army aviation digest - may 1984

8/12/2019 Army Aviation Digest - May 1984

1/32

US RLS I S U P P O R ~ ~ ~ ~

O OX-- nT UJ AL . v ...


2/32

M Y 1984 VOLUME 30 NUMBER 4

* **Brigadier General Wayne C. Knudson Major General Bobby J. Maddox Colonel Andrew J. MillerAssistant CommandantU.S. Army Aviation CenterFort Rucker, AlabamaArmy Aviation OfficerODCSOPS, Headquarters,Department of the Army CommanderU.S. Army Aviation CenterFort Rucker, Alabama2 Aerial Combat, MAJ Michael L. Brittingham and

CPT Greg R. Hampton9 Air-To-Air Workshop, CPT James P. Smith

11 DES Report To The Field: The New ATMs13 Threat: Threat Branch, LTC William F. Voth17 Aviation Personnel Notes18 Watch The Birdie2 PEARL'S22 Aviation Logistics By Any Name, Mr. Otis L.Haislip Jr.26 The OfficeriWarrant Officer Rotary Wing AviatorCourse, CPT P) Charles W. Henry

Back Cover: ATC Action Une: Joint Use ofMilitary AirfieldsCover: Relates to the lead story, Aerial Combat. The authors insist that we need toachieve low altitude air superiority. Also,lessons learned in aerial engagement tacticsduring previous conflicts are highlighted sothat we don't repeat the earlier mistakes. Storybegins on page 2.

Themission of the U S Army Aviation Digest (USPS 415-350) is to provide information of an operational, functional nature concerning safety and aircraft accidentprewntion, training, m i n t e n ~ operations, research and development, aviationmediCine and other related data

The Digest is an official Department of the Army periodical published mon thlyunder t he superviSion of the Commanding General, U.S. Army Aviation Center. Viewsexpressed herein are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army nor theU.S. Army Aviation Center. Photos are U.S. Army unless otherwi se specif ied. Useof the masculine pronoun is intended to include both genders unless otherwisestated. Material may be reprinted provided credit is given to the Digest and to theauthor unless otherwise indicated.

Articles, photos, and items of interest on Army Aviation are invited. Direct communication is authorized to Editor, U S rmyAviation Digest P.O. Drawer P, Fort

[=if J

Richard K. TierneyEditor

page 13

page 22

page 26

Honorable John O. MSecretary of the ARucker, l 36362. Manuscripts returned upon request.This publicati on has been approved by the Secretary of the Army, 6 JanuaryIn accordance with Army Regulation 310-1. Second-class postage paid at DalAl, and additional mailing offices.

Active Army units receive distribution under the pinpoint distribution syas outlined in AR 310-1. Complete DA Form 12-5 and send directly to CDRPublications Center, 2800 Eastern Boulevard, Baltimore, MD 21220. For any chin distribution requirements, initiate revised DA Form 12-5.

Nationa l Guard and Army Reserve units under pinpo int distribution also shsubmit DA Form 125. Other National Guard units should submit requests thrtheir state adjutant general.Annual subscription rates are $26.00 domestic and $32.50 overPOSTMASTER: Send address changes to Superintendent of Documents,Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402.


3/32

ERIAL COMBAT BY Major Michael Brittingham and Captain Greg Hampton provides aconcise background on this subject togetherwith lessons learned application; these areuseful for Army aviators so that we do not againmake the same mistakes. The authors contendthe need to achieve low altitude air superiorityis paramount if we are to succeed with ourAirLand Battle operations. Specif ic, time-provenaerial combat tactics are reviewed and the inimitable value of experience and o b s e ~ v t i o nthrough exercises-similar to the Navy Top Gunand the Air Force Red Flag programs-areemphasized.Captain James Smith's Air-To-Air Workshopgives a brief description of the upcoming FM1-107, Air-To-Air Combat. The final draft of theArmy's first air-to-air combat manual is a productof a workshop that consisted of representativesfrom Army, Marine and Air Force units who haveextensive experience in developing air-to-air tactics and doctrine. In addition, members of theworkshop made many recommendations aboutair-to-air weapons, training and doctrine; theauthor cites the major proposals.The Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization's Report To The Field concerns The NewArMs designed to help unit commanders implement their Aviation training programs. For years,emphasis has been on basic and emergencytasks, whereas now the stress is on t ctic ltasks. You've already witnessed some effect inyour training such as no more touchdownemergency procedures training. Commandersalso will have more flexibility scheduling individual flying hours to enable less proficientaviators to practice more and improve theiraviator skills.Lieutenant Colonel William Voth offers an update on the missions and functions of theThreat Branch of which he is chief. Among theimportant missions is providing current threatdata to the Aviation sector of the combined armsteam. The unit maintains the Center ThreatReference Library, a compilation of the latestdata from many intelligence agencies. Thebranch supports the Aviation materiel acquisition process with facts, figures, tactics and doc

trine about the Threat to make certain that newaircraft and equipment can capably confront the

MAY 1984

Threat and win. In training and training development, the branch gives guidance for and reviewof lesson plans for Threat content validity. LTCVoth specifies subject areas and those analystswho spec ialize in them so personnel in the fieldcan readily communicate with a subject matterexpert.

Watch The Birdie provided by the SafetyCenter reminds us of the widespread hazard ofbird-aircraft strikes. Frequency of bird strikesfrom July through October, the period of mostmigration, is three to four times that of othertimes of the year. A guide to avoid birdstrikesproduced by the Air Force is available throughthe Army Safety Center.

Aviation Logistics By Any Name by Mr. OtisHaislip Jr., describes the newly organized schoolat Ft. Eustis. The mission is to support the Aviation Branch and to integrate Aviation Logisticsinto the overall Army Logistics Program.Captain P) Charles Henry's article, The Officer/Warrant Officer Rotary Wing AviatorCourse, portrays this training of potentialaviators. He describes the 36 weeks and 2 dayscourse from preflight training to graduation.We at the Aviation Center are leaning forwardas we prepare to welcome and train the officersof the first Aviation Officer Advanced Coursenext month.

Major General Bobby J MaddoxCommander U S Army Aviation CenterFort Rucker AL


4/32

u s RMY VI TION DIGEST


5/32

S LUCK WOULD have it, Habib's enon the fritz again. t

"Damns to get into everything," he thought. "May

lly get some parts for this worn out snake." Habibt a bead on the pilot in the backseat, Captain Rydah.can't we make our own flapper valves " he"Ah, quit your griping," said Rydah. "We'll be donet was amazing how much more hospitable a desert

t

"Well then, let's get to it," said Habib in anJ-

(AH-l) Cobra, pulled up alongside.Suddenly L T Shamar, in the front seat in the other"I've got two Mi-24s at 2 o'clock.

don't think they've seen us. Nope ... nope theyour side of the

Rydah, an extremely quick-thinker, immediately"All right, let's take 'em out "A chill ran up Habib's spine. They never told him

about fighting helicopters during his flightat Isfahan. "What do we do?" he asked his

Rydah tersely replied, "We'll just improvise. AllahBoth of the Iranian Cobras sucked up as much

as their engines could wind out and turned to set"We'll bounce them from the aft quarter," said"with the sun at our backs. Don't

on top of them. I don t wantthis twice." Rydah meant business.The Iraqi gunships were obviously intending tot element in the Iranian rear andof the Cobras that were using the

upon the Hinds, the gunners in

gunsights. Habib waited until the lead Mi-24 filled thesight completely and then let loose with his 20 mm cannon. Almost immediately he saw the numerous flashesof rounds striking the lead Hind's tailboom. Piecesbegan to flyaway from the Soviet-made gunship asit began to disintegrate in front of his eyes. Suddenlyit started to catch fire and just as rapidly spun intothe ground, gyrating wildly as it plowed into a scrubcovered patch of desert. LT Shamar's fire was equally devastating as evidenced by a plume of thick blacksmoke eminating from the wreckage of the Hind'swingman a short distance away.

"Allah Ackbar," cried Habib as the two victoriousCobras wheeled back around to view their fallen Iraquiadversaries. "Allah Ackbar Allah Ackbar."

