Discussion Paper

Armed Conflict:Mediation, Conciliation, and Peacekeeping

Independent Commission on Multilateralism

May 2016

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INTRODUCTION

From the rise of ISIS in Syria and Iraq, to the rekindling of long-standing conflicts in places such asAfghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Somalia, to the desperate waves ofrefugeesarrivinginEurope,tothespecterofsectarianviolenceinBurundiandelsewhere,recenteventshavechallengedtheinternationalsystemtoprovideadequateresponses.

Thepersistenceofarmedconflict liesatthecenterofeachofthesecrises,anditmotivatesagrowingperceptionthatglobalstability isatrisk.However,takinga longviewofhistory,theworld is lesswar-torn than in previous centuries.1 This trendwas particularly evident in the immediate post–ColdWarperiod;between1992and2005thenumberofarmedconflictsdroppedbyasmuchas40percent.2Yetthishistoricdecline inarmedconflictnotwithstanding, recentyearshaveexhibitedtroublingtrends inthe opposite direction. While the number of armed conflicts continues to decline, the number ofconflict-relateddeathshasrisendramatically,from56,000fatalitiesinsixty-threeactiveconflictsin2008to180,000fatalitiesinforty-twoactiveconflictsin2014.3Since2007,thenumberofhigh-intensityandlong-lastingconflictshasinfactincreased.ThisincludestheconflictsinAfghanistan,theCentralAfricanRepublic(CAR),theDRC,Iraq,Nigeria,Pakistan,Somalia,SouthSudan,Syria,andUkraine.4Thesehigh-intensity conflicts have resulted in a growing number of people killed and a vast expansion of thenumberofpeopledisplacedbyconflict.TherearenowmorerefugeesandinternallydisplacedpeopleintheworldthanatanytimesinceWorldWarTwo.

Furthermore,recentarmedconflictshaveproventobeparticularlyresistanttopeacefulsettlement,asthecasesofAfghanistan,theCAR,Iraq,Syria,andUkrainesuggest.Thereareatleasttwocontributingfactors to consider here. First, conflicts that are principally intra-state have become increasinglyinternationalized,whether throughdirect interventionor indirectsupport foronepartyoranotherbyanoutside actor.5 Thewars in theCAR, Syria, Yemen, andUkraine, not tomention the long-standingconflictintheDRC,allinvolveinterventionsbyexternalstatesinaninternalarmedconflict.InarecentstudyofUNattemptstobrokerpeaceinSyria,RaymondHinnebuschandI.WilliamZartmanarguethatoutsideinterventiondecisivelyexplainswhytheSyrianconflicthasbeensounreceptivetomediation.6

Second, the involvement of new types of armed non-state actors has made recent conflict lessconducive to resolution through the traditional tools of mediation and preventive diplomacy. SuchactorsincludeviolentIslamistextremistgroups,liketheso-calledIslamicState(alsocalledISISorDaesh)

1StevenPinker,TheBetterAngelsofOurNature(NewYork:Viking,2011).2AndrewMack,“GlobalPoliticalViolence:ExplainingthePost-ColdWarDecline,”CopingwithCrisisWorkingPaperSeries,InternationalPeaceAcademy,March2007;HumanSecurityCentre,HumanSecurityReport2005:WarandPeaceinthe21stCentury(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2005).3InternationalInstituteforStrategicStudies,ArmedConflictSurvey2015(NewYork:Routledge,2015),p.78.4CenterforSystemicPeace,“GlobalConflictTrends,”n.d.,availableatwww.systemicpeace.org/conflicttrends.html.Seealso,SebastianvonEinsiedel,etal.,“MajorRecentTrendsinViolentConflict,”UNU-CPROccasionalPaper1,UnitedNationsUniversity,Tokyo,November2014.5VonEinsiedel,etal.,“MajorRecentTrendsinViolentConflict,”p.6.6RaymondHinnebuschandI.WilliamZartman,“UNMediationintheSyrianCrisis:FromKofiAnnantoLakhdarBrahimi,”InternationalPeaceInstitute,March2016,p.8.

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and Boko Haram, and transnational networks of organized crime. Unlike more traditional non-statepartiestoarmedconflicts,suchasliberationmovementsandseparatistorleftistguerillagroupsofthepast,violentIslamistextremistgroups,pervasiveintheconflictsoftheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica,donotaspiretojointheinternationalsystemofmemberstates;theystandindirectoppositiontoit.Thus,their raisond’êtrewould seem todisallowanydiplomatic settlement.And,moreover,manymemberstates and international organizations have rules and policies that make engaging with such actors,usuallylistedasterroristorganizations,difficultorimpossible.

Similarly,thepresenceoforganizedcrimeinconflictsettingsexacerbatesconflictdynamics.Whilesomesmall-scale, local networks of organized crime can provide livelihoods and alternative governance inareas where the state is absent, access to the illicit funds of transnational organized crime, throughtrafficking and other activities, can sustain conflict longer thanwould be possible otherwise and cancreate disincentives for settlement.7 This interconnectivity of political objectives, the presence andincentives of crime, and the rise of violent extremism has in some cases blurred the lines betweenarmedconflictasdefinedby internationalhumanitarian lawandotherformsofviolence,complicatingthe capacity of the UN and other international actors to respond with the traditional tools ofpeacemaking,peacekeeping,andpeacebuilding.8

It was in this context that the UN system set out to review key elements of its peace and securityarchitecturein2015andtoaskwhetherthetraditionaltoolsofthemultilateralsystemareadequatetothe taskathand.Theyear2015also sawotherUN initiatives that contributed to theaspiration foramore peaceful, just, and inclusive world, including the negotiations leading to the 2030 Agenda forSustainableDevelopmentandtheParisAgreementonclimatechange.

Buildingonthesereviewsandrelatedinitiatives,thisreportasksanumberofquestions:Howdoesthecurrentcontextofarmedconflictaffectthecapacityofthemultilateralsystemtomaintaininternationalpeaceandsecurity?Whatdoesitmeanforpeacekeepingmissionstooperatewherethereisnopeaceto keep? And how can mediation processes address conflict environments where armed non-stateactors havebroad impact but little incentive to joinnegotiations andwhere conflicts are increasinglyfoughtbyproxy?Whatdoespeacemeanwhenmorepeoplearekilledbycriminalviolencethanarmedconflict?Andhowcanrhetoriconpreventionbeturnedintoactioninordertomaintainpeaceoverthelongterm?Toaddressthesequestionsandmore,thispaperisdividedintotwochapters.ChapterOneaddressestheissuesof“MediationandPeacebuilding”andChapterTwodiscusses“Peacekeeping.”

7VonEinsiedel,“MajorRecentTrendsinArmedConflict,”p.5.SeealsoJamesCockayneandAdamLupel,PeaceOperationsandOrganizedCrime:EnemiesorAllies?(London:Routledge,2011).8On“hybridwar,”seeMaxBoot,“CounteringHybridWarfare,”inInternationalInstituteforStrategicStudies,ArmedConflictSurvey2015,pp.11-20.

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CHAPTERONE:MEDIATIONANDPEACEBUILDING

Introduction

Mediationandpeacebuildingarenotnew.Foraslongastherehasbeenwar,therehavebeeneffortstoend violence and to build, strengthen, or maintain peace. What is newer, however, is the vastinstitutional architecture for mediation and peacebuilding. International and regional organizations,internationaldonors,andsomeindividualcountrieshavedevelopedextensiveframeworks,guidelines,programplans, and policies to help support efforts to bring about peace in areas affected by violentconflict. In2015,threepanelsreviewedtheperformanceoftheUNpeaceandsecurityarchitecture inlightof the changingglobalenvironmentandmadeanumberof recommendations tohelpmake thisarchitecture fit for purpose. These panels included the High-Level Independent Panel on PeaceOperations (HIPPO), theReviewof theUnitedNationsPeacebuildingArchitecture, and theHigh-LevelAdvisory Group for the Global Study on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 onWomen,Peace,andSecurity.

Alongside the proliferation in the number of actors and institutions engaged in mediation andpeacebuilding, there has been an increase in scholarly journals, articles, and reports focusing on theideas,practices,successes,andfailuresofmediationandpeacebuilding.However,thisprolificliteraturehas not resulted in consensus about what constitutes peace and how to build it when it is broken.Existing practices and institutions have been questioned in terms of their end goals and legitimacy.There has been a regionalization of peace and security issues, but this has not resolved thornylegitimacy issues. Debates about the effectiveness of regional and international mediation andpeacebuildingfocusonwhethercurrentapproachesareoutdated,orwhethertheycanbeadaptedtorespondtocontemporary formsofviolence.While themultilateralsystemtendstocompartmentalizevarious issuesandresponses,currentthreatstoglobalhealth,theenvironment,andsecurityhighlightthesystemicandinterdependentnatureofthefactorsthatdriveconflictandsustainpeace.

