armed conflict survey 2016

Arundel House, London5 May 2016

2015 was the year that, for better or worse, the state struck back in many of the world’s largest armed conflicts, making territorial gains in the face of considerable resistance. In Iraq, Syria, Nigeria, Somalia and Yemen, government forces recaptured land previously held by rebel groups. Often this was achieved with the help of foreign allies: the introduction of Russian airpower enabled the Syrian government to go onto the offensive and to recover 10,000 square kilometres of land, including towns to the south and east of Aleppo, the town of Qaryatayn in Homs Province and strategically important parts of Daraa, Latakia and Hama provinces. The US-led coalition increased the tempo of its airstrikes in Iraq and Syria, while on the ground Iranian forces supported government offensives, including the recapture of Tikrit. In Nigeria, the army announced it had recovered all of the towns it lost to Boko Haram in 2014. In its fightback, it was supported by the African Union’s Multinational Joint Task Force, to which Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Benin contributed troops.

In Somalia, the National Army and the African Union force AMISOM conducted successful offensives against al-Shabab strongholds in the south. They also recaptured several towns and villages in the provinces of Gedo, Bakool and Bay.

Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies conducted airstrikes in Yemen and later inserted advisers, trainers and ultimately their own troops to help President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi recover Aden and four other provinces from the Houthis. Amid this trend of rising intervention we note a distinct reversion to more classical forms of statecraft, with power being projected to secure national interests. Whereas previously this was largely the preserve of the P5 states, it is now being pursued with alacrity and determination by second-tier and regional powers.

Egypt and Turkey also upped the ante in their fight against insurgent groups, but without scoring any notable territorial gains. Egypt’s president, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, strengthened his grip on power and pursued a tougher approach to insurgents in the Sinai – where the army practised a scorched

Press Statement

earth policy – and other parts of the country. In Turkey, the government responded to increased security threats with greater military force, bombing PKK camps in neighbouring states and seeking to wrest control of southeastern cities from insurgents. The Armed Conflict Database shows that fatalities in Turkey in 2015 were at the highest level in 15 years, taking the country back to a level of violence last seen before the capture of Abdullah Ocalan.

IIIn the previous edition of the Armed Conflict Survey, we noted that since 2008 there had been a decrease in the number of active conflicts but a steady increase in fatalities. In 2015, the death toll halted its rapid ascent while all major active conflicts persisted. Globally, conflict fatalities amounted to 167,000. Half of those deaths occurred in conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa, and a further 21% in Latin America.

In those regions, fatalities remain stubbornly high and there are few signs of conflicts moving towards de-escalation or resolution. On our conservative count, the death toll in Syria fell in 2015 to 55,000 – yet this accounted for one-third of conflict fatalities globally. Conflict deaths rose sharply in Turkey, Egypt and Yemen – to 2,000, 3,000 and 7,500 respectively. We judge that the prospects for resolution or de-escalation grew more distant in those three conflicts, and drew no closer in Iraq, the Palestinian territories or Lebanon. Syria’s ceasefire has kindled some hope of a political solution, as have the attritional effects of four years of fighting on the disposition of forces there, but we remain doubtful that the civil war will be resolved in the near term.

Nearly all of Latin America’s fatalities took place in Mexico and the Central American triangle of Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador, where combined conflict deaths rose to 34,000 from 30,000 in 2014. Fatalities in these conflicts are on a par with Iraq, even though none of the fighting is conducted with heavy weaponry. The one bright spot for Latin America was the gathering momentum of Colombia’s peace negotiations and the sharp decline in FARC attacks in

Remarks by Dr John Chipman, IISS Director-General and Chief Executive

EMBARGO: NOT FOR PUBLICATION OR QUOTATION IN ANY FORM BEFORE 9:30 BST ON 5 MAY 2016

THE WORLDWIDE REVIEW OF POLITICAL, MILITARY AND HUMANITARIAN TRENDS IN CURRENT CONFLICTS

THE IISS

ARMED CONFLICT SURVEY 2016

EMBARGO: NOT FOR PUBLICATION OR QUOTATION IN ANY FORM BEFORE 9:30 BST ON THURSDAY 5 MAY 2016

PRESS LAUNCHARUNDEL HOUSE, LONDON

5 MAY 2016PAGE 2 OF 3

THE IISSARMED CONFLICT SURVEY 2016

the second half of 2015, which helped to push annual fatalities down to 350 from 500 a year earlier and 1,000 in 2013.

Afghanistan’s conflict registered the largest rise in conflict fatalities, to 15,000. Two years earlier the figure was 3,500, underlining the decline in security since ISAF began its drawdown in earnest. Fatalities also rose markedly in Nigeria’s battle with Boko Haram, reaching 11,000 compared with 7,000 in 2014. Six conflicts – Syria, Iraq, Mexico, Central America, Afghanistan and Nigeria – account for nearly four-fifths of global conflict fatalities.