T hough the names and situation may have differedin the encounter described above, the combat actionin all probability transpired somewhere along theIran/Iraq front during April of 1981. On 24 April 1981the Iranian News Agency reported air-to-air combatbetween helicopters, stating that Iranian helicopters"blew up two enemy attack helicopters during adogfight. "1

In late 1981 the United States Army presented aradically new concept in its Aviation doctrine: that ofhelicopter air-to-air combat (see October 1981 v -tion Digest). For a number of years prior to 1981numerous authors, both aviators and nonaviators, hadbeen raising the question of whether air-to-air combat between helicopters could, would or should occur.The debate began even before the official news releaseof the existence of a potential Soviet rotary wingadversary.2 Indeed, the course of the great discussionhas seen the extremes of both sides. t ranged fromthe white-scarved aviators decreeing that you' checkyour six-or checkmate partner"3 to the doubtingThomases muttering that "to think of air-to-air combat as so important that it requires a dedicated weaponssystem, i.e., air-to-air missiles, is pure bunk. 4 We'veseen it all. Unfortunately we have lost the better partof 10 years arguing the point and not getting to theheart of the matter.The threat is here and now. The Soviets know h )wmuch of a deterrent our attack helicopter force is to

3


6/32

ERI LCOMB Ttheir armored spearheads and you can rest assured thatthey will counter it with the most effective means possible: that of another armed attack helicopter. When andif this should occur, the Army Aviation communitymust act aggressively. We must push the attackhelicopter threat out of our airspace. Army Aviationmust be the sole owner of the limited environment tha twe live and work in, for without low altitude airsuperiority, our highly maneuverable operations willbe doomed to failure.By now you are probably saying to yourself, Okay,I believe, I believe. But what does all of this rhetoricmean to me. What really is helicopter vs. helicopteraerial combat? How do you fight another helicopter?How can I, an aviator in the field, implement a training program? This and other articles to followhopefully will provide you with some of the answers,but first some background.

h e first aerial combat between manned, poweredaircraft occurred during the early days of World WarI, more by chance than by intent. Aircraft were initiallyseen by the ruling tacticians of that era as being usefulonly for observation and reconnaissance, not as vehiclesfor the projection of combat power. Contrary tosome accounts, aerial combat of a sort occurred almostfrom the beginning, though in crude form. 5On August 1914, Sergeant Major Tillings of theNo.2 Squadron (Royal Flying Corps) claimed to havedowned a German observation aircraft with a riflefrom the front seat of a British aerial scout. Quickly,many pilots began to seize the initiative and appliedthe existing technology to their aircraft and rudimentary tactics to their flying skills in an attempt todominate the air over the trenches. Soon thereafter,the first claimed victory came with the installation ofa machinegun and on 5 October 1914, came the firstaerial kill using the six o'clock, or tail-on, attacktechnique. 7Military aviation rapidly developed into a formidable combat force with an ever-increasing level oftactical sophistication. The pilots and commandersliterally had to teach themselves the mechanics of aerialcombat, for there was no institutional knowledge todraw upon, A select few, those pilots who couldquickly apply lessons learned together with the

4

technological innovations, began to amass a sizeablnumber of aerial kills.Contrary to the romantic portrayals of Hollywoodthe successful aviators of World War I did not alwaypossess outstanding flying skills or a tremendous repertoire of aerial tactics. Both the renowned German aceBaron Manfred von Richthofen, and the top scoringpilot of the U.S. Air Service, Edward Vernon Rickenbacker, were initially poor aviators. Each had crashedduring his first solo and had experienced difficulty inmastering new aircraft. However, they both possesseda cool demeanor while in the air, an extremely keenknowledge of their machines and, most importantlyexpert marksmanship. In an era when the maneuverability of aircraft was the paramount factor in aeriacombat, both Richthofen and Rickenbacker (and, infact, all of the successful pilots) foresaw the folly ocontinuous turning and looping tactics. Instead theyemployed a devastating, carefully chosen, slashingstyle of attack. One high-speed attack, firing at thelast second, proved to be the most successful, and, inot successful, would lead to a quick escape. Simplicitynot tactical genius or outstanding aviator skillsproduced success for these men, and when forgottencaused many of their deaths.While the machines and weapons used during WorldWar I were sometimes crude and unwieldy, the tactics that employed them served as a basis for the aeriacombat that would transpire later in history. The tactics which proved to be successful in one war generallyproved sound in the next. Whereas aircraft performance and armament increased dramatically duringthe interwar years of 1919 to 1939, basic tactics didnot alter fundamentally. To be sure, operating

Royal Aircraft FactoryS E S ighterWorld War Iillustration by Blake Morrison

l



7/32

pilots were becoming better trained. But, the fun

o r l d War II saw the emphasis on aerial comswing from maneuverability to speed. The need

from a fight, to be able to quickpull away from or close upon an adversary was parain the minds of the aircraft designers and pilots.

of aerial comfiring and rapidly escaping the combat area

to yield high tallies for those whoously followed this dictum. No better example of

s can be found than in examining the combat recordf the highest scoring ace of World War II, Major

Hartman. His tactics were simple. He wouldattempt to see them firstpredict what they would do. Then he would selectand single out

Employing surprise, Hartman would dive upon thefrom behind, close rapidly and open

World War II

fire often within 100 meters, sometimes as close as50 ).8 After destroying the target, or prior to overtaking it, he typically would dive or turn if altitude didnot permit) executing a hard descending turn to clearthe immediate battle area and prepare for a subsequentattack. He always attempted to avoid repeated attacksin the same location. Choosing the time and place ofhis attacks and always knowing and planning in advance how to escape, Hartman was able to survive thewar (although he was downed 6 times, mostly dueto ground fire and flying through the debris of hiskills). In 800 instances of aerial combat, he amasseda score of 352 aerial kills in only 2 years of combat 8Indeed, the best pilots of World War II employed thepractical lessons learned during World War I andmodified them to take advantage of their own weaponsand aircraft.

World War II also saw the advent of massive formations of heavy bombers, escorted and protected bylarge numbers of fighter aircraft. Both the Americanand British Air Forces quickly discovered that large,relatively slow and unmaneuverable bombers operatingwithout fighter escort were extremely vulnerable to attack by Luftwaffe fighters. Some reduction in bombervulnerability was achieved by increased quantities of

illustr tion by lake Morrison


8/32

ERI LCOMB Tdefensive weapons on the bombers and by flying tightformations to allow effective mutual support. But untilcontinuous fighter protection became routine, frightfullosses occurred in the bomber force. Aircraft designedfor the necessary speed, maneuverability, weaponization and fuel range were required to allow the strikeaircraft to perform their primary mission. Aerial combat in World War II was fought, not simply for its ownsake, but for the purpose of preserving some other element of the total force, or for protection (from enemyfighters and bombers) of friendly installations. Theneed for dedicated, design-optimized air combat aircraft became an inescapable conclusion as air warfarein general grew into a tactically and strategicallydecisive element of combat.Pilots' training again proved to be critical in aerialcombat during World War II. Just as in World WarI, a pilot's first days in combat were critical. Whileprecombat training was for the most part adequate onboth sides, it was the aviator's survival during the firstactual combat engagements which provided the mostaccurate gauge of whether a pilot would survive in thelong run. During World War II a new pilot was oftengiven only a 25 percent chance of surviving his firstfive combat missions. 10 However, if he did survive theprobability of his seeing the end of the conflict rosedramatically. Combat experience in the air, like thatof ground warfare, traditionally has a steep learningcurve. The lengthy duration of World War II allowedfor a great deal of air-to-air combat experience and,as we see later, proved to be crucial during the KoreanWar. It was to be many years later that we developedeffective means to conduct peacetime training that approached the critical experience-building learning ofactual combat.

h e introduction of jet propelled aircraft duringthe late 1940s and the start of the Korean War in 1950,moved the art of air combat to greater altitudes andairspeeds. From the outset, the aerial engagements between Communist and United Nations' jets during theKorean conflict were conducted at speeds and altitudesthat were unthinkable to pilots just 5 years prior.Whereas combat during World War II was essentiallytop-ended at around 32,000 feet with airspeeds of 370to 430 miles per hour, engagements in Korea often

began from an altitude of 50,000 feet and at speedapproaching that of sound itself. 11Operations in this greater performance envelopehowever, were limited by the existing weapontechnology. Machineguns and rapid fire cannon werinitially the only practical armament the jets had to usin air combat. To be sure, great advancements in gunsights and ranging devices were made, but aerial encounters still relied upon the same weapon employed35 years earlier during World War I The pilots of theKorean War quickly found that all of their high performance often only produced one adequate gunshoduring an entire engagement sequence. Not until thelatter portion of the war did air-to-air missiles seeservice.

An interesting and crucial dialogue emerged at thepoint that air-to-air missiles began to prove theiworth. The debate over whether or not guns were required, since high technology had given us a long-range(stand-off) weapon, was to continue well into the1960s. In general, the Air Force missile proponentsried the day, and the fighter fleet at the onset of theVietnam air war was essentially armed with missilesonly. Stand-off weapons, the argument went, havenegated the need for guns, since air-to-air combat wilnow take place at a range measured in miles betweencombatants who may never even see each other, muchless become engaged in a close-in, turning gun fight.Not only did this philosophy dominate weapons development, it also influenced aircraft design as wellwith fighters being built heavier and faster and withgenerally less emphasis on agility and turningmaneuverability.

