aristotle on participatory democracy-winthrop, delba-polity volume 11 issue 2 1978

8/10/2019 Aristotle on Participatory Democracy-Winthrop, Delba-Polity Volume 11 Issue 2 1978

1/22

Northeastern Political Science Association

Aristotle on Participatory DemocracyAuthor(s): Delba WinthropReviewed work(s):Source: Polity, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Winter, 1978), pp. 151-171Published by: Palgrave Macmillan Journals

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2/22

Aristotle

n

Participatoryemocracy

Delba

Winthrop

University

f

Virginia

The

nature nd role

of

political articipation

ave n

recent

ears

been

the

center

f

discussionwith

eference

o

both

the

American

ystem

f

government

nd the

more

general

oncepts f political

cience.

The

patent ndifference

f

the

Founding

Fathers

f

theAmerican

epublic

to

participatory

emocracy

eems

to have

eft

hem

pen

to the

harge

f

undemocraticendencies.

his article

rgues

that

uch

criticism

gnores

themore

basic

question

f whyparticipatoryemocracy

hould

be

desirable. or a clearerunderstandingftheprinciplesndproblems

involved

heauthor

efers

o

Aristotle's

nalysis

f political

ystems,

examining

is reasons

n

favor

f

democratic

articipation

nd

speculates

as

to how

participation

an be reconciledwith ts unarticulated

remises.

Delba

Winthrop

s assistant

rofessor

f

Government

nd

ForeignAffairs

at the

University

f

Virginia.

he

has

published

rticles n Aristotle

nd

Tocqueville

n

Political

Theory

nd

Publius.

Another rticle s

forth-

coming

n The American olitical cienceReview.

Professor

Winthrop

ispresently orkingn a book on Tocqueville'sDemocracyn America.

When

olitical

cientists

nd

historians

f

political hilosophy

ead

Aris-

totle

oday,

hey

re

understandablyempted

o

speculate

hat

e

might

have

aid

about

political

roblem

ithwhichwe

Americans

re

vitally

concerned:

articipatory

emocracy.

f ourown

houghts

bout

partici-

patory emocracyere lear, tmighte unnecessaryoconsult ris-

totle;

ut

ontemporary

nalysis

ends

o

be,

t

best,

f ittle

elp

o

dem-

ocratic

olitics

nd,

t

worst,

nsufficientor coherent

olitical

cience.

Virtually

ll

political

cientists

oday

dvocate-even

f in

varying

degree

nd

for arious

nds-participation

n

politics

ecause

t s dem-

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3/22

152

Aristotle

n

Participatory

emocracy

ocratic. All

but

some radicals

gree

that

participatory

emocracy

makes or nefficientovernment,hile hese adicalsanonly ope hat

they

willbe

shown orrect.

onsequently,

itizens'

articipation

ust e

desired

or

ome ther eason han o

secure

fficient

overnment.

ll

do

admit,

owever,

hat

degree

f

participation

s

useful

o

make

govern-

ment

ecure:

To

keep

even an

inefficientnd

imprudent

overnment

functioning

t

may

e

necessary

o

permit

t

eastminimal

articipation.

Most

gree

hat

articipation

s

ustified

n

part

ecause

t satisfiesndi-

viduals

who,

by participating,

an

force

he

ruling

elite

o

meet heir

substantive

emands. ince thesedemands

re

chiefly

conomic,

he

benefitsfmodernechnologyremorewidelyndequally istributed.

At

the same

time,

oyalty

o

the

elite,

hence

tability,

s

purchased.

Finally, any

ontendhat

articipation

tselfs

good

for

he

participants

because

t

brings sychic

atisfaction,

ombating

entalllnesses

uch

s

alienation.

hus,

ontemporaryolitical

cientists

ontend hat

artici-

patory

emocracy

s bad or

qualifiedly

ood

for emocratic

overnments

and

unqualifiedly,

f

vaguely,ood

for

emocratic

itizens.

The

failure f

American

olitical

cientistso

come o

grips

with

he

problem

f

participation

eflects

he

mbivalence

f

he oundersoward

democracy.istoricallyurs sthe irstolityntentionallyonstituteds

a democratic

epublic.

et what heDeclaration

f

ndependencerom-

ises s

to secure ur

ives,

ur

iberty,

nd our

pursuit

f

happiness,

ot

our

right

o

deliberateboutwhether

ur

hildrenhould

e

bused o

an

integrated

chool.Our

government

s

deemed

ust

because

ts ctions

re

consented

o

ratherhan

articipated

n.

According

o

The

Federalist e

have democratic

epublic

ecause

we

have

representative

emocracy.2

Citizens

onsent

very

ew

years

o be

governedy

electing

epresenta-

tives

nda

president;

nd

this,

n

the

udgment

fthe

Founders,

as

the

properxtentf democraticarticipation.emocraticntheorynd n

rhetoric,

ur

government

as to be

a

mix

f

democracy

ith

ristocracy

and

monarchy

n

practice.

1.

A

very

useful

urvey

nd

bibliography

f

the current

olitical

cience

itera-

ture on

democracy

nd

participation

an

be found

n

Dennis

F.

Thompson,

he

Democratic

Citizen

London:

Cambridge

University

ress,

1970),

and Political

Participation,

Perennial

ssue

Paper

forthe

Division f EducationalAffairs

f

the

American olitical

cience

Association

Washington,

.C.,

1977).

Thompson

puts

the iteraturen

perspective

y treating

ot

only

the

acknowledged

oints

f

disagreementmongcontemporaryolitical cientistsnd theorists,utalso the

premises acitly

hared

by

them.

he

central

ssuesof

the current

ispute

re also

reflected n Carole

Pateman,

Participation

nd

Democratic

Theory

London:

Cambridge

niversity

ress,

970).

2.

Alexander

Hamilton,

ames

Madison,

John

Jay,

The

Federalist

apers New

York: New American

ibrary,

961),

No.

10,

pp.

81-88;

No.

63,

p.

387.



4/22


5/22

154

Aristotle

n


theticoward

emocracy

han

e

really

as.

Aristotle,

f

course,

ived

n

a democracynd acknowledgedhatdemocracy as themost ikely

regime

or

his

day.

He

judged emocracy

he

east

bad of defective

e-

gimes,

nferioro some are

ypes

nd

superior

o the

ikely

lternatives

of

oligarchy

nd

tyranny.

his

udgment

eflectseither

ntidemocratic

prejudice

or

prodemocratic

ympathy.

n

fact,

ristotle

resentedrgu-

ments

gainst

s

well s

for

democracy.

y

contentions that is

rgu-

mentswere

ormulatedo

show

what coherent

efense

f

democracy

would

ave

o

be. To

be more

pecific,

ear he

enter fBook

In

ofthe

Politics,

e assertshat

certain

ind f

democracy

s

ust,

while ear he

endof that ook he makes he denticalssertionor certainype f

monarchy.

shall

argue

hat his

pparent

ontradictions

merely

o

articulate

he

premises

n which he

ase for

emocracy

ust

roperly

rest,

nd at the ame

time,

o

bring

o

light

he ctual

hortcomings

f

democracy

n terms

f ts

own

premises.

