aristotle on soul and soul-‘parts’ in semen

7/30/2019 Aristotle on Soul and Soul-Parts in Semen

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Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2009 DOI: 10.1163/156852509X339879

Mnemosyne 62 (2009) 378-400 brill.nl/mnem

Aristotle on Soul and Soul-Parts in Semen(GA 2.1, 735a4-22)

Abraham P. BosVrije Universiteit, Faculteit der Wijsbegeerte,De Boelelaan 1105, 1081 HV Amsterdam, Te Netherlands

[email protected]

Received: January 2008; accepted: April 2008

Abstract

Aristotle, Generation of Animals2.1, 735a4-22 speaks about semen and soul. Tepassage speaks about the soul and the parts. Against all current interpretations itis argued that Aristotle means the soul in its entirety and the parts of the soul. Itis proposed that the Greek text edited by Drossaart Lulofs in 735a22 be correctedby accepting the reading of ms Z.

Keywords

Aristotle, Generation of Animals, soul-theory, biology, procreation

1. Introduction

Generation of Animals2.1, 735a4-22 raises the question whether semenpossesses soul. We could call it a study in semen-tics. Te passage talksabout the soul and the parts.1) Modern critics are clear on the meaning

1) Arist. GA 2.1, 735a4-22: , . . , .

. . .


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of the passage, which they translate and explain along the same lines.

According to this interpretation, the passage talks about the soul and theparts of the body. But the same text admits of an entirely different explana-tion. In this alternative interpretation Aristotle talks about the soul in itsentirety and the parts of the soul. Below I reproduce the translation byPeck (1942, 155-7). A number of arguments are then offered which seemto support this explanation. But next I want to see which elements in

Aristotles oeuvre could point in a different direction. Finally, I propose an

alternative translation.

ranslation by Peck:As for the question whether the semen possesses Soul or not, the same argumentholds as for the parts of the body, viz., (a) no Soul will be present elsewherethan in that of which it is the Soul; (b) no part of the body will be such inmore than name unless it has some Soul in it (e.g., the eye of a dead person).

Hence it is clear both that semen possesses Soul, and that it is Soul,potentially.And there are varying degrees in which it may bepotentiallythat which it iscapable of beingit may be nearer to it or further removed from it (just as asleeping geometer is at a further remove than one who is awake, and a wakingone than one who is busy at his studies). So then, the cause of this process offormation is not any part of the body, but the external agent which first setthe movement goingfor of course nothing generates itself, though as soonas it has been formed a thing makes itself grow. Tat is why one part is formedfirst, not all the parts simultaneously. And the part which must of necessity beformed first is the one which possesses the principle of growth: be they plantsor animals, this, the nutritive, faculty is present in all of them alike (this alsois the faculty of generating another creature like itself, since this is a functionwhich belongs to every animal and plant that is perfect in its nature). Tereason why this must of necessity be so is that once a thing has been formed,it must of necessity grow. And though it was generated by another thing bear-

ing the same name (e.g., a man is generated by a man), it grows by means ofitself. So then, since it makes itself grow, it issomething. (underlinings added)

. . , .

. ext Drossaart Lulofs 1965. Underlinings added. In the following I will propose toread in 735a7: and in 735a22: .


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2005 saw the publication of an excellent Dutch translation by R. Ferwerda.

Te translations of Peck and Ferwerda are in complete agreement. Bothtranslate the crucial elements as parts of the body and no part of thebody. Te same goes for the translation by P. Louis (1961, 56), who notes:les parties du corps. D. Lanza (1971, 888-9), Balme,2) and A. Platt3) readthe parts but in fact make the same choice. Likewise the interpretation byC. Lefvre (1972, 58).

2. Arguments in Favour of the Traditional Interpretation

(a) GA2.1 uses the parts Fifteen imes to Denote the parts of the body

Generation of Animals2.1 talks constantly about parts. Te chapter dealswith the question how a plant or an animal is formed from seed and what

entity is responsible for forming the parts. Te heart, lungs, liver, eye arementioned as examples of these parts (2.1, 734a17). Te word part/partsis used fifteen times in this sense in chapter 1, not including the passagequoted above.4) So it seems natural, when the passage mentions parts thrice,to assume that this again refers to parts of the body, though the Greek textdoes not explicitly indicate what parts are meant.

(b) An eye is a Partof the Body, like a face or fleshTe interpretation of Peck and Ferwerda can also base itself on the factthat 2.1, 735a7-8 seems to repeat the more extensive passage in 734b24-7,where Aristotle also applies the principle of homonymy. In 734b25 he saysthat after fertilization each one of the parts gets formed and acquires Soul.It acquires Soul, because there is no such thing as face, or flesh either,

2) Balme 1972, 61: And has the seed soul or not? Te same reasoning applies to it as to theparts. For there can be no soul in anything except in that of which it is in fact the soul, norcan there be a part unless it has some soul, with commentary on p. 157.3) In Barnes 1984, I 1140-1: Has the semen soul, or not? Te same argument applies hereas in the question concerning the parts. As no part, if it participate not in soul, will be a partexcept homonymously (. . .) so no soul will exist in anything except that of which it is soul;it is plain therefore that semen both has soul, and is soul, potentially (with only minorchanges compared with the 1912 Oxford edition).4) Both and occur. Peck (1942, xlvii-xlix) devotes an entry to the word, pay-ing attention only to the meaning parts of the body. For parts of soul, cf. lviii.