It required a great deal of experience to master thisnew type of high-altitude, fast-forward and politicallyconstrained combat. That was the norm in KoreaLuckily our pilots at the time possessed that experience. The tremendous pool of American and otheUnited Nations' aviators who had accumulated combat experience during World War II proved to be thekey in Korea. The jets of the Korean War, the UnitedStates F-86 and the Soviet MIG-15, were basicallyequal to each other. 12 The one-sided air combat ratioin Korea (10-to-14 to 1 was produced primarily by thesuperior United Nation pilots. Entire Russian squadrons, comprised of many low-time pilots, weredestroyed by United Nations' air units. Chinese andNorth Korean units suffered similar fates as their experience was inferior to that of their opposition. Pilotraining won the air war in Korea and, as we shall seewould be our undoing in Vietnam 15 years later.



9/32

4D Vietnam War illustr tion by lake Morrison

h e u s Air Force entered the Vietnam Warconfident that it could inflict the same defeat upon itsCommunist foes as handily as it had in Korea.However, this was not the case. For some reason, during the years between the two Asian wars, our concepts of aerial warfare changed. The Air Force did notpossess a dedicated counterair-fighter aircraft in Vietnam. The F-4 Phantom and F-105 Thunderchief weredesigned as fighter bombers and thus did notpossess all of the characteristics needed for air combat. While being faster than their principal opponent,the MiG-21, the F-4 and F-105 were outclassed inmaneuverability and acceleration-factors of great importance in air-to-air combat.The combat environment of the air war over NorthVietnam (where the majority of air engagements tookplace) proved to be an intensely air-defended area.Considering their primary mission of supporting thebombing effort in the North, and the obvious tacticsthat this implied, it s not difficult to understand whyU.S. pilots as a whole achieved only a slightly betterthan 1 to 1 exchange ratio in air- to-air combat duringthe early stages of the war. Frequently, North Vietnamese MiG-21s would attack the heavily loaded U.S.fighter-bombers, employingthe classic element of surprise (and tactics not unlike Hartman's), to attain aquick kill and then retreat into their own highly effective air defense network. But these were not the onlyreasons for our poor showing in Vietnam.The vast aviation combat experience pool that wehad drawn upon in Korea was simply not in existencein 1967. The World War II and Korean War veteranswere now flying for the airlines or had retired fromthe service. Also, during the interim between the wars,a virtual moratorium was placed on actual air-to-airtraining by the Air Force. 13 Quite simply we were unprepared for air-to-air encounters and our combatrecord reflected it.During the Vietnam War, the Navy was the first service to officially recognize the problem and to take

steps to correct it. Recognizing the value of experienceand observation in training, the Navy instituted its TopGun program, in which pilots from throughout theNavy were trained in aerial combat tactics and techniques. Wherever possible, Navy pilots practiced againstother Navy pilots who were trained to employ enemymethods, and who flew aircraft whose performanceapproximated that of the MiGs encountered over Vietnam. A sophisticated recording system was incorporated (Air Combat Maneuver Instrumentation) toallow aircrews to review every detail of their training

fights during post-mission briefings and critiques.The results in Vietnam were dramatic, as Navy aircombat exchange ratios soared in our favor.The Air Force quickly followed suit, and institutedthe now famous Red Flag training program in theNevada desert to provide its pilots with as close to thereal thing as possible. By allowing their pilots the rareopportunity to make mistakes in simulated air-to-aircombat, the Navy and Air Force hope to alleviate thebeforementioned learning curve problem of actual firstcombat.Air-to-air combat during the Vietnam War taughtus a valuable lesson in regard to aerial armament selection. The Air Force entered the conflict fully confident in the fact that heat-seeking air-to-air missileswould rule supreme. Soon after the first aerial encounters between the MiGs and our missile-only-armedF-4s, Air Force pilots screamed for their guns to bereturned. They found that all the electronic wizardrybuilt into the Sidewinder and Sparrow missiles did notamount to a hill of beans when a short range shot hadto be made. Visual firing techniques still had a placein aerial combat and the Air Force quickly added highspeed cannons to its aircraft. The gun vs. missiledebate of the 1950s and 60s was quickly put to rest.A combination of weapons-guns for close-in workand missiles for long-range shots-was found to be thekey. The best air superiority aircraft of today (F-16,F-15) reflect this concept and have proven to be extremely effective in air-to-air support.

The lessons of World War II regarding dedicatedfighter protection for strike forces repeated themselvesover Vietnam. While the pr imary mission might havebeen to bomb the bridge, there were a few incidentalhurdles to overcome in the process-namely, toughminded, well-trained, well-equipped Communist forceswhich were determined to prevent that mission.Only carefully thought-out strike force task organization got the job done. Not only dedicated fighterprotection, but also air-defense suppression, electronic

7


10/32

ERI LCOMB Twarfare and other special-purpose aircraft were required before fighter-bomber strikes could be madewith a reasonabJe chance 0,[ success and acceptable lossrates.

~ most recent example of the lessons of air-toair combat occurred during the Israeli invasion ofLebanon in June and July oJ 1 9 2 ~ In only 9 days theIsraeli Air Force (lAF) IOO.naged to sweep the skiesover the Be.kaa Valley, dowliling more than 80 Syrianaircraft whlle losing only 2.14 While this rather lopsidedscore was no doubt partially due to an extensive useoJ electronic cOUIltermeasures employed by the Israelisj.a.nnniDg ground radars., radio frequencies and weaponsi.rulo\Cations,), OQe can also detect the superior level oftraini.n.g aDd experieDCe that the IAF possesses. Thepjlo.t, knOw.ing his macmne" his environment and hism e ~ Qf tactical e.m.ployment, has alw.ays been theCell.ter of the Israeli Air Fo.rce. Their training reflectsthis concept. aiild it is obviously successful.History showlll toot the successful pilots, thos

v ~ t o r s who amassed the highest scores in air-to-aircomba.4 employed a surprisingly simple brand of aerialiacti.cs.. The methods of aircraft employment used bythe high scoring aces oJ th.e past have changed littlefrom Work War I to the p.resent. The most successfuloffensive tactics in a.ir-tlo-air combat include the useoJ surprise wbeuever possible, a fast pass from above,close-im. s.booting and two elements of mental judgment-t1ae ability O q.uickly aNd accurately size up a

~ t u a t i O l 1 , aDd prtideDce.EveD wit.11 today s so,phisticated, automatic, fire

and-fo.rget xmss.iJes the concept of getting in close, ofabsokI1ely ellSlLring a hit., still holds true. These generalfWldamel1tals can I e applied to helicopter vs. helicopter combat as well, aLthough the helicopter's uniqueperfocmance char.acteristics w.ill cause some modification to specific e c h n i q . u e s ~ Using simple tactics, gainll:tg the fIrst sight of a rotary wing adversary and quickly anticipating wbat he w.ill do, sets the stage for victory. Possessing the patience and demeanor to aggressively pick a fight to dictate the terms of an engagement, attacking and exploiting enemy weaknesses andthen firiug as close as your weapons, the situation andthe enemy will permit, will yield consistently positive

8

results. By immediately clearing the battle arethereafter you will ensure your survival and allow thbattle to be continued again another day.

History is filled with examples of soldiers who havprofited from the lessons of the past. Just as Hindenburg applied the lessons learned by Hannibal s victorat Cannae (in 216 BC) into the German battle plan foits stunning victories in the beginning of World WaI, so must the Army Aviation community see thlessons of history in its venture into the arena of aeriacombat between helicopters. Our counterhelicoptedoctrine and tactics are now being developed by somof the best minds in the Army s newest branch. In thidevelopment process we must be cognizant of historand apply what has been learned by our aviation predecessors during the last 65 years, for reinventing thwheel is a time consuming and wasteful process.

Army Aviation can provide the ground forces withthe low altitude air superiority needed for success onthe AirLand Battelfield. To learn how to do this wneed only to look over our shoulders and match ouweapons to the lessons of our aviation predecessorsfor he who fails to learn from the mistakes of the pasis destined to repeat them.

