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  • 1. The data and information contained herein are provided solely for informational purposes. None of the informationor data is intended by AREVA to be a representation or a warranty of any kind, expressed or implied with respect tothe design and sustainability of the Japanese Reactors, product disparagement of the Japanese Reactors designand or engineering or an infringement on any intellectual property rights of any third party. AREVA assumes noliability for the use of or reliance on any information or data disclosed in this document. AREVA 2011 The Fukushima Daiichi Incident Dr. Matthias Braun - 7 April 2011 AREVA 2011p.1 The data and information contained herein are provided solely for informational purposes. None of the information or data is intended by AREVA to be a representation or a warranty of any kind, expressed or implied with respect to the design and sustainability of the Japanese Reactors, product disparagement of the Japanese Reactors design and or engineering or an infringement on any intellectual property rights of any third party. AREVA assumes no liability for the use of or reliance on any information or data disclosed in this document.

2. The Fukushima Daiichi Incident1.Plant Design2.Accident Progression3.Radiological releases4.Spent fuel pools5.Sources of InformationMatthias BraunPEPA4-G, AREVANP GmbHMatthias.Braun@AREVA.comThe Fukushima Daiichi Incident Dr. Matthias Braun - 7 April 2011 AREVA 2011p.2The data and information contained herein are provided solely for informational purposes. None of the information or data is intended by AREVA to be a representation or a warranty of any kind, expressed or impliedwith respect to the design and sustainability of the Japanese Reactors, product disparagement of the Japanese Reactors design and or engineering or an infringement on any intellectual property rights of any thirdparty. AREVA assumes no liability for the use of or reliance on any information or data disclosed in this document. 3. The Fukushima Daiichi Incident 1. Plant Design of Unit 1-4Fukushima Daiichi (Plant I) Unit I General Electric BWR3 (439 MW) Containment MARK I Operating since 1971 Unit II-III General Electric BWR4 (760 MW) Containment MARK I Operating since 1974 Unit IV Outage for regular inspection Unit V-VI Outage for regular inspectionThe Fukushima Daiichi Incident Dr. Matthias Braun - 7 April 2011 AREVA 2011p.3The data and information contained herein are provided solely for informational purposes. None of the information or data is intended by AREVA to be a representation or a warranty of any kind, expressed or impliedwith respect to the design and sustainability of the Japanese Reactors, product disparagement of the Japanese Reactors design and or engineering or an infringement on any intellectual property rights of any thirdparty. AREVA assumes no liability for the use of or reliance on any information or data disclosed in this document. 4. The Fukushima Daiichi Incident 1. Plant Design of Unit 1-4Reactor Service Floor(Steel Construction)Spent Fuel PoolConcrete Reactor Building(secondary Containment) Fresh Steam line Main FeedwaterReactor CoreReactor Pressure VesselContainment (Dry well)Containment (Wet Well) /Condensation ChamberThe Fukushima Daiichi Incident Dr. Matthias Braun - 7 April 2011 AREVA 2011p.4The data and information contained herein are provided solely for informational purposes. None of the information or data is intended by AREVA to be a representation or a warranty of any kind, expressed or impliedwith respect to the design and sustainability of the Japanese Reactors, product disparagement of the Japanese Reactors design and or engineering or an infringement on any intellectual property rights of any thirdparty. AREVA assumes no liability for the use of or reliance on any information or data disclosed in this document. 5. The Fukushima Daiichi Incident 1. Plant Design of Unit 1-4Emergency Core Cooling Systems1) Residual Heat Removal System2) Low-Pressure Core Spray (for LOCA) (5)3) High-Pressure Core Injection (for LOCA)4) Reactor Core isolation cooling (1) (Unit 2,3 [BWR4])5) Isolation Condenser (Unit 1 [BWR3])(3)(4)6) Borating System(2)(6)The Fukushima Daiichi Incident Dr. Matthias Braun - 7 April 2011 AREVA 2011p.5The data and information contained herein are provided solely for informational purposes. None of the information or data is intended by AREVA to be a representation or a warranty of any kind, expressed or impliedwith respect to the design and sustainability of the Japanese Reactors, product disparagement of the Japanese Reactors design and or engineering or an infringement on any intellectual property rights of any thirdparty. AREVA assumes no liability for the use of or reliance on any information or data disclosed in this document. 