arjomand, said amir history, structure, and revolution in the shi_ite tradition in contemporary iran

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History, Structure, and Revolution in the Shi'ite Tradition in Contemporary IranAuthor(s): Said Amir ArjomandSource: International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique, Vol.10, No. 2, The Historical Framework of Revolutions/Le contexte historique des rvolutions(Apr., 1989), pp. 111-119Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1600710.

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International Political ScienceReview (1989), Vol. 10, No. 2, 111-119

History, Structure, andRevolution in the Shi'ite Traditionin Contemporary IranSAID AMIR ARJOMAND

ABSTRACT.The aim of this article is to draw theoretical lessons from thecontemporary transformation of Shi'ism by examining the bearing ofhistory, structure and cultural tradition on the causes and consequences ofthe Islamic Revolution in Iran. It is argued that the Islamic Revolution canbe viewed as the traditionalizationof a modernizing nation-state, and at thesame time the modernization of the Shi'ite tradition. This apparentlyparadoxical characterization strongly suggests that a Weberian paradigmfor culturally specific patterns of social change is more helpful for itscomprehension than any alternative model.

Few would dispute that the Islamic Revolution in Iran is one of the major events ofthe twentieth century, or that it is theoretically as significant as any of the greatrevolutions of modern times. But where, exactly, does its significance lie? Is itsignificant primarily for falsifying theories of modernization? Or for demonstratingthe vitality of religion in modern politics? Or for showing that secularization could bereversible to the point of establishment of theocracy? Or for proving the significanceof "de-differentiation" (Tiryakian, 1985)? Or for suggesting that social change can becyclical as much as unilineally evolutionary? Does the Islamic Revolution in Irandemolish the Comtean model of uniform and universal social evolution? Does it affirmthe Weberian vision of culturally specific paths of social evolution determined by theinstitutionalization of different value-ideas?I

The inadequacy of the conventional view that portrays politics as a mere reflection ofsociety is gaining increasing recognition in the social sciences, as in the "newinstitutionalism" (March and Olsen, 1985). Nowhere is this inadequacy more glaringthan in the study of long-term socio-political transformation, which highlights theimportance of history, structure and culture. History is important in two relatedways: historical contingencies often determine the direction taken at major turningpoints in the process of socio-political transformation, and the prevailing forces of theformative periods of institutionalization leave a permanent mark on the institutional0192-5121/89/02 0111-09 $03.00 ?0 1989 International Political Science Association


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112 TheSki'ite Traditionn Contemporayranstructure of the societies concerned. Structure is important for the following reasons:the institutional structure of society constitutes the framework within which thematerial and ideal goals of the political actors are defined and pursued; it has its ownexigencies, requirements and potential for development; and it sets serious limits tofeasible change, thereby assuring some measure of continuity through anysocio-political transformation.Last, but by no means least, the cultural tradition is an important factor in thedynamics and the teleology of socio-political transformation: it is the source fromwhich the idiom of popular protest is drawn, and the repertory of the value-ideaswhose selective institutionalization determines the direction of socio-political change.In fact, the emergence of an autonomous cultural tradition-resting, in Eisenstadt's(1981, 1986) formulation, on the institutionalization of the tension between thetranscendental and the mundane in the "post-Axial Age civilizations"-can beconsidered the fundamental precondition of teleological or directional socio-politicalchange set in motion by ideological politics and political revolutions.

IILet us begin with the seeds of the present revolutionary transformation of Irancontained in the Shi'ite tradition. Shi'ism, the "heterodox" branch of Islam, in fact,evolved side by side with "orthodox" Sunnism. Their mutually oriented doctrinalarticulation and self-definition occurred concomitantly in the formative period ofdevelopment of Islamic institutions (Hodgson, 1974, vol. 1). They therefore representthe two main coeval variants of Islam as a world religion of salvation.

