Arms control and Disarmament

Definitional Issues

• What is arms control?• How is this different from Disarmament?• Does one lead to another?• Normative versus practical dimensions.• What causes arms control?• Is disarmament feasible?

Defining Arms Control• Any agreement among states to regulate some

aspects of their military capability or potential. The agreement may apply to the location, amount, readiness, and types of military forces, weapons and facilities

• Arms control is an alternative approach to achieving international security through military strategies or ‘peace through manipulation of force’

Definition…

• Participants jointly regulate their abilities to threaten each other and to drive a bargaining advantage in their context. So, an arms control agreement allows states to retain their relative ability to bargain, but at the same time, reducing the cost of sustaining these abilities

Arms Control Defined

• Jaffrey Larsen: “AC can be defined as any agreement among states to regulate some aspect of their military capability or potential. The agreement may apply to the location, amount, readiness, and types of military forces, weapons and facilities…all AC presuppose some form of cooperation or joint action among the participants regarding their military programs.”

Further Defining Arms Control

• 1961 - Thomas Schelling & Morton Halprin:“Adjustments in military postures and doctrines that

induce reciprocal adjustments by a potential opponent can be of mutual benefit if they reduce the danger of a war that neither side wants, or contains its violence, or otherwise serve the security of the nation.

Arms Control

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In its general conception, arms control is any type ofrestraint on the use of arms, any form of militarycooperation between adversaries. Arms control can beimplicit or explicit, formal or informal, and unilateral,bilateral, or multilateral. It is a process of jointlymanaging the weapons-acquisition processes of theparticipant states in the hope of reducing the risk of war…Arms control [refers] to formal agreements imposingsignificant restrictions or limitations on the weapons or securitypolicies of the signatories.

Disarmament

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Disarmament rests on a fundamentally differentphilosophical premise than arms control. It envisions thedrastic reduction or elimination of all weapons, lookingtoward the eradication of war itself. Disarmament is basedon the notion that if there were no more weapons therewould be no more war. This is a compelling proposition,with enough truth to give it a very long life in the historyto popular impression, it is not necessarily abut reducingarms levels.

Arms control and disarmament

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Arms control attempts to stabilize the status quo and to manage conflict, to force. Although many visceral opponents would be shocked at the thought, arms control is fundamentally a conservative enterprise.Disarmament, by contrast, is a radical one. Disarmament seeks to overturn the status quo; arms control works to perpetuate it.

Major Arms Control Agreement

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Agreement Signed by Provision Year

Geneva Protocol 100+ Bans use of chemical weapons 1925

Antarctic Treaty Partial Nuclear

12 Prohibits all military activity in Antarctic area 1959

Test Ban Treaty 131 Prohibits nuclear explosions in the atmosphere In outer space, and under water

1963

Outer Space Treaty 127 Prohibits all military activity in outer space, Including on the moon and other celestial Bodies

1967

Treaty of Tlatelolco 35 Prohibits nuclear weapons in Latin America 1967

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

191 Prohibits acquisition of nuclear weapons by Non-nuclear nations

1968

Seabed Arms Control 92 Bans placing nuclear weapons in o under the seabed

1971

Biological Weapons Convention

80+ Ban the possession and use of biological weapons

1972

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Agreement Signed by Provision Year

Strategic Arms Limitation Treat (SALT 1)

2 Provides for freeze on aggregate number of fixed, Land-based ICBMs and SLBMs

1972

ABM Treaty 2 Limits deployment of antiballistic missile systems Two sites in each country. Reduced to one site by 1974 agreement

1972

Threshold Test Ban 2 Limits U.S. and USSR underground tests to 150 kt

1974

SALT II 2 Limited the number and types of USSR and USA. Strategic weapons

1979

South Pacific Nuclear Free-Zone

13 Prohibits the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear Weapons in the region

1985

Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF)

2 Eliminates all U.S. and Soviet missiles with ranges Between 500 km and 5500 km

1987

Missile Technology Regime 25 Limits transfer of missiles or missile technology 1987

