armor magazine, november-december 1992

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I pulled out my address book the other vice honorably, might look forward to a pen-night - ou know the one - he one you sion. O n the o ther hand, a few sprees or a nuse to keep up with the rest of the world attempted desertion might bring him a bob-that doesnt move every three years - o tail or dishonorable discharge... The Con-get the phon e number of a man Id served gressional appropriation bill of 1869 had cutwith as a lieutenant in the 82d. As I flipped down the number of infantry regiments fromthe alphabetical pages, I cam e to realize forty-five to twenty-five. This required thejust how many of my comrades have ridden elimination of many officers more quicklyoff into the civilian world. than casualties were accom plishing thatTheres nothing new about whats happen- end. Along with a certain number of incom-ing to our Army. After Appomattox, the petents disposed of, the Service lost ableGrand Army of the Repub lic, officers with fine records-like that of DESERT men who had, they b eSTORM, had its chest-swell- lieved, dev oted their lives toing victory parade, put aw ay a military career, with retire-its weapons, and sent ment on half-pay to be1,034,000 volunteers and coun ted upon in their oldmilitia home to thankful age. For the survivors pro-wives and families. But then motion was stagnated fora certain atrophy set in asthe na tion came to view therole of its military differently. Fairfax Dow- This period saw regiments removed fromney, in his book Indian-fighting A m y their outposts against aggression on the(1941), presents this hauntingly familiar pic- frontier, and sent to quell riots in Chicagoture of the 1869 -era army: and New Orleans. Proud, seasoned unitsfurled their colors and disappeared, while

others operated undermanned and poorlyequipped.

years.

Failing to compensate for a hard present,the future generally offered by the Armywas anything but brilliant and all-embracing.A soldier, who com pleted long years of ser- Then came the Indian Wars. - .D. Brewer

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

GORDON R. SULLIVANGeneral, United States Army

Chief of Staff

Official:

MILTON H. HAMILTONAdministrative Assistant to the

Secretaryof the Army02780


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The Professional Development Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB-17-92-6Editor-in-ChiefMAJ J.D. BREWERManaging EditorJO N T. CLEMENSCommandantMG PAUL E. FUNKARMOR (ISSN 0004.2420) is publishedbimonthly by the US. Army Armor Center, 4401Vine Grove Road, Fort Knox, KY 40121.Disclaimer: The Information contained inARMOR represents the professional opinions ofthe authors and does not necessarily reflect theofficial Army or TRADOC position, nor does itchange or supersede any Information presentedin other official Army publications.Official distribution is limited to one copy foreach armored brigade headquarters, armoredcavalry regiment headquarters, armor battalionheadquarters, armored cavalry squadron head-quarters, reconnaissance squadron head-quarters, armored cavalry troop, armor company,and motorized brigade headquarters of theUnited States Army. In addition, Army libraries,Army and DOD schools, HQ DA and MACOMstaff agencies with responsibility for armored,direct fire, ground combat systems,organizations, and the training of personnel forsuch organizations may request two copies bysending a m ilitary letter to the editor-in-chief.Authorized Content: ARMOR will print onlythose materials for which the U.S. Am y ArmorCenter has proponency. That proponencyIncludes: all armored, direct-fire ground combatsystems that do not serve primm'ly as infantrycarriers; all weapons used exclusively in these

systems or by CMF 19-series enlisted soldiers;any miscellaneous items of equipment whicharmor and armored cavalry organizations useexclusively; training for all SC la , 128, and12C officers and for all CMF-19-series nlistedsoldiers; and inform ation concerning the training,logistics, history, and leadership of armor andarmored cavalry units at the brigadelregimentlevel and below, to include Threat units a t thoselevels.Material may be reprinted, provided credit Isgiven to ARMOR and to the author, exceptwhere copyright is indicated.November-December 1992, Vol. CI No. 6

Features46

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Fort Carbon Cav Squadron Is Last to Llve-Flre MOA3 TankRehearsalInWar: Preparlng o Breachby M ajor Lawrence M. Steiner Jr.Tank Company Security Operationsby Major Patrick A. StallingsThe CounterreconnalssanceBattle: Managing ho Monrterby Captain Kenneth L. Deal Jr.From Behind the Dragon's Teeth: HItler's Folly? Or Wa8 It?by Capta in Kevin R. Austra14th AD, InSeven Months of Combat,Liberated Thousands in Nazi EmpireThe Two-Man Tank- ts Fightability and Enduranceby Robin FletcherArmor's Own Prlvate Idahoby Major James BrewerTOW and Dragon Employment In the Armor Team befenreby Captain Sande J. SchlesingerWomen InArmor and Cavalryby Cap tain Kelly John WardWho Was "Old Bill?"Armor Center Tank Deslgn Contest

Departments2 Letters2 Contacts3 Commander's Hatch5 Driver's Seat50 The Armor Center Hotllne

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Operatlve Word: FOCUSDear Sir:I ead with great interest the l e w n theMay-June issue by SSG Christopher F.Schneider, a fellow Guardsman from Indi.ana. I, for one, believe his comments arevalid concerning the way we train. I wasimpressed with the candor displayed in hissoldierly commentary on how training isconducted and what he would like to seechanged in the training environment. Ifleaders are going to be successful, we

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must be responsive to our soldiers who* identify and surface issues and ideas thatenhance the limited time available for per-formance oriented training to attain or sus-

tain perishable technical skills. The "opera-tive wore in SSG Schneider's well writtenletter is "focus." As a battalion commandergoing into a gunnery cycle, I was able to"focus" the battalion leaders on the'commander'r intenr and what determinedsuccess for the battalion. The staff put to-gether a normal 15-day Annual Trainingplan and a contingency plan that used anextended window for an incremental AT pe-

riod for gunnery completion (two ycles).This was not a new idea, as most battal-ions that had D E l T M60A3 at CampShelby followed a similar schedule. Weconducted our DElT during AT-89; by theway, that AT was a 'success' according toour soldiers, The three-week AT is alsooutlined in FC 17-12 RC. The extendedwindow allowed for a normal 15-day AT pe-riod with an overlap of seven days betweencycles for issue and tu mi n of equipment.The battalion task organized with HHC (-)Continuedon Page 51

ARMOR Editorial OfficesEditor-in-ChiefMajor J. D. BrewerManaging EditorJon T. ClemensEditorial AssistantVivian ThompsonProduction AssistantMary HagerContributing ArtistSPC ody Harmon

22492249261026102610

MAILING ADDRESS: ARMOR A m : AnK-PTD. FortK ~ o x . Y 40121-5210.

ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS: To improve speed and accu-racy in editing. manuscripts should be originals or clear copies. eithertyped or printed out double-spaced in near-letterqunlity printer mode.We also accept stories on 5-1/4" floppy dirks in MultiMate.WordS~,Microsoft WORD, WordPerfect. XyWrite, Xerox Writer,urd ASCII (please include a double-spaced printout). Please tape cap-t ions to My illustrations suhnitted.

PAID SUBSCRIPI'IONS/ST. GEORGE-ST. JOANAWARDS: Report delivery problems or changes of address toMS. onnie Bright. Secretary-Treasurer. P.O. Box 607, F Knox.Ky. 40121 01 d l 502)942-8624. FAX (502) 942-6219.u" ISTRIBUTION: Report deliwy problems orchanges of address to MS.Mary Hager, DS N 464-2619 commercial:(502)624-2610. Requests to be added to the free distribution l i s tshould be in the form of a letter to the Editor-in-Chief,ARMOR HOTLINE- SN 464-TANKme Armor Hollim i s a 24-hour seMce to provide assistance withquertions concerning doctrine, training, ogmizaIions, and equipmentof the Annor Force.)

U.S. ARMY ARMOR SCHOOLCommandant (A'IZK-CG)MG Paul E. Funk 2121(ATSB-AC)ssistant CommandantBG Larry R. Jordan 7555

(ATSB-DAS)hief of Strrff, Armor SchoolCOL John B. Sylvester 1050Command Sergeant MajorCSM Richard L. Ross 4952Armor School Sergeant MajorSGM Douglas K. Memll 5405COL Gary M. Tobin 8346COL Pat O'Ned 5855COL E. G. Fish I1 1055COL Joseph D. Molinari 7250Directorate of Combat D evelopmen ts (ATZK-CD)COL Edward A. Bryla 5050CSM Taft D. Webster Sr. 5150

Maintenance Department (ATSB-MA)Command and Staff Department (ATSB-CS)Weapons Department (ATSB-WP)Training Development Division (ATS B-TD)

NCO Academy (A'IZK-NC)Reserve Component Spt Div (A'IZK-PTE)LTC Billy W. Thomas 5953Office of the Chief of Armor (A'IZK-AR)COL Don Elder 7809FAX - 7585TRADOC System Managerfor Armored Gun System (ATZK-TS)COL Charles F. Moler 7955Mounted Warfighting Battlespace Lab (A'IZK-MW)COL David L. Porter 2139

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MG Paul E. FunkCommanding GeneralUS.Army Armor Center

i

- --The NCOs Role is CrucialIn Setting the Armys StandardsAnother one of my h e m andfriends retired from our Army theother day. CSM Joe T. Hill ha s re-turned to his roots in Georgia, but heleft a legacy of selflessness. dedica-tion, soldier skill, and leadership thatIll never forget. Joe T. is also pos-sessed of one of the keenest mindsthat Ive ever come across. In theHamburger Study of Combat Leader-ship, the characteristic possessed by

successful leaders in battle whichmnscended all others, and which wasthe hardest to find, wlls a form of in-telligence most of us call commonsense - t is a trait possessed byCSM Hill in greater measure thanabout anyone I know. He comes froma long tradition of NCO greatness,and he is simply the best!* * *First Sergeant Dolan rode with themain body, three troops of the 5th

