art 25-81 labor cases

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

ManilaTHIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 77279 April 15, 1988MANUELA S. CATAN/M.S. CATAN PLACEMENT AGENCY, Petitioners, vs. THE

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION and FRANCISCO D. REYES, Respondents.

CORTES, J.:Petitioner, in this special civil action for certiorari, alleges grave abuse of discretion on the part of the National Labor Relations Commission in an effort to nullify the latters resolution and thus free petitioner from liability for the disability suffered by a Filipino worker it recruited to work in Saudi Arabia. This Court, however, is not persuaded that such an abuse of discretion was committed. This petition must fail.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The facts of the case are quite simple. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner, a duly licensed recruitment agency, as agent of Ali and Fahd Shabokshi Group, a Saudi Arabian firm, recruited private respondent to work in Saudi Arabia as a steelman.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The term of the contract was for one year, from May 15,1981 to May 14, 1982. However, the contract provided for its automatic renewal:

FIFTH: The validity of this Contract is for ONE YEAR commencing from the date the SECOND PARTY assumes hill port. This Contract is renewable automatically if neither of the PARTIES notifies the other PARTY of his wishes to terminate the Contract by at least ONE MONTH prior to the expiration of the contractual period. [Petition, pp. 6-7; Rollo, pp. 7-8].

The contract was automatically renewed when private respondent was not repatriated by his Saudi employer but instead was assigned to work as a crusher plant operator. On March 30, 1983, while he was working as a crusher plant operator, private respondent's right ankle was crushed under the machine he was operating.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On May 15, 1983, after the expiration of the renewed term, private respondent returned to the Philippines. His ankle was operated on at the Sta. Mesa Heights Medical Center for which he incurred expenses. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On September 9, 1983, he returned to Saudi Arabia to resume his work. On May 15,1984, he was repatriated. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Upon his return, he had his ankle treated for which he incurred further expenses. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

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On the basis of the provision in the employment contract that the employer shall compensate the employee if he is injured or permanently disabled in the course of employment, private respondent filed a claim, docketed as POEA Case No. 84-09847, against petitioner with respondent Philippine Overseas Employment

Administration. On April 10, 1986, the POEA rendered judgment in favor of private respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the complainant and against the respondent, ordering the latter to pay to the complainant: chanrobles virtual law library

1. SEVEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED EIGHTY-FIVE PESOS and 60/100 (P7,985.60), Philippine currency, representing disability benefits; chanrobles virtual law library

2. TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND NINETY-SIX Philippine pesos and 20/100 (29,096.20) representing reimbursement for medical expenses; chanrobles virtual law library

3. Ten percent (10%) of the abovementioned amounts as and for attorney's fees. [NLRC Resolution, p. 1; Rollo, p. 16].

On appeal, respondent NLRC affirmed the decision of the POEA in a resolution dated December 12, 1986.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Not satisfied with the resolution of the POEA, petitioner instituted the instant special civil action for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

1. Petitioner claims that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it ruled that petitioner was liable to private respondent for disability benefits since at the time he was injured his original employment contract, which petitioner facilitated, had already expired. Further, petitioner disclaims liability on the ground that its agency agreement with the Saudi principal had already expired when the injury was sustained.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

There is no merit in petitioner's contention. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Private respondents contract of employment can not be said to have expired on May 14, 1982 as it was automatically renewed since no notice of its termination was given by either or both of the parties at least a month before its expiration, as so provided in the contract itself. Therefore, private respondent's injury was sustained during the lifetime of the contract. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

A private employment agency may be sued jointly and solidarily with its foreign principal for violations of the recruitment agreement and the contracts of employment:

Sec. 10. Requirement before recruitment.- Before recruiting any worker, the private employment agency shall submit to the Bureau the following documents:


(a) A formal appointment or agency contract executed by a foreign-based employer in favor of the license holder to recruit and hire personnel for the former ...chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

xxx xxx xxx2. Power of the agency to sue and be sued jointly and solidarily with the principal or foreign-based employer for any of the violations of the recruitment agreement and the contracts of employment. [Section 10(a) (2) Rule V, Book I, Rules to Implement the Labor Code].

Thus, in the recent case of Ambraque International Placement & Services v. NLRC [G.R. No. 77970, January 28,1988], the Court ruled that a recruitment agency was solidarily liable for the unpaid salaries of a worker it recruited for employment in Saudi Arabia.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Even if indeed petitioner and the Saudi principal had already severed their agency agreement at the time private respondent was injured, petitioner may still be sued for a violation of the employment contract because no notice of the agency agreement's termination was given to the private respondent:

Art 1921. If the agency has been entrusted for the purpose of contra with specified persons, its revocation shall not prejudice the latter if they were not given notice thereof. [Civil Code].

In this connection the NLRC elaborated:

Suffice it to state that albeit local respondent M. S. Catan Agency was at the time of complainant's accident resulting in his permanent partial disability was (sic) no longer the accredited agent of its foreign principal, foreign respondent herein, yet its responsibility over the proper implementation of complainant's employment/service contract and the welfare of complainant himself in the foreign job site, still existed, the contract of employment in question not having expired yet. This must be so, because the obligations covenanted in the recruitment agreement entered into by and between the local agent and its foreign principal are not coterminus with the term of such agreement so that if either or both of the parties decide to end the agreement, the responsibilities of such parties towards the contracted employees under the agreement do not at all end, but the same extends up to and until the expiration of the employment contracts of the employees recruited and employed pursuant to the said recruitment agreement. Otherwise, this will render nugatory the very purpose for which the law governing the employment of workers for foreign jobs abroad was enacted. [NLRC Resolution, p. 4; Rollo, p. 18]. (Emphasis supplied).

2. Petitioner contends that even if it is liable for disability benefits, the NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it affirmed the award of medical expenses when the said expenses were the consequence of private respondent's negligence in returning to work in Saudi Arabia when he knew that he was not yet medically fit to do so. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Again, there is no merit in this contention. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

No evidence was introduced to prove that private respondent was not medically fit to work when he returned to Saudi Arabia. Exhibit "B", a certificate issued by Dr. Shafquat Niazi, the camp doctor, on November 1, 1983, merely stated that private respondent was "unable to walk properly, moreover he is still complaining [of] pain during walking and different lower limbs movement" [Annex "B", Reply; Rollo, p. 51]. Nowhere does it say that he was not medically fit to work. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Further, since petitioner even assisted private respondent in returning to work in Saudi Arabia by purchasing his ticket for him [Exhibit "E"; Annex "A", Reply to Respondents' Comments], it is as if petitioner had certified his fitness to work. Thus, the NLRC found:

Furthermore, it has remained unrefuted by respondent that complainant's subsequent departure or return to Saudi Arabia on September 9, 1983 was with the full knowledge, consent and assistance of the former. As shown in Exhibit "E" of the record, it was respondent who facilitated the travel papers of complainant. [NLRC Resolution, p. 5; Rollo, p. 19].

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit, with costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.



G.R. No. 90273-75 November 15, 1989FINMAN GENERAL ASSURANCE CORP., Petitioner, vs. WILLIAM INOCENCIO,

ET AL. AND EDWIN CARDONES, THE ADMINISTRATOR, PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS AND EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION, THE SECRETARY OF

LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, Respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N FELICIANO, J.:Pan Pacific Overseas Recruiting Services, Inc. ("Pan Pacific") is a private, fee-charging, recruitment and employment agency. T in accordance with the requirements of Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the Rules and Regulations of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), Pan Pacific posted a surety bond issued by petitioner Finman General Assurance Corporation ("Finman") and was granted a license to operate by the POEA. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Private respondents William Inocencio, Perfecto Palero, Jr., Edwin Cardones and one Edwin Hernandez filed with the POEA separate complaints against Pan Pacific for violation of Articles 32 and 34 (a) of the Labor Code, as amended and for refund of placement fees paid to Pan Pacific. The complainants alleged that Pan Pacific charged and collected such fees from them but did not secure employment for them.

Acting on the complaints, the POEA Administrator motu proprio impleaded petitioner Finman as party respondent in its capacity as surety for Pan Pacific. Separate summonses were served upon Finman and Pan Pacific. The return of the summons served on Pan Pacific at its official address registered in the POEA records, showed that Pan Pacific had moved out therefrom; no prior notice of transfer or change of address was furnished by Pan Pacific to the POEA as required under POEA rules. The POEA considered that constructive service of the complaints had been effected upon Pan Pacific and proceeded accordingly. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

For its part, petitioner Finman filed an answer denying liability and pleading, by way of special and affirmative defenses, that: (1) the POEA had no "jurisdiction over surety bonds," that jurisdiction being vested in the Insurance Commission or the regular courts; (2) it (Finman) had not violated Articles 32 and 34 (a) of the Labor Code and complainants' claims had accrued during the suspension of the principal obligor, Pan Pacific; (3) complainants had no cause of action against Finman, since it was not privy to the transactions between them and Pan Pacific and had not received any moneys from them; and (4) the amounts claimed by complainants had been paid by them as deposits and not as placement fees. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

A hearing was held by the POEA on 14 April 1988, at which time complainants presented their evidence. Petitioner Finman, though notified of this hearing, did not appear.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On 30 May 1989, the POEA Administrator issued an Order which, in its dispositive portion, said:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally complainants' claims as follows: chanrobles virtual law library

1. William Inocencio P6,000 .00 chanrobles virtual law library

2. Perfecto Palero, Sr. P5,500 .00 chanrobles virtual law library

3. Edwin Cardones P2,000 .00 chanrobles virtual law library

Respondent agency is ordered to release Cardones' passport, the expenses or obtaining the same of which (sic) shall be deducted from the amount of P2,000.00 as it appears that it was respondent agency who applied for the processing thereof. The claim of Edwin Hernandez is dismissed without prejudice.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

For the established violations respondent agency is hereby imposed a penalty fine in the amount of P60,000.00. Further, the ban earlier imposed upon it is herein reiterated. SO ORDERED.