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

30 Sets limits on NATO and WARSAW Pact tanks, Other armored vehicles, artillery, combat, helicopters And air craft

1990

Major Arms Control Agreements

Agreement Signatories Provisions YearCTBT Over 180 Bans nuclear Tests,

Allows sub-critical tests

1996

Arms control treaties

Washington Naval Treaty, 1922 (as part of the naval conferences) Geneva Protocol on chemical and biological weapons, 1925 and

its two augmentations: Biological Weapons Convention, 1972 Chemical Weapons Convention, 1993

Outer Space Treaty, 1967 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1968 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, 1972

Arms control treaties

Environmental Modification Convention, 1976 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR ), 1987 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, 1992 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I ), 1994 Wassenaar Arrangement, 1996

Arms control treaties

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 1996 Open Skies Treaty, 2002 • Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty ( SORT), 2003 • START Three (2010)

Arms Control – The Cold War Days

• Theory developed as an adjunct to national security from 1958 – 62

• Instead of disarmament it emphasized enhancement of cooperative security arrangements

• Numerous institutional mechanisms• Problems of trust• Problems of verification

Cold War Days…

• The driver of arms control agreements was the shared perception regarding the fear of a nuclear war between the two powers.

• Arms control seen as a prime means of restraining strategic arms race, especially restraining the use of certain types of technologies that exacerbated the threat of war

• The objective was also to reduce the cost of war,

• And reduce the damage of a war did occur

Arms Control Explained• According to Thomas Schelling and Morton

Halprin:“We believe that arms control is a promising, but

still only dimly perceived, enlargement of the scope of our military strategy. It rests essentially on the recognition that our military relations with potential enemies is not one of pure conflict and opposition, but involves strong elements of mutual interest in the avoidance of a war that neither side wants, in minimizing the costs and risks of the arms competition, and in curtailing the scope and violence of war in the event it occurs.”

It achieves…

• Reduces possibility of war• Reduces political and economic costs• Minimizes the scope and violence of war• So it primarily depends on cooperation of some level

between adversaries

The Purpose of Arms Control

• It is a means to an end which is enhancing security, especially security against nuclear weapons

• The three underlying principles of arms control are:– It is a means to an end – national security– States have a common interest in avoiding

nuclear war– Arms control and military strategy should work

together to promote national security (deployment of weapons or an adverse tactical maneuver)

Objectives of Arms Control

• Should be in broad harmony with national security strategy

• Arms control theory was developed during the Cold War to deal with the questions of:– What deters?– How much is enough?– What if deterrence fails?

Methodology

• Institutional mechanisms involving a certain understanding regarding force buildup, strategic deployment, etc

• Improve strategic signaling • Build channels of communication• Increase exchange of information

Institutions• Alliance or agreements - INCSEA, SALT or Indus Water

Treaty• Potential tools but remain on the sidelines of

statecraft (Track-II, III…)• Change preference over outcomes Institutions are important because they have the

potential of generating powerful impact on the policymaking process e.g. Anglo-French Entente 1904

Institutional mechanisms create enduring patterns of shared expectation of behavior that gradually receive some degree of formal assent – INCSEA or Indus Water Treaty

Institutional Mechanisms – Another View

• Institutions will not have any substantial impact because, as Charles Glaser Points out:

“Institutions are the product of the same factors – states interests and the constraints imposed by the system that influence whether should cooperate”

Issues with Arms Control

• Additional information cannot change the strategic choices

• There is also the issue of trust• The concept will not work because relations between

states are driven by their interest in enhancing their power

• Prisoner’s dilemma

Prisoner’s Dilemma• Choices made by two players between two possible

outcomes• Hedley Bull’s perspective - players do not act in total

ignorance of each other’s choices and no one can count on having the last word. Hence, a pessimistic outcome could be avoided and a condition of conditional cooperation can be maintained which is termed as an equilibrium outcome

Arms Control in South Asia

• There is a need for institutionalizing arms control arrangement because:– Nuclear weapons– Conventional buildup– Existing disputes– Endemic mistrust – a generational change that would

undermine peace– Countries pursing independent trajectories of socio-

political and military development

Present Situation

• Technological expansion• Asymmetrical balance• No arms control arrangement• CBMS only

Existing CBMs

Communication Measures• Hotline between DGMOs since Dec 1971.• After Brasstacks IV tensions and 1990 US

alarm, DGMO hotline activated weekly.• Telephone links between sector

commanders on LoC

Communication Measures

• Hotlines between PMs: • Installed in 1989 by Benazir Bhutto and Rajiv

Gandhi. • In November 1990, re-established by Chandra

Shekhar and Nawaz Sharif to facilitate direct communication.