First,

et

us

make learwhatwe

mean

by

democracy,

eginning,

s

does

Aristotle,

y

defining

citizen. o

speak

fcitizens

s

necessarily

o

bring

olitics,

ence

he

problem

f

political

articipation,

o the

fore-

front.

t

the

beginning

f

Book

III,

Aristotleskswhat

citizen

s,

and

an answers suppliedndthenmodified.n thefinal,modifiedorm,

citizens

defined

s

onewho

has

the

ight

power)

o

share

n

the ffice

of

deliberating

nd

udging

ith kill

1257bl8-19).

When

his

inal

definitions

offered,

ristotle

oints

ut

hat

he

nitial

ttempt

t defini-

tion

had

succeeded

nly

n

defining

democratic

itizen.

We,

however,

are

more nterestedn the

nitial

ttempt

or

hat

ery

eason.

According

othat

ttempt,

citizens one

who

participates

n

udging

and

ruling

1257a23).

The

formulaeems o

obvious

s

to

appear

n-

interesting.

e can earnmore

rom

onsidering

hat

he itizens said

not o be.First,his itizensnot made itizen reated y omehu-

man

act,

nor s

he

one

who

chances

o be

a

citizen;

herefore,

e

is

naturally

r

fittingly

citizen.

econd,

e s

a

citizen

ot

merelyy

dwell-

ing someplace,

ike

someonewith he

status

f

a

resident

lien; thus,

sharing

n

thebenefits

f

economic

rosperity

s not he ame s

partici-

pating olitically.

hird,

e

s not citizen

y

virtuef

having

ccess o

thecourts or

he

nforcementf

his

rightsgainst

thers;

ence ven

enjoying

ivil

ights

s

not

he

ame

s

participating

olitically.

ourth,

he

s not

citizenfhe

s

too

young

r

too

old,

ike omeone

ho s

too

youngobedraftednd tovote nd runfor ffice.omeonewho s the

rightge

would

ikely

e

n the

rime

f

manhood,

ence

n

the

ulnessf

his

being.

uch man s a citizen ho

deliberates

n the

ssembly

as

do

our elected

representatives

n

Congress)

and

udges

as

do our

urors

n

duty

nd our

elected

or

appointed udges

in

courts).

Deliberating

nd



6/22

Delba

Winthrop

155

judging

n

this

irst

efinition,hen,

re the ctsnot

only

f

citizenship,

but fhumanity.

When

Aristotle

peaks

t

greaterength

bout

democracy,

e

clarifies

the

democrat's

easons or

upposing

hat

very

uman

eing

ught

o

engage

n

politicalctivity:

Now

fundamental

rinciple

f hedemocratic

orm

f onstitution

is

iberty-that

s

what

s

usually

sserted,

mplying

hat

nly

nder

this

onstitutiono

men

participate

n

liberty,

or

hey

ssert

his

as

the

imof

very emocracy.

ut ne

factorf

iberty

s

to

govern

andbe governednturn; or hepopular rinciplef ustices to

have

qualityccording

o

number,

ot

worth,

nd f

his

s

the

rin-

ciple

f

ustice

revailing,

hemultitude

ust

f

necessity

e sover-

eign

nd thedecision

f the

majority

ust

e final

nd must

on-

stitute

ustice,

or

hey ay

hat

achof

the

itizens

ught

ohave

n

equal

share;

o

that

t

resultshat

n

democracieshe

poor

re more

powerful

han he

rich,

ecause

here re

more f them

nd what-

ever

s

decided

y

the

majority

s

sovereign.

his

then s one mark

of

iberty

hich

ll democrats

etdown

s a

principle

f

the

onsti-

tution. ndone s for man o ive s he ikes; or hey ay hathis

is

the

unction

f

iberty,

nasmuch

s to ivenot s one

ikes

s

the

life f

a

man hat s

a

slave.This s the econd

rinciple

f democ-

racy,

nd

fromt

has

come

he

laimnot

o

be

governed,

referably

not

by

anybody,

r

failing

hat,

o

govern

ndbe

governed

n

turn;

and

this s

the

way

n

which he second

principle

ontributes

o

egalitarian

iberty.4

1317a40-1317b17)

The first

rinciple

f

democracy

s

equalpolitical

articipation,

y

which

ismeant ot oneman, ne vote s anequal say n whoultimatelyan

make

hoices,

ut

n

equal

say

n

what

s

chosen nd

for

what

nd.

Ac-

cording

o Aristotle's

ccount,

he

partisan

f

democracy

emands

olit-

ical

equality

ecause e

believes

hat he xercise

ffreedom

s

a

worthy

choice

or

man.

The

defensefthedemocratic

rinciple

f

equal

partici-

pation

s notmade

n

terms f

governmentalfficiency

r

stability

r

the

psychic

atisfaction

t

provides,

ut

ests

n the elief hat

eing

whole

human

eing

means

eing political articipant

f

this

ort.

emocracy

is

demanded

ot or

he ake

of

a

right

o do

my

wn

hing,

utbecause

ofanobligationo ive s a man ught.f thedemocraticartisan'son-

clusion--equal olitical articipation-follows

rom he

premise

hat

4.

Aristotelis,

olitica,

d.

W.

D.

Ross

(Oxford:

Oxford

University

ress,

957).

I

have used

the translation f

H.

Rackham

Cambridge,

Mass: Harvard Uni-

versity

ress,

1932),

except

hat have

made corrections

here

necessary.



7/22

156 Aristotlen

Participatory

emocracy

being

man

means

ngaging

n

the

ctivity

f

freedom,

hen

he

ase for

participatoryemocracyeems orest ncompellingrounds.

The

partisan

f

democracylleges

hat

reedom

s

found

nly

n

a

democratic

egime

nd

that

emocracy

ust

herefore

e the est

egime,

since

iving

reely

s how manwishes

o

ive.

He

further

lleges

hat

ll

men

participate

n

freedom

1280a5).

But

we are

ed

to

suspect

ither

that e does

not

know

what tmeans o be

free

r that e doesnot

rgue

in

good

faith.When

Aristotleirst

resents

he

democratic

logan,

e

presents

t

as

just

hat:

slogan.

Aristotle as

neither

he

first orthe

last

political

cientist

o notice

hat

he wo

most

bvious

ivals or

oliti-

cal authorityretherich ndthepoor ndthat hey se theiruthority

to

keep

or

make

themselves

ich.

The

political

logan

f the

rich,

y

which

hey

ropose

o

secure heir

wn

xclusive

uthority,

s that

hose

who ontributeo the

ity ught

o be

given proportionateay

n

deter-

mining

ow resources

re to

be

used

1280a22-23).

They mply

hat

citizen

articipation

equires

ome

ability

r virtue nd

that

what

s

meant

y

virtues what

ontributeso the

common

enefit.

heymay

well

rr

n

taking

ealth o be both

sign

f

virtue nd

the

good

most

needfulo the

ommunity

1280a25-36

with

281a4-40);

but

he

ich

mayhaveother sefulualitiesnadditiono their ealth:heresponsi-

ble

habits

f

businessmen,

he

dmirable

anners

ound

mong

men f

old

wealth,

better

ducation

1283a29-37).