Petitioner Finman went on appeal to the Secretary of Labor insisting that: (1) the POEA had no authority to implead petitioner as party respondent in the proceedings before the POEA; and that (2) the POEA had no authority to enforce directly the surety bond against petitioner. In an Order dated 3 August 1989, the Secretary of Labor upheld the POEA Order appealed from and denied the appeal for lack of merit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner Finman now comes before this Court on a Petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, raising much the same issues it had already ventilated before the POEA and the Secretary of Labor. It is contended once again by petitioner Finman that the POEA had no authority to implead petitioner in the proceedings commenced by private respondents: and that the POEA was not authorized to require, in those same proceedings, petitioner to pay private respondents' claims for refund against Pan Pacific on the basis of the surety bond issued by petitioner. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner's contentions are interrelated and will be dealt with together. They are, however, quite bereft of merit and must be rejected. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner cannot seriously dispute the direct and solidary nature of its obligations under its own surety bond. Under Section 176 of the Insurance Code, as amended, the liability of a surety in a surety bond is joint and several with the principal obligor. Petitioner's bond was posted by Pan Pacific in compliance with the requirements of Article 31 of the Labor Code, which states that -

Art. 31. Bonds. - All applicants for license or authority shall post such cash and surety bonds as determined by the Secretary of Labor to guarantee compliance with prescribed recruitment procedures, rules and regulations, and terms and, conditions of employment as appropriate.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The Secretary of Labor shall have the exclusive power to determine, decide, order or direct payment from, or application of, the cash and surety bond for any claim or injury covered and guaranteed by the bonds. (Emphasis supplied).

The tenor and scope of petitioner Finman's obligations under the bond it issued are set out in broad ranging terms by Section 4, Rule II, Book I of the POEA Rules and Regulations:

Section 4. Payment of Fees and Posting of Bonds. - Upon approval of the application by the Minister, the applicant shall pay an annual license fee of P6,000.00. It shall also post a cash bond of P100,000.00 and a surety bond of P150,000.00 from a bonding company acceptable to the Administration duly accredited by the Office of the Insurance Commission. The bonds shall answer for all valid and legal claims arising from violations of the conditions for the grant and use of the license or authority and contracts of employment. The bonds shall likewise guarantee compliance with the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations relating to recruitment and placement, the rules of the Administration and relevant issuances of the Ministry and all liabilities which the Administration may impose. The surety bonds shall include the condition that notice of garnishment to the principal is notice to the surety. 1 (Emphasis supplied).

While petitioner Finman has refrained from attaching a copy of the bond it had issued to its Petition for Certiorari, there can be no question that the conditions of the Finman surety bond Pan Pacific had posted with the POEA include the italicized portions of Section 4, Rule 11, Book I quoted above. It is settled doctrine that the conditions of a bond specified and required in the provisions of the statute or regulation providing for the submission of the bond, are incorporated or built into all bonds tendered under that statute or regulation, even though not there set out in printer's ink. 2


In the case at bar, the POEA held, and the Secretary of Labor affirmed, that Pan Pacific had violated Article 32 of the Labor Code, as amended

Article 32. Fees to be paid by workers. - Any person applying with a private fee charging employment agency for employment assistance shall not be charged any fee until he has obtained employment through its efforts or has actually commenced employment. Such fee shall be always covered with the approved receipt clearly showing the amount paid. The Secretary of Labor shall promulgate a schedule of allowable fees. (Emphasis supplied).

as well as Article 34 (a) of the same Code:

Article 34. Prohibited practices. - It shall be unlawful for any individual, entity, licensee, or holder of authority: chanrobles virtual law library

(a) To charge or accept, directly or indirectly, any amount than that specified in the schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the Secretary of Labor, or to make a worker pay any amount greater than actually received by him as a loan or advance. (Emphasis supplied)

There is, hence, no question that, both under the Labor Code 3 and the POEA Rules and Regulations, 4 Pan Pacific had violated at least one of the conditions for the grant and continued use of the recruitment license granted to it. There can, similarly, be no question that the POEA Administrator and the Secretary of Labor are authorized to require Pan Pacific to refund the placement fees it had charged private respondents without securing employment for them and to impose the fine of P60,000.00 upon Pan Pacific. Article 36 of the Labor Code authorizes the Secretary of Labor "to restrict and regulate" the recruitment and placement activities of agencies like Pan Pacific and "to issue orders and promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions of [Title I on "Recruitment and Placement of Workers]," including of course, Article 32 on "Fees to be paid by workers," quoted earlier. Upon the other hand, Section 13 of Rule VI, Book I of the POEA Rules and Regulations expressly authorize the POEA Administrator or the Secretary of Labor to impose fines "in addition to or in lieu of the penalties of suspension or cancellation" of the violator recruitment agency's license. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

If Pan Pacific is liable to private respondents for the refunds claimed by them and to the POEA for the fine of P60,000.00, and if petitioner Finman is solidarily liable with Pan Pacific under the operative terms of the bond, it must follow that Finman is liable both to the private respondents and to the POEA. Petitioner Finman asserts, however, that the POEA had no authority to implead it in the proceedings against Pan Pacific.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We are not persuaded by this assertion. Clearly, petitioner Finman is a party-in-interest in, certainly a proper party to, the proceedings private respondents had initiated against Pan Pacific the principal obligor. Since Pan Pacific had thoughtfully refrained from notifying the POEA of its new address and from responding to the complaints, petitioner Finman may well I be regarded as an indispensable party to the proceedings before the POEA. Whether Finman was an indepensable or merely a proper party to the proceedings, we believe and so hold that the POEA could properly implead it as party respondent either upon the request of the private respondents or, as it happened, motu propio. Such is the situation under the Revised Rules of Court 5 and the application thereof, directly or by analogy, by the POEA can certainly not be regarded as arbitrary, oppressive or capricious. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The fundamental argument of Finman is that its liability under its own bond must be determined and enforced, not by the POEA or the Secretary of Labor, but rather by the Insurance Commission or by the regular courts. Once more, we are not moved by petitioner's argument.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

There appears nothing so special or unique about the determination of a surety's liability under its bond as to restrict that determination to the Office of the Insurance Commissioner and to the regular courts of justice exclusively. The exact opposite is strongly stressed by the second paragraph of Article 31 of the Labor Code:

Art. 31. Bonds. - ... ...chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The secretary of Labor shall have the exclusive power to determine, decide, order or direct payment from, or application of, the cash or surety bond for any claim or injury covered and guaranteed by the bonds. (Emphasis supplied)

We believe and so hold that to compel the POEA and private respondents the beneficiaries of Finman's bond-to go to the Insurance Commissioner or to a regular court of law to enforce that bond, would be to collide with the public policy which requires prompt resolution of claims against private recruitment and placement

agencies. The Court will take judicial notice of the appealing frequency with which some, perhaps many, of such agencies have cheated workers avid for overseas employment by, e.g., collecting placement fees without securing employment for them at all, extracting exorbitant fees or "kickbacks" from those for whom employment is actually obtained, abandoning hapless and unlettered workers to exploitative foreign principals, and so on. Cash and surety bonds are required by the POEA and its predecessor agencies from recruitment and employment companies precisely as a means of ensuring prompt and effective recourse against such companies when held liable for applicants or workers' claims. Clearly that public policy will be effectively negated if POEA and the Department of Labor and Employment were held powerless to compel a surety company to make good on its solidary undertaking in the same quasi-judicial proceeding where the liability of the principal obligor, the recruitment or employment agency, is determined and fixed and where the surety is given reasonable opportunity to present any defenses it or the principal obligor may be entitled to set up. Petitioner surety whose liability to private respondents and the POEA is neither more nor less than that of Pan Pacific, is not entitled to another or different procedure for determination or fixing of that liability than that which Pan Pacific is entitled and subject to. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner. This Resolution is immediately executory.


ManilaFIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-79436-50 January 17, 1990EASTERN ASSURANCE & SURETY CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. SECRETARY OF LABOR, PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT

ADMINISTRATION, ELVIRA VENTURA, ESTER TRANGUILLAN, et al., Respondents.

NARVASA, J.:In connection with the application with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) of J & B Manpower Specialist, Inc. for a license to engage in business as a recruitment agency, a surety bond was filed on January 2, 1985 by the applicant and the Eastern Assurance and Surety Corporation, herein petitioner, in virtue of which they both held themselves -

. . . firmly bound unto (said) Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, Ministry of Labor in the penal sum of PESOS ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND ONLY . . . (Pl50,000.00) for the payment of which will and truly to be made, . . . (they bound themselves, their) heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns, jointly and severally . .