B.BLIOGRAPHY1 Joint General StaU communique II 480 FBIS-81,-080. Tehran rad .o in

Persian at 2030 hr.s GMT. 24 April 1,9,14.2 Jossen. Harvey F. Air-to-Air Combat. Aviation Digest. Jul,y 1-974.3 Baird. Robert L Check Six or Checkr:nate. Av.iation Diges t. Oct 1977.

pg. 7,4 Beasley,. LonDie S. Why Air-to-Air Missiles on Attack Helico,pters .

Aviation Digest. August 1.978. pg.20.5 Sims, Edward H. Fighter Tactics and Strat.egy 1-91-41 970. .. Aero

Publishers Inc . 1980, pg. 7.6 IBID, pg. 7.7 IBID. pg. 8,8 (a) Hartman. E. Der JagdtJieger. Motorbuch Verlag. Stuttgart 1978. pg.

14 .9 Personal interview w.ith COL (Ret) Hartman on 8 January 1984 at Wiel 1m

Schonbuch. Ger.many,10 Sims. pg. 93.11 IBID. pg, 217,12 Var:l Gilder. Walter L Realistic Training; The Key to Success in Aerial

Cor:nbat, USC&GSC T:hesis, Ft. Leavenworth . KS. 1979. pg. 9.13 IBID. pg. 11-20.14 Eshel. David (L Te. Ret. IOF),. The Lebanon War. Eshel-Dramit Ltd. Hod

Hasharod. Israel 1983, pg, 47 .

u.s. RMY VI TION DIGEST


11/32

AVIATION CENTER

WORKSHOPThe Department of Combined Arms Tactics

hosted an Air-to-Air Workshop from 30January to 3 February 1984 at the U SArmy Aviation Center, Ft Rucker, AL. The

purpose of the workshop was to producethe final draft of FM 1-107, Air-to-Air

Combat, which reflects a broad consensusof air-to-air tactics and doctrine for Army

Aviation units.

Captain James P Smith

THE NEED for a doctrinalpublication on air-to-air ATAcombat is based on an in-creasingly evident threat which exists in the form of heavily armedMAY 1984

rotary wing and flXed wing aircraft.In April 1983 work began on an

ATA manual, which was initiallycalled Field Manual (FM) 1-105,Air-to-Air Operations. The pre-

liminary draft of this manual waspublished and distributed for staffing at the Aviation Center in August1983. The Department of CombinedArms Tactics (DCAT) publishedand distributed Armywide the coordinating draft of FM 1-105 for staffing in October 1983.The response to the draft wasgenerally poor. Only 11 percent ofall the commands and agencies thatwere sent a draft of the manualreplied on DA Form 2028. In addition, most of the responses centeredaround spelling or grammatical errors. Few responses dealt with substantive issues on ATA tactics anddoctrine.As a result of the response, DCATdecided to host an Air-to-AirWorkshop. People from various services and units in the continentalUnited States and Europe attended.All of the attendees had worked extensively in the development ofATA tactics and doctrine. Those attending were:

6th Cavalry Brigade Air Combat) 2/17 Cav, 101st Airborne AA)Division 3/5 Cav, 9th Infantry Division U.S. Army Europe Headquarters, Training and

Doctrine Command Marine Aviation Weapons andTactics Squadron-l Army Development and Employment Agency Tactical Air Command, U.S.

Air Force Directorate of Evaluation andStandardization, Aviation Center. Department of Flight Training,Aviation Center

Department of Combined ArmsTactics, Aviation CenterAs stated, the primary purpose ofthe Air-to-Air Workshop was toproduce a final draft of the Army'sfirst ATA manual. For administrative reasons, the number ofthe FM was changed to 1-107. Toalign A T A doctrine with AirLandBattle doctrine, the title was changedto Air-to-Air Combat.

9


12/32

A brief synopsis of each chapterand appendix in FM 1-107 follows:

Chapter 1 Introduction: Provides an overview and incorporatesmuch of the Army's operationalconcept for air-to-air combat;covers roles and missions of ArmyAviation units and aircraft in ATAcombat; and briefly describes the iremployment. Chapter 2, Air-to-Air Threat:Emphasizes rotary wing and fixedwing Threat aircraft, and describestheir tactics and employment. Thischapter also contains informationand diagrams depicting the Threathelicopter vulnerabilities. Chapter 3, Air-to-Air CombatOperations: Integrates ATA combatinto the AirLand battlefield and tellsbattalion and brigade commandershow to plan for and conduct ATAcombat in combined arms operations. Chapter 4, Principles ofAir-toAir Combat: Describes the principles that must be adhered to inorder to fight and win in ATAcombat. Chapter 5, Air-to-Air Tactics:Covers suggested techniques for thetactical employment of helicoptervs. helicopter; helicopter vs. fixedwing aircraft; and Aviation units vs.Threat aircraft. Chapter 6, Air Combat Maneuvering ACM): Provides detaileddescriptions of single aircraft andteam maneuvers in air-to-air combat. These maneuvers may be usedwhen operation in the terrain flightenvironment is no longer feasible.ACM is normally used to obtainsuperior flring positions on an enemyaircraft or to quickly break contactand seek terrain masking.

Chapter 7 SEMA Air-to-AirTactics: Describes unclassified tactics for special electronic missionaircraft in ATA combat, and coversaircraft survivability equipment(ASE) used on special electronicmission aircraft. Appendix A Sample TrainingProgram for Air-to-Air Combat:Provides detailed guidance on the

1

academic and flight training required to train aircrews in ACMand unit employment in ATAcombat. Appendix B Aerial Ballistics:Briefly expands some of the information found in FM 17-40, Helicopter Gunnery. Covers factorsfor consideration in door gun andaerial gunnery.ATA Workshop RecommendationsIn addition to producing the finaldraft of FM 1-107, the workshop attendees made many recommendations on air-to-air combat. Majorrecommendations on ATA weapons,training and doctrine include thefollowing:

Begin training immediately inair-to-air combat. Despite ATAshortcomings in current weaponsystems, all Aviation units must betrained in ATA combat and aircombat maneuvering. By trainingnow with current systems, Aviationunits will better adapt to ATA combat when the AH-64 Apache, theOH-58D Kiowa, the air launchedStinger and improved gun systemsare fielded.

Incorporate ATA combat intoAirLand Battle doctrine by incorporating air-to-air doctrine intoA TMs for all Army aircraft; FM17-40, Helicopter Gunnery ; FM17-50, Attack Helicopter Operations ; FM 17-95 Cavalry ; andFM 100-5 Operations. Also, addclassified appendices to all aircraftoperators' manuals. These appendices would address in extensivedetail the air-to-air capabilities andlimitations of each aircraft, itsweapon systems and its aircraft survivability equipment.

Proposed aircraft modifications include improving the rotorsystem of the AH-IS Cobra toenhance aircraft agility and responsiveness; installing rearview mirrorson all helicopters to prevent beingsurprised from the 6-0'clock (rear)position; and complete fielding of

ASE on all Army aircraft. InstaAPR-39s, inf rared suppression kitsradar jamming equipment, etc., asoon as possible. Establish an air-to-air office athe Aviation Center. t should consist of ATA subject matter expertwho are responsible for developingcoordinating, implementing anmonitoring ATA tactics and doctrine, training and equipmenrequirements. Incorporate air-to-air trainininto aircraft simulators. Improve weapon systems foATA combat. Ideally all Army aircraft should be armed with an airto-air missile for long-range engagements and a high rate of fire cannon for short-range engagements

Also recommend that the A viation Center accept proponent responsibility for the developmenand instruction of ACM by Armair crews and recognize the need foACM factors-that they be considered in future Army aircraf(LHX) design, conflguration, annament and employment.

The Air-to-Air Workshop was major step in the Aviation Center'goal of producing a field manuaabout ATA combat. Although muchwork must be done to produce field manual, the final draft of FM1-107 reflects a broad consensus onair-to-air tactics and doctrine foArmy Aviation units.

ABOUT THE AUTHORCaptain James Smith was a project officer in the Department of Combined ArmTactics and the point of contact for FM1-107. He is currently commander of 45thCompany 1st Aviation Brigade Ft Rucker

CPT Smith is a graduate of USMA IOACand CAS3 .

u s ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


13/32

u.S. RMY

irectorate of Evaluation StandardizationR PORT TO THE FIEL VI TIONST ND RDIZ TION

TheewTMs

SINCE THE INCEPTION of aircrew training manuals(ATMs) in 1978 there have been numerous changesto tailor Army Aviation s training program. The purpose of A TMs which have been redesignated as fieldcirculars is to identify tasks that the aviator should accomplish to maintain proficiency. Thus, the ATMdelineates the tasks to be performed with conditionsand standards that must be met.Prior to the origin of ATMs, proficiency was maintained by specific annual hour requirements. However,there was no way to show what training was being accomplished for the resource dollar spent. With today sresource constraints, money is just not available to payfor an unlimited Flying Hour Program. Therefore, theuse of A TMs can considerably improve the resourcesneeded for maintaining pilot proficiency and unitreadiness.Notwithstanding, air crew training manuals are notproblem free. In its infancy the A TM went overboardwith the amount of required tasks, the iterations ofeach task and how often each should be accomplished.The Aviation uni t s specific mission was not givenstrong consideration. Simply put, commanders did nothave any real input that would help them tailor training programs to the unit s mission . Instead, the emphasis was on training in basic and emergency tasks.

