arroy vs. de venecia

7/31/2019 Arroy vs. de Venecia

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 127255. August 14, 1997]

JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R. OSMEA, WIGBERTO E.TAADA, and RONALDO B. ZAMORA,petitioners, vs. JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL DAZA,RODOLFO ALBANO, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, ANDTHE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

MENDOZA,J.:

This is a petition forcertiorari and/or prohibition challenging the validity of Republic Act No. 8240,which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called sintaxes (actually specific taxes) on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes.

Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit against respondentsJose de Venecia, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Deputy Speaker Raul Daza, Majority LeaderRodolfo Albano, the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Finance, and the Commissioner of InternalRevenue, charging violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally

mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.The law originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bill was approved on thirdreading on September 12, 1996 and transmitted on September 16, 1996 to the Senate which approved itwith certain amendments on third reading on November 17, 1996. A bicameral conference committeewas formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill.

The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House at 8 a.m. on November 21,1996. At 11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier, chairman of the Committee on Ways andMeans, proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speech, after which he was interpellated. Rep. RogelioSarmiento was first to interpellate. He was interrupted when Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack ofquorum. Rep. Antonio Cuenco objected to the motion and asked for a head count. After a roll call, the

Chair (Deputy Speaker Raul Daza) declared the presence of a quorum.[1] Rep. Arroyo appealed theruling of the Chair, but his motion was defeated when put to a vote. The interpellation of the sponsorthereafter proceeded.

Petitioner Rep. Joker Arroyo registered to interpellate. He was fourth in the order, following Rep.Rogelio Sarmiento, Rep. Edcel C. Lagman and Rep. Enrique Garcia. In the course of his interpellation,Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a question on the quorum, although until the end ofhis interpellation he never did. What happened thereafter is shown in the following transcript of thesession on November 21, 1996 of the House of Representatives, as published by Congress in thenewspaper issues of December 5 and 6, 1996:

MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move that we now approve and ratify the conference committee report.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the motion?MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker?

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none, approved.

(Gavel)

MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I want to know what is thequestion that the Chair asked the distinguished sponsor.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There was a motion by the Majority Leader for approval of
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the report, and the Chair called for the motion.

MR. ARROYO. Objection, I stood up, so I wanted to object.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is suspended for one minute.

(It was 3:01 p.m.)

(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed)

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is resumed.

MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four oclock, Wednesday, next week.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is adjourned until four oclock, Wednesday, nextweek.

(It was 3:40 p.m.)

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Presidentof the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having beenfinally passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolledbill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.

Petitioners claim that there are actually four different versions of the transcript of this portion of Rep.Arroyos interpellation: (1) the transcript of audio-sound recording of the proceedings in the sessionhall immediately after the session adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996, which petitioner Rep.Edcel C. Lagman obtained from the operators of the sound system; (2) the transcript of the proceedingsfrom 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996, as certified by the Chief of the TranscriptionDivision on November 21, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; (3) the transcript of the proceedingsfrom 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996 as certified by the Chief of the TranscriptionDivision on November 28, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; and (4) the published versionabovequoted. According to petitioners, the four versions differ on three points, to wit: (1) in the audio-sound recording the word approved, which appears on line 13 in the three other versions, cannot be

heard; (2) in the transcript certified on November 21, 1996 the word no on line 17 appears only once,while in the other versions it is repeated three times; and (3) the published version does not contain thesentence (Y)ou better prepare for a quorum because I will raise the question of the quorum, whichappears in the other versions.

Petitioners allegations are vehemently denied by respondents. However, there is no need to discussthis point as petitioners have announced that, in order to expedite the resolution of this petition, theyadmit, without conceding, the correctness of the transcripts relied upon by the respondents. Petitionersagree that for purposes of this proceeding the word approved appears in the transcripts.

Only the proceedings of the House of Representatives on the conference committee report on H. No.7198 are in question. Petitioners principal argument is that R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it

was passed in violation of the rules of the House; that these rules embody the constitutional mandatein Art. VI, 16(3) that each House may determine the rules of its proceedings and that, consequently,violation of the House rules is a violation of the Constitution itself. They contend that the certificationof Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed is false and spurious.