6. The Fukushima Daiichi Incident2. Accident progression11.3.2011 14:46 - Earthquake Magnitude 9 Power grid in northern Japan fails Reactors itself are mainly undamagedSCRAM Power generation due to Fission of Uranium stops Heat generation due to radioactive Decay of Fission Products After Scram ~6% After 1 Day ~1% After 5 Days~0.5%The Fukushima Daiichi Incident Dr. Matthias Braun - 7 April 2011 AREVA 2011p.6The data and information contained herein are provided solely for informational purposes. None of the information or data is intended by AREVA to be a representation or a warranty of any kind, expressed or impliedwith respect to the design and sustainability of the Japanese Reactors, product disparagement of the Japanese Reactors design and or engineering or an infringement on any intellectual property rights of any thirdparty. AREVA assumes no liability for the use of or reliance on any information or data disclosed in this document. 7. The Fukushima Daiichi Incident2. Accident progressionContainment Isolation Closing of all non-safety related Penetrations of the containment Cuts off Machine hall Due to successful containment isolation, a large early release of fission products is highly unlikelyDiesel generators start Emergency Core cooling systems are suppliedPlant is in a stable save stateThe Fukushima Daiichi Incident Dr. Matthias Braun - 7 April 2011 AREVA 2011p.7The data and information contained herein are provided solely for informational purposes. None of the information or data is intended by AREVA to be a representation or a warranty of any kind, expressed or impliedwith respect to the design and sustainability of the Japanese Reactors, product disparagement of the Japanese Reactors design and or engineering or an infringement on any intellectual property rights of any thirdparty. AREVA assumes no liability for the use of or reliance on any information or data disclosed in this document. 8. The Fukushima Daiichi Incident2. Accident progressionUsual course of action: Cooling reactor by Residual Heat Removal Systems Active spend fuel pool cooling Active containment heat removalNecessary Electricity for pumps Heat sink outside Reactor building (Service Water)The Fukushima Daiichi Incident Dr. Matthias Braun - 7 April 2011 AREVA 2011p.8The data and information contained herein are provided solely for informational purposes. None of the information or data is intended by AREVA to be a representation or a warranty of any kind, expressed or impliedwith respect to the design and sustainability of the Japanese Reactors, product disparagement of the Japanese Reactors design and or engineering or an infringement on any intellectual property rights of any thirdparty. AREVA assumes no liability for the use of or reliance on any information or data disclosed in this document. 9. The Fukushima Daiichi Incident2. Accident progression11.3. 15:01(?) Tsunami hits plant Plant Design for Tsunami height of up to 5.7-6.5m Actual Tsunami height 7-11m Flooding of Diesel and/or Switchgear building and/or Fuel Tanks and/or Essential service water buildings11.3. 15:41 Station Blackout Common cause failure of the power supply Only Batteries are still available Failure of all but one Emergency core cooling systemThe Fukushima Daiichi Incident Dr. Matthias Braun - 7 April 2011 AREVA 2011p.9The data and information contained herein are provided solely for informational purposes. None of the information or data is intended by AREVA to be a representation or a warranty of any kind, expressed or impliedwith respect to the design and sustainability of the Japanese Reactors, product disparagement of the Japanese Reactors design and or engineering or an infringement on any intellectual property rights of any thirdparty. AREVA assumes no liability for the use of or reliance on any information or data disclosed in this document. 10. The Fukushima Daiichi Incident2. Accident progressionFukushima I -Unit 1 Isolation Condenser Unit 2 & 3Unit 1 Steam enters heat exchanger Condensate drains back to RPV Secondary steam released fromplant Need Pumps for Water supply Cant replace water in ReactorFukushima I Unit 2 & 3 Reactor Core Isolation Pump Steam from Reactor drives Turbine Steam gets condensed in Wet-Well Turbine drives a Pump, pumpingWater from the Wet-Well in reactor Necessary: Battery power Wet-Well Temperature < 100C No heat removal from the buildingsThe Fukushima Daiichi Incident Dr. Matthias Braun - 7 April 2011 AREVA 2011p.10The data and information contained herein are provided solely for informational purposes. None of the information or data is intended by AREVA to be a representation or a warranty of any kind, expressed or impliedwith respect to the design and sustainability of the Japanese Reactors, product disparagement of the Japanese Reactors design and or engineering or an infringement on any intellectual property rights of any thirdparty. AREVA assumes no liability for the use of or reliance on any information or data disclosed in this document. 11. The Fukushima Daiichi Incident2. Accident progression11.3