Traditional normative and institutional guideposts for mediation and peacebuilding are thereforeprecarious and questioned by different actors. At the same time, protest and political action bynetworksofpeopleandcitizenmovements inmanypartsof theworld, facilitatedbymoreexpansivecommunicationtechnologies,presentbothopportunitiesandrisksformediationandpeacebuilding.

This chapter is roughly divided into two sections. The first section deals with current debates inmediation and peacebuilding. The second section explores institutional challenges, gaps, and blindspots.Thechapter isastartingpointfordiscussionratherthanadefinitiveroadmapforthefuture. Itemphasizes the diversity of views on mediation and peacebuilding and uncovers some of theassumptionsthatinformdominantinternationalandregionalapproaches.Perhapsmostimportantly,itquestions current foundations for peacebuilding,which tend tobebasedupon an analysis of conflictfollowed by efforts to stop or reduce violence. The chapter suggests that a reframing of ourunderstandingofwhatconstitutepeaceandconflictfromtheperspectiveofthoseatthereceivingendmayprovideanalternative,context-sensitivefoundationforpeacebuilding.

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I. CurrentDebatesinMediationandPeacebuilding

Therehasbeenarobustdebateaboutendgoals,theappropriatenessandlegitimacyofactors,andtheeffectivenessofmediationandpeacebuildingprocesses.

EndGoals

Although diversemediators and peacebuilders all claim to beworking toward reducing violence andpromoting peace, their underlying visions of peace can be quite different. Sometimes, this has beenframedasadebateoverwhethertoprioritizenegativepeace(theabsenceofdirectphysicalviolence)orpositivepeace(theabsenceofstructuralviolence).Whileendgoalsareusuallyassumedratherthanexplicitly discussed, essential questions about politics are at stake, including issues of representation,equality,accountability,solidarity,andjustice.

In the faceofenduringandnewformsoforganizedviolence,stability tendstobethe firstpriority. Inmediation,thismaybeexpressedintermsofreachingacease-fireagreementbetweenbelligerentstocreate space formoving parties from violence to politics. In peacebuilding, thismay be expressed intermsofbuildingstatesequippedwithamodicumofcapacitytoguaranteesecurityandtocontroltheexpression of violent identities. Order is prioritized, even if this order is attained through coercivemeasures. Paradoxically, increased militarization and securitization can thus be seen as laying thefoundationsforpeaceandstability.

Prioritizingstabilization as apeacebuilding strategyhasbecome increasinglyprevalent since the9/11attacks on the United States and the subsequent “global war on terrorism.” Many mediators andpeacebuilders believe that stabilization is a necessary first step. Some believe that outsiders lacklegitimacytoundertakemoreextensivepeacebuildingtasks,thus leavingthemtopursuestabilization.Important international interests, including business and military interests, may converge with theinterestsofdominantnationalelitesinfavorofstabilizationandsecuritization.

The limitsandethicsof stabilizationandsecuritizationhavebeencriticized.Thus, for somemediatorsand peacebuilders, the end goal is liberal governance or some kind of social contract governing therelationship between the state and its citizens. Discussions over the contours of such a governanceframework are often included as part of the mediation process. Peacebuilding programming oftenincludes elements of statebuilding and strengthening the rule of law. The “order” of peace is thuspromoted through law,humanrightsnorms,democratic representation,and (often) theprivilegingofthestate.

Anotherapproachtomediationandpeacebuildingprioritizesanendgoalofsocial justice,ratherthanorder through stabilization or liberal governance. If this is the desired end goal, mediation andpeacebuildingmustincludeadiscussionofglobalandnationalinequalities.Thisviewofpeacerequiresachangeininstitutionsandframeworksthroughwhichpeopleexpresstheirviewsandgrievancessothatalltypesofknowledgeandexperienceareequallyprivileged.Implementingthisendgoalisperhapsthe

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mostdifficult,becauseitrequiresradicallyreconstitutedidentitiesandveritableshiftsinpower,whichgoagainsttheinterestsofdominantglobalandnationalactors.9

Mediatorsandpeacebuildersmayholdanormativecommitmenttoallthreeoftheseendgoals,butattimestheymaybeintensionwithoneanother.Adoptingastabilizationapproach,forinstancethroughprioritizingacease-fireandbolsteringthestatesecurityforces,maylimitthechancesforcertainsocialjusticeendsinthefuture.

Actors

Awiderangeof international,regional,national,andcommunityactorsare involved inmediationandpeacebuilding. Current approaches frame theproblem in termsof finding the appropriatedivisionoflaborbetweendifferentactors,butthisglossesoversomeofthemoredifficultdilemmas.

One dilemma is that different actors have different normative commitments and goals, as describedabove.Mediatorsmustbeaccepted,credible,andwell-supported,buttheyalwayshavetheirownsetofinterests,whethertheyareinternationalorganizations,states,nongovernmentalorganizations(NGOs),or private individuals. This may translate into mediators’ desire to reach an agreement fororganizational/bureaucraticreasonsorforprestige.Ormediatorsmaydesiretoreachaparticularkindof agreement due to normative concerns or security and economic considerations. Likewise,peacebuilders have a range of different interests. If peacebuilding frameworks are built from thestartingpointofconflictresolution,stabilization,andpacification,thenoutsidersandnationalelitesaregoingtohavetheupperhand.Ontheotherhand,ifcommunityideasaboutpeaceandsocialjusticearethestartingpoints,theninternalactorsarethekeyplayers.

There are also important debates about the legitimacy of international actors. In particular, somepeople have voiced concerns over the perceived erosion of state sovereignty under the guise ofinternationalpeacebuilding. Indeed, somepeoplequestion theverypremise thatoutside interventioncan be characterized as peacebuilding. There are also criticisms that international peacebuildingframeworks are ineffective due to the disjuncture between the peacebuilding requirements of localcommunitiesand thegoalsofexternalmediatorsandpeacebuilders.Onepossibility is to look towardcontinental and regional bodies, but these institutions have tended to adopt mediation andpeacebuildinglogicsimilartotheirinternationalcounterparts,relyingheavilyuponliberalgovernanceorsecuritizationandstabilizationpackages.

Recently,therehavebeencallstoopenupspaceforparticipationbyabroaderrangeofactors,includingfaith-based leaders,representativesofethniccommunities,women’sgroups,youthorganizations,civilsociety groups, and citizen networks. This requires different forms of engagement, such as movingmediationandpeacebuildingawayfrominternationalhotelsandheavilyfortifiedcompoundsandintothe places where people actually live. It also relies upon local capacity for negotiation and theassumptionthatsocially-embeddedformsofgovernancearemorelikelytoresultinpeacefulrelations.While there is something to be learned from so-called “local” alternatives, enthusiasm for local or

9SeeDevonCurtis,“TheContestedPoliticsofPeacebuildinginAfrica,”inPeacebuilding,Power,andPoliticsinAfrica,editedbyDevonCurtisandGwinyayiADzinesa(Athens,OH:OhioUniversityPress,2012).

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indigenous“solutions”couldmaskseriousshortcomings.Muchofthe literatureon“local”approachestopeacereproducesaflaweddistinctionbetweenaliberal,rational,andmodernWestandaculturallydistinct“local”space.Inaddition,focusingonlocalalternativesmayoverlooktheshortcomingsoflocalgovernance systems, which are not necessarily legitimate or accountable to those who live underthem.10

Process

MediationProcesses

The trend in international and regionalmediation has been toprofessionalize the process and drawuponacadreofexpertswhohaveexperienceandknowledgeofbestpractices.There isan increasinginsistence on process design and analysis. There are still questions, however, about how toprofessionalizeandsetstandardswhilestillallowingforcontextualvariationanddifferentrequirementsinvariouscommunities.

Mediation typically includes track I (formal, official, governmental) processes and track II (informal,unofficial, nongovernmental) processes. These efforts sometimes occur simultaneously. Sometimestrack II mediation takes the lead when the context does not lend itself to third-party externalintervention.Inthiscontext,therearedebatesaboutwhethercoordinationisdesirableorfeasibleandaboutthebestmechanismsfordialoguetohelpensurethatprocessesdonotcontradictoneanother.

