armor, september-october 1995 edition - fort benning...calling on you to help us at armor do our...

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

DENNIS J. REIMERGeneral, United States Army

Chief of Staff

Official:

JOEL B. HUDSONActing Administrative Assistant to the

Secretary of the Army 00545

In your digitized movement forward toward Force XXIdon’t forget to report your progress. There are many is-sues remaining that require thoughtful discussion andconsideration. What still needs to be developed? Whatdo we have that doesn’t work as advertised? Whatworks better than expected? Where are the holes?What is solid? What haven’t we thought of? These arebasic questions, of course, but every armored advocateisn’t currently serving in a position authorizing micro-processor implantation into his body. They are questionswe must ask and answer. Render spot reports whennecessary, for the Armor community needs to hearabout your discoveries and your questions. Get the de-bate going, for until we have the discussion, we can’teffectively move past the words and ideas phase intothe equipment and implementation phases. Yes, I’mcalling on you to help us at ARMOR do our part in ush-ering in the future.

As we rush toward the future, however, we can’t ig-nore what we continue to see nightly on our televisionscreens or read daily in the morning papers. Let’s faceit, some situations are hard to observe. For instance,the continued throes of Yugoslavian dissolution arepainful to watch. According to the Secretary of Defense,it’s possible that “an evacuation of U.N. forces fromBosnia may become necessary no matter what we do.”That mission would obviously require employment of aportion of the armored force once all of the political in-itiatives are complete. Whether we will actually sendtankers, scouts, or cavalrymen to help extract the multi-national force that is in contact is unknown at this writ-ing. The possibility is certainly real, though. But, whetherthe task is in the Balkans or not isn’t the issue.

What should most interest us is that, in addition to ourdigitized movement to the future, and no matter whatthe conflict, we will move armored warriors onto a cur-rently unfamiliar section of the battlefield. Most everyoneagrees with that. So now we must think hard about whattasks a heavy unit can perform in a combat zone wherethe conditions fall far short of total commitment againstan opposing tank or mechanized force, a la South WestAsia. We can imagine the difficulties in operations other

than war (OOTW), and a few of us have even experi-enced them, but most heavy guys haven’t: incomingfire from any direction; identification problems in dis-cerning friendly force from foe, friendly noncombatantsfrom hostile ones; language barriers between militaryforces and civilians, and amongst allied forces; restric-tive rules of engagement; vehicle identification prob-lems when both ally and potential foe use the sameequipment. Our lighter warfighter brethren have dealtwith these unconventional situations many timesthroughout the last couple of decades and have a ma-turing body of TTP. One need only think of Somaliaand Haiti to know that across the entire spectrum ofwar there is a place for tankers and cavalrymen, so allof us armored warfare planners and executors betterget busy.

Fortunately, learning how to handle these additionalstresses is part of the curriculum for our heavy forcesat our Combat Training Centers, but we are still as-cending this learning curve. Of course, these opera-tions are not the armored force’s raison d’être, but therequisite skills are ones we must add to our kit bags,ready to pull out when needed. We’ve all seen the em-battled peacekeepers looking up to the hills and moun-tains, dodging bullets and shells. They’ve vigilantlypointed their weapons, but their rules of engagementlargely prevented them from toggling their guns on. Aheavy dose of discipline and an equally heavy trainingrequirement are necessary before we put ourselves inan area being shelled, and then ask our soldiers not toreturn fire simply because they aren’t the target. Aimedfire is too often an oxymoron.

No matter how events unfold, we owe it to our sol-diers not to grab hold of tar babies that we can’t shakefree. We owe them well-considered tactics, useful tech-niques, and rock-solid procedures. We owe them timeto rehearse and time to learn. We owe them our atten-tions to the immediacy of the close fight while we si-multaneously build and discuss the structures whichwill win our future deep fights.

— TAB

Stand To

The Professional Development Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB-17-9S-S

Editor-in-Chief MAJ TERRY A. BLAKELY

Managing Editor JON T. CLEMENS

Commandant BG (P) LON E. MAGGART

ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published bimonthly by the U.S. Army Armor Center, 4401 Vine Grove Road, Fort Knox, KY 40121.

Disclaimer: The information contained in ARMOR represents the professional opinions of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the official Army or TRADOC position, nor does it change or supersede any information presented in other official Army publications.

Official distribution is limited to one copy for each armored brigade headquarters, armored cavalry regiment headquarters, armor battalion headquarters, armored cavalry squadron headquarters, reconnaissance squadron headquarters, armored cavalry troop, armor company, and motorized brigade headquarters of the United States Army. In addition, Army libraries, Army and DOD schools, HQ DA and MACOM staff agencies with responsibility for armored, direct fire, ground combat systems. organizations, and the training of personnel for such organizations may request two copies by sending a military letter to the editor-in-chief.

Authorized Content: ARMOR will print only those materials for which the U.S. Army Armor Center has proponency. That proponency includes: all anrnored, direct-fire ground combat systems that do not serve primarily as infantry carriers; all weapons used exclusively in these systems or by CMF 19-series enlisted soldiers; any miscellaneous items of equipment which armor and armored cavalry organizations use exclusively; training for all SC 12A, 12B, and 12C officers and for all CMF-19-series enlisted soldiers; and information concerning the training. logistics, history. and leadership of armor and armored cavalry units at the brigade/regiment level and below, to include Threat units at those levels.

Material may be reprinted, provided credit is given to ARMOR and to the author. except where copyright is indicated.

September-October 1995, Vol. CIV No.5

Features

6 The Exploitation from the Dieulouard Bridgehead by Captain Donald E. Vandergriff

10 D-Day 50th Anniversary Commemoration by Lieutenant Colonel John Gillman

14 Armored Expeditionary Forces by Ralph Zumbro

17 Cavalry Mortars - A Better Way

22 The Draper Combat Leadership Award

22 Kouma Tank Platoon Gunnery Excellence Competition Winners

23 Making the Case for an Airborne Infantry Fighting Vehicle by Stanley C. Crist

25 Book Essay - Tank Action: From the Great War to the Gulf

26 The Battle of the Bridges: Kuwait's 35th Brigade on the 2d of August 1990 by Major Robert A. Nelson

33 Mission: Combat Reconnaissance Patrol by Captain Daniel B. Miller

35 The Work Order Logistics File (WOLF) by Tom Ress

37 Engagement Area Development First Lieutenant Brian L. Steed.

41 The Lessons of Operation Desert Hammer VI: Training Digltizatlon Will Impact Many Areas of Training by Captain Ronald K. Kollhoff

44 The Combat Trains Desert Laager by Captain Gregory A. Daddis

46 CSS For the Scout Platoon: Another Solution by First Lieutenant John S. Wilson

48 Franks Award Winner Worked on Desert Mobility for Special Forces Units

Back All Active Cavalry Unit Locations Cover

Departments

2 Contacts 3 Letters 4 Commander's Hatch 5 Driver's Seat

52 Books

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Editor-in-Chief Major Terry A. Blakely 2249 E-Mail: [email protected]

Managing Editor Jon T. Clemens

Editorial Assistant

2249

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U.S. ARMY ARMOR SCHOOL

Commandant BG(P) Lon E. Maggart

(ATZK-CG) 2121

E-Mail: [email protected]

Assistant Commandant

Director of the Armor School COL Paul E. Lenze

(ATSB-AC) 7555

(ATSB-DAS) 1050


Command Sergeant Major CSM Ronnie W. Davis 4952 E-Mail: [email protected]

Armor School Sergeant Major CSM Jeffery L. Richardson 5405 E-Mail: [email protected]

16th Cavalry Regiment COL Don Elder

(ATSB-SBZ) 7848


1st Armor Training Brigade COL Fred A. Treyz III

(ATSB-BAZ) 6843


Directorate of Combat Developments COL Edward A. Bryla

(ATZK-CD) 5050


NCO Academy CSM John E. Barnett

(ATZK-NC) 5150


Reserve Component Spt Div LTC Bennett 1. Mott

(ATZK-PTE) 1351


TRADOC System Manager for Abrams and Armored Gun System COL John F. Kalb

(ATZK-TS) 7955


Mounted Battlespace Battle Lab COL G. Patrick Ritter

(ATZK-MW) 2139


Office, Mounted BatUespace Integration (ATZK-AR) COL Gary Krueger 7809 E-Mail: KRUEGER@KNOX-EMHLARlV/Y.MIL FAX 7585

ARMOR - September-October 1995

Dismounted Scouts in Mechanized Cavalry Operations

Dear Sir:

Divisional cavalry organizations are “com-bined arms” units with the capability andflexibility to operate within a variety of op-erational concepts, today and in the future.

The versatility of divisional cavalry makesit the unit of tomorrow’s Army, capable ofsustaining operations as far as 100 kilome-ters forward of a division in a massivestrike concept, such as DESERT STORM,or providing mechanized and air support ofsecurity operations in a lower intensity,small force concept which faces the Armyand U.N. forces today. Another theater ofoperation for today’s cavalry is its involve-ment in the support of counternarcotics op-erations. The divisional cavalry serves asthe eyes, ears, and support element forjoint task force operations on our nation’sborders.

A divisional cavalry squadron’s TO&E isideally suited for these various missions,consisting of 28 M3 Bradleys, 18 M1Abrams, and four mortars for ground op-erations, and eight AH1 Cobras, 12 OH58CKiowa, and a UH1 Iroquois for aerial recon-naissance and group support.

The concept of security in speed (offen-sive) and security in depth (defensive) justi-fies the need for an additional element inthe cavalry squadron, a dismounted scoutplatoon.

The dismounted team concept is not newto the cavalry. The “Blues Platoon” of theVietnam era was very successful, and to-day’s OPFOR ground scouts at the Na-tional Training Center (NTC) are highly suc-cessful in utilizing small dismounted “dirtteams” to gain intelligence and call indirectfires on unsuspecting rotational forces.

The mission of the dismounted scout pla-toon must be tailored to the conduct of op-erations forward of the cavalry squadron.This platoon would provide intelligence andsecurity prior to the commitment of groundand air forces and would conduct battledamage assessment for aerial and indirectfires. It would also provide security, allow-ing ground and air elements freedom andspeed of movement, security of downedaircraft sites, and extraction of downed air-craft crewmembers. The addition of thesemissions greatly enhances the squadron’ssurvivability on the battlefield, buys morerealtime, hard intelligence, and providesadded security and support for ground andair forces moving into an area of operation.

Including this dismounted platoon as anelement of the squadron alleviates the co-ordination needed with other ground forcesnot organic to the squadron, and allows thedivision to use those assets that would oth-erwise be attached to the squadron. Mak-ing the dismount scouts organic also allows

continuous dynamic training of the dis-mounted platoon within the squadron andallows cross-training with ground and airelements of the squadron to enhance mis-sion success.

The assets needed to allow the platoonto accomplish its mission are currently or-ganic to the squadron or easily attachedfrom the aviation brigade. The modes oftransportation for insertion and extractionwould vary. Aerial support can be accom-plished by the UH1 that is within thesquadron, or by an attached UH60 pro-vided by the brigade. Ground transportationcan be accomplished by using ground forceM3 Bradleys or HMMWVs. Another optionis to simply move dismounted into the areaof operation. Resupply is handled similarly,or by other creative options such as pon-cho parachute drops from OH58s.

The issue of sustaining communicationswith dismounted teams can also be han-dled internally. One option is to establish aseries of observation posts with additionalteams from within the platoon, each ofthese observation posts having an addi-tional mission of acting as relay stations.Another option is to use helicopters or for-ward-deployed ground scouts to act as re-lay stations. Using these methods of com-munication must be rehearsed and per-fected, which further justifies the need ofthis platoon to be an organic, not attached,element of the squadron.

The absolute need for the dismountedplatoon’s soldiers to understand cavalry op-erations, coordinate direct and indirectfires, conduct reconnaissance to supportthe squadron’s operations and executesmall team dismounted operations indi-cates the need for the team’s members tobe 19D scouts.

The need for such an element would bestbe demonstrated by employing them on atheoretical mission. I refer to LTC DouglasA. Macgregor’s example in “Cavalry Opera-tions in Limited Warfare” (printed in ArmyTrainer, Spring 93 issue) to display thepossible use of the dismounted platoon.

In this scenario, an Army aviation brigade(-) has been deployed as the vanguard ofthe U.S. contingent. Sent as part of theU.N. forces, the brigade is to quell ethnicfighting between rival factions and push theKrasnovian forces back over the approveddemarcation line in the region of Lydia, aprovince of Samaria. Upon deployment,U.S.-U.N. coalition forces establish an air-ground screen without interference fromthe hostile Krasnovian forces.

Intelligence then reports that the Kras-novian forces refuse to evacuate the areaaround the town of Krasnoye-selo due toits tactical and logistical importance. Thetownspeople, being primarily of Samariandescent, have voted themselves free ofKrasnovian rule. The town lies within theSamarian boundaries, as set forth by theagreed upon demarcation line. Intelligence

also reports that several air defense batter-ies of S60 radar-directed guns, ZSU-23cannons, and ZPU multi-barreled machineguns have been positioned in the valleyaround the town.

At this point, tactical planning by the coa-lition forces begins. This is also the time fordismounted scouts to become active, mov-ing to positions overlooking the enemy’s lo-cation to provide hard intelligence for theS2 and reports of enemy main logisticalroutes resupplying their forward units. Thisintelligence will greatly benefit the com-mander in his tactical planning.

The dismounted scouts will also pinpointenemy built-up areas and preplot them forindirect fire. Resupply of cache sites byOH58 scout helicopters and other outgoingteams allows continuous operations by thedismounted teams.

At H-3 of mission execution, an MLRSbattery fires on known locations of enemyADA Batteries. Dismounted teams are usedto assess battle damage and ensure thereis no longer a threat from these units priorto committing aerial assets to the area. Inaddition, an Apache company is placed inreserve to help locate and destroy a miss-ing ADA battery. With dismounted teams inthe area days prior to mission execution,the missing enemy battery may previouslyhave been located and marked for indirectfire, alleviating the need to tie up assetssuch as the Apache company. In the eventthe missing battery is discovered after theoperation begins, a dismounted team candirect indirect fire and conduct battle dam-age assessment to eliminate the possibleloss of friendly aircraft by direct fire. Laterin the mission, the dismounts’ battle dam-age assessment becomes vital becausetwo friendly helicopters are lost to enemyair defense artillery fire. Lack of proper bat-tle damage assessment of the MLRS fireon the enemy ADA positions can be directlyattributed to these losses.

Upon committing of the ground forces (H-Hour), small dismounted teams locatedalong the friendly main axis of attack wouldbetter be able to direct indirect fires, inturn, providing an increased level of secu-rity along the axis. The ground and air ele-ments conducting the attack (using securityin speed) have a greater level of success,while minimizing losses.

Dismounted teams are also used assearch and rescue teams in the event ofdowned, friendly aircraft. Teams already lo-cated in the area of operations speed tothe scene and provide security at the crashsite. This will also help reduce the risk ofcapture, and allow quick evaluation ofwounded air crews.

Upon completion of the operation, thesquadron begins security and surveillanceoperations in which the dismounted teams,

ARMOR — September-October 1995 3

Continued on Page 49

Force XXI digital systems are rede-fining the way we will fight on the bat-tlefields of the future. Mounted war-fighters must familiarize themselveswith the new technological advancesthat are driving our Army into the 21stCentury. This requirement is compli-cated by the necessity to conduct theday-to-day business of running pla-toons, companies, battalions, and bri-gades with non-digital systems.

We have come a long way in under-standing the implications of digital op-erations and it is clear now that infor-mation age technology will profoundlychange the way we fight in the nextcentury. The challenge is to deal withthe technological advances while ad-dressing the daily problems of training,maintaining, and sustaining our tacticalunits.

The need to keep our units preparedand ready during this process is evi-dent. I know this will be difficult overthe next few years as we search forways to reduce personnel turbulence.In fact, the number of armor and cav-alry soldiers will be reduced by aboutone-third from that available in Opera-tion DESERT STORM by the time wecomplete downsizing. The number ofavailable company level commandswill be reduced as will opportunities toserve as a battalion S3 and XO. How-ever, the demand for branch qualifiedofficers, particularly captains and ma-jors, will remain about the same.Therefore, unless we carefully manageour human resources, young officers

will have less time in tactical units todevelop the skills necessary to becomequality battalion and brigade com-manders.

For the foreseeable future, companycommand, S3, and battalion executiveofficer tours will be approximatelytwelve months in duration. There aremany, competing demands on leadersin the Army of today, including an everincreasing requirement for joint andAC/RC duty assignments. If we are tocontinue building competent war-fighters for the future, all of us mustfind ways to teach our young officerscritical warfighting and leadershipskills quicker and more efficiently.

This will be a complex undertakingwith no precedent to follow. However,there are some general guidelineswhich may provide insight into this di-lemma. We can empower subordinateswith relevant information, focus onteaching and mentoring, and redefineroles and relationships. We can take ad-vantage of the information available onthe Internet. Unit leaders can call thedoctrine writers and the training andconcept developers at the ArmorSchool to find ways to assist subordi-nates in learning about new ideas andprocedures.

Also, we cannot underestimate thepower of talking to one another profes-sionally and in frank, plain language.The ability to move information aroundin our organizations remains the singlebest way to ensure high performance.Clearly, we must establish priorities

and spend our precious time workingonly on the important tasks. What wecannot change is the standard of per-formance in leading, training, main-taining, and caring for our soldiers andtheir families that we achieved duringDESERT STORM.

All of us will have to work hard tomaintain currency on the emergingForce XXI developments while doingother important jobs. But the mountedforce has faced periods of change likethis before and has not only endured,but flourished. Innovation and team-work remain core characteristics of themounted force.

Dealing with the Army of today is notunlike preparing for a rotation at one ofour combat training centers. We mustfocus on the important tasks, moveauthority to get things done down tothe lowest level, and integrate our ef-forts if we are to be successful. Wemust do all of this without grinding ourleaders and soldiers into the ground.There must be time for reflection,thinking, planning, and coordination ifwe are to operate at peak efficiency.We must make time for our familiesand for professional growth. There alsohas to be a place for fun. And lastly, wemust accomplish the mission. All ofthis is possible, but not without effort.We can and must accommodate changein this period of turmoil and turbu-lence, and now is the time to start.

ON THE WAY!

COMMANDER’S HATCH

Digital Warrior

4 ARMOR — September-October 1995

BG (P) Lon E. Maggart Commanding General U.S. Army Armor Center

Those whose job it is to pull triggersin war will tell you theirs is a danger-ous business. Believe it! Those whosejob it is to collect intelligence about theenemy without being detected, will tellyou theirs is more dangerous. Then,there is the essence of danger...thescout.

Scouts are commonly referred to asthe eyes and ears of the battlefieldcommander. As the commander’s eyesand ears, scouts are considered themost highly trained soldiers on the bat-tlefield. They are required to knowmore common and specialized skillsthan any other soldier to accomplishtheir mission and survive.

Survivability demands that scoutspossess courage, strength, endurance,resourcefulness, and agility. These at-tributes are necessary for conductingtheir unique mission, operating close toand within enemy lines.

The manual, Tactics and Techniquesof Cavalry, dated August 1940, pro-vides a clear definition of the scout. “Ascout is a trooper trained in the use ofground and cover; in mounted and dis-mounted movement from cover tocover; in marksmanship; in observa-tion, and accurately reporting the re-sults of his observation.” A more cur-rent definition from Army Regulation611-201 states that a cavalry scout,“leads, serves, or assists as a memberof a scout crew, section, or platoon in

reconnaissance, security, and othercombat operations.”

Throughout history, scouts have beenperforming this unique mission. Ac-cording to Lynn Montross’s WarThrough the Ages, most armies haveused scouts in one form or another.One of the earliest recorded accounts isin the year 331 B.C. in ancient Greece,during the time period Alexander theGreat conquered Persia.

Cavalry scouts were used in theAmericas as early as the 1750s, whenthe British were fighting the French. Acolonial American, Robert Rogers,raised a company of rangers and usedscouts to gather information in order tocarry out his raids against the French.In that day and age, it wasn’t called“going on a recon;” it was called, “go-ing on a scout.” It is important to notethat Rogers learned most of his scout-ing skills from Native Americans,many of whom served with him. It isbelieved those skills created the foun-dation for the scout’s mission through-out U.S. Army history.

Cavalry scouts continued their useful-ness from the Revolutionary Warthrough the Civil War. Those familiarwith American history can recall theexploits of Jeb Stuart’s and JohnBuford’s cavalry; most importantlyRobert E. Lee’s “blindness” on the bat-tlefield at Gettysburg without Stuart’scavalry, and Buford’s initial stand de-

laying the Confederate advance untilthe Union infantry arrived. Through theIndian Wars, World Wars I and II, andVietnam, to their most recent role inDESERT STORM, scouts have contin-ued to own the night and gather intelli-gence.

As intelligence gatherers today, thescout’s unique mission is simple —find the enemy! This is considered theheart of his mission — providing themaneuver commander with his mostcritical information, combat intelli-gence, enabling him to achieve free-dom of action, focus combat power,and overwhelm and decisively defeatthe enemy. To do that, scouts performtwo primary missions — reconnais-sance and security.

During reconnaissance missions,scouts conduct route, area, and zone re-connaissance to obtain informationabout enemy forces and the terrainwithin the area of operations. Whenperforming a security mission, scoutsprovide the maneuver commanderearly warning, enabling him to concen-trate his combat power at the decisiveplace and time.

To ensure this reconnaissance and se-curity mission, today’s scouts usemounted and dismounted techniquesand stealth to ensure their survivability.


CSM Ronnie W. Davis Command Sergeant Major U.S. Army Armor Center

The Cavalry Scout

Continued on Page 43

The exploitation from the Dieulouardbridgehead by Combat Command A(CCA) 4th Armored Division, 12-14September 1944, offers valuable les-sons if we are to adapt maneuver war-fare as our Army’s future doctrine. Em-ploying the fundamentals of maneuverwarfare, CCA achieved a difficult mis-sion — exploitation to operational depthagainst a determined, well trained,equipped, and led enemy in rolling for-ested terrain inhabited by an unfriendlypopulation.

CCA continually overcame complexproblems because it possessed cohe-sion, solidified through two years ofhard training, and a command climatethat promoted mission tactics. Today’sArmy must take a hard look at aligningnew doctrine (both operations and lead-ership) with the benefits produced bythe new Intervehicular InformationSystem (IVIS) in order to become asproficient as CCA 4th Armored Divi-sion.1 The Army must encourage com-manders to create a command climatethat promotes mission tactics. Thegrowing complexity, speed, and accu-racy of weapons on today’s battlefield,compounded by shrinking budgets thatlimit actual maneuver time, highlightthe need to pursue better cohesion intactical units.

With a vast array of potential and de-termined enemies to be fought on theirhome territory, the Army cannot affordto keep practicing the “break-the-glass-in-case-of-war” philosophy toward lead-ership that practices maneuver warfare.

The encirclement of Nancy, specifi-cally the actions of CCA on 11-14 Sep-tember 1944, provide many examplesof rapid and decisive decision-making,from the individual to the combat com-mand (brigade) level, that only an ex-perienced, well trained, and maneuverwarfare-oriented unit could accomplish.

The exploitation fromthe Dieulouard bridge-head demonstratedspeed, “not just speedin movement, whichis important, but speedin everything, calledtempo.”2 Throughoutthe period, CCA, un-der Colonel Bruce C.Clarke, forced theGermans to react tothe Americans’ fastertempo. Examples ofrapid decision-mak-ing, enabling units toact quickly, occurredthroughout the exploitation. They in-cluded the flexibility of CCA as itchanged its route from crossing theMoselle at Pont-a-Mousson to thebridgehead at Dieulouard, the actionsof CPT Charles Trover and LTCCreighton Abrams along the route ofmarch, their avoidance of strength atChateau Salins, and COL Clarke’s useof mission orders. This flexibility onlycame about because the unit and itsleaders worked, trained, and knew oneanother for a long period of time.

The 3d Army plan called for an of-fensive across the width of the sector.3

General George S. Patton speculatedthat the Germans were still reelingfrom their defeats in Normandy. He or-dered both the XX and XII Corps toseize Metz and Nancy, respectively,and prepare to continue the advance tothe Rhine. Specifically, the XII Corpsplanned a double envelopment. Thetwo prongs of the corps, led by CCAand CCB, 4th Armored Division, wereto seize the high ground around Arra-court, and isolate the Germans defend-ing Nancy.4 CCA was to conduct oneof the war’s first forward passages oflines, through 80th Infantry Division asit seized a planned crossing site of theMoselle River in the vicinity of Pont a

Mousson. When the division was re-pulsed there, it changed its focus of ef-fort further south, and with the assis-tance of careful deception and prepara-tion, seized a bridgehead at Dieulouard.

Through 80th Division’s rapid seizureof a crossing site at Dieulouard, CCAwas able to demonstrate its ability toadapt to a rapidly changing situation.5

COL Clarke, upon hearing of the infan-try crossing at a different crossing sitethan planned, quickly dispatched hisreconnaissance troop, under CPT Tro-ver, with the appropriate liaison offi-cers, toward the bridgehead. As thetroop approached the Moselle, itmarked the route, thus facilitating therapid movement of the brigade throughthe first of many difficult and complexmissions of the exploitation.

COL Clarke and his subordinate com-manders were able to make rapid deci-sions. As he foresaw and wargamed theupcoming mission, his staff quicklyand efficiently dealt with current prob-lems.6 The experience and teamworkwithin the CCA staff overcame the dif-ficulty of the first part of the mission,getting hundreds of vehicles and per-sonnel to the Dieulouard crossing pointand conducting a forward passage of


The Exploitationfrom the Dieulouard Bridgehead:An Example of Maneuver Warfare that Applies Today

by Captain Donald E. Vandergriff

U.S. infantrymen haul an assault boat to the banks of the MoselleRiver. This unit was crossing near Metz, north of the Dieulouardbridgehead at about the same time the 80th Infantry Divisionseized the crossing exploited by CCA, 4th Armored Division.

lines against an expectant enemy. Eachstaff officer understood his missionand, more importantly, received thelatitude to make decisions in support ofthe commander’s intent. CCA’s focusof effort received total support and co-ordination through an experienced andconfident cross-talking staff.

When CPT Trover and his troop ar-rived at the Dieulouard bridgehead,they found it under a German counter-attack that threatened the very bridgesCCA planned to use. After reportingthe situation to CCA, and being de-layed by a crossing control officer,CPT Trover led his troop across theriver and immediately eliminated thethreat to the bridges by destroying theattackers. As the troop moved awayfrom the bridgehead, CPT Trover iden-tified assault gun units too strong forhis reconnaissance troop to handle. Hehalted, assumed a hasty defense, andreported his situation to CCA head-quarters.7 During this first phase of thecrossing, CPT Trover conducted an ef-fective advance guard mission for CCAand enhanced its movement to,through, and out of the bridgehead.8

The actions of CPT Trover led to adecision-making conference attendedby representatives of XII Corps, 80thDivision, CCA, and the TF 37th Armorcommander, LTC Creighton Abrams.Asked his opinion on a course of ac-tion, LTC Abrams pointed toward Ger-many and said, “That is the shortestway home.”9

Immediately, COL Clarke backed hissubordinate by ordering him to proceedwith the next mission, conducting aforward passage of lines and penetrat-ing the enemy defenses.

Both COL Clarke and LTC Abramsunderstood the situation created by

CPT Trover’s de-feat of the Ger-man counterat-tack. They madea rapid decisionthat took advan-tage of “thrivingon chaos.”10 Asconfusing as thesituation seemedto the Americans,the unexpectedarrival of Ameri-can armor threwthe Germans intoa temporarytrauma, offer-ing an imme-diate oppor-

tuni ty on ly exper ienced and h ighlytra ined leaders recognize.