Cavalry, as they approached RedCanyon on September 29,1879.Fromthe ridges on both flanks, Ute lndianwarriors opened fire on the column,then attacked, some 400 strong, andwere rapidly cutting off he advanceguard and surrounding them. Al-though skirmshers deployed and re-turned fire, troopers were falling fromtheir saddles amid the rain of enemybullets,and First Sergeant Dolan sawthe detachment commander tumble tothe dirt from a sniper*s round.Dolans troop commander, CaptainJ.S. Payne, had been lefi behind asthe advance guard fell back towardthe main body. His horse was deadand his revolver empty. Spurring hismount, Dolan risked a withering firefrom the fast-closing Utes to ride tohis troop commander. Jumping fromthe saddle, he saluted and offeredPayne his horse, which the com-

mander refused. Just bcfore the Utesclosed the circle on them, a youngtrooper that Dolan had signaled ar-rived with an extra horse and thethree soldiers escaped to the securiryof the main body. Two hours later,First Sergeant Dolan would be dead,but h is commander would forever re-call the NCOs gallantry and steadi-ness under ire.Noncommissioned officers havethroughout the history of our Armybeen riding to the rescue of both thesoldiers they lead and the commanderthey support. Whether its the fmt-term private that they teach the funda-mentals of soldiering, or the secondlieutenant they gently show the art ofleadership, our NCOs provide theM-last that keeps our force steady andthe backbone that keeps us strong.If there is a good idea that has foundits way into our daily operation,

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theres a good chance it either beganor was nurtured by a noncommis-sioned officer. Because hes not tooproud to listen to others, the NCOwill normally fmd the smartest, safestway to teach soldier skills. Because hemaintains his own personal job skills,the NCO of today can show his sol-diers how something is done ratherthan just tell him.In basic mining, a young recruitgets his fmt and most lasting impres-sion of what it means to be a soldierfrom his drill sergeant. mat stnrched,spit-shined, competent leader will setthe recruits standard for the remain-der of his career and, consciously orunconsciously, he will seek to emulatewhat he sees. Officers, be it throughROW summer camp, OCS. or WestPoint, will also come to view soldier-

ing through the behavior they observein NCOs. A lieutenant taking com-mand of his first platoon quicklylearns to watch his platoon sergeant,listen twice as much as he speaks, andemulate his NCOs selfless dedicationto soldiers welfare.Although officers may outwardly ap-pear to command the most attention, itis the day-today interaction betweena booper and his sergeant that will ul-timately determine a soldiers perfor-mance. From the early morning ac-countability formations in dark motorpools to the demand that some financeclerk get his squad members paystnight, to the late night walk-throughs of a sleeping bmcks, non-commissioned officers train and main-tain the force best by their example ofselfless dedication.

And the chances are pretty good thata young soldier brought up in such aproficient, committed tradition willlikely someday come rolling up to hisstranded troop commander, in thethroes of n great battle. and offer himhis track.I sewed with CSM Hill in the &-serts of Mesopotamia, where we allworked as a team to whip the Repub-lication Guard. Every single char-acteristic of leadership that we gener-ate was amply lived by him on thebattlefield as it was in our A m y atpeace. His great energy and E-sourcefulness, his wonderful sense ofhumor, and his keen intellect just flatmade 3AD n much better unit. He ismy friend, and every other soldiersfriend. too (even when hes beingtough on them), and I shall miss him.

Fort Carson Cav Squadron Is Last to Live-Fire M60A3 TankSoldlers of 2d Squadron, 7th Cav-alry, were the last active Army unitto live-fire the M60A3 tank recentlyas the unit prepared to transition toM2 and M3 Bradley Fighting Vehi-cles. The changeover is the lateststep in the modernization of the 4thInfantry Division, based at FortCarson. The division recentlytraded in Rs Improved TOW Vehi-cles and M113 APCs for Bradleys.The M60A3 was the most recentversion of a m ain battle tank thathad been the Armys frontline stan-

dard since the Vietnam era. Thefirst tank in the M60 series devel-oped from the 90-mm-gun M48 ofthe 19508, with the substitution ofthe 105-mm gun, a license-builtBritish design, in an improved hull.The M60A1 saw the passing of theM48s dome-like turret in favor ofthe more wedge-shaped M60 turretso familiar today.The M60A2 was an unusual ex-cursion, an attempt to replace a

high-pressure tank gun with a gun-missile system. Reliability problemsplagued this design, and the tankwas issued only to units in Ger-many. The short, 152-mm gun tubeon the A2 was capable of firing

both fixed ammunition rounds andthe Shillelaghmissile.With the introduction of the A3version, the M60 reverted to a 105-mm tank gun, with laser rangefin-der and tank thermal sight.

, I.

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SeIecting the Right Nby CSM Richard L. Ross, USAARMC Command Sergeant Majocand MSG Kenneth Preston, Weapons Department, USAARMS

Noncommissioned officers and offi-cers in a variety of leadership posi-tions throughout the U.S.Army havediffering thoughts and ideas on select-ing a master gunner candidate. Withthe exception of a small percentage,NCOs selected to attend the MasterGunner Course are the cream of thecrop of the NCO corps in a unit.However, have we, as their leader-ship, ensured weve given them everyopportunity for success? Look at thefollowing questions and se e how theyapply to your organization:

*How often has the master gunnercandidate in a battalion or squadronhad to decline attending school for avariety of reasons?

*How often has this occurred withina couple of weeks prior to attendingschool?

*How often have we had to selectNCOs to attend school to keep fromhaving a shortfall?

co

*How often have we had to accept alower-quality NCO to attend schooldue to a short notice?

*How often, due to short notice,have we not sent our best qualifiedNCOs and sent a substitute in hisplace?*What is the success rate of NCOsin my unit completing the master gun-ner course?

If the answers to any of these ques-tions caused a light to come on, wemay have identified a problem. Iveseen units that have an outstandingmaster gunner selection process. misselection process does not mean youhave to detail a master gunner to trainthe candidate for several weeks ormonths to pass the course. If this werethe case, then we have a course that*smissed the boat. We currently have amanagement tool in place in our unitsto help eliminate the problems asssoci-ated with the questions listed above.

In w units, weve established orderof merit lists ( O W )or soldiers at-tending NCOES schools. The purposeof the OML is to identify the priorityof soldiers selected to attend schoolwithin the unit. The OML also givesthe soldiers involved a heads-up tothe time frame of when they will goto school. This heads-up allows themto complete any preparatory require-ments (Le. math testing, TABE test,TCGST, tc.), take care of finances,and ensure family matters are in goodorder prior to attending school. Nor-mally, the OML s managed at com-pany/troop level by the first sergeant.An OML for master gunner candi-dates should include the units besttank trainers. Selection of those mas-ter gunner candidates must include thefollowing considerations.*Rank of SGT o SFC

Continued on Page 50ARMOR- November-December 1992 5


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Rehearsal in War:Preparing to Breachby Major LawrenceM. Sterner, Jr.The Result

On 24 February 1991, the openingday of the ground offensive of Opera-tion DESERT STORM, ask Force 2-34 h o r (DREADNOUGHT) con-ducted a deliberate attack on preparedpositions defended by a battalion ofthe Iraqi 26th Infantry Division. Theassault included a breach of engineerobstacles across a nm ow front and anexpansion of the breach-head bydisrupting the defense, reducingtrenches and destroying enemy posi-tions in depth.At the end of that day, it was evi-dent that th e attack was extremelysuccessful. In less than four hours, thetask force had met its initial objec-tives at the cost of only one soldierwounded by enemy artillery. Enemylosses were estimated at 250 prisoners(some taken before the actual assault)and 40 killed in action.TF 2-34 Armor rapidly establishedfour of the 16 cleared lanes throughthe obstacles made by the 1st InfantryDivision (Mechanized). The remain-der were made by the other breachingorganhation in the 1st Brigade, TaskForce 5-16 Infantry, and by taskforces in the 2d Brigade. This over-

whelming success allowed the rest ofthe division and, significantly, the 1stBritish Armored Division, to continuethe attack into Iraq a day ahead ofschedule.A Key to Success

Rehearsals are a part of doctrine,stressed heavily at the N ational Train-ing Center, and TF 2-34 Armor foundthem to be invaluable in preparing for

the breach operation. In their variousforms and at all levels, rehearsals con-tributed immemurably to the successachieved on the 24th of February.Throughout the time spent in gettingready for the attack, rehearsals werean integral part of the task forces life.These included leader participation inmap exercises and sand tablewalkthroughs that ensured familiaritywith the plan and explored variouscontingencies that might be requiredbased on enemy actions. At everylevel from company to brigade, re-hearsals led to total understanding andcontinual refinement of the plan, bothimportant to its eventual successfulexecution.Perhaps more impomnt, however,were the actual rehearsals of the planthat were conducted from platoon totask force level. Practicing in the des-ert sand with the personnel and equip-ment to be used in the attack im-pressed upon each and every soldier,from private to task force commander,his role and relationship to other peo-ple, vehicles and units in the taskforce.The focus below, however, will beon changes made to the way the taskforce was to actually operate based onthe lessons leaned through thesetraining exercises. While some ofthese relate to leader actions and plan-ning, most are physical in natureand were only identified throughhands-on rehearsal. While the les-sons outlined below may not be com-pletely applicable to any future con-flict, they do co n f m the importanceof rehearsals, even in war, and mayprovide techniques useful to others.They also reflect the kinds of prob-

lems that might be identified andovercome through effective planningwhen reheard timdopportunity is notavailable.Background- he PlanAs with any training, there must bean objective in mind. In this case, thegoal became mission accomplishment.The mission, stated in TF 2-34 ArmorOPORD Desert Storm # 4-91 dated26 January 1991 was as follows:2. MISSION: TF 2-34Armor moveson Lane Delta to attack in zone alongAxis Gauntlet to penetrate IRAQI de-fenses vie OBJ 3K hT695386; estab-lishes four breach lanes; attacks later-ally to the W est to clear IRAQI forcesfrom OBJ 4 K ; continues the attackalong Axis Ace or Axis Saturn to seizeOBJ 9K. 010 Pass 1-34 Annorthrough the BREACH LANES. 010Move along h i s ZEUS o BP 105 asBD E reserve. 010 Move along AxisMARS to BP 150 as BDE reserve. 010Move on AXIS VICTORY during BDEMovement to Contact to destroyRGFC.Although the mission seems longand somewhat complex, it was basi-cally sequential. While the implied

task of clearing and proofing thelanes was to be done at the same timeas reduction of the defenses, the taskorganization available allowed for thisto be accomplished effectively, TFDreadnoughts force and its structureare shown at Figure 1.