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without Soul in it; and though they are still said to be face and flesh after

they are dead, these terms will be names merely (homonyms), just as ifthe things were to turn into stone or wooden ones (transl. Peck).5)

It is clear there that the parts are ensouled and therefore parts of thebody. Tis is also the case in Generation of Animals1.19, 726b22-4, where

Aristotle states: For a hand or any part is not a hand or a part if it does notcontain a soul or some other power: they only bear the same name.6) So itdoes not seem far-fetched to see the parts of 735a6 as harking back to

what was just said, in almost the same way, about the parts of the body.Moreover, 735a8 talks about an eye. Tis can also be taken as a randomexample of a bodily part.

3. What is Aristotles Point in the Traditional Interpretation?

So did Aristotle try to clarify the question Is there soul in semen? by pos-ing the comparable question: Is there soul in a bodily part?? And did hesolve this problem by saying that a soul is always the soul of a specific livingcreature, and that no part of it does not participate in the soul of the entirecreature? And is he pointing out once again that a part of an animal orhuman being that does not participate in the soul of this animal or humanbeing as a whole is not a part of such a living creature, that is to say, not a

real hand or foot or eye? In that case it is only homonymously a foot or aneye. What argumentative force did Aristotle therefore attribute to the com-parison? After all, semen is semen of the begetter and as such not a part ofthe new specimen. Does he mean that, just as all parts of the begettersbody are ensouled, his semen is ensouled too? But then how are we tointerpret the conclusion in 735a8? Is it a double conclusion on the soulor is it a two-part conclusion that talks about the soul and the parts of the

5) GA 2.1, 734b24-7:, , . Cf. 2.5, 741a10-3: .6) Louis (1961, 215) refers to this text. Lefvre (1972, 57) notes that Nuyens saw thesetexts as evidence of the hylomorphistic character of the conception in GA, inasmuch as they

argue the presence of soul in all parts of the body. Lefvre is sceptical (59) and points to 2.1,734a14-6, which says explicitly that soul must always be in a partof the body.


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body? And how does the addition potentially function? Aristotles con-

ciseness again demands a choice here. Does he mean: so it is clear that(semen) possesses (soul) and potentially is (soul)?7) Or: so it is clear that(semen) possesses (soul) and is (a bodily part) potentially (participatingin soul)? Te first option is highly problematical. o have soul is quitedifferent from being soul. According to De anima2.1, 412a19; a27-8,the natural body of the soul can potentially possess life. But it cannotbe life.

So we should in any case consider the second option. But it is unclearwhy Aristotle would say of bodily parts that they potentially participate insoul.8) Had he not said in 734b24-5 that there is no face or flesh of anembryo that does not possess soul? We should bear in mind, though, that

Aristotle also says in De motu animalium 10 that the soul of a living crea-ture is notpresent in all parts of the living creature, but only in its centralpart, i.e. in the heart (or its analogue). Te other parts possess life because

they are connectedwith it.9)An interesting text in this connection isMetaphysicsZ 16, which asks

what an ousia is. Tis status is denied to Earth or Water. More eligiblecandidates are said to be the parts of ensouled entities and the (parts) ofthe soul (1040b10-1). Because Aristotle clarifies this with a reference tothe phenomenon that both parts of some animals, when bisected, live on,he seems to be thinking here of millipedes and the like.10) Could it be that

7) Tus Peck and Ferwerda. Lanza 1971, 888: perci chiaro che il seme possiedeunanima e che potenzialmente anima and Vinci & Robert 2005, 216. Louis (1961, 56)goes off on a different tack: Il est vident que la semence a une me et que cette me est enpuissance. Balme (1972, 61) reads here: Clearly therefore it does have soul and existspotentially.8) It is striking that Aristotle here does not use to have, to possess (), but to share

in, to participate (). For this, see GA 1.23, 731a32; 2.1, 732a11; a12; 732b29;de An. 2.1, 412a15 in contrast to a17; a20; a28.9)MA 10, 703a14 and a36: , , . Aristotle had already stated in 9, 702b15 that the principle of motion is to besituated in the centre of the living creature. Tis is one of the reasons which led Nuyens andhis followers to talk about development in Aristotles philosophy, and to assign MA to histransitional phase but GA and de An. to his late, hylomorphistic phase.

10)Metaph. 6.16, 1040b14. On the skolopendrai, cf. HA 4.2, 531b28 ff.; PA 4.6, 682b4;IA 7, 707b2-4 and Bos 2007.


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in our text, too, Aristotle is thinking of the phenomenon that, when some

plants and insects (e.g. some worms) are cut into pieces, their parts live onand produce a new plant or insect? Aristotle explains this phenomenon bystating that these plants possess one soul actually, but many souls poten-tially.11) Is perhaps the point of comparison that both semen and the partsof visible bodies possess the soul dormantly, without the soul itself beingactivated? We should note, however, that such an explanation assumesextensive knowledge of Aristotles discussions in other writings. Te con-

text of this passage in itself does not suggest this avenue of approach. Andit seems to be virtually ruled out by the examples of face and flesh.

4. Objections to Pecks Explanation

But there are also arguments against the explanation proposed by Peck and

other modern exegetes. o start with, it is hard to understand why Aristotlebelieves that a reference to the ensouled parts of a living body could clarifywhy semen possesses soul. Next, a first reading of the sentence in 735a5 onthe parts may suggest that it is talking about the parts of the soul or aboutthe parts of the semen referred to in the preceding interrogative clause.