Elsewhere, developments are more encouraging. The dominant trend in active conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia is towards de-escalation or resolution.

In our judgement, the prospects for conflict resolution in Mali, the Central African Republic and Somalia improved during the course of 2015. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia and South Sudan, they became no worse. We calculate that the death toll in sub-Saharan Africa’s conflicts fell to 24,000 from 30,000 a year earlier, notwithstanding the rise in fatalities in Nigeria.

Developments in India and Southeast Asia also inspire some optimism. The conflicts in Myanmar, Southern

Thailand, the Philippines and India’s Nagaland moved closer to resolution in 2015. Few of the region’s other conflicts became appreciably worse, and fatalities in Southeast Asia plus India barely exceeded 2,000.

IIIIn the battle against ISIS across the Middle East and North Africa, we have seen a displacement effect. As the group lost territory in Syria and Iraq, it sought to bolster its presence in Libya. Developments there underline the challenges facing the group beyond its home region, but also its resilience. Islamic State seized control of the eastern city of Derna, only to be ejected by citizens revolted by the group’s brutality. This was nearly repeated in Sirte – the city which the group now aspires to establish as a ‘second Raqqa’ – as locals rose up against the Islamic State. ISIS faces a challenge in Libya: its fighters there are seen as outsiders, and society lacks the sectarian divisions on which the jihadists have fed in Iraq and Syria. Yet the group’s success in reinforcing Sirte and so holding the city testifies to its determination and resources. It will not be ejected swiftly or easily.

BADAKHSHAN

BADGHIS

BAGHLAN

BALKH

BAMYAN

SAMANGAN

DAYKUNDI

AFGHANISTAN

FARAH

GHAZNI

GHOR

HELMAND

HERAT

JAWZJAN

FARYAB

KANDAHAR

KAPISA KUNAR

KHOST

KUNDUZ

LAGHMAN

LOGAR

MAIDAN WARDAKNANGARHAR

NIMRUZ

NURISTAN

PAKTIA

PAKTIKA

PANJSHIR

PARWAN

SAR-E PUL

TAKHAR

URUZGAN

ZABUL

Zarghun Shahr

Paghman

Pul-e Alam

Muhammad AghaJalalabad

Khost

Mehtar Lam

Tarin Kot

Qalat

Almar

Khanabad

Lashkar Gah

Sangin

Kabul

The con�ict in Afghanistan worsened in 2015. The Taliban was emboldened by the full transfer of security responsibilities to Afghan forces, and NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was folded into the Resolute Support train, advise and assist mission, with more limited rules of engagement. Operation Freedom’s Sentinel was launched as a separate US counter-terrorism mission. At the same time, military operations in Pakistan’s tribal areas pushed more militants into

Afghanistan, and an o�shoot of the Islamic State (also known as ISIS or ISIL) took territory in eastern Afghanistan. Con�ict fatalities increased sharply from 2014, as the UN assessed the Taliban’s presence to be more widespread than at any time since 2001. The peace process was disrupted by Taliban disunity after the death of Mullah Omar. Recognising Afghan forces’ continued need for strong support, the United States and other NATO allies decided to slow their withdrawal of troops.

The Afghan con�ict in 2015

Signi�cant Taliban control

Main ISIS–KP presence

Districts with insurgent activity/armed clashes

Major suicide attacks (>20 casualties)

© IISS




THE IISSARMED CONFLICT SURVEY 2016

Progress towards peace talks between Libya’s rival governments was partly a consequence of rising international concern over ISIS. This is not the only example of the catalysing effect that the Islamic State has had on international cooperation. Concern at the threat emanating from Syria prompted renewed efforts by the US and Russia to broker a ceasefire and launch peace talks. Elsewhere in the world, the rise of ISIS has inspired cooperation between unlikely partners. Israel and Hamas have tacitly worked together to keep the group out of the Gaza Strip; and Russia has shared intelligence with the Taliban to stop the Islamic State advancing in Afghanistan.

IVAlthough there are fewer armed conflicts today than a decade ago, the number of refugees and internally displaced people has surged, from 33m in 2013 to 43m in 2014 and 46m by mid-2015. Alongside this quantum leap in forced displacement, the distribution of refugees and IDPs has changed in just a few years. Whereas in the past they were mainly housed in rural camps, today most reside in towns and cities. As the Chart of Conflict notes, around 80% of refugees in Turkey and Jordan reside in cities. Globally, there are two IDPs for every refugee. Often, IDPs face greater risks to their security and wellbeing than refugees. They also tend to be displaced for

longer: the average duration for an IDP is 23 years, versus 17 years for a refugee.