The amount of time available forplanning allowed for a detailed andcomprehensive picture of the enemypositions. Intelligence es imates6 ARMOR - November-December 1992


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yielded the graphics of their defenseas shown in Figure 2. Although thepicture was clear, there was no defini-tive analysis concerning the contentand extent of the obstacles, nor of de-fensive preparations.

Given the uncertainty, planning andmining assumed the worst- ines,wire, full strength defenders dug in,coordinated trench systems. Excerptsfrom the Commanders Intent givethe key points behind the plan of at-tack...We will have achieved success ifwe breach and clear four secure lanesand are able to secure the zone. .Theheart of the plan is that we must focuscompany-sized units on platoons. Ad-ditionally, except for the attack onOBJ 3K [the initial assault], we willseek to clear the enemy in zone by af-tacking his positions from the flanksand rear...Movement is the key to sur-vivability.The plan for the attack was simplein concept, yet complex in th e detailsof clearing the trenches while keepingto the commanders intent. Thereinlay the importance of rehearsals in en-suring adherence to the plan. Again,quoting from the order:Following a 2 5 hour [artillery]preparation we will attack OBJ 3Kwith Aces [Tm C] and Bulldog [TmB] abreast. Wolfpack [Tm D] will

Figure 2. Intelligence Estimates of Enemy Dispositionssupport by firing following clearanceof intermediate OBJ AXE. Orange[Tm A] will follow Bulldog preparedto assume the mission of either leadteam. Bulldog and Aces will assaultthrough the enemy positions usingplows, infantry and ACES (ArmoredCombat Engineer Vehicles) to destroythe enemy in the trench.As the graphics at Figure 3 show,the initial assault and passage of the

TF 2-34 Armor Task OrganizationTeam A Team B Team C Team DAN 16 Inf (-) B/2/34 Ar (-) C m 4 Ar (-) D/5/16 Inf (-)2/812/34 Ar 31NSl16 Inf 3/Dl5116 Inf llC12/34 Ar

21Nl Eng 3 lN l Eng 2 ACE1 CEV 1 CEV 1 AVLM1 ACE 2 ACE1 AVLM 1 AVLMAn Eng (.I2 D7 Dozers HQ Tanks Decon Squad1 AVLB Scout Platoon GSR Section

1IlINl Eng 1lNU3ADAMortarPlatoon Smoke PlatoonAlpha FIST

Task ForceControl

Figure 1ARMOR- November-December 1992

task foxe through the breach was de-signed to get the scout platoon andTeam B protecting to the northeastand northwest. The other three ma-neuver teams would be on line pre-pared to continue the attack to clearthe remaining objectives. Getting intothis configuration rapidly and withoutconfusion was the focus of the ma-neuver rehearsals.The Concept of ManeuverRehearsa sThe 2d B attalion, 34th Armor closedin 1IDs tactical assembly area, TA ARoosevelt, on 17 January 1991. It wasexpected that there would be sometime to train for the attack and there

was plenty to do to get ready. Prior tothe actual mining, two actions wererequired: (1) Task organize with ele-ments of 5-16 Infantry and other orga-nizations in the division (specificallyengineers) and (2) Receive and mountmine plows and rollers that had beenshipped earlier from the port ofDammam.Training progressed from crew andplatoon to battalion, with com plexityof the events increasing with mch7


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Figure3. TF 2-34 Armor Maneuver Graphicssubsequent itemtion. For example,companies began with basic move-ment formationsand progressed to de-tailed r e h m d s of the breach opem-tion. At the task force level, rehearsalsstarted with maneuver units only andevolved into full dress rehearsals in-cluding combat service support assets

with medical casualties/evacuation/tri-age and simulated vehicle recovery,To make the training as realistic aspossible, Company A, 9th Engineers,the first engineer company attached tothe task force, built a replication ofOBJ 3K in the vicinity of the TacticalOperations Center (TOC) in the TAA.

The details of the obstacles andtrenches conformed as close as possi-ble to what the intelligence commu-nity determined was rtctually on theground. This training aid becamethe focus of maneuver rehearsals, par-ticularly at the task force level.

Modifications to the objectivewere made after several rehearsals inorder to train leaders to mc t effec-tively to the unexpected. During thenight preceding one rehearsal, for ex-ample, the engineers built a berm infront of the simulated minefield. Vmi-ety of this sort, as well as increasedcomplexity of each reheml, ensuredthat leaders and soldiers did not be-come overconfident robots, movingdong prescribed routes without think-ing about what was going on aroundthem.Other training events became re-

hearsals in the sense that actions re-lated to the actual attack were prac-ticed and refined before they wenused. One key training event was abrigade movement to contact whereTask Force Dreadnought practiced theformation to be followed in its move-ment to the attack.

In addition, a hasty refuel on themove was attempted during the move-ment to contact mining. Problems en-countered led to changes in the em -

ployment of combat servicesupport (CSS) assets. Later,

2s these changes allowed for asuccessful refuel operationduring combat within 2,000meters of Iraqi positions.Practicing night CSS linkupand resupply operations wasdso beneficid and contributed to effective resupply atnight after the initial attackwas complete.Lessons learned through the

rehemls came from various

Figure 4Schematic ofthe Rehearsal Area

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mm cannons ahead of the ACE tokeep the enemy down, and to firebehind it in case some enemy es-caped the trench.Vehicle recognition was im portantto the operation , not only to preventfratricide, but to keep proper teamalignment and for medical evacuation.While certain systems were in placeas a matter of SOP before the warbegan, certain modifications had to bemade in order for them to be effectivein pmtic e.01ID instituted a system of numbersand chevrons painted on th e sides ofvehicles that allowed recognitiondown to platoon level. These mark-ings were extremely important inkeeping teams aligned as the taskforce maneuvered in the objectivema.Unfortunately, previously devel-oped load plans that hung duffle bagson the sides of vehicles obscured themarkings. Not only did units have tomodify load plans, but the infantryplatoons had to store both A andB bags on bucks in the rear areas..Given Allied air superiority, it wasdecided that al l friendly vehicleswould display the orange VS-17panel, or facsimile, on top. Not havingenough panels, the task force boughtorange paint on the local economyand painted rectangles on vehicleswithout panels. To test the effective-ness of the overall system, the taskforce Air Liaison Officer ( K O ) r-ranged for an A-10 Thunderbolt tooveffly a rehearsal. He could readilyidentify all the markings..Solving the problem of recognizingfriendly vehicles from the air createda new problem. Task fane SOP wasthat the VS-17 panels would be usedto identify a vehicle that required amedical evacuation. Further r e h e a d sfound that mnge flags would work inlieu of the VS-17 panels, althoughthey had to be placed higher on vehi-cle antennas in order to be seen effec-tively by medical personnel.Navigation proved to be as difficultin the desert as it was predicted to be.Cautioned otherwise, task force unitsstill came to rely too heavily on the

Magellan Global Positioning System(GPS). Other means of navigation hadto be found, even when considering alimited objective a m ..The scout platoon. in conducting arehearsal of a potential dismountednight reconnaissance of the objectivereaffmed the need to back up th eGPS. Halfway to the objective the sat-ellites disappeared, and the scoutswere totally lost. No one had botheredto take a compass reading or maintainthe pace. The lesson was learned andnot forgotten..Identifying the actual site for thebreach would not be an easy task,even if the GPS was working, butwould be much worse if it was not. Itwas important to hit the right spot be-cause the plan was dependent uponknowing the location of the trenchesand starting into them at th e rightplace. Moreover, there were fourbreach sites in relatively close prox-imity to be cleared by four differentbattalions. Confusion could have beendisastrous. An on order white phos-phorus round from the direct supportfield artillery battalion solved thisproblem and worked well in the exe-cution..Finally, as Team D moved up tosupport-by-fire positions, rehearsalspointed out the difficulty of identify-ing Team C and keeping fires to theirleft. In a manner similar to themethod for identifying the breacharea, it was decided to use th e mortarsto suppress the enemy platoon to theleft of the breach area and keep TeamDs fires in the same area and fartherto the left.Combat SewIce Support (CSS)lntegration

Perhaps the greatest benefit gainedfrom the task force level rehearsals,

besides maneuver execution, wasthe practice and refinement of CSSoperations and their synchronizationwith the maneuver plan. While thistook away from routine logisticspreparations for combat, the gainsfar outweighed the costs.Rehearsals included, in part, thecombat tnins (S4, main aid station,fuel and ammunition trucks) and theunit maintenance collection point (bat-talion m aintenance assets). These ele-ments practiced their movement to th eobjective area as part of the move-ment to contact, and the subsequentmove through the breach lanes to setup resupply, maintenance, and medi-cal operations on the far side.There was, however, another CSSpiece that gained the most from therehearsals. In planning for th e attack,it w as evident that the critical point inthe battle would be getting through

the breach and the actions im -mediately thereafter. It wa s important,therefore, to mass key CSS assets atthis critical phase of the battle.Task force planners created abreach support team to ensure thispriority of effort was met. This teamconsisted of five M88A1 recovery ve-hicles (the remaining two being at-tached to the lead maneuver teams)and the jump aid station. It was posi-tioned within one kilometer of thelead teams for quick response to jmb-lems encountered during th e attack.The purpose of the recovery assetswas initially to ensure that the breachlanes were cleared of my disabledcombat vehicles so that the attackcould continue and following forceswould have unobstructed lanes. Theirsecond task was to proceed throughthe breach immediately behind them i l combat elements and performbattle damage assessment and repair(BDAR) n vehicle casualties. Thejump aid station was to move throughthe breach with the recovery vehiclesand perfom its medical treatmentmission close to the combat elements.Rehearsals determined that the con-cept was sound. Not used to tacticalmaneuver in this type of mission, the

~

10 ARMOR - November-December 1992


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lessons learned by maintenance andmedical crews and leaders were morepronounced, yet similar to, thoselea ne d by their combat comrades.Forexample, lane recognition, going intoand evacuating frodthrough thebreach, and the requirement to stay inthe cleared lanes were new skills thatdid not come readily but stuck hardonce the consequences were madeclear.After several rehemls, the CSSteam, down to the individual crew-men, became familiar with its place inthe scheme of maneuver. The teamoperated efficiently and effectivelywith a full understanding of its rela-tionship to the maneuver units and theexpected natureAocation of its missionon th e battlefield. In execution duringbattle, it worked as smoothly as thefinal practice, a testimony to the bene-fit gained through rehearsal with themaneuver units.