(a) Te Semen and the Parts of the Semen

It is not entirely unthinkable that Aristotle would talk about parts of thesemen. He is familiar with the possibility of multiple births as the result ofone fertilization (GA 1.18, 723b9-11). And he has proved in 2.1, 733b32-734a16 that the parts of the new living creature are produced by a partof the embryo which must have been present in the semen. In 734a33-b3he declares that the semen contains no part of the new specimen of a liv-ing creature.

(b) Te Entire Soul and the Parts of the Soul

But it is also conceivable that Aristotle is referring to the parts of the soul.He makes it very clear that he is addressing a major problem in the theory

11) See Long. 6, 467a18-30, esp. a29:

. Cf. de An. 2.2, 413b18-9: , (text quoted from Jannone 1966).


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of reproduction, viz. the question by what entity specific plants and spe-

cific animals are formed,12)

that is to say, the parts of these animals andplants (733b32). His thesis is that it must be something external, or some-thing in the male semen and seed, either a part of a soul or a soul orsomething that possesses soul.13) Of these four options he goes on toexclude the option that something external is the productive principle,and then that it is something in the semen itself which does not form partof the semen (734a2-13). Only two options remain, that the productive

entity is present in the semen and is either soul or a soul-part.14) Tis meansthat Aristotle speaks at least once in chapter 1 about a part in the sense ofasoul-part, and does so, importantly, in the formulation of the problemthat he proposes to solve and that amounts to the question whether theproductive principle should be identified with soul or with a part of thesoul. And this makes sense, because the question being asked is what entityis responsible for producingall parts of the body. Clearly this entity cannot

itself be a bodily part.When he now asks in 735a4: Does semen possess soul or not?, he is

determining whether the first of the two remaining options from 733b33-734a1 is valid. And when he continues: Te same dilemma applies to theparts, it could be, and it is in fact natural to assume, that he is thinking ofthe second remaining option from 733b33-734a1, and is therefore askingwhether semen possesses the parts of a soul. Tis turns out to be relevant,for it will become clear further on that the bodily part which is produced

12) GA 2.1, 733b23-4: , . In 2.3, 736b5 Aristotle seems to indicate a problem of evengreater weight: . . . . . . .13) GA 2.1, 733b32-734a1: , , . For parts

of the soul, see also: de An. 1.1, 402b9; b10: , b12; 5, 411b2;14; 16; 25; 2.2, 413b7; b14; b27; 3.9, 432a19; a23; 432b2-3; 10, 433b1; Sens. 1, 436a1;

Mem. 1, 449b5;Juv. 1, 467b17; b21; b26; 2, 468a28; PA 1.1, 641b10; GA 2.1, 735a12(see below); 3, 736a30; 737a22 (see below); 4, 741a2;Metaph. 6.16, 1040b11; EN1.13,1102b4; 6.2, 1139a9; b12; 5, 1140b25; Pol. 1.5, 1254b8-9; 13, 1260a11; Ph. 7.3, 247a6;247b1; 248a8. See also Bonitz, Index864b8-865a53 and Feola 2006; Bastit 1996; Whiting2002.14) Tis removes the basis of the entire argument put forward by Hinton (2006). Tis author

states incorrectly on p. 370: the seed is not the type of thing that could bear any soul forit is just a residue of a living being and not itself a living being.


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first, the heart or the analogue of the heart,15) is produced in all living crea-

tures by the vegetative or procreative soul-part. If the semen of a catpossessed soul but not the vegetative/nutritive soul-part, the process ofproducing the bodily parts of young kittens would not get under way.

And, conversely, Aristotle holds that chickens do pass on the nutritive/vegetative soul-part to an egg they lay, but that the sensitive soul-part iscontributed by the cock alone. Tat is why a wind egg (an unfertilizedegg) does not yield a chicken (2.5, 741a6-32).

In comparable fashion Aristotle in De anima2.1, 412b6-17 first postu-lates the unity of the soul and its instrumental sma; and in 412b17-3a5explains the unity of the parts of the soulwith the instrumental body ofthe soul.16) He contrasts there the eye as the visual facultys instrumentalbody with the entire sensitive body as the bearer of the faculty of sense ingeneral17) and observes that it must be connected with the soul-body, evenif this faculty is dormant in every respect. In this context Aristotle also

notes that an axe which cannot be used for chopping is an axe only in ahomonymous sense and a stone eye or a painted eye an eye only homony-mously, because it cannot perform the function of seeing (of the soul-partwhich is called the anima sensitiva). Studying the consequences attendanton the bisection of insects, he also concludes that the various functions orparts of the soul do not occur separately from each other,18) as Plato hadclaimed.

15) We have already seen Aristotles repeated assertion that no part of the bodyis present insemen. He rejects the preformation theory and opts for the epigenesis theory. Cf. GA 1.17,721b6 and 18, 725a21, and Bos 2003, 149-50.16) Tere we also have a clear contrast between (412b10) and (412b13). Cf. Bos 2003, 103-9.

All modern translators opt for parts of the body here too. Likewise Whiting 2002, 145n. 4; Shields 2007, 290. But de An. 2.1, 413a4-5 shows clearly that Aristotle talked aboutthe parts of the soul.17) Aristotle there sets the single sense of sight with its bearer (the eye) against the entirefaculty of sense (412b24) with the entire body which is the bearer of the faculty of sense.Tis must be connected with semen, he says there in 412b24-8, even though it ismere potentiality.18) de An. 1.5, 411b24-6: ,

, . . . . Cf. 2.2,413b19-24; 3, 415a1-3 and Whiting 2002, 142-50.