Shi'ite Islam as a world religion of salvation has had considerable transformativepotential. This potential acted upon the structure of the Iranian polity once TwelverShi'ism was declared the state religion of the rising Safavid empire in 1501. By theearly nineteenth century, Shi'ism had transformed the societal structure ofdomination in Iran. The typical Islamic "caesaropapist" political order of the lateMiddle Ages has given way to a dual structure of domination in which anautonomous hierocracy-the Shi'ite 'ulama-exercised its religio-legal authorityindependently of the ruler and the state (Arjomand, 1984).From one point of view, it is possible, indeed cogent, to regard the establishment ofan Islamic theocracy ruled by the Shi'ite ulama as the last stage of the evolution ofclerical authority in Shi'ite Islam, an evolution that was checked but not reversed bythe centralization and modernization of the state in the twentieth century. By theearly decades of the Qajar period (1 785-1925), the Shi'ite hierocracy had freed itselffrom the tutelage of political authority characteristic of the Safavid era (1501-1722)and secured its autonomy. The next logical possibility was to assert the superiority fthe hierocracy over the state by extending clerical authority to the political sphere.This logical possibility was explored and actualized when Ayatollah Khomeinitransformed a sizeable section of the Shi'ite hierocracy into a revolutionary politicalparty. The projected final stage of the growth of Shi'ite clerical authority then becamethe blueprint of the militant clerics who overthrew the Shah.In mobilizing the Iranian masses for the revolution that was to realize Shi'iteclerical rule on behalf of God and the Hidden Imam, Khomeini and his followersdrew on the cult of martyrdom which constitutes the major component of the Shi'itetheodicy of suffering, and on the millenarian elements in the Shi'ite tradition. Theglorification of martyrdom and the assimilation of the revolutionary struggle against


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SAID AMIR ARJOMAND 113the Shah to Imam Husayn's uprising against the Umayyad Caliph, Yazid, in thedesert of Karbala in 680 A.D., have received ample attention in the coverage of theIranian revolution by the media. Suffice it to add that Moharram was the decisivemonth for the defeat of the Shah, and that the massive protest marches, during whichKhomeini was formally declared the Imam of an Islamic government to replace themonarchy, took place on the 'Ashura, the day of martyrdom of Imam Hosayn inKarbala (Arjomand, 1988a: 134). The drawing forth of the millenarian beliefs in theShi'ite tradition, however, requires a somewhat more extensive comment.The idea of the Mahdi, "the rightly-guided one," as the expected restorer of thetrue religion and redresser of injustices, enters the history of Islam in general and ofShi'ism in particular during the second civil war in the 680s, shortly after the death ofImam Hosayn in Karbala. It became a distinctive belief of the radical Shi'ite sects,and was incorporated into the Twelver Shi'ite doctrine in the ninth and early tenthcenturies as a result of the doctrinal effort to solve the prolonged crisis of succession tothe eleventh Imam. The twelfth Imam was said to be in Occultation until the End ofTime, when he would reappear as the Mahdi. The Mahdi was thus identified with theHidden Imam, and its eschatological features became more pronounced after thetenth century (Madelung, 1986).The rise of the Safavids can be considered the first successful Shi'ite revolution inIran. The leader of the Safavid movement, Shah Isma'il I (1501-1524), claimed to bethe Mahdi and was worshipped by his Turkoman followers as the incarnation of God.His millenarian movement turned the Turkoman tribesmen into a zealous fightingforce for the conquest of Iran and its subsequent conversion to Shi'ism. Once illpower, the Safavid rulers modified their millenarian claims to being the lieutenants ofthe Hidden Imam, and their reign was said to continue until His reappearance as theMahdi (Arjomand, 1984: esp. 182-183). The Shi'ism spread in Iran by the ulamaunder the patronage of the Safavid rulers was more quietistic than the extremist faithof the conquering Turkmen. It did containmillenarianism, by emphasizing that theHidden Imam would remain in hiding and yet fulfil the functions of the Imamate, butcould not eradicate it. The belief in the Mlahdi remained inescapably chiliastic, andwould from time to time be activated, the most notable instance being the rise of theBab and the Babi rebellions in the mid-nineteenth century.By the 1970s, the plausibility of the belief in the return of the Hidden Imam as theMahdi after eleven hundred years of concealment was seriously undermined amongeducated individuals. The lay Islamic ideologue, Ali Shari'ati (1971), interpreted thebelief in the return of the Hidden Imam as the allegory of the imminent revolution ofthe oppressed masses of the Third World. It is interesting to note that in this period,the late Ayatollah Motahhari, one of the chief intellectual figures of the IslamicRevolution, rejected this politicized interpretation of the Mahdistic tenet, butnevertheless offered an allegorical interpretation of his own: the idea of the Mahdi asthe restorer ofjustice and the true religion contained the utopia of the perfect societyto be gradually approximated and realized only at the end of the process of humanevolution (Motahhari, 1975).Given this climate of educated opinion and the general anti-millenarian attitude ofthe Shi'ite hierocracy, it is not surprising that Khomeini did not make any explicitmillenarian claims. Without claiming to be the returning Maahdi, however, heingeniously exploited the Shi'ite Messianic yearning by encouraging his acclamationas the Imam from about 1970 onward. Never since the majority of them had becomeShi'ite in the sixteenth century had the Iranians called any living person Imam. An