While the general lessons learned byth e CSS elements mirrored thoseleaned by the combat teams, therewere others related specifically to th eCSS functional areas:.Until rehearsed with the expectednumber and type of casualties, simu-lated by tagged combat vehiclecrewmen, th e battalion aid station didnot fully gnsp the magnitude of theproblem it faced. The medical platoonparticipated in early rehearsals beforethe rest of the CSS team. They beganwith the complete aid station, consist-ing of both M577 command vehicles,and progressed to the more complexsplit of the main and jump as di-rected in the plan. This progressivemethod allowed better supervision inthe initial stages of training, effec-tively identified problems, and led tothe development of solutions. Specific

areas requiring improvement includedsetup, triage, and the knowledge ofevacuation routes and destinations. Byth e last rehearsal, when the aid stationwas split, it was evident in talking tothe simulated casualties that they wereimpressed with th e performance oftheir medical support and confident

that they would be well taken care ofshould the need arise..Given the forward location of thejump aid station (JAS) on th e far sideof th e breach, rehearsals showed thatit was not staffed sufficiently to per-form several functions related to itsmission. The JAS did not haveenough personnel to secure itself oncethe M88s left it in position, nor did ithave qualified soldiers to effect casu-alty reporting and to conduct th echemical decontamination of casual-ties if required. These deficienciescould only be solved by augmentingthe JAS with personnel to performthese specific tasks. The problem wasto identify the augmentees and to de-termine how they would be trans-ported through the breach. Solutionswere as follows: (1) S1 personnelwere available to do the reporting; (2)Cooks were not needed during the at-tack since we were to eat MREs, andenough volunteers came forth to bemined in chemical decontaminationof casualties and to double as secu-rity; (3) There was enough mom inthe M88s to transport the additionalsoldiers through the breach and dropthem off at the site of the JAS.

.Command and contro l for move-ment of the breach support team, swell as control of the recoveryD3DARmission, was vested in the battalionmaintenance technician who rode inth e lead M88. It became apparent inr e h e m l s that the team needed aradio communications net separatefrom the normal adminbog net so asnot to interfe re with the command andcontrol of the standard CSS elements.Fortunately, the plan called for th ebattalion S3, in conjunction with theengineer company commander, tocontrol movement through the breach,and he had a spare radio with him inth e battalion TAC. An unused fre-quency from the engineer companywas given for this purpose and en-sured positive control of the breachsupport team, both in ordering itthrough the breach and in accomplish-ing its missions.ARMOR - November-December 7992

The Bottom LineRehearsals work. Task ForceDreadnoughts performance wasvastly improved through the sequen-tial progression of training events con-

ducted in preparation for its attack onthe Iraqi defenses. Ultimately, the suc-cessful, efficient conduct of the attackunder fire proved the value of an ex-tensive, comprehensive program of re-hearsals. While there may not alwaysbe 30 days available to train and re-hearse for an operation (particularly atthe NTC), the concepts used by TaskForce 2-34 Armor still apply. Appli-cations also exist regarding th e typesof, and perhaps the specific, lessonsleaned through the rehearsals. Givena limited amount of time, it will bethe task of the units leadership to setpriorities concerning the focus, type,level and extent of its rehearsals.Choosing well can mean the differ-ence between victory and defeat.

Major Lawrence M. SteinerJr. graduated from the Univer-sity of Minnesota in 1974. Hewas commissioned in Armorand graduated from the ArmorOfficer Basic Course. Afterserving with the 3d Bn., 32dArmor in Germany, he at-tended the Armor Officer Ad-vanced Course and com-manded two companies in the4th Bn., 37th Armor at FortKnox. After teaching ROTCand receiving a Masters De-gree in Logistics Managementat Fort Lee, Va., he attendedthe Command and GeneralStaff College at Fort Leaven-worth. Subsequent to his nextassignment with the 8th Armystaff in Korea, he was as-signed to Fort Riley, Kan. andserved as the S4, 1st Bri-gade, 1st Infantry Division(Mechanized). Currently, he isthe executive officer of 2dBn., 34th Armor at Fort Riley.

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Tank Company Security Operationsby Major Patr ick A. Sta l l lngs

IntroductionStationary tank units are vulnerableto infantry using infiltration tactics,particularly in close terrain. Infantryunits are well-armed with very effec-tive antiarmor weapons, and can causegreat damage if allowed to get closeto the tanks. The tank company mustbe able to detect and destroy infantryattacks in order to conserve combatpower.The current tank company organiza-tion hcks the equipment and person-nel for handling an infiltrating dis-mounted threat. Equipment needs in-clude sensor systems, thermal nightvision devices, and other security-re-Iated equipment. Personnel shomges

rue best addressed by ensuring thattask organization provides the tankcompany adequate dismounted secu-rity forces to conduct patrols and es-tablish observationposts.Additionally, current company de-fensive doctrine does not give enoughdetail and guidance on security opera-tions in the battle position or the as-sembly area Doctrine needs to in-clude more definitive direction to thecompany commander on how to orga-nize and implement his security oper-ations.Personal experience at the NationalTraining Center (NTC),Fort Polk, andFort Hood has demonstrated the effec-tiveness of well-trained, dismountedsoldiers armed with modem antitankweapons against armor in static posi-tions. A dismounted night, attack byinfiltrating infantry can be devastatingto an armor company's defense, re-sulting in unacceptably high losses.Historical experience and an analysisof current light infantry antiarmordoctrine demonstrate that the potentialfor such a threat is not just a miningphenomenon. Historically, infantryhas often attacked armor with hand-

held weapons alone. With appropriateequipment and doctrine, these attackshave been very successful.Currently, some Third World nationswith technological and numerical defi-ciencies in weapons systems com-pensate by using masses of peoplearmed with inexpensive weapons toprovide combat power.' Even in moredeveloped countries, such as th eUnited States, China, and NorthKorea, doctrine prescribes infiltrationtactics by infantry units to attack anddisrupt defending m o r units. We canexpect armed forces at all levels ofthe operational continuum to conductinfiltration attacks.Historical Pe r s pe c t iveMy first moment of action was when

I was marker tank in the Tobrukbreakout and a very brave Germanjumped on my back fl ap s armed witha Molotov cocktail and a crowbar... Imust admit that ever since then I'vesuffered a certain amount of 'infantryterror.'Brigadier Richard Simpkin survivedhis encounter with an infantry anti-armor attack with the help of an alertwingman. There are numerous exam-ples of other armored troopers whodid not. Some of these examples arevaluable lessons in the value of deny-ing infantry the ability to find, close

with, and attack m o r .The first infantry attacks againsttanks occurred shortly after tankswere introduced onto th e battlefie ld inWWI. Recovering from th e initialshock of being attacked by armor, in-fantry soldiers improvised ways to at-tack tanks, including closing with thetanks and using phosphorus grenades,bundles of fragmentation grenades,and shots through the vision slits tostop the tank or kill th e crew? Due to

the slow speed and thin armor ofthose early tanks, these tactics werefairly successful.In the spring of 1917, the Germansintroduced the "K" ullet, a solid coreround capable of penetrating mo r ,providing the infantry with their firstorganic antiarmor capability.In the Spanish Civil War 20 yearslater, the technologically backwardseparatists in northern Spain usedsacks of explosives with time fusesagainst armor in close terrain. Thesefirst satchel charges required the at-tacker to close with the tank, start thefuse, and throw the charge on thetank. This highly dangerous maneuverwas often fatal to both participants,but demonstrated again the vulnerabil-ity of armor to a determined thoughlightly-equipped enemy:World War I1 inspired the m t i o nof numerous infantry weapons specif-ically designed to destroy tanks. TheGerman blitzkrieg and th e apparentinvincibility of the tank lent specialurgency to developing a way for lightforces to conduct antiarmor opera-tions. The combatants introducedthree key antiarmor weapons duringthis period.In the late 1930s. the British fieldedthe first hollow-charge antitankweapon. a rifle grenade for the LeeEnfield rifle. This weapon, a forerun-ner of the modem HEAT round, wasbased on the shaped charge still usedin many antiarmor systems today?Later, th e Germans developed thePanzerfaust, a small hand-held recoil-less launcher for a hollow-charge pro-jectile. Within 50 yards, it was veryeffective against tanks. The Panzer-faust was also the first antiarmor sys-tem designed to be thrown away onceit was fmd.6About the same time the Germanswere fielding th e Panzerfaust, th eAmericans created their own hand-

12 ARMOR - November-December 1992


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held, recoilless antitank weapon, thebazooka. AIso firing a shapedchargewarhead, it was, for most of WorldWar 11, very effective against Germanm o r . A heavier version of the ba-zooka was developed too late for usein World War 11, but saw widespreaduse in the Korean War?

The main similarity between thesehand-held antitank weapons was theshort range required for maximum ef-fectiveness. The requirement to getclose to the target tank produced re-markably similar tactics among infan-try forces in World War 11. A Germanexample of these tactics is describedby Guy Sajer in his book The Forgot-ten Soldier.Sajer was in the Gross DeutschlandDivision on the Russian Front in1943. His antitank training prescribeddigging in and allowing tanks to over-ru n his position, and included instruc-tions on how to operate thePanzerfaust, and how to mount amoving tank to attach a magneticmine between the turret and hull. Asoldierwas trained to wait until a tankwas five to ten meters from his fight-ing position before leaping out andrunning to the tanks side or rear toengage! These dangerous tactics wereused across the Russian Front to greateffect?

Another World War II example ofmen attacking tanks occurred duringthe 1st British Airborne Divisionsfight to retain the bridges at Amhem.The First Divisions bnve and lightlyequipped soldiers found themselvesfacing 56-ton Tiger tanks. Usinghand-held antiarmor weapons, anti-tank guns no larger than 75mm. andimprovised antiarmor weapons, theairborne soldiers attacked and de-stroyed 60 tanks in the close confinesof the city. They accomplished thisby using stealth and cover to engagethe tanks from the top, rear, and sides.