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(c) Te Eye is the Instrument of the Sensitive Soul-Part

We can note in this connection that the example of the eye of a dead per-son in 735a8 differs significantly from the example in 734b24-5 of theface or flesh. Te eye is the instrument of one of the five sensory facultieswhich together form the anima sensitiva,19) or the soul-partthat is typical ofan animal as opposed to a plant.20) So if Aristotle had used the example ofthe face or flesh here in 735a8, it would be natural to assume that theparts in 735a6 refers to the parts of the body.21) But now that he uses theexample of the eye, it may be, and is in fact likely, that his focus here, asin De anima2.1, 412b17 ff., is on the parts of the soul. In that case hisargument is that semen which does not take part in the sensitive soul-partis no more semen than a stone eye is a bearer of sensitive soul-activity.

(d) Philosophical Relevance

We should note, too, that it is philosophically relevant if Aristotle in735a4-6 poses the (new) question whether semen also possesses the partsof the soul, but not relevant if he mentions (again) the ensouled nature ofthe bodily parts. Living creatures of a higher order than plants possessmore than one soul-part: horses at least two and human beings at leastthree (cf. 2.3, 736a35-b8). Because these soul-parts do not become opera-tive at the same time, it makes sense to consider whether only one soul-

part is initially present in semen and the others later, or whether they areall present in semen from the outset, but start to function successively andnot at the same time.

If this is right, we will have to take semen as the subject of in735a7 and will then have to correct to . Te erroneous read-ing of the manuscripts may be due to the fact that a scribe was still think-ing of the passage 734b24-5, which talks about face and flesh.

19) 412b28-9 mentions sense () and sight () as the two conditions ofactuality and potentiality for the anima sensitiva.20) GA 2.3, 736a30: . 5, 741a9-13.

Cf. de An. 2.3, 414a32-b3.21) But even then we would have to take into account GA 2.5, 741a9-13.


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(e) In what Way does Semen Possess Soul?

It is worthwhile to look more closely at the question broached in 2 above.What does Aristotle exactly mean by the question: Does semen possesssoul or not?22) He has given an explicit answer to this question in Genera-tion of Animals2.3, 736b29-737a5. Semen is not the instrumental body(sma organikon) of the soul. In De anima2.1 Aristotle explains that thesoul itself is not asma, but something that is inextricably linked to anatural body. Semen, however, possesses soul inasmuch as it contains thissoul plus its instrumental body. For this instrumental body is the vitalheat orpneuma. Aristotle says this in as many words in Generation of Ani-mals2.3: Te semen of all living creatures contains within itself its causeof being fertile, viz. the so-called vital heat. Tis vital heat is not fire or anysuch power but thepneumawhich is enclosed within the semen and in thefoam-like stuff; it is the active substance which is inpneuma, which is an

analogue of the astral element.23)

It ispneuma(or the vital heat) which is properly the bearer of the souland possesses the soul actually or potentially. And it is semen as the con-tainer ofpneumathat is compared by Aristotle in 734b9-17 to a windingmechanism of which the parts are successively set in motion. Semen isnot properly the bearer of the (immaterial) soul, but is the container of

pneuma.24) Te heat and the quality ofpneumacan differ in the semen of

one animal species compared with that of another (GA 2.3, 737a1 ff.). As22) On this important subject, see Longrigg 1985; Coles 1995. Te above-mentioned arti-cle by Hinton (2006) fails to shed light on this subject.23) GA 2.3, 736b33-737a1. Pneuma is an equivalent (analogon) of the astral element,because it is equally an instrumental body of the soul and a bearer of life-giving power.24) Cf.Mu. 4, 394b9-11, wherepneumais described as: . Cf. Reale & Bos 1995, 285-8.

Te authorship ofOn the cosmoshas always been hotly contested. Te discussion has beenradically affected by the conclusion of Barnes in his review of Reale, G. 1974. Aristotele.rattato Sul cosmo per Alessandro (Napoli) in Classical Review 27 (1977), 440-3 that thereare no intrinsic arguments left for denying Aristotles authorship. But he believes thatvocabulary and style do invalidate it. Barnes considers the works likely date to be before250 BC. Schenkeveld (1991, 221-55) argued for a date between 350-200 BC. But his dat-ing of the work on the basis of language and style raises a new problem: which anonymousand highly skilled author in this period would want to present his own ideas as Aristotelian

in this way and why? oday we are able to recognize that the rejection ofOn the cosmosandofDe spiritu was the result of the same erroneous understanding of Aristotles psychology.


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a consequence, one instrumental body of a soul differs from that of another

and one soul may display vital activity on a higher level than another. Tatis the gist ofDe anima1.3, 407a13-26, where Aristotle explains that thelevel of functioning of the soul depends on the quality of the receiver (, b21) of the soul.25)

(f ) Te Vegetative Soul-Part First

It is essential to Aristotles argument in this passage that, in the process inwhich the new specimen is formed, not all bodily parts are formed at thesame time, but one first and then others. And the starting-point is that nopart of the body is present in semen. Te part of the body that is formedfirst must therefore be produced, but it cannot be produced by a part ofthe body. Tis first part of the body, like all subsequentparts of the body, isproduced by the soul and its instrumental body. Aristotles point is that

the production of the parts of a new specimen of the species man alwaysinvolves the heart, the lungs, the eyes of a human being, and so this specificform of a human being must guide the production process as a rational(structural) principle (GA 2.1, 734a29-33).26) And it is a consequence ofthe difference in quality of souls that the first bodily part to be producedin the case of higher animals and man is the heart, and in the case of insectsand plants an analogue. So the heart or very first part, according to Aris-

totle, is that which possesses the principle of growth, or, in other words:which possesses the nutritive (part of the soul). Tis is the principle thatbegets a new specimen which is exactly like itself.27)

25) Cf. Bos 2003, 31-46.26) Tis is entirely disregarded by Hinton (2006).