More specifically, petitioners charge that (1) in violation of Rule VIII, 35 and Rule XVII, 103 of therules of the House,[2] the Chair, in submitting the conference committee report to the House, did notcall for theyeas ornays, but simply asked for its approval by motion in order to prevent petitionerArroyo from questioning the presence of a quorum; (2) in violation of Rule XIX, 112,[3]the Chairdeliberately ignored Rep. Arroyos question, What is that . . . Mr. Speaker? and did not repeat Rep.
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Albanos motion to approve or ratify; (3) in violation of Rule XVI, 97,[4] the Chair refused torecognize Rep. Arroyo and instead proceeded to act on Rep. Albanos motion and afterward declaredthe report approved; and (4) in violation of Rule XX, 121-122, Rule XXI, 123, and Rule XVIII,109,[5] the Chair suspended the session without first ruling on Rep. Arroyos question which, it isalleged, is a point of order or a privileged motion. It is argued that Rep. Arroyos query should havebeen resolved upon the resumption of the session on November 28, 1996, because the parliamentary

situation at the time of the adjournment remained upon the resumption of the session.Petitioners also charge that the session was hastily adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996 andthe bill certified by Speaker Jose De Venecia to prevent petitioner Rep. Arroyo from formallychallenging the existence of a quorum and asking for a reconsideration.

Petitioners urge the Court not to feel bound by the certification of the Speaker of the House that the lawhad been properly passed, considering the Courts power under Art. VIII, 1 to pass on claims of graveabuse of discretion by the other departments of the government, and they ask for a reexamination ofTolentino v. Secretary of Finance,[6] which affirmed the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill, in view ofthe changed membership of the Court.

The Solicitor General filed a comment in behalf of all respondents. In addition, respondent De Venecia

filed a supplemental comment. Respondents defense is anchored on the principle of separation ofpowers and the enrolled bill doctrine. They argue that the Court is not the proper forum for theenforcement of the rules of the House and that there is no justification for reconsidering the enrolledbill doctrine. Although the Constitution provides in Art. VI, 16(3) for the adoption by each House ofits rules of proceedings, enforcement of the rules cannot be sought in the courts except insofar as theyimplement constitutional requirements such as that relating to three readings on separate days before abill may be passed. At all events, respondents contend that, in passing the bill which became R.A. No.8240, the rules of the House, as well as parliamentary precedents for approval of conference committeereports on mere motion, were faithfully observed.

In his supplemental comment, respondent De Venecia denies that his certification of H. No. 7198 isfalse and spurious and contends that under the journal entry rule, the judicial inquiry sought by the

petitioners is barred. Indeed, Journal No. 39 of the House of Representatives, covering the sessions ofNovember 20 and 21, 1996, shows that On Motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Bodyapproved the Conference Committee Report on House Bill No. 7198.[7]This Journal was approved onDecember 2, 1996 over the lone objection of petitioner Rep. Lagman.[8]

After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for holding that Congresscommitted a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240. This case is therefore dismissed.

First. It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated in the enactment ofR.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutionalrequirements for the enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, 26-27. Petitioners do not claim that there wasno quorum but only that, by some maneuver allegedly in violation of the rules of the House, Rep.

Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum.Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the constitutional provision thateach House may determine the rules of its proceedings[9]and that for this reason they are judiciallyenforceable. To begin with, this contention stands the principle on its head. In the decided cases,[10]the constitutional provision that each House may determine the rules of its proceedings was invokedby parties, although not successfully, precisely to support claims of autonomy of the legislative branchto conduct its business free from interference by courts. Here petitioners cite the provision for theopposite purpose of invoking judicial review.
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But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power toinquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules,in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of privateindividuals. In Osmea v. Pendatun,[11] it was held: At any rate, courts have declared that the rulesadopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of thebody adopting them. And it has been said that Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with

their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislativebody. Consequently, mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action(taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particularmeasure.

