the arms o the jihadist movement.

IV. STATE SPONSORSHIP OF TERRORISMTe United States must apply the state sponsor o terror designation consistently in order to establish international standards o behavior. Keeping Cuba on the list o state sponsors o terrorism, while exempting ostensible allies in theon terror, delegitimizes the designation and undermines the development o consensus about permissible state behavunder international norms.

V. PUBLIC ATTITUDES IN THE MUSLIM WORLD American policy and public diplomacy must go hand-in-hand. Ritualistic denunciations o terrorism in the abstract mube joined by policies and public diplomacy that demonstrate a positive vision o the uture across societies and aith

VI. PUBLIC ATTITUDES IN THE UNITED STATES American political leaders must stop using terrorism as an electoral wedge issue. Instead, they must engage in a seridiscussion with the public over the real level o risk Americans ace and the price the nation is willing to pay to comthe violent jihadist threat.

VII. ECONOMIC PROSPERITY AND POLITICAL FREEDOMTe United States must lead the world in a transition away rom oil-based economies to limit its stake in the internal a

airs o the Middle East. It must also encourage oil-rich nations to move toward sustainable, post-oil economies.

VIII. UNGOVERNED SPACESTe United States must lead the world in developing international law or ungoverned spaces which clearly de nes staresponsibilities or establishing governance. Tis law must also create a set o rights and obligations or the internaticommunity to respond to threats to international peace and security that emanate rom these areas o limited govnance.

IX. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AGAINST TERRORISTSTe United States must prioritize international cooperation and consensus above unilateralism and reedom o action order to enhance its ability to counter violent jihadism most e ectively.

X. TERRORIST FINANCINGTe illicit market created by the war on drugs is one source o unding or terrorists. Policy makers must create polithat e ectively address this linkage.

RECOMMENDATIONS


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1. Raw data extracted rom the Memorial Institute or the Prevention o Terrorism, Terrorism Knowledge Database (produced in conjunction with the RANDCorporation). (Available at http://www.tkb.org/). Data or Islamist groups was produced exclusively using cases where speci c attacks where ascribed toa particular group. Groups that ASP has classi ed as Islamist are those which are reported to have a religious ideology and primarily Muslim membershipby the Terrorism Knowledge Base. In cases where incidents have been ascribed to multiple groups, they have been counted just once in each case that atleast one o these groups met the criteria to be classi ed as Islamist. Attacks relies upon the Terrorism Knowledge Bases de nition o incidents andthere ore includes plots which were not success ully completed. Group data is available at http://www.tkb.org/Category.jsp?catID=1. For more detailsabout this coding process, please contact Dr. Bernard I. Finel at the American Security Project. Trendlines produced in MicroSo t Excel using 6th degreepolynomial unction in order to produce best t possible.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. George W. Bush has stated, Were taking the ght to the terrorists abroad so we do not have to ace them here at home. George W. Bush, Remarksby the President at Independence Day celebration, West Virginia University Morgantown, West Virginia, July 4, 2005. http://usin o.state.gov/dhr/Ar-chive/2005/Jul/05-349803.html?chanlid=democracy.

8. Rod Nordland, Terror or Export,Newsweek , Nov. 21, 2005. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10018673/site/newsweek/.

9. Director o National Intelligence, Declassi ed Key Judgments o the National Intelligence Estimate.Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications or theUnited States. Dated April 2006. http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/Declassi ed_NIE_Key_Judgments.pd .

10. Terrorism Knowledge Database. Available at http://www.tkb.org/. See note 1 or methodological discussion.

11.Ibid.

12. For the original list, see BBC News, Americas Most Wanted Terrorists, October 10, 2001. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1591997.stm. Listo the status o these 22 individuals is available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FBI_Most_Wanted_Terrorists#List_o _initial_22_wanted_terrorist_ ugi-tives. In addition, the FBI continues to update the list at http://www. bi.gov/wanted/terrorists/ ugitives.htm. Amnesty International disputes some o theat large designations. See Amnesty International, O the Record: U.S. Responsibility or En orced Disappearances in the War on Terror, June 7, 2007.http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR510932007.