LTC Abrams’ task force rapidly pene-trated the ring of German units sur-rounding the bridgehead using effectivecombined arms teamwork, then ex-ploited into the German rear using apaved highway. As Task Force Abramspressed the confused Germans, lighttanks from CPT Trover’s troop and DCompany of 37th Armor quickly estab-lished flank screens north and south of

the rapidly moving column.11 Thisphase of the operation, the exploitation,demonstrated the effective use of des-ignating the main effort. COL Clarkechose his best subordinate to lead theattack through the German rear andsupported him with everything elsewithin CCA (a sharp contrast to whatwas occurring at the operational level).LTC Abrams took decisive action, andCOL Clarke ruthlessly focused combatpower at any enemy weakness thatCCA encountered. COL Clarke madethis decision based on his experienceand strong character. He took risk infocusing on a single route, despite little

intelligence about the enemy. The fol-low-on units — the 53d Armored In-fantry task force and an engineer col-umn — provided their own security.COL Clarke and the leaders of CCAworried more about what they were go-ing to do to the Germans than what theGermans could do to them.12

With speed and focus, CCA overcameany German unit it encountered as itmoved to seize the high ground aroundArracourt. Once the leaders made thedecision to move faster than the Ger-mans, subordinate units, time and timeagain, executed drills that destroyed theenemy and prevented the Germansfrom establishing a coherent defense.From Benicourt to Fresnes, Task ForceAbrams expertly handled the advanceguard mission for CCA. LTC Abrams,taking advantage of a surprised enemy,did not slow his unit to deploy as theyran into and around German units. Em-phasizing shock, the task force mini-mized casualties through its ability toconduct its action drills, enhanced byindirect fire support, before a Germanunit could deploy. To execute suchrapid drills with no fratricide, the unitpracticed established SOPs repeti-tively.13

As mentioned earlier, CPT Trover’stroop and D Company provided theflank screen as CCA advanced deepinto the German rear. Given their mis-sion orders, these units confused theGermans because they provided theCCA commander with “multiplethrusts.” These “multiple thrusts” gen-erated more enemy confusion andserved to disguise LTC Abrams’ taskforce as the main effort. As long as thetwo units supported the main effort to-ward Arracourt, the company com-manders made whatever decisions werenecessary to accomplish their missionsand thus support COL Clarke’s intent.14


General Patton, the Third Army commander, ordered his two corps toattack Metz and Nancy preparatory to a Rhine crossing. The crossingat Dieulouard and the sprint eastward toward Arracourt isolated theGermans in Nancy and led to control of the high ground farther east.

The next rapidly changing situationwas reported by LTC Abrams’ taskforce and observed by COL Clarke,who flew over the battlefield in hissmall airplane. As the CCA nearedChateau-Salins, increased artillery firefrom the town fueled COL Clarke’ssuspicion that a larger German unit oc-cupied the town. CCA did not want tofight Germans defending a built-uparea. So, as September 13th drew to aclose, CCA — following one of its ac-customed drills at the close of a march— moved into a coil formation thatprovided a 360-degree defense. Asunits arrived in the laager, they imme-diately assumed an assigned placewithin the perimeter under the watchfuleye of the CCA executive officer. Fol-low-on units of the CCA, under thecharge of CCA staff, assumed the sameformation. The field trains beat offGerman patrols with internal resourceswithout weakening the main effort.CCA maintained tempo even as ma-neuver slowed in hours of limited visi-bility. To maintain relentless pressureon the Germans, three battalions ofCCA artillery fired onto every sus-pected enemy attack position or assem-bly area.15

As the CCA trains closed up to andresupplied the main body on 14 Sep-tember, increased artillery fire fromChateau-Salins confirmed a decision by4th AD commander, General John “P”Wood, to bypass the town. Task ForceAbrams left the main road, taking anindirect route through heavy forests toreach the CCA objective of Arracourt.The stress and strain of the previoustwo days continued to prevail overGerman units as Task Force Abramsoverran more units, to include theheadquarters of the 15th Panzer Grena-dier Division. Even blown bridges didnot slow the tempo of the advance, asreconnaissance assets of the CCA sim-ply found alternate crossing points. Allthese events occurred under the obser-vation of COL Clarke without unitshaving to ask his permission or halt toawait decisions from “higher.”

On 14 September, CCA seized its ob-jective in and around the high groundat Arracourt. It did not settle down toawait German efforts to regain the in-itiative. Units from the different taskforces fanned out from Arracourt tocontinue harassing and paralyzing theGerman command, and affected a link-up with CCB, moving up from thesouth. These roaming units alwaysmade certain that CCA’s artillery couldeffectively support them as they at-

tacked German units, and did not gooutside the artillery’s range.16

To top off the training and the effec-tive leadership that made the exploita-tion by CCA seem easy, it was the 4thArmored Division commander, MGWood, who created CCA’s climate ofsuccess. During all phases of the CCAadvance, General Wood’s commandstyle of trust promoted rapid decisions,enabling the commanders at combatcommand and task force level to de-cide a course of action “up front,”without awaiting permission. GeneralWood pressed his corps commander,General Manton S. Eddy, to employthe entire division in the exploitation.Failing this, he pushed both commandstoward reuniting the division’s combatpower at Arracourt. During the opera-tion, General Wood pushed reinforce-ments to further CCA’s exploitation,and did not interfere with the decisionsmade “on the ground” by subordinatecommanders.17

The commanders of both the divisionand combat command did not rest onthe laurels won with the encirclementof Nancy. They immediately lookedbeyond Arracourt, proposed the seizureof Saarbrucken, and continued to focuson how to defeat and destroy the en-emy.18 This was exactly what the Ger-mans feared. No reserves were presentto shore up their tattered front.

Unfortunately, the designated focus ofeffort stopped with 4th Armored Divi-sion and the tactical level of war. The

corps commander, General Eddy,needed to eliminate bypassed Germansand tidy up his flanks, so he stoppedthe forward movement of the armoreddivision.19 Thus the Germans regainedthe initiative and did not give up untilNovember. The fault cannot rest withGeneral Eddy, for General Patton or-dered attacks across the entire front ofthe 3d Army, and stretched its limitedresources so no success could be ex-ploited. Patton’s 3d Army strategy re-flected General Eishenhower’s broadfront policy — a policy that acceptedno risk and took away scarce resourcesto feed the British army’s lackluster ad-vance into Belgium and Holland.20

Several valuable lessons from thisdramatic operation still apply. The ad-vent of digital technology intensifiesthe need to practice maneuver warfare.Future conflict pits our smaller butmore expensive forces against numeri-cally larger but slower-reacting adver-saries. We will likely be operating overvast distances. Maneuver-oriented op-erations, such as the exploitation fromthe Dieulouard bridgehead, must be-come commonplace in order to limitpolitically unacceptable casualties andend conflicts quickly. Units that findthemselves fighting widely dispersed,to avoid strikes by enemy nuclear andchemical weapons, must be able tocome together as D Troop, D/37 Ar-mor, CCA, and CCB massed aroundArracourt. They must be prepared todestroy high value enemy targets pin-pointed by our vast intelligence-gather-

A 37th Tank Battalion crew gets a few moments rest near Chateau Salins on September 26,1944. This town had been bypassed in the drive toward Arracourt.


ing systems and relayed by digital tech-nology, or move quickly to further ex-ploit an enemy weakness. As units“fight to move,” commanders, throughcommunications links, will have tomake rapid decisions. Units will haveto be well trained and capable of exe-cuting drills that will destroy enemyunits surprised by our unexpected ap-proach.21

Today, the Army practices antiquatedwarfare (e.g., the massed divisionwedges employed during DESERTSTORM). We must change to bringtactical and operational doctrine in linewith newly created technology.22 In or-der to achieve the kind of cohesion thatlaid the foundation for CCA’s team-work, the Army must drasticallychange its personnel system and poli-cies. We need to promote stability, in-stead of the constant turmoil and ca-reerism that accompany frequent rota-tions. When officers are assigned inkeeping with their talents and charactertraits, the result will be units such asCCA.23

Given our “come-as-you-are-now”warfighting situation, the Army doesnot have two years to train units to beas proficient as Combat Command A.

Finally, to create maneuver tacticians,the Army must eliminate the zero de-fects mentality that leaders of weakcharacter inflict on subordinates. Thecurrent system works against everyvalue that sustained COL Clarke’s andLTC Abrams’ success in warfare. It isnot likely that we will face as incompe-tent an opponent as we did in our last

conflict, and even less likely that nexttime we will have the time to “learn onthe job.”

Notes

1Major Dean A. Nowowiejski, “AchievingDigital Destruction: Challenges for the M1A2Task Force," ARMOR, Jan-Feb 1995, p. 21.

2William S. Lind, The Theory and Practice ofManeuver Warfare, Presidio Press, 1993, p. 7.

3Dr. Christopher R. Gabel, The LorraineCampaign: An Overview, September-October1944, Combat Studies Institute, February 1985,p. 14.

4Gabel, pp. 16-17.5Dr. Christopher R. Gabel, The 4th Armored

Division in the Encirclement of Nancy, CombatStudies Institute, April 1986, pp. 13-14.

6Commanders and Staff of Combat CommandA, 4th Armored Division, U.S. Army, The Es-tablishment and Defense of the Nancy Bridge-head, Military History-Battle Analysis, CombatStudies Institute, 1994, p. Lsn 3-2-19.

7Gabel, Encirclement of Nancy, p. 14.8Headquarters Department of the Army, Field

Manual 71-2, p. 3-45.9Gabel, Encirclement of Nancy, p. 14.10Lind, p. 8.11Gabel, Encirclement of Nancy, p. 14.12Lind, pp. 12-13.13Commanders and Staff of CCA, p. Lsn 3-2-

25.14Lind, p. 14.15Commanders and Staff of CCA, p. Lsn. 3-2-

26.16Gabel, Encirclement of Nancy, p. 16.

17Gabel, Encirclement of Nancy, pp. 5 and 15.18Lind, p. 12.19Gabel, p. 17.20Gabel, p. 33.21Lieutenant Colonel Mark P. Hertling, “The

Battle of Oom Chalouba, 17 June 2008,” AR-MOR, Jan-Feb 1995, p. 34.

22Hertling, p. 34.23Lind, p. 14.

LTC Abrams, at left, with LTC Harold Cohen, CO of the 10th Armored Infantry Battalion.


Captain Donald E. Vandergriffenlisted as a Marine in 1981and served in the 4th EngineerBattalion, 4th Marine Division.He then entered the Simultane-ous Membership Program andserved as a tank commander inthe 278th ACR, TennesseeArmy National Guard. Upon be-ing commissioned in 1983 fromthe University of Tennessee, heserved as a cavalry platoonleader with G Troop 2-278thTNARNG. A 1984 graduate ofthe University of Tennessee, hehas attended AOBC, the MarineCorps Amphibious WarfareSchool (honor graduate), theCavalry Leader’s and M1A1Tank Commander’s Courses,and Combined Arms and Serv-ices School. He served as atank and scout platoon leaderand tank company XO with 1-72 Armor, scout platoon andbattalion staff observer trainerfor the Dragon Live Fire Team,and as chief of reconnaissancefor the 32d Guards MRR (OP-FOR) at the NTC. As com-mander, A Co, 3-77 Armor, hedeployed his company with thetask force on “Operation Posi-tive Force” in Kuwait, He wasalso commander of HHC, 3-77Armor. Under the “Bold Shift”program, he became part of theReadiness Training Detach-ment, 1-303d Armor Regiment,Washington National Guard. Heis currently pursuing his gradu-ate degree in Military Historythrough the American MilitaryUniversity. He has publishedseveral articles concerning re-connaissance.

LTC Gillman, Light Dragoons, com-mands the British Army’s ArmouredTrials and Development Unit - Ed.

American Army personnel from FortKnox were heavily involved in sup-porting the British Army’s Royal Ar-moured Corps Centre and BovingtonTank Museum activities during the50th Anniversary commemorations ofD-Day. A large number of Americanveterans traveled to Europe to com-memorate D-Day, many visiting theBovington, Weymouth, and Poole areain the South of England before depart-ing for France.

The main event was the presentationby Major General Jordan from FortKnox of a set of General Patton’s uni-

form stars to the Tank Museum at Bov-ington, supported by the firing of a sa-lute from an American Sherman tankby an honor guard tank crew from FortKnox. Major General Jordan then tookthe salute at a large commemorationparade at Weymouth, the jump-off portfor the main American forces 50 yearspreviously.

The choice of vehicles used on thecommemorative parades was compli-cated by the need to be able to drive ontarmac roads through Weymouth andPoole without damaging the tarmac.This effectively prevented the use ofBritish vehicles, such as Cromwell andChurchill, or any medium Americantanks using steel chevron tracks. An-other factor considered was the needfor reliability, as it was estimated that

track mileage would be in excess of 35miles per vehicle. It was therefore de-cided to concentrate efforts on fieldingSherman tanks fitted with rubber pad-ded tracks, an M5 Stuart light tank,again with rubber padded tracks, andthe Museum’s halftrack, which was al-ready fitted with rubber tracks. A 1944-vintage Ford Universal Carrier, despitehaving steel tracks, was consideredlight enough not to cause road damage.

Margaret Gillatt, from Retford, pro-vided her father’s M4 Sherman, follow-ing months of preparation, especiallyfitted with new rubber chevron track.The Patton Museum at Fort Knox pro-vided the markings for this tank, de-picted as being in the U.S. 1st InfantryDivision, 745th Armor. Fort Knox sentover a comprehensive color scheme for


D-DAYOld vehicles and old soldiers returnto the Channel portsfor the 50th anniversaryof their greatest adventure

by Lieutenant Colonel John Gillman

the tank, including paint swatches anda full description of markings. It wasdecided to use the M4A2E8 Sherman,stored at the Tank Museum. The tankwas a 76-mm gunned, 1944-vintagetwin diesel-engined Sherman withHVSS suspension. However, it was fit-ted with unsuitably aggressive steelchevron track. The track was ex-changed with the rubber chevron trackfitted to the Museum’s M74 ShermanArmoured Recovery Vehicle by Ar-moured Trials and Development Unit(ATDU) personnel testing the latest de-signs of track tools issued for the newChallenger 2 battle tank. The ATDUworkshops also fitted new fuel filters toboth engines, rebuilding the old filterelements using modern Challengercomponents. The vehicle was painted

to conform to markings suggested bythe Patton Museum, again for the 1stAmerican Infantry Division. Thischoice of American markings for bothSherman tanks may not have soundedvery patriotic to the British vehicle re-storers, but it should be borne in mindthat over 541,000 Americans departedfor France through the port of Wey-mouth, with yet more Americans goingafloat from nearby Poole.

The first event, the May Bank Holi-day Military Vehicles Trust Ralley heldon Southsea Common from 27 to 31May, saw both Sherman tanks dis-played, together with an American M5Stuart light tank, a British Matilda 1Infantry Tank, and a Priest, all organ-

ized by the Friends of the Tank Mu-seum, Bovington. The Friends’ displaywas joined by the American HonorGuard crew from Fort Knox, led byCaptain Kevin Emdee, serving at FortKnox, together with his brother, Ser-geant Major David Emdee, U.S. Army,Mr. Bill Stallworth, and Mr. Ted Salter,ex-U.S. Marine Corps. Their participa-tion had been arranged during a visita year previously from England toFort Knox by Lieutenant Colonel JohnGillman, with crewing details agreedwhile waiting at the check-out queue inFort Knox’s PX! It had been a longqueue and the arrangements agreedsurvived the test of time. A group ofRoyal Armoured Corps volunteers fromATDU helped with vehicle crewing,with the Americans concentrated on the


Along the beachfront atWeymouth, one of the D-Day embarkation ports, resi-dents, visitors,and returningveterans cheer the parade.At left, the author in his re-stored Ford Universal Car-rier.

At right, an M5 Stuart,called “Honeys” by the Brit-ish soldiers who also usedthem.

Most of the vehicles wereprivately owned by collec-tors. Unless a tank had rub-ber tracks, it was not permit-ted to appear in the parade.

M4A2E8 Sherman and Margaret Gillatton the older M4 Sherman. Camping fa-cilities were provided by ATDU, butlife was complicated by having tocamp on extremely boggy ground be-tween very large pools of water, as ithad been raining non-stop for the pre-vious 10 days. Sadly, it also meant thatvehicle movement was therefore re-stricted to the barest minimum. TheAmericans quickly settled down intothe routine of showing British school-children through the M4A2E8, dodgingrain storms, and trying to poison theBritish with MRE ration packs.

The Matilda 1 proved to be of greatinterest, although it was not a D-Dayvehicle. In May 1940, a counterattackby 48 of these tanks cut through Rom-mel’s 7th Panzer Division and haltedthe German advance outside theDunkirk evacuation port. On 31 May,

the majority of MVT exhibitors de-parted for France while the Friends’Shermans, Stuart, and Matilda 1 all re-turned to Bovington.

The Museum hosted a reception forMajor General Jordan on 1 June. MajorGeneral Jordan and the Master Generalof the Ordnance, Major General SirJeremy Blacker, were driven into theHall in the American halftrack fromwhich they made their speeches. MajorGeneral Jordan presented the RACCentre with a set of General Patton’sstars. The reception culminated in aband recital and beating of the retreatby the band of the Royal Scots Dra-goon Guards. The concert culminatedin a salute fired by the M4A2E8,crewed by Captain Emdee and hisAmerican honor guard.

Friends of the Tank Museum fieldedsix vehicles for the commemorative pa-rade at Weymouth on 2 June. The pa-

rade featured a long, two-mile drivealong the seafront at Weymouth, fol-lowed by a static display and reception.The Friends’ vehicles were led by theFord carrier, followed by the halftrack,Dingo scout car, M5 light tank andboth Shermans. Most of these vehicleswere showing their age by the time theparade started. The Dingo had a fuelleak, the carrier’s right hand brakejammed on. Margaret Gillatt spentthree hours removing the track anddrive sprocket in order to free thebrake. Her Sherman needed a linktaken out of each track, and theM4A2E8 was suffering from lack ofengine synchronization. Despite theseproblems, the vehicles all completedthe ceremony without a hitch. The sa-lute was taken by Major General Jor-dan, half-way down the seafront inWeymouth, a poignant reminder thatthis was the main American departureport. At the end of the parade, the tanks

At left, MG Larry Jordan,then Chief of Armor, isgreeted by an unidenti-fied British veteran. TheLord Mayor of Wey-mouth, at right, wears herceremonial robes.

In photo above right, theauthor’s wife, at left, withMargaret Gillat who hadto repair the track of herfather’s Grizzly, a Sher-man variant made in Can-ada.

Inevitably, a bagpiper ledthe parade. How very Brit-ish!


all lined up by the Pavilion at the endof the seafront, where they were be-sieged by crowds of interested onlook-ers from the estimated 20,000 peoplewho had lined the streets of Weymouthto cheer the parade. There were a greatmany American veterans visiting, aswell as many serving American sol-diers and sailors, as an American cruiseliner and Marine assault ship were ly-ing close offshore.

The enforced lack of vehicle move-ment enabled the crews to synchronizethe M4A2E8’s diesel engines and ad-just the throttle settings so that both en-gines ran at the same boost. During thisexercise, there was no shortage of ad-vice from veterans, with no fewer thanseven American mechanics offeringtheir services. They had done this samejob many times 50 years previously.Major General and Mrs. Jordan werethen invited as guests of honor to themayor of Weymouth’s lunchtime recep-tion at the Pavilion, where they metmany older townspeople who had beenpresent 50 years previously to witnessthe embarkation of the main body ofAmerican forces for the invasion ofFrance. After tea, both Shermans weredriven back around the seafront, twomiles through the town traffic to Lod-moor Car Park, where they wereloaded to be transported to the RoyalMarine Barracks at Poole.

The parade at Poole on 3 June beganwith both Shermans following amarching parade for a mile and halfthrough Poole to the Quayside, wherethey formed a static line in front of aseries of marching parades. Again, themajority of those parading appeared tobe American veterans. During the after-noon, both vehicles were driven backto the Royal Marine Barracks, loaded,and transported back to Weymouth.They were both then driven around theseafront to the Pavilion Car Park, readyfor the church service the followingday.

The church service on 4 June washeld on the beach at Weymouth, de-spite very wet weather reminiscent ofthe actual weather suffered 50 yearspreviously. Friends helped crew bothShermans, the M5, the Dingo, thehalftrack and the Universal Carrier. Ve-hicle Squadron from Bovington alsoprovided Challenger 1, Warrior, CET,CRARRV, and Scimitar. Despite theweather, a large number of Americanveterans attended. Following the serv-ice, full advantage was taken of the op-

portunity to drive vehicles up anddown the empty mile and a half longbeach front at Weymouth. The Univer-sal Carrier was in great demand, as itshot engine louvres quickly dried peo-ple’s clothes, even the local traffic war-dens queuing up to get dried out. Bythe end of the afternoon, it had coveredover 22 miles transporting people upand down the sands.

Much consternation was caused bythe crew of the Combat Engineer Trac-tor, who drove into the sea and pro-ceeded to swim their vehicle out to-wards an American cruise liner about500 meters offshore. At the end of theafternoon, all vehicles drove backaround the seafront to Lodmoor CarPark where they were loaded for trans-port to the Tank Museum, to be readyfor the Concert Day on 5 June. TheAmerican honor guard crew was put onboard the Poole-to-Cherbourg ferry tovisit the French invasion beaches, care-fully briefed to revert to driving ontheir usual side of the road. (This ap-peared not to confuse Captain Emdeeat all, as he had only ever been ob-served to drive down the middle of theroad throughout the previous week.)

June 6th, the 50th Anniversary of D-Day, saw the majority of Friends of theTank Museum returning to work for arest, following a hectic weekend. Thefirst casualty returned from France: TedSalter, the co-driver from the Americanhonor guard crew of the “Easy Eight”Sherman. He had taken the ferry toCherbourg and then a train to Bayeux.Unfortunately, the train’s driver openedthe door on the wrong side at Bayeuxand Ted fell onto the railway track,breaking his arm fairly comprehen-sively. So, a mere 30 hours after leav-ing Bovington, he found himself backin the officer’s mess, his arm in a castand having “done” France. He reportedthat the main British/American camp-site near Arromanches, organized by

the Military Vehicles Trust, had suf-fered days of continuous rain and wasa quagmire. A number of tanks taken toFrance still had their steel tracks fitted,so the French had banned their move-ment onto the roads. After two days ofrest, he was able to fly home andphoned to report that his arm wasmending well, the French doctors hav-ing done an excellent job of setting hisarm despite multiple fractures.

Following the D-Day anniversary ac-tivities, the vehicles used were servicedand then returned to their home bases.Repair work on the cooling system ofthe “Easy Eight” Sherman was under-taken at ATDU and revealed that a re-turn pipe had cracked between the twoGMC diesel engines. It was a simplefault to repair but required over 30hours work to gain access to the pipe!The Carrier was washed down andgreased, but the sea water from Wey-mouth Beach still managed to seize allthe steering and brakes within days.Driving the vehicle through the localfresh-water pond a few times seemedto wash most of the salt and freed thesteering and brakes, although the vehi-cle and driver became rather smelly asa result.

The participation of Fort Knox’s Ma-jor General Jordan and his HonorGuard crew under Captain Emdee weremuch appreciated by the veterans of D-Day and the local people who turnedout in their thousands to commemoratethe American commitment to peace inEurope. It was especially fitting thatthe parade at Weymouth, the embarka-tion port for 541,000 American troopsin 1944, should have been taken byMajor General Jordan from Fort Knox.The American commitment 50 yearsago, continued in Europe to the presentday, was honored and acknowledged.For those who embarked never to re-turn, we must remember them and re-main forever in their debt.

A privately-owned M16 halftrack, followed by a Weasel tracked carrier, parade in Weymouth.


Gentlemen, in order to be effective inthe 21st century, we’re going to have tolearn how to fly, not only strategically,but on a tactical level as well. There isprecedent, from the glider assaults ofWWII to the successful movement of22-ton M41s in RVN reported by Colo-nel Battreall. It is also known that therewere 13 M24s with the French ForeignLegion at Dien Bien Phu, but mostpeople don’t realize that they were bro-ken down into planeloads, flown in,and assembled in place. Used a bitmore aggressively, they might haveprevented that particular debacle.

So, we can fly light armor into anyplace with relative ease. It’s the air-borne deployment of the heavies thatgets sticky. But do we need the Abramsor even an M60 in most small-scaleoperations? The Rangers in Somaliacould have been extracted by mech in-fantry supported by ACAVs. What wedesperately need is a TO&E in whichlight armor is so embedded in a com-bined arms unit that it CAN’T be leftbehind by some bureaucrat. Thatmeans that the APC must be able to actin the light armor role as well as beinga battle taxi.

This postulated unit needs to be easilydeployable by air, in self-sustaining, tac-tically-viable combined arms groups. Itmust have armor, infantry, artillery, andheavy lift helicopters in the TO&E.We’re going to need this capability inthe near future, both because of Amer-ica’s worldwide interests and the grow-ing needs of our diplomatic stepchild,the United Nations. What we require isan American based and commandedforce that can be used at will by ourgovernment or “loaned” to the U.N.,but still under American control, keep-ing our national interests as its basicoperating tenet. In other words, weneed a permanent Armored Expedition-ary Force.

To that end, we should develop doc-trine and test it in the field. ARMOR isthe forum in which these ideas are be-ing discussed and refined, but we needto get some hardware out in the hillsand test these developmental concepts.The old rule is “you go with what

you’ve got,” and what we’ve got arethe new AGS, the Bradley, and themany permutations of the old, reliableM113. Properly used and modified,they can do 90 percent of the work thatwe’ll be seeing in the next few years,including establishing an airhead andseizing an airfield that will allow, ifnecessary, the insertion of enoughAbrams tanks to secure the area againstany unpleasant surprises. We need,however, to get combined arms, includ-ing integral airlift, as low in the tableof organization (T.O.) as possible andthere’s precedent for that, too.

The old “Blackhorse” T.O. of the Vi-etnam era serves as a jumping-offpoint, and if it is combined with thePentomic organization of the late fiftiesand early sixties, it might just serve asthe perfect framework, at least for ex-perimentation. In Ringed in Steel,available from Presidio Press, COL Mi-chael Mahler, who was the squadronexec back then, briefly describes thatorganization. Basically, it was thestandard cavalry squadron of the times.Each troop owned nine tanks, 23 as-sorted ACAVs, three mortar tracks anda retriever. The kicker was the squad-ron aviation troop!

Right down there at squadron/battal-ion level, was a troop that owned ninescout birds, 11 UH1B slicks and threeHuey gunships. A tracked armored cav-alry unit had its own air force! Unfor-tunately, although the system worked,next higher command took their airaway from them most of the time andused it at brigade level. When the birdscame home, though, the squadron wasthe unit that maintained them. The cav-alry squadron was their home, becausethat’s where the mechanics were. HalSpurgeon informs me that, as recentlyas 1985, he commanded a sabre troopin 1/18 Cavalry and that the squadronoperated an air troop, under a major.Now 2ACR is experimenting with airsquadrons and the Quarterhorse is us-ing air troops along with ground troops.But we’re using the wrong helicopters.

Supporting armor requires BIG birds,not utility choppers. Getting ammo andfuel to a moving armored task force

cannot be done with Hueys or scoutchoppers; even the Blackhawk simplycan’t lift the amount of combustiblesthat ACAVs and tanks can burn. OneChinook, however, can lift a basic loadfor a tank, AGS, or Bradley platoon,plus a couple of fuel bladders, MREsand the mail. What is needed is an airtroop with CH-47s, and this opens up awhole new box of capabilities. We’veall seen the pictures of a CH-47C lift-ing a mired ACAV out of a paddy, andthe photos of a CH-47D hauling a 13-ton rapid deployment force/light tankthrough the air. That combination haspossibilities.

The connection needs to be made thatheavy choppers can LIFT light armor.If the armor in question is M113-basedACAVs, they can be made to fly. If weuse that old squadron T.O. and assignchoppers big enough to lift the ACAVportion of our force, we’ve got battle-field mobility like no other force in his-tory. And with the CH-47, we’ve alsogot the availability of a gunship thatmakes an Mi-24 look like a light obser-vation helicopter!

Back in 1967, the 1st Air Cav in BinDinh Province, RVN, got two newgunships to test. Technically, they weredesignated ACH47As but the trooperscalled them “Go-Go” ships. They weredescribed by General Tolson, whocommanded the Air Cav then, in an ar-ticle in Vietnam Combat magazine, #2,1988. Basically, they were CH-47s thatcarried a pair of 20-mm Vulcans, a pairof 2.75-mm rocket pods, a 40-mmautomatic grenade launcher and “as-sorted light machine guns.” It couldalso be used as an impromptu bomberby rolling fuzed drums of napalm offthe tail ramp. That is serious air sup-port, and the big ships can carryenough ammunition to set down awayfrom the contact area and reload theirrocket pods.

If we keep the basic aviation com-pany T.O. and retain the light observa-tion choppers, we’ve got aerial scouts.Remove the utility choppers and re-place them with the heavy ships, andthere’s enough airlift for any humani-tarian mission that we can see coming


Armored Expeditionary Forcesby Ralph Zumbro

up. If the mercy birds are fired on byintransigent warlords, they simply liftthe refugees out and ferry back a fewACAVs, supported by a Go-Go ship.That should take care of whatever in-ternational “varmicide” necessary toclear the way for the humanitarian mis-sions or non-combatant rescue. Theaviation company or troop should beable to equip the big ships with asmany assault kits as necessary for de-veloping situations.

Since most of the areas where thistype of unit would be used present noMBT threat, an ACAV will serve thelight tank role. The nine tanks in theT.O. can be replaced with Bradleys,and suddenly we’ve got an armoredforce that is fully amphibious withoutpreparation. The existence of the heavylift capability means that light armorcan leap tall buildings at a singlebound... or the Great Rift Valley, theShatt al Arab or the Isthmus of Pan-ama.