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114 The Skifite Tradition n Contemporaryranunmistakably apocalyptic mood was observable during the fateful month ofMoharram 1399 (December, 1978) among the masses in Tehran. Furthermore, withthe fourteenth Islamic century about to expire and a new one to begin, thequasi-millennial charisma of the man they called Imam was compounded for theyoung militant clerics by his image as the Renovator (moJadded)of the century.Intense discussions were raging as to whether or not Khomeini was the Imam of theAge and the Lord of Time. Those who answered in the affirmative, or were at leastready to regard him as the Mahdi's precursor, were undoubtedly among the millionswho massed in the streets of Tehran to welcome the returning Ayatollah in February1979, and whose frenzy was to be televised across the globe.The success of the Islamic Revolution in 1979 seemed incredible enough to at leastsome of the revolutionaries themselves to generate millenarian expectations andrestore the plausibility of the Mahdistic tenet. On the birthday of the Hidden Imamin June 1981, Hojjat al-Islam Mohammadi Rayshahri, Prosecutor General of theRevolutionary Courts and later Minister of Intelligence, published a pamphletentitled The Continuationof the Islamic Revolutionof Iran until the Global Revolutionof theMahdi which was reissued with an added chapter exactly a year later (MohammadiRayshahri, 1982). It expounded the emerging belief in the continuation of the IslamicRevolution until the coming of the Mahdi. This belief bears a striking similarity to theclaim that the Safavid rule would continue until the advent of the Hidden Imam. Itgained additional impetus from Iran's successes in the war with Iraq during thesummer of 1982. In a speech to the Majlis (Iranian parliament) in September 1982,Hojjat al-Islam Rezvani, the clerical representative of Firuzabad, predicted the defeatof Iraq as a prelude to marching on Jerusalem. Adducing a number of Traditionsrelating to the Mahdi, he added that the purpose of the march on Jerusalem would beto acclaim the reappearance of the Hidden Imam as the Mahdi, and to witness thereappearance ofJesus Christ and his final conversion to Islam by the Mahdi (Keyhan,17 Shahrivar 1361/8 September 1982). In November 1982, Sorush, the intellectualjournal of the Islamic radicals, published an article on "The Connectedness of theTwo Movements" (those of Khomeini and the Mahdi), in which the slogan "O God,o God, keep Khomeini until the Revolution of the Mahdi" was recommended to thereader as a constant prayer. The article referred to an earlier interview in which awounded man had reported having met the Mahdi on the front and having been toldby him that the above prayer had expedited His return by a few hundred years.

IIIWe can now turn to the crucial importance of the dual societal structure ofdomination that became established in Iran at the beginning of the nineteenthcentury. Norms of authority in the world religions of salvation can contain significantimplications not only for religious ranking but also for political stratification. Shi'iteIslam contains several norms of authority which have such implications. Theabove-mentioned Mahdistic tenet contains the norm of charismatic authority inwhich religious and political authority are fused in the person of the supreme leader.As we have seen, this norm was activated directly by the founder of the Safavidempire and indirectly by Khomeini and his followers.