13. BBC News, Whos Who in al-Qaeda, April 27, 2007. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/2780525.stm.

14. Fred Barnes, Inside the Oval O ce: President Bush gives journalists a heads up about the mid-term elections, among other things, The Daily Stan- dard , September 13, 2006. http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/012/696wn cp.asp.

15. Director o National Intelligence, The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland, July 2007. Unclassi ed Key Judgments. http://dni.gov/press_releas-es/20070717_release.pd .

16. Rita Katz, Testimony be ore the House Armed Services Committee, Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee, United StatesHouse o Representatives, The Online Jihadist Threat, written by Rita Katz and Josh Devon, February 14, 2007. http://armedservices.house.gov/pd s/

TUTC021407/Katz_Testimony021407.pd . Additional research available at http://siteinstitute.org/index.html. Also see, the research produced by theMiddle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) Islamist Websites Monitor Project, http://www.memri.org/iwmp.html.

17. Map compiled rom several sources. See Angel Rabasa, et al, Beyond al-Qaeda Part 1, The Global Jihadist Movement, (Santa Monica: RAND Corpora-tion, 2006), pp xx-xxii. http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG429.pd . U.S. Department o State list o Foreign Terrorist Organizations,available at http://usin o.state.gov/is/Archive/2005/Apr/27-320736.html. State Department Country Reports on Terrorism. http://www.state.gov/s/ct/ rls/crt/2006/.

18. Angel Rabasa, et al, Beyond al-Qaeda Part 1, The Global Jihadist Movement (Santa Monica: RAND, 2006), pp xx-xxii. http://www.rand.org/pubs/mono-graphs/2006/RAND_MG429.pd .

19. Brian Jackson, et al, Aptitude for Destruction, Volume 1: Organizational Learning in Terrorist Groups and Its Implications for Combating Terrorism (SantaMonica: RAND, 2005).

Notes


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20. Severin Carrell and Paul Lashmar, Revealed: London bombers links to Briton in suicide attack on Tel Aviv, The Independent of London , July 24, 2005.http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/crime/article301235.ece. Associated Press, Italy holds 3 on terror charges, July 21, 2007. http://www.cnn.com/2007/ WORLD/europe/07/21/italy.terrorism.ap/. Craig Whitlock, Al-Qaeda Branch Claims Algeria Blasts,Washington Post , April 12, 2007, Page A01. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/11/AR2007041100371.html.

21. Murad Al-shishani, Cerwyn Moore, From Egyptian Islamic Jihad to Chechnya: A Portrait o Mahmoud Hinnawi,Terrorism Monitor , Volume 3, Issue 13 (July1, 2005). http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369736.

22. Department o State, Country Reports on Terrorism.

23. Department o State, Country Reports on Terrorism April 28, 2006. http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/64337.htm. A ghanistan was never o ciallyplaced on the list because the Taliban regime was unrecognized.

24. Table adapted rom, Daniel Byman,Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 27-31. Updatedin consultation with Daniel Byman, email communication with author.

25. Steven Kull, et al., Muslim Public Opinion on US Policy, Attacks on Civilians, and al Qaeda, WorldPublicOpinion.org, April 24, 2007, pp. 9-10. http://wwwworldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pd /apr07/START_Apr07_rpt.pd

26. Steven Kull, et al., Muslim Public Opinion, pp. 13-16. Pew Global Attitudes Project, Rising Tide Li ts Mood (July 24, 2007), pp. 57. http://pewglobal.org/reports/pd /257.pd . Trends are encouraging, however, signi cant percentages o Muslims in several key countries continue to express con dence inOsama bin Laden include 38% o respondents in Pakistan and 41% in Indonesia.