The bond stipulated that: chanrobles virtual law library

a) it was "conditioned upon the true and faithful performance and observance of the . . . principal (J & B Manpower Specialist, Inc.) of its duties and obligations in accordance with all the rules and regulations promulgated by the Ministry of Labor Philippine Overseas Employment Administration and with the terms and conditions stipulated in the License; chanrobles virtual law library

b) the liability of the . . . Surety (petitioner) shall in no case exceed the sum of PESOS ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (P150,000.00) ONLY, PHILIPPINE CURRENCY; 1


c) notice to the Principal is also a notice to the Surety; and chanrobles virtual law library

d) LIABILITY of the surety . . . shall expire on JANUARY 02, 1986 and this bond shall be automatically cancelled ten (10) days after its expiration and the surety shall not be liable for any claim not discovered and presented to it in writing within said period of . . . from expiration and the obligee hereby expressly waives the rights to file any court action against the Surety after termination of said period of . . . . above cited. 2


As narrated by respondent Secretary of Labor, the facts are as follows: 3

From June 1983 to December 1985 . . . thirty three (33) . . . (persons) applied for overseas employment with . . . (J & B). In consideration of promised deployment, complainants paid respondent various amounts for various fees. Most of' the receipts issued were sighed by Mrs. Baby Bundalian, Executive Vice-President of . . . (J & B). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Because of non-deployment . . . (the applicants) filed separate complaints with the Licensing and Regulation Office of POEA against . . . (J & B) for violation of Articles 32 and 34 (a) of the Labor Code between the months of April to October 1985.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Despite summons/notices of hearing,, . . . (J & B) failed to file Answer nor appear in the hearings conducted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In its separate Answer, . . . EASCO essentially disclaimed liability on the ground that the claims were not expressly covered by the bond, that POEA had no jurisdiction to order forfeiture of the bond, that some of the claims were paid beyond or prior to the period of effectivity of the bond. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On September 8, 1986, the POEA Administrator issued the Order in favor of complainants ruling thus:

After careful evaluation, we find that the receipts and testimonies of complainants, in the absence of controverting evidence substantially establish that respondent charged and collected fees from them in amounts exceeding what is prescribed by this Administration. Complainants' non-deployment strongly indicates that there was no employment obtained for them. Hence, violation of Articles 32 and 34 (a) of the Labor Code, as amended, is established against respondent. The claims of complainants having arose (arisen) out of acts of the principal covered under the surety (bond), the respondent surety is equally liable therefor.

Except for complainants Ramos, Samson, de Leon and Rizada, whose claims were transacted prior to the effectivity of the bond, . . . EASCO was declared jointly and severally liable with . . . (J & B) to twenty-nine (29) complainants. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles

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(The dispositive portion of the POEA Administrator's Order also contained the following statement and direction, viz.:

Respondent was suspended on May 23, 1985, June 26, 1985 and January 17, 1986 all for illegal exaction. Considering its track record of illegal exaction activities and considering further the gross violation of recruitment rules and regulations established against it in the instant cases, and the expiration of its license on February 15, 1985, it is hereby forever banned from participation in the overseas employment program. It is ordered to cease and desist from further engaging in recruitment activities otherwise it shall be prosecuted for illegal recruitment.')

(J & B filed a motion for reconsideration). On December 19, 1986, the then deputy Minister of Labor and Employment denied the . . . Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit and affirmed the findings in the Order of the POEA Administrator finding no reversible error therein.

On appeal by EASCO - J & B having as aforestated taken no part in the proceeding despite due service of summons - the judgment was modified by the Secretary of Labor, by Order dated July 1, 1987, disposing as follows: 4

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Resolution of the then Deputy Minister of Labor dated December 19, 1986 affirming the Order of the POEA Administrator dated September 8, 1986 is hereby MODIFIED. Respondent J & B Manpower Specialist is directed to refund all thirty-three (33) complainants as listed in the Order of September 8, 1986 in the amounts listed thereto with the modification that complainants Lucena Cabasal and Felix Rivero are both entitled only to P15,980 and not P15,980 each. Respondent Eastern Assurance and Surety Corporation is hereby found jointly and severally liable with respondent J & B Manpower Specialist to refund nineteen (19) complainants in the modified amounts . . . (particularly specified).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The other findings in the Order of the POEA Administrator dated September 8, 1986 affirmed in the Resolution of the then Deputy Minister . . . are also hereby AFFIRMED. This Order is FINAL. No further Motion for Reconsideration hereof shall be entertained.

It is noteworthy that EASCO's liability for the refund, jointly and severally with its principal, was limited to 19 named complainants (in contrast to verdicts of the POEA and the Deputy Minister which both ordered payment to no less than 33 complainants) and was correspondingly reduced from P308,751.75 and US $ 400.00 5 to the aggregate amount of P 140,817.75. 6


The special civil action of certiorari at bar was thereafter instituted by EASCO 7 praying for the nullification of the POEA Administrator's Order of September 8, 1986, the Resolution of the Deputy Minister of Labor of' December 19, 1986, and the Order of the Secretary of Labor of July 1, 1987, It theorizes that:

1) the POEA had no jurisdiction over the claims for refund filed by non-employees; chanrobles virtual law library

2) neither did the Secretary of Labor have jurisdiction of the claims; chanrobles virtual law library

3) assuming they had jurisdiction, both the POEA and Secretary of Labor also committed legal errors and acted with grave abuse of discretion when they ruled that petitioner is liable on the claims.

EASCO contends that the POEA had no "adjudicatory jurisdiction" over the monetary claims in question because the same "did not arise from employer-employee relations." Invoked in support of the argument is Section 4 (a) of EO 797 providing in part 8 that the POEA has -

. . . original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving employer-employee relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment including seamen ..

The complaints are however for violation of Articles 32 and 34 a) of the Labor Code. Article 32 and paragraph (a) of Article 34 read as follows:

Art. 32. Fees to be paid by workers.-Any person applying with a private fee-charging employment agency for employment assistance shall not be charged any fee until he has obtained employment through its efforts or has actually commenced employment. Such fee shall be always covered with the approved receipt clearly showing the amount paid. The Secretary of Labor shall promulgate a schedule of allowable fees. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Art. 34. Prohibited practices.-It shall be unlawful for any individual, entity, licensee, or holder of authority: chanrobles virtual law library

a) To charge or accept, directly or indirectly, any amount greater than that specified in the schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the Secretary of Labor, or to make a worker pay any amount greater than actually received by him as a loan or advance; . . .

The penalties of suspension and cancellation of license or authority are prescribed for violations of the above quoted provisions, among others. And the Secretary of Labor has the power under Section 35 of the law to apply these sanctions, as well as the authority, conferred by Section 36, not only, to "restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement activities of all agencies," but also to "promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions" governing said activities. Pursuant to this rule-making power thus granted, the Secretary of Labor gave the POEA 9 "on its own initiative or upon filing of a complaint or report or upon request for investigation by any aggrieved person, . . . (authority to) conduct the necessary proceedings for the suspension or cancellation of the license or authority of any agency or entity" for certain enumerated offenses including - chanrobles virtual law library

1) the imposition or acceptance, directly or indirectly, of any amount of money, goods or services, or any fee or bond in excess of what is prescribed by the Administration, and chanrobles virtual law library

2) any other violation of pertinent provisions of the Labor Code and other relevant laws, rules and regulations. 10

The Administrator was also given the power to "order the dismissal of the case or the suspension of the license or authority of the respondent agency or contractor or recommend to the Minister the cancellation thereof." 11

Implicit in these powers is the award of appropriate relief to the victims of the offenses committed by the respondent agency or contractor, specially the refund or reimbursement of such fees as may have been fraudulently or otherwise illegally collected, or such money, goods or services imposed and accepted in excess of what is licitly prescribed. It would be illogical and absurd to limit the sanction on an offending recruitment agency or contractor to suspension or cancellation of its license, without the concomitant obligation to repair the injury caused to its victims. It would result either in rewarding unlawful acts, as it would leave the victims without recourse, or in compelling the latter to litigate in another forum, giving rise to that multiplicity of actions or proceedings which the law abhors. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Even more untenable is EASCO's next argument that the recruiter and its victims are in pari delicto - the former for having required payment, and the latter for having voluntarily paid, "prohibited recruitment fees" - and therefore, said victims are barred from obtaining relief. The sophistical, if not callous, character of the argument is evident upon the most cursory reading thereof; it merits no consideration whatever.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The Court is intrigued by EASCO's reiteration of its argument that it should not be held liable for claims which accrued prior to or after the effectivity of its bond, considering that the respondent Secretary had conceded the validity of part of said argument, at least. The Secretary ruled that EASCO's "contention that it should not be held liable for claims/payments made to respondent agency before the effectivity of the surety bond on January 2, 1985 is well taken." According to the Secretary: 12

. . . A close examination of the records reveal(s) that respondent EASCO is not jointly and severally liable with respondent agency to refund complainants Lucena Cabasal, Felix Rivero, Romulo del Rosario, Rogelio Banzuela, Josefina Ogatis, Francisco Sorato, Sonny Quiazon, Josefina Dictado, Mario del Guzman and Rogelio Mercado (10 in all). These complainants paid respondent agency in 1984, or before the effectivity of the bond on January 2, 1985 as evidence by the reciept and their testimonies.