Democrats,

ho renote-

worthy

either or

heir

irtue

orfor heir

ontributions

o

the

com-

munity,

onetheless

ssert

hat

hey

re free.

ompared

o

the

rich

man's

ssertion,

heirs

trikes s as

a

barely

ivil

way

of

demanding

n

opportunity

o

put

heir ands

n the

public

ill

1281a11-16).

The

democrat's

emand,

hich

ppears

o

neglect

ny

consideration

of the

itizen's

merits,

as an

additional

ndesirable,

ot o

sayunjust,

consequence.fequality ere iven oeachman, oorfreemenwould

virtuallylways

onstitute

majority

n

opposition

o

a

minority

frich

free

men.

he

majority's

verriding

nterest

n

ameliorating

heir

overty

would verride

he nterests

f

wealthy

en.

On

the

basis

of the

ligar-

chic

principle

f

equality ccording

o

worth,

ot

number,

t

would

e

difficulto

argue

n behalf

f

democracy

hat

overty

s a

sign

fhuman

excellence,

ecause f

which

he

demotichould e

accorded

hat

s,

n

effect,

greater

han

qual

ay.

But ven fwe

began

with he

emocratic

principle

hat

ll

free-born

itizensre

equally

ntitled

o

participate

or

the akeof ivings eachwouldwish, modificationrmoderationf

majority

ule

would

be

required.

he

democrat

hotakes

reedomor

each man

eriously

oes not ntend

tyranny

fthe

majority.

herefore

he

intends,

f

necessary, regime

which

ccords

seemingly

reater

han

equal say

to

minoritiesn orderto

permit

ach

exponent

f a

minority



8/22

Delba

Winthrop

157

interest

o

live as

freely

s

theman who

espouses

he

nterest

f the

largestlass.

How

the

quality

feach

s

to be secured

s a

practical roblem

ith

whichwe are not

concernedor

hemoment. he theoretical

ifficulty

that

nterestss

is

why

he

democratic

artisan

elieves hat

t s

sound

reasoning

o

make

numerical

quality,

ot

merit

r contribution

o

the

common

ood,

he

measure

or

istributive

ustice.

Let

us

briefly

ecall

how

modern

olitical

cience emonstrateshat

all men

re

equal,

or

oday

ur

defense

f

democracy

tems

hiefly

rom

the

eaching

fThomas

Hobbes,

he

elf-proclaimed

ounder

f

modern

politicalcience,ndhisfollowers.nyustregimelaims o securehe

common

enefit,

nd

according

o

Hobbes,

we can

ascertain

hebenefit

thats

common,

y

which

e

means

niversal,

hen

we

examinehe

arts

of the

whole s

they

re n themselves. e know

what

political

hole

is and

what

ts nd

ought

o be

when

we know

what

he

parts

aturally

are and

why

hey

move

ogether

o

form

whole.

his

we

earn

y mag-

ining

men

n

the tate f

nature,

hat

s,

n

their

aturalondition.

obbes

says

that

ach

man s

naturally

body

n

motion,

lthough

he

human

body

n

particular

s

moved

y

ts

passions.

t

s moved

speciallyy

the

fear fviolenteath tthehands fanother an,whomay imilarlye

in

motion

nd even n

a

collision

ourse.

ach

man an reason hat

e

best

preserves

is

nature

when e

ives

within

commonwealth

aking

it

possible

orhim o maintainisfreedom

f

movement

nder sover-

eign

t

whosehandshe and his fellow ravelersan

fear

violent

eath

should

hey

make

wrong

move.The endof

commonwealth,

reserva-

tion f the

whole,

eflects

f

not he

deepest

esire,

hen

he

undamental

aversion

feachof

the

parts,

hich

s to

cease

motion. he

whole,

en-

erated

y

the

parts

manifesting

heir

atures,

s

like,

r

represents,

ach

of theparts nd s the auseof a universalenefit.cceptingobbes's

definitions

fman nd

commonwealth,

o citizen

oulddoubt he

ustice

of he

eviathan.5

Hobbes

finds

imilarity

n

the

parts,6

nd

we

today

end o use his

teaching

bout

quality

n

the

tate fnature

s a

justification

or

olitical

equality.

obbes,

f

course,

was not

a

partisan

f

democracy,

ut

of

monarchy.

e insists

n

the

qual

natural

ight

f each to contractr

consent

o

be

governed

ecause

n the

tate

f nature ach

has

an

equal

ability

o kill

nother,

r

to

resist

overnment.

n

commonwealth

ach

5.

Thomas

Hobbes,

Leviathan

Harmondsworth,

ngland:Penguin

ooks,

1968),

Chap.

13,

pp.

62-63;

Chap.

11,

p.

47;

Chap.

17,

pp.

87-88;

Chap.

15,

pp.

79-80.

References

re

to Hobbes's

original

agination.

6.

Ibid.,

Introduction,

.

2.



9/22

158 Aristotlen


does

notretain he

right

o

deliberatend

udge,

hat

s,

to

rulerather

than oconsentoberuled, ecause, emighturmise,obbes an ssert

equality

f

prudence nly

s

a

thinly isguisedoke.'

While

he

shows

that defense f

political quality roperly

egins

with n

argument

about

qual

strength

nd

equal

prudence,

e himself

ses

his

teachings

about he tate

f nature

s a

justification

otfor

emocracy,

utfor

government

hat

s

as

indifferents

possible

o

thevarious nds

pursued

by

itizens. is

purpose

n

nventing

nd

mphasizing

he tate f

nature,

characterized

y

a universalear

f

violent

eath,

s

to

avoid

having

o

considerhe

parts

s

different,

s

they

would e

if

they

were onsidered

with eferenceo thedifferentndstheymightesirewhennotpreoc-

cupied

with

mere

reservation.

It

has

been

observed

hat

n

constituting

heir

olitical

rders,

men

tend o

ookfor

natural

model

o mitate.

uch model

an command

their

espect

ecause

hey

end o

suppose

hatwhat

xists

ndependent

of human reation

must

ave

originated

n

tremendous

ower

nd,

hey

hope,

benevolence.uch

uppositions

re

the

hemes

f

religion

nd

re-

ligious

ontroversy.

obbes

elievedhat

when

olitical

rder

s

ntended

as an imitation

f a whole

ompleted

y

a summum

onum,

t is

the

source f ontinuousisagreementeadingodisorder,ndfails osecure

theone minimal

ood

on which

veryone

s

agreed:peace

or

preserva-

tion.

Men

inevitably

ontend

bout

the

meaning

f

the

highest ood,

either ecause

here

s

no one correct

efinition

r because

men

annot

be

expected

o

concede

tscorrectness.9obbes

ntendedo

discourage

questions

bout

he

bases

n

whichmen

laim

o merit share n

govern-

ment nd

the

nds

orwhich

heymight

overn,

ecause

nswerso such

questions

epend

n the

prior

esolution

f

disputes

boutthe

good.

Even

thosewho

reject

obbesfor

Rousseau,

ontending

hat

articipa-

tion srequiredecause llmen refree ndbecause reedomsthe nd,

deny

hat

overnment

s

properly

oncerned

ith

efining

he ontent

f

freedom.10

owever

we

mightudge

Hobbes's

ntention,

hetruncated

modeof

political

iscourse

dvocated

y

himhas

prevented

ontempo-

rary

olitical

cience

rom

efending

ith

larity

he

goodness

f

equal

political

articipation.