In United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co.,[12] the rule was stated thus: The Constitution empowers eachhouse to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints orviolate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method ofproceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within theselimitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the House, and it is no impeachmentof the rule to say that some other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is noobjection to the validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and in force for a length of

time. The power to make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power,always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyondthe challenge of any other body or tribunal.

In Crawford v. Gilchrist,[13] it was held: The provision that each House shall determine the rules of itsproceedings does not restrict the power given to a mere formulation of standing rules, or to theproceedings of the body in ordinary legislative matters; but in the absence of constitutional restraints,and when exercised by a majority of a constitutional quorum, such authority extends to a determinationof the propriety and effect of any action as it is taken by the body as it proceeds in the exercise of anypower, in the transaction of any business, or in the performance of any duty conferred upon it by theConstitution.

In State ex rel. City Loan & Savings Co. v. Moore,[14] the Supreme Court of Ohio stated: Theprovision for reconsideration is no part of the Constitution and is therefore entirely within the control ofthe General Assembly. Having made the rule, it should be regarded, but a failure to regard it is not thesubject-matter of judicial inquiry. It has been decided by the courts of last resort of many states, andalso by the United States Supreme Court, that a legislative act will not be declared invalid fornoncompliance with rules.

In State v. Savings Bank,[15] the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut declared itself as follows:The Constitution declares that each house shall determine the rules of its own proceedings and shallhave all powers necessary for a branch of the Legislature of a free and independent state. Rules ofproceedings are the servants of the House and subject to its authority. This authority may be abused,but when the House has acted in a matter clearly within its power, it would be an unwarranted invasion

of the independence of the legislative department for the court to set aside such action as void becauseit may think that the House has misconstrued or departed from its own rules of procedure.

In McDonald v. State,[16] the Wisconsin Supreme Court held: When it appears that an act was sopassed, no inquiry will be permitted to ascertain whether the two houses have or have not compliedstrictly with their own rules in their procedure upon the bill, intermediate its introduction and finalpassage. The presumption is conclusive that they have done so. We think no court has ever declaredan act of the legislature void for non-compliance with the rules of procedure made by itself, or therespective branches thereof, and which it or they may change or suspend at will. If there are any suchadjudications, we decline to follow them.
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Schweizerv. Territory[17] is illustrative of the rule in these cases. The 1893 Statutes of Oklahomaprovided for three readings on separate days before a bill may be passed by each house of thelegislature, with the proviso that in case of an emergency the house concerned may, by two-thirds vote,suspend the operation of the rule. Plaintiff was convicted in the district court of violation of a lawpunishing gambling. He appealed contending that the gambling statute was not properly passed by thelegislature because the suspension of the rule on three readings had not been approved by the requisitetwo-thirds vote. Dismissing this contention, the State Supreme Court of Oklahoma held:

We have no constitutional provision requiring that the legislature should read a bill in any particularmanner. It may, then, read or deliberate upon a bill as it sees fit, either in accordance with its ownrules, or in violation thereof, or without making any rules. The provision of section 17 referred to ismerely a statutory provision for the direction of the legislature in its action upon proposed measures. Itreceives its entire force from legislative sanction, and it exists only at legislative pleasure. The failureof the legislature to properly weigh and consider an act, its passage through the legislature in a hastymanner, might be reasons for the governor withholding his signature thereto; but this alone, even

though it is shown to be a violation of a rule which the legislature had made to govern its ownproceedings, could be no reason for the courts refusing its enforcement after it was actually passed bya majority of each branch of the legislature, and duly signed by the governor. The courts cannotdeclare an act of the legislature void on account of noncompliance with rules of procedure made byitself to govern its deliberations. McDonald v. State, 80 Wis. 407, 50 N.W. 185; In re Ryan, 80 Wis.414, 50 N. W. 187; State v. Brown, 33 S.C. 151, 11 S. E. 641; Railway Co. v. Gill, 54 Ark. 101, 15 S.W. 18.