• In May 1997, I. K. Gujral and Sharif pledged to reinstate the hotline.

Existing CBMs

Notification Measures• Agreement on Prior Notification of Military Exercises, 1991:

– 10,000 or more troops.– No manoeuvres towards IB.– Exercises at Corps-level minimum 45 km and

Division-level minimum 25 km from IB. No Division exercise near LoC.

– No military activity within five km of IB.

Existing CBMs

Border Security Measures• Karachi Agreement, 1949: no deployment less than

500 yards from CFL (now LoC). (Observed more in breach!)

• Indo-Pakistani Agreement on Border Disputes in the West, 1960.

• Rann of Kutch Tribunal Award after 1965 War. (Left out Sir Creek dispute.)

Existing CBMs

Border Security Measures• Agreement on Prevention of Violation of Airspace, August 1992:

– Armed fixed-wing aircraft not to fly within 10 nautical miles of IB.– Armed helicopters not permitted within one NM.– No aircraft within 1,000 metres.

• Often breached: Atlantique incident; RPVs; helicopters shot down at Siachen.

Existing CBMs

Transparency Measures• MAs/DAs being invited as

observers for major exercises:– Zarb-e-Momin in 1989.– Several Indian exercises.

• DGMO clarifications – Brasstacks, 1990, Kargil 1999, ongoing.

Existing CBMs

Declarations• Joint Declaration on Prohibition

of Chemical Weapons.

Track II Measures• Neemrana initiative.• Admiral Ramdas’ forum.

Breakdown Since 1989 -90

Breakdown of CBMs• Flag meetings on LoC stopped. Fraternisation has

fizzled out.• Tele links between sector commanders non-existent.• Deployment on/across LoC, particularly since Kargil

conflict.• Frequent RPV flights and air space violations.• Reduced humanitarian cooperation.

Breakdown of CBMs• Flag meetings on LoC stopped. Fraternisation has

fizzled out.• Tele links between sector commanders non-existent.• Deployment on/across LoC, particularly since Kargil

conflict.• Frequent RPV flights and air space violations.• Reduced humanitarian cooperation.

Potential CBMs

• Demilitarisation of Siachen (?):– Permanent Ceasefire.– Demarcation of AGPL on ground and map.– Joint verification agreement. – Redeployment to mutually agreed positions.– Agreement to resolve dispute.

Potential CBMs

• Verification: Joint patrolling of LoC to counter infiltration (?).

• Reduction in Indian troops deployed in Kashmir (?)

Potential CBMs

• Ferry service between Mumbai and Karachi

• Security of Oil and Gas pipelines• Maritime disaster management• Joint search and rescue at sea• Protection of fishermen

Arms Control in South Asia

• Cycle of conventional and non-conventional technology proliferation

• Various CBMs that have the potential of gradually moving towards an arms control agreement

• Prisoner’s dilemma in the region• Increasing the cost of the adversary is part of

the calculus• Varied threat perceptions• Varied political cultures

Potential Arms Control Measures

• Mutual troop reduction/disarmament (?)• Notification of mobilisation (?)• Exchange of data (Detailing existing military holdings, planned

purchases, military personnel and budgets can clarify a state’s current and projected military capabilities and provide advance notice of destabilising arms build-up. Data exchanges can take place bilaterally or multilaterally)

• Ground-based electronic sensor systems (Manned or unmanned, these can verify compliance to agreed restrictions on equipment deployment or troop movements)

• Incidents at Sea Agreement (first proposed at Lahore, 1999)

Some Questions

• Is it possible to build institutional mechanisms for arms control in the region?

• What will deter either sides from a surprise attack or destabilizing the military-strategic balance?

• What will be the institutional guarantees to ensure that the parties will not shirk from honoring their commitment?

• What kind of asymmetrical military balance will ensure deterrence in the region?

VERIFICATION MEASURES

• Designed to collect data or provide first hand access in order to confirm or verify a state's compliance with a particular treaty or agreement.

• Aerial inspections Monitor compliance with force deployment limitations in restricted zones, confirm data exchanges on the disposition of military forces, provide early warning of potentially destabilising activities.