An

alternative

rocedure,cknowledged

ut

not

followed

y

Hobbes,

would

e to

begin y akingeriously

he

laimsmade

y

men

bout heir

7.

Ibid.,

Chap.

13,

pp.

60-61.

8.

Ibid.,

Chap.

21,

p.

109;

Chap.

21,

p.

113;

Chap.

30,

pp.

181-182.

9.

Ibid.,

Chap.

11,

p.

47;

Chap.

5,

pp.

18-19.

10.

Jean-Jacques

ousseau,

The

Social

Contract,

k.

I,

Chap.

6.

The end of the

association reated

y

the

ompact

s defense

nd

preservation

f

original

reedom.



10/22

Delba

Winthrop

159

individual erits

nd about

he

ommon

enefit

hey

ntendo

secure

y

means ftheir ule.To understandhis lternativend ts mplications

we

must eturn

o

Aristotle.

II

In

the

central

ortion

f

Book

iii

of

The

Politics,

ristotle akes

his

most

xplicit

rodemocratic

tatement:

It

s

probably

rue

hat

he

mul-

titude,

atherhan

he ew

est,

ught

o

be

sovereign

1281a40-42).

He

offerseveral

rguments

n

support,

ut

the

only

unobjectionable

ne

givens that hemany,aken ltogether,rebettern the ameway hat

a

common

meal s betterhan meal

provided

y

one

expenditure.

ow

it

s better

s

clarifiedater: A collective

anquet

s more

eautiful

han

a

single,imple

ne. For the

ame

reason,

e are told

ronically,

mob

judges

etter

han

ny

ne

of

them,

rbitrarily

hosen,

might.

imilarly,

many

re more

ncorruptible,

r

indestructible,

han

few,

s

is

more

rather han ess

water

1286a29-33).

Hence

we

might

nfer hat

he

many

re

as

good

or

better

ecause

hey

an

provide

reater

uantity

r

bulk t a

pot-luckupper.

n

fact,

heir

resence

s soon

ompared

o the

additionf mpureood opure 1281b36-38).No satisfactoryroofs

given

hat

hey

ave

either

ood

taste

r

sound

udgment

bout

nutri-

tion.11

t

is, however,

urburden

o

prove

hat

bjections

o base tastes

andto

wrongudgments

re

reasonable,

r that

we

can

properlypeak

f

good

aste nd

rightudgment

t

all

(1282b8-13).

More

to the

present oint,

he

rgument

or

niversal

nd

equal par-

11.

The

arguments

made to establish

he

sufficiency

f the

taste

nd

judgment

of

the

many,

s

distinguished

rom he

few

good,

are

obviously

nadequate.

he

many re said to be able to judgethe wholewell,forwecan suppose hat mong

them re individuals ach of

whom

knows

part

well.

Not

only

can we

ask

why

the totalresult

will

be the um

of

noble and correct ather

han

base

and

ignorant

judgments,

ut

we can ask

whether whole s

not

more

han he

um

of

its

parts,

as

are

the

poems

and

musicalworks

given

s

examples

here.Aristotle's

eference

to

the

many's

oming

ogether

ike

a man with

many

hands

nd feet

uggests

hat

he thinks he result

will

be monstrous.

e then

ndicates

hat

he

many

mustbe

given

say

not because

they

will

say

well,

but

because

they

will

oppose

a

regime

which

does not

give

them

hearing.

he

argument

hat

ne need

not be

a

doctor

to

judge

the

workof other

doctors,

y

which

some

might ttempt

o

solve

the

difficulty,

oes not solve

it.

Aristotle

egins

with

the

problem

f

ensuring

hat

rulerswillchoosewell;he endswith questionablergumenthatusers an udge

the workof

makers.

his

argument

stablishes

t most

hat he

many

re

capable

of

calling

their ulers

o

account,

not that

hey

hemselves

re

capable

of

ruling.

Even

their

bility

o

assess elected

fficials

s

questioned

n the

final

assage

of this

section.

he

goodness

f

democracy

s not established

nsofar s

the

nobility

nd

wisdom

f

democratic

udgments

re

ultimately

otdefended.



11/22

160

Aristotle

n


ticipation

ests n

an

assertion

bout he

equality

f

the

human

ody.

The democrat ants oargue or he overeigntyf all inthe egislative

assembly

nd

to

say

that uch

quality

s

just

according

o the

kind

f

measure

hat

ermits

s tomake total ut f ach fthe

ots

t

the

up-

per.

n

referring

o wholes

ther

han

political

wholes,

e

attempts

o

make

nature is

tandard-anature

ntelligible

s

a

totality

fbodies. f

course

he

democrat ustmean

totality

f self-moved

odies,

orhe

intended

o

make

n

argument

or

qual

freedom,

ot

unfreedom.

n

speaking

f the

overeignty

f the

demos

n the

egislature,

e reminds

us

that uman

odies

an

be

found

eated n

assemblies,

here

hey

re-

sume o egislateheir wn awsofbehavior,rmotion.

WhenAristotle

esponds

o

an

hypothetical

bjection

hat he

base,

who

onstitutenumerical

ajority,

ught

ot

o

be

sovereign

ver

more

important

atters

han

re

the

espectable

r

reasonable,12

e does

con-

tend hat

emocracy

s nonetheless

ight

nd

ust.

He

says,

owever,

hat

this

olitical

olution

s

right

n

that ach

s

a

part

f the

ssembly,

he

council,

nd

the

ourts.n

other

ords,

e deems

t

right,

hat

s,

correct

according

o

nature,

hat his

ity

s

a

whole

omprised

f

partial

holes,

defined

y

heir

haracteristic

olitical

orks.

t

s

ust, ccording

o

him,

because hedemosssovereignnthe ssembly,hilewithintandfrom

it

deliberators

nd

udges

re

distinguished

s

special

arts

f

the

whole.

Justice

resumably

equires-as

we concede

n

the

framing

f our

own

political

nstitutions-that

he

respectable

r

reasonable,

pecialists

n

deliberating

nd

udging,

e

grantedpecial

uthority.

he

whole

on-

tains

ll,

not

s a

totality

f

undistinguished

odies,

ut

s

a

collectionf

defined

multitudes.

ndeed,

he

human

multitude

ust

e

distinguished

from he

nonhuman,

ust

s within

t

those

who

personify

ts

distinguish-

ing

faculties

f

deliberation

nd

udgment

re

distinguished,

or

t

alone

is a multitudefthefree.A democracyffreemenneeds better e-

fense

han hedemocratic

artisan

as

given.

t

needs

demonstration

that he emos s

properlyovereign

n

the

ssembly

ndthat hehuman

multitude

oes ndeed

egislate

or

tself.

The

practical

olution eached

t

this

oint

n

Aristotle'sext

trikes

us as more

r

ess

dequate.

ustice

equires

democracy,erhaps

ot

s

democratic

artisans

ouldhave

t,

but

a

democracy

n

which

ll fac-

tions ave heir

air

ay.

Each

man,

ase or

respectable,

s

assured fair

say

by

dding

o

the

democratic

ssembly

igh

ffices

orwhich

nly

he

12.