MAY 984

Aircrew training manuals to be published:FC 1-210 ATM , Commander s Gu ide FC 1-211 ATM , Util ity Hel icopter, UH-1 FC 1-212 ATM , Utility Helicopter, UH-60 FC 1-213 ATM , Attack Helicopter, AH -1FC 1-214 ATM , Attack Helicopter, AH-64 FC 1-215 ATM , Observation Helicopter, OH-58 FC 1-216 ATM , Cargo Hel icopter, CH-4T'FC 1-217 ATM , Surve illance Airplane , OV-1 FC 1-218 ATM , Ut ility Airplane, C-12, U-21 and U-8

While the mission of the U.S. Army Aviation Centerat Ft. Rucker, AL, is to train pilots for the field andgive them the basic skills needed to be an asset to theAviation community, in the field it is up to unit commanders to train aviators to be assets to the unit inthe performance of their mission.The Commander s Guide, FC 1-210, is intended tobe a guideline for the commander, thereby it allowshim or her to design training programs around the

unit s mission with respect to the experience level of


14/32

REPORT o THE FIELthe aviators and permits the commander to tailor training based on individual needs.Whereas in the early life of aircrew training manualsemphasis was on training in basic and emergency tasks,now the stress is on tactical tasks. A TMs have beenand are still being revised to reflect this new emphasis.n example is the deletion of touchdown emergencyprocedures. This change alone will no doubt save onthe damage costs for training mishaps. To illustratethe point, statistics show that units in the field createa greater burden on themselves, both in maintenanceand instructor pilot workload, with the practice oftouchdown emergency procedures. f we wrote offevery aircraft, each time there has been an actualengine failure or antitorque malfunction, the cost indamages would not even come close to the cost of

damages due to training mishaps during which thesesame malfunctions were simulated.The touchdown emergency procedure task descriptions will remain in the ATM as an appendix. Thesemaneuvers have been retained for reference only andwill not be accomplished.By using the Commander s Guide and aircrew training manuals, the aviator s readiness level is determinedbased on accomplishment of the base tasks as well asthe special tasks. Moreover, the unit commander isable to reprogram individual aviator flight time to bestuse available resources. For example, a highly proficient aviator may require fewer hours to sustain hisor her proficiency than the average aviator. With thatin mind, commanders may consider this and reducethe highly proficient aviator s semiannual flying-hourrequirements by up to 25 percent. He can take thesereprogramed hours and give them to a less proficientaviator to meet his training requirements. Exercise ofthis reprogratning will not change the unit s totalflying-hour program.Commanders may also adjust unit or individualaviator semiannual A TM flight-hour requirements byup to 15 percent to meet training and mission needs.The aviators may fly up to 65 percent of the annualrequirements in one semiannual period, but not lessthan 35 percent in the other semiannual period. Again,exercise of this authority will not change the unit s annual flying-hour program, nor will it cause an in-DES welcomes your inquiries and requests to focus attentionon an area of major importance . Write to us at: CommanderU.S . Army Aviation Center ATTN: ATZQ ES Ft. Rucker AL

12

dividual aviator s annual aircrew training manualflight-hour requirements or tasks to be reduced. Inother words, the aviator still has to fly 1 percent ofhis or her determined hours and complete 1 percentof assigned tasks.The commander has been given more flexibility bythe deletion of the semiannual iteration requirement.The minimum iterations have been changed to oneiteration annually of ll base tasks for both F AC 1 andFAC 2 positions. The commander is now required todetermine the number of iterations each aviator willaccomplish based on his unit s training needs.Other changes that have been incorporated into individual A TMs include the consolidation of severalmaneuvers. For example, the normal, shallow andsteep approach tasks are now labeled the VMC (visualmeteorological conditions) approach. The rationalebehind this change is that approach angles are difficultto evaluate for standardization purposes. Therefore,the individual is required to pick an angle that will clearthe obstacle and maintain that angle to touchdown.Another example is the consolidation of terrainflight navigation, nap-of-the-earth (NOE), contourand low level flight into one task Terrain Flight. Toaccomplish this task, aviators will navigate theirselected routes after determining the mode of flightthey will use for the mission (i.e., NOE, contour orlow level).The tactical instrument flight planning, tactical instrument takeoff and approach are no longer mandatory base tasks. They are now considered specialtasks and will be accomplished only if selected by thecommander as a required task.In summary, the aircrew training manuals and theCommander s Guide are to help the unit commandersdesign and implement their Aviation training programs. We must remember that not all aviators areat the same level of experience, just as no two unitsare the same. Commanders need some flexibility inshaping aviator training needs to enhance the unit smission.Aircrew training manuals are still undergoing revisions. As draft comments are returned and implemented, ATMs that reflect recommended changesare being distributed to the field. In the meantime, wehere at DES welcome your comments and questionsabout ATMs.36362 ; or call us at AUTOVON 558 3504 or commercial 205255-3504.After duty hours call Ft.Rucker Hot LineAUTO VON558 6487 or 205 255 6487 and leave a message



15/32

BRANCH

Lieutenant Colonel William F VothChief Threat Branch

Directorate o Combat DevelopmentsU S Army Aviation Center

Fort Rucker AL

THREAT BRANCH is alive and well at Ft. Rucker, LA(Lower Alabama). In my last Threat Branch update article,which appeared in the February 982 issue of AviationDigest, Threat Branch had nine military analysts assigned.As of this writing, we still have nine, one of whom is a GS-12civilian who fills an intelligence research specialist (careerprogram 9 GS-132-12) position. While most of the faceshave changed, our threat support missions are much thesame.Threat articles, identified by our threat logo as seen above,have become a familiar and, we hope, helpful part of almostevery Aviation Digest issue over the years. Since know yourenemy" is one of the most basic laws of successful warfare,knowing may well save your life and will certainly help youdo a better job

To get the threat information you need and want, pleasetake a minute to jot down your ideas, questions or commentson the attached questionnaire. We would especially like toknow what Aviation threat subjects you want to see in futureA viation Digest articles.

Providing current threat information to the Aviation sector of the combined arms team through briefings andpublication of threat articles in military periodicals is amongour important missions. We also have several others whichdirectly and indirectly benefit you, the combat aviator. Weserve as the single point of contact for threat at the U.S.Army Aviation Center at Ft. Rucker, AL. This threat management function includes maintenance of the Center ThreatReference Library which contains the latest, all source,finished products from numerous intelligence agencies. Thisthreat information, including briefings, is also available toyou through your local threat representative or intelligenceofficer (see the threat training article in the April 983 A via-tion Digest . Our Threat Reference Library is the major

MAY 1984

source of information for the many articles and briefingswe are called upon to produce.

Our task of supporting the Army Aviation materiel acquisition process in all stages is our interface in the combatdevelopment (CD) community. At Ft. Rucker, threat drivesthe CD train. We enjoy the total support and confidenceof the CD structure and participate fully on the CD team.

The most significant new work being done in CD hascentered on the experimental Light Helicopter Family, orLHX concept. This completely new turn of the century airframe demands very comprehensive intelli_ence analysis including postulations of threats throughout its life cycle. Inthe CD business, the threat intelligence community is oftenchallenged to produce facts and figures on threat equipment,tactics and doctrine in greater detail than the CD'ers can giveon the U.S. system they are designing This difficult taskhas required one LHX threat analyst on a full-time basis andthe dedicated assistance from others on numerous occasions.As the Army Helicopter Improvement Program (AHIP)goes into its second operational test (OT II) this summer,extensive preparations in all areas are being made. Threatwise, we have published a comprehensive document titledOH-58D Scout Helicopter Threat Support Plan (TSP)which will guide testers on what threat the AHIP willconfront.Also in support of Army studies, one of our analysts spent6 months at White Sands Missile Range, NM, on the Forward Area Directed Energy Weapons Study.In addition to providing threat support to the residentTraining and Doctrine Command system managers for scout,attack and utility helicopters, aircraft survival equipment and

Aviation missiles such as HELLFIRE, Threat Branch alsosupports more than 30 departments, directorates, agenciesand other organizations at Ft. Rucker. Numerous briefings,fact sheets, studies and threat guidance in every form possible result from this part of our mission.