ACAVs, at least, can be made to fly.The heavier combat machines wouldhave to go by ground, of course, aswould the retrievers, but we can flylight armor around ambushes. Thereare ways to counter the Stinger men-ace, if they can be detected soonenough. Future armor is going to haveto live in a web of detection frequen-cies, and we may have to add an ECMtrack to the HQ platoon. There are alsoAA turrets, such as the GE Blazer, thatwill fit either the AGS or the BradleyFighting Vehicle.

So, we can fly tactically and accom-plish most missions, but how aboutstrategic projection? In the May-June1994 issue, the article by COL Battreallproves the concept. Light to mediumarmor can be airlifted if a suitable air-field or level stretch of road can be ac-quired as a landing field. We haveGOT to have this capability, and thatmeans that tankers must also becomeparatroopers! Pre-positioned navy shipsfull of Abrams tanks will not survivemilitary attack. They are unarmored,and many Islamic nations are rapidlybuying submarines. Germany, ofcourse, is back in the commercial U-Boat business, along with the Frenchand the Swedes. Now England, of allnations, is offering to LEASE their Up-holder-class subs out to the highestbidder. This means that we must beable to go by air, all the way from theU.S. to our objectives.

As Major Spaulding and Mr. Cristpoint out, what we badly need is a

light, air-transportable, multi-role vehi-cle. We already have two of them, theBradley and the M113. You don’t needan Abrams to beat up a T-54 or a BMP,and a quick perusal of Jane’s serves tolocate most of the world’s mechanizedmenaces.

Africa, for instance, concentratesmost of its heavy armor in the northernsegment, where Libya and Egypt are inan uneasy face-off that’s been going onsince Ramses II, in biblical days. TheSudan, which is coming increasinglyunder Iranian influence, has some mod-ern armor and could get sticky, but forthe most part, there is no serious MBTthreat in the nations of central Africa,which seem to be rapidly de-civilizing,and will create a power vacuum. Wedepend on the stability of those nationsto provide the chromium, cobalt, andmolybdenum that keeps us in the fore-front of the hi-tech revolution. Moreimportantly, those unstable little politi-cal entities need to be defended againstlocal power grabs by greedy neighborswith foreign backing. If Somalia, forinstance, came under Iranian sway, onesmall missile base on the horn of Af-rica could cut off the flow of oilthrough the Red Sea. There’s a civilwar going on across that sea, in Yemen.The point is, sooner or later, we’re go-ing to get called out again, as part ofthe global 911 system, and we’d betterhave an armored force ready to go, orbe sent in piecemeal again, with pre-dictable results. Training and the T.O.

are what we need to address, andquickly.

First off, what type of parent organi-zation will be needed? We need largecompanies, so the HQ had better be bigand flexible. A full regiment might justbe too big, though. Back in the 1950s,when I first enlisted after JROTC inhigh school, the Army was mostly Pen-tomic and the major tactical unit wasthe battle group, which fell between thebattalion and regiment in size. It hadfive line companies — real big compa-nies, and a look at their organization isinstructive. In the five active years ofthat enlistment, I worked almost all theMOSs in a line airborne company, be-low E-6, and was in on the formationof the 8th Division’s first light airbornefield artillery (105 towed) battalion atBaumholder, so I can perhaps open awindow into the past which could helpus now. Those old units were quiteflexible and could operate in manyconfigurations. A-2/504, for instance,once operated for two months awayfrom Ft. Bragg, running graduation ex-ercises for the Special Forces in themountains of West Virginia, back in1962. Lordy, was that a lot of fun. Weeven used horses.

The battle group headquarters con-sisted of a HQ company with its ownintegral infantry platoon, a scout pla-toon in jeeps, and a large transportationplatoon, as well as the usual HQ neces-sities. There were enough deuce and a


“Supporting armor requires BIG birds, not utility choppers.... One Chi-nook...can lift a basic load for a tank, AGS, or Bradley platoon, plus a cou-ple of fuel bladders, MREs and the mail. What is needed is an air troop withCH-47s, and this opens up a whole new box of capabilities.”Above, a CH-47 slings an ACAV out of a rice paddy in Vietnam.

halfs in that transportation platoon tomove one of our infantry companies inone convoy. The supply section had itsown transport and could handle severalauxiliary units, such as engineers, withno problem. We had a surgeon andenough medics for each line platoon.The mess section, while normally di-vided up into company units, had con-solidated into a battle group mess, butwhen we went to the field — Baum-holder, Wildflecken, Grafenwohr, etc.,they went with us in their own trucks.

Support artillery for the battle groupwas a 4.2-in. mortar battery with (Ithink), five platoons of four tubes each.In the present proposal, a full battery of105-mm light howitzers might be moreeffective. There is an anti-helicopter105-mm round under development andit could fit that tube, just by changingshell casings. There’s also a 105-mmHEAT round available that can bemade to fit the howitzer, giving the bat-tery, and the HQ base camp, a long-needed self-defense capability. We usedto use 3/4-ton trucks, two per gun, asprime movers for a 5,000-pound M-2howitzer, so a Hummer should have notrouble with the new light gun. A sec-ond HMMWV with a trailer wouldsupply the basic load and would bepart of an airdrop, LAPES, or assaultlanding. If mortar-locating radar waspart of that battery’s equipment, the LZwould be mortar-proof. In addition, thatradar could render much artillery use-less, stopping the shelling of civilians.

The main force of the battle groupwas five line companies, each consist-ing of four infantry platoons of 44 meneach, and one weapons platoon withthree 81-mm mortars and three 106 re-coilesses on special jeeps. The infantrysquads had 11 men, a squad leader andtwo fire teams, each with a BAR. Theplatoon weapons squad had twoM1919A6 Brownings and two 3.5-in.Bazookas. If the outfit was supportedby ACAVs or Bradleys, the armoredvehicles would replace the weaponssquad. Possibly we could have two in-fantry squads and an ACAV per sectionand call two sections a platoon.

There’s room for a lot of experimen-tation here, especially with the newtypes of hard-shell body armor that areavailable. This is an important concept.If the infantry has its own body armorwhich is rifle resistant, they don’t evenneed APCs for most operations. Be-sides being a tank commander and run-ning an ammo/POL operation in RVN,

I’ve been a light infantry squad leader(airborne, both divisions), and have rid-den all over Germany, both Carolinas,West Virginia, Southern France, andthe Canal Zone in the back of a deuceand a half. An infantry squad can livein the back of a truck very handily,thank you. Is it possible to create a pla-toon that consists of two ACAVs andfour squads of body-armored grunts intrucks with the ASP 30mm on gunrings on the cabs? Or can we uselightly armored wheeled APCs like theLAV that the Marines have adopted?

What about the weapons platoon?Can we simply replace it with four up-gunned Bradleys and plug in the AGSwhen it becomes available? That littlebeastie would make a good assault gunas well as a tank destroyer. The 105tank gun is also a creditable artillerypiece, and if the training is given andthe artillery controls are fitted to theturret, the AGS could do duty on thegunline. Come to think of it, there arejust 18 guns in a howitzer battalion andabout 15 in a tank company. There’s abit of flexibility to be thought abouthere. Could an AGS company simplyreplace the artillery battery? We’d havenot only long-range support but an ar-mored reaction force, but no high-anglecapability.

If one of those oversized line compa-nies were replaced with the heavy avia-tion company discussed earlier for air-lift and gunship support, a battle group,all by itself, could give most nations alot of grief. For the record, the T.O. ofone of those line companies was 260

officers and men. The battle group T.O.was 1500 men and was commanded bya full colonel, in our case, COL “WildBill” Welsh, who later wound up incharge of the expansion of the SpecialForces. Maybe it is now time to con-sider the creation of a small, airmobile,armored, combined arms special force.The big divisions can handle the Sad-dams of the world, but we desperatelyneed troubleshooters and forcible entryteams. Time’s a’wasting.

The ACAV - Weights and Loadings

In the present proposal, the M113 in an ACAV configuration would serve as a light tankwith a few dismountable infantry. With a one-man gun cupola, it can still carry eightinfantrymen to provide local security and forcible entry teams. Considering the emptyweight of the M113 to be 9,926 kg and the max lift of the CH47D to be 13,000 kg, weare left with 3,074 kg of discretionary stores and armament weights. Here are someexamples of the M113 with various available armament.

M163A1 Vulcan, 20-mm gun 13,310 kg combat loadedArrowpointe 90-mm turret 11,870 kg empty, two-man turretCadillac Gage, 40mm/12.7mm 10,994 kg empty, one-man turretFMC 25-mm electric turret 11,335 kg empty, one-man turret

If one of the lighter turrets were fitted to the M113, it should still be heli-portable. Fit a90-mm turret to a Bradley and you have essentially a medium tank with dismounts.When the AGS comes on line, the unit would then have its Assault Gun/Tank Destroyercapability.

Source: Jane’s Artillery and Armor, 1987-88


Ralph Zumbro served as anNCO in each of the combatarms, including combat servicein RVN. He has commandedtanks in Vietnam, USAREUR,and CONUS, and served as agunnery and demolitions in-structor. Tank Sergeant, amemoir of his service in Viet-nam, is in its second printing inpaperback by Pocket Booksand is available at bookstores.He has written articles for AR-MOR, in addition to writing twonovels, Jungletracks and PumaForce, co-authored with his for-mer XO, James Walker, alsopublished by Pocket Books.Currently, he is writing an oralhistory of American tankers whofought in all battles of the 20thCentury. Tank Aces is sched-uled to be published in 1996.

I read with interest Captain Prior’s ar-ticle in the November-December 1993issue, “Cavalry Mortars — Trainingand Tactics.” In the article, CaptainPrior states that difficulties in live-firetraining in the indirect fire role com-promise the important mission of thecavalry mortars, particularly underpeacetime safety regulations. The up-shot of this is that, “The mortar sectionof the cavalry troop is probably theleast-used asset in the unit," which isthe very first sentence of the article.

Captain Prior clearly knows the limi-tations of training to use a muzzle-loading mortar buried down inside theconfines of a metal box. I believe thatthere is another way to provide effec-tive mechanized mortar fire, and notjust for the cavalry. It is a way to sim-plify training in indirect fire and tomake mechanized mortars effective ina wider variety of roles than just indi-rect fire. The approach I describe hereis not confined to the U.S. M106-seriesof vehicles, but is applicable to a widervariety of systems, including vehiclesof the APC and MICV type, as well asamphibian tractors. I further submitthat a lightly armored vehicle armedwith such a versatile weapon wouldmake an invaluable contribution tocombined arms teams and would bereadily deployable by air.

The way to accomplish all this is touse a turret-mounted, breech-loading,dual purpose (DP) mortar (with appro-priate fire control) capable of firing inboth the indirect and the direct fire

roles.1* The vehicle will also beequipped with IVIS and GPS, and theturret will be armored to at least thelevel of the chassis.

Weapon characteristics proposed are:

• Turret-mounted, continuous traverse.

• Breech-loaded. (Breech type not rele-vant to this article.) Muzzle-loadingis not an option.

• Elevation angle from<->5° to +80°.

• Recoil mechanism, probably hydro-pneumatic.

• Smoothbore or rifled? Not relevant tothis article. It depends on the type ofmortar ammunition chosen, or whichis already in the national inventory.

• Ammunition:

- Conventional mortar ammunition.

- Anticipated ‘smart’ rounds.

- HEP/HEAT or other special-pur-pose rounds designed for directfire.

- Caliber - Not relevant to this arti-cle. Any specific caliber chosenis dependent upon vehicle sizeand weight class, maximumrange and terminal effects de-sired, minimum number ofrounds to be carried, and the typeof mortar ammunition that mayalready be in inventory. However,since so many people insist upondwelling on the caliber issue, Isuggest a caliber range of ap-proximately 60mm minimum to120mm maximum.

There are several reasons whymechanized mortars be turret-mounted,breech-loading, and capable of indirectand direct fire.

The tactical reasons — the mostimportant — are:

• It provides both an offensive capabil-ity and a self-defense capability.

• A mechanized muzzle-loading mor-tar, when faced with a target thatcannot be effectively engaged withindirect fire (i.e., an encounter with adirect fire threat at a close range) hasa system engagement effectivenesslevel of zero. It is nearly helpless, inspite of the long-term investment invehicle, crew, and training. If thissame vehicle had a dual purposeweapon and appropriate fire control,it would be capable of not only sur-viving, but having a good chance ofwinning the encounter. Conversely, amechanized, muzzle-loading mortarthat’s never used in a battle becauseit has no indirect fire targets also hasa system engagement effectiveness ofzero.

• A turret can rapidly swing throughany arc to quickly engage targets ofopportunity, rather than having toturn the entire vehicle, as one wouldhave to do with a system like theM106. In the indirect fire role, thetime to get ‘steel on target’ will besubstantially reduced, as compared tothe time needed by a conventionalmuzzle-loading mortar.

• There are many suitable direct fire,as well as indirect fire, targets for aDP weapon.

The technical/functional reasonsare:

• A turret-mounted weapon’s turretdrives make it much faster and easierto control traverse and elevation. Fur-thermore, the gunner will be lookingthrough a magnifying sight pointingin the same direction as the barrel.This is far superior to squatting downinside a metal box and squinting intoa mortar sight.

• A turret provides overhead armorprotection, internal mounting surfacesfor fire control, coaxial MG, andcrew equipment, external surfaces fora pintle-mounted MG and crewequipment, and protection from muz-zle blast and fumes.

Cavalry Mortars — A Better WayAdopting turreted, breech-loading mortarsCapable of both direct and indirect fireWould double their value to Cav units


*Numbered superscripts refer to Notes andlettered superscripts refer to References (seelast page of this article).

Editor’s Note: The author, who prefers to re-main anonymous, is a retired ordnance engineerwith a broad background in the defense industry.He has no financial interest in any decision thegovernment might make in regard to the weaponsdescribed in this article.

• Properly designed, an enclosed turretwill provide CBR protection.

• By designing the weapon to be capa-ble of breech-loading only (ratherthan including the option of muzzle-loading, as some do), the bore diame-ter can be made smaller than thestandard mortar barrel diameter (forany given caliber), which will en-hance accuracy and range with stand-ard mortar ammo. The reason for thisis that a typical muzzle-loading mor-tar barrel must be larger in diameterthan the projectile to allow the airtrapped in the barrel (and ‘behind’the projectile) to escape, so as to letthe projectile fall freely to the bottomof the tube. Not only must the air es-cape, but it must do so quicklyenough for the projectile to be able tofall fast enough to set off the primer.The difference in diameter betweenthe bore and projectile of a muzzle-loading mortar is called ‘windage,’and it is the windage that allows bothballoting (wobbling) in the tube andvariation in muzzle velocity becauseof escaping propelling gases (a.k.a.:‘blow-by’). Balloting and variationsin muzzle velocity lead to inaccuracy.

• Reducing windage will slightly in-crease muzzle velocity, hence range,because blow-by will be reduced. Abreech-loaded weapon can have alonger barrel, for any given caliber,than a muzzle loader. This will re-duce muzzle flash, blast, and smoke.It will also provide a slight increasein muzzle velocity, hence slight addi-tional range. Increased barrel lengthwill ensure more uniform combustionof propellant and will decrease vari-ation in muzzle velocity, resulting indecreased round-to-round dispersion.

• A breech-loaded weapon cannot bedouble-loaded, unless by an ingen-ious idiot.

When speaking of close combat di-rect fire targets for cannon-caliberweapons, one usually thinks of ar-mored targets; in particular, armoredvehicles, whether of the MICV or tankclass. Weapons used to defeat armoredtargets are typically flat trajectory, highvelocity, high kinetic energy weaponsof the 20-50-mm class used to attackIFVs; and a weapon of at least 90-mmcaliber is ordinarily used to attacktanks. A proposal to enhance direct fireweaponry of these two classes ofweapons is frequently oriented towardincreasing their armor-defeating capa-bility. Considering the fact that suchweaponry is based upon a highly de-

veloped technology (i.e., we are wayout on the ‘learning curve’), increasesin armor-defeating capability will onlycome at the expense of additionalweight, volume, and cost.

There is a double irony here in theperception of what the threat target re-ally is. The first irony has been the pre-sumption of the ever-increasing ar-mored threat, which is a vestige of thedays when our concern was the possi-bility of a horde of ‘technologically ad-vanced,’ armor-led Soviet forces thun-dering across the Fulda gap. The threatbriefings we were all exposed to inthose days stressed the advances intechnology that we could expect in or-der to meet those threat forces. Withoutdwelling on the issue of whether or notthose threat briefings were overdrawn,it should not be difficult to accept thefact that the current Russian state is notnow in a position to be producing a‘technology’ that the Soviet Unioncould not field in its heyday. For exam-ple, there are those who say that theprotection level of the ‘BMP-3,’ orwhatever it is called now, requires aweapon more powerful than the 25mm.

This is a simple case of threat escala-tion — that vehicle is obviously a‘swimmer’ and it has no swim curtainto provide the extra buoyancy neededby a system that is more heavily ar-mored than vehicles of the generalclass of a BMP-2, Piranha LAV, M113,etc. No swim curtain, no extra armor.(It’s a good thing that Archimedes’Law cannot be classified, or someonewould have tried by now.)

The second irony is that, since not alldirect fire targets are armored, an ad-vance in combat capabilities is not nec-essarily based on more powerful antiar-mor weapons. In today’s world, wesometimes see the combat capability offighting vehicles being sensibly up-graded with improved command andcontrol systems — not larger caliber ormore powerful weapons. In reality, weare well armed with excellent weaponshaving a demonstrated capability of de-feating likely threat armor, now andwell into the future. The real issue weshould be addressing is: “How do weincrease the overall offensive and de-fensive capability of our close combatforces?” This must include a readily


Close Combat Targets

Vehicles: •Heavy protection: tanks.(moving targets) •Medium protection: MICV.

•Light protection: APC, LAVs, LVTs, some HMMWV & MICV.•No protection: some HMMWV, trucks, jeeps, radar vans.

Dismounted troops: •Heavy protection: in concrete bunkers, some buildings.(“not moving”) •Medium and light protection: in log bunkers, dug-in

positions w/sandbags, ATGM, AAA, towed artillery, mortars, command & control centers.•No protection: troops in attack: prone and standing.

Aircraft: •Light protection • fixed wing(fast moving) •No protection • rotary wing

Now, to see the targets that are vulnerable to our DP weapon, just delete from the abovearray those targets that can only likely be defeated by some combination of high kineticenergy, high velocity, and/or flat trajectory weapons. These targets are tanks, heavily pro-tected concrete bunkers and a few other buildings, and aircraft. After deleting them, theremaining targets are:

Vehicles: •Medium protection: MICV.(moving targets) •Light protection: APC, LAVs, LVTs, some HMMWV & MICV.

•No protection: some HMMWV, trucks, jeeps, radar vans.

Dismounted troops: •Medium & light protection: in log bunkers, dug-in positions w/sandbags, ATGM, AAA, towed artillery, mortars, command & control centers.

(“not moving”) •No protection: troops in attack: prone and standing.

Figure 1

deployable capability. One of the waysto do this is to consider (i.e., ‘model’)how various combinations of weapons(including dual purpose weapons) andtactics will work against the reallywide variety of targets to be encoun-tered. The point of my argument is notthat this DP weapon can replace the ex-isting superior antiarmor weapons, in-cluding missiles. It cannot. However,there are more, and better, ways to in-crease overall combat capability than tokeep increasing the weight, volume,and cost of the mechanized antiarmorweapons (including ammo), which willin turn impose exponential weight, vol-ume, and cost penalties on the combatvehicle systems. Another point that Iwish to make is my belief that the U.S.has been over-focused on just howmany of the targets to be encounteredare really armored targets.

What are all these close combat tar-gets? The array in Fig. 1 is a reason-able list of most close combat targets. Ihave divided the target list into thosetargets that are: moving, not moving(essentially, as compared to a bullet),and ‘fast moving’ (at least, as com-pared to ground vehicles and dis-mounted troops). Within each of thesetarget velocity classes, I have dividedthem further by level of protection.

I submit that the above list of remain-ing targets for our DP weapon com-prises a very large number of likelyclose combat targets. A combat vehiclearmed with a DP weapon and appropri-ate fire control can perform the role ofthe mechanized mortar as well as en-gage direct fire targets when necessary.Such a vehicle will make an excellent,versatile member of the combined armsteam and will justify the investment inpersonnel, time, and money.

The reader may ask, “If this DPweapon is such a good idea, then howor when has it been done in the past, ifat all? Who is doing it now, if any-one?”

Look first at the historical back-ground:

• The U.S. successfully used howitzersin WWII that were mounted in theturrets of tanks and more lightly ar-mored vehicles, where they wereused in both indirect and direct fireroles. In both these cases cited, thevehicle was originally fitted with ahigher velocity weapon of smallercaliber than the howitzer. A few spe-cific examples are the M4 tank with

105-mm howitzer, which was origi-nally armed with a 75-mm gun; andthe LVT(A)4 amphibian tractor with75-mm howitzer, which was origi-nally armed with a 37-mm gun. Bothof these vehicles were extensivelyand successfully used in combat.

• Weapons seldom considered as ‘dual-purpose,’ but which really were, werethe tracked tank destroyers of WWII,such as the M10 with 3-inch gun,M18 with 76-mm gun, and the M36with 90-mm gun. Because these sys-tems had powerful, long-range weap-ons, and because they also had boththe fire control capability and thecrew training for indirect fire, theywere often used in such roles.a

• In the immediate post-WW II period,a version of the M26 tank was fittedwith a 105-mm howitzer and re-named M45. The M45 saw someservice in Korea.b Later, a variant ofthe LVT(P)5 amphibian tractor wasmounted with a special turret armedwith a 105-mm Howitzer and wascalled the LVT(H)6. The LVT(H)6was successfully used in SoutheastAsia.

• Speaking of Southeast Asia and DPweapons, a really creative and inex-pensive DP mobile application, the81-mm mortar Mk2 Mod 1, was cre-ated by the Louisville Naval Ord-nance Station for use during our pe-riod of involvement there. It was a

light deck mount, installed on smallnaval craft, which mounted both an81-mm mortar and a .50-Cal. MG.The mortar could be trigger fired aswell as drop-loaded, and could beused for both indirect and direct fire.I note that creativity and usefulnessare not always a function of howmuch money and time were invested.Sometimes, there seems to be an in-verse relationship.

Later, American interest in DP weap-ons languished while we struggled withthe design and production of innumer-able specialized weapons (includingmines, grenades, cannons and missiles,guided and otherwise) intended to de-feat armor; even to the extent of field-ing antiarmor warheads for artillery.Examples of this are the 155-mmM483 ICM projectile that contains dualpurpose (this ‘dual-purpose’ is a differ-ent kind of ‘dual-purpose’) armor-de-feating and antipersonnel grenades, andthe MLRS (replacing the 8-inch howit-zer) whose very large warhead uses alarger quantity of the same grenades.

Now let’s look at contemporary sys-tems:

• Two contemporary systems availableon the commercial market are bothThomson Brandt 60-mm breech-loading mortars with hydraulic recoil


DUAL-PURPOSE U.S. WEAPONS OF THE PAST

The M45, at right, was anM26 tank with 105-mm how-itzer. Some were used in theKorean War.

At lower right, the Marines’LVT(H)6 of the Vietnam eramounted a 105-mm howitzer.

Another Vietnam-era multi-purpose weapon was theNavy’s deck-mounted combi-nation of an 81-mm mortarand .50-cal machine gun,seen below.

systems. These weapons, called ‘gunmortars’ by Thomson Brandt, can firestandard 60-mm mortar ammunitionfor high angle fire, as well as specialpurpose ammo intended for directfire. (The standard mortar ammo can,of course, be used against most directfire targets.) There are two versionsof this mortar, the shorter range ver-sion, the MCB 60, and the longerrange version with a barrel extensionknown as the LR Gun Mortar. Boththese gun/mortars have beenmounted in several commerciallyavailable turrets.c The LR is shown atright in a Hispano-Suiza turret,mounted coaxially with a .50-cal.MG.

• Thomson Brandt also has an 81-mmbreech-loading weapon known as theMCB 81 Gun Mortar. Like the 60sabove, it has a hydraulic recoilmechanism and has been turret-mounted. One version is the GIATAMX-10 TMC 81 81-mm MortarGun Carrier.c

• Another system, which has beenaround for a while, is the RussianSO-120 Airmobile Assault Weapon,which is a 120-mm breech-loadinggun/mortar that is turret-mounted ona modified BMD chassis. Like theThomson Brandt weapons above, itis capable of direct and indirect fire.

• A new effort now in development isthe Royal Ordnance 120-mm Ar-moured Mortar System. It is a turret-mounted, breech-loading gun/mortar(call it what you will) that can bemounted on a light or medium ar-mored vehicle chassis. It will have anintegrated fire control with LRF andIR, and will be GPS-aided.

Why is the U.S. not using DualPurpose systems?

Now that I have shown the readerthat DP weapons have existed in thepast, and I have shown some contem-porary ones, let’s examine some of thepotential reasons why the US is not us-ing them now:

Fixation on armored targets? Yes, butwe’ve already covered that.

Too much faith in ‘studies’? WeAmericans dearly love to see the re-sults of computerized effectiveness andoptimization studies (computer mod-els), which shows how little we under-stand them. Next-generation weaponsare usually replacements for an existingone, which has sponsorship from the

existing hierarchy, so the new system isalmost guaranteed to be a product im-provement of what we have now. Realinnovation is hard to cope with in sys-tem-level studies because it would in-troduce new ideas and concepts thatcould not be quickly and readily mod-eled in a computer. Perhaps it could bedone, but how many dissenting opin-ions would there be as to whether itwas done properly? Without validationfrom the rest of the analytical commu-nity it wouldn’t be worth much. Fur-thermore, the hassle would go on for-ever.

Another limitation on studies is thatthey focus on predictable targets and

most likely scenarios, and so focus ourperception of ‘what’s needed’ onto sin-gle-purpose systems. This is becauseany DP system will be a compromiseand will have capabilities for which wewill have paid a price and which arenot needed to defeat the ‘optimum’ tar-get (whatever that illusion is).

The facts are, that the next time wehave to go to war, the time, the place,the enemy, and his capabilities willhave been unknown to us in the 10- to15- year period between the time whenthe development project was initiatedand when it finally was fielded. Thetime when the system will then be usedin war may be anywhere from zero to


DUAL-PURPOSEBREECHLOADING MORTARSIN MODERN USE

In top photo, the Thomson Brandt60mm LR Gun Mortar is mounted in aHispano-Suiza turret with a coaxial 50-mm machine gun. There is also a simi-lar 81-mm version from the Frenchmanufacturer. Both have hydraulic re-coil mechanisms.

Directly above, the Russian SO-120combines a 120-mm breechloadingmortar with a light, airmobile chassis.

Above, the Royal Ordnance120-mm armored mortar sys-tem, seen here on an LAVchassis. This option integratesfire control, laser rangefinder,and GPS

more than 30 years after the fieldingdate. What we really need is a flexible,multi-role DP system to supplementtanks, MICVs, and artillery. It will beadaptable in employment against nowunknown enemies, targets, and terrain,at an unknown time in the future. Formaximum flexibility in employment,the DP system should be readily trans-portable by air and sea.

More complex training? Crews forthese DP systems will need to betrained in both direct and indirect firegunnery practice. This is not the diffi-culty that it used to be, now that wehave computerized fire control tech-niques, CITV, IVIS, GPS, and POS-NAV. I refer the reader to CaptainMcVey’s excellent article, “The M1A2,IVIS, and NTC — A Company Com-mander’s Perspective," that appeared inthe same issue of ARMOR as CaptainPrior’s article.d This article showed justwhat could be done with a tank, thatclassic direct fire weapon, properlyequipped to call in indirect fire. I alsopoint out that the indirect fire controltechniques used for the mechanizedmortars (Captain Prior’s article) are no-where near as advanced as those nowavailable to a tank (Captain McVey’sarticle.) It is not written in stone that aCITV can only be mounted on a tank!

Just as the infantry commander hashad to learn to be an armored combatvehicle commander (MICVs with auto-matic cannons), he may also have tolearn some indirect fire techniques aswell. I am surely not the first to saythat the traditional infantry, armor, cav-alry, and artillery roles may need up-dating, and not for the first time in his-tory. Before WWII, during the SpanishCivil War in the late 30s, the GermanCondor Legion volunteer 88mm flakunits attacked surface targets as well asaircraft targets.f In WWII, the German88 mm flak units provided not only airdefense support, but they also providedsupport against ground targets, includ-ing tanks.