The word

used

is

the

noun,

epieik~s

or

equitable

man,

which

temsfrom

epieikeia,

r

equity.

For

the relation f

equity

o

justice,

f.

Aristotelis,

thica

Nicomachea,

d.

L.

Bywater

Oxford:

Oxford

University

ress,

1894),

1137a31-

1138a3.



12/22

Delba

Winthrop

161

rich

nd

respectable

re

eligible

nd

by

eaching

ow

he ouncil

nd the

courts an be used oguide ndcheck he ssembly.owthismodified,

moderated

emocracy

an be

ustified

s

the

heoretical

ifficulty

hat

e-

mains.Man has

a

unique

lace

and

a

democratic

aw

of

nature

oes

notdo

justice

o

human

ature.

ristotle's

oint,

we

suggest,

s

to

show

that n

argument

or

democratic

quality,

stablished

y

means

f an

abstraction

rom

he

qualities

hatmakehuman

eings olitical

eings,

wouldnot

be

an

argument

or

or

against)

political articipation.

e

leadsus to nfer

hat

hese

rguments

an be

made

nly

n thebasis

f

a

political

cience hat

learly

rticulatesnd

defends

he

istinctive

uality

of political eing.

To

speak

f man

s

political

means

o

define

im

not

by

whatmakes

him mere

art

f

henatural

hole,

ut

by

what

makes im distinctive

part.

his,

we

are

old,

s his

oming

ogether

n a

community

ffree

men

(1278bl17-25,

279a21).

The

democratic

artisan,

rguing

bout

ustice

as

ifmenwere

qual

because

oughly

qual

n

body

in

contrasto

oli-

garchs

who

at

leastwant

o

argue

boutmerits

nd contributionso

a

common

enefit),

annot

peak

of

ustice

or

ree

men.

Aristotle,

ow-

ever,

has referred

o

an

hypothesis,resumably

is

own,

ccording

o

whichman s a citizenn a specialway 1277b7-9,1278a2-5,1278b15-

30).

Man

must

makehimself man nd a citizen

o

become

part

f a

whole hat

ncompasses

he

fullest

uman

ossibilities.

an's

capacities

may

be

given y

nature,

ut

his

being

s

the

ctuality

f

which e is

a

cause,

nd

n this

ensehe

s

free.

n

reflection,

hen,

he

democrat

ho

attempts

o defend is

notion f

ustice

y mplying

hat

t

s

right

c-

cording

o nature

erhaps

eed

not

proceed

s

he

doesto

make com-

pelling

rgument,

r meet he

requirements

f

science.

or

scientists

seek o

know he

ause

or

causes f

being,

nd

one

might

est earn

ow

tospeak ntelligiblybout auses fbeing y tudyingreemen.nother

words,

science hat

nvestigates

ree

men nd thewholes fwhich

hey

make

hemselves

arts-political

cience-is

at least

utonomous

n re-

spect

o natural

cience

nd at

most

aradigmatic

or

t.

Hence

Aristotle

makes

he

ollowing

ssertion

ntroducing

is

discussionf how

politi-

cal

regime

ight

e

ustified:

Since n all

the

ciences nd arts

he

nd

s

good,

nd

the

greatest

and

most inal

s

(the

nd)

ofthe

most

overeign

f

ll,

the

olitical

capacitys this amething,ndthe ust s thepolitical ood, nd

this

s

the

enefit

bringing

ogether)

n

common.13

1282b14-18)

13. To

sympheron

eans

not

only

the

beneficial,

ut the

bringing

ogether,

from

ympher6,

to

bring ogether.



13/22

162

Aristotlen

Participatory

emocracy

As

we

shall

ee,

he

ust

which

s

the

olitical

ood

nd

the

ne

common

thingntowhich ll arebroughtogethers thefirstrinciplefAris-

totle's

ypothesis

bout

man's

ossible

erfection.

The

democratic

rinciple

f freedom

s

not

wrong,

nd

the

ssertion

of

freedom

y

each and

every

mannot

nconsequential.

ut since

free-

dom s meant o

be a

term f

distinction

nd

especially

ince he

political

claim asedon freedom

s

a

response

o the

ligarchic

laim hatwealth

is

a

sign

f

excellence,

e

might

sk

what bvious

istinctionsre

com-

prehended

n the erm

reedomnd

o

what

ind

f xcellence

hey oint.

Most

menwho

peak

ffreedom ish

o

be

free rom

ecessities,

ut

re

not. urely poormanwhomust oil ncessantlyoensure isphysical

survival

r a

base man

who

annot esist

ratification

f

his

very

esire

is not free

man,

ut

slave

to his

body's

needs

nd desires.

eing

free,

we

might rant,

means

t least

having

he

wherewithal,

conomic

and

moral,

o

combat

odily

ecessities,

s

do the

wealthy

nd

virtuous.

Thusan

analysis

f

the

laim f freedomorces

s to

concede

herea-

sonablenessf

the

laims

f

the

nondemocratic

artisans.

urthermore,

this

s

to

acknowledge

hat

ertain

ualities,

uch

s wealth nd

virtue,

are

generally

steemed

r

honored nd that

men

end o

measure

heir

excellenceythem. erhapshis swhyAristotleas said that onors,

as

well

as

freedom,

re a first

rinciple

1281a31),

and

why

he

now

asserts hat

city

s

put ogether

f the

free nd those

whobear

esti-

mates

1283a17-18).

(He

puns

n

the onnectionetween

meeting

property

ualification

nd

being

steemed

r

honored.)

Wealthy

nd

re-

spectable

men

re,

n

effect,

mages

f

the

ualities

hich

ll menwho

value

freedom,

ncluding

emocrats,

ust

steem.14

modifiedemoc-

racy

s,

so to

speak,

mixed

egime,

ixing

uman odieswith he

principles

hat an

rule

heir odies.

erhaps

ne

could

hen

rgue

hat

these rinciplesughtobeembodiedr nstitutionalizedn certainon-

or

antidemocratic

ecognition

f men

who

xhibit

hem

n

a

democracy.

The

rightest

aws,

Aristotle

ays,

re

equally

ight,

hat

s,

of

benefit

to

the

whole

ity

ndto

what

s commono

citizens

1283b35-1284a3).

The

city

s a

whole

s the um

f

free

men,

qual

n their ssertionsf

freedom.

ut

n

order

o

find

hem o

equal

we

must

bstract rom

n

evaluation

f

he

ways

n

whichmen laim

obe

free nd

of he

ualities

ofthe

laimants.

ranted

hat here

would e no

dispute

bouthonors

f

men

did

not

presuppose

heir

reedom

o

make

heir

wn

whole;

n

this

sense reedomsa firstrinciplerbeginningarchi).But his eginning

14. n The Politics

reemen are most

frequently

iscussed

n

terms f

their

ir-

tues

or

even

compared

o

virtues:

1258bl8-1260b18,

1277b7-25, 1283a33-37,

1286a36-bl.



14/22

Delba

Winthrop

163

is

ncomplete

ecause

when

he emocrat

ssertshat e

s

free,

e means

tosaythat ehassome xcellencervirtue.urthermore,endeem

particular

uality

virtuensofars

it

contributes

o the

ttainment

f

some ndheld o be

good.