The third major mission area of Threat Branch is training and training development. We give guici'ance for andreview of lesson plans for threat content validity. In thiscapacity, we also monitor threat instruction in coordinationwith the Department of Combined Arms Tactics. Our branchis becoming more involved in review of all training literatureand audiovisual products containing threat portrayals. Youcan also blame us for those threat questions on the aviator'swritten examination.

Divided among us are 3 areas of subject matter. Eachanalyst specializes in several of these and is, therefore, thepoint of contact in that subject area. The figure shows theareas of interest and the analysts responsible.Threat Branch is a busy place. We do a lot of travelingto both gain and to give threat information. We receivenumerous calls daily from aviators requesting answers tothreat questions; and while a lot asked for is unclassified,often a visit to our office or a secure telephone call isnecessary due to the classification of the material (ask yourlocal Special Security Office for the AUTOSEVOCOM

13


16/32

number . In this regard, one of our primary missions s getting current threat information to you through publicationof threat articles and assisting you in requesting threat training material. Any suggestion how to better do this would

be welcomed. Write: Director of ombat Developments,ATTN: ATZQ-D-CT, Ft. Rucker, AL 36362. AUTOVON558-3506/5671; commercial 205-255-3506/ 5671. Let us hearfrom you.

4

LTC William F. VothAviation 15/35)

*1 , 2 , 5, 6 , 10 , 12, 13

CPT (P) James A. HerbergAviation 15/35)*2 , 5, 7, 11,12

SP5 Tonia PerryOrder of Battle Analyst

96B20)*1 , 4 , 13

MAJ Julius J. ZebehazyAviation 15/35)*5 , 6 , 7, 10, 11

1 L T Charles M. ThomasMilitary Intelligence (35)*1 , 2, 4, 12

SP4 Robert A. JonesOrder of Battle Analyst

96BI0)*1 , 3, 4, 13

* Areas of expertiselNuclear,Biological andChemical Warfare2-Tactics and Doctrine3-0rder of Battie, Mid/Far East4-0rder of Batt le, Europe

5- Tactical A ir Defense6- Tactical Aviation7- Ground Vehicles8 Electronic Warfare9 Directed Energy Weapons

MAJ Dale L. RadtkeAviation 15/35)* 1, 2, 4, 8, 9 , 12

MSG Richard K. McNealOrder of Battle Analyst 96B50)

* 2 , 3 , 4, 7, 8 , 9, 10, 11

. , ' .y

GS-12 Edward J. BavaroIntelligence Research

Specialist 132)* 2, 5 , 6, 12

10-Current IntelligenceII-Field ArtilleryI2-Materiel.Acquisition ProcessI3-Data Base Management

u.s. ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


17/32

USAAVNC THREAT BRANCHuestionnairel What do you think of our threat articles?o good D o.k. D bad2 Which threat articles from past issues were outstanding?..not so outstanding?

no3 re threat articles helpful to you in unit training? Dyescomment ______________________________________________ __4 What threat subjects would you like to see addressed in future articles?5 How would you assess the the level of emphasis on threat awareness in your unit?o satisfactory D unsatisfactory How can we help?6 Prioritize threats to 1. S. Army Aviation by numbering the following one through nine1 =highest threat):_ Radioelectronic Combat Artillery

_ Small Arms Tactical Air Defense ZS 1 23-4,SA-7,SA-9)_ Antitank Guided Missile Soviet Army Aviation air-to-air)

Tank Main Gun Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Warfare___ Directed Energy Weapons (laser, particle beam, EMP)

7 Do you have any questions, comments or requests?

8ptional) rank,nameduty positionunit addressA(1TOVON


18/32

line at right fold and mai I postage free

Department of the ArmyU.S. Army Aviation CenterATTN: ATZQ D CTFt Rucker, AL 36362

OFFICIAL BUSINESSPENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE S3

18

16

FOL

POSTAGE AND FEES PAIDDEPARTMENT OF THE ARMYDOD 314

TO CommanderU.S. Army Aviation CenterATIN: ATZQ-[) CTFort Rucker, AL 36362

FOL


19/32

We Need More Aviation Logisticiansf you are a Year Oroup (YO) 1978 or 1979 Specialty

Code (SC) 15 Aviation officer who would like to holdtwo aviation specialties, your chance will come soonerthan you might think. We need to designate about 60Aviation officers from each group to receive SC 71(Logistics) as an additional specialty (ADSPEC).Awarding SC 71 as an ADSPEC to those 15s with 6years of service is a transition action between accessing SC 71s in fiscal year 1983 and eventually awardingSC 71 as an ADSPEC at the point of Aviation OfficerAdvanced Course training. In April 1984 Military Personnel Center was to have sent those of you in YO78 a letter asking for yOur ADSPEC preferences. Amarksense form will be provided on which you shouldindicate your desires and then return it directly toMILPERCEN. YO 79 officers will be given the Sameopportunity later in 1984. In both instances, themarksense forms of those SC 15 officers not awardedan ADSPEC of 71 will be retained by MILPERCENand used during the upcoming normal ADSPECdesignation cycles for each respective year group (YO78 officers will be processed later in 1984; YO 79 officers will be designated in 1985).While we're on the subject of Aviation Logisticiansconsider the slot you're in. We recently found twoAviation Logisticians occupying slots coded for SC 72(communications-electronics materiel management)officers. While such mal-utilization may be necessaryunder some circumstances it is certainly not desirable.

MAY 984

Officers slotted as SC 72 are prohibited from flyingand do not accumulate operational flying duty credit.

New Engineering Test Pilot SelecteesCongratulations to the 10 officers selected by the1984 Army Aviation Engineering Test Pilot SelectionBoard. These officers were selected as most qualified" from 47 applicants, to attend the rigorous NavalTest Pilot School at Patuxent River Naval Air Station.Selectees are as follows:

MAJ John S. LaurenceCPT Edwin S. BormanCPT James D. BrownCPT Waldo F. CarmonaCPT Michael R. CliffordCPT (P) Telford W. LarewCPT Paul W. LosierCW4 Michael B. FatmerCW3 Stephen O. CrouchCW3 Joseph A. LyleWell done We'll get you slated into school jus t as

soon as possible. For you aviators who are interestedin research and development careers-the next selection board will be in early 1985. Check out how youstack up against the prerequisites expressed in DA Circular 351-82-5. There will be a new one out this fall.Don't wait until the last minute to submit yourapplication. -.iiii

17


20/32

WITCHTHBIRDIE

~ , . . , . . ,US RMY SlHTY IIIHR J j ~

18 u s RMY VI TION DIGEST


21/32

HAT MIGHT AN AirForce base in Delaware,an Army post inKentucky and an affluentneighborhood in Montgomery,AL, have in common? In oneinstance all three foundthemselves taken over by flocksof birds. The birds wereeventually dispersed but notbefore some serious damage hadbeen caused from birdstrikesresulting in a temporarysuspension of flying operations atthe military installations. Thedanger to people fromhistoplasmosis, a disease carriedby birds, was a major concern inMontgomery and at Ft.Campbell l KY. It took acooperative effort involving theAir Force, Army, FederalAviation Administration, U.S.Fish and Wildlife Service, airtraffic control and weatherpersonnel and even an outdooreditor from the local newspaperto finally control the problem atthe Air Force base.There were 3,975 aircraft birdstrikes reported to theInternational Civil AviationOrganization (ICAO) in 1981.Two of the aircraft were totallydestroyed, 1 5 sustainedsubstantial damage and 366received minor damage.According to ICAO, only onefifth of its members werereporting for that period; if allmembers had participated thenumber of strikes could haveexceeded 10,000.

In addition, little informationhad been received from Centraland South America, Africa, theMiddle East and Asia. Some ofthese areas, with their tropicaland semitropical vegetation andlarge populations of wildlife,would have added significantly tothe reported figures.ICAO found 65 percent of thereported bird strikes occurred on

MAY 984

the ground during parking,taxiing, takeoff roll or onlanding. Forty-two percentoccurred above the ground andbelow 2,500 feet. Five percentoccurred while the aircraft wasen route.