We conclude this survey with the useful summary of the rulings by former Chief Justice Fernando,commenting on the power of each House of Congress to determine its rules of proceedings. He wrote:

Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are subject to revocation,

modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural.Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by thelegislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifyingthe act taken if the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure. The aboveprinciple is subject, however, to this qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affectspersons other than members of the legislative body the question presented is necessarily judicial incharacter. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights are involved.[18]

In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead ofseeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to this Court. We have no more power tolook into the internal proceedings of a House than members of that House have to look over ourshoulders, as long as no violation of constitutional provisions is shown.

Petitioners must realize that each of the three departments of our government has its separate spherewhich the others may not invade without upsetting the delicate balance on which our constitutionalorder rests. Due regard for the working of our system of government, more than mere comity, compelsreluctance on our part to enter upon an inquiry into an alleged violation of the rules of the House. Wemust accordingly decline the invitation to exercise our power.

Second. Petitioners, quoting former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcions sponsorship in theConstitutional Commission, contend that under Art. VIII, 1, nothing involving abuse of discretion[by the other branches of the government] amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is beyond judicial
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review.[19]Implicit in this statement of the former Chief Justice, however, is an acknowledgment thatthe jurisdiction of this Court is subject to the case and controversy requirement of Art. VIII, 5 and,therefore, to the requirement of a justiciable controversy before courts can adjudicate

constitutional questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign relations. For while Art. VIII,1 has broadened the scope of judicial inquiry into areas normally left to the political departments todecide, such as those relating to national security,[20] it has not altogether done away with politicalquestions such as those which arise in the field of foreign relations. As we have already held, underArt. VIII, 1, this Courts function

is merely [to] check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond theconstitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of ashowing . . . [of] grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion forthe Court to exercise its corrective power. . . . It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparenterror.[21]

If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on accountmerely of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case does notpresent a situation in which a branch of the government has gone beyond the constitutional limits ofits jurisdiction so as to call for the exercise of our Art. VIII, 1 power.

Third. Petitioners claim that the passage of the law in the House was railroaded. They claim thatRep. Arroyo was still making a query to the Chair when the latter declared Rep. Albanos motionapproved.

What happened is that, after Rep. Arroyos interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report,Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committeereport. The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: There being none,approved. At the same time the Chair was saying this, however, Rep. Arroyo was asking, What isthat . . . Mr. Speaker? The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep.Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leaders motion, the approval of the conferencecommittee report had by then already been declared by the Chair, symbolized by its banging of thegavel.

Petitioners argue that, in accordance with the rules of the House, Rep. Albanos motion for the approvalof the conference committee report should have been stated by the Chair and later the individual votesof the Members should have been taken. They say that the method used in this case is a legislatorsnightmare because it suggests unanimity when the fact was that one or some legislators opposed thereport.

No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specifically requires that in cases such as

this involving approval of a conference committee report, the Chair must restate the motion andconduct a viva voce or nominal voting. On the other hand, as the Solicitor General has pointed out,the manner in which the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 was approved was by no means aunique one. It has basis in legislative practice. It was the way the conference committee report on thebills which became the Local Government Code of 1991 and the conference committee report on thebills amending the Tariff and Customs Code were approved.

In 1957, the practice was questioned as being contrary to the rules of the House. The point wasanswered by Majority Leader Arturo M. Tolentino and his answer became the ruling of the Chair. Mr.
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Tolentino said:

Mr. Tolentino. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the House. Insofar as thematter of procedure is concerned, this has been a precedent since I came here seven years ago, and ithas been the procedure in this House that if somebody objects, then a debate follows and after thedebate, then the voting comes in.

. . . .