The related argument, that it is also not liable for claims filed after the expiry (on January 2, 1986) of the period stipulated in the surety bond for the filing of claims against the bond, must however be rejected, as the Secretary did. The Court discerns no grave abuse of discretion in the Secretary's statement of his reasons for doing so, to wit:

. . . While it may be true that respondent EASCO received notice of their claims after the ten (10) day expiration period from cancellation or after January 12, 1986 as provided in the surety bond, records show that . . . EASCO's principal, respondent agency, was notified/ summoned prior to the expiration period or before January 12, 1986. Respondent agency received summons on July 24, 1985 with respect to claims of complainants Penarroyo, dela Cruz and Canti. It also received summons on November 26, 1985 with respect to Giovanni Garbillons' claim. Respondent agency was likewise considered constructively notified of the claims of complainants Calayag, Danuco Domingo and Campena on October 6, 1985. In this connection, it may be stressed that the surety bond provides that notice to the principal is notice to the surety. Besides, it has been held that the contract of a compensated surety like respondent EASCO is to be interpreted liberally in the interest of the promises and beneficiaries rather than

strictly in favor of the surety (Acoustics Inc. v. American Surety, 74 Nev-6, 320 P2d. 626, 74 Am. Jur. 2d).

So, too, EASCO's claim that it had not been properly served with summons as regards a few of the complaints must be rejected, the issue being factual, and the Court having been cited to no grave error invalidating the respondent Secretary's conclusion that summons had indeed been duly served. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Finally, EASCO's half-hearted argument that its liability should be limited to the maximum amount set in its surety bond, i.e., P150,000.00, is palpably without merit, since the aggregate liability imposed on it, P140,817.75, supra, does not in fact exceed that limit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit, and this decision is declared to be immediately executory. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.



G.R. No. 78409 September 14, 1989NORBERTO SORIANO, Petitioner, vs. OFFSHORE SHIPPING AND MANNING

CORPORATION, KNUT KNUTSEN O.A.S., and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Second Division), Respondents.

FERNAN, C.J.:This is a petition for certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the decision of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission affirming the decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration in POEA Case No. (M)85-12-0953 entitled "Norberto Soriano v. Offshore Shipping and Manning Corporation and Knut Knutsen O.A.S.", which denied petitioner's claim for salary differential and overtime pay and limited the reimbursement of his cash bond to P15,000.00 instead of P20,000.00.

In search for better opportunities and higher income, petitioner Norberto Soriano, a licensed Second Marine Engineer, sought employment and was hired by private respondent Knut Knutsen O.A.S. through its authorized shipping agent in the Philippines, Offshore Shipping and Manning Corporation. As evidenced by the Crew Agreement, petitioner was hired to work as Third Marine Engineer on board Knut Provider" with a salary of US$800.00 a month on a conduction basis for a period of fifteen (15) days. He admitted that the term of the contract was extended to six (6) months by mutual agreement on the promise of the employer to the petitioner that he will be promoted to Second Engineer. Thus, while it appears that petitioner joined the aforesaid vessel on July 23, 1985 he signed off on November 27, 1985 due to the alleged failure of private respondent-employer to fulfill its promise to promote petitioner to the position of Second Engineer and for the unilateral decision to reduce petitioner's basic salary from US$800.00 to US$560.00. Petitioner was made to shoulder his return airfare to Manila. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In the Philippines, petitioner filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA for short), a complaint against private respondent for payment of salary differential, overtime pay, unpaid salary for November, 1985 and refund of his return airfare and cash bond allegedly in the amount of P20,000.00 contending therein that private respondent unilaterally altered the employment contract by

reducing his salary of US$800.00 per month to US$560.00, causing him to request for his repatriation to the Philippines. Although repatriated, he claims that he failed to receive payment for the following:

1. Salary for November which is equivalent to US$800.00; chanrobles virtual law library

2. Leave pay equivalent to his salary for 16.5 days in the sum of US$440.00; chanrobles virtual law library

3. Salary differentials which is equivalent to US$240.00 a month for four (4) months and one (1) week in the total sum of US$1,020,00; chanrobles virtual law library

4. Fixed overtime pay equivalent to US$240.00 a month for four (4) months and one (1) week in the sum of US$1,020.00; chanrobles virtual law library

5. Overtime pay for 14 Sundays equivalent to US$484.99; chanrobles virtual law library

6. Repatriation cost of US$945.46; chanrobles virtual law library

7. Petitioner's cash bond of P20,000.00. 1 chanrobles virtual law library

In resolving aforesaid case, the Officer-in-Charge of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration or POEA found that petitioner-complainant's total monthly emolument is US$800.00 inclusive of fixed overtime as shown and proved in the Wage Scale submitted to the Accreditation Department of its Office which would therefore not entitle petitioner to any salary differential; that the version of complainant that there was in effect contract substitution has no grain of truth because although the Employment Contract seems to have corrections on it, said corrections or alterations are in conformity with the Wage Scale duly approved by the POEA; that the withholding of a certain amount due petitioner was justified to answer for his repatriation expenses which repatriation was found to have been requested by petitioner himself as shown in the entry in his Seaman's Book; and that petitioner deposited a total amount of P15,000.00 only instead of P20,000.00 cash bond. 2 chanrobles virtual law library

Accordingly, respondent POEA ruled as follows:

VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, respondents are hereby ordered to pay complainant, jointly and severally within ten (10) days from receipt hereof the amount of P15,000.00 representing the reimbursement of the cash bond deposited by complainant less US$285.83 (to be converted to its peso equivalent at the time of actual payment). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Further, attorney's fees equivalent to 10 % of the aforesaid award is assessed against respondents.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

All other claims are hereby dismissed for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

Dissatisfied, both parties appealed the aforementioned decision of the POEA to the National Labor Relations Commission. Complainant-petitioner's appeal was dismissed for lack of merit while respondents' appeal was dismissed for having been filed out of time.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence this recourse. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner submits that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion and/or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction by disregarding the alteration of the employment contract made by private respondent. Petitioner claims that the alteration by private respondent of his salary and overtime rate which is evidenced by the Crew Agreement and the exit pass constitutes a violation of Article 34 of the Labor Code of the Philippines. 6 chanrobles virtual law library

On the other hand, public respondent through the Solicitor General, contends that, as explained by the POEA: "Although the employment contract seems to have corrections, it is in conformity with the Wage Scale submitted to said office. 7 chanrobles virtual law library

Apparently, petitioner emphasizes the materiality of the alleged unilateral alteration of the employment contract as this is proscribed by the Labor Code while public respondent finds the same to be merely innocuous. We take a closer look at the effects of these alterations upon petitioner's right to demand for his differential, overtime pay and refund of his return airfare to Manila. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

A careful examination of the records shows that there is in fact no alteration made in the Crew Agreement 8 or in the Exit Pass. 9 As the original data appear, the figures US$800.00 fall under the column salary, while the word "inclusive" is indicated under the column overtime rate. With the supposed alterations, the figures US$560.00 were handwritten above the figures US$800.00 while the figures US$240.00 were also written above the word "inclusive". chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

As clearly explained by respondent NLRC, the correction was made only to specify the salary and the overtime pay to which petitioner is entitled under the contract. It was a mere breakdown of the total amount into US$560.00 as basic wage and US$240.00 as overtime pay. Otherwise stated, with or without the amendments the total emolument that petitioner would receive under the agreement as approved by the POEA is US$800.00 monthly with wage differentials or overtime pay included. 10


Moreover, the presence of petitioner's signature after said items renders improbable the possibility that petitioner could have misunderstood the amount of compensation he will be receiving under the contract. Nor has petitioner advanced any explanation for statements contrary or inconsistent with what appears in the records. Thus, he claimed: [a] that private respondent extended the duration of the employment contract indefinitely, 11 but admitted in his Reply that his employment contract was extended for another six (6) months by agreement between private respondent and himself: 12 [b] that when petitioner demanded for his overtime pay, respondents repatriated him 13 which again was discarded in his reply stating that he himself requested for his voluntary repatriation because of the bad faith and insincerity of private respondent; 14 [c] that he was required to post a cash bond in the amount of P20,000.00 but it was found that he deposited only the total amount of P15,000.00; [d] that his salary for November 1985 was not paid when in truth and in fact it was petitioner who owes private respondent US$285.83 for cash advances 15 and on November 27, 1985 the final pay slip was executed and signed; 16 and [e] that he finished his contract when on the contrary, despite proddings that he continue working until the renewed contract has expired, he adamantly insisted on his termination.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Verily, it is quite apparent that the whole conflict centers on the failure of respondent company to give the petitioner the desired promotion which appears to be improbable at the moment because the M/V Knut Provider continues to be laid off at Limassol for lack of charterers. 17


It is axiomatic that laws should be given a reasonable interpretation, not one which defeats the very purpose for which they were passed. This Court has in many cases involving the construction of statutes always cautioned against narrowly interpreting a statute as to defeat the purpose of the legislator and stressed that it is of the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes so as to avoid such a deplorable result

(of injustice or absurdity) and that therefore "a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results." 18


There is no dispute that an alteration of the employment contract without the approval of the Department of Labor is a serious violation of law. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Specifically, the law provides:

Article 34 paragraph (i) of the Labor Code reads: chanrobles virtual law library

Prohibited Practices. - It shall be unlawful for any individual, entity, licensee, or holder of authority: chanrobles virtual law library

x x x x chanrobles virtual law library

(i) To substitute or alter employment contracts approved and verified by the Department of Labor from the time of actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of expiration of the same without the approval of the Department of Labor.