“At the fronts, the flak guns were as-signed other combat tasks such as anti-tank use, attacking bunkers, supportingtroops under pressure in ground com-

bat, and on the coasts they even firedon sea targets and fought off attemptsto land. In the western campaign, the88mm flak was the only weapon thatpenetrated the heavy French tank ar-mor. Great demands were made of flakunits, which accompanied the panzertroops on their fast advances and re-ceived alternating air-protection andground-combat assignments. That oftenmeant moving their positions two orthree times a day, including the work oftrenching [emplacement?]. Very oftenin this action, motorized units of the ar-mor had to be caught and passed, soas to guarantee gap-free protectionagainst air attacks along the advanceroute. On the other hand, single 88mmflak guns were used by so-called flakbattle troops to wipe out enemy pointsof resistance.” f

The method of employing the 88s, asdescribed above, was clearly dual-pur-pose, if not triple purpose — that is,there may have been indirect fire mis-sions against surface targets, but I amnot certain. I believe that it was the u-biquitous nature of the 88 that origi-nally gave it its fearsome reputation —it seemed to be everywhere, shooting ateverything. The early WWII design ofthe American 90mm AA gun was a sin-gle-purpose AA mount, but it wasmodified later in WWII into a multi-purpose mount capable of attackingsurface targets in either direct or indi-rect fire.g,h Surely, if it was feasibleeven before WWII, there is no reasonnow why more new weapons can’t bedesigned for multipurpose roles. Can’twe expect that computerized fire con-trol techniques will drastically reduceboth the need for specialized computa-tions and the training necessary to dothe remaining computations?

If, in the press of combat, the sameweapon and crew performed in thesame day all three roles of air defense,fire support, and close combat, thenshouldn’t we consider now organizingto do just that — rather than wait untilwe’re in the war? Wouldn’t that be oneof the ‘force multipliers’ the militarykeeps talking about? If we are going to

seriously reevaluate the traditional rolesof infantry, armor, cavalry, and artillery,we will have to solve these issues:

Conflict in traditional roles and mis-sions? What will be the MOS and ca-reer fields of the commanders andcrews? Of course, a DP mortar, firingeither direct or indirect fire, is still aclose combat system, but what happensif a 120-mm caliber is chosen? It maystill be a mortar and ‘close combat,’ buthow does such a weapon differ in ap-pearance, and even in use, from SP ar-tillery? What is it when it is firing indirect fire? Who says indirect fire,other than mortars, must be a fire sup-port role? Until the early 20th Century,the artillery fired direct fire, not indi-rect.i And this leads us to —

Funding priorities? In today’s world,all programs compete with one another,and any ‘tracked combat vehicle’ linein the budget competes all the more sowith other such vehicles. The DP sys-tem that I propose will not be inexpen-sive, so every dollar spent on it will bethat much less for tanks, APCs,MICVs, and SP artillery. This is cer-tainly more of a problem for the mili-tary to sort out than for anyone else —the vehicle system and weapon design-ers and manufacturers should be just ashappy to continue producing a variantof their production chassis with a newturret with new weapons on it. On thepositive side of the cost issue for thesystems proposed, a multipurpose sys-tem capable of handling more than onerole offers the opportunity of needingfewer systems and fewer personnel toman them. There can also be a consid-erable reduction in the amount and costof air and sealift needed if there arefewer specialized systems to beshipped.

Conclusion: The DP combat vehiclesystem proposed has the promise of be-coming a ‘multi-role’2 system that cannot only engage a much wider range oftargets than current combat vehicles,but will be more deployable by air thanmany of the more heavily armored ofthose same combat vehicles. It will be


“In today’s world, all programs compete with one another, andany ‘tracked combat vehicle’ line in the budget competes all themore so with other such vehicles. The DP system that I proposewill not be inexpensive, so every dollar spent on it will be thatmuch less for tanks, APCs, MICVs, and SP artillery.”

a valued member of the ‘crisis-deploy-able combined arms team.’3

Notes

1A purist might want to argue the validity ofdescribing as a ‘mortar’ a weapon intended fordirect fire, even if it is an alternative role, sinceone of the many definitions of a mortar is that itis a weapon intended to be fired at elevationangles exceeding 45°. Regardless, I believe thatcalling such a DP weapon a ‘breech-loadingmortar’ is too well established for me to strug-gle to coin a new expression that will satisfythe purists — and confuse everyone else.

2A good term by Ralph Zumbro. See Refer-ence e.

3Inspired again by Ralph Zumbro, same refer-ence. Mr. Zumbro has a way with words.

References

a(1) The Armored School, Ft. Knox, Ky. Em-ployment of Four Tank Destroyer Battalions inthe ETO, p. 122. ‘A Research Report.’ 1949-1950.

a(2.) Gabel, Dr. Christopher R. Seek, Strikeand Destroy: U.S. Army Tank Destroyer Doc-trine in World War II, Leavenworth Papers No.12, pp. 39-40. Combat Studies Institute, U.S.Army CGSC, Ft. Leavenworth, Kan., 1985.

bHunnicutt, R.P. Pershing: A History of theMedium Tank T20 Series. p. 134. Calif., FeistPublications, 1971.

cJane’s Armour and Artillery, 1986-1987, pp.848-849. N.Y., Jane’s Publishing, Inc.

dMcVey, Captain Wade L. “The M1A2, IVIS,and NTC — A Company Commander’s Per-spective," ARMOR, November-December 1993.

eZumbro, Ralph. “Letters”, ARMOR, July-Au-gust 1994. See his comments on pp. 3 and 50.

fMiller, Werner. The 88mm Flak, SchifferPublishing, Ltd., Pa., 1991, p. 5.

gHogg, Ian. British & American Artillery ofWorld War Two, Hippocrene Books, N.Y.,1978, pp. 126-128.

hBarnes, MG G.M. Weapons of World War II,D. Van Nostrand, N.Y., 1947, pp. 151-152.

iMcMeen, Maj. Scott R., Field Artillery Doc-trine Development: 1917-1945, Master of Mili-tary Art and Science thesis, U.S. Army CGSC,Ft. Leavenworth, Kan., 1991, pp. 6-7.


The Draper Combat Leadership AwardThe annual Draper Combat Leadership

Award recognizes the outstanding armorcompany or cavalry troop in each divi-sion, separate brigade, and armored cav-alry regiment in the U.S. Army, to includeArmy Reserve and National Guard units.It is not a new award. The history of theprestigious program is the legacy of LTCWycliffe P. Draper. In 1924, LTC Draperdeveloped a plan to test and recognizecombat leadership in small cavalry units.The first tests were held at Fort Riley,Kansas, then the Cavalry School.

Since that start nearly 70 years ago, theaward has evolved. In 1928, LTC Drapercreated a trust fund to ensure the per-formance of the award and the competi-tion expanded from Fort Riley to poststhroughout the United States. In 1939,cavalry regiments that had been mecha-nized began to compete for the award,thus ensuring its continued relevance in amodernized Army.

During World War II, the competitionwas suspended, but was resumed in1944 under the title of the Armored Cav-alry Leadership Award to reflect the newreality of the force. Since then, the com-petition has continued to evolve.

Today the Draper Combat LeadershipAward, represented by the “Goodrich Rid-ing Trophy,” is awarded not on the resultsof a test, but on the overall performanceof a unit. This was done for both practicaland economical reasons. Economically, itis no longer necessary to allocate fundsfor a “Draper Test”; the results of all of aunit’s field exercises are considered dur-ing the competition. Examining the func-tioning of a unit throughout the calendaryear (Jan-Dec) gives a better evaluationof the true performance of a unit and itsleaders than a one-time test.

All company-sized armor/cavalry unitsassigned to divisions, separate brigades,armored cavalry regiments, or U.S. ArmyReserve Readiness Regions are eligible

for consideration for the award. Air cavalrytroops and attack helicopter companiesorganic to armored and cavalry groundunits are also eligible. The program isopen to U.S. Army, Army Reserve, andNational Guard units. Troop/company win-ners of the Draper Leadership Awardneed to be identified NLT 31 March of thefollowing year by memorandum to theDraper Custodian. Troop/company com-manders, first sergeants, and the unit willreceive the Draper plaque. Army Regula-tion 672-73 will answer most questionsconcerning the award process.

The Draper Award Program also recog-nizes individuals for their demonstratedleadership in courses at Fort Knox, recog-nizing the outstanding leadership gradu-ates in both ANCOC and AOBC for theircontributions and efforts while students.

The point of contact for any questionsregarding the Draper Leadership AwardProgram is USAARMC, ATTN: ATZK-ARP(Draper Custodian), Fort Knox, KY 40121,phone: DSN 464-1321/1439 or commer-cial (502) 624-1321/1439. FAX: DSN 464-7585, commercial (502) 624-7585.

Kouma Tank Platoon Gunnery Excellence Competition Winners

Congratulations to the 1994/1995 winners of the Kouma Tank Platoon Gunnery Excel-lence Competition for a job well done. The active duty winner was 3d Platoon, D Com-pany, 1/67th Armor, 2d Armored Division, III Corps, Fort Hood, Texas. They achieved 100percent on gunnery hits and “T” (trained) for all tactical tasks. The reserve unit winner was2d Platoon, A Company, 2/116th Cavalry, Idaho Army National Guard, Fifth U.S. Army.They achieved a Tank Table VIII average score of 795.

The concept for the Kouma competition was the brainchild of General Gordon R. Sulli-van, the former Chief of Staff of the Army, who wanted to honor the top tank platoon inthe total armored force. The competition centered around General Sullivan’s guidance of“train to fight” as units are evaluated on their annual qualification gunnery tables. Unitsthat maintain tough, demanding, and realistic training of their soldiers, crews, and pla-toons will be rewarded through this competition.

The XM8 Armored Gun System(AGS) will replace the M551A1 Sheri-dans that presently serve with the 82dAirborne. The AGS will also be usedby light cavalry units and will probablyenter service beginning in 1997. Al-though there has been some criticismof the idea of using a light tank to fightmain battle tanks (MBTs), the fact isthat there is no viable alternative pres-ently available, if one adheres to thephilosophy that the best antitankweapon is another tank.

The notion of employing huge glidersto transport usable numbers of M1tanks to a combat zone, as described byMajor E.C. Parrish III in “Gliders Car-rying Main Battle Tanks?” (ARMOR,September-October 1993), is techni-cally feasible, but it ignores economicand political realities that would almostcertainly defeat such a project long be-fore it got off the drawing board. Giventhe time required to design, build, test,and field military aircraft, the tank-car-rying glider would probably not be inservice (assuming cooperation of theAir Force, which is doubtful) until wellinto the next century. The AGS, on theother hand, being basically an off-the-shelf design, will be available almostimmediately to give rapid deploymentforces some much-needed combatpower.

Comparing the AGS with the WorldWar II M22 Locust light tank is not re-ally valid. While the level of armorprotection is similar, the 37-mm maingun of the Locust did not have a prayerof defeating the heavy armor of theGerman Panthers and Tigers, but theAGS’ 105-mm gun can punch throughany opponent it is likely to encounter.

Major Parrish does make one state-ment, though, that illuminates a defi-ciency that AGS proponents have notaddressed: “Like it or not, light infantrycan’t move as fast... as armor, whichputs our toughest soldiers at a severedisadvantage.” Airborne infantry —while possessing superior strategic mo-bility — has the least tactical mobilityonce it is in-theater.

Recent testimony of the degree towhich light infantry is impaired in thisregard, especially in desert operations,comes from Captain Sean Corrigan(“The 82d Airborne In Saudi Arabia,”ARMOR, September-October 1993),who commented, “If the situation hadnot been so serious, my scout platoonwould have been a funny sight trudg-ing through the sand under rucksacksover-stuffed with...gear. The defensivesector staggered us with its frontageand depth.” He goes on to say, “As alightly armed, unprotected, and dis-mounted task force, we could not havestopped a determined armor attack ofany significant size.”

This situation could be corrected,however, if we were willing to look toa former adversary for an example. TheBMD combat vehicle provides Russianparatroopers with the ground mobilitythat mechanized infantry has long en-joyed. An Airborne Fighting Vehicle(AFV) would provide at least a ten-foldincrease in tactical mobility, survivabil-ity, and overall combat effectivenessfor U.S. parachute infantry.

This concept is not just a luxury;tanks need infantry support. In order towork together, infantry needs the samedegree of mobility as tanks. This willprobably prove to be even more impor-tant in operations involving the AGS.Because of its lesser armor protection,

relative to the Abrams, AGS doctrinewill almost certainly emphasize speed.To hold out against a capable and de-termined foe until heavy forces arrivewill mean pushing the limits of maneu-ver warfare to the utmost. Using dis-mounted light infantry in such circum-stances would be courting disaster, butlight mechanized troops in AirborneFighting Vehicles could easily maintainthe pace.

It would seem logical to use theBradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV) as thebasis for the AFV design. This wouldminimize development time and ex-pense by using existing, battle-provencomponents. As weight is an importantfactor for an air-droppable vehicle, thetwo-man turret assembly should be re-placed with a one-man mini-turretmounting a 40-mm Mk19 grenade ma-chine gun or, perhaps, a 20-mm cannon(for ammunition compatibility with theRAH-66 Comanche helicopter that willaccompany light forces in the future).While this might appear to be a stepbackwards, armament-wise, it does re-sult in other advantages (and, in anycase, the weight must come off if theAFV is to be air-droppable). One of theaforementioned advantages is that,without the turret, the chassis can beshortened by more than three feet —without reducing the number of infan-trymen that can be carried — thereby


Making the Case forAn Airborne Infantry Fighting Vehicleby Stanley C. Crist

Author’s concept of an airborne IFV on shortened Bradley chassis.

further decreasing vehicle weight. Inaddition, the shorter overall lengthmight permit one more AFV to beloaded on board the transporting air-craft.

With a properly designed cargo hatch,it may be possible to have a certainpercentage of Airborne Fighting Vehi-cles serving as mortar carriers. Mortarswould probably be the only indirectfire support that light forces could relyon in fast-moving operation, as accord-ing to Captain William Prior (“CavalryMortars,” ARMOR, November-Decem-ber 1993), “...mortars have no logisticaltail or reinforcing mission that maycause them to fall behind out of sup-porting range during fluid cavalry op-erations, as is often the case with sup-porting artillery.”

Captain Prior also notes that, “Timelyand accurate (indirect) fire can multiplythe effects of the cavalry troop’s directfires many times and spell the differ-ence between success and defeat on thebattlefield.” The effectiveness of mor-tars against heavy armor is soon to un-dergo a quantum leap in capability, asterminally-guided projectiles enterservice, making high-mobility mortar“tracks” more important than ever.

Since a direct-fire antitank weapon ishighly desirable for an infantry fightingvehicle, one should be included in theplanning of the AFV. The TOW’s char-acteristics make it less than ideal forthe fast-paced combat envisioned forAGS-equipped forces. As Captain JohnTien says of his experience in South-west Asia, “In the high-speed mobilewarfare of DESERT STORM, theM901A1 TOW launchers were basi-cally ineffective; neither could weshoot them on the move, nor could weafford the stationary engagement time.”(“The Future Scout Vehicle,” ARMOR,March-April 1993). This may or maynot apply to the BFV, with its stabilizedweapon system, but the need for thegunner to continuously track the targetfrom launch to impact cannot be elimi-nated. This trait of wire-guided missilesseriously limits the rate of fire.

Fortunately, there is a weapon system— Javelin — that will be very wellsuited to AFV requirements. A “fire-and-forget” missile, Javelin (see “Jave-lin: A Leap Forward,” INFANTRY,January-February 1992) has a range of2000 meters, which should be adequatefor most scenarios. Even without a sta-bilized sight, the AFV would not haveto halt for more than a few seconds to

shoot. The ability to use Javelin in dis-mounted ambushes can further amplifythe light force’s fighting ability. Self-guided weapons (such as Javelin) mayprove to be as revolutionary for groundwarfare as they were for air combat.

Finally, although it seems unlikelythat U.S. ground troops will have tooperate without air superiority in theforeseeable future, the AFV can — ifneed be — provide air defense cover-age of the combat team by carrying anample supply of Stinger missiles.

The back cover of the September-Oc-tober 1993 issue of ARMOR posed thefollowing questions regarding the useof the AGS: “How should armor andlight infantry forces work together? Isthere room for improvement in howthis type of operation is conducted?” Itis not logical to use World War IImethods — tanks teamed with dis-

mounted infantry — in an era of high-mobility warfare. To do so would inviteboth excessive casualties and missionfailure. As Colonel Donald Elder soeloquently phrased it in “Force Projec-tion and Combined Arms” (ARMOR,November-December 1993), “By opt-ing for anything less than the mountedcombined arms team...you by no meanshave (the most capable combat force).”An Airborne Fighting Vehicle wouldmaximize the warfighting ability ofearly entry forces at relatively littlecost, by bringing balance to theAGS/Comanche/infantry team. Can weafford not to make it?


Stanley Crist is a former tankcommander, having servedwith the 3d Battalion, 185th Ar-mor. He is a previous contribu-tor to ARMOR.

Above, two views of a model illustrating author’s concept for an airborne IFV basedon a shortened Bradley chassis. Javelin missile and ASP 30-mm cannon providefirepower.

Once every few years, a book comesalong in our field that is truly a surprise.Tank Action, by George Forty, is just such abook. Forty takes us on a riveting tripthrough the earliest stages of tank warfarein World War I and continues his spellbind-ing ride clear through to the Coalition laag-ers in the deserts of South West Asia. Hisvehicle for the journey, obviously, is thetank, but he takes a track to the destinationwholly unlike any we’ve ever experienced.

To be sure, we are taken through manybattles in quite some detail. And refresh-ingly, not all battle tales are told from thetypical “good guys” viewpoint. The operat-ing definition of a good guy in this book isanyone who can handle the wartime re-sponsibilities of a tank commander. The fo-cus is not on politics, geopolitical leanings,or five-star general decision-making, but ontanking and tankers. The first chapter, “TheTank Commander,” clearly articulatesForty’s main idea: “Tank commanders oftoday possess certain qualities which areas necessary when commanding a modernmain battle tank as they were when tanksfirst appeared on the battlefield during theFirst World War.” Through every major war,he shows us how constant those qualitiesare. Dirty boot stuff, loud noises, and ex-traordinary behavior are what Forty wantsus to understand and appreciate. He letsthe men who peer at the outside worldthrough narrow slits and small periscopes,and who pull their triggers from inside ar-mored vehicles, tell the tales of mountedwarfare through their deeds. Extraordinarytank commanders are treated as such, nomatter on which side they fought. We seein graphic detail the deeds of heroic men,(and one woman!), tankers all, who single-handedly made a difference at a criticaltime and a critical point on the battlefield.

Of course, we all know of the epic tankactions fought in this century, beginning inWWI and ending with DESERT STORM,and we wonder if some of those historieswere embellished by public affairs officersw i th overact ive typewri ters. As theWehrmacht blitzed across Western Europe,as the Axis and Allies reeled back and forthover the bleak North African Desert, astank formations plugged holes in the em-battled Pusan perimeter, and as the U.S.-led United Nations armored juggernautrolled into Kuwait, time blurs the faces ofthe men who looked through rangefindersat enemy targets and caused those targetsto die for their countries. Parts of some ofthose big battles are here, but we alreadyknow how they all turn out, and Fortyknows that we know. But we don’t so read-ily know the names, faces, and tales of the

“Tank Aces,” such as LT Norman Plough,1SGT Shelton Picard (“the one tank taskforce”), LT Pavel Danilovich Gudz, andCPT Alan Hart. But the author ensures thatwe do know them by the end of their re-spective chapters. Some of the aces arewell known — General Israel “Talik” Tal,MSG Ernest Kouma, SS OberscharfuhrerErnst Barkmann — but the reason is be-cause they were superb tankers. We findout through individual actions just whatqualities these men — the famous and notso famous — possessed to make themperform so admirably. We see what itmeans to be technically and tactically profi-cient. We appreciate keenly the sacrifice itsometimes takes to get your cannon to thespot on the battlefield that can create aneffect totally out of line with normal forceratio computations.

By studying individual tank crews andcommanders, Forty dissects tank actionthrough this century. He accurately cap-tures the teamwork so elemental to theprofession and honestly portrays the de-structive power that direct fire cannonswield on the battlefield. I’ve been readingabout tanking, or doing my own, for overtwenty years and found the accounts trulyfascinating. They reflected thorough re-search, contained many useful, easily un-derstood maps, and were lavishly illus-trated with photographs. Nearly every pageof the book contains a picture, diagram, ormap. The photos are one of the strongestfeatures of this book. Even the most dedi-cated student of armor will find dozens ofpictures that he has never before seen.

While he alters the pattern s l ightlythroughout, the book generally sets up thehistoric situation, narrows it down to thespecific battle, and discusses the actionwith a focus on the small unit or even indi-vidual tank. The account of General Talpersonally “TC-ing” and gunning againstSyrian targets at long range (over 10 km ina Centurion in the mid-1960s) is indicativeof the type of fascinating information run-ning throughout. An interesting feature aftereach of these discussions is the “Tank Ace”section, where Forty describes in detail theace himself and some follow-up informationso we leave knowing the ultimate fate ofthe warrior.

I found Tank Action so engrossing thatthe book had a “three- or four-to-one fac-tor,” i.e., every five minutes that I thoughtI’d spent with the book was actually fifteenor twenty. Every reader who is, was, orever wanted to be a tank commander willbe well served by adding this superb text tohis personal library. I will.

— Major Terry A. Blakely, Ed.

Tank Action: From the GreatWar to the Gulf , by George Forty.Alan Sutton Publishing Ltd., GreatBritain, 1995. $39.95. (Availablefrom Zenith Books, P.O. Box 1, 729Prospect Ave., Osceola, WI 54020.715-294-3345)

BOOK ESSAY

TARGET!A Fine New Book Focuses on Armor’s Knights, Their Mounts, and Their Battles


An Excerpt from Tank Action :

...(Lieutenant Clifford T.) Elliott’smost satisfactory single engagementcame the following night when heknocked out a formidable 65-ton tankdestroyer — the Sturmgeschutz mit 8.8cm PaK43/2, known as Ferdinand orElefant, only ninety of which were everbuilt. The armor thickness was up to200 mm on the front of the superstruc-ture, so Elliott was indeed fortunate tohave been able to knock it out with hisSherman. However, it was at point-blank range as he explains:

“After we had intercepted the Ger-man column at Fleron we perceivedthat there were probably more Ger-mans in Liege and that they would tryto get out through the main road atFleron.

“I set my tank at a cross street inBeyne Heusay. It was still light and Itold my crew to boresight the tube. Weset the elevation at about six feet. I didnot want to hit the front plate of a Ger-man tank, especially if it was a Pan-ther. My tank was about four feet fromthe left buildings, the street was about25-30 feet wide. This gave me an an-gle of 30 degrees, but it would also putthe tank or vehicle about 40 feet fromour tank before we could fire. My crewand I mounted our tank and sat towait...We waited for five or six hours. Itwas black as the ace of spades; youcould hardly see your hand in front ofyour face. We then heard the steeltracks on the cobblestone street. Weknew that we had some worrisometimes. A tank, and not some soft-shellvehicle. The German tank would comea little further and stop. I could followthe sound on the street. I believe theGerman tank commander knew therewas an American tank up the street.He just did not know where.

“He made one more stop and I be-lieved I could see a darker shadow. Iyelled at my gunner to fire. I could seethe sparks fly. Steel on steel. We firedthree more times. The end of the Fer-dinand!”

In the eight months that Lt. CliffordElliott served with the U.S. 3rd Ar-mored Division, his tank destroyedover 250 pieces of German equipment,including tanks, trucks, artillery pieces,antitank guns, and even a train. Hewas wounded four times, knocked outof eight tanks, and received the BronzeStar and four Purple Hearts...

On 2 August 1990, Iraqi forces in-vaded and seized the State of Kuwait.The Kuwaitis were not prepared forthis onslaught and were unable to mo-bilize and mass their forces in time toprevent or delay the Iraqi forces fromachieving their objectives. One brigade,the 35th “Shaheed” Brigade, was ableto deploy and, for several hours, delaysignificant Iraqi forces. This is the storyof the 35th Brigade’s efforts to defendKuwait.

Background

Iraqi claims to territory in Kuwait areolder than the modern state of Kuwaitand are primarily based on territoryheld by the old Ottoman Empire. AfterKuwait gained its independence fromBritain in 1961, this dispute threatenedto cause war on several occasions.

Shortly after Kuwait gained inde-pendence from Britain on 19 June1961, Iraq threatened to invade Kuwait,claiming that Kuwait was an integralpart of Iraq. British troops went to thearea and took position on the MutlaaRidge until the Arab League could mo-bilize forces to assist Kuwait. The ArabLeague nations maintained their forcesin Kuwait until February 1963, when arevolution in Iraq toppled the govern-ment. The new government issued con-ciliatory statements and the ArabLeague forces withdrew.

In the following years, Iraq repeatedlydemanded that Kuwait relinquish con-trol of Bubiyan and Warbah Islands, ar-guing that forces positioned on theseislands could control access to theShatt al Arab and Shatt al Basrah ca-nals. Yet the Kuwaitis had never at-tempted to control or restrict commercethrough the area.

In March 1973, Iraq invaded Kuwaitand seized a border post and territorythree kilometers in depth in the vicinityof Umm Qasr, along the northeastcoast. Iraq withdrew under pressurefrom the Arab League after securing

low-cost loans from Kuwait. A sub-sequent border dispute was shelved in1983 due to Iraq’s involvement in theIran-Iraq war. Kuwait supported Iraq inthat war through low-cost loans anduse of Kuwaiti port facilities.

At the end of the Iran-Iraq war, Iraqhad a large debt. Iraq also possessed alarge and experienced army. The crisisleading to the 1990 invasion began tobuild in the aftermath of the war. On30 May 1990, Saddam Hussein beganto complain of noncompliance on pro-duction quotas and oil prices by mem-bers of OPEC. A few weeks later, on15 July, Iraq named Kuwait and theUnited Arab Emirates as the culprits.Kuwait was also accused of estab-lishing installations to pump oil fromthe Iraqi side of the Ar Rumaila oilfield and, thus, of stealing Iraqi reve-nues. Further accusations came on the21st of July when Iraq accused Kuwaitof not supporting Iraqi projects con-cerning commerce and transportation.Kuwait announced on 28 July that itwould reduce its oil production. At afurther meeting held in Jeddah, SaudiArabia, Kuwait tried to settle the crisis.The meeting on the 1st of Augustquickly broke down in the face of Iraqidemands for oil, loans, and territorialconcessions. The Iraqis probably neverintended for diplomacy to succeed.Their forces began moving on the 17thof July and were set in their attack po-sitions by the 1st of August.

Friendly Fo rces

The Kuwait Land Forces consisted offour brigades, plus the Amiri Guardand the Commandos Battalion. The 6thMechanized Brigade was in the north,with M113s, BMP-2s, and Vickerstanks. The 15th Mechanized Brigadewas south of Kuwait City, with Chief-tain tanks and M113s. The 80th Infan-try Brigade was in Jahra, with light in-fantry and some Saladin armored cars.Finally, the 35th Armored Brigade waswest of Jahra on the Salmi road.

The 35th Brigade, commanded bythen-Colonel Salem Masoud Al Sorour,included the 7th and 8th Tank Battal-ions, 57th Mechanized Infantry, an an-titank company, and the 51st ArtilleryBattalion. Both tank battalions werearmed with Chieftain tanks. While the7th was in garrison, the 8th Tank Bat-talion was deployed without its tankson a routine mission guarding thenorthern oil fields. In the days prior tothe invasion, the commander of the 8thBattalion brought the 3rd Companyback from the oil fields.

The 57th Infantry Battalion wasequipped with a mix of M113s andBMPs. It also had two companies de-ployed dismounted, one on Bubiyan Is-land, and one on Faylaka Island. Thebrigade antitank company had Im-proved TOW Vehicles and the 51st Ar-tillery Battalion had M109A2 155-mmself- propelled howitzers.

The Kuwaiti version of the Chieftaintank MK 5/2, although aging, was still aformidable fighting platform. It mounteda 120-mm main gun with a laser range-finder, ballistic computer, infrared nightsight, and target designating capability.Although the Chieftain has a muzzlereference sensor, the 35th Brigade wasunable to boresight the tanks on theday of the battle. The weakness of theChieftain lies in the power train. Thetank is underpowered; the engine willonly achieve 720 bhp and is very proneto breakdown. Most Kuwaitis describeit as “Good gun, bad engine.” TheChieftain was due to be replaced by theM84 in the Kuwaiti Land Forces.