Another issue relates to themain focusofmediation activities.Muchattention is given to the actualmediationandtheissuesdiscussedaroundthenegotiationtable.Thefocusisonreachinganagreementatthattable,with lessattentiononthewiderprocess.Focusingonnegotiationsatthetableobscuressomeofthewiderissues,suchasrepresentationandinclusivity.Inotherwords,somepeoplearguethatthereshouldbeagreaterfocusonlonger-termprocessesratherthanagreement.

Oneofthemostdifficultdecisionsinthemediationprocessisthequestionofwhomtoengageandwithwhich instruments.When and why are carrots appropriate and effective, as opposed to sticks? It isusuallydeemednecessarytoinvolvenon-statearmedgroupsinmediationprocesses,astheyareoftenpartiestotheconflictandhavethecapacitytowreakviolenceandspoilanypeaceagreementthatdoesnot include them. TheUN secretary-general, in his report on the recommendationsof theHigh-LevelIndependent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO), concurred with the panel’s recommendation thatpeace processes should not exclude anyone. The question is who should approach these groups tounderstand theirworldview andmindset, even though somenational laws orUN sanctions proscribecontactwiththem?Were itpossibletoreachouttothem,howcouldthisbedonewithoutappeasingthemorappearingtorewardviolence,therebyprovidinganincentiveforotheraggrievedgroupstotakeuparms?

Itisalsogenerallyseenasimportanttoinvolveunarmednon-stateactors,suchascivilsocietygroupsorpolitical opposition groups. Yet there remain questions about the representativeness of such groups.

10DevonCurtis,“TheLimitsofStatebuildingforPeaceinAfrica,”SouthAfricanJournalofInternationalAffairs20,no.1(2013).

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How can mediators be sure that these organizations and groups represent a significant segment ofsociety?

The gendered dimensions of mediation have also been increasingly acknowledged, but there is stillmuchworktodointhisarea.IthasbecomeclearthatitisimportanttoinvolvewomeninbothtrackIandtrackIIprocesses,asparticipantsandasmediators.Yettheprecisemechanismsthroughwhichtheparticipation of women will bring about a more sustainable peace are debated. Furthermore, anincreaseinthenumberofwomendoesnotnecessarilyguaranteethatgenderissueswillbeadequatelyaddressed, so other systems need to be established to ensure an integrated gender perspective inanalyzing the context and devisingmediation responses. In Colombia, for example, theway inwhichwomen from the warring parties organized themselves to actively participate in the ongoing peaceprocess in Havana seems to have helped overcome some of the impediments associated withintegrating gender in peace processes. Observers have credited Colombianwomen peacemakers andthose who were members of victim delegations to the peace process for the meaningful genderedresultsachievedthusfar.

PeacebuildingProcesses

There are questions regarding sequencing, timing, and coordination of peacebuilding processes. Theproblem with a sequenced approach is that conflict changes, and processes therefore must remainflexibleandadaptable.Peacebuildershave todealwith rapidly changing contextsand shifts inpowerdynamics within countries and regions. How can peacebuilders’ programmatic requirements andtimelines be reconciled with changing peacebuilding environments and contexts? How can diverseapproaches to peacebuilding be accommodatedwithin a single coordinated strategywithout limitingvoicesandprivilegingpowerfulactors?

Thecurrenttrendistorecognizetheimportanceofbothtop-downpeacebuildingprocessesbaseduponinternationalandregionalprogramsandnationalelites,aswellasbottom-uppeacebuildingprocessesbased upon the coping strategies and resources of affected communities and peoples. Although themechanisms to connect these different processes are underdeveloped, the 2015 review of the UN’speacebuildingarchitecturerecommendedprinciplesandpracticestomoveforward.

Forexample,wherethePeacebuildingCommission(PBC)facilitatesstrategicframeworkswithcountriesaffectedbyconflict,itcanensuretheparticipationofcivilsociety,includingwomen’sorganizationsandyouth groups. The PBC can advocate for national leaders to include diverse perspectives and localrepresentativesinsettingnationalpeacebuildingprioritiesandactionplans.11Inadditiontoapproachesbasedonconvening,suchasnationaldialoguesorlocalpeacecommittees,newtechnologiesandsocialmediacanalsobeleveragedtofosterdialogueandbroadenparticipationinpoliticalprocesses.12

As with mediation processes, the importance of adopting a gender perspective in peacebuilding iswidely recognized.UnitedNations SecurityCouncil Resolution1325, adopted in2000, aims toensure

11UnitedNations,TheChallengeofSustainingPeace:ReportoftheAdvisoryGroupofExpertsontheReviewofthePeacebuildingArchitecture,UNDoc.A/69/968–S/2015/490,June30,2015,p.57.12Ibid.,p.22.

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that peacebuilding efforts are sensitive to gendered violence and gendered inequalities.Nonetheless,there is still a gapbetween thediscourse on gender and actual practiceswhendealingwithmilitary,economic, political, and socio-legal aspects of peacebuilding. Security Council Resolution 2242 onWomen, Peace, and Security, adopted in 2015, seeks to address this gap for both mediation andpeacebuildingprocesses.ThisisreflectedintheGlobalStudyontheImplementationofResolution1325,which recommends that the UN and member states support women’s engagement not only in aparticular roundofpeacenegotiationsbut throughouteveryphaseofapeaceor transitionprocess—includingimplementationandpeacebuilding.13

II. InstitutionalChallengesandGaps

Thedebatesdescribedabovehighlightthenormativecontestationandpracticaldilemmasandtensionsinthefieldsofmediationandpeacebuilding.Attheinstitutional level,thesedebatesarereflectedinanumberofgaps,includingpoliticalgaps,bureaucraticgaps,andanideasgap.

PowerandPoliticalChallenges

Partof theproblem inreformingmediationandpeacebuildingpracticesandshifting fromapproachesthatfocusonconflictandstabilizationtowardapproachesthatdrawonpeaceandsocialjusticecanbeexplained through power dynamics. Put simply, there are enormous vested interests at theinternational,regional,andnationallevelsinmaintainingthestatusquo,whichfavorsaparticularworldorderwith its inherent inequalitiesandprivileges.Dominantgroups,particularly those steeped in thecertainty that they stand for universal goods, may allow for some institutional tinkering around theedges, but they are unlikely to advocate changes that will lead to a reversal of their power. Thus,understanding thegeopoliticsofmediationandpeacebuilding,aswellas thepoliticswithin individualcountriesandregions,isofparamountimportance.

Thechallengeoffinancingmediationandpeacebuildingreflectsthesepoliticalshortcomings.MostUNfundsformediationsupportcomefromever-shrinkingextra-budgetaryresources.Therecentnormativeadvancesinmediationhavenotbeenmatchedbyfinancialcommitments.Thistrendissomewhatoffsetbysomeregionalandnationaleffortsthatdevotemoretimeandresourcestopromotingmediationasafunction of governance and conflict prevention. But financing for peacebuilding activities is greatlyovershadowed by budgets for peacekeeping and peace enforcement, on the one hand, anddevelopment,ontheother. Inthecaseofpeacekeeping,the limitedfundsdedicatedtopeacebuildingcomponentstendtodryupwhenthemissionexitsormorphsintoanothertypeofpresence.TheHIPPOreportmadeanumberofrecommendationtohelpaddressfinancinggaps.

Institutional/BureaucraticChallenges

Partly in response tocalls for increasedprofessionalization,new institutional structures formediationhave been established. The UN Mediation Support Unit was established in 2006 within the UNDepartmentofPoliticalAffairs,andregionalorganizationssuchastheAfricanUnion(AU)andSouthern

13RadhikaCoomaraswamy,etal.,“PreventingConflict,TransformingJustice,andSecuringthePeace:GlobalStudyontheImplementationofUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilResolution1325,”UNWomen,2015,pp.58-59.

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African Development Community (SADC) have also placed greater institutional emphasis on theirmediationactivities.

Within these institutions, there are problems of financing and questions about coordination andcomplementarity. There are also institutional structural questions. The UN Guidance for EffectiveMediation,publishedin2012, ispremisedonthefactthattheseprocessesare intergovernmental.Yetsome of the new and emerging violent conflicts do not lend themselves to external third-partymediation.Whereregionalor localmediationeffortstakeplace,theytendtobeledbypartial, insidermediators.