Mr. Speaker, a point of order was raised by the gentleman from Leyte, and I wonder what his attitude isnow on his point of order. I should just like to state that I believe that we have had a substantialcompliance with the Rules. The Rule invoked is not one that refers to statutory or constitutionalrequirement, and a substantial compliance, to my mind, is sufficient. When the Chair announces thevote by saying Is there any objection? and nobody objects, then the Chair announces The bill isapproved on second reading. If there was any doubt as to the vote, any motion to divide would havebeen proper. So, if that motion is not presented, we assume that the House approves the measure. So I

believe there is substantial compliance here, and if anybody wants a division of the House he canalways ask for it, and the Chair can announce how many are in favor and how many are against.[22]

Indeed, it is no impeachment of the method to say that some other way would be better, more accurateand even more just.[23] The advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly of a method do notpresent any matter for judicial consideration.[24]In the words of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, thisCourt cannot provide a second opinion on what is the best procedure. Notwithstanding the deferenceand esteem that is properly tendered to individual congressional actors, our deference and esteem forthe institution as a whole and for the constitutional command that the institution be allowed to manageits own affairs precludes us from even attempting a diagnosis of the problem.[25]

Nor does the Constitution require that theyeas and the nays of the Members be taken every time aHouse has to vote, except only in the following instances: upon the last and third readings of a bill,[26]at the request of one-fifth of the Members present,[27] and in repassing a bill over the veto of thePresident.[28] Indeed, considering the fact that in the approval of the original bill the votes of theMembers byyeas and nays had already been taken, it would have been sheer tedium to repeat theprocess.

Petitioners claim that they were prevented from seeking reconsideration allegedly as a result of theprecipitate suspension and subsequent adjournment of the session.[29] It would appear, however, that thesession was suspended to allow the parties to settle the problem, because when it resumed at 3:40 p.m.on that day Rep. Arroyo did not say anything anymore. While it is true that the Majority Leader movedfor adjournment until 4 p.m. of Wednesday of the following week, Rep. Arroyo could at least haveobjected if there was anything he wanted to say. The fact, however, is that he did not. The Journal of

November 21, 1996 of the House shows:ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION

On motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Chair declared the session adjourned until fouroclock in the afternoon of Wednesday, November 27, 1996.

It was 3:40 p.m. Thursday, November 21, 1996. (emphasis added)

This Journal was approved on December 2, 1996. Again, no one objected to its approval except Rep.Lagman.
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It is thus apparent that petitioners predicament was largely of their own making. Instead of submittingthe proper motions for the House to act upon, petitioners insisted on the pendency of Rep. Arroyosquestion as an obstacle to the passage of the bill. But Rep. Arroyos question was not, in form orsubstance, a point of order or a question of privilege entitled to precedence.[30] And even if Rep.Arroyos question were so, Rep. Albanos motion to adjourn would have precedence and would haveput an end to any further consideration of the question.[31]

Given this fact, it is difficult to see how it can plausibly be contended that in signing the bill whichbecame R.A. No. 8240, respondent Speaker of the House be acted with grave abuse of his discretion.Indeed, the phrase grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction has a settledmeaning in the jurisprudence of procedure.

It means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasijudicial power as to amount to lack of power. As Chief Justice Concepcion himself said in explainingthis provision, the power granted to the courts by Art. VIII, 1 extends to cases where a branch of thegovernment or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so

capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.[32]

Here, the matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which theCourt should not be concerned. To repeat, the claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep.Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyos earliermotion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established theexistence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when thequorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.[33] Rep. Arroyowaived his objection by his continued interpellation of the sponsor for in so doing he in effectacknowledged the presence of a quorum.[34]

At any rate it is noteworthy that of the 111 members of the House earlier found to be present on

November 21, 1996, only the five, i.e., petitioners in this case, are questioning the manner by whichthe conference committee report on H. No. 7198 was approved on that day. No one, except Rep.Arroyo, appears to have objected to the manner by which the report was approved. Rep. John HenryOsmea did not participate in the bicameral conference committee proceedings.[35]Rep. Lagman andRep. Zamora objected to the report[36] but not to the manner it was approved; while it is said that, ifvoting had been conducted, Rep. Taada would have voted in favor of the conference committee report.[37]

Fourth. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House andthe President of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that itwas passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment. Much energy and learning isdevoted in the separate opinion of Justice Puno, joined by Justice Davide, to disputing this doctrine. To

be sure, there is no claim either here or in the decision in the EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary ofFinance] that the enrolled bill embodies a conclusive presumption. In one case[38] we went behind anenrolled bill and consulted the Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a statute had beenapproved by the Senate.