A common thread in World War I1is the tactic of closing with tanks totake advantage of blind spots andmaximize the effects of light weap-ons, and the use of stealth and sur-

prise to engage tanks from the flanksand rear.The tankers reaction to the dis-mounted antiarmor threat was to lookfor infantry protection against infantryand antiarmor systems. One solutionused by American commanders inNormandy was to have a rifle squadaccompany their platoons of tanks.These infantry squads moved forwardof the tanks and suppressed the crewsof enemy antitank guns. This allowedtanks to maneuver through obstaclesand close terrain to engage the enemywith the tanks superior firepower.*This combined arms approach toarmor security was a tried and truetactic in World War 11.

In the Korean War, during thelinkup between UN. Forces drivingnorth from Pusan and east from In-chon, Task Force Lynch, an Americaninfantry unit driving toward Osan, en-countered an armored North Koreanunit attempting to block its advance.Task Force Lynch attacked with in-fantry and destroyed two T-34s withrecoilless rifle and 3.5-inch bazookafire. As the day ended, when moreenemy armor was observed, the infan-try conducted a night attack and de-stroyed at least four tanks with ba-zooka fire. The attack continued thenext morning, when three more T-34swere destroyedwith bazookas.The Chinese and North Koreans also

used infantry forces to attack tanks.They mounted an attack on TaskForce Crombez as it attempted to re-lieve the 23rd Regimental CombatTeam in Chipyong-ni. Their techniquewas to approach the m o r column inclose terrain and use satchel charges,bazookas, and bangalore torpedoes todestroy or disable tanks.During the Vietnam War, the VietCong and the North Vietnamese,faced with the necessity of attackingarmored forces with lightly armed in-fantry, infiltrated as close as possibleto firebases and defensive positionsand then massed antitank and rocket-propelled grenade fires on armoredtargets.14 Often, the Vietnamese wereable to locate American positions by

the noise of maintenance operation^.'^The noise of maintenance and sustain-ment activities in armored units stillmake avoiding detectiona problem.The American reaction was geared

toward eliminating the advantage thatclose terrain gave the infiltratingenemy. Treeclearing equipment, de-foliants, and burn-offs created fmzones that made infiltration more dif-ficult. Armor and infantry providedmutual support within fmbases; notanker liked being stuck outside theperimeter without some securityagainst infiItrators.6

Early in its history, the Israeli Armywas an infantry-based force with vir-tually no armor or heavy weapons.During the Israeli War for Indepen-dence, the army compensated for thisdisadvantage by using infiltrationtechniques in limited visibility toclose with the enemy. The infantrywould then destroy any defendingm o r with antiarmor weapon^.'^These antiarmor weapons were a m uof weapons stolen from the British,bought from foreign sources, andtaken from captured enemy stocks.*

Our recent experience in Panamawas a positive example of how toavoid tank losses from infantry at-tacks. Initially, tanks were tasked toreinforce the infantry. During this pe-riod, tanks were often used in engage-ments with Panamanian forces atranges under five hundred meters.After a long period of urban and jun-gle fighting, the tanks were used topatrol as a show of force opera-tion.

The close relationship between in-fantry and m o r helped protect thearmor throughout the operation. Oneillustrative observation of the m o rcommanders on the scene was that,dismounted security is extremely im-portant. We relearned that 360-de-gree dismounted security is necessaryfor armored units in close terrain?

Historically, many infantry forceshave tried to take advantage of limitedvisibility, stealth, and surprise to closewith armor and maximize the effect oflight antitank weapons. Typically,

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armor has reacted by using dis-mounted security and by avoidingclose temin as much as possible.

Brigadier Simpkin put it best whenhe said combatants will, ...concen-trate all available effort, whatever itsnature, in time and space against th eopposing element which is critical atthat point in time and space. Wehave seen the truth of this in the pastwhen m o r was the critical element.Current and Future AntiamorEquipment and TacticsRegional threats will require th eArmy to be ready to deploy world-

wideF2 Regardless of where the Armygoes, it must be prepared to face in-fantry attacks against armor units.

A representative sample of weaponscurrently available for antiarmor oper-ations is described in Figure 1.

All of the weapons systems in Fig-ure 1 are available to a light force forkilling tanks. They are light enoughand have enough range and lethalityto make a light infantry soldier a tank-killing system. Properly employedagainst the flanks, rear, and under-belly of a tank, all can destroy or dis-able.

An observation from the Center forArmy Lessons Learned (CALL) indi-cates that seventy-five percent ofunits that maintain security, win.Ninety-three percent of those thatdont, lo~e.[sic]~~he advantages inintelligence and disruption of the de-fensive scheme that accrue to unitsthat successfully penetrate securitymeasures are very important in settingthe conditions for a successful attack.Given this observation, the role of dis-mounted infantry in denying securityto defending forces becomes very sig-nificant.

According to these observations, dis-mounted infantry should use stealth,darkness, and restrictive t e d n to in-fdtnte enemy lines, recon obstacle lo-cations and enemy positions, and con-duct supporting attacks. These infil-tration tactics are meant to bypass and

Light Antiarmor WeaponsMINES:ModellName BE!!? Weight EffectCarry

M15 Mine Pressure 30 Ibs Breaks trackM19 Mine Pressure 28 Ibs Breaks trackM21 Mine Tilt Rod 18 Ibs Kills orPressure Breaks trackM24 Mine Swi cMCmd 24 Ibs KillsINDIRECT FIREWEAPONS:

Model/Name Type of Round PenetrationM20 3 Grenade Launcher High Explosive 50-mm armor

DIRECT FIRE WEAPONS:Carry

ModellName Type of Round Weight Penetration RangeAT-4 Shaped Charge-HEAT 15 Ibs 350-mm armor 300 MM72A4 LAW Shaped Charge -HEAT 7 Ibs 350-mm armor 220 MRPG-7V Shaped Charge-HEAT 22 Ibs 330-mm armor 500 MRPG-22 Shaped Charge-HEAT 11 Ibs 390-mm armor 250 MPanzerfaust 3 Shaped Charge -HEAT 26 Ibs 700-mm armor 500 M

HEAT (High Explosive Antitank)

Figure 1

eliminate the defending armoredforces security system.One recommended infantry attacktechnique is to force the m o r out ofposition and into the killing zone ofsupporting antiarmor systems, The tar-geted vehicle must choose betweenflank and rn hots from attacking in-fantry or direct engagement with sup-porting armored systems.

The observations further recommendelectronic warfare support to jam firecontrol nets and protect the light forcefrom indirect fires? Additionally, in-direct fire support, particularly smokeand illumination, is important for cre-ating successful conditions for the in-filtrators.

Many nations and forces adhere toth e light infantry doctrine.The Antiannor Handbook for the

82d Airborne Division describes tat-tics, techniques, and procedures foroperations against armored forces.The handbook was developed because

of the need for airborne forces to dealwith armored adversariesF6The basic tenet of the 82dAirbornes approach is to use stealthand periods of limited visibility toclose with defending tanks. The infan-try maneuvers to gain th e advantagesof flank and rear sh0ts.2~Their statedintent is to minimize casualties whilemaximizing weapons effects?* Usingthese tactics, the airborne infantrymancan attack important rear m ites,ambush supporting units, and attack todisrupt the defensive ~ys te m. 2~The United States Marines also tec-ognize the need to train infantry unitsto fight an armored threat? The Ma-rine Infantry Officers Basic Courseteaches its officers to draw tanks intoambush, use smoke and suppressivefires to force the m o r to button up,disable them by flank and rem shots,and destroy them using satchelcharges, Molotov cocktails, thermitegrenades, and antitank weapons. 31

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An article in the Marine Corps Ga-zette describes infiltration as the of-fensive form of maneuver for light in-fantry. According to this article, oneof the objectives is to create a break-through by disrupting or destroyingkey defensive positions. The authoralso points out that current technologyallows relatively small bands of in-fantrymen to call in highly accurateand lethal indirect fire on identifiedenemy locations?2

Other Marine articles recommendtraining techniques for preparing in-fantry to attack tanks in close combat.Familiarization with tank vision re-strictions, the noise of tank gunneryand operation, and an appreciation ofhow to use restrictive terrain to closewith tanks are listed as training tech-n i q u e ~ . ~ ~ll of these techniques pre-pare Marine infantrymen to take onarmored forces and win.

Other nations have developed orga-nizations and tactics geared towarddefeating armored forces. Chineseprinciples of combat include secrecy,infiltration, and night operations tomaximize the effectiveness of theirlargely infantry force.% Soviet platoonleaders and company commanderspersonally take their units through rig-orous training on tank vulnerabilities,emphasizing how to take advantage ofsuch weak spots?s

One regional threat particularly wellsuited to infiltration tactics is theNorth Korean People's Army (NkPA).Specific organizations and tacticaldoctrine have been developed by theNkPA to support dismounted assaultson South Korean and American de-fenses.36Aside from their combat infantryline units, the NkPA has over 100,OOOunconventional warfare and specialcommandotroops whose primary mis-sion is to create breakthroughs of de-fensive lines?7 These infiltratingforces have major objectives of secur-ing the approach routes, raiding andfixing enemy strongholds, securingand controlling key temin, and otherdisruptive missions?* They will use

stealth and limited visibility to pene-trate defenses and close with defend-ing forces.

NkPA combat infantry units havefive basic forms of maneuver: pene-tration, Pocho (an infiltration maneu-ver by small units through gaps in th eenemy lines), Cheon Ib (another formof infiltration maneuver), envelop-ment, and bypass. Infiltration, decep-tion and surprise are integral parts ofeach te~hnique?~ dditionally, thenight attack is a preferred method ofconducting offensive operations, whileone of the types of nighttime forma-tions is the dispersed formation. Thisformation is used to allow infantryunits to find gaps in enemy defensesand close with enemy positions:'

All of the forces discussed arehighly formidable, with tactics wellsuited to disrupting and defeating ar-mored defensive positions. In general,their infantry will use stealth, cover,concealment, and limited visibility toclose with tanks and engage themfrom the flanks and rear. Americanm o r units must be prepared to dealwith this threat.Future Equipment and Tactics

In the future, armies will continue todevelop lighter, cheaper, recoilless,smokeless antitank weapons to exploittank weak spots: Therefore, the nextgeneration of antitank weapons islikely to attack the top of armored ve-h i c l e ~ ~ ~r at least have improvedability to penetrate reactive or com-posite armor. Although effectiveranges may increase, weapon weightwill be kept low enough to allow adismounted soldier to carry it.