The peacebuilding institutional architecture is evenmore diffuse. TheUNPeacebuilding Commission(PBC)wasestablishedin2005inanattempttoprovideanintergovernmentalforumforpeacebuilding.Nonetheless, the PBC has been plagued by bureaucratic disagreements and structural limitations.Likewise, at the field level peacebuilding activities remain fragmentedand insignificant. The returnofviolenceinBurundiandtheCARhaveraisedquestionsaboutthecontinuedrelevanceandcredibilityofthe peacebuilding architecture, since both these countries had benefited from a PBC country-specificconfiguration.Asaresult,theUNpeacebuildingarchitectureisperceivedaslackingpower,andthePBCis not always consulted when peace operations with significant peacebuilding components areconceived.

The2015 Reviewof theUN PeacebuildingArchitecture provided a good diagnosis of the challengesfacing this intergovernmental structure.14 The Review called for the reframing of peacebuilding as anenterprisetosustainpeacethatshouldnotbeconfinedtopost-conflictsituations,anditurgedthePBCtoattempttobreakdownthestructuralsilosthatseparatethepeaceandsecurity,development,andhuman rights pillars of its work. This call is reflected in a new vision for the UN’s peacebuildingarchitectureadoptedinidenticalresolutionsbytheSecurityCouncilandtheGeneralAssemblyinApril2016,whichestablishessustainingpeaceasanewsystem-wideframeworkfortheUN.15

Intheseresolutions,sustainingpeaceisbothagoalandaprocess—onethatisinherentlypoliticalandthat spans prevention, mediation, conflict management and resolution, and peacebuilding. There ishope that the sustaining peace frameworkwill empower the PBC to engage in prevention, a neededdeparture from itspastmandateandprogramming.ThePBC isalsocalleduponto realize itsbridgingrole among the UN’s principal organs by sharing advice on coherence and priorities, broadening itsstrategic convening role, and working in greater cooperation with the Security Council, GeneralAssembly,andEconomicandSocialCouncil(ECOSOC).Overall,theresolutionselevatetheresponsibilityforpeacebuildingtoincludeallpartsoftheUNandfeaturestronglinkstothedevelopmentsystemandastrengthenedrolefortheleadershipofUNcountryteamsintakingonpeacebuilding.16

14UnitedNations,ReportoftheAdvisoryGroupofExpertsontheReviewofthePeacebuildingArchitecture.15SecurityCouncilResolution2282(April27,2016),UNDoc.S/RES/2282;GeneralAssemblyResolution70/262(April27,2016),UNDoc.A/RES/70/262.16ArthurBoutellisandAndreaÓSúilleabháin,“WorkingTogetherforPeace:SynergiesandConnectorsforImplementingthe2015UNReviews,”InternationalPeaceInstitute,May2016,p.27.

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Therehasalsobeenan increase inregional institutionalstructures forpeacebuilding.For instance, in2006, theAUadopted a Post-Conflict Reconstruction andDevelopment Policy Framework (AU-PCRD),andsomeAfricansubregionalorganizationshavealsodevelopedpeacebuildingunitsandinitiatives.Yetthesestructurestendtosuffer fromthesamekindofbureaucratic impedimentsastheir internationalcounterparts.

More generally, there is the question of whether the current architecture is equipped to deal withcontemporary forms of violence. The institutional system is state-centric and is well-equipped torespond to disputes between orwithin states, and their aftermath. However, health, environmental,and security challengeshave local, regional, and internationaldimensions.While scholarshiphas longshown that networks of violence and peace are overlapping and interlinked locally, regionally, andglobally,policyresponsestoviolence largelyremain inseparatesilos.Thus, therearequestionsaboutwhether current institutional structures are appropriate for peacebuilding challenges resulting fromurbanviolenceandprotest,religiousorcommunally-inspiredlocalizedviolence,transnationalorganizedcrime,andnetworksforarmstraffickingorresourcetransfers.Thevariousreviewsmakeanumberofrecommendationsseekingtoaddressthispoint.

TheChallengeofVisionandIdeas

Institutionalchallengesarenotonlytheresultofpoliticalandbureaucraticgaps;therehasalsobeenagapinideasandvision.The2015reviewshelpedtostimulateandcollectnewideasandinnovationsinpeacebuilding, but there is still a need to feed these ideas into thepolicy sphere. The resolutionsonsustainingpeaceadopted inApril2016require thesecretary-general to reportprogressona rangeofpeacebuildingissuesinSeptember2017—frommoresustainablefundingtobettersupportforwomenand youth—and this should be viewed as an opportunity for the UN to test new models and turnsuccessful and cooperative precedents into regular practice.17 In the past, the UN has introducedinitiatives tobecomea “learningorganization,”but ithashaddifficultyputting these intopractice. Inpart,thisisbecauseexistingrelationsofpowerandexistinginstitutionalstructuresheavilycircumscribetheboundariesofthedebate.

Whatwoulditmeantothinkmorecreativelyaboutvisionandideas?Ataminimum,thedebateshouldbe more inclusive and representative. It is tempting for institutions to draw on the ideas of knownexperts,sincetheyalreadyspeaktherequisiteinstitutionallanguageandknowtheacceptablelimitsofthe debate. Inevitably, however, the result is well-established recommendations that, at best, willprovideminimalincrementalchangethatisunlikelytosustainpeaceinthelongterm.Indeed,thenewresolutionsonsustainingpeacecallforbroaderpartnershipsthatincluderegionalandnationalpartners,aswell as civil societyorganizations.This shouldbe takenas cause toconsultand learn fromamuchmorediversesetofvoices.

17YoussefMahmoudandAndreaÓSúilleabháin,“WithNewResolutions,SustainingPeaceSitsatHeartofUNArchitecture,”GlobalObservatory,April29,2016.

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III. Conclusions

Thischapterhasshownthatmanyofthekeygapsandinstitutionalchallengesrelatedtomediationandpeacebuilding can be traced to normative debates about the drivers of conflict and the factorsassociated with peaceful and just societies. Current approaches and institutions tend to see peacethroughthelensofconflict,ratherthantakingpeaceitselfasthestartingpoint.

If the discussion is recalibrated toward understanding what enables peace, it may be necessary toredefinethepurposeandvisionofmediationandpeacebuilding.Forexample,amorecitizen-orientedapproach to peacebuilding would put more emphasis on people’s agency in describing conflict andpeace and prescribing solutions. There are some interesting initiatives in that direction. For instance,researchersat theKroc Institute for InternationalPeaceStudiesareworking todefine the conceptof“quality peace” and have developed a Peace Accord Matrix that provides comparable data on thecontentofvariouspeaceagreements.18TheInstituteforEconomicsandPeacehasdevelopedaGlobalPeaceIndexbasedontwenty-twoqualitativeandquantitativeindicators.19TheyhavealsodevelopedaPositive Peace Index with eight categories, which they call the Pillars of Peace, with twenty-fourindicators. These pillars include factors such as the respect for the rights of others, the equitabledistributionofresources,andlevelsofhumancapital.Thepillarsareinterdependent,andthestrengthoftherelationshipbetweenthemchangesdependingonspecificcircumstanceswithineachcountry.20Otherattemptsaimtodevisepeaceindexesatthecommunitylevel.

Therearesignsthatpeoplearoundtheworldaredisillusionedbyexistingstructuresofpower.Theyareusingmultipleformsofprotesttoadvanceclaimsinsupportofmorelegitimateandaccountableformsofpolitics.Whiletheoutcomeoftheseprotestsisfarfromcertain,itisanopportunetimetoreconsiderexisting ideas and frameworks for preventing violent conflict and building sustainable peace. Thischapter has shown that various approaches tomediation and peacebuilding carry with them certainassumptionsaboutwhichquestionsandwhose interests takeprecedenceoverothers. The result is afragmented and contradictory set of practices seeking to shape the nature and exercise of power incountriesemergingfromconflict.

Ultimately, peacebuilding is a political contest,where peace is not a universally recognized object orfinishinglinebutasetofcontestedideasandpracticesthatplayoutdifferentlyinvariouspartsoftheworld.At aminimum, it seemsnecessary tounpack thenotionsofpeaceand conflict that liebehindparticularmediationandpeacebuildingframeworksandprocesses,sincetheseinevitablyprivilegesomepeopleandideasoverothers.Context-sensitiveanalysesthatincludetheviewsofthoseatthereceivingend,particularlywomenandyouth,willgoalongwayinhelpingwiththisunpacking.