But, where as here there is no evidence to the contrary, this Court will respect the certification of thepresiding officers of both Houses that a bill has been duly passed. Under this rule, this Court hasrefused to determine claims that the three-fourths vote needed to pass a proposed amendment to theConstitution had not been obtained, because a duly authenticated bill or resolution imports absoluteverity and is binding on the courts.[39] This Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following
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excerpt which embodies good, if old-fashioned, democratic theory:

The truth is that many have been carried away with the righteous desire to check at any cost themisdoings of Legislatures. They have set such store by the Judiciary for this purpose that they havealmost made them a second and higher Legislature. But they aim in the wrong direction. Instead oftrusting a faithful Judiciary to check an inefficient Legislature, they should turn to improve theLegislature. The sensible solution is not to patch and mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary to

violate legal principle and to do impossibilities with the Constitution; but to represent ourselves withcompetent, careful, and honest legislators, the work of whose hands on the statute-roll may come toreflect credit upon the name of popular government.[40]

This Court has refused to even look into allegations that the enrolled bill sent to the Presidentcontained provisions which had been surreptitiously inserted in the conference committee:

[W]here allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have not been observed

have no more basis than another allegation that the Conference Committee surreptitiously insertedprovisions into a bill which it had prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolledcopy of the bill. To disregard the enrolled bill rule in such cases would be to disregard the respectdue the other two departments of our government.[41]

It has refused to look into charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of a bill inviolation of Art. VI, 26(2) of the Constitution that upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment shall

be allowed.[42]

In other cases,[43] this Court has denied claims that the tenor of a bill was otherwise than as certified bythe presiding officers of both Houses of Congress.

The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well established. It is cited with approval by textwriters here and abroad.[44] The enrolled bill rule rests on the following considerations:

. . . As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in thecustody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House ofRepresentatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on itsface, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged,respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. Therespect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon thatassurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated;leaving the court to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, isin conformity with the Constitution.[45]

To overrule the doctrine now, as the dissent urges, is to repudiate the massive teaching of our cases andoverthrow an established rule of evidence.

Indeed, petitioners have advanced no argument to warrant a departure from the rule, except to say that,with a change in the membership of the Court, the three new members may be assumed to have an openmind on the question of the enrolled bill rule. Actually, not three but four (Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, andQuiason,JJ.) have departed from the Court since our decision in the EVAT cases and their places havesince been taken by four new members (Francisco, Hermosisima, Panganiban, and Torres,JJ.)Petitioners are thus simply banking on the change in the membership of the Court.
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Moreover, as already noted, the due enactment of the law in question is confirmed by the Journal ofthe House of November 21, 1996 which shows that the conference committee report on H. No. 7198,which became R.A. No. 8240, was approved on that day. The keeping of the Journal is required by theConstitution. Art. VI, 16(4) provides:

Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, exceptingsuch parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and theyeas and nays on any question shall,

at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal.Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.

The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are required by the Constitution to berecorded therein.[46] With respect to other matters, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, theJournals have also been accorded conclusive effect. Thus, in United States v. Pons,[47] this Court spokeof the imperatives of public policy for regarding the Journals as public memorials of the mostpermanent character, thus: They should be public, because all are required to conform to them; theyshould be permanent, that rights acquired today upon the faith of what has been declared to be law shallnot be destroyed tomorrow, or at some remote period of time, by facts resting only in the memory ofindividuals. As already noted, the bill which became R.A. No. 8240 is shown in the Journal.

Hence its due enactment has been duly proven.

___________________

It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either toset aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rulesof procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forumwhen petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been invested witha roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It wouldbe acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it to doso. The suggestion made in a case[48] may instead appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek theenactment of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of anything tothe contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith beliefthat its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment ofthat body.[49]

WHEREFORE, the petition forcertiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
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arroy vs. de venecia

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