Just s men's

ultivationf

virtue

resupposes

freedom,

o it

mplies

ome nd

ntended.

utmen end

o

acknowledge

as

theirntention

nly

what

hey

eem onorable.

his

point merges

rom

Aristotle's

bservation

hat

ome

men

re

authoritative

ecause

hey

re

strong,

oupled

with

isfailureo

ist

ny

men

who

laim

trength

s the

goal

or

title

f

rule.

Men

inevitably

se

their

trength

o make

ome

respectable

ndor first

rinciple

uthoritative,

o that

hey

an

ive

for

themselvesndwith thersn thebasisofwhat s commonlyonored.

To do

this s

to make

regime.

city

s

ncomplete

ithout

regime,

nd

every

ctual

ity

as

one

1283a42-1283b9).

Men's

ssumptions

bout

what

ives

ll

things

nd human

ualities

worth

re thus he

auses

of

regimes.

iven

his,

o

speak

f

what s commono citizens

equires

statement

bout

the

particular

orm

hese

ssumptions

ake

n

each

regime.

o

speak

f

politics

n

this

way,

ringing

o

ight

he

variety

f

regimes,

eems

o

essreasonablehan o consider

ll

citizens

s similar.

In

this

way

we

consciously

dopt

he

perspective

f

political

men,

who

tend oseeallthingsnthe ightf heir undamentalolitical

pinions.15

We differrom

olitical artisans

n

acknowledging

hat ach

particular

perspective ay

e imitednd

n

continuing

o

ask

by

what

measure,

y

what

omprehensive

irst

rinciple,

hedifferent

pinions

bout

worth

can be

compared

o one another.

Aristotle'sssertiont

this

oint

s that

ustice,

r

virtuen

associ-

ating,

makes

he

human irtues

whole

1283a37-40).

He

proposes

that

n

order

o

understand

ow

the

various uman

ualities

eemed

good

are ranked nd

ordered,

e must onsider

ow

thevirtues

ould

be unifiedntheustice fthebestman.Thisbestman omes osightt

the

nd

of

an

analysis

f

the

ualities

y

means

f

which

uman

eings

distinguish

hemselvesrom ne

another

nd from

he

est

f

nature,

r

are

free

s

human

eings.

he

bestman

xemplifies

he

overeignty

f

he

humanmultitudever

odily

ature,

ndthereforeconsideration

fhis

example

nables

s

to

come o

speak

f a

justice

efitting

ll

free

men.

To

repeat,

e contendhat case for

qual

political articipation

annot

be

madeuntilwe have

rticulated

he

tandard

y

which o

measure he

various laims f

hosewho

demand

o

be

treateds free.t

s,

however,

15.

Judgments

n

accordance

with

one's

self-interest

oth

result rom

nd

sup-

port

otal

views,

r

wholes

1280a14-25).

Similarly,

hefirst

ttempt

t

defining

a

citizen

imply

was

exposed

s

one

that

ucceeded

n

definingnly

democratic

citizen.



15/22

164

Aristotle

n


no

onger

trictly

orrecto

speak

n

terms ffreedomather

han

irtue,

since he tandard hichmen espectndbywhichheymeasure hem-

selves

s

understood

y

hem

o

be

worthy

f

respect

recisely

ecause t

is

not

merely

fhuman

making.

he

self-made

irtues

re

deemed irtues

in

the

ight

f

a

principle

enhave

not

made.

ThusAristotle

rgues

hatmen's

laims o honors

onstitute

he

ub-

stance f

political isputes,

nd he

asserts is ntentiono resolve uch

disputes,

t least

n

principle,

y

teaching

bout he

ustice

f thebest

man,

or

man

par

excellence.

here

follow brief

bservation

n

the

threat

osed

o

regimes

yvery

xcellent

en nd

lengthy

xamination

ofkingship,hich eem oreflecthefollowingrainfthought.laims

to honors

mply pinions

bout auses n

the

ight

f which

ertain

u-

man

qualities

re

properly

eemed

irtues,

s

wellas

about

ausesof

virtue.

or

example,

o

say

that

ourage

s

virtue

nd a

characteristicf

a

free ndhonorable an

s to

mply

hat

man's ituations such hat e

ought

o combat

r

resist

ertain

orces,

uman r

natural.

o

say

that

courage

s

a

virtue

s

also

to

tempt

s

to ask what

makes

uman

eings

capable

f

t;

that

s,

what

atural

onditions

nd

what

uman

apacities

and

opinions

nablemen o

perform

he

ctswe

recognize

s

courageous.

For the akeofattaininglarity emightaise hese uestions,hichn

everyday

olitical

iscourse o

longer

ppearproblematical.

hus

we

must

eturn

o

a

consideration

f

nature,

s well s

freedom,

ut

we now

conceive

f

nature s thatwhich

makes

man's

reedom

r

virtue

eces-

sary

nd

possible,

ot

omething

ndifferent

o

t.

We

might

ish o

speak

of

the

first

rinciples

f such nature

s monarchs

mon-archai,

ni-

tary

irst

rinciples).

t

can then e said

that he

movementf Book

n

of the

Politicss

from

n

assertionbout

quality

nd

freedom,

r self-

rule,

or ll to an

examination

f

what

must e

supposed

o

be the ctual

rule fone.What auses hismovementsourreflectionnthemeaning

of

he

laim obe a free

man.

When

we

think

f the

causes

enabling

men o

do

as

they

hoose

n

politics,

e are

likely

o

think

irst

f

strength,

ealth,

nd

influential

friends

1284a20-22).

This,however,

s

insufficient,

or

men's

ctions

are

also affected

y

heir

esires

nd

by

peech

r

reason,

r

by

he

om-

binationf

these wo

n

their

pinions

boutwhat

s

good.Opinions,

s

much

s

physical

trength,

rea

causeofthe ctions f

freemen.

Hence,

also,

peech

ddressed

o

others as

strength

n

politics

s

rhetoric.

lti-

mately,trong ordsmust e basedon a knowledgef human eings,

their

assions

nd

theirmodes

f

reasoning,

nd

also of

what s

possible,

since he

purpose

f such

peech

s

to movemen.

We

might

ote

hat

when Aristotle irst

peaks

of

political

ule,

he

distinguishes

ree

or

po-

litical

men

by

their irtues. he

examples

given

re thefree

man who has



16/22

Delba

Winthrop

165

the

ourage

f a man

nd

the

ne

whohas

the

moderation,

r

discretion

inspeech,fa woman1277b17-23).Nowheaskswhats tobedone

with

ery ood

men,

ndhe

shows

ow

democracies

nd

tyrannies

end

to exclude

manifestlyuperior

enfrom

heir ities.

n

considering

he

causes

of such

behavior

1284al8,

1284a23-24,1284a25,

1284a31),

Aristotle

peaks

f

a

tyrant,

eriander

the

name

means

All-Around

Man ),

who

rules

city y

force

nd was once understood

synnoed)

by

nother

yrant

ithout

aving

ttered

word.

ristotle aintainshat

it is

not

imply ight

o

censure uch

yrants,

ecause hecauses

by

which

men

move,

he

principles

f

political

eeds,

re

strength

f

body

and the trengthhichwisdomffordso opinion.Strengthfbody

might

ellbe

used

n the

rejection

f

excellence,

ut

t

s,

of

course,

o

less

necessary

n

the

defense

f

excellence.)

he

tyrants,

r

monarchs,

mentionedere

mbody

he

rinciples

r

causes

fthe

irtue

manifest

n

politics,

ndtheir

resence

s

mplied,

ut

not

lways

bvious,

n

political

virtue.

hus

aking

he laim

f

freedom

ery eriously

eadsus

to

Aris-

totle's

oke

about

hermaphroditic

yrants,

ike

the

All-Around an

Periander.

hey

personify

olitical

irtue s

tyrants,

r freemen

par

excellence.

onetheless,

f

censure

f

such

yrants

s

not

imply ight

for hementionedeason,t srightn the ense hat he yrantsombine

the

extremes

f

bodily

nd

intellectual

trength

ithout

he

saving

phenomenon

f

the

mean

f

politics

nd

political

iscourse,

hich

s

most

haracteristicf

man,

he

olitical

nimal.