27) GA 2.1, 735a15-22: . . What Aristotle calls here is referred to in 2.3,736a35 as . See also de An. 2.2, 413b7: and 4, 415a23: , , . , and 416a19: , and 416a19 and b15-8. So the heart

is the first part of the bodythat is produced by the vegetative-procreative soul-part, but isnotitself the nutritive principle.


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In 735a23 Aristotle goes on by establishing that in some animals the

heart is the first differentiated part of the body. But this heart is not theprinciple of growth or the nutritive or that which begets a new specimenwhich is exactly like itself. Te nutritive is the firstpart of the soul. If theheart is the first differentiated part of the body, the nutritive soul-part mustbe present in it (just as the soul in its entirety resides in the heart accordingto Aristotle).28) But this means that the sentence: Tat is why one part isformed first, not all their parts simultaneously (735a14-5), though refer-

ring to the heart that is formed as the first part of the body, does so in anargument designed to show that the vegetative soul-part must be the firstto function and produces a bodily part specifically geared to it, and thatlater the eyes and the ears are produced, because the sensitive soul-part isactivated later than the vegetative.29)

Summarizing: the heart, as the first part of the body of the new livingcreature, while not yet being present in the semen of the begetter, is pro-

duced by the vegetative part of the soul, which therefore must have beenpresent in the semen.

(g) Not either . . . or but and . . . and

Te question with which Aristotle begins this intriguing text is a clear dis-junction: Does semen possess soul or not? His answer is that the problem

has not yet been correctly formulated: semen does and does notpossesssoul.30) For semen possesses soul, but not actually, only potentially. Semenpasses on the soul-principle, but the soul is not yet activated in any way inthis process. Tis cannot be said in the same sense of a bodily part, for

28) Cf. Peck 1942, 157 note d. In GA 2.1, 734a14 Aristotle had said: . See alsoMA 10, 703a14-6.

29) Cf. GA 2.3, 736a35-b5. By 736b2: Aristotledoes not mean that the parts of the bodyare not formed simultaneously, but that the partsof the soulare not actualized at the same time. See also 2.5, 740b29-741a3.30) Cf. Vinci & Robert 2005, 207. Aristotle applies the same procedure in 734b2-7, afterstating that the entity responsible for producing the parts of the visible body must resideeither in the semen or outside of it, and that it must needs be one or other of the two. Hissolution in 734b6 is: . Aristotle had solved theEleatic problem of being and non-being in the same way in Ph. 1.3, 186a24:

(sc. Parmenides), and 9, 192a4: , .


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instance an eye of a human being or animal; or of a face or of flesh. An

eye and a face or flesh are always something of an animal or human beingthat is actually alive and that, even when asleep, carries out all kinds of vitalprocesses (of digestion, respiration, etc.).31) But this might equally be saidof the parts of the soul. Semen also does and does not possess the parts ofthe soul. For semen possesses the parts of the soul, but not actually, onlypotentially.

Tis insight also sheds light on a passage in the important chapter 2.1 of

De anima. Aristotle repeatedly talks there about the natural body of thesoul as potentially possessing life.32) Aristotle is thinking here of a bodywhich does not possess life actually on the one hand and potentially on theother (like the body of a dog that is asleep),33) but a body of which theentire souland all the soul-partsare dormantly present.34) Tat is the situa-tion in which the soul is the first entelechy. Aristotle emphasizes thiscrucial point further on in the same chapter: though semen and karposdo

not have soul in actuality, they differ essentially from a corpse because theydo possess soul in potentiality.35) Tis text, in relation to the discussion inGeneration of Animals, makes it crystal clear that Aristotle regards semen ora fruit (e.g. a grain of corn or a beech-nut) as a body that seemsstone-dead,because no vital activity can be detected in it, but as differing essentially

31) Cf. Ph. 8.6, 259b8: , , . Cf. Whiting 2002, 152-3, who refers to Somn.Vig.1, 454b30-455a3 and 2, 456a25-7.32) de An. 2.1, 412a19-20: . Cf. 412a27: .33) A similar situation is referred to in GA 2.5, 741a10-3. For this problem, see Hbner1999. Polansky (2007, 154 n. 13) also takes Aristotle to speak about having life in poten-

tiality when the living being is actually alive.34) de An. 2.1, 412a23-4: .Barbotins translation is correct here: Car le fait dtre anim comporte les deux tats deveille et de sommeil. Tat of Ross (1961, 211) is wide of the mark: For both sleep andwaking involve the presence of the soul. Just as misleading is Peck (1942, lvii): an animalcan have Soul in it and yet be asleep.35) de An. 2.1, 412b25-7: ,. Cf. GA 2.3, 736a32:

.