In the case at bar, both the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission correctly analyzed the questioned annotations as not constituting an alteration of the original employment contract but only a clarification thereof which by no stretch of the imagination can be considered a violation of the above-quoted law. Under similar circumstances, this Court ruled that as a general proposition, exceptions from the coverage of a statute are strictly construed. But such construction nevertheless must be at all times reasonable, sensible and fair. Hence, to rule out from the exemption amendments set forth, although they did not materially change the terms and conditions of the original letter of credit, was held to be unreasonable and unjust, and not in accord with the declared purpose of the Margin Law. 19


The purpose of Article 34, paragraph 1 of the Labor Code is clearly the protection of both parties. In the instant case, the alleged amendment served to clarify what was agreed upon by the parties and approved by the Department of Labor. To rule otherwise would go beyond the bounds of reason and justice. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

As recently laid down by this Court, the rule that there should be concern, sympathy and solicitude for the rights and welfare of the working class, is meet and proper. That in controversies between a laborer and his master, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence or in the interpretation of agreements and writings should be resolved in the former's favor, is not an unreasonable or unfair rule. 20 But to disregard the employer's own rights and interests solely on the basis of that concern and solicitude for labor is unjust and unacceptable. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Finally, it is well-settled that factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the National Labor Relations Commission which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but at times even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence. 21


In fact since Madrigal v. Rafferty 22 great weight has been accorded to the interpretation or construction of a statute by the government agency called upon to implement the same. 23


WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the National Labor Relations Commission is AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT

ManilaSECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 109583. September 5, 1997]TRANS ACTION OVERSEAS CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE

SECRETARY OF LABOR, ROSELLE CASTIGADOR, JOSEFINA MAMON, JENELYN CASA, PEACHY LANIOG, VERDELINA BELGIRA, ELMA FLORES,

RAMONA LITURCO, GRACE SABANDO, GLORIA PALMA, AVELYN ALVAREZ, CANDELARIA NONO,NITA BUSTAMANTE, CYNTHIA ARANDILLO, SANDIE

AGUILAR, DIGNA PANAGUITON, VERONICA BAYOGOS, JULIANITA ARANADOR, LEONORA CABALLERO, NANCY BOLIVAR, NIMFA BUCOL, ZITA

GALINDO, ESTELITA BIOCOS, MARJORIE MACATE, RUBY SEPULVIDA, ROSALIE SONDIA, NORA MAQUILING, PAULINA CORDERO, LENIROSE

ABANGAN, SELFA PALMA, ANTONIA NAVARRO, ELSIE PENARUBIA, IRMA SOBREQUIL, SONY JAMUAT, CLETA MAYO, Respondents.

ROMERO, J.:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary The issue presented in the case at bar is whether or not the Secretary of Labor and Employment has jurisdiction to cancel or revoke the license of a private fee-charging employment agency.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary From July 24 to September 9, 1987, petitioner Trans Action Overseas Corporation, a private fee-charging employment agency, scoured Iloilo City for possible recruits for alleged job vacancies in Hongkong. Private respondents sought employment as domestic helpers through petitioners employees, Luzviminda Aragon, Ben Hur Domincil and his wife Cecille. The applicants paid placement fees ranging from P1,000.00 to P14,000.00, but petitioner failed to deploy them. Their demands for refund proved unavailing; thus, they were constrained to institute complaints against petitioner for violation of Articles 32 and 34(a)[1] of the Labor Code, as amended. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Petitioner denied having received the amounts allegedly collected from respondents, and averred that Aragon, whose only duty was to pre-screen and interview applicants, and the spouses Domincil were not authorized to collect fees from the applicants. Accordingly, it cannot be held liable for the money claimed by respondents. Petitioner maintains that it even warned respondents not to give any money to unauthorized individuals.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

POEA Regional Extension Unit Coordinator Edgar Somes testified that although he was aware that petitioner collected fees from respondents, the latter insisted that they be allowed to make the payments on the assumption that it could hasten their deployment abroad. He added that Mrs. Honorata Manliclic, a representative of petitioner tasked to oversee the conduct of the interviews, told him that she was leaving behind presigned receipts to Aragon as she cannot stay in Iloilo City for the screening of the applicants. Manliclic, however, denied this version and argued that it was Somes who instructed her to leave the receipts behind as it was perfectly alright to collect fees.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

On April 5, 1991, then Labor Undersecretary Nieves R. Confesor rendered the assailed order, the dispositive portion of which reads: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, respondents are hereby ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the following claims:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary 1. Rosele Castigador P14,000.00chanroblesvirtualawlibrary 18. Irma Sobrequil 2,000.00chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

2. Josefina Mamon 3,000.00chanroblesvirtualawlibrary 19. Elsie Penarubia 2,000.00 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

3. Jenelyn Casa 3,000.00chanroblesvirtualawlibrary 20. Antonia Navarro 2,000.00 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

4. Peachy Laniog 13,500.00chanroblesvirtualawlibrary 21. Selfa Palma 3,000.00chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

5. Verdelina Belgira 2,000.00 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary 22. Lenirose Abangan 13,300.00chanroblesvirtualawlibrary 6. Elma Flores 2,500.00chanroblesvirtualawlibrary 23. Paulina Cordero 1,400.00chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

7. Ramona Liturco 2,500.00chanroblesvirtualawlibrary 24. Nora Maquiling 2,000.00chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

8. Grace Sabando 3,500.00 25. Rosalie Sondia 2,000.00chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

9. Gloria Palma 1,500.00chanroblesvirtualawlibrary 26. Ruby Sepulvida 3,500.00chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

10. Avelyn Alvarez 1,500.00chanroblesvirtualawlibrary 27. Marjorie Macate 1,500.00chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

11. Candelaria Nono 1,000.00chanroblesvirtualawlibrary 28. Estelita Biocos 3,000.00chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

12. Nita Bustamante 5,000.00chanroblesvirtualawlibrary 29. Zita Galindo 3,500.00chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

13. Cynthia Arandillo 1,000.00 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary 30. Nimfa Bucol 1,000.00chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

14. Sandie Aguilar 3,000.00 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary 31. Nancy Bolivar 2,000.00chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

15. Digna Panaguiton 2,500.00chanroblesvirtualawlibrary 32. Leonora Caballero 13,900.00chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

16. Veronica Bayogos 2,000.00chanroblesvirtualawlibrary 33. Julianita Aranador 14,000.00 chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

17. Sony Jamuat 4,500.00chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The complaints of Ma. Luz Alingasa, Nimfa Perez, and Cleta Mayo are hereby dismissed in view of their desistance.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The following complaints are hereby dismissed for failure to appear/prosecute: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary 1. Jiyasmin Bantillo 6. Edna Salvantechanroblesvirtualawlibrary 2. Rosa de Luna Senail 7. Thelma Beltiarchanroblesvirtualawlibrary 3. Elnor Bandojo 8. Cynthia Cepechanroblesvirtualawlibrary 4. Teresa Caldeo 9. Rosie Pavillonchanroblesvirtualawlibrary 5. Virginia Castroverdechanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The complaints filed by the following are hereby dismissed for lack of evidence: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary 1. Aleth Palomaria 5. Mary Ann Bebosochanroblesvirtualawlibrary 2. Emely Padrones 6. Josefina Tejerochanroblesvirtualawlibrary 3. Marybeth Aparri 7. Bernadita Aprongchanroblesvirtualawlibrary 4. Lenia Biona 8. Joji Lullchanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Respondent agency is liable for twenty eight (28) counts of violation of Article 32 and five (5) counts of Article 34 (a) with a corresponding suspension in the aggregate period of sixty six (66) months. Considering however, that under the schedule of penalties, any suspension amounting to a period of 12 months merits the imposition of the penalty of cancellation, the license of respondent TRANS ACTION OVERSEAS CORPORATION to participate in the overseas placement and recruitment of workers is hereby ordered CANCELLED, effective immediately.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

SO ORDERED.[2] (Underscoring supplied)chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

On April 29, 1991, petitioner filed its Motion for Temporary Lifting of Order of Cancellation alleging, among other things, that to deny it the authority to engage in placement and recruitment activities would jeopardize not only its contractual relations with its foreign principals, but also the welfare, interests, and livelihood of recruited workers scheduled to leave for their respective assignments. Finally, it manifested its willingness to post a bond to insure payment of the claims to be awarded, should its appeal or motion be denied. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Finding the motion to be well taken, Undersecretary Confesor provisionally lifted the cancellation of petitioners license pending resolution of its Motion for

http://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence1997/sep1997/109583.php#_edn2


Reconsideration filed on May 6, 1991. On January 30, 1992, however, petitioners motion for reconsideration was eventually denied for lack of merit, and the April 5, 1991, order revoking its license was reinstated. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Petitioner contends that Secretary Confesor acted with grave abuse of discretion in rendering the assailed orders on alternative grounds, viz.: (1) it is the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) which has the exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear and decide illegal recruitment cases, including the authority to cancel recruitment licenses, or (2) the cancellation order based on the 1987 POEA Schedule of Penalties is not valid for non-compliance with the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 regarding its registration with the U.P. Law Center. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Under Executive Order No. 797[3] (E.O. No. 797) and Executive Order No. 247 (E.O. No. 247),[4] the POEA was established and mandated to assume the functions of the Overseas Employment Development Board (OEDB), the National Seamen Board (NSB), and the overseas employment function of the Bureau of Employment Services (BES). Petitioner theorizes that when POEA absorbed the powers of these agencies, Article 35 of the Labor Code, as amended, was rendered ineffective. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The power to suspend or cancel any license or authority to recruit employees for overseas employment is vested upon the Secretary of Labor and Employment. Article 35 of the Labor Code, as amended, which provides: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