Taking

uman

yrantseriously ight

ead

us to ask whether holes

other han ities

re

ruled

n

the

ame

way.

n

other

ords,

ust

s

Peri-

ander ere

dvised

hrasyboulos

o

rule ver

city

f menmade

visibly

equal

ike levelfield f

corn,

re

there

auses

n

nature hose

ower

wedo not

ee,

but

which

onetheless

ule

ver he

isible

hole

s do

the

tyrants?nthis amepassage,Aristotlepeaks f men oogoodto be a

part

f

any

ity,

menwho

re

a

law

1284a13-14)

and

mages

fa

god

among

men

1284a10-11).

In

considering

hat

hey

re,

we can

mag-

inewhat

god

or

a first

ause

reminiscentf

Plato'sGoodwould

e

ike.

We are

told

y

Aristotle

1284b30-34)

that

hese

mages

f

god

ought

to be

made

kings;

ings,

ot

yrants.

he

tyrants,

n

ruling

hole

ities

of

men

mpress

s

with heir

mazing,uprahuman,

kills.

hey

ulenot

only

with

orce,

ut

by making

ature

ntelligible

o

themselvess

the

rule

f

force.

n

so

doing, hey

make

way

with

r

abstractrom

aphai-

reo) thebestmen or he akeofuniformity;enceAristotle'sompari-

son of

tyrannical

ule

o

democraticstracism.ut

kings

nd

mages

f

gods

emerge

rom

mong

he best

n

thebest

regime 1284b25-34),

and such monarchs an be

in

harmony

with ities.

A

king

s not

only

a

cause,

but

he is

presumably

cause

in

the

same

way

that hebest

part



17/22

166

Aristotle

n


of human

ature

s

a causeof

political

eeds,

ndhis

rule

s

compatible

with oliticalreedom. hat emainsobe seen s how uch monarch

is

in

harmony

ith

community

f

free

men nd

why

is

rule s neces-

sary.

A

king

ooks fter

he

ommon

ood

nd

s

thereby

istinguished

rom

a

tyrant,

ho rules

for

his

own benefit

1279a33-34,

1279b6-7).

A

king,

hen,

s

the

pitome

f

a freemanwho

participates

n

politics

or

the

ommon

ood.

In

this

espect

e fulfills

he laims

f

bothdemo-

crats

nd

oligarchs.)

t s

abouthim

hat

olitical

cientistsho

wish o

justifyarticipation

eed o

know.

Aristotleellsus that here reseveral inds fkings.As political

scientists,

trictlypeaking,

t

might

eem

hat

we need

not

oncern

ur-

selveswith he

king

who

s

said

to

have

greater

trength

han each

and

one

and

all

together,

ut s

not

held o be

superior

o the

multitude

of

free

men) (1286b35-37).

Briefly,

his

king

s similar

o the

best

man,

but

n

showing

hy

he

ule

f

a human

ing

wouldnot

be

preferable

o

theruleof a

multitude

f

free

men,

Aristotlenables

s

to

see

what

divine

eing,

who

surpasses

he besthuman

eing,

wouldhave to

be

like.16

is

being

s

like

human

oul,

but

better. he

besthuman

oul,

like heEgyptianoctors erewhomove hings,s characterizedyan

eros owardome

nd.

The

besthuman oul lso

egislates

nd

ays

down

or underliesaws. He

combines

ros nd

thymos's

n

the evelof

hu-

manity,

nd n

intending

o make

his

nobility

anifest,

e

generalizes

from is

own noble soul to

set

a

standard

or

otherhuman

beings.

Equally

with ther

ree

men

who

give

aws o

themselves

r are

aws

for

themselves,

e s

one

n

a multitude

hat s

manifoldn

body

nd

unitary

in

soul,

and for

whom

uling

nd

being

uled

hus

re

virtually

nter-

changeable.

is noble

assions

s

well

s his

reason

re

the

ause

ofhis

virtue. etbecausehe hasthepassionsmadepossible yman'sbodily

nature,

e

cannot e

expected

o

be

either

elfless

r

mmortal;

o

perhaps

he should ule

only

n

a

multitude.

hen,

were

we

still o

insist

hat

king's

ule s

beneficial,

e would

have

to

imagine king ompletely

devoid

f

elfish

assions

ecause

evoid

f

body,

ut

herefore

lso de-

void of

will.He would

be

perfect

eason.

To

the

extent

hat

he had

bodily trength

ver ach

and

one

and

all in

order o

guard

is

rule,

that

trength

ould

e

nothing

ore han

ach and one and all's

being

what

hey

re

n

a

nature

uled

y

he

egularity

e

call

a

law

ofnature.

To setdown uch king, ristotleays,sthework f goodman.

16.

Nic.

Ethics,

178b7-32.

17.

bid.,

1113a31-33.

18.

Politics,

286a17-20,

1287a28-32.



18/22

Delba

Winthrop

167

The

reign

f

his

ing

was

prior,

nd

he

was

replaced

y

men f

virtue,

whohappenedobecome umerous.e is not he ause of humanx-

cellence,

ut

s

prior19

nthe

ense

hat heres no defense

f

he

trivings

by

whichman

ttempts

o

overcome isbaseness

fhe

does

not

uppose

that

erfection

s

in

principleossible.

uch

king

s

believed

o exist

and

to be

beneficialr

to

bring hingsogether

y

thosewho

eek

aws

that

give

ommandsbout

what efalls

ne

and

compare olitics

o

an

art

1286a9-12).

To

live

by

the aw of

menwho

deliberate

obly

s

to

suppose

hat irtues

possible

nd

good,

r

prudent.

hen

we

connect

freedom

ith

hoice,

we

necessarily

onnect

t

with

ood

hoice ecause

we also connectreedom ith nimpededction. nactionwhichs not

impeded

might

e

said to be

according

o

nature.

o even

he

freest

c-

tion

must e

chosenwith

ome

knowledge

f

what

ature

ermits.aking

seriously

an's

esire o

be

free hus eadsus to

postulate

hat ature

s

ruled

either

y

mere orce

or

by

a moral

eing

who

gives

ommands,

but

by

rational

eing:

perfect

rtisan,

soul

superior

o human

oul

in

acking

ll

passions,

perfect

udge,

ncorruptible

r

eternal.

e is

the

god

ofwhich

he

philosopher

s

an

image.

e

is

not

he

ame

s

the ree

manmoved

y

thedesire

o

do

well,

lthough

uch

desire

eads

us

to

formulaterule ompatible ith reedom1287a28-30). Politicalmen

participatey making

heir

wn

order

within

n

orderly

ature,

hich

they

an

suppose

o

be ordered

n

such

way

s to

permit

hem

o

act

well.