Additionally, laser technology cur-rently allows small groupsor teams oflight infantry to locate armor defensesand designate individual tanks for in-direct fire targeting. This, in turn, al-lows these infiltrating teams to strikerepeatedly without being detected un-less active detection measures aretaken. As laser technology becomesmore widespread, this technique will

be adopted by many forces in order tomaximize lethality while minimizingcost.

The basic tactic of using stealth, lim-ited visibility, and close terrain to fa-cilitate infiltration will remain thesame. Although technological reactionand counter-reaction may protectagainst many weapons, doctrine andorganization must adequately protectagainst the threat of infiltration attack.The key, now and in the future, is todeny the enemy access to your defen-sive positions.Tank CompanySecurity Capabllitles

Does the tank company have the ca-pability to secure itself against thethreat?

The organic assets the tank companycommander has available to conductsecurity operations are prescribed inthe Table of Organization and Equip-ment (TO&E). By task organizing, thebattalion commander can provide th ecompany commander with more per-sonnel and equipment to secure hisunit. The need for task organization isdetermined for each mission by con-sidering th e situation in terms of mis-sion, enemy, troops, terrain, and time(METT-T). Since task organized as-sets can be as different as each battal-ion commander's assessment ofMEIT-T, I will only discuss person-nel and equipment organic to the tankcompany.Personnel

Figure 2 lists the personnel availableto th e tank company commander.These personnel are organized asthree line platoons of four tanks each,and a headquarters platoon with onearmored personnel carrier, two lfi-ton trucks (I-IMMWV), one five-tontruck, and two tanks. Each line pla-toon is authorized one officer, oneplatoon sergeant, and fourteen sol-diers, while the headquarters platoonha s th e remaining two officers, the



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Personnel InventoryFor Tank CompanyCaptain . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1Lieutenants . . . . . . . . . . .First Sergeant . . . . . . . . .Supply Personnel . . . . . . . . 2NBC Personnel . . . . . . . . .Platoon Sergeants . . . . . . .Tank Commanders . . . . . . . 6Tankcrewmembers . . . . . 43-. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6P3

Figure 2

fmt sergeant, and eleven soldiers.With this number of personnel, thecompany has no more than a completecrew for each vehicle. By comparison,the mechanized infantry company has54 dismounted personnel not commit-ted to crewing vehicles.&A partial list of authorized tankcompany equipment is at Figure 3.The list is limited to equipment withdirect applicability to security opera-tions.Tank CompanyDefensive Security Doctrine

Company defensive tasks are out-lined in mission mining plans (MTP) ,field manuals0,nd unit standardoperating procedures (SOP). Withinthe defensive regimen, many tasks areeither directly related to providing se-curity for the force or direct assetsaway from that requirement. A shortsummary of defensive tasks is in-cluded below.A simple list of tank company tasksfor the establishment of the defense iscontained in the company-level andplatoon-levelMTP:

.Occupy per platoon MTP

.Establish unit security

.Emplace observation posts (OPs)

.Patrol areas that cannot be ob-

.Emplace Platoon Early Warning

.Position weapons systems and es-

and air guardsservedSystem (PEWS)tablish fieldsof fire

16

camouflage positions.All infantry fighting positions andOPs with overhead cover in two hours

.Conduct rehmals

.Improve defense

.Recon and establish alternate and

.Emplace minefields and obstacles

.Stockpile and protect ammunitionand supplies4

The establishment of unit security isintended to protect th e rest of thecompany during prepantion of the de-fense. Many of these security tasks re-quire more effort and assets than oth-ers.

Combat forces and observation posts(OPs) are established to provide earlywarning and gain time for the defend-ers in case of attack. The emphce-ment of OPs is critical to securing thedefense against a11 manner of threats.Standards for the establishment ofOPS are:

.Platoon leader or phtoon sergeantsite the OP

.Must have good observation andprovide early warning

.Select multiple positions if neededto cover platoons sector

supplementary psitions

.Have good cover and concealment,with overlapping fields of view whenpossible

.Covered and concealed mutes backto the position

.Have individual weapons, rifles,telephone, MOPP suits/mask, binocu-lars, night vision goggles or sights,map/compass, load bearing equipmentW E ).At least two soldiersper OP 47

OPs may conduct air guard duties,but typically this duty is picked up bya vehicle with some defensivecounter-air capability. In a tank com-pany, this requires an individual toscan air avenues of approach from thetank commanders position of a tank.

Patrols of dead space in sector mustbe conducted at random, but with wellcoordinated and planned routes. Pa-trols are best employed during th eday, while other passive measures aremore effective at night, Patrols musthave communication, rifles or subma-chine guns, and appropriate supervi-sion by trained noncommissioned offi-cers.

Emplacement of the Platoon EarlyWarning System (PEWS) requires two

Tank Company EquipmentEquipment -uth RemarksM l A l T an k. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4M113A2 Armored Personnel Carrier . . . . . .M8A1 Chemical Alarms . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4Binoculars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16Commo wire rolls, .5 km each . . . . . . . . . 16Camouflage screen systems . . . . . . . . . 1Remote control landmine system . . . . . . . . 240-mm grenade launcher . . . . . . . . . . . .Cat S O MG , heavy fixed turret type . . . . . . 14Ring mount, Cat .50 MG . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1Ground mount, tripod, Ca l.5 0 M G . . . . . . .Night Vision Goggles, AN PV S 7 8 . . . . . . 369-m m Pistols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8Radio Sets, vehicle mounted . . . . . . . . . 17M16A2 Rifles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4Phone Sets, TA-1 8 TA-312 . . . . . . . . . . 12M-4 Carbine, 5.56-mm . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Cal .50 MG, heavy barrel, flexible . . . . . . . . 2

Figure 3

4 per platoon, 2 in HQsHeadquarters platoon1 per platoon1 pertank8,000-m eter capacity

Mounted on M16A 2 rifles1 pertankMounted on truck 8 M113Truck mountCarried in M113A 22 per tankPersonal weaponPersonal weapon3 per platoon2 per tank45



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soldiers and three to five minutes persensor for installation. With five sen-sors per system, total installation timeis approximately thirty minutes. Mon-itoring the system can be done byOPs, but recovery is best accom-plished by the same team that em-placed the sensors!Obstacles are emplaced under thesupervision of a platoon sergeant.Crews m ust emplace obstacles withinsix hours. Security must be providedinitially for the obstacle teams, andthen for the obstacles once estab-lished. That security can be dis-mounted or mounted, depending onthe situation!Conducting the Company Defense

From the incredibly busy activity ofestablishing the defense, the companymust shift into maintaining and con-ducting the defense against all attack-ers. Although the list of tasks issmaller, the commitment of assets isstill intense. Tasks associated withthis phase are:.Continue to improve the defenseC on du ct counterrecon.Prepare for tactical operations.Defend against dismounted attack.Defend against mounted attackEven after the defense is established,the company continues to improve itspositions, camouflaging vehicles andequipment, clearing fields of fire,burying wire, improving firing posi-tions, digging comm unication trenchesbetween positions, and other im-provements the leadership deems nec-essary?Preparation for tactical operationsrequires that many actions be sus-tained for the duration of the defense.Th e first priority is securing the posi-tion by maintaining OPs, patrols, airguards, and PEWS. Equipment andweapons maintenance is also abso-lutely essential. Resupply operations,particularly food, fuel, and ammuni-tion, must also be conducted daily.Training and r e h e m l s continue, anda sleep plan is executed to maintaincontinuous operations?2

The standuds for a successful de-fense against dismounted attack pro-hibit losing more than on e vehicle perplatoon?3 The subtasks of this requirement recognize the importance ofdetection and warning to defeating thedismounted threat. Even with success-fu l detection and reaction, the stan-dards allow the platoon leader towithdraw if necessary to conserve thecombat strength of hi s platoon.Defense against a mounted attack re-quires the concentration of companyfifepower against the enemy. Keyplayers in accomplishing this are theOPs established earlier. OPs provideearly warning, calls for indirect fires,and assistance in identifying the loca-tion of the enemy attack.%Before any attack, countemcon-naissance is conducted to force thewithdrawal or destruction of enemyreconnaissance units. The entire com-pany is involved in making the coun-terreconnaissance fight a success, asdepicted in Figures 4 and 5.5Figure 4 illustrates a security planfor fairly clear terrain, where mountedOPs are able to establish fields of sur-veillance that can truly interlock andreach out a long distance. The com-mander is expected to spread his pla-toons and vehicles as far apart ;Is nec-essay without losing the ability toconcentrate firepower against theenemy.56 Given that a platoons de-

fensive sector is typically from 400 to800 meters wide, the layout depictedwould have to be used in very openterrain in order to deny dismountedroutes into sector. In fact, the platoonin mounted OP positions would becovering the companys frontage of1,OOO to 1,600 meters. This dispersionleaves mom for infantry infiltrationroutes if enough cover or concealmentis available.Figure 5 also envisages fairly openterrain for employm ent of the defense.This is a more realistic approach tosecuring a position, with a mix ofmounted and dismounted securitythat, if properly employed and main-tained, should be able to detect andreact to both mounted and dismountedattack In close terrain, the number ofdismounted OPs would have to be in-creased.In addition to the defensive tasksdiscussed earlier, other tasks, require-ments, and duties will naturally pull atthe companys already limited assets.Sickness, injury, special duties (de-tails, etc.), and maintenance-relatedjobs will also require the commitmentof company personnel.Assembly Area Operations

Another type of operation requiringsecurity operations against a dis-mounted attack is occupation of an as-Double-Layer Technique1. Each platoon puts vehicleOP forward.2. Platoons keep all weaponsights on- rews rotate

//-----

emsentries.