A second historically important norm of authority in Shi'ism can be found in theAkhbari (Traditionalist) tendency in Shi'ism, and concedes only de facto religiousauthority to the compilers of the Traditions of the Prophet and the Imams. I have


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SAID AMIR ARJOMAND 115argued that the Akhbari tendency, which was dominant in much of the seventeenthand eighteenth centuries, indirectly encouraged the fusion of religious and politicalauthority, and directly militated against the consolidation of differentiatedreligio-political authority (Arjomand, 1984: ch. 5).Lastly, we have the Shi'ite norm of the juristic authority of the specialists inreligious learning. By the early nineteenth century, the institutionalization of thisnorm resulted in the independence of the hierocracy from the state, which wasenhanced by its continued evolution throughout the century to become the distinctivefeature of Shi'ite Islam in contrast to Sunnism. In contradistinction to the previoustwo norms, the juristic principle established differentiated religious authority dejureand thus created a basis on which hierocratic authority could be consolidatedalongside political authority and independent f it.

The autonomy of the Shi'ite hierocracy assured its survival despite the relentlesspressure from the state in the twentieth century. The modernization of the state didentail a drastic diminution of the institutional prerogatives and social power of thehierocracy. However, it did not impair the legitimacy of the exclusive hierocraticauthority of the ulama, which assured the continued financial independence of thehierocracy. Consequently, it not only survived but also withstood the Pahlavi state'schallenge to its virtually exclusive control over religious learning and over theauthoritative interpretation of Shi'ite Islam.IV

Twentieth-century history has impinged upon the Shi'ite tradition in such a way as toproduce a revolution that has resulted in the establishment of a theocracy. Thelimitation of space only allows us to consider the consequences of the most importantgeneral trend of the twentieth century. The reader interested in the consequences ofmore specific historical contingencies for the success of the Islamic Revolution and forits direction can be referred to another work (Arjomand, 1988a: Pt. 2).

The creation of centralized bureaucratic states has been identified as afundamental precondition of modern revolutions (Baechler, 1975; Eisenstadt, 1978;Goldstone, 1982; Arjomand, 1986). It requires the concentration of coercive, materialand cultural resources and thus entails dispossession of some privileged strata. Suchdispossessed strata are prominently represented among revolutionary leadersthroughout history (Arjomand, 1986). In Iran, state-building made serious headwayonly under the Pahlavis (1921-79). In this period of centralization andmodernization, the state initiated a series of reforms which seriously undermined thefoundations of religious authority and curbed its cultural influence.The erosion of clerical control over education had begun earlier, even before theConstitutional Revolution of 1906-11. But it culminated in the creation of a secular,national educational system under Reza Shah in the 1920s and 1930s. Control overeducation was the least defensible of clerical prerogatives as it was a contingent fact,lacking any doctrinal basis. More defensible citadels also fell under the attack of thecentralizing state. The major defeat of the hierocracy was in the legal sphere, whereclerical domination rested on a firm doctrinal basis. Under Reza Shah, the judiciarywas secularized and centralized as a branch of the state. Finally, the Endowment Actof 1934 established centralized supervision over religious endowments throughoutIran that had largely been under direct or delegated control of the ulama (Akhavi,1980: 33, 40, 56-58). Though less important in its consequences than his father's


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116 TheShi'ite Traditionn Contemporaryranpolicies, Mohammad Reza Shah's Land Reform of the 1960s resulted in theredistribution of land owned by mosques, seminaries and individual clerics. Thehierocracy's remaining links to the state through the supervision of the religiousendowments were virtually broken. Religious institutions became totally independentof the state; and this independence was sustained by the one last source of incomewhich was inevitably immune from state encroachment: the voluntary payment ofreligious taxes to the leaders of the Shi'ite hierocracy as the deputies of the HiddenImam.These developments seriously weakened the hierocracy. But they also had anotherimportant consequence: the differentiation and separation of religious and politicalpowers became complete. The loss of judicial and educational functions on the onehand, and the loss of control of religious endowment and land ownership on the other,meant that the Shi'ite hierocracy became largely "disembedded" from the Pahlaviregime. This economic and political disengagement of the hierocracy was stronglycomplemented by their social "disembeddedness": there had always been a tendencyfor the upper echelons of the hierocracy to intermarry, forming a highly endogamousgroup, the entry into which by bright young men was often accompanied by marriageto daughters or close relatives of their teachers. This tendency was accentuated by the'ulama's loss of social prestige, which greatly reduced the frequency of intermarriagebetween them and the increasingly secularized social and political elites.Eisenstadt (1978: 245-246) has emphasized the importance of the autonomy anddisembeddedment of a leading social stratum for the generation of revolutionarysocial change. Oberschall (1973: 118-124, 129-132) demonstrated the importance ofthe "segmentation" of a solitary communal group from the ruling strata as acondition favorable to political mobilization; Tilly (1978) that of group solidarity,resting on common identity and a network of organized interaction, as amobilizational asset for political contenders. In the light of these considerations, it isnot difficult to see the disengagement of the Shi'ite ulama from the Pahlavi regime as acrucial factor in the causation of the first traditionalist revolution in modern history,and their solidarity as a tightly knit status group in control of autonomous religiousinstitutions, in its success.

