ContentsAcknowledgmentsIntroductionChapter 1. Of Doctrine and ManualsDoctrine as ChoiceThe U.S. Army, 1973A New FM 100—5

Chapter 2. The General and the Army, 1941—73William E. DePuyDePuy in World War IIThe Influence of Hamilton H. HowzeVietnam and the Big Red OneA Tactical StyleOperation Steadfast—Reorganizing CONARCToward a New Doctrine

Chapter 3. Assessing the October War, 1973—74The New TRADOC CommanderStrategic Realities and TrainingFiscal Realities and WeaponsLessons of the October War

Chapter 4. Harnessing TRADOC, 1974Training LiteratureThe Armor Center LeadsWriting a ConceptExpanding the Dialogue

Chapter 5. Conflicting Ideas, 1974—75Fort Leavenworth: The "Ingegrating Center" That Wasn'tDifferent Generals, Different IdeasDifferent Ideas, Different ManualsNo Compromise

Chapter 6. The Higher Politics of Developing Doctrine:The Germans and the U.S. Air ForceThe Influence of German DoctrineThe TAC Connection and Air-Land BattleThe Effects of Collaboration

Chapter 7. TRADOC Writes the ManualThe Army Loses AbeDoctrine, Weapons, and BudgetsThe Active DefenseThe Boathouse GangGeting Everyone AboardThe Final Draft

Chapter 8. Toward the Best Available ThoughtThe Early CritiqueFM 100—5 and the Doctrinal Process

NotesBibliography