ART. 35. Suspension and/or Cancellation of License or Authority. - The Minister of Labor shall have the power to suspend or cancel any license or authority to recruit employees for overseas employment for violation of rules and regulations issued by the Ministry of Labor, the Overseas Employment Development Board, and the National Seamen Board, or for violation of the provisions of this and other applicable laws, General Orders and Letters of Instructions. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

In the case of Eastern Assurance and Surety Corp. v. Secretary of Labor,[5] we held that:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The penalties of suspension and cancellation of license or authority are prescribed for violations of the above quoted provisions, among others. And the Secretary of Labor has the power under Section 35 of the law to apply these sanctions, as well as the authority, conferred by Section 36, not only to restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement activities of all agencies, but also to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions governing said activities. Pursuant to this rule-making power thus granted, the Secretary of Labor gave the POEA,[6] on its own initiative or upon filing of a complaint or report or upon request for investigation by any aggrieved person, x x (authority to) conduct the necessary proceedings for the suspension or cancellation of the license or authority of any agency or entity for certain enumerated offenses including - chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

1) the imposition or acceptance, directly or indirectly, of any amount of money, goods or services, or any fee or bond in excess of what is prescribed by the Administration, andchanroblesvirtualawlibrary

2) any other violation of pertinent provisions of the Labor Code and other relevant laws, rules and regulations.[7]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The Administrator was also given the power to order the dismissal of the case or the suspension of the license or authority of the respondent agency or contractor or recommend to the Minister the cancellation thereof.[8] (Underscoring supplied)chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

This power conferred upon the Secretary of Labor and Employment was echoed in People v. Diaz,[9] viz.:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A non-licensee or non-holder of authority means any person, corporation or entity which has not been issued a valid license or authority to engage in recruitment and placement by the Secretary of Labor, or whose license or authority has been suspended, revoked or cancelled by the POEA or the Secretary. (Underscoring supplied)chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

In view of the Courts disposition on the matter, we rule that the power to suspend or cancel any license or authority to recruit employees for overseas employment is concurrently vested with the POEA and the Secretary of Labor. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

As regards petitioners alternative argument that the non-filing of the 1987 POEA Schedule of Penalties with the UP Law Center rendered it ineffective and, hence, cannot be utilized as basis for penalizing them, we agree with Secretary Confesors explanation, to wit:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

On the other hand, the POEA Revised Rules on the Schedule of Penalties was issued pursuant to Article 34 of the Labor Code, as amended. The same merely amplified and particularized the various violations of the rules and regulations of the POEA and clarified and specified the penalties therefore (sic). Indeed, the questioned schedule of penalties contains only a listing of offenses. It does not prescribe additional rules and regulations governing overseas employment but only detailed the administrative sanctions imposable by this Office for some enumerated prohibited acts.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Under the circumstances, the license of the respondent agency was cancelled on the authority of Article 35 of the Labor Code, as amended, and not pursuant to the 1987 POEA Revised Rules on Schedule of Penalties.[10]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary


WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly, the decision of the Secretary of Labor dated April 5, 1991, is AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT


[G.R.No.120835-40.April 10, 1997]PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.TAN TIONG MENG alias

"TOMMY TAN", Accused-Appellant.









D E C I S I O NPADILLA, J.:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary Accused-appellant Tan Tiong Meng alias "Tommy Tan" was charged with Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and six (6) counts of estafa. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary The information for large scale illegal recruitment reads: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

"That on or about the period comprising June 1993 to August, 1993, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, using a business name RAINBOW SIM FACTORY, a private employment recruiting agency, and misrepresenting himself to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad with the ability to facilitate the issuance and approval of the necessary papers in connection therewith, when in fact he did not possess the authority or license from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration to do so, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly for a fee, recruit in a large scale and promise employment in Taiwan to the following persons, to wit: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Ernesto Orcullo y Nicolas - P15,000.00chanroblesvirtualawlibrary Manuel Latina y Nicanor - P15,000.00chanroblesvirtualawlibrary Neil Mascardo y Guiraldo - P15,000.00chanroblesvirtualawlibrary Librado C.Pozas - P15,000.00chanroblesvirtualawlibrary Edgardo Tolentino y Vasquez - P15,000.00chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Gavino Asiman - P15,000.00chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

as in fact, the said persons gave and delivered the abovestated amount, respectively, to the herein accused who know fully well that the aforesaid persons could not be sent to Taiwan, to the damage and prejudice of said aforementioned private complainants."[1]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary


The informations for estafa aver substantially the same allegations as follows: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

"In Criminal Case No.277-93:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

That on or about June 7, 1993, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of false representations that he can secure an employment in Taiwan for Ernesto Orcullo y Nicolas as a factory worker induced the latter to entrust to him the amount of P15,000.00, in consideration of the promised employment, but the herein accused, once in possession of the amount, with intent to defraud, with grave abuse of confidence and without fulfilling his promise, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly, misapply, misappropriate and convert the same to his own personal use and benefit and notwithstanding repeated demands made upon him for the return of the amount, accused herein failed and refused to do so, to the damage and prejudice of Ernesto Orcullo y Nicolas in the amount of P15,000.00, Philippine Currency."[2]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary


The other informations for estafa involve the following complainants and amounts. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

1) Neil Mascardo - P15,000.00chanroblesvirtualawlibrary 2) Manuel Latina - P15,000.00chanroblesvirtualawlibrary 3) Ricardo Grepo - P20,000.00chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

4) Librado Pozas - P15,000.00chanroblesvirtualawlibrary 5) Gavino Asiman - P15,000.00chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to all the informations and all seven (7) cases were tried jointly.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

On 12 May 1995, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, Cavite City rendered a decision* the dispositive part of which reads:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

1.In Criminal Case No.278-93, the Court finds the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale defined and penalized under Article 38 of the Labor Code, as amended in relation to Article 39 thereof, and hereby sentences him to a penalty of life imprisonment, and to pay a fine of P100,000, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

2.In Criminal Case No.277-93, the Court finds the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa defined and penalized under Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to a penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years as minimum, to six (6) years as the maximum; and to pay ERNESTO ORCULLO the sum of P15,000 as actual damages and P15,000 as moral and exemplary damages;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

3.In Criminal Case No.279-93, the Court finds the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa defined and penalized under Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences him to a penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years as minimum, to six (6) years as the maximum, and to pay NEIL MASCARDO the sum of P15,000 as actual damages and P15,000 as moral and exemplary damages;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

4.In Criminal Case No.280-93, the Court finds the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa defined and penalized under Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to a penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years as minimum, to six (6) years as maximum; and to pay MANUEL LATINA the sum of P15,000 as actual damages, and P15,000 as moral and exemplary damages;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

5.In Criminal Case No.343-93, the Court finds the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa defined and penalized under Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences him to a penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years as minimum, to six (6) years as maximum; and to pay RICARDO GREPO the sum of P20,000 as actual damages and P20,000 as moral and exemplary damages;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

6.In Criminal Case No.365-93, the Court finds the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa defined and penalized under Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences him to a penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years as minimum, to six (6) years as maximum and to pay LIBRADO POZAS the sum of P15,000 as actual damages and P15,000 as moral and exemplary damages;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

http://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence1997/apr1997/120835.php#_ftn1

http://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence1997/apr1997/120835.php#_edn2


7.In Criminal Case No.371-93, the Court finds the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa defined and penalized under Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences him to a penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years as minimum, to six (6) years as maximum; and to pay GAVINO ASIMAN the sum of P15,000 as actual damages and P15,000 as moral and exemplary damages.

In addition to the foregoing penalties, the accused being an alien, shall be deported without further proceedings after service of sentence. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

In the service of his sentence, the accused shall be credited with the full time during which he underwent preventive imprisonment, provided he voluntarily agreed in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, otherwise, he shall be credited with only four-fifths (4/5) thereof (Article 29, RPC, as amended by RA No.6127 and BP Blg.85). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary SO ORDERED."[3]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary


On appeal to this Court, accused-appellant assigns a single error allegedly committed by the trial court, thus: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

"THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE OFFENSE OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IN A LARGE SCALE UNDER CRIMINAL CASE NO.278-93 AND ESTAFA IN CRIMINAL CASE NOS.277-93, 279-93, 280-93, 343-93, 365-93, AND 371-93." [4]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary


