ARISTOTLE

Nicomachean Ethicstranslated and edited by

ROGER CRISPSt Anne's College, Oxford

The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge, United Kingdom

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things are, though they appear to have the power to in¯uence and

encourage those young people who possess generosity of spirit, andperhaps to make susceptible to virtue a character that is well bred and

truly loves what is noble, they seem unable to in¯uence the masses inthe direction of what is noble and good. For the masses naturally obey

fear, not shame, and abstain from shameful acts because of the punish-ments associated with them, not because they are disgraceful. For, living

by their feelings as they do, they pursue their own personal pleasuresand the means to them, and avoid the opposed pains; and they do nothave even an idea of what is noble and truly pleasant, since they have

never tasted it. What argument, then, could reform people like this? Fordisplacing by argument what has been long entrenched in people's

characters is dif®cult if not impossible. And presumably we should becontent if, when we have everything that seems required for becoming

good, we attain some share of virtue.Some think we become good by nature, some by habit, and others by

teaching. Nature's contribution is clearly not in our power, but it can befound in those who are truly fortunate as the result of some divinedispensation. Argument and teaching, presumably, are not powerful in

every case, but the soul of the student must be prepared beforehand inits habits, with a view to its enjoying and hating in a noble way, like soil

that is to nourish seed. For if someone were to live by his feelings hewould not listen to an argument to dissuade him, nor could he even

understand it. How can we persuade a person in a state like this tochange his ways? And, in general, feelings seem to yield not to argument

but to force. There must, therefore, somehow be a pre-existing char-acter with some af®nity for virtue through its fondness for what is noble

and dislike of what is disgraceful.But if one has not been reared under the right laws it is dif®cult to

obtain from one's earliest years the correct upbringing for virtue,

because the masses, especially the young, do not ®nd it pleasant to livetemperately and with endurance. For this reason, their upbringing and

pursuits should be regulated by laws, because they will not ®nd thempainful once they have become accustomed to them.

Perhaps it is not enough, however, that when they are young they getthe right upbringing and care; rather, because they must continue to

practise and develop their habits when they are grown up, we shall needlaws for this as well, and generally for the whole of life. For the masses

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heed necessity rather than argument, punishments rather than what is

noble.This, some people think, is why legislators ought to urge people to

virtue and encourage them to act for the sake of what is noble ± on theassumption that those who have been trained well in their habits will

respond ± but ought also to impose punishments and penalties on thosewho disobey or whose nature is more de®cient, and completely banish

the incorrigible. For, they think, the good person, since he lives with aview to what is noble, will listen to reason, while the bad person, sincehe desires pleasure, is chastened by pain, like a beast of burden; this is

also why they say the pains in¯icted should be those most opposed tothe pleasures they like.

As we have said, then, the person who is to be good must be noblybrought up and habituated, and then spend his life engaged in good

pursuits and do nothing bad whether involuntarily or voluntarily. Andthis would happen when people lived in accordance with a kind of

intellect and a correct system with power over them.Now the command of a father has no strength or compulsive power,

nor in general does that of a single person, unless he is a king or

something like that; but law does have compulsive power, and it isreason proceeding from a kind of practical wisdom and from intellect.

And people hate a human being who stands in opposition to theirimpulses, even if he is right to do so; but there is no oppressiveness in

the law's prescribing what is good.But it is in the city of Sparta alone, or almost alone, that the legislator

seems to have been careful about people's upbringing and pursuits. Inmost cities, such matters have been neglected, and each person lives as

he wishes, `laying down the law for children and wife', like a Cyclops.83

The best thing, then, is for there to be correct public concern with suchthings. But if they are neglected in the public sphere, it would seem

appropriate for each person to help his own children and friends on theway to virtue, and for them to be able to do this, or at least rationally

choose to do so. From what we have said, however, it would seem thathe will be better able to do this if he has the chance of legislating,

because care at the public level is evidently demonstrated through laws,and good care through good laws. And whether they are written or

83 Homer, Odyssey ix.114f.

201

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Book X

unwritten, whether they are to educate one or many, seems not to

matter, any more than it matters in the case of music, gymnastics andother pursuits. For just as in cities laws and people's characters are

powerful, so in households are the words and character of fathers, all themore because of the relation of kinship and the bene®ts he confers; for

from the start the children are naturally fond of him and inclined toobey.

Again, education on an individual basis is superior to education incommon, as in the case of medical care. For though in general rest andabstinence from food are bene®cial for a person in a fever, presumably

they may not be for a particular person; and a boxer, presumably, willnot prescribe the same style of ®ghting for all his pupils. It would seem,

then, that particular cases are treated with greater subtlety if there isattention to individuals, since each person is more likely to obtain what

suits him.But the best at providing individual attention will be the doctor, the

gymnastic instructor or anyone else who has the universal knowledge ofwhat is good for everyone or for speci®c people, since the sciences aresaid to be, and indeed are, concerned with what is common. Never-

theless, there is perhaps nothing to prevent someone's taking care of anindividual person well, even lacking any scienti®c knowledge, if he has

considered precisely, in the light of experience, what happens in eachcase, just as some people seem to be their own best doctors, though

incapable of helping anyone else. None the less, presumably it doesseem that if a person does wish to become practised in a skill or in

something theoretical, he must go to the universal, and come to know itas well as he can; for, as we have said, it is with this that the sciences are

concerned.Then perhaps as well a person who wishes to improve people,

whether many or few, through his concern for them should try to

develop a capacity for legislating, if it is through laws that we willbecome good. For producing a noble disposition in just anyone,

whoever is put before one, is not a task that just anyone can perform; ifit is anyone's task, it is that of the person who knows, just as in the case

of medicine and the other sciences that require some kind of care andpractical wisdom.

Should we not move on, then, to consider where or how one mightacquire a capacity for legislation? Is it, as in other cases, from politi-

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