FIgure 4- ight Sunfelllance Plan (Part II )ARMOR- November-December 1992 17


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semblym.Assembly areas resembledefensive positions, but are more tem-porary and typically oriented 360-de-grees for security purposes. In assem-bly mas,many of the m e asks arerequired as n the defense.Security operations during the occu-pation of an assembly area m earedtoward avoiding detection, since de-fensive arrangements are usuallyhasty. This includes an increase indismounted patrols to cover deadspace and heightened alert status forvehicle crews?Personnel 8t Equi pmen t Issues

Within the framework of assemblym a and defensive tasks is the need tomaintain security. FM 71-1, TheTanWMechanized Infantry CompanyTeam, describes security measures asthose actions taken to protect theteam from being found or attacked bysurprise.58Figure 6 is a matrix fromthe manual listing some active andpassive security measures.As described earlier, Oh rn veryimportant for the companys defensivesecurity. To minimize effect on thetotal force and heighten the teamworkof the OP team, two members of thesame tank crew are used as OPs. If re-quired, the remaining two crew mem-bers can move their tank. The prob-lem is they can only fire in slow, de-

Passive and Active Security MeasuresPass i ve A c t i ve*Disperse vehicles and platoons.*Use camouflage, concealment,*Impose radio-listening silence.*Turn engines off and keep them cold.*Reduce noise. *Position GSR posts.*Do not move around in positions.*Use no lights.*Keep antennas tied down.*Use hide or defilade positions.*Do not position in likely artillery target areas.

*Establish OPs.*Perform mounted and dismounted*Emplace platoonea@ warning devices.*Deploy M8 chemicalalarm nets.

and cover. patrols.

Figure 6

graded mode. If each platoon is forcedby terrain to establish an OP. thecompany commanders immediatelyavailable firepower is cut by one-fourth.Since two of the 16 personnel as-signed to a tank platoon are the pla-toon leader and platoon sergeant,there me actually 14 men at best tomaintain I wo-man OP on a 24- hourbasis. If teams are rotated to maintaineffectiveness, the platoon leader willcycle through his entire platoon inshort order. At the same time, the pla-toon must have someone on air guardand monitoring the radios. Further,dismounted patrols will require atleast three soldiers under a noncom-

-/

Figure 5- ight SurveillancePian (Par t 1)

Systems Ovrl rp Technique1. Platoon 100% alert-other platoons rest.2. Platoon conducts localsecurity with only NVGs.3. Dismounted patrol links thetwo platoons and usesNVGs.4. GSR reinforces the forwardscreen (if available).5. Company HQ and trainsconduct local security andradio watch.6. Company commander lo-cates with company HQ.

missioned officers control (typicallya tank crew) to periodically checktheir sector.All of the tasks listed above, dongwith maintenance jobs, sustainmentrequirements, and sleep planning addto the platoon leaders personnel load.He must accept considerable risk insome areas to accomplish all of theseimportant tasks.As casualties, illness, or accidentsoccur, the platoon leaders ability toconduct security operations is furtherdegraded. There is no redundancy inthe organic tank platoon or companyorganization that compensates for per-sonnel shortages.One obvious equipment shortfall isthe lack of PEWS.Despite the recog-nition in doctrine that this sensor sys-tem is needed at the platoon level toeffectively implement security open-tions. th e PEWS is absent from thetank companys authorized equipment.This is particularly serious since thesystem would help compensate forpersonnel shortages in the organim-tion by covering dead space thatmight requ ire an OP.The heaviest weapon available to thedismounted platoon member is the5.56-mm carbine. OPs need a moreeffective weapon to engage and sup-press infiltrating infantry. The tankcompany has 7.62-mm machine gunsmounted at the loaders position oneach of its tanks. These could be used

i a ARMOR - ovember-December 1992


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by the OPs if a ground-mount wasprovided? An observation from Operation JUST CAUSE was that aground mount system of some sortwas needed for the coaxial machinegu n on the Sheridans. One crewmanwent so far as to actually use asbestosmittens to hold and fire the dis-mounted coaxial machine gu n to sup-press attacking infantry!Another equipment problem is theshortage of binoculars. There are justenough for a set on each of the tanksand two sets with the commander andexecu tive officer respectively. When aset of binoculars goes forward withthe OP, one of the tanks does without.This reduces one tank commandersability to observe his sector duringdaylight hours. The lack of a man-portable radio is also a problem. Doc-trine recomm ends the use of patrols tocover dead space, but the TOE doesnot provide the tank company anycommunication for those patrols to re-port contacts. The additional radioswould also provide a back-up for wirecommunications to OPs.OPs are expected to establish theirpositions as standard fighting posi-tions with at least 18 inches of over-head cover. There are no provisions inthe TOE or on the M1 tank load planfor materials to accomplish this re-quirement, with the exception of ashovel, axe, and pick. I found that air-field paneling provided an excellentoverhead base. With the addition ofsandbags to the load plan, the unitwould have adequate resources to pro-tect their OPs in any terrain.

One advantage for the company isits tank Thermal Imaging Systems(TIS). These ballistic sights allownight and day target acquisition andengagement capability for the maingu n and coaxial machine gun. Ther-mal sights allow identification of ve-hicles at 2,000 m et ed 1 and detectionof dismounted personnel at 4,000 me-ters, regardless of light conditions.6*There are some limitations to thethermal system. Thermal sights im

powered by the tanks batteries, andcannot be dismounted from the vehi-cle. The power drain from running thesights requires the periodic rechargingof the batteries by running the tanksengine. Aside from the intermittentnoise of running engines, the sightsthemselves emit a loud clicking noiseeasily discernible up to 100 metersfrom the k1nk.6~ These unavoidablenoise producerswe a real handicap tonoise reduction as a passive securitymeasure. Also, thermal sight capabili-ties are degraded by rain, snow, dust,infrared smoke, and heavy foliage.64Unfortunately, these conditions occurwith great regularity in many p a s ofthe world. Additionally, since the TISis a line-of-sight system, terrain mask-ing also blocks thermal sight detec-tion.Future tank designs iv e going toworsen som e of these problems by re-ducing the number of available per-sonnel. The tanks of the future will,most likely, have reduced crew sizedue to adoption of an automaticloader.6 These two- or three-mancrews will still have to handle thetasks listed above. The current tankcompany can bxely accomplish thesetasks as organized. The reduction inpersonnel will force some sort of aug-mentation by personnel and equip-ment to successfully secure the futuretank company.Compahsonof CapabiritytoThreat

The tank company commander mustnot only m y is forces to detect in-filtration attacks, but must also be ar-rayed to defend against what is proba-bly his primary threat, the mounted at-tack. The difficulty in resolving thisdilemma is the most serious conse-quence of gaps between capabilityand doctrine.In open t e d n , the tank companycommanders night vision sights andweaponry allow him the flexibility toset up effective mounted OPs whichcan be supplemented by minimal dis-

mounted OPs to compensate for deadspace. This is the ideal situation thatdoctrinal security operations are bestsuited to address. Unfortunately, flat,clear terrain is not prevalent in manyparts of the world where tanksmightbe expected to fight.Close tenain, such as heavily for-ested areas or hilly, rugged ground isnot as simply defended. Mounted OPsin close termin are themselves vulner-able to infiltration attack due to theirnoise and physical signature. Many ofthe advantages of m ounted sights andweaponry will be negated by interven-in g terrain and vegetation. All that anattacking infantry unit requires is oneunwatched lane to successfully over-come a defenders counterrecon ef-fort.Heavy use of dismounted OPs tocompensate for limited fields of ob-servation will quickly degrade thecompanys ability to fight its tanks.OP equipment is inadequate; moon-less or cloudy nights limit the capabil-ity of the authorized passive night vi-sion goggles significantly. Tank com-pany OPs do not have sufficientweaponry to defeat or suppress attack-in g infantry units.Clearly, these deficiencies indicatethe TOE does not provide adequatepersonnel for executing security oper-ations as required by current doctrine.On paper, there are enough soldiers inthe company to handle security re-quirements. However, due to lack ofdepth in the organization, any circum-stances that detract from the numberof available soldiers will impact di-rectly on the companys capability tosustain defensive operations.Equipment shortages and inadequa-cies are also debilitating. The lack ofground movement sensors like thePEWS handicaps the companys de-tection effort. Infiltrating forces willtake advantage of dense foliage areasand dead space to move into sector.Easily emplaced and recovered sen-sors would allow the company tocover infiltration avenues of approach



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"Ministry o f Infamation. By Air to Battle -rhe Oficiol Account of the British First andSixth Airborne Divisions, His Majesty's Sta-tione ry Offic e, London, 1945. p. 134."J.O. Rod riguez. "David and Goliath - CanAirborne Infantry Defend Against Armor inCen tral Europe." MMAS Thesis, U.S. ArmyCommand and General Staff College, 1986, pp.

"Captain Richard S. Faulkner, "Lecvning theHard Way," ARMOR. VoL 99, July-August199 0, p. 25.I3Jim Mesko. Armor in Korea.SquadrwJSig-nal Publications, Inc.. Camllton. Texas. 1984.

14Jamer R. Arnold. Illurrmred History of theVietnam War,Armor, Bantam Books, Inc, NewYo&, 1987. pp. 60-61."bid .. pp. 69-71.I6lbid."Karl Farris. "Grow~h nd Change in the Is-raeli Defense F o ra s Through Six Wan." The-sis. U.S. A rmy Wa r Col lege , Carl isle Barracks,Pa, 1987. p. 22."David Eshel. Chariots of the Deseort,Brassey's D efence Publishen. London, 1989.19Cap tain Kevin J. Hammond and CaptainFrank Sherman, "Sheridans in Panama,"

22-24.

p. 21.

pp. 1-10.

ARMOR. Vol. 99, MatCh-April 1990. pp. 8-13.201bid.. p. 14."Brigadier Richard E. Sirnpkin, Antifank,Brassey's Publis hen Limited. Oxford, 1982. pp.2tWhite House. National Security Strategy ofthe United Srcrres. Government Printing Office.Washington, D.C.. 1991. p. 30.=Center for Army Lessons Learned. "YearofTraining Compendium. Volume 1: HeavyFom s," Combined Arms Training Activity.Fort Leavenworth . Kan.. 1988. p. 6.