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from the corpse of a deceased animal or human being, because it has allthe

vitalpotentialitiesof its kind in it. And Aristotle says this in an expositionon the parts (412b18), which in 413a5 are said to be the parts of thesoul. We shall therefore have to translate 735a8-9 as: Hence it is clear that(semen) has (soul) and that (semen) is (participatory in the parts of thesoul), potentially.36)

But the statement that semen has soul must of course tally with thedefinition of soul which Aristotle gives in De anima2.1. Tis is another

compelling argument against the translation of in De anima2.1,412a28 and 412b6 as equipped with organs, for there are no organs insemen. We shall have to interpret thepneumain semen as the instrumen-tal body of the soul.37)

(h) Degrees of Potentiality

Against the background of the fundamental distinctions in De anima2.1it is also easier to understand why Aristotle in Generation of Animals2.1,735a9-11 elaborates the distinction between potentiality and actuality inthree steps, while in De anima2.1 he confines this to two steps. In Deanima2.1, 412a9 Aristotle notes that the entelechy is the eidosof some-thing that serves as matter. But he adds: Now there are two kinds of ent-elechy, corresponding to knowledge and to reflecting. Tis is repeated in

36) GA 2.1, 735a8: () . In my view, thisinterpretation is more in line with Aristotles argument than , asthe modern translations assume. Cf. Lefvre 1972, 71: le sperme a une me; il est me, enpuissance. Semen is always asma. It therefore cannot be soul in the sense of the eidosorthe entelechy. Cf. de An. 2.1, 412a17; 2, 414a20. Tis could at most be said ofpneuma.Semen is, however, the bearer ofpneuma, and as such the bearer of the soul plus its instru-mental body and of the parts of the soul, which can be present potentially or actually. Tis

is also suggested byGA 2.3, 736b8-10: , . . .,b15: and 737a16-8: , . Louis (1961, 56) seems to adopt the same view: Il est doncvident que la semence a une me et que cette me est en puissance, following Nuyens.Peck (1942, xiii) leaves the question open: the females residue . . . is, or contains, Soulpotentially. How Balme (1972, 61) can translate: Clearly therefore it does have soul and

existspotentially, I do not understand.37) Cf. Bos 2003, 85-94. See also Bos & Ferwerda 2007 and 2008.


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412a22-3 with the clarification that soul is first present as potentiality. In

De anima2.1 Aristotle thus clarifies the distinction between the possessionof a potentiality and the actualization of a potentiality of an existing soul.In Generation of Animals2.1 he goes back a further step. Male semen whichhas not yet led to a complete embryo has a prior degree of potentiality. In735a10-1 he distinguishes a sleeping from a waking and from a scien-tifically active mathematician.38) In this way he tries to make it clear that afully grown rabbit can use its eyes; that a newly born rabbit has the poten-

tial to see; but that the semen of a rabbit also possesses the potentiality ofan anima sensitiva, though there is no question of an eye-to-be nor of aworking eye. Tis addition, too, makes sense only if Aristotle is talkingabout the soul in its entirety and the parts of the soulin their varying degreesof potentiality and actualization.

(i) Te Argument of Homonymy

Te argument on the basis of homonymy39) that Aristotle uses in 735a7-8seemed a decisive point in favour of the standard interpretation, as weargued in 2 under (b). For this argument is supported with reference to apart of the body, the eye. Yet such an interpretation of these lines is prob-lematical. According to this interpretation, Aristotle starts by saying: Tesame argument applies here as in the case of the parts.40) And he continues

with a two-part sentence, both parts of which start in Greek with not. Tefirst part reads: On the one hand a soul will not be present in somethingother than that of which it is the soul. But the second part reads: On theother hand a part will not notparticipate in it. If we follow the standardinterpretation, however, this is not the same argument, but the opposite!

38) In view ofde An. 2.1, 412a22: , it seems more

natural to identify the ofGA 2.1, 735a10 with a practitioner of the theoreticalscience of mathematics than with a traditional land surveyor, as Ferwerda proposes. Cf.

Metaph. 5.1, 1026a7-29.39) Anton (1968, 326) argues that Aristotle designated Platos Ideas and the concreta of thesame name as homonyms. See now also Shields 1999.40) For the expression , cf. Bonitz, Index436a6 ff.MA 10, 703a16-8: , , and Cael. 1.3, 270a11-2:

. GA 1.17, 721b7 and 18, 722a11: . de An.2.11, 422b17.


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For it is said of the soul that it must always be present in something corpo-

real. But the part (of the body) is then said to participate in the soul. In myview, it is not easy to explain how this sentence can be interpreted as fol-lowing a similar argument to the first part of the sentence. Moreover, it isunclear why Aristotle uses the verb to participate here, whereas he hadsaid possesses in 734b25.41) But the question remains whether the exam-ple of homonymy is in keeping with the previous statements. In my expla-nation this can be defended. In this alternative explanation Aristotle says:

a soul can only be present in that of which it is the soul (so it must bepresent in semen), and (semen) is (participatory in the parts of the soul),potentially. Tis two-part statement, which follows the same argumentfor both halves of the sentence, is then stipulated by the remark aboutspeaking homonymously. Semen that does not possess soul is semen inthe way that a eunuch can be called a man.42) And semen of a humanbeing that does not possess a sensitive soul-part would be like the eye of a

dead person. Tis is still called an eye, but cannot perform the functionof an eye.