Displacement on this scale is a humanitarian, political and economic disaster for states in conflict and many of their neighbours. It presents huge obstacles to stabilisation, conflict resolution and reconstruction. As the previous edition of the Armed Conflict Survey noted, a solution to preventing forced displacement has three elements. Firstly, the application of effective pressure on conflict parties to abide by the Geneva

URBAN REFUGEES: GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF REFUGEES IN 2014*

The proportion of refugees living in urban areas has increased in recent years. In Turkey – which hosts more refugees than any other country – two-thirds of refugees lived in camps in 2012.

By 2014, the situation had reversed: 15% of the 1.5 million Syrian refugees there were in camps and 85% were in individual residences (the vast majority of which are in urban centres).

In Jordan, an estimated 80% of Syrian refugees reside in cities.

*Among refugees with location known by UNHCR

Increase in urban refugees RURAL

URBAN

7.5m

4.7m

TOTAL:12.2m

2012*

2013*

53.4%

56.1%

2014* 61.2%

SOURCE: UNHCR, UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2014 (Geneva: UNHCR, 2014); Palo Verme et al., The Welfare of Syrian Refugees: Evidence from Jordan and Lebanon (Washington DC: World Bank, 2016).

URBAN

© IISS

Latin America:34,000(2014: 31,000)

Sub-SaharanAfrica:

24,000(2014: 30,000)

Syria 66%

Nigeria Boko Haram 46%

Central America 50%

other 1%

Mexico 49%

Ukraine 94%

other 6%Afghanistan 79%

other 5%

Pakistan 16%

Somalia 17%

SouthSudan 15%

Sudan-Darfur 13%

other 9%Philippines 42%

Myanmar 33%

SouthernThailand 14%

other 11%

Iraq 16%

Yemen 9%

other 9%

South Asia:19,000(2014: 12,000)

Europe &Eurasia:4,500

(2014: 5,000)

Asia-Paci�c:1,800(2014: 1,500)

Middle Eastand

North Africa:83,000

(2014: 101,000)

© IISS

Global Con�ict Fatalities 2015




THE IISSARMED CONFLICT SURVEY 2016Conventions and international humanitarian law. That will limit the scale of initial displacement and facilitate the return of displaced people. Secondly, securing better access for humanitarian relief in the country of conflict. That way, civilians will not be forced to flee simply to secure access to food, water and shelter. Thirdly and most importantly, greater political action to de-escalate and resolve conflicts. If states are to embrace this challenge, they will have to expend more political and economic resources, and devote a greater proportion of them to tackling the drivers of conflict rather than treating some symptoms.

VAlongside a growing influx of refugees, Europe has also in the past year experienced terrorist attacks in which EU nationals who fought in Syria and Iraq played a leading role. Daniel Byman, writing in this year’s Armed Conflict Survey, notes that the post-2010 conflicts in Syria and Iraq have attracted more foreign fighters than even the anti-Soviet resistance in Afghanistan, which spawned al-Qaeda. Not all such conflicts exhibit bleedout, in which foreign fighters return home and attack their fellow citizens. Of the 30,000 foreigners in the ranks of Islamic State, approximately 5,000 are Westerners. Of these, one-fifth or more are likely to die in combat. Others will remain abroad to avoid arrest. Some will return home war-weary or deterred from engaging in violence by the risk of endangering friends and family. This leaves a core of returnees, battle-hardened and indoctrinated, that pose a threat to their home states.

A measure of insecurity is an inescapable cost of living in a liberal society. Western security services are larger, better-informed and better-funded than they were before 9/11, but they cannot thwart every plot. Smarter management of bleedout can help, but the threat will remain while the conflict remains active. For policymakers wrestling with the challenge of bringing conflicts to an end, the Armed Conflict Survey and Database constitute principal sources of data and analysis.

FOR EDITORSThe Armed Conflict Survey 2016 provides data and analysis on the military, political and humanitarian dimensions of the world’s armed conflicts. It includes maps, infographics and our highly regarded Chart of Conflict to illustrate key trends, as well as thematic essays by some of the world’s leading experts on conflict.

This is the second edition of the Armed Conflict Survey, drawing on data from the Armed Conflict Database, which monitors the world’s active armed conflicts on a daily basis and is gaining increasing attention from governments, militaries, intelligence agencies and international organisations.

The essays in this year’s Armed Conflict Survey are on Pessimism and Planning in Armed Conflict; the Political Economy of Violent Conflict; the Threat from Foreign Fighters; and the Changing Role of Female Combatants.

armed conflict survey 2016

Documents