How much of a problem birdsare to your flying operations willvary greatly depending on whereyou are located geographicallyand the routes you fly. Armyunits in the Panama Caned Zone,for example, have found birds tobe a significant hazard. It is aproblem which probably shouldbe considered in planning airoperations in Central America.

f you think all that abirdstrike amounts to is a fistfulof feathers, a few bloodyremains and a possible dent inthe fuselage, consider whathappened to a C-5 at DoverAFB, DE, when it flew into aflock of geese at approximately1 feet agl during takeoff.Examination of the damagerevealed a football-size dent inthe nose cone of number 4engine, dents in the leading edgeof the cowling, large pieces ofmetal missing from the first andsecond stage fan blades of the1.5 million-dollar engine andlarge jagged holes ripped throughthe cowling by a disintegratingengine rotating at 8,000 rpm.The leading edge of number 3engine cowling had several dentsand shrapnel from number 4engine had caused two bullet-sizeholes on the outboard side of theengine pylon. Luckily none ofthe fuel, electric and hydrauliclines located in that area hadbeen hit. Two geese had crashedthrough the nose wheel wellbulkhead and had come to rest1 feet inside the fuselage.Number 2 engine fan bladesshowed the same kind of damageas number 4. Outside of minorfan damage, number 1 engine

was in pretty good shape. Thecrew had managed, against heavyodds, to land the aircraft safely.There were 40 passengers onboard.

So before you dismiss birds asa minor problem, you mightwant to assess the hazards theypresent to your flying operations.The Air Force Bird AircraftStrike Hazard (BASH) team hasdone a lot of your work for you.Distributed with the February1984 issue of the Air ForceSafety Journal was a guidancepackage produced by this teamwhich is located at Tyndall AirForce Base, FL. The packageincludes information on birdavoidance and provides ways toidentify conditions which attractbirds and methods recommendedto disperse them. The packagealso has a list of state agenciesthat can help in solving localbird problems. An outline isprovided for developing aneffective bird hazard reductionplan. The BASH team has giventheir permission to reproduce thisguidance package. Copies will bedistributed to all Army aviationsafety officers.The frequency of bird strikesduring the months of Julythrough October is 3 to 4 timeshigher than that in thenonmigratory months of theyear. It's time now to getready watch the birdie. ZSourcesFlight Safety Digest July 1983.Luckenbach, Michael G., Major,USAF, Just AnotherBirdstrike, The MA C FlyerOctober 1983.Sterling, Dwight D., Major,USAF, A Few GoodBirdbrains, Flying SafetyFebruary 1984.

9


22/32

PEARI SPersonal Equipment And Rescue survival LowdotNn

Shelley oles photo by Reflections Studio

SARSATFor those of you who think emergency locatortransmitters (ELTs) are not going to improve yourchances for a quick rescue and recovery because Armyaircraft do not have VHF/UHF direction findingcapability, or other service and civilian aircraft prob-ably are not monitor ing 121.5 or 243.0 anyway, I havetwo words for you, COSPAS-SARSAT Gee-whizyou think, two more acronyms to try and cram intoyour already crowded memory. Seems there is a neverending array of buzz words and acronyms that younever see any hardware or results from. Such is notthe case here SARSAT means search and rescuesatellite aided tracking and has been opera tional sinceJune 1982, when the Soviet Union launched the firstsatellite known as COSPAS 1 Thus the COSP -SARSAT. This project was formed when the UnitedStates, Canada, France, Norway and the Soviet Unionas participating partners joined resources to explorethe feasibility of using satellites to detect and locateELT signals from aircraft and ships in distress. Thereare three satellites in near polar orbit and a fourth isplanned for launch in August 1984. These satellites candetermine the geographical location of a transmitting

2

ELT by using Doppler effect (measuring shifts in frequency as the satellite passes over the transmittingELT . This information is then relayed back to earthvia a network of ground receiving terminals. Each participating nation has a na tional mission control center(MCC) and at least one ground receiving terminal. Inthe United States the Air Force, Coast Guard, NationalAeronautics and Space Administration and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration havecooperated in the SARSAT Program.

The United States MCC s manned by USAF personnel at Scott AFB, IL, and colocated with the AirForce Rescue Coordination Center there. U.S. receiving terminals are located at Scott AFB, IL; Pt. Reyes,CA; and Kodiak, AK. The California and Alaska sitesare operated by the U.S. Coast Guard.

In Canada the terminal and MCC s at Ottawa, Ontario, and extends coverage into the Atlantic Ocean.Canada plans to install three more receiver terminalswhich will extend coverage over all of Canada andabove the Arctic Circle. Currently the four NorthAmerican terminals provide 121.5, 243.0 and 406megahertz coverage over the continental United States,Alaska, Mexico, densely populated areas of Canadaand the maritime regions. Additionally, terminals inFrance, Norway and the Soviet Union providecoverage of Europe and parts of Asia. For those ofyou flying in Europe, the terminals and MCCs inFrance and Norway will notify the USAF RescueCoordination Center (RCC) at Ramstein Air ForceBase in Germany. Upon receiving an ELT signal thatis within the geographical area of responsibility for theRCC at Ramstein, the French and Norwegians w ll alsoalert the appropriate national search and rescueorganization.

COMING UP SOON: Pointers on search and rescueplans operations and procedures for Army Aviationunits.

U S RMY VI TION DIGEST


23/32

oPTION L DSRU2 P Survival Vest Component List

1. Vest Contents, Assembly2. Vest, Survival, Small or Large3. Light Marker, Distress (Strobe Light)4. Signal Kit, Foliage Penetrating (Flares)5. Survival Kit, Individual Tropical6. Tourniquet, Nonpneumatic, Camouflage7. Compass, Lensatic8. Net, Gill Fishing9. Knife, Pocket

10. Bag, Storage, Drinking Water, Size B11. Mirror, Emergency Signaling12. Fire Starter, Aviation Survival, Magnesium13. Assembly Instruction Sheet(Not Shown Put in either inside pocket)14. De.leted15. DeJeted

SRU 21/P Survival VestThe current configuration o the SRU-21/P survivalvest s shown above. Notice that there are some newitems and some items have been deleted. We recom-

16. Deleted17. Cartridge, Caliber .38 Ball18. Cartridge, Caliber .38 Tracer19. Radio, AN/PRC90 (Pocket used will be NSN8415004423616)20. Blanket, Combat Casualty21. Whistle, Ball, Plastic22. Operator s Manual (Not Shown Put in either insidepocket)23. Optional item. Knife, Hunting, Sheathed. If issued,may be located as shown in this drawing alongsidePRC-90 radio pocket (Item 1924. Optional item. Pistol Holster for .38 Caliber Pistol.

Holster will be fitted to wearer as shown25. Vest, Survival, Large or Small26. Insect Repellent, 1 ounce

mend you ALSE technicians use this to make copiesto include in your unit s survival vests. Point o contact at Natick Labs for this item s Mr. Chuck Braga,AUTOVON 256-5449.If you have a question about personal equipment or rescue/survival gear write PEARL DARCOM ATTN: DRCPO-ALSE4300 Goodfellow Blvd. Sf. Louis MO 63120 or call AUTOVON 693-1218/9 or ommercial 314-263-1218/9.

MAY 984 2


24/32

W I I 1 r I I ( Q ) ~IL Q)CGJ II 1rIICC

Mr Otis L aislip Jru s Army Aviation Logistics School

Fort Eustis VA

I T WAS JUST WH T I needed. After 32 yearsin aviation maintenance and logistics, I became amember of the newest Training and Doctrine Com-mand TRADOC) service school: the U.S. Army Avia-tion Logistics School. t was like tasting the sweetspring of youth again. There was only one flaw. I wasstill at the same place, doing pretty much the samething I had been doing for years. I guess this deservesan explanation.The emerging prominence of Army Aviation re-sulted in creation of the Aviation Branch in the springof 1983. A part of the Aviation Branch Implementa-tion Plan called for the establishment of the AviationLogistics School at Ft. Eustis, VA. Sounds like amassive stroke, but not really. Since 1952, the U.S.Army Transportation Corps had been responsible forthe Army Aviation logistics program, and the largestpart of the U.S. Army Transportation School at Ft.Eustis was devoted to that mission. The responsiblegeneral officers got together and decided that theTransportation School could be reorganized to create