The case for the prosecution averred the following facts: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Gavino Asiman testified that a certain Jose Percival Borja who was a friend of his relative informed him that a job recruiter would be at Borja's house at Capt.Villareal St., Cavite City, in case anyone was interested in an overseas job in Taiwan.Asiman further recalled that on 18 August 1993, he and his friend, Librado Pozas went to Borja's house where they met the accused-appellant who told them he could get them jobs as factory workers in Taiwan with a monthly salary of P20,000.00.Accused-appellant required them to submit their passport, bio-data and their high school diploma as well as to pay P15,000.00 each for placement and processing fees.The former issued two (2) receipts which he signed in the presence of Asiman and Pozas.[5] Accused-appellant assured them that they could leave for Taiwan twelve (12) days later.Asiman stated that they filed the complaints for illegal recruitment when they learned that accused-appellant was arrested for illegal recruitment activities.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Librado Pozas corroborated the testimony of Asiman.He added that Borja had no participation in the offense as his house was merely used as a meeting place by accused-appellant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Neil Mascardo testified that he met accused-appellant through a friend and also through Jose Borja.Mascardo narrated that on 7 July 1993, he went to Borja's house to meet accused-appellant who assured him of getting him an employment in Taiwan at the Rainbow Ship Co., a marble and handicraft factory with a monthly

salary of P20,000.00.He further testified that he paid P15,000.00 to accused-appellant for placement and processing fees as shown by a receipt signed by accused-appellant.[6] Accused-appellant first told him he could leave on 15 July 1993.When he later inquired about his departure date, accused-appellant told him he could leave by the end of July 1993.After July, accused-appellant told him he would leave on 15 August 1993 together with his uncle Manuel Latina.When he failed to leave on the last mentioned date and accused-appellant told him he would leave on 28 August 1993, Mascardo told accused-appellant he wanted his money back.Accused-appellant told him that a refund was not possible since he had already sent the money to his brother-in-law in Taiwan.Mascardo decided to file a complaint for illegal recruitment on 28 August 1993.On 31 August 1993, he, Manuel Latina and Ernesto Orcullo went to the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) where they found out that accused-appellant was not a licensed or authorized overseas recruiter.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Ricardo Grepo testified that on 11 August 1993, he went to Borja's house where he met with accused-appellant who received from him P15,000.00 for placement and processing fees.Accused-appellant told him he could get a job as a factory worker in Taiwan with a monthly salary of P20,000.00.Accused-appellant gave him a signed typewritten receipt[7] and assured him he could leave for Taiwan on 28 August 1993.Accused-appellant later told him that his visa was not yet ready and he thereafter learned from Jose Borja that accused-appellant had been arrested for illegal recruitment activities.Grepo filed his complaint on 30 August 1993. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Lucita Mascardo-Orcullo testified that she is the wife of Ernesto Orcullo, one of the complainants.She stated that on 7 June 1993, she went with her husband to Borja's house where they gave Ernesto's passport and other papers to accused-appellant who assured them that Ernesto could get a job as a factory worker in Taiwan.Lucita further averred that they paid P15,000.00 to accused-appellant for placement and processing fees as shown by a receipt signed by accused-appellant.[8]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary


Dionisa Latina testified that she is the wife of complainant Manuel Latina.She stated that on 9 June 1993, she and her husband went to Borja's house to meet accused-appellant who told them that Manuel could get a job at a toy factory in Taiwan.They paid P15,000.00 to accused-appellant who issued a receipt[9] and assured them Manuel could leave on 30 June 1993.After said date, accused-appellant kept on promising them that Manuel would be able to leave for Taiwan.The promises were never fulfilled.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Angelina de Luna, a Senior Labor Employment Officer of the POEA, testified that their office received a subpoena from the trial court requiring the issuance of a certification stating whether or not Tan Tiong Meng alias Tommy Tan was authorized by the POEA to recruit workers for overseas employment.De Luna presented a certification signed by Ma.Salome S.Mendoza, Chief, Licensing Branch of the POEA dated 7 July 1994 stating that accused-appellant is neither licensed nor authorized by the POEA to recruit workers for overseas employment.[10]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary


Accused-appellant Tan Tiong Meng alias Tommy Tan was the only witness for the defense.He testified that he is a Singaporean national married to Estelita Oribiana, a Filipino-Chinese.He added that he works as a sales representative for Oribiana









Laboratory Supplies, a company owned by his brother-in-law which sells laboratory equipment to various schools in Cavite. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Tan alleged that Jose Percival Borja was introduced to him by a certain Malou Lorenzo at the office of their laboratory supplies in Sta.Cruz, Manila.Lorenzo allegedly told him that Borja needed his help in processing job applications for abroad.When he talked to Borja, the latter told him that he could help in convincing applicants that they could work in Taiwan.Borja offered him a P1,000.00 commission from the amount paid by each applicant. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Tan admitted having received money from all the complainants but he said that all the money was turned over to Borja after deducting his commission.Tan likewise admitted that he and his wife are respondents in about seventy (70) cases of estafa and illegal recruitment but that it was Lorenzo who was the main recruiter. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The prosecution presented Jose Percival Borja as a rebuttal witness.Borja testified that Tan was introduced to him by Malou Lorenzo.Accused-appellant told him that they were direct recruiters for jobs in Taiwan and that he has relatives there.Tan's offer was attractive considering that he charged only P15,000.00 while the prevailing rate for job placements was P45,000.00-P60,000.00.Borja added that he even told his friends and relatives to apply with accused-appellant.Tan had told him that he sometimes comes to Cavite to deliver laboratory equipment.When Tan called him up to tell him he was in the area, Borja told him to come to his house.It was at his house where Tan accepted money from several job applicants most of whom he (Borja) did not know.When Borja realized that Tan had cheated the applicants, he helped set up a trap and had Tan arrested by his neighbor Tony Guinto, a Cavite City policeman.Borja later learned that Tan had victimized several people in Batangas and Metro Manila.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

In the present appeal, accused-appellant would have the Court believe that he merely acted as a collector of money for the principal recruiter Borja who made the representations that he (Tan) could give the applicants jobs in Taiwan.He maintains that he merely received commissions from the transactions and that the deceit was employed not by him but by Borja who introduced him as a job recruiter. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The Court is not impressed by such bizarre pretensions. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Several revealing circumstances belie the version for the defense, namely: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary 1.Neil Mascardo testified that accused-appellant told him he could no longer return his money because he had already sent it to his brother-in-law Lee Shut Kua in Taiwan;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary 2.All the receipts issued to complainants were signed by accused-appellant; chanroblesvirtualawlibrary 3.Tan admitted that he and his wife are respondents in about seventy (70) cases for estafa and illegal recruitment in Batangas; [11]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

chanroblesvirtualawlibrary 4.Tan executed a sworn statement dated 13 September 1993 before SPO2 Eduardo G.Nover, Jr.in the presence of his lawyer Atty.Florendo C.Medina wherein he admitted receiving P15,000.00 from Gavino Asiman;[12]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

chanroblesvirtualawlibrary 5.The complainants all pointed to Tan and not Borja as the one who had represented to them that he could give them jobs in Taiwan. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

There is no showing that any of the complainants had ill-motives against Tan other than to bring him to the bar of justice.The testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution were straight-forward, credible and convincing.The constitutional presumption of innocence in Tan's favor has been overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt and we affirm his convictions. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The Labor Code defines recruitment and placement thus: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

"(A)ny act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not; Provided, that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement." chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

It is clear that accused-appellant's acts of accepting placement fees from job applicants and representing to said applicants that he could get them jobs in Taiwan constitute recruitment and placement under the above provision of the Labor Code.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The Labor Code prohibits any person or entity, not authorized by the POEA, from engaging in recruitment and placement activities thus: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

"(a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this Code x x x x ch

(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage and shall be penalized in accordance with Article 39 hereof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the first paragraph hereof.Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group."[14] chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The POEA having certified that accused-appellant is not authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment, it is clear that the offense committed against the six (6) complainants in this case is illegal recruitment in large scale punishable under Article 39 (a) of the Labor Code with life imprisonment and a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Accused-appellant's guilt of six (6) separate crimes of estafa has likewise been proven.

The argument that the deceit was employed by Jose Percival Borja and not by accused-appellant is specious, even ridiculous.All the complainants agreed that it was accused-appellant Tan who assured them of jobs in Taiwan.The assurances




were made intentionally to deceive the would-be job applicants to part with their money.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

In People v.Calonzo,[15] the Court reiterated the rule that a person convicted for illegal recruitment under the Labor Code can be convicted for violation of the Revised Penal Code provisions on estafa provided the elements of the crime are present.In People v.Romero[16] the elements of the crime were stated thus: chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

a) that the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit, andchanroblesvirtualawlibrary

b) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Both elements have been proven in this case. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

One final point.The names of a certain Malou Lorenzo and Chit Paulino have been mentioned by accused-appellant as being illegal recruiters whom he contends are either the main recruiters or their agents.It also appears that accused-appellant's wife Estelita Oribiana who is a co-accused in the other illegal recruitment complaints may be a part of a large syndicate operating in Batangas, Cavite and Metro Manila.There is nothing on the record to show that attempts were made to investigate these three (3) people. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The campaign and drive against illegal recruiters should be continuous and unrelenting.Government should not be content with bringing to justice but a number of these diabolic denizens of society who thrive on the dreams of our countrymen of having a better life.Only when the last of their tribe has been convicted and punished can the government rightfully claim that it has fulfilled the constitutional mandate to protect the rights and promote the welfare of workers.[17]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary


WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from finding accused-appellant Tan Tiong Meng alias "Tommy Tan" guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale and six (6) counts of estafa, is hereby AFFIRMED.Costs against accused-appellant.SO ORDERED.


ManilaEN BANC

G.R. No. 81510 March 14, 1990HORTENCIA SALAZAR, Petitioner, vs. HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his

capacity as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, and FERDIE MARQUEZ, Respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.:This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of arrest and seizure under Article 38 of the Labor Code, prohibiting illegal recruitment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The facts are as follows:xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library

1. On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro of 177 Tupaz Street, Leveriza, Pasay City, in a sworn statement filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA for brevity) charged petitioner Hortencia Salazar, viz:

04. T: Ano ba ang dahilan at ikaw ngayon ay narito atnagbibigay ng salaysay.

S: Upang ireklamo sa dahilan ang aking PECC Card ay ayaw ibigay sa akin ng dati kong manager. - Horty Salazar - 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Mla.