Enemy Forces

Republican Guard units led the Iraqiforces. Originally, this force was Sad-dam Hussein’s security force, but theGuards expanded into a full corps dur-ing the Iran-Iraq war. By the end ofthat war, the Republican Guardsemerged as Iraq’s striking force, usu-ally the main effort of offensive opera-

The Battle of the Bridges: Kuwait’s 35th Brigade on the 2d of August 1990

by Major Robert A. Nelson


tions. The Hammurabi Mechanized andMedina Armored Divisions led theIraqi attack. Each division had threebrigades, two armored brigades andone mechanized in the armored divi-sion, or two mechanized and one ar-mored in the mechanized division.Each also included artillery, usuallythree battalions of 2S1 and one of 2S3,with an engineer, commando, air de-fense, and reconnaissance battalionplus logistics elements. Each maneuverbrigade consisted of three tank battal-ions and one mechanized or threemechanized and one tank. The brigadealso had a reconnaissance platoon andmortar battery.

The principal weapons of these divi-sions were the T-72 tank and BMP In-fantry Fighting Vehicle. The T-72 isarmed with a 125-mm smoothbore gunwith laser rangefinder, ballistic com-puter, and infrared night vision equip-ment. The main gun is stabilized ontwo axes. The Iraqi version has the“Dazzler” device mounted on the turretto defeat ATGMs; however, it is not ef-fective. The main advantages of the T-72 are the low profile and ease of op-eration and maintenance. The Iraqishad both the BMP-1, with 73-mm gunand AT-3 missile, and BMP-2, with a30-mm gun and capable of firing theAT-4 and 5.

At 2200 hours on 1 August, the 35thBrigade operations officer learned ofthe impending invasion and placed thebrigade on alert. The officers and men,alerted by telephone, quickly assem-bled. Soldiers were on leave or unableto report so, in some cases, new crews

were assembled on the spot. CPT Nas-ser, XO of 7th Battalion, took soldiersand checked their background. If aclerk had been previously trained as atank gunner, CPT Nasser assigned himto a tank crew as a gunner.

The tanks and howitzers were notuploaded in normal peacetime routine.Ammo upload took most of the night.According to MAJ Khasan Dawud ofthe 51st Artillery Battalion, the officersand men worked side by side, withoutany regard for rank. There was a greatdeal of confusion and speculation, andperiodically the soldiers received up-dates on the situation. Many believedthis would be a repeat of the 1973 Iraqioccupation of the border areas.

At 0030 on the 2d, the brigade re-ceived information the Iraqis occupiedAl Ratka; by 0100, they occupied all ofthe frontier boundary centers in thenorth.

From the brigade commander’s per-spective, things were very confused.There were many tasks to be done andthe situation was unclear. A significantnumber of personnel were still de-ployed executing routine peacetimeguard missions and could not be re-called in time to fight with the brigade.The subordinate units took about eighthours to upload ammunition and sup-plies. Unfortunately, they were unable,despite their haste, to load everythingnecessary in the limited time. The 8thBattalion did not load enough water, acritical item in Kuwait in August. Theartillery battalion could only prepareseven of their 18 guns. Furthermore,

the guns were not loaded with a com-plete mix of ammunition. This limitedtheir options later when they executedfire missions. COL Salem departed thecamp at 0430 and joined the antitankcompany. The rest of the units clearedthe camp by 0600. They dispersed todeny the Iraqis a good target.

The antitank company initially de-ployed in two sections, one sectionwent to the Al Salem airbase to providesecurity, and the second to secure theintersection of the 6th Ring Road andthe Salmi Road. During their move eastalong the Salmi Road, they witnessedan Iraqi air raid on the Al Salem air-base. The remaining forces of the bri-gade moved out of the camp as theycompleted assembly. The 7th Battalionassembled three companies with 9, 10and 7 tanks in each company, plus thebattalion commander’s tank (whichbroke down during the movementeast). The 3d Company of the 8th Bat-talion had 10 tanks, the single companyfrom the 57th had about five BMP-2splus several M113s and, finally, therewas a composite firing battery from the51st Artillery Battalion with sevenguns.

The Battle of the Bridges; First Phase

The 7th Tank Battalion led the re-mainder of the brigade. They movedeast along the Salmi Road to the vicin-ity of the Al Ghanim Oasis and tookpositions near the graveyard north ofthe road. At about 0645, LTC Ahmad


The Kuwaitis fought the Battle of the Bridgeswith the British Chieftain MBT, at left,equipped with an excellent 120-mm rifledgun, but cursed by power train reliability prob-lems. Infantry carriers include the SovietBMP, above, and the U.S.-built M113.

Al Wazan sent a reconnaissance vehi-cle forward to the vicinity of the policestation on the Mutlaa Ridge to investi-gate activity on the Abdaly Road. Therecon party moved forward and identi-fied Iraqi forces coming down the ridgeattacking both east and west of Jahra.COL Salem contacted LTC Al Wazanand directed him to occupy positions inthe vicinity of the graveyard (See Map1). When LTC Al Wazan arrived at thesite, COL Salem gave him instructionsand oriented him on the enemy forcecoming down from the Mutlaa Ridge.The Iraqis continued west in columnalong the 6th Ring Road. COL Salemdirected the 7th Battalion to engage,LTC Al Wazan gave the order to openfire. The 7th Battalion began engagingthe Iraqi column. The recon party, stillforward, cut through the graveyard toescape back to friendly lines withoutbeing hit by either side.

The Iraqi forces were elements of theHammurabi Division, the lead divisionon the Iraqi northern axis. It attackedwith two brigades south along the Ab-daly Road and one brigade from UmmQasr down the east coast. The division

attacked directly south and east of Ja-hra along Highway 80 as well as westof Jahra on 6th Ring Road. The ele-ments moving east of Jahra werebriefly delayed by three Saladin ar-mored cars from the 80th Brigade be-fore continuing their attack into KuwaitCity. Those elements moving down the6th Ring Road apparently did not ex-pect any opposition. They moved incolumn on the road and did not reconor secure their flanks.

The Chieftains, firing at a range of1,000 to 1,500 meters, were very effec-tive; the Kuwaitis hit numerous vehi-cles and caused the column to halt.However, due to confusion at higherechelons, LTC Al Wazan received anorder to cease firing and return to garri-son. After several minutes, he decidedthat the order was inappropriate and re-sumed engaging the Iraqis.

While the 7th Battalion engaged theIraqis from the north side of the SalmiRoad, the 8th Battalion arrived on thesouth side. The 3d Company com-mander, CPT Ali Abdulkareem, re-ceived an order to move his companyacross the 6th Ring Road and attempt

to free the 80th Brigade, trapped ingarrison by the Iraqis. The 6th Ring isa six lane divided highway with con-crete barriers separating the north andsouth lanes and not easily crossed. TheIraqis controlled the two northernbridges and there was a long detour toreach the next bridges to the south.CPT Ali moved forward in his tank,covered by his company, to conduct apersonal reconnaissance. Due to thedifficulties in finding a crossing siteand continued Iraqi movement southon the 6th Ring Road, the 8th Battalionwas subsequently directed to tie in withthe 7th Battalion and stop Iraqi move-ment along the 6th Ring.

When CPT Ali closed on the southernflank of the 7th Battalion, LTC AlWazan at first did not recognize them.He thought the Iraqis were attemptingto turn his flank from the south and di-rected a TOW platoon to move tocover his flank. He said later, “Youknow, I almost killed my friend. I gavethe order to prepare to engage and wehad our fingers on the trigger. But then,thank God, we saw the Chieftains andstopped.” This was to be a very luckyday for CPT Ali.


The 7th Tank BattalionOccupies Its Battle Positions

CPT Ali positioned his companysouth of the Salmi Road to cover thetwo bridges over 6th Ring. A car pulledup driven by one of the battalion’s gun-ners who was on leave. This soldierwas one of the best tank gunners in thebattalion and joined CPT Ali’s crew.CPT Ali scanned the sector and identi-fied an Iraqi command vehicle underthe southern bridge that crosses 6thRing Road. He gave the order to fire,but his company did not respond atfirst. He gave his gunner the order tofire and destroyed the vehicle under thebridge. (The burn marks are still visibleunderneath this bridge.) The Iraqiswere now trapped on the road. The restof the company, following CPT Ali’sexample, now began engaging theIraqis (See Map 2). At first, all tanksfired at the same target, CPT Aliquickly directed his crews to distributetheir fires across the entire front. Theenemy did not respond aggressively,abandoning their vehicles and hidingalong the road. A tank platoon at-tempted to maneuver against the 3rdCompany by going around the artillerycamp and attacking from the east. Thecompany destroyed them.

While CPT Ali’s company engagedthe Iraqis on the road, a flight of 30HIP helicopters flew across his fronttoward Jahra. Although CPT Aliwanted to engage them he was not ableto elevate his gun high enough. He wasnot concerned until he saw a HIND atthe trail of the formation. He recog-nized the threat but could not bring hisgun to bear. The HIND turned and hov-ered as if it was preparing to engage.Again, CPT Ali’s luck was with him.The HIND hovered for a few minutes,then turned to follow the rest of theformation.

Iraqis continued to come down the6th Ring Road, apparently unaware ofthe situation. A convoy of cargo trucksloaded with soldiers passed in front of8th Battalion. The Kuwaitis engagedthe trucks, and several hundred troopsdismounted. Instead of deploying tofight, most of the soldiers merely satdown on the side of the road to awaitthe outcome of the day’s events. SomeIraqi infantry moved into the ammuni-tion camp on CPT Ali’s right flank. Hisflank tanks received small arms andRPG fire, but took no losses. Ali also

destroyed a 2S1 still mounted on atransport, indicating the Iraqis were stillunaware and unable to react to the 35thBrigade’s fires.

Events slowed down along the 6thRing Road. The Kuwaiti artillery con-tinued to engage the Iraqi soldiers shel-tering among the wrecks and behindthe embankment along 6th Ring Road.Some Iraqi soldiers attempted to sur-render, but the Kuwaitis turned themback because they did not have enoughsoldiers to secure prisoners. The Ku-waitis took advantage of the lull in thefight to send vehicles back to the bri-gade camp to replenish ammunition.

Battle of the Bridges, Phase Two

At about 1100 hours, the 35th Bri-gade received information about aforce coming from the west towardsJahra. The Kuwaitis identified an ar-mored force approaching from theirrear. The Kuwaitis thought this was aGulf Cooperation Council force mov-ing up to reinforce them. Some of the


Engaging the HammurabiDivision on the 6th Ring

vehicles flew green flags that the Ku-waitis first took to be Saudi Arabian.CPT Khasan walked over to questionthe lead vehicles. As he approached, herealized that this was an Iraqi force be-cause it was equipped with T-72s andBMPs, but he was too committed toturn around. He asked the crew of thelead vehicle their identity and locationof their commander. The crew an-swered, Khasan turned around, walkedback, and passed the information to thebrigade. The Iraqis continued to driveeast along the Salmi Road between the7th and 8th Battalions. When the leadvehicles turned south on the 6th Ring,Kuwaitis fired into them. The 7th Bat-talion turned to engage along their rightflank and rear while the 8th Battalionengaged a company-sized force to theirfront on 6th Ring Road.

These Iraqis were the lead brigade ofthe Medina Division. This division at-tacked from the west along the SalmiRoad. Like the Hammurabi, they werestill in column on the road and had noidea of the resistance by the 35th Bri-gade. Information found after the warindicated there was no direct contact

between the Hammurabi and the Med-ina Divisions. In fact, the Medinadrove past the artillery firing positionsand reserve tanks of the 35th Brigadewho were south of the Salmi Road inthe vicinity of the Al Salem Airfield.

The fires of the 7th and 8th Battalionscaused heavy casualties and attrition inthe lead brigade. The Kuwaitis cap-tured six prisoners, The brigade opera-tions officer, LTC Suleiman Al Huwail,questioned them and they identifiedthemselves as members of the MedinaDivision.

The Iraqis withdrew towards the westalong the Salmi Road, temporarily halt-ing to regroup at a truck-weighing sta-tion located about three kilometersfrom the 7th and 8th Battalions posi-tions (See Map 3). The Kuwaitisquickly brought effective artillery fireson this point, causing additional casual-ties and confusion among the Iraqis.LTC Fahad Ashush, the 51st ArtilleryBattalion commander and CPT KhasanDawud, the 2d Battery commanderwere forward acting as observers. Theguns were manned by composite crewsof all ranks because the battalion had

not fully assembled. MAJ Nabil Saleh,the battalion XO, commanded theguns. These fires caused the Iraqis tocontinue to withdraw to the west overthe Mutlaa ridge. Unfortunately, theIraqis established their own artillery infiring positions just north of the SalmiRoad on the west end of the Mutlaaridge. They placed accurate fires on theKuwaiti positions. Several rounds hitnear the brigade command group, seri-ously wounding the artillery battalioncommander, LTC Fahad. MAJ Nabil,the battalion XO, took command of thebattalion.

While the 51st Battalion was engag-ing the Medina Division, a Kuwaiti A-4 Skyhawk appeared. It flew aroundthe Kuwaiti artillery position twice andattacked the Iraqi columns just to thenorth along the Salmi Road. The ar-tillerymen were concerned that theymight also be targeted because theywere close to the Iraqi force. They hadgood reason to be concerned. LTC Ma-jed Al Ahmad, an A-4 pilot, flew oneof the strikes against the Iraqis alongboth the Abdaly and Salmi Roads. Dueto the rapid pace of the invasion, he


The Medina DivisionApproaches from the West

was not given a clear picture of eventson the ground nor was a forward aircontroller or communications availablewith the ground forces. Under the con-trol of the Al Salem Airbase controller,he hit both the Hammurabi and theMedina Divisions with a total of fiveMK-82, 500-pound bombs. He was un-aware of the positions of the 35th Bri-gade and could not identify the Chief-tains during his bomb runs. MAJ Ma-jed targeted the Iraqis because he wasdirected by the controller at Al Salemto hit the columns on the road. He re-turned to Al Jaber Airfield after beinghit by a surface-to-air missile.

The Iraqis threatened to attack the ar-tillery with a company of BMPs andfired several rounds of 30mm in theirdirection. Although several rounds hitthe position, the Iraqis were firing ar-mor-piercing instead of high explosiveammunition and did not get a direct hitor cause any casualties. The gunnersprepared to engage them with directfire and the Iraqis did not continue theattack. The artillery moved south andeast to new firing positions that werefarther away from the Iraqis and lessexposed.

The Medina regrouped and attackedagain, this time with two brigades de-ployed. The unit commanders informedCOL Salem they were running short ofammunition, in particular tank maingun rounds. Most tanks were down totwo or three rounds of main gun am-munition. COL Salem requested rein-forcements and support from headquar-ters, but there was no additional sup-port available. To prevent the brigadefrom being encircled between theHammurabi and now-deployed MedinaDivisions, COL Salem directed a with-drawal to new positions south of theSalmi Road. The 8th Battalion coveredthe 7th Battalion’s initial move (SeeMap 4).

The 51st Artillery Battalion set tenkilometers to the south and prepared tofire. They were delayed in firing whileobservers moved into position and thenagain by communications difficulties.MAJ Nabil had difficulty contactingthe brigade commander to help coverthe repositioning. CPT Nasser, XO ofthe 35th Brigade, took charge of thetanks of the two reserve platoons andprepared to attack the enemy. Commu-

nication was re-established and the at-tack canceled.

While his company covered themovement of the 7th Battalion, CPTAli stood on his turret to gain some re-lief from the heat. For no apparent rea-son, his driver moved the tank aboutten or twenty meters. The driver hadnever moved the tank without specificdirectives before. As soon as the tankmoved, an Iraqi main gun round hit theposition they just vacated. After the 7thBattalion set, the 8th Battalion began tomove and again, CPT Ali was misiden-tified as Iraqi and almost engaged.

The brigade continued moving southto a subsequent position to escape theclosing Iraqi pincers. While reposition-ing, they received a directive fromhigher headquarters to move toward the15th Brigade camp to replenish andcontinue to defend. However, higherheadquarters did not have an accuratepicture of the battlefield and communi-cation was tenuous at best. Joint head-quarters informed COL Salem to takewhatever action he considered neces-sary. He decided to withdraw to posi-tion his back against the Saudi border


Second Attack byMedina Division

and secure hisflanks and rearagainst envelop-ment during thenight. Thus, thebrigade continuedto move southand set on theSaudi border, ar-riving at about 1630. The brigade re-mained in position through the night.LTC Ahmad Al Wazan, along with arecon element, moved into Saudi Ara-bia and made contact with the borderpolice and informed them who theywere and the brigade situation. The bri-gade entered Saudi Arabia the follow-ing morning. After the last units with-drew into Saudi Arabia, an Iraqi air-strike hit the vacated positions.

The Saudis assisted the brigade in re-organizing and resupplying. Whilesome units, such as the 7th Battalion,were relatively well supplied withwater during the fight, others were suf-fering badly from a lack of water andall suffered from fatigue. At one point,both Kuwaitis and Iraqis alternatedpurchasing water from the same road-side vendor, soldiers from both sidescalmly lining up to pay.

Conclusion

The 35th Brigade was able to inflictheavy casualties on the Iraqis and delaythe movement of two divisions. Hadthe Kuwait Army had been able to or-ganize the entire force into a cohesivedefense, they may have delayed theIraqis long enough to allow the GulfCooperation Council Forces to assem-ble and reinforce them.

The Kuwaiti armed forces continue toface this challenge today. Iraq and Iranboth present a significant long-termthreat to peace and stability in the re-gion. Kuwait must look to the lessonsof the Battle of the Bridges as it con-

tinues to modernize and develop itsability to defend itself.

Postscript

Brigadier General Salem hosted the membersof the United States Office of Military Coop-eration-Kuwait on a staff ride of the Battle ofthe Bridges on 8 April 1995.

Bibliography

Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, A Final Re-port to Congress, Department of Defense, April1992.

The Iraqi Aggression on Kuwait, The Truth...and the Tragedy, Center for Research and Stud-ies on Kuwait, 1994.

“An Account of the Actions and Events of the35th Shaheed Brigade During the Invasion ofKuwait by Iraqi Forces 1990,” 35th BrigadeCommander and Staff.

“The Iraqi Army Organization and Tactics,”prepared by S2, 177 Armored Brigade, updatedby USCENTCOM, August 16, 1992.

Interviews

Ahmad Al Wazan, Colonel, Executive Offi-cer, 35th Shaheed Armored Brigade. Colonel AlWazan was a lieutenant colonel and commanderof the 7th Tank Battalion at the time of the in-vasion.

Ali Abdulkareem, Major, Commander, 8thTank Battalion. Major Ali was a captain andcommander of the 3d Company of the 8th TankBattalion on the 2d of August. He had just re-turned to Kuwait after completing the U.S.Army Armor Officer Advanced Course in Juneat the time of the invasion.

Bader Al Dehani,Major, ExecutiveOfficer, 63d Battal-ion, currently actingas an assistant op-erations officer in26th Brigade. MajorBader was assignedto the 35th Brigadeintelligence section

during the invasion.

Khasan Dawud, Major, Executive Officer,51st Artillery Battalion. Major Khasan was acaptain and commander of the 2d Battery, 51stArtillery Battalion during the invasion.

Majed Al Ahmad, Lieutenant Colonel, Opera-tions Officer at Al Jaber Airbase. Majed was amajor at the time of the invasion. He flew A-4Skyhawks from Al Jaber Airbase.

Nabil Saleh, Major, Commander of the 51stArtillery Battalion, also serving as an assistantoperations officer at Land Forces. Major Nabilwas the XO of the 51st Artillery Battalion atthe time of the invasion. Major Nabil had re-cently returned to Kuwait after completing theField Artillery Advanced Course in the Springof 1990.

Salem Masoud Al Sorour, Brigadier General,Commander, Kuwait Land Forces. GeneralSalem was a colonel, commander of the 35thBrigade during the invasion. He lead the bri-gade back into Kuwait during Operation DE-SERT STORM.

The following officers reviewed this article:

BG Salem Al Sorour, COL Ahmad AlWazan, COL Nasser Khames Al Zaabi, MAJNabil Saleh, MAJ Nasser Dowailah, MAJ AliAbdulkareem, and MAJ Suleiman Al Huwail.

Major Robert A. Nelson is cur-rently assigned as the trainingadvisor to the Kuwait LandForces. Previous assignmentsinclude 3d ACR, 1st ArmoredDivision and the National Train-ing Center.

Members of the Kuwaiti 35th “Shaheed” Brigade and the Chief of the U.S. Office of Military Cooper-ation Kuwait. From left to right: Major Ali Abdulkareem, Major Nabil Saleh, Major Nasser Dowailah,Brigadier General Ivany, Brigadier General Salem Al Sorour, Colonel Ahmad Al Wazan.


“Everything in war isvery simple, but the sim-plest thing is difficult.”1

On 18 February 1991, ITroop, 2d Armored Cav-alry Regiment received amission to reconnoiter theterrain in our sector of re-sponsibility along theSaudi Arabia-Iraq border.The patrol had to payparticular attention to the“border berm,” and to lo-cate primary and alternatecrossing sites. This wasin preparation for “PhaseI,” the regiment’s cross-ing into Iraqi territory onG-1. For OPSEC reasons,the patrol had to executethe mission on foot.

In peacetime, thiswould have been almosttoo easy. As troop com-mander, I would select one of the scoutplatoons, have the platoon leader selecta scout section, and follow the usualtroop leading procedures. The scoutshad routinely executed similar patrolsalong the Czech border, and at theCMTC (Hohenfels). This was notpeacetime, however, and the decisionabout who would go was not that sim-ple.

“Train as you fight” is a vital rule ofthumb. It is easier said than done, how-ever. This was the troop’s first combataction since WWII. I had absolute con-fidence in 1LT Tom Isom, the 3d pla-toon leader, (later to earn the BronzeStar for valor at 73 Easting). An experi-enced scout platoon leader, he had ledpatrols before, often with great success.

1LT Isom had shown that he was fullycapable of planning, organizing, andleading the patrol. All he needed wasappropriate support from 3d Squadronand myself.

However, I had a big question to an-swer. That question was whether or notto lead the patrol myself.

It might seem as if this was a ques-tion that did not even need considera-tion. But several factors made this adifficult decision. Only two soldiers inthe troop (SFC Mullinix and SSGThacker) had combat experience, bothin Vietnam. I was obviously in the non-veteran category, and therefore an un-known quantity in the Iron Troopers’eyes. Everything I did or did not dowould factor into their view of me as a

worthy leader. I did notwant to make a poor de-cision here, and start offwith a bad precedent.Several factors influ-enced my final decision.

Strong lessons frommilitary history teachthat the vast majority ofsuccessful commandersled from the front. Myexperience of observingand working for severalcommanders had provedthe validity of this les-son. To me, the frontwould be with the patrol,not in “the rear” (definedas anywhere behind thepatrol).

In addition, many suc-cessful battlefield com-manders showed a vir-tual contempt for danger,

both real and potential. Some paid theultimate price for their actions, but theirsoldiers never doubted their personalcourage for a moment. I did not wantto appear a shirker or a coward to thetroopers by asking them to do some-thing I apparently was not willing to.

The last factor influencing my incli-nation to lead the patrol was that bydoing so, I would see the ground onwhich the troop would operate. Again,numerous examples in history point outhow critical it is to know the ground.History is also replete with examples ofthe high price paid in soldier’s liveswhen their commanders did not havean appreciation of the terrain. At thispoint, my knowledge of the terrain wasfrom map reconnaissance and some


MISSION:

Combat Reconnaissance Patrol by Captain Daniel B. Miller

PHOTO: Greg Stewart

Aviation and Special Forces intelli-gence reports. As far as I knew thiswould be (and was) my only chance topersonally view the ground.

Several factors mitigated against lead-ing the patrol, however. 1LT Isom’scredibility as a leader was on the lineas well. His platoon was looking forand expected the same quality leader-ship from him as the troop did fromme. No matter how I tried to convinceLT Isom and the soldiers, leading thepatrol myself would show I lacked con-fidence in his ability. Neither he nor Icould afford that, as we still had to getthrough the rest of the operation.

Attaching myself to the patrol whileletting LT Isom lead it was not a viableoption. It would still look to the sol-diers as if I were checking on or “baby-sitting” him. In addition, if I went onthe operation I would be THE leader.Lieutenants should not lead captains,and allowing this to occur would bewrong for both of us.

Both doctrine and “train as you fight”dictate that the commander place him-self where he can best control his unit.If I went on the patrol, my span of con-trol would effectively be the eight sol-diers on it, even with a radio. Orches-trating an extraction under fire wouldbe extremely difficult at best if I werepinned down with the rest of the patrol.The XO, 1LT Paul Calvert, was fullyqualified to do this himself, but shouldthis be his responsibility, or mine?

Also, I was neither a world-classscout, nor a normal member of thatteam. Both points, but particularly thelatter, made me more of a potential dis-advantage than an asset. Again, “trainas you fight” seemed to indicate thatmy role lay somewhere other than withthe patrol.

On a personal level, I am somewhataccident-prone. Due to the enemy situ-ation as we knew it, I was not particu-larly concerned with getting shot. But I

was deathly afraid of doing somethingstupid, like breaking an arm or a leg ina fall. While no one person is irreplace-able, I did not want to miss the upcom-ing operation doing something I wasnot supposed to. As it was, I had myhead split open by a tent pole the daybefore we crossed the border. Fortu-nately for me, my gunner patched meup, and I was able to lead the troopinto Iraq.

It seems trivial now, but at the time Iagonized over what I should do. Mytraining told me to let LT Isom and 3dPlatoon accomplish the mission. Mygut kept making me reconsider that de-cision. Fortunately, I was able to talk itover with the XO, LT Calvert. He is ahighly professional officer, and wewere able to discuss it in a detachedmanner.

My final decision was a compromise.While I did not actually go on the pa-trol, I moved as far forward as possiblewith the FIST-V and the Bradleys ofthe scout section assigned for extrac-tion. I viewed as much of the terrain aspossible from the FIST-V’s hammer-head, which also allowed me to occa-sionally glimpse the patrol as it movedto its various observation locations.With the communications capabilitiesafforded by the FIST-V, I could effec-tively coordinate the actions of thetroop, while being as far forward asphysically possible.

In the end, the patrol was successful.They made no contact, brought backvaluable information on suspected en-emy locations, and selected not two,but three, potential crossing points.They also gave me the make-up of theborder berms, and an estimate of howeasy it would be for the ACE to breachit. Even though there was no sign ofenemy activity, the fact that the patrolwent off without a hitch set a goodprecedent for the troop. LT Tom Isomhad a great start on proving himself asa combat platoon leader. I was still an

unknown quantity to the troop, but wehad “fought as we trained.”

The point of this article is that in acombat situation, simple decisions arenot always so simple. Given roughlythe same set of circumstances, othertroop commanders in the regimentwent on the patrol with their scouts. Idecided to fight as we trained. PerhapsI agonized over something that shouldnot even have been an issue. There areother solutions to this dilemma. Whatwould you have done?

Notes

1Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited andtranslated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,1976), p. 127.

The author would like to thank LTCGerard T. Hopkins for his assistance inthe preparation of this article (proof-reading and review).


Captain Daniel B. Millerwas commissioned in 1984from the U.S. Military Acad-emy. He has served with 3dBattalion (Abn), 73d Armoras a platoon leader, XO,and assistant S3; 3d Sqdn,2d ACR as assistant S3,S4, and troop commander;and as commander, I Troop,3/2 ACR during DESERTSHIELD/DESERT STORM.A graduate of AOBC,AOAC, CAS3, Airborne, andJumpmaster Schools, he iscurrently assigned to ROTCat St. John’s University,Queens, N.Y.

“My final decision was a compromise. While I did not actually goon the patrol, I moved as far forward as possible with the FIST-V andthe Bradleys of the scout section assigned for extraction. I viewed asmuch of the terrain as possible from the FIST-V’s hammerhead...”

Would you like to know which repairparts were the most frequently used in1993 in maintaining an M1A1 tank?How about the average number ofhours it takes to repair a HMMWV en-gine? Or the main components that arecausing maintenance actions on theHEMTT? How many days does it taketo return a Bradley to a unit when it isinducted to indirect support mainte-nance?

All of these questions and more canbe answered by simply picking up yourphone and calling the Army’s USAMCLogistics Support Activity (LOGSA).

The LOGSA, located at Redstone Ar-senal, Alabama, operates and maintainsa centralized data base of worldwidemaintenance data generated from thedirect support and general support(DS/GS) maintenance activities. Thisdata base, called the Work Order Lo-gistics File (WOLF) provides Armymanagers with the capability to per-form maintenance and logistics analy-ses on fielded equipment and units.This data base can answer the type ofquestions posed above and many oth-ers.

The best thing about the WOLF isthat it imposes practically no burden on

the units, but in turn provides the capa-bility to store and access worldwidehistorical maintenance data — a capa-bility which is not available to fieldmaintenance units. The WOLF can beused by any unit or activity in theArmy to analyze maintenance actionsor equipment maintenance factors.