18KrocInstituteforInternationalPeaceStudies,“PeaceAccordsMatrix,”2015,availableathttps://peaceaccords.nd.edu/.19InstituteforEconomicsandPeace,“2015GlobalPeaceIndex,”availableathttp://www.visionofhumanity.org/#/page/our-gpi-findings.20InstituteforEconomicsandPeace,“PositivePeaceReport2015,”availableathttp://www.visionofhumanity.org/#page/news/1264.

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PeacebuildingandmediationareamongthemanypoliticaltoolsforthepeacefulsettlementofdisputesenshrinedinChapterVIoftheUNCharter.Lastyear’sthreeglobalpolicyreviewsonpeaceandsecurityhave called for greater focus on prevention and mediation to counter what was perceived as anoverreliance on military and other coercive measures in addressing new and enduring threats tointernational peace and security. Despite some recent normative advances, peacebuilding remains anebulous and contested field under the best circumstances, particularly when outsiders drive it.Mediation isequallyunderstress, largelyduetothechangingnatureofcontemporaryconflict,wherethestateisattimestheperpetratorofviolenceagainstciviliansandwherearmedgroupsholdextremistviews that do not easily lend themselves to negotiation or third-party, external mediation. Bothpeacebuilding andmediation suffer from severeunderfunding. TheAdvisoryGroupof Experts on thereviewof thePeacebuildingArchitecturemadeseveral recommendations toaddress this shortcomingand called for the reframing of peacebuilding as an enterprise to sustain peace that should not beconfinedtopost-conflictsituations.

CHAPTERTWO:PEACEKEEPING

I. MappingtheTerrain:TheGrowthofUNPeacekeeping

Peacekeeping, although not explicitly provided for in the UN Charter, has become the most visibleactivityoftheUnitedNations.Despiteallthechallengesandcrises ithasfacedandthechangesithasexperienced, peacekeeping remains one of the most important conflict management tools at thedisposalofthemultilateralsystem.

Thefirstpeacekeepingoperation,authorizedin1948,consistedofunarmedmilitaryobservers,andthefirstarmedoperationsweredeployed in1956 inthecontextoftheSuezCrisis. It isonly inthe1990s,aftertheendoftheColdWar,thatUNpeacekeepingsawitsfirstimportantexpansion,risingbrieflyto75,000bluehelmetsbeforedroppingagain,thenexpandingsteadilysince2000.TherearenowmoreUNpeacekeepers on the ground than ever before, with 125,000 UN personnel (military, police, andcivilians) deployed in sixteen peacekeeping missions across four continents with an annual budgetexceeding$8billion.

Atthesametime,thenatureandambitionsofpeacekeepinghaveevolvedconsiderably.Peacekeepingwent from cease-fire monitoring between states to complex “multidimensional” missions withincreasingly long mandates. These mandates can now include ensuring the implementation ofcomprehensivepeaceagreements;assistinginlayingthefoundationsforsustainablepeace;supportingthe extension of state authority; monitoring human rights; organizing elections; overseeing securitysector reform and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration; and protecting civilians underimminentthreat.

Thepeacekeepingbureaucracyexpandedwiththecreation,in1992,oftheDepartmentofPeacekeepingOperations(DPKO)—separatefromtheDepartmentofPoliticalAffairs (DPA)—inresponsetotheneedfor “force generation” and for running increasingly large and complexpeaceoperations. In 2007, theDepartment of Field Support (DFS) was created to provide a more integrated logistical andadministrative support system to field missions, as was the Office of Rule of Law and Security

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Institutions (OROLSI),underDPKO.Thesenewagenciescreatedanewsetofchallengesto integrationandcoherenceintheUN.21

AlthoughUNpeacekeepingoperationssincethe1990shavealmostexclusivelybeenauthorizedbytheSecurity Council, this has not always been the case. Earlier missions have been authorized by theGeneralAssembly,whichalsoretainsanimportantroleindeterminingthemissionbudgetsthroughitsFifthCommittee.AndwhileearlyobservermissionswereauthorizedunderChapterVIoftheUNCharter(“Pacific Settlement ofDisputes”), peacekeeping operations—many recent ones coined “stabilization”missions—have increasingly being authorized under Chapter VII22 and have directed peacekeepers touseforcetoprotectcivilianswherepossible.23

Withthegrowthofpeacekeeping,however,camemanychallengesandmuchquestioningofthemodelfromwithinandwithout,particularlywhenpeacekeepersareaskedtomanageconflictratherthankeeppeace. The basic principles (consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defenseanddefenseofthemandate)andphilosophythatsupportthepeacekeepingmodelhavebeenunderstress,andthegapbetweenexpectationsandmeans(political,financial,military,etc.)hasoftenledtotheperceptionthatpeacekeepingdoesnotwork.Manyquestionwhetherpeacekeepingisstill“fitfor purpose” to respond to challenges such as the growing complexity of some local and regionalconflicts, people’s growing aspirations for change, fluctuating consent of host-country governments,assertiveregionalorganizationswantingtoplayagreaterroleinmaintainingpeaceintheirregions,andthespreadofviolentextremismandtransnationalorganizedcrime.

II. CurrentDebates

TheHIPPOReport

Inlightofthechallengesfacedbypeacekeepingandotherfield-basedpeaceoperations,UNSecretary-GeneralBanKi-moonestablishedaHigh-Level IndependentPanelonPeaceOperations(HIPPO) late inhis second term, on October 31, 2014, to comprehensively assess the state of UN peace operationstodayandemergingneeds inthefuture.ThiswasthefirstcomprehensivereviewofUNpeacekeepingsincethe2000“BrahimiReport,”whichhadbeenwrittenbyapaneloftenexperts inresponsetothedramatic failures of UN peacekeeping in the 1990s, especially in Rwanda, Somalia, and Srebrenica inBosnia.TheHIPPO,asixteen-memberpanelchairedbyJoséRamos-HortaofTimor-Leste,consideredabroad range of issues facing peace operations, encompassing both UN peacekeeping operations andspecialpoliticalmissions,toreflectthefactthatfield-basedspecialpoliticalmissionsmanagedbyDPAhave gained considerable importance under this secretary-general and could be described as “lightpeacekeeping.”

21ArthurBoutellis,“DrivingtheSystemApart?AStudyofUnitedNationsIntegrationandIntegratedStrategicPlanning,”InternationalPeaceInstitute,August2013,availableatwww.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/ipi_e_pub_driving_the_system_apart.pdf.22CharteroftheUnitedNations,“ChapterVII,”1945.23JoachimKoops,NorrieMacQueen,ThierryTardy,andPaulD.Williams,“Introduction,”inTheOxfordHandbookofUnitedNationsPeacekeepingOperations(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,July2015).

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InJune2015,theHIPPOreleaseditsreport,24whichputforwardover100recommendationsandcalledforfouressentialshiftsinthefuturedesignanddeliveryofUNpeaceoperations:

1. “Politics” must drive the design, deployment, and implementation of UN peace operationmandatesaspoliticalsolutionsratherthanmilitaryortechnicalones.Italsocalledonmemberstates to help mobilize renewed political efforts to keep peace processes on track whenmomentumbehindpeacefalters.

2. Peace operations should be tailored to the context, using the “full spectrum of UN peaceoperations” flexibly rather than past “peacekeeping” versus “special political missions”templates. It also called on theUN to strengthen analysis, strategy, and planning and on theSecurityCouncil to adopt “sequencedandprioritizedmandates” to allowmissions todevelopovertime.

3. Astronger“global-regionalpeaceandsecuritypartnership”isneededtorespondtocrises,andsuch partnership should be based on enhanced collaboration and consultation, as well asmutualrespectandmutualresponsibilities.

4. UNpeaceoperationsmustbecomemore“field-focusedandpeople-centered.”

TheReportofanOutgoingUNSecretary-General

InSeptember2015,UNSecretary-GeneralBanKi-moonreleasedhisownfollow-onreportoutlininghisagenda and “priorities and key actions” tomove theHIPPO recommendations forwardby the endof2016,whenhistermends.25Inthisreport,heendorsedtheHIPPO’s“primacyofpolitics”anduseoftheterm “peaceoperations” to denote the full spectrumof responses (i.e.,making flexible useof allUNcrisis management tools available, tailored to the conflict and the political strategy). This is both anopportunitytoremedythecurrentfragmentationintheworkofUNentitiesinchargeofimplementingthe organization’s peace and security agenda through “a continuum of response and smoothertransitions”andachannelforthefirstshifttheHIPPOcalledfor(i.e.,forpeaceoperationstobeguidedby political solutions—with a particular focus on prevention and mediation—and “for the SecurityCounciltobringitscollectivepolitical leveragetobearonbehalfofpoliticalsolutions”).Thesecretary-general seconded thepanel’s cautiousapproach to theuseof forceand its conclusion thatUNpeaceoperationsarenottheappropriatetoolformilitarycounterterrorismoperations.