(j) Te Genesis of the Soul and the Genesis of the Soul-Parts

Tere is another passage which remains unclear in the text that formedour starting-point. It is 735a12-3. Tere, too, the standard interpretation

is unanimous but disputable. In Pecks translation we read: So then, thecause of this process of formation is not any part of the body, but theexternal agent which first set the movement going.43) Tree things areremarkable here. First, the question why Aristotle would suggest here thata part of the bodybrings about the process in which a new living creatureis formed. Second, why in Greek the word this is five words removedfrom process of formation. Tird, the introduction of this process of

formation, though the preceding passage does not talk about a specificprocess of formation. Note, too, that Aristotle continues by indicatingthat, straight after the production of semen by the father figure, the soulof the living creature itself sets to work, and specifically the primary, most

41) GA 2.1, 735a7: . 734b24-5: .42) On the eunuch, cf. Arist. GA 4.1, 766a24-30.

43) Likewise Lanza 1971, 889 and Ferwerda 2005. Balme (1972, 62) translates: Now thisgenerative process is not caused by any of its parts.


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basic soul-part, present in all living entities, the nutritive or vegetative

soul-part.We should therefore consider an alternative explanation here too, in thesense that part here should again be taken as soul-part.44) In that case thedemonstrative pronoun should not be connected with process of forma-tion but with soul (of the semen). Aristotle is therefore saying: no part ofthis (soul in the semen) is the cause of formation, but the begetter is thecause. As soon as fertilization has taken place, however, the new specimen

feeds itself independently thanks to its nutritive soul-part (which musttherefore already be present in the semen).45) For Aristotle the generativeand the nutritive functions are the same function. But this function startsas the function of the father (the external agent); it then continues tooperate as the nutritive function of the embryo.46) Te conclusion of thispassage and this chapter also makes it clear that Aristotle has been talkingabout the first moving and effi cient principle of the soul.47) And his argu-

ment links up closely with what he had emphasized in 734b17-9: thebegetter is always a living creature in actuality, of which all soul-parts arealso operative in actuality; but he passes on a movement via his semen insuch a way that the movement, though belonging to the entiresoul of themature specimen of the kind in question, is activated only on the vegeta-tive level, and not yet on the higher levels.48)

(k) Te Greek ext of 735a22

In passing we arrive at a passage in which a striking textual variant has beenpassed down by, significantly, manuscript Z, which is three centuries older

44) Louis (1961, 215 n. 6) suggested this possibility, but rejected it because he thought it

more logical to interpret part here as partie du corps.45) Tat is to say, Aristotle is taking for granted here what, according to my alternativeinterpretation, he posited in 735a4-9.46) GA 2.4, 740b34: ,. , .47) GA 2.1, 735a27-9: , , . Aristotle is thus refer-

ring both to the begetter and to the form-producing movement of the begetters semen.48) GA 2.1, 734b17-9:, .


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than all the others. Te edition by Drossaart Lulofs reads there: So, as

soon as it exists, it causes itself to grow. But Z has an entirely differentreading: .49) Tis alternative reading can be seen asdecisive evidence for my alternative explanation. Aristotle says in 735a20:Something with the same name has begotten it, for instance a man a man.But it grows by itself. Te Z reading now has: So there must be somethingwhich brings about growth.50) Tat is to say: as soon as the begetter hassecreted his semen, a process of growth must be instigated which the beget-

ter no longer carries out. But this means that, before a heart has beenformed, a potential for growth must already have become operative. Tiscan only be the potential for growth which, as the vegetative soul-part, ispresent in the semen. We must conclude that Drossaart Lulofs, very excep-tionally, has chosen the wrong side. Te text should be corrected in theway indicated by manuscript Z (as the obvious lectio diffi cilior).

(l) Te Menstrual Fluid also Potentially Contains all the parts

A text from Generation of Animals2.3 is also relevant to the text whichformed our starting-point. Te menstrual fluid which the female contrib-utes to the reproductive process, it is said there, contains all the partspotentially, though none in actuality, and all includes those parts whichdistinguish the both sexes (Peck 1942, 173-5).51) What is the purport of

this text? Te reading of all modern exegetes here is that all the parts of thebody, including the male and female genitals, are potentially present in themenstrual fluid.52) But this would be a totally irrelevant statement. And itwould be just as bizarre as a statement along the lines: this one woodenbeam potentially contains an entire house.

49) Drossaart Lulofs 1965, 56: . Likewise Louis 1961, 56. But Z,

which hardly notes any accents or aspiration marks, has:

. In the edi-tion of the text this would be: .50) Louis (1961, 56) translates strikingly: Il existe par consquent quelque chose qui le faitcrotre, though he prints a Greek text which does not allow this! Lanza 1971, 889 has: Vi dunque qualche cosa che fa crescere.51) GA 2.3, 737a22-5: , . . On this, see Bos 2006.52)

Peck 1942, 175: all the parts of the body; Balme 1972, 165: the female material con-tains potentially both sets of parts by which the sexes are distinguished; Cooper 1990, 58:all the bodily parts; Ferwerda 2005, 87: alle lichaamsdelen.


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We should ask ourselves whether this traditional interpretation does not

depend on the equally traditional (and erroneous) hylomorphistic inter-pretation ofGeneration of Animals. Tis view always sees the female contri-bution as providing the corporeal side of the new specimen. Only when wehave abandoned this view, which goes back to Alexander of Aphrodisias, isit possible to understand that the menstrual fluid provides the corporealside of the soul(as a composite of entelechy and instrumental body). Tisputs a different complexion on all kinds of details. Inasmuch as part of the

menstrual fluid is used as food or matter for a part of the new specimen,its purpose is to form the very first bodily part of the new specimen, theheart or its analogue.53) All other parts of the new specimen are producedfrom food that has been drawn from outside. But the proposition that themenstrual fluid possesses all parts of the soul, including those to which itbears a different relationship from the (semen of the) male, is necessary tothe course of the argument and is emphatically supported by the context.