How does the data get from the fieldto the WOLF? The process is easy andpainless. The data contained in theWOLF are generated directly by thefield maintenance support activities.Those DS/GS maintenance activitiesthat use the Standard Army Mainte-nance System (SAMS) for their day-to-day maintenance management func-tions end up reporting to the WOLF.This submission is done by the SAMS-2 sites which forward closed mainte-nance actions generated at the SAMS-1sites to LOGSA or electronically viafloppy diskette on a weekly basis. Thedata submitted to LOGSA includes allmaintenance actions completed sincethe previous week. The key to the use-fulness of the WOLF is completenessand accuracy of reporting. Any time awork order (DA Form 2407, Mainte-nance Request) is generated at theSAMS-1 level, data from that work or-der will eventually appear in the

WOLF — if the SAMS-1 site followsestablished procedures and reports tothe SAMS-2 sites as required. It iscritical that the SAMS-1 sites reportthis data on a regular basis so that theSAMS-2 sites have complete submis-sions to LOGSA.

The LOGSA currently receivesweekly submissions from 103 SAMS-2sites. This includes all of the ActiveArmy and National Guard DS/GS Ta-bles of Organization and Equipment(TO&E) units. In addition, LOGSA re-ceives data on closed maintenance ac-tions from those Table of Distributionand Allowances (TDA) Directorates ofLogistics (DOL) located at installationsoperating the Maintenance InformationManagement System (MIMS). Thedata from these two sources (SAMSand MIMS) are processed and loadedinto the WOLF on a monthly basis. Wealso received data from the Fort HoodDOL which operates a unique mainte-nance management system. Approxi-mately 250,000 records are loaded in tothe WOLF every month, representingall maintenance actions completed inthese units. The combination of datafrom the TDA and TO&E activitiescovers the vast majority of mainte-

The Work Order Logistics File (WOLF)by Tom Ress


nance activities occurring at the DS/GSlevels throughout the Army.

What does all of this mean to you?By using the data contained in theWOLF, you can look at the mainte-nance factors affecting your equipmentor your unit. The WOLF retains histori-cal data for up to five years (currentlyfrom January 1990 to the currentmonth). You can use this data to deter-mine historical maintenance costs,maintenance man-hours, repair partsconsumption, reasons for mainte-nance actions, number of days inmaintenance, and other signifi-cant maintenance factors.

The data in the WOLF are re-tained both by item repaired andby unit. In other words, everymaintenance action is performedagainst an item of equipment, re-ported by National Stock Number(NSN) and End Item Code (EIC),and with an associated Unit Iden-tification Code (UIC) and DataProcessing Installation (DPI) code. Ifyou need an analysis on an item, suchas an M998 HMMWV, the NSN or theEIC may be used to access and extractthe appropriate data from the data base.Similarly, an analysis on a particularunit or division would use the UIC orDPI code to extract data.

Accurate reporting of data from thefield is critical to the usefulness of theWOLF. Insertion of an incorrect EICwhile entering data into the SAMS-1computer can result in the data beingincorrectly loaded into WOLF andthereby adversely affecting any studiesperformed that include that data.

The studies that are done usingSAMS/MIMS data that you submit toLOGSA have visibility at the highestlevels within DA and above. TheWOLF has been used to determinesupport costs for specific items ofequipment, such as the M1A1 and theM2/M3 Bradleys. Also, the WOLF wasused to determine problems affectingmaintenance and support of theHEMTT and the UH-60 Blackhawk.These studies were used by HQDA andthe item managers to isolate and cor-rect equipment and component supportproblems. Many WOLF analyses areused for general officer briefings andinformation papers.

Inaccurate or missing reports fromyour units can and do show up in thesereports. Failure to submit your SAMS/

MIMS data to LOGSA on a regularand timely basis can hamper the effec-tiveness of management decisions andhave resulted in follow-up actions withnon-reporting units to determine rea-sons for lack of reporting.

Accuracy of reporting of certainpieces of data in SAMS is also impor-tant. For instance, the accuracy of man-hours used in the course of mainte-nance actions is important since it af-fects the man-hour utilization figures

used to determine support require-ments.

Similarly, accuracy of MOS reportingaffects calculation of manpower stud-ies, and accuracy of repair parts con-sumption affects determinations ofparts stockage for units.

We want you to use the WOLF. Thedata can help you manage your mainte-nance budget and increase the effec-tiveness of your maintenance unit.These are two ways you can get datafrom the WOLF. If you anticipate be-ing a one-time or infrequent user of

WOLF, the LOGSA will performanalyses for you. You can call, write,FAX, or e-mail us and we will respondto your request. If you will be a recur-ring or frequent user of the WOLF, apassword will be issued to you that willallow direct access to the data base.You will be provided with a passwordand WOLF User’s Guide that will in-struct you in accessing and using theWOLF.

If you have tried to use the WOLF inthe past and have been unsuc-cessful due to the difficulty of itsuse, we have made considerablechanges in the past months thathave improved the system. TheWOLF is now a user-friendly,menu driven system that pro-vides easy access to this histori-cal maintenance data so you caneasily manipulate the data fromyour terminal. Access proceduresare detailed in the user’s guide,but basically all you need is aterminal and modem.

There is no other source for historicalmaintenance data on all items withinthe Army. If you require this type ofdata within your organization, LOGSAis the place to contact. The WOLF is avaluable tool that can improve themaintenance and management ofequipment in the Army inventory. It isavailable for your use.

Tom Ress is a logistics manage-ment specialist with the USAMC Lo-gistics Support Activity.


If you have any questions on the data available in the WOLF,please contact the WOLF office at LOGSA. The address and phonenumbers are:

Executive DirectorUSAMC Logistics Support ActivityATTN: AMXLS-RRS (WOLF)Redstone Arsenal, AL 35898-7466

DSN 645-9711/9695COMM (205) 955-9711/9695

FAX: DSN 645-9711COMM (205) 955-9700

e-mail: [email protected]

The WOLF is now a user-friendly,menu driven system that provideseasy access to this historical mainte-nance data so you can easily ma-nipulate the data from your terminal.

Engagement area development anddirect fire planning in the division cav-alry squadron are remarkably differentthan in a regular task force. The dis-tance over which the squadron defends,the critical mission tasks, and size ofthe enemy engaged are all reasons forthe differences. As a result of these dif-ferences, the weight of direct fire plan-ning falls primarily on the shoulders ofthe tank platoon leaders in the squad-ron, rather than the company/teamcommanders, as in the task force. Thetroop commander normally has respon-sibility for multiple engagement areas,in addition to coordination with air, in-direct fires, engineers, etc. These tasksdemand much of his attention and time,not allowing him to devote the neces-sary time to direct fire planning.

The tank platoon leaders must stepforward and assume their roles as di-rect fire planners to reduce the burdenon the troop commander and ensure adetailed product. Since most documentsare written with the focus on the com-pany/team commander, this recommen-dation becomes problematic. The pur-pose of this article is to provide a directfire planning focus for the tank platoonleader developing a platoon engage-ment area (EA) which may then ex-pand to the development of troop en-gagement areas.

In the cavalry environment, most en-gagement areas normally begin as ahasty occupation of a battle position. Atthe schoolhouse, we are taught that wesit in our tanks and use the radio toidentify to our TCs the various targetreference points (TRPs), sectors of fire,etc. We are even made to memorize aseries of control measures to be identi-fied. Instead, we need to look at howwe occupy and develop a deliberateposition to better understand the EAdevelopment process. The followingwill address the defense of a platoonbattle position and the development ofa platoon EA.

Receive the MissionAs soon as the platoon leader receives

a warning order that hints at the de-

fense and where it will be conducted,he must conduct a quick map recon-naissance and evaluate the followingitems:

Task-Purpose: This is an entire issueunto itself, but is critical to the successof any mission. What are we doing,and why are we doing it are questionsthat the platoon leader must answer forall soldiers. The better we understandthese answers, the easier it is for theleaders to retask themselves during amission to accomplish their purpose.

Enemy Courses of Action (IPB):Absolutely critical to a platoon leaderand most often ignored is the issue ofIPB. The platoon leader must assessfrom his knowledge of the enemy, aprobable enemy course of action. Is theenemy: an MRC, an MRB, etc.? Whatequipment does he have? How fastdoes/can he move? How does he em-ploy and deploy his combat power?What combat support and combat serv-ice support does he have? What is hisobjective? Is he terrain- or force-ori-ented?

These and any other questions in re-gard to how the enemy has fought andwill fight are essential for success. Thisis impossible for a platoon leader to dowhile perched in his tank. He must al-ready know the answers to these ques-

tions; they must spring to his mind ashe begins to run down the list.

Most Probable Enemy Course ofAction: With a map reconnaissanceand a detailed look at the probable en-emy course of action, the platoonleader must look at the one course thathe expects the enemy will take. Wheredoes the enemy want to go?

EA Placement: Upon receipt of theoverlay, the platoon leader must beginhis map reconnaissance. He needs toanalyze the terrain, identifying the in-tervisibility lines and testing the BPand EA positions. Do they make sense?A high level of detail here will improvethe quality later.

Engineer, Fire Support, and CSSGuidance: What sort of priority canyou expect from the troop and squad-ron? Simply because the platoon ortroop is low on the priority list shouldnot stop the platoon leader from re-questing additional assets. It neverhurts to ask.

Security: All around security, all thetime. Don’t assume away enemy eyes.

Engagement Area Refinement

Now he must answer the question,where does the platoon want to kill theenemy? What this means to the platoon


Figure 1.Focal TRPPlacement

Engagement Area Development A Guide for Tank Platoon Leaders in Cavalry Squadrons

by First Lieutenant Brian L. Steed

leader is that he must physically go outinto the proposed EA and mark thespot where he wants to kill the enemy(i.e., where he will mass 120-mm di-rect fires). The ideal would be for hiscrew to place a TRP at that spot whilehe looks back to the friendly side andidentifies his platoon’s positions (Fig-ure 1). He should be on the radio com-municating with his tank commandersback at the BP. If they plan to dig thevehicles in, then the TC should be lay-ing on the ground with the binocularsat the proposed gun tube level and hav-ing the platoon leader’s statements re-layed by the loader in the hatch. TheTCs will then reposition to allow themto engage the focal TRP. If the platoonleader has a GPS, then placing the fo-cal TRP becomes more academic as hetakes the grid of his proposed BP andprograms it as a way point. Then as hemoves forward into the EA he knowsapproximately how far it is and the fo-cal TRP will be placed at a more accu-rate distance (e.g. 2400 meters).

The platoon leader should also placeTRPs for trigger lines, break lines, andpossibly for defining the EA itself. TCsshould continue to track these addi-tional TRPs and communicate whetheror not they can observe them. Not onlyhas the platoon leader defined the EA,but he has gone a long way in creatinghis direct fire plan.

Designate Weapons Positions

If the platoon leader follows the ac-tions previously noted, most of hisweapons positions are already desig-nated. Often, however, the platoonleader will not have all the systems hewill fight present when he plans andprepares the EA. Maybe he is design-ing a troop engagement area, or he ex-pects several scout vehicles to supporthis platoon BP. These positions also re-quire planning and proper marking.Planning each weapon’s position re-quires the following considerations:• Tanks: The M1A1 was designed for

massed fires that destroy with un-mitigated fury. Always mass tanks!

• Bradleys: They have two weaponssystems, TOWs that can outrangeyour tanks, and a cannon that canprovide final protective fire whileyou withdraw. Plan for both. The25mm is a very destructive weaponwhen controlled by those who knowhow to use it, and our 19Ds know(Figure 2)!

• Dismounts: We don’t usually get in-fantry support, but at times our

scouts will have dismounts. They arevery useful in securing dismountedavenues of approach and killinglight-skinned vehicles with their or-ganic LAWs and/or DRAGONs. In-fantry units usually bring DRAGONsand scouts have LAWs of one type oranother. Dismounts are great whenyou can get them, but they must re-ceive adequate support and requiredetailed planning.

• Attack Helicopters: One of thegreatest benefits of being part of a di-vision cavalry squadron is the ma-neuverability and speed that the aircav provides. Don’t discount theirfirepower. At times, AH-1 Cobraswill be available. The AH-1 Cobrahas three different weapons systems.The TOW it carries is just as destruc-tive as the Bradley TOW. It also has2.75-inch rockets and 20mm, both ofwhich can suppress BMPs and de-stroy light-skinned vehicles andtroops. Always plan how you woulduse them. They are best on theflanks. Once this is done, requestthem. You will probably be the onlytank platoon leader to plan for suchassets and may receive a higher pri-ority for your efforts. No promises.

Direct Fire Control Measures

The Armor School teaches that an EAis defined by trigger lines and breaklines. This is correct, but oversimpli-fied. The more detail the better. Here isan example of the needed level of de-tail:

A range of 3500 meters with two en-emy vehicles across, represents thetrigger for TOW firing.

• A range of 2900 meters with threeenemy vehicles across, sends the sig-nal to begin observed fire with onetank.

• A range of 2400 meters with five en-emy vehicles across is the signal tothe entire platoon to begin massed120-mm fire.

• A range of 2000 meters with six en-emy vehicles across signals displace-ment and the Bradleys to shift fromTOW to 25mm for the final protec-tive fires (FPF).

• Accompany every trigger line with acriteria, i.e. number of vehiclesacross. Items not discussed, butwhich should be, are how manyrounds fired at each phase, whatround is battlecarried, when tochange battlecarry, etc.Break lines and break criteria are also

important. The division has only onedivision cavalry squadron. We are notexpendable. Survival of our assets iscritical to the continued success of thedivision and, therefore, must be pre-served. Break lines and criteria are thecommander’s means of allowing unitsto survive. Take them seriously; plan,rehearse, and validate them. The intentis for a unit to be able to disengage anddisplace back to a subsequent position.If the line is too close, or the criteriaeither too heavy or light, then informthe commander. Always remember theintent is to survive, not to make a laststand.

Engineer Guidance

Firm control and specific guidance iscritical to success with engineer assets.They need to be shown in graphic form


Figure 2. Planning for Weapons Positions

and engineer terminology what you re-quire, where you want it, and when itneeds to be completed. Engineers willdo two things for tank platoon leadersin the defense. They will dig surviv-ability positions, and they will emplaceobstacles. First, remember that theywill not always be available, so youmust be prepared to plan and set obsta-cles from your platoon basic load.Even a few pickets and several rolls ofwire can be significant across a highspeed avenue.

Survivability: The standard is nowasted blade time. Timely and efficientaction during the first portions of thisprocess will improve the chances forsuccess. Supervised marking of posi-tions and having guides available themoment engineers arrive on station arecritical. The platoon leader should meetthe senior engineer and inform him ofhis plan, accepting recommendationsfrom the engineer. Remember, he onlyrecommends; you are in charge! Thenlead him to the first position and ensureyour TCs are prepared to show theACE (or dozer) drivers what their dig-ging focus (the center of the position’sorientation) is and what the priority ofthe positions are.

Questions a tank platoon leader needsto consider:

• How much time will I have the engi-neer assets?

• How many blades do I have?• How long does it take to dig a two-

tier fighting position in this ground?• How many holes can I get dug?• Do I want hull-down positions in-

stead? (Only when time is criticallyshort.)

• Where is my priority?• If I get blades longer, what more can

I do with them? (Never leave engi-neer assets idle.)

Countermobility: Priority and pur-pose. Is the intent to turn, fix, disrupt,or block? These are questions andterms that engineers understand andcan answer. Understand what theterms mean and what you want. Nor-mally, at cavalry troop and platoonlevel, there will not be enough assetsor time to emplace blocking or fixingobstacles.

Ensure you communicate priority ofeffort. You must take the senior engi-neer to each position and show him theextent of each obstacle if you want itdone correctly. Additionally, you mustinspect the obstacle preparation to en-sure you are not surprised when the en-

emy attacks. Always consider limitedvisibility when planning obstacles; howdo you cover them?

Fire Support GuidanceJust as with engineers, you must think

in terms that the artillerymen under-stand: destroy, neutralize, and suppress.Each target needs to have a purpose.Why is it there? What do you want todo to the enemy with that target? Bothyou and the FIST must understandwhat you want to do and how you planto do it in each EA. Always think ofsmoke. Direct support artillery battal-ions are hard to come by, but mortarsare organic to your troop. Smoke canhelp in displacement. Also rememberthat obscuration, both smoke and dustcaused by round impacts, work bothways. Plan for this obscuration; it willdestroy laser efficiency. Mortars arealso very useful for the FPF.

Don’t just plot targets, but plan howto orchestrate indirect into the fire plan.Who is calling for fire in your platoon?Is it you, your platoon sergeant, awingman maybe? What is their triggerfor initiating these fires? Unlike directfires, indirect fires are unresponsiveand require even more thorough plan-ning for success in a swirling tankfight.

Concepts to Consider

• Engagement criteria: Distance andnumber of vehicles across.

• Engagement priorities for each weap-ons system: -TOW and 120-mm SABOT shouldshoot tanks and ATGM systems.

-120-mm MPAT (HEAT) should fo-cus on ADA, command and controlvehicles, BMPs, and engineer assets.

-25mm and cal. .50 should focus onADA, command and control vehi-cles, engineer assets, and BMPs.

-Coax fires should focus on dis-mounts and trucks.

• CFV shift from TOW to 25mm:What enemy action triggers?

• Displacement criteria: Number of ve-hicles across a designated distance.Must be based on refinement throughdisplacement rehearsal. We don’twant vehicles caught in the openwhile they head for a subsequent po-sition.

• Test EA on paper and on the ground:This will be discussed in the nextsection.

• Prepare:

-Positions-Direct fire plan-Obstacle plan-Indirect fire plan-Limited visibility plan. (This isn’tsimply for night operations. Whatabout fog, dust, smoke, etc.? Ourthermal sights and lasers are not in-vincible. What is the plan if lasersare ineffective?)

-Counterattack plan-CSS plan (platoon leaders must al-ways think of this, especially M1A1platoon leaders).

• Rehearse: You will never do thisenough!-Combined arms. Indirect fires, engi-neers, aviation (if available), andscouts.

-Hatches open, open protected,closed, over pressurized.

-Full-up, with CSS (transferring fromsemi-ready to ready rack, transfer-ring from tank to tank, and fromHEMTT to tank), and in MOPP 4.

-Rehearse contingencies: What-ifdrills.

• Execute-Mass fires and maintain volume offire.

-Report accurately.-Be prepared to reposition andFRAGO off the plan. Flexibility ofthought and action are the cavalryway of execution.

-Consolidate and reorganize-Accurate, timely status reports.-CASEVAC on anything that is mov-ing to the rear.

-Maintenance forward.-Redistribute ammunition betweenready racks and tanks. Restock ifpossible.

-Fix obstacles.

EA TestingPredict Enemy Formation - Is he on

line or in column or somewhere be-tween? Paint the picture so your gun-ners will know what the enemy willprobably look like as they scan the bat-tlefield (Figure 3).

Predict Enemy Speed - 20 kph is notalways the right answer, even at NTC.If the enemy, in a former Warsaw Pactmodel, has a high speed avenue he willpush it to the maximum. On the otherhand, he may move much slower be-cause of terrain constraints. This is whyit is a must to physically drive the en-tire engagement area at the expectedspeeds. If an M1A1 tank can’t go 20kph then it is a safe bet that the enemytanks can’t either.


Measure Engagement Area - Howfar back can the enemy be seen and en-gaged, and where does he reach thebreak line and criteria?

Determine Enemy Time in the En-gagement Area - This starts with driv-ing the engagement area and havingTCs communicate at what point theylose you in their sights, and accuratelyrecording the amount of dead space byboth time and distance. This, subtractedfrom the enemy’s speed through theengagement area, will tell the platoonleader how long he has to shoot the en-emy.

Determine Type, Number of EnemyVehicles in the Engagement Area -What kind, and how many, vehiclesdoes the platoon have to kill?

Determine Time, Ammo Requiredto Kill - Will the platoon require moreSABOT or MPAT (HEAT)? How longwill be needed to kill the number ofvehicles predicted? Can you get therefrom here, meaning, does the engage-ment area provide the time and spaceto kill all those vehicles?

Determine Number, Type ofFriendly Vehicles Shooting into theEA - Are the right numbers of weaponssystems arrayed? Does the platoonneed Bradleys to help, or maybe thecommander’s tank?

Determine Friendly Obstacle DelayTime - The engineer representative canhelp with this question. Will the obsta-cles placed provide the time necessaryto kill the enemy?

Compute the Number of Kills - (1)Direct Fire: This is the calculus part ofthe whole test. Assume an experiencedgunner can identify, lay on, lase, andengage one target every 45 seconds. Inthe heat of a swirling tank fight, that isoptimistic, especially once the enemy’sdirect and indirect fires are considered.

(2) Indirect Fires: Always assumezero. This applies to aviation kills aswell. Direct fire must be able to de-stroy everything in the EA in your testor you are assuming away too manyenemy capabilities.

Adjust Defense to Achieve DesiredNumber of Kills in Adequate TimeAllowed!

Numbers to Remember

• The TOW 2 missile is about 75 per-cent effective at 3500 meters.

• A distinguished tank crew shootsabout 35 percent at 3000 meters.

• A qualified tank crew shoots about45 percent at 2400 meters.

• Most tanks fire ten rounds or lessduring the day live fire defense atNTC. This is against an entire MRR!

• Volume of fire equates to 20 roundsor more fired from a tank against anMRR. This means detailed planningof how a platoon rotates tanks backto transfer ammunition from semi-ready to ready rack.

• At NTC day and night live fire de-fense you will face 162 enemy vehi-cle targets. A “world class” task forcekills 140 or more.

Final Note

Don’t forget platoon fire commands.Think about them, and write themdown before the battle so that there is aready reference during the battle. Thismakes it much easier. The more think-ing done prior to the fight, the easier itis to fight the fight.

Learn your doctrine, TTP, and gun-nery manuals, but most of all, learnyour platoon. Most direct fire planningcan be SOP. You know your best shoot-ers, those who can kill at long range,those who have a tight zero, etc. Usethis knowledge to assist in your place-ment and calculations.

Always remember you are a cavalry-man. This means that you must assumemore responsibility and take more in-itiative. It doesn’t mean that you treatdefensive preparations in a cavaliermanner. The scouts are the artists, youare the technicians, the military scien-tists in the squadron. Take this seri-ously in your planning and preparationand your four tanks will be able to de-stroy entire battalions. You are the realfirepower, but you must be used effec-tively and efficiently.

This article was made possible be-cause of the mentoring of several keyleaders: LTC Lute, LTC Soeldner, LTCLynch, MAJ Lucier, CPT Laniewski,and the oustanding observer control-lers at the NTC, MSG Bleisner (Scor-pian 12A) and SFC Stanley (Cobra12D).

Figure 3. Enemy in the EA

Enemy Formation: MRC with Platoons in Column


First Lieutenant Brian L.Steed was commissioned inArmor from Brigham YoungUniversity in 1992. He hasattended AOBC and SPLC,and has served as a scoutplatoon leader and tank pla-toon leader in B Troop, 1-7Cav, 1st Cavalry Division.As a tank platoon leader,he went to two NTC rota-tions, #94-06 with 1-7 Cav(Division Cavalry Squadron)and #95-01 with TF 2-7Cav (Mech Infantry). He iscurrently assistant S3 with1-7 Cav.

During April 1994, the Army War-fighting Experiment (AWE) named Op-eration Desert Hammer VI (ODH VI)took place at the National TrainingCenter. The purpose of the experimentwas to have the first digitized battaliontask force complete a full rotation anddevelop essential insights that wouldassist the Army’s efforts toward achiev-ing the goals of Force XXI. This articletalks about lessons derived from the ro-tation in the area of training, that in-cludes training tasks, strategies, meth-ods, and literature.

Training T asks

During training, preparation, and con-duct of the AWE, observer controllers(O/C) and subject matter experts(SME) identified few new tasks. Of thenew tasks identified, most were relatedto the new capabilities and require-ments of the new digital systems. Forexample, the use of far-target designa-tion and POSNAV on the M1A2 tank,or the operation of the HL-UAV, were“new” tasks. These tasks were few innumber compared to the tasks modifiedby digital systems, like reporting, navi-gating, and C2. These tasks are not ad-ditions; only the nature of accomplish-ing them has changed.

Unit training efforts must recognizethese new and modified tasks and inte-grate these new tasks and new taskprocedures into the training plan. Train-ing tasks “non-digitally” and then“digitally” can quickly exceed avail-able training resources. The real focusof training should be to train soldiershow to leverage off digital system ca-pabilities.

The advent of digital systems createsthe need to train other members of a

crew/section on these tasks, in additionto the already designated tasks withintheir primary Military OccupationalSkills (MOS) and duty position. Duringthe AWE train-up, leaders as the pri-mary users, received the majority ofthe training on the digital systems. Notsurprisingly, as a result, O/C assess-ments indicated that there was no depthwithin crews/sections for AWE leadersto delegate digital tasks down to subor-dinates. For example, the gunner andloader on a tank must also receivetraining on how to operate IVIS, sothey can pick up some of the work loadfrom the tank commander. The TCs be-came overburdened with operatingdigital equipment, which detractedfrom their primary roles as leaders. An-other example is the All Source Analy-sis System (ASAS) where battalion-level intelligence personnel will dealwith increased amounts of information.These personnel require training to re-quest intelligence in forms usable bytactical commanders.

The bottom line is that we must iden-tify the specific tasks that are new,modified, and unchanged when operat-ing in a digital environment.

Training Strategy

The AWE TF train-up for NTC fo-cused primarily around simulationtraining, with no TF field maneuvertraining taking place in the 12 monthsprior to deployment. With the emphasison simulation training, not field train-ing, the TF experienced difficulties per-forming basic warfighting skills andfieldcraft. Several O/Cs and SMEscommented that the lack of hands-ontraining prevented soldiers fromachieving proficiency with digital sys-tems. It is also important to understand

that the AWE TF did not have suffi-cient time to assimilate digital systemsinto its administrative and warfightingSOPs. Equipment and software changesoccurred as late as the unit’s arrival tothe NTC.

Another key point is that the AWE TFdid not link up with all its supportingelements until arrival at the NTC. Thisparticular training preparation is gener-ally unsuccessful and not the trainingstrategy used by conventional baselineunits preparing for a rotation.

Several lessons learned were men-tioned by O/Cs and SMEs from thisuse of simulation within training strat-egy. The training strategy must addresstraining horizontally across BattlefieldOperating Systems (BOS), and verti-cally within BOS. AWE TF trainingexercises reinforced horizontal integra-tion across BOS, but geographicalseparation of the units hindered train-ing within BOS. For example, FISTsand FSOs were integral players insimulation exercises, but training couldnot routinely include the key playersfrom supporting artillery units. As a re-sult, the complete fire support systemwas not exercised. The training strategymust provide for this vertical and hori-zontal integration.

Despite the presence of digital sys-tems, the synchronization of all avail-able combat power proved a challenge.Although digital systems can aid syn-chronization, leaders must know whenand where to synchronize. Future train-ing strategies must train the leader inall the necessary steps to attain syn-chronization. Training events shouldoccur at company, battalion, and bri-gade levels and involve all the keyplayers required in attaining synchroni-zation. Constructive, virtual, and livesimulations should also be used.

The Lessons of Operation Desert Hammer VI: Training

Digitization Will Impact Many Areas of Trainingby Captain Ronald K. Kollhoff


Future training strategies should alsofeature a clear progression of training.First, there is still a requirement fortraining basic fundamentals. Soldiersmust learn basic warfighting skills andfieldcraft. Then they train on how tooperate digital equipment, followed bytraining on integrating these systemsinto unit warfighting processes. Thisstructure ensures that individuals andunits are proficient in fundamentalskills and tasks prior to moving on tomore advanced concepts. O/Cs ob-served that the AWE TF was proficientwith certain digital systems, but under-lying weaknesses in fundamental skillsprevented success. Training strategiesshould focus on avoiding such short-comings. In fact, structured trainingprograms require development andfoundation on a logical progression oftraining.

Future training strategies must orienttoward more complete combined arms(CA) training with a higher proportionof CA exercises. Digital systems andtheir associated communications linksare designed to more closely integratethe various BOS. The M1A2 and theBradley (with IVIS) can be considered“two BOS systems” since they canboth maneuver and direct artillery/mor-tar fires. Clearly, these systems andtheir links must be frequently exercisedfor overall unit proficiency on the bat-tlefield. This can only be achieved byCA training.

Also, leaders and soldiers must trainon digital systems until they are secondnature. During the preparation and con-duct of the AWE, leaders and crewswere observed using digital systemswhen time was available. In high pres-sure situations (such as enemy contact),soldiers tended to revert to voice meansof communication and other techniquesthey considered “normal.” This waslargely due to unfamiliarity with thedigital systems. The M1A2 and its ca-pabilities were better utilized becausethe AWE TF had worked with thesesystems the most. Only repeated train-ing gives soldiers the necessary insightsto best use their systems. Future train-ing strategies (institutional and unit)must incorporate the necessary trainingtime for leaders and soldiers to gainthis knowledge and proficiency.