• Ground-based electronic sensor systems (Manned or unmanned) Verify states' compliance to agreed restrictions on equipment deployment or troop movements.

• On-site inspections Challenge and routine; help verify that states are complying with agreements. Inspections may be carried out by third parties, opposing parties, or jointly.

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The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty at a GlanceMay 2003

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The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) which entered into force in March 1970, seeks to inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons. Its 188 states-parties are classified in two categories: nuclear-weapon states (NWS)—consisting of the United States, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom—and non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS). Under the treaty, the five NWS commit to pursue general and complete disarmament, while the NNWS agree to forgo developing or acquiring nuclear weapons.

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Select Treaty Articles

Under Articles I and II of the treaty, the NWS agree not to help NNWS develop or acquire nuclear weapons, and the NNWS permanently forswear the pursuit of such weapons. To verify these commitments and ensure that nuclear materials are not being diverted for weapons purposes, Article III tasks the International Atomic Energy Agency with the inspection of the non-nuclear-weapon states' nuclear facilities. In addition, Article III establishes safeguards for the transfer of fissionable materials between NWS and NNWS.

Article IV acknowledges the "inalienable right" of NNWS to research, develops, and uses nuclear energy for non-weapons purposes. It also supports the "fullest possible exchange" of such nuclear-related information and technology between NWS and NNWS. Article V, now effectively obsolete, permits NNWS access to NWS research and development on the benefits of nuclear explosions conducted for peaceful purposes. As the perceived utility of peaceful nuclear explosions has diminished over time, the relevance of this clause has lost much of its practical value. It is now moot due to the restriction on all nuclear explosions mandated by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty—to which all five NWS are signatories.

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Article VI commits the NWS to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." Acknowledging the necessity of intermediate steps in the process of nuclear disarmament, Article VII allows for the establishment of regional nuclear-weapon-free-zones.

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Article VIII requires a complex and lengthy process to amend the treaty, effectively blocking any changes absent clear consensus. Article X establishes the terms by which a state may withdraw from the treaty, requiring three month's advance notice should "extraordinary events" jeopardize its supreme national interests.The remainder of the treaty deals with its administration, providing for a review conference every five years and a decision after 25 years on whether the treaty should be extended. The 1995 review conference extended the treaty indefinitely and enhanced the review process by mandating that the five-year review conferences review past implementation and address ways to strengthen the treaty.

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With its near-universal membership, the NPT has the widest adherence of any arms control agreement, with only India, Israel, and Pakistan remaining outside the treaty. In order to accede to the treaty, these states must do so as NNWS, since the treaty restricts NWS status to nations that "manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.“ For India, Israel, and Pakistan, all known to possess or suspected of having nuclear weapons, joining the treaty as NNWS would require that they dismantle their nuclear weapons and place their nuclear materials under international safeguards. South Africa followed this path to accession in 1991.

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The following are the thirteen practical steps to implementArticle VI obligations. The program of action was adopted bythe State parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in the final document of the 2000 Review Conference.The Conference agrees on the following practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement articleVI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weaponsand paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on"Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation andDisarmament":

Thirteen Practical Steps to Implement Article VI Obligations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty

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1. The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

2. A moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty.

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3.The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.

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4.

The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate establishment of such a body.

5. The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures.

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6. An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under article VI.

7. The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions.

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8. The completion and implementation of the Trilateral

Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

9. Steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all:

Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally;

Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament;

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The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process;

Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weaponssystems;

A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk thatthese weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination;

The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon States in the processleading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

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10.Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes.

11. Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

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12. Regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Non- Proliferation Treaty, by all States parties on the implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", and recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.

13. The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

START I at a GlanceJanuary 2002

START I was signed July 31, 1991, by the United States and the Soviet Union. Five months later, the Soviet Union dissolved, leaving four independent states in possession of strategic nuclear weapons: Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. On May 23, 1992, the United States and the four nuclear-capable successor states to the Soviet Union signed the "Lisbon Protocol," which makes all five nations party to the START I agreement. START I entered into force December 5, 1994, when the five treaty parties exchanged instruments of ratification in Budapest. All treaty parties met the agreement's December 5, 2001 implementation deadline.