25/32

MAY 984

u s rmy viation Logistics SchoolFort Eustis, Virginia 23604

Commercial: 804) 878-XXXXAUTOVON: 927 -XXXX

Commandant

ssistant Commandant5503 7103

Department ofAviation Systems

3001 2682

Department ofAviation Trades

23


26/32

two schools at Ft. Eustis: The Transporta tion School(less Aviation logistics) and the new Aviation LogisticsSchool. Their plan was implemented on 1 October1983, with no increase in resources at Ft. Eustis.The mission of the Aviation Logistics School is tosupport the Aviation Branch and to integrate Aviation logistics into the overall Army logistics program.TRADOC School Model 83 was also implementedin October 1983, so it was almost double trouble formany of the managers and administrative people-but older members of the staff were more accustomedto the rigors of reorganization: office moves, dividingthe files, new telephone charts and numbers, new office symbols, rating schemes misrouted correspondence,misplaced property, etc. Fortunately, a lot of us wereexperienced enough to be able to protect the missionworkers from most of these frustrations. Consequently, the new school was born without interruption ofmission.An important part of the school s operating procedure is based on a Memorandum of Agreement(MOA) between its commandant, Major General AaronL. Lilley, and Major General Bobby J. Maddox, commander of the U.S. Army Aviation Center, Ft.Rucker, AL. The MOA delineates responsibilities andoperations of the Aviation Logistics School (ALS) asthey pertain to the Aviation Branch and the Armylogistics community; it also solidifies coordinatingprocedures.With a few approved deviations, ALS is organizedin accordance with School Model 83. The deviationsare designed to save resources. As an example, theSchool Brigade and the School Secretary s Office support both the Transportation and the Aviation LogisticsSchools. Otherwise, the two schools are separate except that they have the same commandant, MG Lilley,and assistant commandant, Colonel Albert B. Luster;both are Master Army Aviators and old hands at Aviation logistics. The deputy assistant commandant of theAviation Logistics School is Colonel Ronald L._Bellows. Sergeant Major Richard L. Jackson, Ms.

4

Joan P. Garrison and I try to keep the papers movingin COL Bellows office.Administrative, logistics and operational support forthe Aviation Logistics School is provided by the Programs Management Office and its chief, Major JamesMeans. He manages the TDA (table of distributionand allowances), personnel actions, correspondencedistribution, budget, facilities, supply and anythingthat does not fall in someone else s area.Personnel management studies, analyses and policiesfor Aviation logistics enlisted personnel, officers andwarrant officers have their origins in the ProponencyOffice. Its chief is Major (P) Colon Keel. Conversionof personnel to the Aviation Branch has given him aking-sized migraine, but he hangs in there. With anAUTOVON call in each hand, we think the SignalCorps is going to claim him as a part of its communications network.The Director of Combat Developments (DCD) isLieutenant Colonel Gary Johnson. His folks developconcepts and studies for Aviation logistics. These oftenmaterialize as new support equipment. They also developAviation logistics organizations. As all the new things(organization, operation plans and new equipment) areput together, his test and evaluation people design teststo make sure it all works as planned. Some of DCD sprojects include the Transportable Helicopter Enclosure (aportable maintenance shelter), a self-propelled maintenance crane, a new ground power unit, the Helicopter Internal Cargo Handling System, Unit Productivity Studies, and Battle Damage Repair Systems.Organizational design activity has been so hot andheavy of late, that LTC Johnson is beginning to thinkthat Infantry Division 84 beats any number that Excedrin has shown on TV, and Basis of Issue Plan issomething that happens after swallowing too muchforce modernization.Lieutenant Colonel (P) Grover Snipes is the Director of Training and Doctrine (DOTD). His organization develops Aviation logistics doctrine and training.When the reorganizational smoke cleared, he found



27/32

M Y 984 5


28/32

6

This is the fourth in a series o articles that covers the new trainingplan evelope for Aviation officers, both commissioned and warrant.The first article, Training The Aviation Warrant and ommissionedOfficers was an overview o the entire training plan and appeared inthe March issue. In April the Aviation Digest published the AviationOfficer Basic Course and the Warrant Officer Candidate MilitaryDevelopment Course.

heOfficer/WarrantOfLicerRotary Wing Aviatorourse

Captain P) Charles W. HenryCourse Development Division

Directorate o Training and DoctrineU.S. Army Aviation Center

Fort Rucker AL

illustration by Paul Fretts

TH OFFICER/WARRANT Officer RotaryWing Aviator Course O/WORWAC is the secondphase in the training of potential Aviation commis-sioned officers and Aviation warrant officers and is36 weeks 2 days in length. It provides academic andflight training leading to qualification s an Army aviator.

The /WORWAC consists of several phases whichare depicted in the diagram on page 27.

U S ARMY AVIATION DIGEST


29/32

Preflight TrainingDuring the 2-week period known as preflight training, Aviation students are provided academic trainingto prepare them for their first flight. Students aretaught basic aerodynamics, helicopter controls andfunctions, visual flight rules (VFR), aviation weatherand TH-55 Osage aircraft systems. Students alsoundergo physiological training such as an altitudechamber exercise, and attend a series of aeromedicalclasses. All training during this phase is designed toacquaint the student with the basic principles ofAviation.

Primary Flight TrainingDuring the third week of the course, students moveonto the flight line at Hanchey Army Airfield to begintheir flight training. From this point on, students spendabout 5.5 hours per day at the flight line, and about3 hours in academics with a 40-minute lunch break atmidday. At the conclusion of the formal training day,students have homework assignments to complete inpreparation for the next day s training.

The flight training during this phase consists ofabout 5 flight hours, flown over an 8-week period.Primary flight training is conducted by a civilian flighttraining contractor. The TH-55A is used to train flightstudents in basic helicopter flight skills. Students learnsuch fundamental skills as starting and runup procedures, hovering flight, takeoffs and landings, straightand level flight, basic flight maneuvers and emergency proced ures.Upon demonstrating satisfactory performance in required flight tasks, students are allowed to solo. Aftersuccessfully soloing, students begin to alternate between dual flights with their instructor pilot (IP) andsolo flights. The dual flight periods allow the P tointroduce new flight maneuvers and to evaluate andupgrade previously acquired skills. The solo flights areused to practice maneuvers designated by the student sP and to build self-confidence. Students are counseledand receive flight grade slips at the conclusion of each

flight training period.As students approach the 50-hour mark for flighttime, they take their end-of-phase flight evaluation.

MAY 984

FLIGHT

7


30/32

UH l Transition

8 RMY IGES


31/32

The eroscout Track

ArI lJgnC pri CourseOfficer


32/32

us rmyCommunicationsCommandTe CTION LINE

Joint Use of MilitaryirfieldsTHE FOLLOWING is extracted from the executive

summary of the Department of Defense/Departmentof Transportation Congressional Directed Plan forJoint Use of Military Airfields and is provided forgeneral information.

The 958 Aviation Act authorized the Departmentof Defense DOD) to regulate public use of militaryairfields. The DOD had released 24 airfields for jointuse, when it was determined that such use would notadversely affect ongoing military operations. In addition to the 24 domestic military airfields having jointuse agreements, many other airfields permit limitedcivil operations on a case-by-case basis in response tospecific requests.Within this context, and in response to PL97-248,the DOD has developed a systematic approach for additional airfields to be made available when a qualifiedsponsor proposes joint use at a military airfield. Thecornerstone of this approach is the following DODpolicy on joint use:

The Department of Defense determines thefeasibility and extent of joint use at military airfields. The Department of Defense will considerjoint use when it is determined that joint use doesnot compromise military response, security,readiness or safety. Joint use of military airfieldswill be considered on a case-by-case basis whena formal proposal is submitted by a local government agency eligible to sponsor a public airport.Established criteria and good judgment will beused by the Department of Defense whenevaluating formal proposals.

From this policy, criteria for submitting andevaluating joint use requests have been developed, andare described briefly:

Submitting Joint se Requests Joint use requestswill be considered when proposed by a local government agency eligible to sponsor a public airport. Civiloperations must begin within 5 years of formalizingthe agreement between the concerned service and thelocal government agency.Evaluating Joint se Requests-Generally an airfield will be considered for joint use if it does not havea nuclear alert force, pilot training student orqualification), nuclear storage or a major classifiedmission. Joint use operators should not require colocation of military and civil aircraft, routine accessto the civil facilities through the installation, nor increased airfield operating hours.

When evaluating each proposal, the appropriatemilitary department, at a minimum, will consider thefollowing areas:

a. Airspaceb. Traf fic mixc. Instal lation mission current and future)d. Type of proposed civil usee. Existing civil facilitiesf. Airfield configurationg. Availability of landh. Navigation aidsi. Fire, crash and rescue capabilitiesj. ~ i r c r f t arresting systemsk. Encroachment1 Security

m. Manpower requirementsn. Reimbursement termso. Environmenta l impactAs stated, the above is extracted from the Ex-

ecutive Summary of the DOD/DOT Plan for JointUse of Military Airfields. The director, USAATCAASO is the executive agent for Department of theArmy Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Planson joint use matters. Mr. Burch, AUTOVON284-7796/6304 is your point of contact for joint usematters.