Future battle command will definitelyrequire a revised training strategy. Thisstrategy must be built around a solidtraining program. Such a training pro-gram requires its own synchronizing offield/simulation so that all BOS train-ing occurs within a combined armscontact.

Training Methods

Given the changes noted above intraining requirements, most currenttraining methods are excellent, but digiti-zation we will cause a few changes.Some already know, but it’s too earlyto determine the extent of all the neces-sary changes. Many new methods needdeveloping as new systems undergotesting and fielding. Suggestions madeafter observing the AWE TF were theneed for embedded training, assigninga “master digitizer,” and using simula-tion as a means of dealing with the in-creased training frequency required forunits to function digitally.

Using available training time to thefullest extent possible is always a chal-lenge. Training tools like “hip pockettraining” are useful as embedded train-ing to fill time voids when soldiers arestanding around waiting to conducttheir other scheduled training. Digitalskills are highly perishable, whichmeans that the frequency of digitaltraining will need to increase. We havecurrent training strategies that alreadyrequire significant amounts of time tocarry out, thus increasing the frequencyin order to provide sustainment canquickly exceed available training time.There is just so much time to allot totraining. When soldiers are sitting intheir M1A2 waiting to shoot Tank Ta-ble VIII, or standing around in the mo-tor pool waiting to have their vehicleinspected, they could call up a trainingtutorial software program within thedigital system. The tutorial would al-low soldiers to gain and sustain thenecessary skills required to operatetheir assigned digital equipment.

Having a master digitizer at the com-pany/team level, the unit SME on digi-tal systems, would greatly enhancedigital training within the unit. Thisperson is similar in function to the

master gunner, providing the necessaryexpertise required for the unit to trainto digital excellence. He would trainthe users when and how to use digitalsystems and how to communicate whatthey’ve learned to subordinates.

In Force XXI, we digitize so thatlarge units, battalion and higher, canfunction quickly as one. Consequently,there needs to be more battalion-and-higher exercises. Maneuvering largeforces with increased frequency in thefield is too costly in terms of trainingdollars; therefore, there is the need formore simulation training. However, itis important to understand that simula-tion is not a total substitute for fieldtraining. We must determine a propermix of field/simulation training to en-sure essential field skills don’t deterio-rate. Finally, as often as possible, simu-lations and field training, should in-clude combat support and combat serv-ice support elements to ensure the en-tire TF trains as it will fight.

Training Evaluation

The evaluation of training is criticalto assessing a unit’s ability to performits METL tasks. Evaluation should becontinuous and integral to all trainingevents. Knowing that digital task per-formance decays rapidly, units must en-sure continuous evaluation of soldiers’performance during training. Externalevaluations, digital skills test, and“gates” in simulation can ensure unitsare adequately trained to operate on thedigital battlefield.

During a major simulation trainingexercise, the AWE TF did not receiveadequate external evaluations at allechelons. At the platoon and com-pany/team levels, sufficient externalevaluations did take place. However, atthe battalion level, the staff did not re-ceive its evaluation from an externalsource. FM 25-100 states that formalevaluations should be conducted by aheadquarters higher in the chain ofcommand than the echelon undergoingthe evaluation. Also, when using Dis-tributive Interactive Simulation (DIS)for multi-echelon training, there shouldalways be a plan to properly critiqueeach echelon involved. Training con-ducted without some form of feedback


provides little benefit to leaders in as-sessing their unit’s ability to perform itswartime mission.

Furthermore, Force XXI creates theneed for conducting a digital skills testas part of a unit’s collective training. Akey point derived from the AWE TFwas that digital systems must be an in-tegral part of a unit’s operations andtraining. To ensure soldiers can performnecessary digital tasks prior to a majortraining event, something like a digitalskills test should be performed — pos-sibly a test similar in nature to the TankCrew Gunnery Skills Test (TCGST)which armor crews must pass prior toshooting tank gunnery. Not only willthe test demonstrate proficiency withdigital systems, it will also provide atool for conducting sustainment train-ing.

There is a need for monitoring digitaltraining progression that allows com-manders to track performance. Aproven method is to use simulationwith “gates,” like in the Unit Conductof Fire Trainer (UCOFT). Have a ma-trix, as used with the UCOFT, whichmoves soldiers through continuallytougher conditions until proficiency isachieved at each level. Feedback wouldbe provided so that commanders candetermine what personnel/sections re-quire additional training in order toperform all essential digital tasks tostandard.

Training Literature

Training literature across the boardneeds rewriting, with present tasks,conditions, and standards updated to re-flect the digital environment. Soldiermanuals for every MOS level will re-quire revision to reflect the impact ofdigitization.

A significant problem with the train-up of the AWE TF was insufficienttraining literature and documentationfor the digital systems prior to fielding.Equipment and software updates oc-curred frequently, with some takingplace even after the unit’s arrival to theNTC. As a result, the TF had to learnand master the digital systems duringthe rotation, which detracted from itsperformance.

Force XXI creates the need for newtactics, techniques and procedures(TTP). Several written materials deline-ating TTPs were available to the AWETF prior to the rotation. Some of theseincluded the Fort Knox SupplementalMaterial (FSKM) 17-15-1A2: M1A2Tank Platoon Tactics, Techniques andProcedures; Special Texts (ST) 71-1-1,71-2-1 and 71-2-2: Tactics, Techniquesand Procedures for the M1A2 TankCompany Team, Battalion Task Force,and Digital Battalion Task Force (re-spectively). In many cases, these manu-als were not field- tested prior to theAWE and should now be treated asfoundations for the continuing develop-ment of future TTPs. Again, with ForceXXI, we see changes to tasks, staffprocesses, and warfighting; thereforeour training literature must change.

Digitization is taking the Army innew and exciting directions. The AWETF and Operation DESERT HAMMERVI gave us some valuable lessons onwhich we need to focus to achieve suc-cess in the future. Force XXI willchange the way we fight and, therefore,we must relook the way we train andmake changes accordingly. Digitizationalone will not win future wars; onlyunits that have well trained leaders andsoldiers will.


Captain Ronald K. Kollhoffwas commissioned in 1985from OCS. His previous as-signments include tank platoonleader, support platoon leader,and company executive officerat Ft. Carson, Colo.; battalionmaintenance officer and BravoCompany commander with the40th Armor, Berlin Brigade;and HHC commander andtraining officer for the BerlinBrigade. He is a graduate ofAOB, IMPOC, IOAC, AirborneSchool, CAS3 and ORSAMAC. He is currently assignedas an Operations ResearchAnalyst in the Directorate ofCombat Developments, Ft.Knox, Ky.

“Force XXI changes the way we will fight and, therefore,we must relook the way we will train and make changesaccordingly.”

DRIVER’SSEAT(Continued from Page 5)

They only fight as a last resort, usu-ally in self-defense when surprised,or to escape once detected. Scoutsare too vital a resource to be used inthe traditional combat role best re-served for armor and infantry. Scoutsneed to be available where and whenneeded, and woe to the commanderwho loses his eyes and ears. Muchlike Lee at Gettysburg, he will findhimself going into battle blind.

For future scouts, the news is excit-ing. Technology is providing moresophisticated and reliable equipmentto make their job easier. There arecurrent plans for a Future Scout Ve-hicle capable of affording the stealthneeded to minimize and survive de-tection. This new FSV will be highlymobile and have a reduced signature.It will be smaller than the Bradley,and will incorporate advanced com-munications and electronics. It willbe equipped with the most advancedoptics and sensors to detect the en-emy at greater distances.

Future training will be more impor-tant than ever. With the new technol-ogy being developed under ForceXXI, continuous training is critical tothe scouts’ success. In addition to theinitial entry training and the prereq-uisite NCOES courses, scouts havevarious other schools and coursesthey are encouraged to attend. TheArmor Center, where scouts aretrained, provides additional training,such as the Scout Platoon Leaderand Scout Commander CertificationCourses. Additionally, scouts are en-couraged to attend airborne and airassault training. Scout platoon ser-geants are encouraged to attend thePathfinder course.

There is no other soldier in theArmy like the cavalry scout. His im-portance is immeasurable — and ithas been throughout history. Thosecommanders who fought and won onhistory’s battlefields know this. Be-cause of scouts, they’ve decisivelyengaged and destroyed their enemybehind the command of....

SCOUTS OUT!

Possibly one of the most difficulttasks in squadron-level logistics opera-tions for the cavalry is the movementand security of the trains organizations.In desert terrain, such as the NationalTraining Center (NTC), this potentialproblem becomes exacerbated. Lack ofconcealment, large operating distances,and numerous high speed enemy ave-nues of approach all impact on theservice support of the unit. And moreoften than not, of all six of the sustain-ment functions, protecting the CSS sys-tem is the most overlooked and looselyplanned.

One option for protecting a key logis-tical node, the combat trains, is the useof a ‘desert laager formation.’ Althoughthe laager formation is mostly identi-fied with line ground troops, it can beeasily modified for effective use in asquadron combat trains. In a groundtroop, a laager allows for quick move-ment with simple command and con-trol. The troop is in a box formation,with the two scout platoons in columnmoving abreast and the two tank pla-toons following behind their sisterscout platoons, also in column. Thetroop TOC and headquarters elementsare in the center of the formation, so inessence the unit moves in three parallellines. Gun tubes are oriented outwardsfor an approximate 360 degree circle ofsecurity while both moving and station-ary. In a moment, we can see how thiscould be easily applied to a combattrains formation.

FM 17-95, Cavalry Operations, statesthat the combat trains are “normally lo-cated well forward and remain mo-bile.” What 17-95 does not depict is aresponsive layout for the trains so itcan support the squadron on a fastmoving battlefield, especially in a de-sert scenario. In the cavalry, where ex-tended fronts and quick-paced opera-tions are the norm, flexibility is a mustfor service support. Unfortunately, thevery nature of a combat trains, which

can be cumbersome if linked into aunit maintenance collection point(UMCP), does not lend itself to suchflexibility. Security also throws awrench into this, for the trains havelimited organic weapons for self-de-fense, yet maintain quite a large signa-ture.

So, if the trains must operate well for-ward, remain mobile, and protect itself,it seems the only way all of this can beaccomplished is through the formationthat is chosen. Formations for the com-bat trains are somewhat enigmatic andobviously change, based on the tacticalsituation. Regardless, the combat trains

organization can be a large creature.The combat trains command post(CTCP) can control the squadron’s aidstation, maintenance collection point,squadron commo section, and unit min-istry team (UMT). With medical M113sand downed vehicles in the UMCP, thecombat trains can feasibly reach up totwenty vehicles or more. In this situ-ation, the laager formation can greatlyassist in mobility and security.

In this formation (see Figure 1), atrains element in the offense, support-ing a zone reconnaissance or move-ment to contact, can move efficientlybehind the forward troops. Either the

The Combat Trains Desert LaagerThe right formation can provide securityAnd be ready to move if needed

by Captain Gregory A. Daddis


Figure 1

S4 HMMWV or M577 leads the trainsmoving in three columns. The left col-umn is led by the attached maintenancesupport team (MST) M113, followedby the squadron aid station and medicvehicles. The left column is followedup by any of the squadron’s commosection. In the center, the supportHMMWVs follow behind the CTCP.This offers the SMO and SMT’s vehi-cles and the UMT protection inside ofthe lightly armored vehicles. The rightcolumn is led by the squadron’s main-tenance M88s and M113s, and the rearis taken up by any recovering downedvehicles.

The squadron S4 or SMO can nowquickly and easily move the combattrains through a “follow me” method.If the trains remain in this formationduring short halts, momentum can eas-ily be regained once the squadron rein-itiates movement. As with a line troop’sformation, any weapon systems arepointed outwards to assist in securitywhile moving.

In the defense or during stationary se-curity missions, the laager can easily bemaintained in a desert environment(see Figure 2). The right column facestoward the most likely enemy avenue

of approach, allowing the weapon sys-tems on the M88s and downed vehiclesto orient towards any threat. Again, allweapons are facing outwards to assistin 360-degree security. The CTCPmoves to the center of the formationfor command and control and protec-tion inside the small perimeter.

By maintaining the laager formationduring stationary operations, the com-bat trains can rapidly transition back tothe offense. If attacked unexpectedlyby air or artillery, the trains simplymaintain formation and move out ofcontact. This eases the problem of link-ing back up with several dispersed ele-ments that have broken from a coil for-mation. Command and control for theS4 or SMO becomes much easier, al-lowing both staff officers to remain fo-cused on supporting the squadron.

Mobility is also simplified by usingthe laager. The S4, leading the trainsformation, can position his organizationinto a hasty defense by conducting a“column left, march.” This quickly putsforward what armor is available for-ward while protecting the wheeled ve-hicles and medical assets.

There are times when the UMCP andcombat trains will be separate entities.The tactical situation, or simply a large

number of broken vehicles in mainte-nance, may dictate that the combattrains break away to maintain a smallersignature. Here, the laager formationcan still apply. A small maintenanceteam can move with the trains to assistin fixing forward and can thereforemaintain position in the right column.The CTCP now has a smaller signatureto deal with, while preserving simplecommand and control.

In a desert environment, where con-cealment can be limited, the laager for-mation provides an option for securitythrough mobility and flexibility. With adesignated combat trains internal SOP,the laager formation can be used to ef-fectively move, control, and protect akey node in the squadron’s logisticalstructure.


Captain Gregory A. Daddis isa 1989 graduate of the UnitedStates Military Academy andcommissioned as an Armor of-ficer. He has served as a tankplatoon leader, scout platoonleader, and cavalry troop ex-ecutive officer in 2/3 ACR atFort Bliss, Texas. After comple-tion of the Armor AdvancedCourse, he served as the S3plans officer for the 5-17thCavalry Squadron, 2d ID, atCamp Pelham, Korea. He iscurrently assigned as the S4for the 2-4th Cavalry Squad-ron, 24th ID at Fort Stewart,Georgia.

“By maintaining the laager formationduring stationary operations, the combattrains can rapidly transition back to theoffense. If attacked unexpectedly by airor artillery, the trains simply maintainformation and move out of contact....”

Figure 2

As aptly stated by Captain Maus inhis article “Combat Service Support forthe Task Force Scout Platoon” (AR-MOR, Mar/Apr 93), the scout platoonsuffers from a lack of support. I believeCaptain Maus was on the right track;however, he did not carry it far enough.Everyone has tried, in some cases suc-cessfully, to apply band-aids to thissystemic problem. The main error withthese quick fixes is that the task forceeither robs Peter to pay Paul or just letsPaul starve. The right answer is to adda support section to the current taskforce scout platoon MTOE. A scoutsupport section gives the scout platoonsergeant a highly flexible element thatreports directly to him, guaranteeingthe scouts responsive combat serviceand support.

Organization and Equipment. TheScout Support Section would only re-quire a small addition to the currentscout platoon MTOE. The HMMWVsection works from a M998 HMMWVin the two-door cargo configuration(See Figure 1). The M998 tows anM101A1 cargo trailer for carrying sup-plies forward. The HMMWV has threesecure radios to allow the section tomonitor the scout net, the A/L net, andthe task force command net. TheM998 is equipped with a winch andHMMWV tow bar for recovery opera-tions. The section has a light wheeledmechanic’s tool kit and a field medic’skit. The section is armed with threeM16A2 rifles and one M203 grenadelauncher. The HMMWV scout supportsection is manned by one 19D30, one63B20, and one 91B20. The 19D30must be the most experienced scout inthe platoon next to the platoon ser-geant. By doctrine, the support sectionleader position must be filled by the19D next in line for the platoon ser-geant’s job.

The M3 CFV and M113 scout sup-port section is similar to the HMMWVsection (See Figure 2). The section isequipped with M113A3 and M105cargo trailer. The best answer is toadopt the Israeli M113 configured as arecovery vehicle. However, the presentM113A3 would suffice. The M113,like the HMMWV, is equipped with awinch and tow bar. The section is addi-tionally armed with an M2 HB .50

caliber machine gun. In the M113 sup-port section, the 63B20 is replacedwith a 63Y20.

Operations. The support section an-swers directly to the scout platoon ser-geant. The section is responsible forcoordinating and supplying service andsupport to the platoon. The section isalso manned and equipped to treat andevacuate casualties and fix or recoverscout vehicles forward. The sectionalso passes CSS information from thescout platoon to the CTCP via the A/Lnet. The support section stages in thecombat trains or in the company trainsof the forward deployed company clos-est to the scout platoon.

The personnel in the section workand train together regularly. The lowdensity MOS soldiers should also workand train with their MOSs occasionallyto keep their skills in tune. The sectionleader, the 19D30, has the experienceand ability to maneuver the section toand from the screen line, through theforward lines, and back to support ar-eas with the stealth necessary to keepthe support unit in the battle. The me-chanic will have the tools and on handPLL to fix a majority of mechanicalproblems forward. If a vehicle cannotbe fixed, the section has the assets tomove it to the rear for more complexoperations. The medic can stabilizecasualties forward. The section cancarry a small number of serious casual-ties rearward, and safely lead othercasualty evacuation assets forward. Thesection has enough cargo space to carrysmall amounts of emergency suppliesto the scouts and can relay the dailyLOGPAC forward from the forwardcompany.

Advantages. The scout platoonwould have a loyal team dedicated toensuring they receive adequate supportwhile forward of the main body. Thededication of assets in the new MTOEensures the platoon has a responsiveservice and support on call. The sectionwould act as a direct link between thescouts and the CTCP; ensuring theCTCP has up-to-date CSS informationfrom the scouts that is often missingwhen the platoon sergeant is busypainting the task force commander apicture. The support section can guidespecial attachments (i.e. engineer re-con, GSR) forward to link up with thescouts on the screen line. The supportsection could fill in for scout elementswho have pulled back to a forwardscout service station resupply opera-tion. The section all but eliminates theextra headache of the area supportcompany’s first sergeant who is often

too busy filling his company’s needs tothe detriment of the trusty scouts. Apermanent support section relieves theHHC commander and the S4 of thetribulations of piecemealing a scoutsupport plan together. As a bonus, thesection can act as a relay station be-tween the screen line and the TOCwhen scout radios are out of range.Who knows? The scouts may even geta hot meal for once.

Disadvantages. The section ismounted in a thin-skinned vehicle andis vulnerable to enemy attack. How-ever, the section sergeant can compen-sate for this with stealth and experi-ence. One could perceive the section asa loose cannon on the battlefield.Training and coordination with thecombat trains and company first ser-geants will alleviate the problem. Thesection, especially the M3/M113 sec-tion, can carry little or no fuel forwardto the scouts. While the HMMWV sec-tion can carry fuel forward via 5-galloncans, the M113 section would have tolead a fuel HEMTT forward to a safelocation, set up a fuel point, and fill infor each scout vehicle as it goes to re-fuel. The fact that the M113 weighsless than the M3 is a drawback to usingthe M113 for recovery. The M113 cantow the M3, but should only tow it asfar as the forward supporting com-pany/team whose M88 and mainte-nance team could take it from there.

An addition to the MTOE during theArmy drawdown would seem to makethis proposal cost-prohibitive. However,when weighed against the loss of effec-tive, experienced scouts on the screenline, the addition is worth it. The ma-neuver task force can no longer affordto patch ineffective solutions togetherwith limited CSS and tactical assets.

CSSFor the Scout Platoon:Another Solutionby First Lieutenant John S. Wilson


First Lieutenant John S. Wilsonis a 1989 ROTC graduate of Oua-chita Baptist University. After AOB,he served as platoon leader with2-64 Armor in Schweinfurt, Ger-many. After deploying his platoonas a WSRO (Weapon System Re-placement Organization) unit, heserved as the assistant S4 andthen as the battalion S4 for 2-64Armor. At the end of his branchdetail, he was assigned as theS1/S4, 106th Finance Battalion inWuerzburg, Germany. He is cur-rently support platoon leader,HHC, 2d Battalion, 153d InfantryBrigade, Arkansas ARNG.

The first winner of the GeneralFrederick M. Franks, Jr. Award is aSpecial Forces operations sergeant whoworked to develop doctrine, equipment,and training material to improve thedesert mobility of Special Forces units.

The award, presented to MSGBradley H. Guile by MG Larry R. Jor-dan at the annual Armor Conference inMay, was the first in a competition torecognize individuals who make long-term contributions to the Army’sground warfighting capabilities. Alsopresent was General Franks, now re-tired, who was commander of the VIICorps in the Gulf War and later servedas commanding general of the Army’sTraining and Doctrine Command.

According to the award criteria, thewinner must “offer a vision for the fu-ture of the mounted warfighting forcethat significantly improved combat sur-vivability, lethality, maneuverability, ormobility, or developed an innovation inequipment, materiel, or doctrine thatsignificantly enhanced the effectivenessof mounted elements of the combatarms....”

MSG Guile’s contribution was as pro-ject NCO in an effort to develop Spe-cial Forces mounted doctrine and fieldthe equipment required to conductmounted operations in desert environ-ments. The Desert Mobility VehicleSystem project began in 1985 andended five years later with the develop-ment of modified vehicles, tactics, anddoctrine, in the form of the training cir-cular “Special Forces Mounted Opera-tions.” The project was intended to en-able 5th Special Forces Group (A) toconduct joint and unilateral mountedoperations in desert environments usingspecially modified HMMWVs, trailers,satellite navigation equipment, and de-sert mobility motorcycles.

According to his detachment com-mander, CPT Richard A. Shaw, Guilecontributed to both hardware and con-cepts: “Directly through his efforts, 23modifications have been approved, fab-ricated, and implemented on the M998and M1026 HMMWVs to enhancetheir operation in the desert.” The SFunits call these vehicles the Desert Mo-bility Vehicle (DMV).

The training cicular, known as the“SF Mounted Bible,” was published in1987 and revised in 1993. Its tacticsand techniques were based on lessonslearned in SF deployments to Jordan,Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, and inCONUS training. It details how to con-duct and plan mounted operations, howto ensure their supplies, and how tomaintain them. The circular also covershelicopter insertions of mounted units,desert navigation, and employment ofthe motorcycle sections. It includes aMission Essential Task List and criteriafor unit ARTEP evaluation.

Working with Tank Automotive Com-mand, Special Warfare Center ForceModernization, and the 5th SFG(A),MSG Guile also helped develop theRequirement of Capabilities (ROC)document for the project equipmentmodifications and — because opera-tional detachments often work in areaswithout direct support — a mainte-nance training program at TACOM toprepare SF soldiers to perform -20 andlimited -30 level maintenance on theHMMWV.

Finally, MSG Guile created the Spe-cial Reconnaissance Project, an investi-gation of available Army and off-the-shelf commercial equipment that wouldgive mounted SF operators an edge indesert environments.

MSG Guile served more than nineyears as mounted operations subjectmatter expert for 5th SFG at Fort Bliss,Texas. He has been reassigned to FortPolk, La., as senior observer-controllerfor the Special Operations Division.

Nominations for the Franks Award,administered by the Director of the Ar-mor School, should be submitted to thepresident of the selection panel be-tween 1 January and 31 March for ac-complishments in the previous calendaryear. Recommendations can begin withany soldier or civilian. Nominationsmust come from brigade-level orequivalent organizational commanders,and endorsements from division-levelor equivalent commanders. Each majorheadquarters — i.e., TRADOC, FOR-SCOM, Cadet Command, etc. — mayalso nominate one individual for theaward.

The nominee can be an active duty orreserve Armor or Infantry officer ornoncommissioned officer, or a Depart-ment of the Army civilian. In additionto making a long-term contribution toground warfighting capabilities, thenominee should possess two or more ofthe following characteristics of dutyperformance during the year or yearsprior to the nomination:

•Offered a vision for the future of themounted warfighting that significaantlyimproves combat survivability, lethal-ity, maneuverability, or mobility.

•Developed an innovation in equip-ment, materiel, or doctrine that signifi-cantly enhanced the effectiveness ofmounted elements of the combat arms.

•Exemplified professional excellencein demeanor, correspondence, and lea-dership on issues relevant to mountedwarfare.

•Revealed a love of soldieringthrough leadership skills, recognition ofthe sacrifice and achievements of sub-ordinates.

•Attention to the intent and directionsof higher commanders.

The selection panel will meet in thespring prior to Armor Conference andwill forward its nomination to theChief of Armor. The award will bemade at the Conference and the ArmorSchool will pay for the TDY expensesso that the selectee can attend.

Further information on the award anda complete list of award criteria areavailable from USAARMS, ATTN:ATSB-DAS, Fort Knox, KY 40121.

MSG Bradley H. Guile, Franks Award winner

In Nine Years, He Developed Doctrine, Tactics, and Vehicles

Franks Award Winner Worked on Desert Mobility for Special Forces Units


establishing observation posts and con-ducting patrols, play a key role.

The dismounted teams used in depth asobservation posts, during and after the op-eration, would also be able to maintaincontact with the retreating Krasnovianforces to ensure there is no reconsolidationof forces and threat of counterattack.

A dismounted platoon organic to a cav-alry squadron would enhance the com-mander’s capabilities before, during, andafter any operation. The assets needed tocreate such a unit are virtually organic tothe squadron, making it a cost-effectiveconcept, while the increased mission suc-cess and minimized loss of life and equip-ment make it invaluable.

The configuration of the platoon, whendeployed, will vary by mission and METT-T.There should be at least 20 soldiers in theplatoon, allowing enough manpower toconduct multiple missions and necessarycoordination and resupply for the teams inoperation.

The platoon should be controlled by theS3, while working closely with the S2.Command would fall directly under thesquadron commander, treated as anotherunit under his command.

Training of such a unit must receive thehighest priority and training distractors mustbe kept to a absolute minimum to ensurereadiness of the platoon and its survivabil-ity when deployed. Only the best scoutsshould be selected for the platoon, and thehighest standards must be sustained andperiodically evaluated.

SSG FRANK R. BELONUSTroop B, 1-4 Cavalry

Ft. Riley, Kan.

Scout Vehicles:Still No Good Answer

Dear Sir:

The purpose of this letter is to add myviews to the ongoing, rapidly expandingdia logue regard ing su itabil i t y of theHMMWV for the battalion task force scoutplatoons. I have attempted to reduce com-plexity of the subject by focusing on surviv-abil ity, mobility, and deployability. TheHMMWV is regarded as a proven high-mo-bility, multi-purpose, wheeled vehicle. But isit really suitable for combat operations in abattalion task force scout platoon?

Survivability: Survivability is of para-mount importance to the scout. CanHMMWV-mounted scouts survive on amodern battlefield while actually conductingreconnaissance, surveillance, and securityoperations? Truthfully, even the uparmored

HMMWV cannot adequately protect scoutsfrom either direct or indirect fire.

Most reconnaissance units around theworld are using armored vehicles with largecaliber weapon systems. Scouts will fre-quently have to preclude enemy reconnais-sance personnel from doing the same thingthat they are trying to do. HMMWV-mounted scouts are disadvantaged fromthe start.

HMMWV-mounted scouts have neitherthe lethality nor armor protection requiredfor survival. There is little to protect thecrew from fragmentation. On the otherhand, the M3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle, al-though a noisy vehicle with a large silhou-ette, can also compromise its location be-cause of exhaust plumes. The Bradleydoes have good armor protection againstdirect fire up to 30mm (BMP-2), and goodprotection from effects of high-density artil-lery fragmentation. It provides excellentprotection from small arms, 12.7mm andbelow (BRDM-2).

The basic HMMWV is not comparable. Itcan be uparmored, but the results are onlyslightly better than nothing. Uparmoringalso carries penalties — increasing grossvehicle weight and decreasing space insidethe vehicle, thus reducing the payload.Payload is very important. Scouts mustcarry all their equipment all the time.

NBC protection is another aspect of sur-vivability. The HMMWV offers nothing inthis area, except what the scout carries forpersonal protection. Most armored combatvehicles in the U.S. Army have an NBCparticulate system which greatly enhancesthe crew’s ability to perform while mounted.I cannot say enough about survivability onthe battlefield. Scouts cannot be effective ifthey cannot survive, and you cannot relyon stealth alone for mission accomplish-ment. Scouting is very dangerous underthe best battlefield conditions.

HMMWV lethality doesn’t really measureup to requirements of a modern battlefield.Weapon systems currently organic to atask force scout platoon are well proven.The M2HB .50-cal. machine gun is an ex-cellent weapon, but it does not pack thepower to defeat the threat a scout maymeet. The Mk 19 MOD 3 is also a greatweapon. It has a good range and explosiverounds capable of defeating most thin-skinned vehicles. It can wreak havoc ondismounted troops. But there is a definiteshortfall in the antitank area.