27. Steven Kull, et al., Muslim Public Opinion, p. 7.

28. Created using Pew Global Attitudes Project, Global Unease with Major World Powers (June 27, 2007), pp. 13, 18. http://pewglobal.org/reports/pd /256.pd

29. Pew Global Attitudes Project, Rising Tide Li ts Mood, p. 56.

30. Ibid, p. 55.

31. Ibid, p. 57. Steven Kull, et al., Muslim Public Opinion, p. 16.

32. Adapted rom Pew Global Attitudes Project, Rising Tide Li ts Mood p. 57.

33. Ibid, pp. 48-54.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Steven Kull, et al., Muslim Public Opinion, p. 5.

37. Ibid, p. 6.

38. Ibid, p. 17.

39. Ibid, pp. 20-23.

40. Graph created using data rom Gallup Poll, Gallup Brain Poll Archives. http://brain.gallup.com/ .

41. See, or instance, Stern, Jessica. Dreaded Risks and the Control o Biological Weapons.International Security Vol. 27, No. 3 (Winter 2003): 89-123. BruceSchneier, Beyond Fear (New York: Springer, 2003).

42. Graph created using data rom Gallup Poll, Gallup Brain Poll Archives. http://brain.gallup.com/.

43. Ibid.

44. Freedom House surveys on reedom in the world. Data available at http://www. reedomhouse.org/template.c m?page=15

45. Adapted rom Freedom House surveys on reedom in the world. Data available at http://www. reedomhouse.org/template.c m?page=15

46. World Bank, Regional Fact Sheet rom the World Development Indicators 2007: Middle East and North A rica. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INT-MENA/Resources/EDP_2007_REPORT_Aug7.pd


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47. World Bank data. http://www.worldbank.org

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.

50. Pew Global Attitudes Project, Global Unease with Major World Powers, pp. 1-6.

51. UN Development Programme, Arab Human Development Report 2005: Empowerment o Arab Women. http://www.undp.org/arabstates/ahdr2005.shtml.

52. Created using UN Statistical Division data. http://unstats.un.org/unsd/nationalaccount/nade ault.htm.

53. For more in ormation see the reports and statements at http://www.de enselink.mil/a ricom/

54. This assessment is supported by the ndings o the 2007 NIE on the terrorist threat. Director o National Intelligence, The Terrorist Threat to the USHomeland.

55. Director o National Intelligence, The Terrorist Threat to the US Homeland. Press reports o a cancelled 2005 mission to capture or kill al Qaedas numbertwo leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, demonstrated our lack o capacity or will to take unilateral action in northwest Pakistan. Mark Mazzetti, U.S. Aborted Raid onQaeda Chie s in Pakistan in 05,New York Times , July 8, 2007.

56. Map rom The World Bank, Decade o Measuring Governance, 2007, p. 4. http://in o.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/pd /booklet_decade_o _mea-suring_governance.pd . This map measures government e ectiveness which is one measure o ungoverned spaces. See also Angel Rabasa, et al., Ungov- erned Territories (Santa Monica: RAND, 2007).

57. Mark Landler, et al, German Court Con ronts U.S. On Abductions,New York Times , January 1, 2007. CNN, Court orders 35 to stand trial over CIA fights,February 16, 2007. http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/europe/02/16/italy.cia.trial/index.html. Kristin Archick,U.S.-EU Cooperation Against Terrorism, CRSReport or Congress, October 16, 2006. http://www. as.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22030.pd .

58. The White House, Progress Report on the Global War on Terrorism (September, 2003). http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/progress/ ull.html.