Thesecretary-generalalsocalledforstrongerglobal-regionalpartnerships,inparticularwiththeAU,anorganization thathas carriedoutpeaceenforcementmissions fromSomalia (with somesupport fromtheUNassessedbudget) toMaliandtheCAR(twooperationsthat theUNhassincetakenover).Therelationship between the two institutions has deepened over the years, and a new Joint UN-AUFramework for an Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security is due to be signed in 2016. Thesecretary-general’sreport,however,didnotgoasfarastheHIPPO—whichhadbeenwell-receivedbyAfricanmemberstates—whenitcametothecontentiousissueoffinancingAUpeaceoperations.Both24UnitedNations,UnitingOurStrengthsforPeace—Politics,Partnership,andPeople:ReportoftheHigh-LevelIndependentPanelonUnitedNationsPeaceOperations,June16,2015.25UnitedNationsSecretary-General,TheFutureofUnitedNationsPeaceOperations:ImplementationoftheRecommendationsoftheHigh-LevelIndependentPanelonPeaceOperations,UNDoc.A/70/357–S/2015/682,September2,2015.

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theHIPPOandthesecretary-generalcalledfor“apragmaticcase-by-caseapproach,”buttheHIPPOalsocalled forUN “enabling support—including throughmorepredictable financing—to theAfricanUnionpeacesupportoperationswhenauthorizedbytheSecurityCouncil”(aspreviouslyrecommendedbytheProdiReportof2008).26

Someofthemoreconcretemeasurespresentedinthesecretary-general’sreportrelateto“newwaysofplanning and conducting peace operations to make them faster, more responsive, and moreaccountabletocountriesandpeopleinconflict.”Theseincludetheestablishmentofasmall,centralizedunitforanalysisandplanninginthesecretary-general’sofficetoenhancethecapacityoftheSecretariatto conduct conflict analysis and strategic planning across the UN system, as well of the alreadyestablishedStrategicForceGenerationandCapabilityPlanningCell.

Some of the issues raised by theHIPPO, however,were not picked up by the secretary-general. ThefourthshiftcalledforbytheHIPPO(i.e.,towardmore“field-focusedandpeople-centered”operations)did not garner as much attention. Neither did the panel’s proposal of ways to effectively integratewomen,peace,andsecuritythroughoutmissionlifecyclesandacrossmandatedtasks—althoughsomeoftherecommendationsweretakenupinhis1325GlobalStudy.Strategiesforunarmedprotectionofcivilianswere also largely absent from the secretary-general’s report. The report’s strongermessageswere on accountability, including for sexual exploitation and accountability, at the time of sex abuseallegations in the CAR. These were directed both to his staff—leading to the resignation of BabacarGaye,hisspecialrepresentativeandheadoftheUNMultidimensionalIntegratedStabilizationMissionintheCAR(MINUSCA)—andtroop-contributingcountries—leadingtotheirdecisionnottoreplaceoneofthe peacekeeping contingents in MINUSCA due to its poor performance, setting an importantprecedent.27

Thesecretary-generalalsoleftseveralimportantissues“forconsiderationbyhissuccessorandmemberstates.”TheseincludedrestructuringtheSecretariatentitiesentrustedwithmanagingtheUNpeaceandsecurity agendas (including the HIPPO’s suggestion to create an additional deputy secretary-generalposition responsible for peace and security) and financing (including theHIPPO’s recommendation tohaveasingle“peaceoperationsaccount”tofinanceallpeaceoperationsandtheirrelatedbackstoppingactivities in the future). Innotaddressing these issues, the secretary-generalprobably judged thathedoesnothavethenecessary internalauthorityattheendofhistermandthatmemberstatesarenotready for such an overhaul of the system with its potentially important political and financialimplications.28

26FormoreontheissueoftheUN-AUpartnership,seePaulD.WilliamsandArthurBoutellis,“PartnershipPeacekeeping:ChallengesandOpportunitiesintheUnitedNations–AfricanUnionRelationship,”AfricanAffairs113,no.451(2014).SeealsoICMreporton“TheRelationshipbetweentheUNandRegionalOrganizations,CivilSociety,NGOs,andthePrivateSector.”27“RCA:CommentremplacerlesCasquesbleuscongolais?”RFI,January1,2016,availableatwww.rfi.fr/afrique/20160109-rca-inquietude-apres-annonce-depart-contingent-congolais.28SeeArthurBoutellis,“FromHIPPOtoSGLegacy:WhatProspectsforUNPeaceOperationsReform?”GlobalObservatory,September24,2015,availableathttp://theglobalobservatory.org/2015/09/hippo-peacekeeping-peacebuilding-united-nations/.

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AMembershipwithStrongDifferingViews

WhiletheHIPPOreportwastheresultofwideconsultationsandwas initiallywell-receivedbya large,diversegroupofUNmemberstates, thereleaseof thesecretary-general’s follow-onreportendorsingmanyof its recommendationsbrought to the surface long-standingdifferencesamong somememberstatesoverkeyissuesrelatedtopeacekeeping.Oneoftheinitialreservationsvoicedwastheuseoftheterm“peaceoperations”todenotethefullspectrumofresponses.Anotherdivisionemergedoverhowmuchauthoritythesecretary-generalactuallyhastoimplementsomeoftherecommendationshehasputforwardinhisreportwithoutthesefirstbeingconsideredbythebroadermembershipofthevariousGeneralAssemblycommittees(theSpecialCommitteeonPeacekeepingOperations“C34”andtheFifthCommittee,inparticular).

TheNovember20,2015,SecurityCouncil session,duringwhich thesecretary-general formallybriefedthe council (under the UK presidency) for the first time on his action plan for taking forward therecommendations found in theHIPPOreport, revealed furtherdivisions,and it tookanother fivedaysfor the council to negotiate a presidential statement. One of the most contentious issues was, notsurprisingly, the unresolved issue of financing of AU operations. But also contentious was thereaffirmation of the basic principles of UN peacekeeping without adding the language in the HIPPOreport that “theseprinciplesmust be interpretedprogressively andwith flexibility in the faceof newchallenges,andtheyshouldneverbeanexcuseforfailuretoprotectciviliansortodefendthemissionproactively.”29 The final presidential statement merely “takes note of” rather than “welcomes” therecommendations of the two reports and commits the council to “consider sequenced and phasedmandates,whereappropriate,whenevaluatingexistingUnitedNationspeaceoperationsorestablishingnewUnitedNationspeaceoperations.”30

Thesedifferencesofview,however,reflectlongstandingdivisionswithintheSecurityCouncil,withinthebroadermembershipoftheGeneralAssembly,andparticularlybetweencouncilmemberswhomandatepeacekeeping missions, financial contributing countries (FCCs, the top six of which include not onlycouncilmembersbutalsoJapanandGermany),andtroop-and-police-contributingcountries(TCCs/PCCs,mainly from Southeast Asia and sub-Saharan Africa). These divisions have emerged since the"departure"ofWesterncontributorsfrompeacekeepingintheearly2000sasaresultofthefailuresinBosnia,Somalia,andRwanda.Inpastyears,member-statedisagreementsoverissuessuchastroopandcontingent-ownedequipment(COEs)reimbursementratesandperformancehavediminishedtheabilityoftheC-34toeffectivelyconsiderandnegotiateoutcomesonpeacekeepingpolicy.

The publication of the two reports also brought to the fore the long-held view that, for years, somepermanentmembersof theSecurityCouncil resorted toUNpeacekeeping forces to takepressureofftheirownmilitaries,whichwereheavilyengagedelsewhere,incrisistheatersofequalorlesserstrategic

29What’sinBlue,“BriefingandDraftPresidentialStatementontheFutureofUNPeaceOperations,”November20,2015,availableatwww.whatsinblue.org/2015/11/briefing-and-draft-presidential-statement-on-the-future-of-un-peace-operations.php.30UnitedNations,StatementbythePresidentoftheSecurityCouncil,UNDoc.S/PRST/2015/22,November25,2015.