The TOW system carried by platoons oflight cavalry squadrons is a combat multi-plier. “Scouts are not supposed to fight,”but it has been proven in combat over andover that there are those situations inwhich a scout must f ight. HMMWV-mounted scouts do not have a weapon ca-pable of at least taking out enemy armoredreconnaissance elements, whereas Bradleyscout platoons have all the firepower

needed to defeat almost any threat on thebattlefield.

Scouts, unfortunately, by the nature oftheir business, will frequently get intotrouble in combat. They must be providedthe capability to defend themselves andsurvive on potential battlefields.

Target acquisition is an extremely impor-tant aspect of a good scout platoon. Scoutsmust be able to detect the enemy beforethe enemy detects them. The HMMWV of-fers poor target acquisition capabilities, ba-sically nothing better than World War Itechnology, i.e., binoculars which are noteven close to state-of-the-art.

At the NTC, my platoon was issuedAN/TAS6 night sights along with UAS-11TOW sights. There were only two vehiclemounts available. We were being creative,attempting to find ways to put the sight upwith the gunner, but whatever we tried wasfield expedient at best. These sights en-hanced our night operations ability, theircapabilities cannot be compared to what anM3 BFV platoon can do.

Thermal sights are a must for a scoutplatoon. Scouts are supposed to own thenight. How can scouts own the night if theycannot see? Night vision goggles are goodon patrols and OPs for close-in observa-tion, but a thermal sight is a must for long-range night vision. We will always haveproblems with this in the dismounted modeuntil someone designs a reliable, light-weight, thermal sight for the dismountedelements of a scout platoon.

Mobility: Mobility is an essential require-ment for scout platoon operations. Coupledwith mobility is stealth. Being quiet is veryimportant. If the enemy cannot hear you,the enemy probably cannot locate you. TheM3 BFV does have a large silhouette, aloud engine and powertrain, an exhaustplume, and a thermal signature which canbe seen for two miles. But it can be rea-sonably stealthy if operated in a stealthymanner.

In reality, the Bradley can be maneuveredfairly quietly, but not as quietly as aHMMWV or LAV-25. When attemptingstealth with the Bradley, the time it takes tomaneuver/move is greatly increased. TheHMMWV, on the other hand, has excellentstealth attributes. It is quiet and has a lowsilhouette. There is a problem with havingexternal speakers for the communicationsystems that can compromise its position.

Amphibious capabilities of the Bradley,which can be rigged to swim, given thetime, are lacking in the HMMWV. TheHMMWV requires engineer support, ormust find a bridge or ferry to cross morethan a ford.

Deployability: Both vehicles can be de-ployed by many means. While a HMMWVcan be loaded in just about any cargo air-craft, the M3 BFV cannot. But, since theU.S. Army will not deploy solely by air,

LETTERS (Continued from Page 3)


there really is no problem in strategic de-ployment given early warning.

The problem is in tactical deployment. Myplatoon has practiced sling-loading theHMMWV in a tactical environment. It takes,at a minimum, two UH-60 helicopters pervehicle. As it stands, an empty M1025 orM1026 HMMWV is just short of the maxi-mum weight for the cargo hook of a UH-60.This equates to one aircraft for the vehicleand a second for the crew and equipment.Which in turn means either 20 aircraft forthe ten HMMWV scout platoon or two air-craft flying ten sorties. Not impossible, butis it feasible?

Bottom Line: Is there an existing vehiclewhich would be better than the HMMWV ofthe task force scout platoon? There are ap-proximately 107 vehicles worldwide thatcould be used as a reconnaissance plat-form. Some would need to be modified tofit the scout’s needs, others would not.

Should the U.S. Army develop a uniquereconnaissance vehicle from the groundup? Unless we are prepared for extremelyhigh casualties among reconnaissance,surveillance, and security personnel, theanswer is a resounding YES!

We urgently need to capture modern andmaturing technology to adequately preparescouts for the modern battlefield, as well asfor the 21st century battle. It is essentialthat the scouts/soldiers who will use it pro-vide the input into the design, develop-ment, and testing process. This is an abso-lute requirement to ensure that we field theright design.

In closing, I want to emphasize thatscouts across the total force need to en-gage in the dialogue to ensure the futureuser is properly mounted/equipped. AR-MOR, over the years, has provided us agreat forum. My thanks for that.

SGT WILLIAM BIGHOUSEHHT, 2-1 Cavalry

Ft. Hood, Texas

Recoil Vibration of the .50 Cal MG

Dear Sir:

Two things in the September-October1994 ARMOR really caught my attention:One is Don Loughlin’s article, “ReducingGun Recoil: Differential Recoil Systems,”the other the back cover HMMWV ScoutUpdate regarding the new dual-purpose,dual-weapon gun mount for the Mk 19GLMG and cal .50 BMG M2-HB.

Although Loughlin’s article is primarilyabout weapons firing “out of battery,” both itand the back page gun mount story ad-dress the problem of the recoil “vibration”of the cal .50 machine gun.

This problem has existed as long as thepowerful cal .50 MG has. I first fired a .50over 50 years ago. It was one of the M2

water-cooled antiaircraft mounts, which in-corporated recoil-absorbing springs. How-ever, in World War II, relatively few cal .50swere fitted with recoil-absorbing devices.

In World War II, recoil-absorbing deviceswere primarily used on those M2 water-cooled and M2-HB .50s in antiaircraftmounts. They were also used in many ofthe flexible hand-held mounts for the cal.50 M2 aircraft guns and in some .50 M2aircraft guns mounted in power aircraft tur-rets. The introduction of the new MK 93dual-purpose mount with recoil absorbingprovisions seems to me to make it worthdiscussing the systems used in World WarII and long after.

These original recoil absorbers, devel-oped in the World War II era, fell into twoclasses: “recoil adapters,” integral with thegun assembly, and “gun mount adapters,”interposed between the gun and mount. Inaddition to either of these, there has al-ways been the “barrel buffer assembly” ofthe gun’s action and the “buffer assembly”portion of the gun’s back plate assembly,both integral to the gun itself.

Neither of the .50’s integral “buffer” as-semblies do much to limit the “vibration” ofthe gun, but they both make an importantcontribution to its basic Browning designbeing one of the most reliable and smooth-est of any machine gun ever conceived,and that is what has made it as long-liveda weapon as it is. Its basic design datesfrom about 1920!

The integral “recoil adapter” for the .50M2-HB was listed as late as in TM 9-500,Data Sheets For Ordnance Materiel, Sep-tember 1962, but it is largely forgotten to-day. This is in part due to the fact that itcannot be used with the M2 tripod groundmount or any of the .50 gun mount assem-blies in use today.

The recoil-absorbing “gun mount adapt-ers” of World War II were only usable withthe .50 M2 aircraft gun, and they havebeen used with it in things like helicopterand gunship hand-held flexible mountsfairly recently. This system has never beenadapted to the .50 M2-HB gun although re-coil absorbers were part of some older anti-aircraft mounts for it.

The problem of stability of mounts for ma-chine guns was addressed in TM 9-2205,Fundamentals of Small Arms, 1952 edition.Figure 47 on page 57 in this TM shows aseries of graphs of recoil effect which hap-pen to have been for the cal .50 machinegun. From these it can be seen that the“recoil adapters,” like any recoil absorber,made a considerable reduction in thepeaks of the gun’s recoil force, which madea gun fitted with them much more stable.

In addition to reducing the gun’s recoilforce peaks, these recoil adapters, particu-larly the “stiff” type, had no effect on theguns reliability and/or rate of fire, andspeaking from personal experience, theymade the gun easier to aim and controland enhanced its accuracy when it was

fired “free” handheld. They also improvedits accuracy when it was locked in itsmount for long-range fire.

It has long bothered me to see thatmounts for powerful weapons such as the.50 M2-HB have not incorporated recoil ab-sorbing “recoil adapters” or “gun mountadapters.” These devices can make the .50a more stable and, therefore, more accu-rate and effective weapon in not onlymounts for vehicles like the HMMWV, buton any light motor vehicle, aircraft, or boat.They can also do the same thing for a .50mounted on more stable platforms such astank turrets. Perhaps the time has comethat they will?

Now that I have got the burr out from un-der my saddle, let me say you continue thelong tradition of turning out ARMOR as anexcellent and highly professional publica-tion. Thank You.

KONRAD F. SCHREIER JR.Los Angeles, Calif.

The Dichotomy of Non-Digitizedand Digitized Fo rces

Dear Sir:

By the turn of the century, a force dichot-omy will exist between non-digital and digi-tal forces. There are four very likely scenar-ios in which this will occur: within units con-ducting digitized new equipment training(DNET), when an Army brigade is assignedto support a Marine Corps-led Joint TaskForce (JTF), when a yet-to-be-digitizedArmy National Guard fights with a digitalactive duty force, and in conducting coali-tion warfare. We must, therefore, not sim-ply determine how to fight homogeneousdigital forces. We must also ascertain howthey will fight with non-digital forces.

In Sun Tzu’s The Art of War, he definesthe concepts of ordinary and extraordinaryforces. The ordinary force is described as a“...normal, direct... orthodox... (or) fixingforce... or... as the force(s) of distraction....”The extraordinary force is recounted as the“...indirect... unorthodox, unique... (or)flanking (force)... or the force(s) of deci-sion....” (Sun Tzu stresses that both forcesare complementary, and that an ordinaryforce can become the extraordinary force ifthey meet with success, while the reverseis true of the extraordinary force.)

A recent example of this notion was theuse of the Marine Corps in Operation DE-SERT STORM. To the consternation of theCorps, CENTCOM planners envisionedthem as the ordinary force whose attackwould “...hold the Iraqis by the nose....”One day later, an Army extraordinary force(the VII and XVIII Corps) was to “...blind-side them from the rear....”

A non-digital force can similarly comple-ment digital warfighters. The digitized,


M1A2 force is no more lethal than a non-digitized, M1A1 force in terms of firepower.(Both main guns still have a 12-rounds-per-minute rate of fire.) The digital force, how-ever, has inherently superior command andcontrol (C2) features, allowing for the fasterdecision cycle necessary in pursuit opera-tions. This suggests that non-digital unitsare suited to the ordinary force role whiledigital units are tailored to extraordinaryforce missions.

There are two possible reasons that apartially-digitized unit could be sent intocombat. Most obvious is the incredible,shrinking Army, followed closely by possiblebudget cuts that stall or slow digitization.

In the first (and worse) case, two simulta-neous regional conflicts could erupt. Werethat to occur, every available armored unitwould be needed. That just may include abrigade, division, or corps with elementsthat concurrently are, and are not, digitized.In the second example, if funding dried upto complete digitization of the force, theArmy would have to determine whereDNET breaks off. Doing so could leave thesame situation.

Keying on a digital force’s faster decisioncycle capability, I would argue that there isa twofold method for employing this force.First, we designate non-digitized forces asour ordinary force to conduct fixing attacksor attacks to achieve a penetration of en-emy defenses. Digitized units are then as-signed extraordinary force missions. Andsecondly, we provide every Army head-quarters down to battalion level digital C2

capability, even if their fighting vehicles donot have combat vehicle command andcontrol (CVC2) systems. This is primarilybecause of a need to communicate withhigher and sister units. It also providesnon-digital units the means to perseverewhen they meet with success and are usedto press the attack. With digital intelligencecollection assets, their C2 method would beto receive data and vector units using aFRAGO with GPS waypoints.

In Major R.W. Lamont’s November-De-cember 1994 article, he speaks of the Armyand Marine Corps memorandum of under-standing to provide a brigade-sized ar-mored force in support of Operational Ma-neuver From the Sea (OMFTS). It is con-ceivable, given the Marine Corps’ budgetconstraints, that our supporting force couldbe digitized while theirs is not.

For this effort to be successful, we shouldbe prepared for two possible courses of ac-tion (COAs), either colocate our brigade’sheadquarters with the MEF’s, or, provide adigital liaison staff to the JTF commander.

The first option limits our brigade head-quarters’ flexibility by possibly placing it outof communications range with forward ele-ments. However, it provides the MEF com-mander with easy access to the intelligenceour digital sensor package collects.

The second option provides flexibility toour brigade’s headquarters and JTF access

to our assets. However, we may need toconfigure our digital systems to operate onboard ship if that is the site of the JTF HQ.I would argue for this course of action be-cause it allows us to retain our flexibility.

Engaging in even one major regional con-flict will see reserve component combatunits fighting alongside active duty units. Aheavy force equivalent to that deployed forDESERT STORM would require significantcombat unit support from the NationalGuard. Since the National Guard will notsee digitization until well into the next cen-tury, we will have the same situation aswith our partially digitized active duty forceabove.

I believe the answer is the same: desig-nate National Guard units as the ordinaryforce and provide them with digital C2 sys-tems down to battalion headquarters level.The National Guard can then orient on of-fensive missions in unit training (based onlate deployment into the region).

Current Army doctrine states that the U.S.will often pursue its objectives through coa-litions and alliances. Indeed, it is difficult toimagine fighting in the Middle East, Korea,or Bosnia unilaterally. Wherever we havedigitized forces fighting alongside non-digi-tal allies, we have the same situation aswhen our digital brigade supports OMFTS.

To fight a synchronized battle, we mustbe prepared to share intelligence gatheredby digital sensors with our allies. To do so,we are probably better served having digi-tal liaison staffs working in conjunction withour allies, as mentioned above with theMarines.

However, there are a few twists. The liai-son staff must speak our allies’ native lan-guage, suggesting Army Special Opera-tions Forces need training in digital C2 sys-tems. We must also be prepared to placesome form of mobile CVC2 system — saythe kind we will employ in HMMWV scoutelements — with any allied unit that flanks,or is within, our battlespace. If we com-mand the coalition, we also need to con-sider ramifications of designating our non-digital allies as the ordinary force and useour digital forces as the extraordinary force.

We must consider how we will employ aforce dichotomy of non-digital and digitalelements. In all cases, it is key that everyArmy battalion-level staff has digital C2 sys-tems so that it can communicate with anyheadquarters across the command and hasthe means to persevere if it meets withsuccess. It is equally important that our sis-ter branches in a JTF, and our allies, havesome form of liaison team equipped to pro-vide them with digital links to our force. Inso doing, we can lessen the potential C2

nightmare we might face whenever this di-chotomy arises.

CPT MICHAEL L. PRYORCdr, C-1-156 Armor

LAARNG

The Crewing and Configurationof the Future MBT

Dear Sir:

I have a few comments, which are notnecessarily intended as being contradictoryto Robin Fletcher’s article, which appearedin the May-June 1995 issue.

The Swedish “S-Tank” is an innovative,creative approach to combat vehicle de-sign, but it is not a tank. Any vehicle notcapable of being fired on the move canhardly now be called a ‘tank.’ It is really anarmored, self-propelled, antitank gun; atwhich, it should be excellent. It is compact(a small target), lightweight, has highlysloped armor to the front, and saves all theheight, weight, and cost associated with aturret, associated armor, and the turretdrives and ‘stabe’ — a not inconsiderablesaving. I wish I knew more about it andwhy it didn’t become more widely used.Can anyone with personal knowledge en-lighten me? Perhaps calling it a ‘tank’ justconfused people about what its role is, orshould be?

More has been written about the future offront engine designs for tanks than is nec-essary. Yes, rear access is desirable forseveral reasons, but so is adequate frontalarmor which makes it difficult to be able toraise engine access doors and get ade-quate cooling air. Meeting the requirementfor maximum gun depression angle is alsoimportant. It is all a matter of which ap-proach best meets the system’s specifica-tions, which should reflect the user’s priori-ties. When the system designers are satis-fied that a front engine design best meetsthe user’s requirements, it will be chosen— which is what the Israelis did with theMerkava.

DONALD J. LOUGHLINAntioch, Calif.

Requests Information

Dear Sir:

I am doing a study and research on themassacres by Hitler’s armies during theBattle of the Bulge. I would appreciate anyinformation your readers could provide me.

AL PRICE3732 E. 58th

Tulsa, OK 74135PH: (918) 742-1462

Correction

On the back cover of the May-June 1995issue, we listed incorrectly the future desig-nation of the 3d ID in Vilseck and Schwein-furt. The correct designation is 1st ID(Mech).


Prodigal Soldiers: How the Gen-eration of Officers Born of VietnamRevolutionized the American Style ofWar by James Kitfield. Simon & Schus-ter, N.Y., 1995. 476 pages, $25.00.

Prodigal Soldiers is a hard-hitting, one-on-one personal account of how the Ameri-can military lost, then found, its soul. It su-perbly captures the emotion, passion, andlove fundamental to the profession of arms.Kitfield’s selection of General Barry McCaf-frey, Admiral Stan Arthur, General ChuckHorner, and General Tom Draude is righton target because their stories are repre-sentative of the “emotional roller coaster”experienced by every soldier, sailor, airmanor marine who joined the military, trained,went to war, and preserved the peace. It isa quick read that most will be able to im-mediately identify with and relate to theirpersonal experiences. Several times, Icaught myself wandering back through my17 years of service, remembering my ownparticipation in this story of being lost, thenfound. The book leaves the military readerwith an overwhelming pride in those warri-ors who stayed the course and made a dif-ference, yet sad for another group of offi-cers no less committed or competent buton whose watch the collective soul was di-minished.

Kitfield tells the story of officers who re-fused to submit to the madness aroundthem as they rose through the ranks. It wasbecause of that almost maniacal focus ondoing the right thing that they, by chance,happened to be in the right place at theright time to participate in the greatest featof arms in the modern era — OperationDESERT STORM — thus purging theAmerican military and the American peopleof that cloud called Vietnam, and re-estab-lishing the sacred trust and confidence be-tween America and its military. This bookoffers great insights into the incredibleamount of emotional, intellectual, andphysical energy required to recapture theessence of our profession.

Kitfield captures, in great detail, perhapsone of the most courageous acts ever by asenior American military leader — GeneralEdward “Shy” Meyer’s “Hollow Army” testi-mony before Congress. He opened thefront gate and laid bare an American mili-tary establishment shaken to its very core,and coming apart at the seams. His pro-nouncement allowed the Joneses, Creeches,Depuys, and Starrys to begin the healingprocess in a purposeful, coherent fashion.He also understood that it would take morethan a determined force, but also a tremen-dous capital resource investment, to attractquality recruits, build the finest equipment,provide family care programs, ensure real-

istic, demanding, training opportunities, andempower tactical leaders. No amount ofgood intentions or hard work can create aprofessional force such as the one assem-bled in 1990 in Saudi Arabia without theinstitutional wherewithal that allows leadersand soldiers to focus on their warfightingmission.

Kitfield also gives superb treatment to thegenesis of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols De-fense Reorganization Act, which set thestage for the transformation of the Ameri-can military into a single warfighting teamas opposed to three (or four) servicesworking the seams. Kitfield though identi-fies the primary culprit of the entrenchedparochialism as the “iron major,” a term of“endearment” he awkwardly applies to anapparently omnipotent group of officerswho he characterizes as bent on thwartingany real progress. He is off the mark in thiscase because, in truth, the power of these“iron majors” is directly proportional to thelack of definitive guidance from senior lead-ers. In situations where the “Big Hand-LittleMap” philosophy of senior leadership istranslated into “I’m not sure what I want butI’ll recognize it when I see it — workharder,” there develops a rich environmentfor institutional entropy embodied in the“iron major” thought, and drives everyoneto the lowest common denominator. Gen-eral Jones, Senator Goldwater, and Con-gressman Nichols recognized that fact andcreated a mandate so prescriptive thateven the “iron generals” cannot diffuse itspower. I assure you that in the 24th Divi-sion, under MG McCaffrey, there was nolack of definitive guidance and, therefore,the professional life expectancy of Kitfield’s“iron majors” in the 24th Division wouldhave been brief at best. In fact, being an“iron major” in the Victory Division was abadge of honor because it meant you couldoperate on four hours sleep a night and stillproduce results. Somehow, I believe thatthen-Majors McCaffrey and Horner wouldhave been proud of the title because it re-ally reflects the moral, intellectual, andphysical constitution of that special groupof officers who are usually the bridge be-tween senior leader vision and the reality ofoperating tactical units. Those “iron majors”were the ones who turn commander’s in-tent into battlefield outcome — they “makeit happen.” Regrettably, Kitfield’s charac-terization confuses the issue and missesthe point in this regard.

On balance, Kitfield’s work is an intellec-tually stimulating book that leaves the mili-tary reader recommitted to prevent the tre-mendously dysfunctional trauma of the1970s. Published at a time when many ofthe institutional initiatives which “fixed” theArmed Services in the early 1980s are dis-

appearing, the unstated conclusion isironic. Of particular note are the fundamen-tal programs, such as recruiting standardsand robust training and leader developmentprograms. Battalion and squadron com-manders, ship captains, and senior non-commissioned officers are the product of a20-30 year institutional training and leaderdevelopment commitment from recruitmentto retirement. You simply do not find theseskilled professionals listed in the YellowPages under “Warfighter. These systemswere lost in the late 1960s and early 1970sand took a generation to recover — oncelost, they just cannot simply be boughtback with supplemental funding programs.

Prodigal Soldiers stirs a unique blend ofdisappointment, pride, and anxiety. As westand facing the next crisis of confidence,our operational commitments increase, ourresources decrease, and our structure isdown-sized. Kitfield’s challenge is leader-ship in a time of uncertainty. The challengeis for our senior leadership to create andmaintain the institutional conditions for suc-cess into the 21st century. The risk is the“hollow Army” of 1979. Our soldiers, sail-ors, airmen, and marines deserve no less.

LTC JOSEPH C. BARTO, IIIJoint Warfighting Center

Ft. Monroe, Va.

Lucky War: Third Army in DesertStorm by Richard M. Swain, FortLeavenworth, Kansas: United StatesArmy Command and General StaffCollege Press, 1995. 369 pages.

This study has not been released for pub-lic sale, according to the Superintendent ofDocuments. Copies will probably be avail-able at military libraries. -Ed.

Colonel Richard M. Swain’s Lucky War isthe first genuine historical account of DE-SERT STORM to appear amid a host of“quicky books” and journalistic accounts ofthe war. It joins Rick Atkinson’s Crusadeand Gordon and Trainor’s The Generals’War as the principal books about the warwhich begin to interpret the events of 1990and 1991 in a way which will be usefulboth to soldiers and historians.

Like Crusade and The Generals’ War,Lucky War demonstrates the importance ofpersonality in the conduct of the war. Tosome, these accounts are irritating sincethey suggest that professional considera-tions and patriotism are not the only valuesdemonstrated by senior leaders in combat.The notion that professionalism or patriot-ism are the chief values which define com-

BOOKSA History of the Army’s Rebirth


manders is naive. How officers, regardlessof rank, see themselves and each otherhas always been important. Commandershave a sense of who they are and haveegos just as other people do.

This disturbs us because the stakes areso high, but also reminds us that even ourbravest, brightest, and highest command-ers are, in the end, human beings.

Swain brings to his study an under-standing of combat operations based onpersonal experience, a thorough groundingin American military history and, most im-portantly, he knows the current history ofthe Army. Rick Swain understands how thecontemporary U.S. Army thinks and how itoperates. Accordingly, Swain is able to gobeyond the history of the war and deftlyweave into his account of operations whyGeneral John Yeosock and other soldiersthought as they did, and how they per-ceived events. What results is a balancedaccount, not only of Third Army generally,but also of General Yeosock and his chiefsubordinates. Neither John Yeosock nor hiscorps and division commanders deservethe abuse meted out by some authors,whose agendas include staking out specificservice claims or perserving their own posi-tions in history. (It is hard, for example, toread The Generals’ War without hearingthe strains of the Marine Hymn.)

Having said that, Swain’s own bias isclear. Rick Swain is a soldier and there is,as a result, some sense that he is justifyingor defending Third Army. Still, his asser-tions are ably made and evidence to sup-port them is documented so the readermay check Swain’s sources for themselves.Lucky War will be useful for years to come,both to soldiers seeking to understand theart of high command and those who wishto know not only what happened, but why.

COL GREGORY FONTENOTDirector, School of

Advanced Military StudiesFt. Leavenworth, Kan.

Persian Gulf War Almanac byHarry G. Summers, Jr. Facts on File,New York, 1995. 320 pages, $35.00.

The Persian Gulf conflict has been thesubject of countless memoirs and after-ac-tion reviews since its conclusion in thespring of 1991. Now for the first time, a de-finitive compilation of the events, personali-ties, and lessons appear in a single vol-ume. Carefully compiled by Colonel HarryG. Summers, Jr., this almanac is the mostcomprehensive reference book to date onthe Gulf War.

Divided into four parts, the book initiallytraces the geographical and historical reali-ties of the Persian Gulf region from Babylo-nian times to Saddam Hussein’s invasion

of Kuwait on August 2, 1990. The secondsection focuses on the chronology of theconflict, from Hussein’s request at the ArabCooperation Council meeting on February19, 1990, for financial assistance to sharethe cost of the Iran-Iraq war to the repatria-tion of allied POWs on March 5, 1991. Theheart of the almanac, however, is the thirdsection, which is a detailed listing of themost significant aspects of the war. Over350 entries are included. Finally, the se-lected bibliography and index complete thereference portion of this book.

What makes this book so important forfuture officers and students of the conflict isthe reference material contained in the ex-tensive almanac portion. Entries include adiverse range of topics, such as AirlandBattle doctrine, coalition forces, divisionalunits, and virtually every aspect of themaritime, air, and ground campaigns. Sum-mers also examines a number of controver-sial issues. The role of women in the mili-tary, the American media, U.S. mobilizationand deployment practices, and ecologicaland chemical warfare will prove of im-mense interest to future military strategistsand planners. In addition, the author pro-vides biographical sketches of all major ci-vilian and military leaders involved in theconflict.

Another aspect of this book that deservesspecial mention is the author’s own insightinto the conflict. A noted military analyst,Summers has published two previous al-manacs on the Korean and Vietnam Wars,as well as his classic, On Strategy, an ex-amination of the relationship between strat-egy and policy in the Vietnam War. Duringthe Gulf War, he served as an analyst forall the major American television networksin addition to writing a weekly syndicatednewspaper column for the Los AngelesTimes.

Summers is at his best in tracing the evo-lution of U.S. military strategy from the stra-tegic defense of the Cold War to the strate-gic offense. That transition, coupled withthe changes in military operational policies,including the expanded role of women onthe battlefield, the contributions of the re-serve components to battlefield success,the necessity of joint operations and com-mand structures, and the awareness of theimportance of combined operations, makesthe Persian Gulf War Almanac an indispen-sable companion to the author’s previousworks.

In short, this almanac is must reading forall military officers. It will remain a superbsource book for information and future re-search on the first major campaign of thepost-Cold War world.

COL COLE C. KINGSEEDAssociate Professor of History

U.S. Military AcademyWest Point, N.Y.

Problems for Platoon and Com-pany by Erwin Rommel, translated byCyril Koob. Military/Info, P.O. Box27640, Golden Valley, MN 55427,1995, 74 pages, $20.

In 1935, Erwin Rommel wrote this smallbook so junior officers could think throughcomplex training exercises. He included 19tactical exercises that progressed from therifle platoon’s deployment from the marchto the actions of a reserve in a battalion’sattack. Each exercise increased in com-plexity and in the level of responsibility ex-pected of the leader. The exercises arebased on Rommel’s experience in WorldWar I and were revised in 1940 and 1944.

One of the most interesting aspects ofthese exercises is that they include the es-sence of “tasks, standards, and conditions”which the U.S. Army emphasizes sostrongly today in its training. In each exer-cise, the purpose or task is stated clearlyand the conditions described in detail.Those conditions include such things ashearing “single rifle shots” to the time thathas passed since the last hot meal.Though the standard is not as clearlystated, a careful reading of the exercise re-veals what is expected.

The major shortcoming of this work is thetranslation. The translator states, “this ismore literal than other translations of Ger-man military writings you have possiblyread in the past. Translations into Englishhave tendency [sic] to lose quite a bit intheir content.” The problem for the reader,however, is that many of the sentencesmake little or no sense, and many of theparagraphs have to be studied deeply inorder to be understood. Phrases such as“imply the enemy fire,” or “defense on thesouthern hang of 343,” or “disruption fire”may make sense to the translator, but theyserve only to confuse the reader. More-over, the work has not been carefully proof-read. For example, each exercise includesa “Purposed Outcome” even though thetranslator in the introduction uses “Pro-posed Outcome.” Problems with translatingand proofing become evident in the front ofthe book, which is entitled “Translators For-ward,” rather than “Translator’s Foreword.”

Despite the problems with the translation,this is a useful work. It includes 66 tacticaldrawings and maps and a wide variety ofchallenging tactical situations. These willchallenge the reader and require carefulthinking about responses. Nonetheless, agreater sensitivity to the reader’s needsand a clearer translation would have madethis book much more useful.

COL ROBERT A. DOUGHTYDepartment of HistoryU.S. Military Academy

West Point, N.Y.