Political

hilosophersarticipate

ymaking

his

ecessaryremise

offreedomrvirtue

xplicit.

We seemto have

overstepped

he

bounds

f

academic

ropriety

n

suggesting

hat

political

cientists

articipate

y becoming

eachers

f

natural cience

nd

theology,

ut

Aristotle's

oint

s

that

his

eeming

impropriety

s,

n

fact,

oth

roper

nd

necessary.

his s not

o

say

hat

weoughtoneglect oliticsnthenarrowerense suallyssignedoit.

Hence

we

should

eturn,

y

means

fa

brief

onsiderationfAristotle's

solution,

o the

more

pecificuestion

f

what

olitical

cientistsan

do

about

articipatory

emocracy.

III

With

Aristotle,

e have

attempted

o

ascertain

hether

nd how

par-

ticipatoryemocracy ighte ustified. ehave ontendedhatnorder

19.

At

1275bl-3,

Aristotle

romises

clarificationf

the

manner

n

which

ight

regimes

re

prior.

n

the

Metaphysics,

e are

reminded

hat

emporal

riority

s

only

one kindof

priority.

ristotle,

etaphysics,

rans.

Hugh

Tredennick

Cam-

bridge,

Mass: Harvard

University

ress,

935),

1018b9-29.



19/22

168

Aristotle

n

Participatory

emocracy

to

ascertain

he

ustness

f

democracy

r

any

other

egime,

e need o

measurepecificallyoliticalqualitynd nequality.

Aristotle

resents

s

with

democratic

itizen,

ho

nitially

rgues

that

udging

nd

ruling

re somehow onnected ith

manifesting

he

complete

uman

eing

nd

also that

very

itizen,

ut

only

citizen,

s

capable

of

udging

nd

ruling.

e identifiesuman

nd

political

eing.

Yet this

pokesman

ries o

establish

he

ustice

f

democracy

n

particu-

lar

by

nvoking

rguments

o

prove

hat

emocracy

s

by

nature

ight

because

human

ity

s

properly

odeled n

a

nature

omposed

f

bodies,

ach

of

which

s

a

one

and an

equal.

n

so

arguing,

e

forgets

abouthishumanityltogether.anresemblesodily aturewhen ne

abstracts romwhat

distinguishes

imfrom ther

eings,

hat

s,

his

freedom,

r his

capacity

o

be

the

ause

of

his

own

being

nsofar

s

he

can determineis nd nd

ct n

accordance

ith is

determination.

his

is

not

o

suggest

hat

he

body

an be

forgotten,

ut

hat

mphasizing

t

distractshe

democrat

rom

making

herelevant

rgument.

ow

can

it

be

said

that

itizenship

ontributeso the

bility

o

do

well

nd that he

citizen

ecessarily

as

this

bility,

stablishing

hat

itizensre

equal

as

freemen?

his

rgument

s

attempted

y

Aristotlen

behalf f

he

emo-

cratnthe ontextfhis tatementnkingship.

Aristotle

ritesn

a

democracy,

ut

holds

hat

emocracy

s not

n-

evitable.

e,

too,

s

conscious

f

he

problem

fwould-bentidemocratic

democratic

lites. heir

resence

s

indicated

arly

n

Book

III

in the

correctionf

the

first efinitionf a

citizen,

or

hey

rovoke

he tate-

ment

hat

citizens one who

has

the

power

o

judge

nd deliberate

with

kill.

ower

nd

skill

o

not

lways,

ut

might

oincide. ristotle

demonstrates

he

good

citizenship

f

the

political

hilosopher.

hile

e

attempts

o make

he

powerful

ore

apable

nd

defendsheir

ower

only nsofars itis defensible,e reconcileshemore killed o their

relative

owerlessness.211

his

he

does

by

arguing

n a

certain

ay

that

democracy

s

ust.

His

way

makes

emocracy

ore

ust

nd

at the

ame

time

rovides

n

explanation

f

alternatives

uperior

o

democratic

iti-

zenship.

t

shows

when

nd

why

democratic

articipation

houldbe

chosen.

Whatwe are

shown

s

that

ccording

o

which

he

king

whodoes

everythingccording

o his

own ntention

ules

1287a8-10).

That

according

o which

king

ules

s an

each

an

individual)

ho

rules

by udging,ndtheking's wnrule s constitutedy udging.Weoffer

the

ollowing

xplanation

f

he

meaning

fAristotle's

bsolute

ingship.

20.

ContrastAristotle's efense

f

democracy

with

his

immoderate

ttackon

immoderate

emocracy

n

Book

v,

at

1292a4-38.



20/22

Delba

Winthrop

169

The democrat's

ecessary

rgument,

hat

itizenship

ontributes

o

a

man's bilityo do well ndthat citizen asthis bility,s bestmade

with

eference

o

themanner

nwhich

judge

r

uror

makes

udgments

(1287a25-27, 1287a41-b3,

287b15-17,

287b23-24,

287b25-29).

When ne

udges

n a

court

f

aw,

he

supposes

hathe

udges

n ac-

cordance ith

aw and

accepts

he

uthority

f the

aw

and

of the

gov-

ernment

hat

asmade t. n

thewords

f

ne uch

udge:

Judicial

ower resupposes

n established

overnment

apable

of

enacting

aws

and

enforcing

heir

xecution,

nd

of

appointing

judges

to

expound

nd administer

hem. he

acceptance

f

the

judicial

ffices a

recognition

f the

uthority

fthe

government

from hich

t

s

derived.21

The

judge

or

juror

does not

suppose

hat

he

makes

aws.

Rather,

n

judging

e s confrontedith contradiction

ither

etweenhe

aw

and

someone

who

has

broken

t,

as

did

Socrates,

or

xample,

r

between

citizens

hohave

ome

laims

gainst

achother.

et in theface

f

an

objection

othe

aw,

ne s

forced

o

reaffirmr

reject

t,

nd

n

applying

it

to a

case

presently

ot overed

y

t,

o

expand

he

aw.

n

fact,

hen,

hedoes egislate hen e udges.He does o in a way hat emindss of

the

procedure

f a scientist ho

examines

is

own

working

ypothesis,

deliberately

evising

is

aws

as he

tests

hem

n

the

face of manifest

exceptions

nd

omissions.

In a

democracy,

emocratsake

pparent

imilaritiesnd

equalities

too

seriously.

his

defective

erception

oincidentally

erves

he nterest

of

ach

democrat,

ho

s

thereby

nabled o

perceive

emocratic

quality

as

right.

n

legislating,

emocrats

ake

general

ules

or

he

many

ike

themselves.

n

udging,

owever,

democrat

ight

etter

isregard

im-

self ndthemanyikehimself,ither ecause he ud

aristotle on participatory democracy-winthrop, delba-polity volume 11 issue 2 1978

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