59. United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee, Mandate. http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/mandate.shtml. G8, Building International PoliticalWill and Capacity to Combat Terrorism: A G8 Action Plan. http://www.g8. r/evian/english/navigation/2003_g8_summit/summit_documents/building_inter-national_political_will_and_capacity_to_combat_terrorism_-_a_g8_action_plan.html. U.S. Department o State O ce o the Coordinator or Counterterror-ism, Country Reports: Chapter 2: Western Hemisphere Overview, April 30, 2007. http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/82735.htm. Asia-Paci c EconomicCooperation, Counter Terrorism Task Force. http://www.apec.org/apec/apec_groups/som_special_task_groups/counter_terrorism.html. European Com-mission, Counter-Terrorism Coordinator (March 2006). http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/ sj/terrorism/institutions/ sj_terrorism_institutions_counter_ter-rorism_coordinator_en.htm. U.S. Department o State O ce o the Coordinator or Counterterrorism, Country Reports Chapter 5: A rica Overview (Ap28, 2006). http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/64335.htm. Council o Europe, Convention on the Prevention o Terrrorism (Warsaw, May 16, 2005).http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/196.htm. Leaders Signal Asean Change, Sun Star (January 14, 2007). http://www.sunstar.com.ph/static/ ceb/2007/01/14/news/leaders.signal.asean.change.html.

60. UN Conventions. http://untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism.asp.

61. White House, Financial Actions in the War on Terrorism.http://www.whitehouse.gov/response/ nancialresponse.html.

62. U.S. Department o Treasury O ce o Public A airs, Bush Administration Announces Creation o New O ce in Ramped up E ort to Fight the Financon Terror (March 8, 2004). http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/js1219.htm.

63. Data on terrorst assets rozen rom U.S. Department o Treasury, O ce o Public A airs. Estimates o poppy production rom the White House O

o National Drug Control Policy. Press release available at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/news/press06/120106.html. Estimate o costs o July2005 attacks rom Brendan ONeill, Underwriting Britains 7/7 Attacks,Christian Science Monitor (June 5, 2006). http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0605/ p09s02-cogn.htm. Estimate on the cost o the 9/11 attacks rom The 9/11 Commission Report , Executive Summary. http://www.9-11commission.gov/ report/911Report_Exec.htm.


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Methodology Tis report was developed by producing a list o indicators o progress in thestruggle against violent jihadism. We devised appropriate metrics and oundsolid, objective evidence to assess trends in each relevant area. Te goal wasto avoid biases that occur due to oversimpli cation, while at the same timeproducing a document that can be updated on an annual basis in order totrack progress over time.

Te policy making community has signi cant gaps in its knowledge. Tere isinsufcient evidence available to make clear assessments about whether terroristgroups are nding it more or less costly to launch attacks. Tere is virtually no understanding o the speci c dynamics within Muslim communities that

lead some individuals to radicalism. Further, we have little ability to assessthe appeal o religious arguments that may sustain or undermine jihadism.Even relatively straight- orward measures, such as global counter-terrrorismexpenditures, are virtually impossible to calculate given opaque accountingprocedures and unds spent on related endeavors.

Nonetheless, we believe this report provides a uller, richer evaluation o progress in the struggle against violent jihadism than other publicly available work.

Te ndings is this report are presented in order o importance. Whilethere is no purely objective way to rank metrics, we believe the order in thisreport re ects a reasonable weighting o indicators. Troughout, we havecoded positive developments, green; negative, red; and ambiguous, yellow toprovide the reader with a visual representation o the struggle against violent jihadism.

Several individuals provided signi cant comments on the structure andsubstance o this report. Most notably, we would like to thank Alexis Albion,Rand Beers, Stephen Biddle, Joseph Collins, Kevin Croke, P.J. Crowley, JasonGross, Steven Honigman, Christopher Joyner, Kristin Lord, Erich Marquardt,

Paul Pillar, and Caroline Wadhams or their insights and comments during theearly stages o this process. Te sta and board o directors o the AmericanSecurity Project also contributed signi cantly throughout the dra ting o thisreport. All data analysis, interpretations, and conclusions are the responsibility o the American Security Project, and in particular re ect the judgments o thestudys lead author, Bernard I. Finel.


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www.americansecurityproject.org Telephone: 202.347.4267

James M. Ludes

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