VNothing within the Shi'ite tradition and institutions can explain the internalcrumbling and paralysis of the Pahlavi state which caused the revolution of 1979.However, the Shi'ite cultural tradition and institutional structure had everything todo with the consequences of that revolution. The autonomous structure of hierocraticauthority in Shi'ism enabled Khomeini and the militant clerics to win therevolutionary power struggle, and the Shi'ite cultural tradition crucially influencedthe teleology of the Islamic revolution and the shape of the post-revolutionary regime.Khomeini led the revolutionary movement against the Shah to restore and preservea Shi'ite tradition threatened by modernization and Westernization. The IslamicRevolution is undoubtedly a traditionalist revolution. However, the restoration of atradition in practice always entails its transformation.In fact, the traditionalistrevolution of 1979 has brought about a revolution in Shi'ism. The ideologicalrevolution in contemporary Shi'ism has been treated in detail elsewhere (Arjomand,1988b), as have the distinctive institutions of the Islamic Republic of Iran thatrepresent the unfolding of the distinctively Shi'ite teleology of the Islamic Revolution(Arjomand, 1988a: ch. 8). Here some general observations should suffice. We see


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SAID AMIR ARJOMAND 117both continuity and change between the pre- and post-revolution societal structure ofdomination in Iran. The cultural and institutional changes in post-revolution Shi'ismbear the imprint of the historical contingencies that produced them. One of theunintended consequences of the direct take-over of the state by the clerical elite in1980, to give an important example, has been the extension of the principle ofbureaucratic organization from the state to the hitherto organizationally amorphousShi'ite hierocracy itself. Nevertheless, these changes are also distinctively Shi'ite inthat they are modifications and extensions of elements of pre-revolution Shi'ism.Most notable among these is the sweeping extension of hierocratic authority. Thisand other modifications and extensions are both stimulated and delimited by thelogical possibilities of the original traditional elements. The latter therefore partlydetermine the direction of the contemporary socio-political transformation of Shi'ism.This transformation, consequently, represents a pattern of social change that isculturally specific.If the structure of hierocratic domination in post-revolution Iran is marked bycontinuity as well as change, so is the structure of political domination. Theocraticrule-that is, the replacement of the post-Safavid dual structure of authority bytheocratic monism-and the sacralization of political authority represent the mostimportant aspect of revolutionary change. However, elements of continuity betweenpre- and post-revolution structures of political domination are equally striking.Despite the intention of Khomeini and the militant Ayatollahs to shrink the state to amodest size, the growth of the bureaucratic state has not been checked. In fact, theIranian state now employs twice as many people as it did on the eve of the IslamicRevolution (Arjomand, 1988a: 173).