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importance. Under these conditions, peacekeeping tends to become at times part of great-powergeopoliticalcalculationsandasubstituteforapoliticalstrategy.31

Peacekeepershaveincreasinglybeenaskedto“domorewithless”—eventhoughthesymbolicceilingof$8billionfortheannualpeacekeepingbudgetwaseventuallybrokenin2014—andthelegitimacyoftheSecurity Council is increasingly contested. In this context, much remains to be done to ensure the“burden”ofpeacekeepingisbettersharedamongmemberstatesandtoimprovewhathasbeentermedthe“triangularcooperation”betweentheSecurityCouncil,theUNSecretariat,andTCCs/PCCs,despitedeclarationsofgoodintention,suchasthepresidentialstatementonDecember31,2015.32

UN peacekeeping may, however, be entering a new era. In the aftermath of NATO’s operations inAfghanistan, a number of European countries have expressed an interest in returning to UNpeacekeeping, and some (most significantly the Netherlands, Sweden, and, most recently, Germany)already started doing so in the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali(MINUSMA).33 The United States has also shown a renewed commitment to UN peacekeeping byorganizingtheSeptember2015Leaders’Summit(“ObamaSummit”)inNewYorkandissuinganewUSpolicy on peacekeeping.34 The summit generated over 170 pledges of new personnel, assets, andcapabilities (as well as capacity building for the AU) from a number of countries, including manyEuropeanones,butalso,notably,China,whichhasbecomeninth in termsof troopcontributionsandfirst among Security Council members.35 The United Kingdomwill organize the follow-on summit onSeptember8,2016,intheUKtofollowuponpledgesalreadymadeandgetnewones.

ThesenewpledgescouldeventuallyleadtobetterpeacekeepingiftheUNseizestheopportunitytofillcapability gaps in current field operations and to shift from a numbers-based to a capabilities-basedapproachtoforcegeneration.36MorepledgescouldultimatelymeanthattheUNSecretariatisabletochoose themost appropriate of different offers rather than beg TCCs for troops. But this should notdistractfromthefactthat“politics,”nothardware,istherealforcemultiplierandthekeytothesuccessof peacekeeping. The US and European countries’ sudden renewed interest in UN peacekeeping,particularlyinplaceslikeMali,havealsoraisedconcernsaboutapossible“NATO-ization”ofcertainUNpeacekeeping operations and about some Security Council members possibly wanting to take the

31RichardGowan,“TheSecurityCouncilandPeacekeeping,”inTheUNSecurityCouncilinthe21stCentury,editedbySebastianvonEinsiedel,DavidM.Malone,andBrunoStagnoUgarte(NewYork:LynneRienner,October2015).32UnitedNations,StatementbythePresidentoftheSecurityCouncil,UNDoc.S/PRST/2015/26,December31,2015.33JohnKarlsrudandAdamC.Smith,“Europe’sReturntoUNPeacekeepinginAfrica?LessonsfromMali,”InternationalPeaceInstitute,July2015,availableatwww.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/IPI-E-pub-Europes-Return-to-Peacekeeping-Mali.pdf. 34PaulD.Williams,“TheNewUSPolicyonPeacekeeping,”IPIFuturePeaceOperations,October6,2015,availableatwww.futurepeaceops.org/2015/10/06/keeping-a-piece-of-peacekeeping/.35UnitedNations,“RankingofMilitaryandPoliceContributionstoUNOperations,”January31,2016,availableatwww.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2016/jan16_2.pdf.36AdamC.SmithandArthurBoutellis,“RethinkingForceGeneration:FillingtheCapabilityGapsinUNPeacekeeping,”InternationalPeaceInstitute,May2013,availableatwww.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/ipi_rpt_rethinking_force_gen.pdf.

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peacekeeping tool further down the road of stabilization and/or offensive operations against violentextremistsinthefuture.

TheHIPPOconcluded thatUNmissions shouldnotbemandated toconductmilitarycounterterrorismoperations because they are not suited to do so but that they must be able to operate whereasymmetricthreatsarepresent,includingthroughapreventiveandpreemptivepostureandwillingnessto use force tactically to protect civilians and UN personnel.37Much of the debate over asymmetricthreatenvironmentshassofarbeenaroundthesafetyandsecurityofpersonnel.38Thisdebatehasalsoinfluenced the UN’s recent thinking on technology and innovation,39 as well as on information andintelligence—no longer a taboo word.40 However, the secretary-general’s Plan of Action to PreventViolent Extremism,which recommended thatmember states “integratepreventing violent extremismintorelevantactivitiesofUNpeacekeepingoperationsandspecialpoliticalmissionsinaccordancewiththeirmandates,”41willnodoubtraiseanewsetofquestionsonwhether,how,andwhentheUNshouldengagewithsomeofthepoliticalandgovernancefactorsthatdriveandsustainviolentextremism.42

III. TheChallengeofPeaceOperationsReform:LeadershipandChampions

In order for UN peace operations reform tomove forward and result in a UN that is “better fit forpurpose,” itwillbeessential fortheUNSecretariatandmemberstatestoplaytheirpartsandforthepolitical momentum created by the HIPPO to be sustained for the implementation of therecommendationsputforwardbytheUNsecretary-generalandtheHIPPO.43

LeadershipbytheNextUNSecretary-General

While current efforts by the UN Secretariat to move forward some of the recommendations of theHIPPO should be applauded (such as establishing the new centralized strategic analysis and planningcell),theeffectiveimplementationofmostrecommendationswilltaketime,assuccessfulchangeintheUNoftenhappensincrementallyoverthelongterm.44Recommendationsthathavenotgarneredmuchattentionsofar,suchastheneedforrenewedfocusonpreventionandforamorefield-focusedUN,will

37UnitedNations,ReportoftheHigh-LevelIndependentPanelonUnitedNationsPeaceOperations.38SeeHaidiWillmot,ScottSheeran,andLisaSharland,“SafetyandSecurityChallengesinUNPeaceOperations,”InternationalPeaceInstitute,July2015,availablewww.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/IPI-E-pub-Safety-and-Security-in-Peace-Ops.pdf.39SeeExpertPanelonTechnologyandInnovationinUNPeacekeeping,“PerformancePeacekeeping,”December22,2014,availableatwww.performancepeacekeeping.org/offline/download.pdf. 40UnitedNationsSecretary-General,ImplementationoftheRecommendationsoftheHigh-LevelIndependentPanelonPeaceOperations,paras.94,107.41UnitedNationsSecretary-General,“PlanofActiontoPreventViolentExtremism,”UNDoc.A/70/674,December24,2015,para.58(b).42See“UNPeaceOperationsinViolentandAsymmetricThreatEnvironments,”InternationalPeaceInstitute,OlgaAbilova,rapporteur,March2016,availableatwww.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/1603_Peace-Ops-in-Asymmetric-Environments.pdf.43OnUNpeaceoperationsreform,seewww.futurepeaceops.org/.44YoussefMahmoud,“ARipeMomentforChangeattheUN?”GlobalObservatory,March9,2016,availableathttps://theglobalobservatory.org/2016/03/a-ripe-moment-for-change-at-the-un/.

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requireallthemoreeffort.Thenewsecretary-generalmayalsowanttoputhisorherownmarkonUNpeaceoperationsreforminsteadofsimplyimplementingrecommendationsfromhisorherpredecessor.

Asthereisadangerthatmomentummightbelostwiththeleadershipchange,strongleadershipwillberequired fromthenextUNsecretary-general topush for important internal reformsearlyon inhisorherfirstmandateandtomanageexpectationsonreform.Heorshemayneedtodevelopafive-to-ten-yearplan forpeaceoperations reform,whichcan thenalignwithGeneralAssemblybudget cycles,asreforms proposed in the HIPPO would require a substantial restructuring of current financing andresourcestoallowformoreflexibilitytoadapttoevolvingenvironments.

No matter what, such reforms will not be easy, and the next secretary-general will need to clearlyarticulate his or her strategic vision and build a compelling narrative45—accompanied by concreteincentives—onthevalueandrelevanceofpeaceoperationsreformthatboththeUNbureaucracyandmemberstatescansupport.Suchreformswouldnodoubtchallengeestablishedpowerstructures,risk-aversebehaviors, anddifferingmindsetsof individuals,member states, anddepartments (particularlyDPA, DPKO, andDFS, but also, for example, theDepartment ofManagement,which is resistant to amorefield-focusedSecretariat).