Basic Terms:1,600 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers for each side. 6,000 "accountable" warheads on ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, of which no more than 4,900 may be on ICBMs and SLBMs, 1,540 on heavy missiles (the Soviet SS-18), and 1,100 on mobile ICBMs. Ballistic missile throw-weight (lifting power) is limited to 3,600 metric tons on each side.

Counting Rules:Heavy bombers equipped only with bombs or short-range attack missiles (SRAMs) are counted as carrying one warhead each. U.S. heavy bombers may carry no more than 20 long-range air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) each. The first 150 of these bombers count as carrying only 10 ALCMs each. Soviet heavy bombers may carry no more than 16 ALCMs each. The first 180 of these bombers count as carrying only eight ALCMs each. No more than 1,250 warheads may be "downloaded" (removed from) and not counted on existing multiple-warhead ballistic missiles.

Other Provisions:START I runs for 15 years with an option to extend for successive five-year periods. Based on commitments made at the March 1997 Helsinki Summit, the sides agreed in principle to negotiate an agreement making the START treaties unlimited in duration. Separate "politically binding" agreements limit sea-launched cruise missiles with ranges above 600 kilometers to 880 for each side and the Soviet Backfire bomber to 500.

START II and Its Extension Protocol at a GlanceJanuary 2003

Russia announced on June 14, 2002, that it would no longer be bound by its START II commitments, ending almost a decade of U.S.-Russian efforts to bring the 1993 treaty into force. Moscow's statement came a day after the United States withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and a few weeks after the two countries concluded a new nuclear arms accord on May 24. The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), which requires the United States and Russia to reduce their deployed strategic arsenals to 1,700-2,200 warheads apiece by December 31, 2012, effectively superseded START II's requirement for each country to deploy no more than 3,000-3,500 warheads by December 2007. Yet other key START II provisions, such as the prohibition against deploying multiple independently target able reentry vehicles (MIRVs) on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), were not addressed in the SORT agreement.

START II's ratification process began after U.S. President George H. W. Bush and Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed the agreement on January 3, 1993. The United States ratified the original START II agreement in January 1996, but never ratified a 1997 protocol extending the treaty's implementation deadline or the concurrently negotiated ABM Treaty succession, demarcation, and confidence-building agreements. On May 4, 2000, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed the resolution of ratification for START II, its extension protocol, and the 1997 ABM-related agreements. Russia's ratification legislation made exchange of START II's instruments of ratification (required to bring it into force) contingent on U.S. approval of the extension protocol and the ABM agreements; Congress never voted to ratify the entire package.

Basic Terms:

Deployment of no more than 3,000 to 3,500 strategic nuclear warheads on ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers by December 31, 2007.

"Deactivation" of all strategic nuclear delivery vehicles slated for elimination under the treaty by removing their nuclear reentry vehicles (warheads), or taking other jointly-agreed steps, by December 31, 2003.

Additional Limits:

No multiple warheads (MIRVs) on ICBMs. All SS-18 "heavy" Russian ICBMs must be destroyed. No more than 1,700 to 1,750 warheads may be deployed on SLBMs. Reductions in strategic nuclear warheads, as well as de-MIRVing ICBMs,

may be achieved by "downloading" (removing) warheads from missiles. Once removed, warheads may not be restored to downloaded missiles.

The START III Framework at a GlanceJanuary 2003

With the signing of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), it appears unlikely that a START III agreement will be negotiated. President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed SORT on May 24, 2002. The treaty calls for each country to deploy no more than 1,700-2,200 strategic warheads, effectively matching the limit of 2,000-2,500 warheads proposed for START III. SORT does not, however, address strategic nuclear warhead destruction or tactical nuclear weapons limits, both ground-breaking arms control measures that were suggested for inclusion in START III.

START III's Origins:

During their March 1997 summit meeting in Helsinki, U.S. President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin agreed on a framework for START III negotiations. At the Moscow Summit in September 1998, Clinton and Yeltsin reiterated their commitment to begin formal negotiations on START III as soon as Russia ratified START II.

Basic Elements:

By December 31, 2007, coterminous with START II, the United States and Russia would each deploy no more than 2,000 to 2,500 strategic nuclear warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers. Russian officials stated that they were willing to consider negotiated levels as low as 1,500 strategic nuclear warheads within the context of a START III agreement.