228-229.

%]bid.. p. 10.2Slbid.m82d Airborne Division, Antiarmor Hand-book, Fort Bragg. N.C.. Hea dquarten . 82d Air-borne Division, 1984.t71bid.. pp. 22-12 through 22-13.?bid.. p. 22-9.ZPlbid..p. 22-1 1.9 e r g e a n t J O ~ . ~ u rp h y . AntiarmorTraining. "Marim Corps Gazette 74. October

3'Captain Timo thy J. Jackson. "Light InfantryTechniques," Marine Corps Gazette 74. June32William S.Lid. "Light Infantry Tactics."

Marine Corps Gazette 74. June 1990, p. 46.33Captain David W. Szelowski, "TrainingGrunts to Tackle Tanks,"Marine Corps Gazette74. October 1990, p. 49.

1990.p. 46.

1990,pp. 54-55.

"Bellamy. p. 162."Robert Kuth, "Soviet Airborne AntiarmorTactics in the Defense," U.S.Army Russian In-stitute. Gar misch, Germany. 1981. p. 15.%.S. Army Combined Arms Combat Devel-oanents hctivitv. FC 100-2-99. North Korean

People's Army Opemtions, H e a d q u m n . US.Army Combined Arms Center. Fort h a v e n -worth. Kan.. 1987. p. 3-4."Ibid.. p. 3-5 ."Ibid., p. 4-8.?bid.. p. 4-2.*Olbid.. p. 4-20.4'Weeks. p. 186.'2Randall Steeb. Keith Bmdley. Dan Norton.John Bondanella, Richard Salter. and TemllCovington, An Exploration of Integratd

Ground Weapons Concepts for ArmorlAnti-armor Missions,RAND, Santa Monica. Cali.,1991.p.24.%.s. A ~ Y .abl le of Organization andEquipment. W17377L000, Tank Com pany, TankBattalion," Printout received from F o m D evel-w e n t Office. Fort Leavenworth, Kan.. 31 Oc-tober 1991. p. [email protected]. Amiy Tactical Canmanden Development Course. Battle Book, US.BrigadelBattal-ion Task Force. U.S. Army Command and Gen-eral Staff College. Fort Leavenworth. Kan.,1991, pp. M-1 - M-5.U.S. Army. "TOE U17377LDOO." p. 8-9.5%.S. Army. ARTEP 71-1-MTP. MissionTmining Planfor the Tank and Mechanized In-fantry Company and Company Team. HQ. De-partment of the Army. Washington, D.C., 1988.

47U.S. Army. ARTEP 17-237-10-MTP. Mu-sion Training Plan for the Tank Platoo n, HQ.Department of the Army, Washington. D.C.,48P. Antson, A. Burkard. 1. Jacobs, D.McLaughlin. K. McPhenon. and B. Rapapt.

Tacricnl Sensorsfor Dispersed TacticalNuclearForce Units. Phase 11. Defense NuclearA ency. McLean, Va.. 1984, pp. 108-109.f9U.S. Army. ARTEP 71-1-MTP. p. 5-142 .5oU.S. Army. ARTEP 17-237-10-MTP. pp. 5-

pp. 101-103.

1988. pp. 119-120.

10, 5-99. Also U.S. A rmy, ARTEP 71-1-MTP.p. 5-103.99. Also U.S. Army, ARTEP 71-1-MTP, pp. 5-102 - 5-103.U.S. Army. ARTEP 17-237-10-MTP. p. 5-10.

"U.S. Army, ARTEP 17-237-10-MTP. p. 5-52

531bid., p. 5-99.%.S. Army. FM 71-1. TankandMechanizdIqantry CompnylTeam. Government PrintingOffice. Washington, D.C., 1988, pp. 4-9 - 4-1 1.See ala0 FM 71-123. Tactics and Techniquesfor Combined Arms Heovy Forces: ArmoredBrigade, BattaliodTask Force, and Com-panylTeam, Final Draft. Unedited. U.S. Army

"U.S. Army, ARTEP 71-1-MT P. p. 5-103.%FM 71-1. p. 4-9."ARTEP 17-237-10-MTP. pp. 5-31 - 5-32.%.S. Army. FM 7l-1. p. 4-10.s ll i s idea first surfaced in a convenation Ihad with Captain Curt Hoover. Maneuver Divi-sion, Center for Army Lessons Lecvned.

Armor School. Fort KIIOX. Ky.. 1991, p. 4-179.

60Hamrnond.p. 15.< .


6'US. Army T a a i d Commander's Dcwlopment Coune. Battle B m k , U S . BrigadkIBattal-ion Task Force. p. 1-7."Howard Tate, engineer for Geaed Dynam-ics Tank Division, telephonic interview by .u-thor, Leavenworth. Kan.. 18 Novem ber 1991.63~cnonal xperience with furdig tank u-m b l y area at Fort Hood, Texas. taught methat the distinctive clicking of thermal sightnwas a tme indicator of the Ml's presence.%DC. Bank Book,p. 1-8.aR. Steeb. et al, Integrated Ground Weapons@P. Antsen. e( 4 NP security study. p.671bid.. p. 66.aU.S. Army Training and Doctrine Com-mand. Indepen&nr Evaluorion Report fa heCombined Arms Maneuver Battalion, US.Army TRADOC, Fort havenworth, b.,1988, p. 1.

Concepts,pp. v-vi.120.

TCDC, ~ t t l e m k, p. 1-7.9

Major Patrick A. Stallingsgraduated in 1980 with a BAfrom McNeese State Univer-sity in Lake Charles, La.After AOB, he served as atank platoon leader, S1, andtank company executive offi-cer in 1st Battalion, 7th Cav-alry at Fort Hood, Texas. Heattended AOAC in 1985after being a senior classadvisor to an AOB class.After reassignment to FortPolk, Major Stallings sewedas the S4, company com-mander and S3 in 3d Battal-ion, 77th Armor, participatingin NTC rotations while theS4 and S3. He was as-signed to PERSCOM as theJoint Speciatty Officer man-ager from 1988 to 1989, fol-lowed by a year as the Fu-ture Readiness Officer forArmor Branch. He attendedCGSC and SAMs, and iscurrently assigned as thedeputy G3, Plans, 1st Ar-mored Division, BadKreuznach, Germany.

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by Captain Kenn eth L. Deal Jr.The rising sun is a welcome sight tothe scout platoon leader. He fought a

long, hard battle during the night, andthree of his vehicles were destroyed.He can accountfor only three BRDMsdestroyed, and he heard BMPs pene-trate his screen but has no idea wherethey are now. The battalion com-mander gave him two tank platoons,each from a different company. Hehas not had contact with one of themall night and suspects they did notlink up, as ordered. Enemy electronicwarfare was effective, and made i t im-possible to use the radio ef/ectively.Of the other platoon, two of the fourtanks went maintenance down, and hehas no idea when they will be recov-ered, and the remaining two workingtanks went back to the parent unithours before daybreak to prepare de-fensive positions. Even if he knewwhere the enemy was, he couldntfight them now. Of his three destroyedvehicles, five scouts died of woundsbecause the closest company medics

were 10 kilometers away and couldntf ind the scout locations on time. Totop it off, he battalion commanderwants to see him to learn why thefight was such a failure. I f he couldonly get a f ew hours sleep maybe, hecould start to prepare for the nextbattle; not a chance, the battalion de -fensive order is to be issued mid-morning, and the scout platoon leaderi s expected to be there.

Unfortunately, this picture is all toofrequent. A scout platoon leader eagerto be successful is unable to, becausehe is given neither the assets nor thestructure to accomplish the mission. Itis ironic that what may be the mostimportanttask in the battalion defenseis given the least attention. And itraises more questions about whoshould be responsible for the coun-terreconnaismce fight, or more accu-rately, the security zone battle.

Given that the counterreconmiss-ance battle is the responsibility of thedefending task force, one of the mostsuccessful techniques is for the TFcommander to allocate a company-

size element to fight the battle. Thequestion then becomes, how does thecompany commander array hi s limitedforces to ensure success throughouthis sector? What should he know?What should he look for? What isconsidered successful for such 8 mis-sion? And how does he organize forthe fight?

The battalion commander should as-sign the counterreconnaissancebattle,or the battalion security zone, to hismost competent commander or hismost effective company. If at all pos-sible, it should be a habitual assign-ment so the unit has time to train (as aresult of the unit METL). because thenature of this security mission re-quires a well trained unit with pla-toons and crews that can operate withlittle or no guidance. The battalioncommander must give the securityzone commander very specific guid-ance, which at a minimum must givethe commanders intent for that spe-cific mission, what the battalion com-mander wants accomplished, andwhere he wants it done. The security

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zone commander must determinehow. Once the assignment is given.the company commander is fully re-sponsible for everything that happensin the sector. This may include anypassage lanes or any forward obsta-cles. To ensure unity of effort, thecompany commander must control allassets in the security zone, includingthe scouts, mortars, and any MI assetsforward. The S2 is always a criticalpart of the information cycle and willgive the countemconnaissance com-mander PIRs. He will continue tomonitor the company net to bettertemplate enemy forces and follow therecon battle. In the same vein, thecounterrecon commander should sup-ply the task force with IRs (informa-tion requirements) that can help winhis fight. The S2 hould no have oper-ational control of any forward ele-ments in the main battle area.When the commander conducts hisleaders recon, he must do a completeintelligence prepamtion of the battle-field, paying special attention to keyterrain, avenues of approach (mountedand dismounted), engagement areas,and withdrawal routes. Much of thiswill come from the battalion S2. buthe needs to look at the terrain and as-sess what will be critical for him, es-pecially since the battle is usuallyfought at night or under limited visi-bility. If at all possible, the leadersrecon should be done with the battal-ion commander, the S2. the FSO, thesecurity zone commander and thescout platoon leader. This will beginthe synchronization process and thebattalion commander will know ex-actly what to expect from

armor magazine, november-december 1992

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