TheNeedforMember-StateChampions

Incontrasttothepeacebuildingreview,whichhasnowgone intoa formal intergovernmentalprocessco-ledbyAngolaandAustralia,therewasnoclearplanformemberstatestocarryeithertheHIPPOorthe secretary-general’s recommendations forward. It therefore will largely be up to “interested”member states tobuildand carry forward themomentum forpeaceoperations reformandkeep theHIPPO’sspiritaliveoverthenextyearandbeyond.ThepresidentoftheGeneralAssemblycouldplayanimportant role in generating political support and building consensus toward promoting change,includingthroughtheHigh-LevelThematicDebateonUN,Peace,andSecurityofMay10–11,2016.Thisdebate will present the opportunity to build on synergies between the HIPPO and the other globalreviews—thePeacebuildingArchitectureReviewand theReportof theSecretary-GeneralonWomen,Peace,andSecurity.46

Groups of member states will, however, be tempted to focus on and “cherry-pick” specificrecommendationsratherthanimplementingamuch-neededholisticvisionformoreeffectivefutureUNpeaceoperations.Thismayhavealreadystartedhappeninginthecommitteesandadhocbodiessuchas the Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations, the General Assembly SpecialCommitteeonPeacekeepingOperationsC-34,and theFifthCommitteeas thesestartedconsideringanumberofHIPPOrecommendations.With100recommendationsofferedintheHIPPOreportandmore

45FrancescoMancini,“ManagingChangeattheUnitedNations:LessonsfromRecentInitiatives,”InternationalPeaceInstitute,October2015,availableatwww.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/IPI-E-pub-Managing-Change-at-UN.pdf.46UnitedNations,ReportoftheAdvisoryGroupofExpertsontheReviewofthePeacebuildingArchitecture;Coomaraswamy,etal.,“PreventingConflict,TransformingJustice,andSecuringthePeace”;UnitedNationsSecretary-General,ReportoftheSecretary-GeneralonWomenandPeaceandSecurity,UNDoc.S/2015/716,September16,2015,availableathttp://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2015_716.pdf.

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thanfortyinitiativespresentedinthesecretary-general’sreport,prioritizingmightseemlikeanoneroustask,butitmaybenecessary.Comingupwithamoredetailedimplementationplan,andthusbreakingdown challenging issues into more manageable bundles of proposals, could be helpful. While somemember states have shown interest in supporting the implementation of the HIPPO and secretary-general’srecommendations,47norealmember-statechampionsor“groupoffriends”haveyetemergedaroundkeyrecommendations.Aclearlyarticulatedrationaleforchangewithafewconcreteproposalsfromthenewsecretary-generalwouldalsobemoreeasilychampionedbymemberstatesorgroupsofmemberstates.

IV. Conclusion

In 2000, the “Brahimi Report” called for a "renewed commitment" of all member states—includingmembers of the Security Council, FCCs, and TCCs/PCCs—to the maintenance of international peace.Fifteenyearslater,whileUNpeacekeepingandthechallengesitfaceshaveevolved,thekeyconclusionoftheHIPPO’sreportisnotverydifferent:politicsmustdrivethedesignandimplementationofpeaceoperations,andarenewedfocusonpreventionisneededtoavoidhavingtodeploycostlypeacekeepingoperationstodealwithmanagingconflict.

InlightofpastUNpeacekeepingreformattempts,wemustremainrealisticabouttheimplementationoftherecommendationsofapanelappointedbyasecretary-generalattheendofhissecondtermandtheimpactthesewillultimatelyhaveonthecommitmentandsharedsenseofresponsibilityofmemberstatesandonaSecurityCouncilfacingacrisisoflegitimacy.

Thatsaid,theHIPPOremainsanopportunityformemberstates—togetherwiththeUNSecretariat—toreflectcollectivelyonhowtoforgeanewconsensusovermakingUNpeaceoperations“fitforpurpose.”Member states have to collectively choose between sharing the responsibility and benefits of moreflexibleandeffectivepeaceoperationsthatareabletoaddressabroadspectrumofchallenges,ontheone hand, and continuing to share the burden of maintaining peacekeeping operations that aredeployedasadefaultresponsecontestedfromallsides,ontheother.

47EthiopiaandNorwayhavebeenorganizingregularinformalmeetingsofpermanentrepresentativesinNewYork,andtheRepublicofKoreaorganizedaseriesofseminarsinNewYorkandSeoulinpartnershipwithIPI.See“TheFutureofPeaceOperations:MaintainingMomentum,”InternationalPeaceInstitute,OlgaAbilova,rapporteur,November2015.OnApril11,2016Ethiopia,Norway,andtheRepublicofKoreaco-organized,withIPI,aconferenceinNewYorkon“UNPeaceOperationsReview:TakingStock,LeveragingOpportunities,andChartingtheWayForward.”TheobjectiveofthiseventwastotakestockofthestatusofimplementationoftherecommendationsputforwardbytheHIPPO.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

PreventionandMediation

1. In the margins of the high-level segment of the 72nd session of the General Assembly, thepresidentof theGeneralAssembly,with the supportof the secretary-general and thehelpofindependentexperts,shouldorganizealeaderssummittolaunchtheprocessfordevelopingaglobalagendaonpreventionasanationalgovernanceanddevelopmentpriority.

2. Aspartofthepreventionagendamentionedabove,andgiventhechangingnatureofconflict,theDepartmentofPoliticalAffairs(DPA)should:

a. Reexamine the state-centric foundational assumptions on which recent normativeadvancesinmediationhavebeenbuilt;and

b. Support the UN system in devising practical programming modalities for helpingmember states integrate prevention and mediation as national governance anddevelopmentfunctionsforsustainingpeaceandbuildingresiliencetoviolentconflict.

AnewGAresolutiononmediationwillhavebeenadoptedbythen,offeringfurtherguidanceonhowbesttoconductthesetasks.

Peacebuilding

3. The Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission should set up a member-state-led structure toproduce,by the72nd sessionof theGeneralAssembly, a roadmap for implementing thenewidenticalSecurityCouncilandGeneralAssemblyresolutionsonthepeacebuildingarchitecture,adoptedonApril 27,2016 (Resolutions2282and70/262, respectively). This roadmap shouldincludemodalities for predictable and sustainable financing for peacebuilding andmediationactivitiesonthebasisofrecommendations itwillhavereceivedfromthesecretary-general,asrequestedintheresolutions.

Peacekeeping

4. Thenewsecretary-generalshouldappointasmallteamwithintheexecutiveofficetopropose—inconsultationwithmemberstatesthroughbothformalandinformaldialogue—adetailedfive-yearplanonwaystocarry forwardthoseHIPPOrecommendationsthatwerenottakenupbythecurrentsecretary-generaloronwhichmemberstatesremainundecided.Theseinclude:

a. Restructuring the Secretariat entities entrusted with the peace and security agendasratherthansimplycreatinganadditionaldeputysecretary-generalpositionresponsibleforpeaceandsecurity(asrecommendedbytheHIPPO),bringingtogetherteamsfromthe DPKO and DPA in the same regional groupings to support all UN field missions,whetherpeacekeepingmissions,specialpoliticalmissions,orUNcountryteams;

b. FinancingallUNpeaceoperations(whetherpeacekeepingorspecialpoliticalmissions)and their related activities under a single “peace operations account” to facilitate

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tailoredresponsesandfinancingSecurityCouncil–authorizedAUpeacesupportmissionsfromassessedcontributions;

c. Selecting, preparing, and managing performance and overall accountability of peacemission leadership teams, including heads (special representatives of the secretary-general)anddeputyheadsofmissionandforcecommanders,withdueregardtogenderequality;

d. Rethinking UN administrative and budgetary decision making in light of the HIPPOrecommendationformorefield-focusedandpeople-centeredoperationsabletodelivertheir mandate more effectively on the ground and more efficiently, with moreintegrateduseofnewtechnologies,includingformonitoringandevaluation;and

e. Exploringthetensionbetweenshort-termprotectionofciviliansandlong-termpoliticalstrategies,aswellasfurtherexploringunarmedprotectionofcivilians.

5. Member states committed to prevention, mediation, peacebuilding, and peacekeeping and tokeeping the spirit of the 2015 reviews alive should carry forward the momentum of peaceoperations reformduring this transitionphase andbeyondandbuildonemerging consensus andpoints of commonality by forming “groups of friends” around specific proposals or bundles ofproposals(e.g.,AU-UNpartnershipandfinancing;turningpreventionintopractice;fieldsupport).

6. Someof the above issues, aswell as other issues thatmay not have been taken up by the 2015reviews,wouldbenefitfromfurtherresearchandpolicydebates.

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