Finally, continuity and change in the legal sphere require a brief discussion. Evenbefore the revolution, Khomeini, in his manual of practical jurisprudence had soughtto make the Shi'ite law more practical and accommodating of some modernconditions. For example, he had given "the knowledge of the judge" based on writtenand other modern forms of evidence preponderance over the unpractical traditionalrules of evidence. Since the revolution, his cautiously modernizing approach tojurisprudence has been continued by his successor-designate, Ayatollah Montazeri.Much more importantly, the Islamic Revolution has transformed the Shi'ite SacredLaw from a "jurists' law" (Weber, 1978: 820-821) to an increasingly codified publiclaw of the Iranian state. Alongside this revolutionary transformation of Shi'ite law(Arjomand, 1988a: ch. 9), there is considerable continuity between pre- andpost-revolution legal systems. Despite the Islamicization of the legal system there hasbeen considerable continuity with regard to the legislative function of the Majlis, thesubstance of the laws, and the administration of justice. Khomeini and the militantclerics preserved the Majlis, the heritage of the Constitutional Revolution of 1906.Although its legislation is subject to the approval of the clerical jurists of a Council ofGuardians, it has shown great vigor and has enacted an impressive body of laws.These include the revision of the Commercial, Civil and other Codes of the Pahlaviera. The revised Codes now appear Islamicized by bearing the approval of the clericaljurists of the Council of Guardians. In this fashion, an enormous amount of legalmaterial from the European-based laws of the Pahlavi era has been incorporated intothe laws of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Similarly, the hierarchical organization ofcourts in the Ministry ofJustice set up under Reza Shah, which was modeled on thecontinental European judiciary systems, has been taken over by the Islamic regime,with many of its secular judges continuing to serve.


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118 TheShi'iteTraditionn ContemporaryranThe leaders of the Islamic Revolution in Iran recognize this borrowing, eventhough they would rather not talk about it. In an outburst in December 1984 againstthe recalcitrant traditionalists who considered taxation at variance with the IslamicSacred Law, the shrewd Majlis Speaker, Hojat al-Islam Hashemi-Rafsanjaniremarked:

Is whatever occurs in the Western world contrary to the Sacred Law? ... You aresitting in Parliament. Where is the precedent for parliament in Islamichistory? .. . [or for] a president, cabinet of ministers, prime minister and thelike? ... You say that nofatvas [injunctions] were issued [in support of] taxes. No

fatvas were issued for a great many things. In fact, we lackfatvas in Islam for 80 percent of the things on which today we base Islamic government. (cited in Bakhash,1987: 113)

VIThe Islamic Revolution in Iran has set in motion a culturally specific pattern of socialchange which is distinctively Shi'ite. At the same time, however, it has reinforcedsome universal trends, the most important being the growth of the bureaucratic stateand the rationalization of the legal order.By saying that the case of the contemporary transformation of Shi'ism in Irancompels us to discard the simple Comtean model of unilineal evolution in favor of aWeberian model of culturally specific social change, I think we are also answering therest of the questions raised at the beginning of this article. If we accept this position,cyclical and linear trends in social change can be seen to intersect at the starting pointof the revolution. "De-differentiation" in the form of charismatic fundamentalismoccurs with the cry of "Back to the Book " The basic values of a world religion can beseen to "take on less differentiated and flexible form in order to revitalize utterly keyprinciples of a tradition, but thereby retract legitimation from many practicallyimportant institutions" (Lidz, 1982: 293). As this outbreak of charismaticfundamentalism is followed by routinization, linear trends in institutionalization andrationalization set in. The similarities between modern political revolutions andtraditional millenarian uprisings of the post-Axial Age cease to seem paradoxical.Finally, there would not be any paradox in saying that the Islamic Revolution in Iranrepresents both the traditionalization of a modernizing nation-state and themodernization of the Shi'ite tradition, a tradition endowed with the usualtransformative potential of the world religions of salvation.

ReferencesAkhavi, S. (1980). Religion and Politics in Contemporaryran. Albany: State University of NewYork Press.Arjomand, S. A. (1984). The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam. Religion, Political Order andSocietal Change n Shi'ite Iran rom theBeginning to 1890. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Arjomand, S. A. (1986). "Iran's Islamic Revolution in Comparative Perspective." WorldPolitics 38: 3.Arjomand, S. A. (1988a). The Turban or the Crown: The Islamic Revolution n Iran. New York:Oxford University Press.Arjomand, S. A. (1988b). "Ideological Revolution in Shi'ism." In Authorityand Political Culturein Shi'ism. Albany: State University of New York Press.Baechler, J. (1975). Revolution. New York: Harper and Row.


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