The United States and Russia would negotiate measures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories and the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads, as well as other jointly agreed technical and organizational measures to promote the irreversibility of deep reductions.

The United States and Russia would resolve issues related to the goal of making the current START treaties unlimited in duration.2

Resolution 1540

• Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,• 1. Decides that all States shall refrain from providing any form

of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery;

• Decides also that all States, in accordance with their national procedures, shall adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-State actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes, as well as attempts to engage in any of the foregoing activities, participate in them as an accomplice, assist or finance them;

• . Decides also that all States shall take and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials and to this end shall:

• Further to counter that threat, calls upon all States, in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, to take cooperative action to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, their means of delivery, and related materials;

• Every day, millions of men, women and children are living in fear of armed violence. Every minute, one of them is killed. There are 640 million weapons in circulation globally and 8 million more are produced every year along with 16 billion bullets. Small arms are produced by 1,249 companies in

Ban Ki- Moon’s five point proposal

• All states to negotiate an international nuclear weapons convention, backed by a strong system of verification;

• The U.N. Security Council to discuss security assurances with non-nuclear states;

• The international community to pursue institutionalization of nuclear treaties, including the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty;

• Nuclear states to be more transparent about the sizes of their arsenals, stocks of fissile material and specific disarmament achievements;

• All states to pursue complementary materials, including the elimination of other types of WMD.

What did he say…

• "The United States will take concrete steps toward a world without nuclear weapons,"

• Committed himself to reducing the U.S. nuclear arsenal. • Bringing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty into force. • And seeking tough penalties for countries that broke the rules

on non-proliferation.

What did he say….

• If the nuclear threat from Iran were eliminated, this would remove the driving force for building anti-missile defenses.

• As long as the threat from Iran persists, we will go forward with the missile system," Obama said.

• "If the Iranian threat is eliminated, we will have a stronger basis for security, and the driving force for missile construction in Europe will be removed."

What is behind the Obama doctrine

• More is worse not better: "Even with the Cold War now over, the spread of nuclear weapons or the theft of nuclear material could lead to the extermination of any city on the planet,“

Basic assumptions

• Nuclear weapons have become more trouble than they are worth, an expensive luxury for superpowers and a threat for the rest of the world.• The size of the U.S. and Russian arsenals inspires nuclear starter-states such as China to add to their stockpiles and give non-nuclear states a reason to join the club.• Getting serious about eliminating nuclear weapons makes the United States more credible when it argues that states such as Iran should not be able to build their own arsenals.

Why the initiative

• Responding to call for a nuclear free world made by Former secretaries of state Kissinger and Schultz and two others, former Defense Secretary William Perry and former Sen. Sam Nunn in a joint newspaper article.

• Ashton B Carter, Obama’s nominee as the Pentagon's chief weapons acquisition official, has warned of dangers of “catastrophic terrorism” facing the United States.

• Obama has hired a coterie of advisers and aides with extensive arms control and nonproliferation pedigrees.

Feasibility of the proposal

• We have been there before – 1986 Reagan proposal for ground zero – for example.

• Is the US willing to lead by example?• Can he get other’s – the remaining 4 P’s, India, Israel and

Pakistan on board. • Will US be the last to eradicate nukes?• What will happen to the nuclear labs and the

infrastructure?• What will happen to nuclear knowledge?• What about security guarantees?

Feasibility of the proposal

• Is the world ready for a nuclear weapon free world?• How do we address the security concerns of weak states?• How do we reverse the proliferation dynamic?• Who will punish the violator of the global norm against having

nuclear weapons?

WMD and Prospects for AC in Globalized World

Nuclear Chemical Biological Cyberspace

Number of participants

P5 plus 3--- 100s 100s 10,000 plus

R and D Limits ABM Treaty, CTBT No testing Testing limits None

Production/storage Declarations, Limits Ban Ban None

Deployment Launcher Limits None None None

Testing Warhead Limits Ban Ban None

Use Legal 1993 ban 1972 ban Criminal law

Barriers to entry High Moderate Low Very low

Offense Dominant Limited Dominant Dynamic

Defense Very Difficult Dominant Difficult Dynamic

Verification Relatively easy Difficult More Difficult Very difficult

Dual Purpose Low High High Very low

Role of NSA Low Moderate High Very high

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