For though Aristotle has demonstrated that male semen must possess theentire soul and all parts of the soul, a problem arises because he also statesthat no physical substance of the male semen remains in the embryo. Tisleads once again to the question: can we be sure that the embryo possessesthe entire soul and all parts of the soul, given that the female menstrualfluid needs to be worked on by the male partner? For the male semen maypossess soul and the parts of the soul, but crucial of course is that theembryo, thanks to the activity of the male, comes to possess these. And acondition for this is that the menstrual fluid of the female shares in thesoul-principle provided by the male via his semen.54)

As in the case of semen, Aristotle must be talking here about parts of thesoul.55) Te female menstrual fluid has the potential to become what theliving creature is by nature.56) But not by itself. A female can produce life,but only up to a certain level. And she also has a potential for soul. But

53) Cf. GA 2.4, 740b2-8 and 1.23, 731a8: .54) GA 2.3, 737a33: .55) Te difference between the male and the female with regard to the soul-parts is lucidlyexplained by Peck (1942, lxvii): semen possesses the principle of sentient Soul, menstrual

fluid possesses only nutritive Soul (potentially).56) GA 2.4, 740b18: .


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only for the most basic kind, the vegetative soul.57) Te difference between

male semen and female menstrual fluid is that the male semen potentiallypossesses the soul of the specific living creature, includingall partsof thesoul. But by itself the menstrual fluid potentially possesses only the vegeta-tive soul. It does have, besides, the potential for all the higher soul-parts ofthe animal of the specific kind. But for this it needs fertilization by themale.58) Here in Generation of Animals2.5 we find that the female differs from the male in lacking the animal and human soul-

functions as entelechy, and this is what Aristotle is referring to in his state-ment in 2.4, 737a24 about the parts regarding which the female differsfrom the male.59) And after fertilization the menstrual fluid must differen-tiate itself into a male or female embryo before it can produce male orfemale genitals. For only a female soul-principle plus instrumental bodyproduces a female body. On this view the passage underlines the correct-ness of our explanation of the earlier passage in Generation of Animals2.1.

But we have yet to deal with a possible objection: the traditional expla-nation seems to be strongly supported by the passage in Generation of

Animals4.1, 766b3-5.60) Peck (1942, 393) reads there: As far, then, as theprinciple and the cause of male and female is concerned, this is what it isand where it is situated; a creature, however, really is male or female onlyfrom the time when it has got the parts by which female differs frommale. Aristotle is in fact talking here about the parts of the visible bodywhich differ in male and female specimens. And here, too, he uses the

57) GA 2.5, 741a17: , with 741a23: . . .58) GA 2.5, 417a28: .59) Tis could lead to the conclusion that Aristotle talks in two different ways about poten-

tially possessing soul. Te male semen possesses soul as first entelechy but dormantly.Te female menstrual fluid possesses only the vegetative soul (dormantly) and not theentire soul, but has the potential, through the effect of the males movement, to become abearer of the soul in actuality, including all parts of the soul, also the sensitive and dianoeticsoul-parts which it does not possess of itself.60) GA 4.1, 766b3-5: . . Cf. Ferwerda 2005, 156. Note the striking difference between and

in the texts of 2.1 and 4.1. See also 4.1, 766b26: .


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unspecified term the parts. From the perspective of this passage in book

4.1, it seems wholly reasonable to follow the same line in book 2.1. Yet thistrain of thought is not compelling. Te passage occurs in a much later partof the argumentation. In 2.1 Aristotle is still dealing with a prior issue.Establishing in 2.1, 766a34-6 that male and female are assigned as pred-icates on the basis of different sexual characteristics, he says that this dis-tinction is determined much earlier by the real principle of differentiationbetween a male and a female specimen, the vital heat of the souls instru-

mental body. In book 4.1 the reference to the difference in genitals iswholly appropriate. If the same theme had already been addressed in book2.1, the argument would have been much less structured than it is now.

5. Alternative Translation

Does semen possess soul or not? Te same dilemma (holds) for the parts (ofthe soul). No soul will be present elsewhere than in that of which it is the soul;nor will (semen) not participate in parts (of the soul) unless homonymously,

just as the eye of a dead person (is called an eye but does not participate in thesensitive soul-part).

Hence it is clear both that (semen) possesses Soul, and that it is (participa-tory in the parts of the soul), potentially.

Tere are varying degrees in which something may be potentially thatwhich it is capable of beingit may be nearer to and further removed from it(just as a sleeping geometer is at a further remove than one who is awake, anda waking one than one who is busy at his studies).

Of this (soul) no part is the cause of its coming-to-be, but the external agentwhich first set the movement going. For nothing generates itself, but as soonas it has been formed a thing makes itself grow. Tat is why one part is formed

first, not all the parts simultaneously. And the part which must of necessity beformed first is the one which possesses the principle of growth: be they plantsor animals, this, the nutritive faculty (of soul), is present in all of them alike.Tis also is the faculty of generating another creature like itself, since this is afunction which belongs to every animal and plant that is perfect in its nature.

Te reason why this must of necessity be so is that once a thing has beenformed, it must of necessity grow. And though another thing bearing thesame name does generate it (e.g. a man is generated by a man), it grows by

means of itself. So there must be something which brings about growth.


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aristotle on soul and soul-‘parts’ in semen

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