05. T: Kailan at saan naganap and ginawang panloloko sa iyo ng tao/mga taong inireklamo mo? chanrobles virtual law library

S. Sa bahay ni Horty Salazar.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

06. T: Paano naman naganap ang pangyayari? chanrobles virtual law library

S. Pagkagaling ko sa Japan ipinatawag niya ako. Kinuha ang PECC Card ko at sinabing hahanapan ako ng booking sa Japan. Mag 9 month's na ako sa Phils. ayhindi pa niya ako napa-alis. So lumipat ako ng ibang company pero ayaw niyang ibigay and PECC Card ko.

2. On November 3, 1987, public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez to whom said complaint was assigned, sent to the petitioner the following telegram:

YOU ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO APPEAR BEFORE FERDIE MARQUEZ POEA ANTI ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT UNIT 6TH FLR. POEA BLDG. EDSA COR. ORTIGAS AVE. MANDALUYONG MM ON NOVEMBER 6, 1987 AT 10 AM RE CASE FILED AGAINST YOU. FAIL NOT UNDER PENALTY OF LAW.

4. On the same day, having ascertained that the petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued his challenged CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER NO. 1205 which reads:

HORTY SALAZARNo. 615 R.O. Santos St.Mandaluyong, Metro Manila chanrobles virtual law library

Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No. 1920 and Executive Order No. 1022, I hereby order the CLOSURE of your recruitment agency being operated at No. 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that you have -




(1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment; chanrobles virtual law library

(2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal prosecution under existing laws.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Done in the City of Manila, this 3th day of November, 1987.

5. On January 26, 1988 POEA Director on Licensing and Regulation Atty. Estelita B. Espiritu issued an office order designating respondents Atty. Marquez, Atty. Jovencio Abara and Atty. Ernesto Vistro as members of a team tasked to implement Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205. Doing so, the group assisted by Mandaluyong policemen and mediamen Lito Castillo of the People's Journal and Ernie Baluyot of News Today proceeded to the residence of the petitioner at 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. There it was found that petitioner was operating Hannalie Dance Studio. Before entering the place, the team served said Closure and Seizure order on a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar who voluntarily allowed them entry into the premises. Mrs. Flora Salazar informed the team that Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited with Moreman Development (Phil.). However, when required to show credentials, she was unable to produce any. Inside the studio, the team chanced upon twelve talent performers - practicing a dance number and saw about twenty more waiting outside, The team confiscated assorted costumes which were duly receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

6. On January 28, 1988, petitioner filed with POEA the following letter: chanrobles virtual law library

Gentlemen: chanrobles virtual law library

On behalf of Ms. Horty Salazar of 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, we respectfully request that the personal properties seized at her residence last January 26, 1988 be immediately returned on the ground that said seizure was contrary to law and against the will of the owner thereof. Among our reasons are the following:

1. Our client has not been given any prior notice or hearing, hence the Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205 dated November 3, 1987 violates "due process of law" guaranteed under Sec. 1, Art. III, of the Philippine Constitution.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

2. Your acts also violate Sec. 2, Art. III of the Philippine Constitution which guarantees right of the people "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose." chanrobles virtual law library

3. The premises invaded by your Mr. Ferdi Marquez and five (5) others (including 2 policemen) are the private residence of the Salazar family, and

the entry, search as well as the seizure of the personal properties belonging to our client were without her consent and were done with unreasonable force and intimidation, together with grave abuse of the color of authority, and constitute robbery and violation of domicile under Arts. 293 and 128 of the Revised Penal Code. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Unless said personal properties worth around TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) in all (and which were already due for shipment to Japan) are returned within twenty-four (24) hours from your receipt hereof, we shall feel free to take all legal action, civil and criminal, to protect our client's interests.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We trust that you will give due attention to these important matters.

7. On February 2, 1988, before POEA could answer the letter, petitioner filed the instant petition; on even date, POEA filed a criminal complaint against her with the Pasig Provincial Fiscal, docketed as IS-88-836. 1


On February 2, 1988, the petitioner filed this suit for prohibition. Although the acts sought to be barred are already fait accompli, thereby making prohibition too late, we consider the petition as one for certiorari in view of the grave public interest involved.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The Court finds that a lone issue confronts it: May the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code? It is also an issue squarely raised by the petitioner for the Court's resolution. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Under the new Constitution, which states:. . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 2


it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest. 3 In one case, it was declared that mayors may not exercise this power:

xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library

But it must be emphasized here and now that what has just been described is the state of the law as it was in September, 1985. The law has since been altered. No longer does the mayor have at this time the power to conduct preliminary investigations, much less issue orders of arrest. Section 143 of the Local Government Code, conferring this power on the mayor has been abrogated, rendered functus officio by the 1987 Constitution which took effect on February 2, 1987, the date of its ratification by the Filipino people. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution pertinently provides that "no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized." The constitutional proscription has thereby been manifested that thenceforth, the function of determining probable cause and issuing, on the basis thereof, warrants of arrest or search warrants, may be validly exercised only by judges, this being

evidenced by the elimination in the present Constitution of the phrase, "such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law" found in the counterpart provision of said 1973 Constitution, who, aside from judges, might conduct preliminary investigations and issue warrants of arrest or search warrants. 4


Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body:

We agree that the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force exercises, or was meant to exercise, prosecutorial powers, and on that ground, it cannot be said to be a neutral and detached "judge" to determine the existence of probable cause for purposes of arrest or search. Unlike a magistrate, a prosecutor is naturally interested in the success of his case. Although his office "is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused," he stands, invariably, as the accused's adversary and his accuser. To permit him to issue search warrants and indeed, warrants of arrest, is to make him both judge and jury in his own right, when he is neither. That makes, to our mind and to that extent, Presidential Decree No. 1936 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002, unconstitutional. 5


Section 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, as now written, was entered as an amendment by Presidential Decrees Nos. 1920 and 2018 of the late President Ferdinand Marcos, to Presidential Decree No. 1693, in the exercise of his legislative powers under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. Under the latter, the then Minister of Labor merely exercised recommendatory powers:

(c) The Minister of Labor or his duly authorized representative shall have the power to recommend the arrest and detention of any person engaged in illegal recruitment. 6


On May 1, 1984, Mr. Marcos promulgated Presidential Decree No. 1920, with the avowed purpose of giving more teeth to the campaign against illegal recruitment. The Decree gave the Minister of Labor arrest and closure powers:

(b) The Minister of Labor and Employment shall have the power to cause the arrest and detention of such non-licensee or non-holder of authority if after proper investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a danger to national security and public order or will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers. The Minister shall order the closure of companies, establishment and entities found to be engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas employment, without having been licensed or authorized to do so. 7


On January 26, 1986, he, Mr. Marcos, promulgated Presidential Decree No. 2018, giving the Labor Minister search and seizure powers as well:

(c) The Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall have the power to cause the arrest and detention of such non-licensee or non-holder of authority if after investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a danger to national security and public order or will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers. The Minister shall order the search of the office or premises and seizure of documents, paraphernalia, properties and other implements used in illegal recruitment activities and the closure of companies, establishment and entities found to be engaged in the recruitment

of workers for overseas employment, without having been licensed or authorized to do so. 8


The above has now been etched as Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles

virtual law library

The decrees in question, it is well to note, stand as the dying vestiges of authoritarian rule in its twilight moments. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The Solicitor General's reliance on the case of Morano v. Vivo 9 is not well-taken. Vivo involved a deportation case, governed by Section 69 of the defunct Revised Administrative Code and by Section 37 of the Immigration Law. We have ruled that in deportation cases, an arrest (of an undesirable alien) ordered by the President or his duly authorized representatives, in order to carry out a final decision of deportation is valid. 10 It is valid, however, because of the recognized supremacy of the Executive in matters involving foreign affairs. We have held: 11


The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens (Chuoco Tiaco vs. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 57 L. Ed. 960, 40 Phil. 1122, 1125). That power may be exercised by the Chief Executive "when he deems such action necessary for the peace and domestic tranquility of the nation." Justice Johnson's opinion is that when the Chief Executive finds that there are aliens whose continued presence in the country is injurious to the public interest, "he may, even in the absence of express law, deport them". (Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield, 16 Phil. 534, 568, 569; In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41). chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The right of a country to expel or deport aliens because their continued presence is detrimental to public welfare is absolute and unqualified (Tiu Chun Hai and Go Tam vs. Commissioner of Immigration and the Director of NBI, 104 Phil. 949, 956). 12


The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the power to order arrests) can not be made to extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of the courts.

Moreover, the search and seizure order in question, assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that it was validly issued, is clearly in the nature of a general warrant:

Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No. 1920 and Executive Order No. 1022, I hereby order the CLOSURE of your recruitment agency being operated at No. 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that you have -

(1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment; chanrobles virtual law library

(2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code.

This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal prosecution under existing laws.

We have held that a warrant must identify clearly the things to be seized, otherwise, it is null and void, thus:


Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants. The search warrants describe the articles sought to be seized in this wise:

1) All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo equipment, typewriters, cabinets, tables, communications/ recording equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone and the like used and/or connected in the printing of the "WE FORUM" newspaper and any and all documents/communications, letters and facsimile of prints related to the "WE FORUM" newspaper. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law

library

2) Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publications to promote the objectives and purposes of the subversive organizations known as Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement; and chanrobles virtual law library

3) Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM" and other subversive materials and propaganda, more particularly, chanrobles virtual law library

1) Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892; chanrobles virtual law library

2) DATSUN, pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969; chanrobles virtual law library

3) A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 542; chanrobles virtual law library

4) TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665; and chanrobles virtual law

library

5) TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 472 with marking "Bagong Silang."

In Stanford v. State of Texas, the search warrant which authorized the search for "books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written instruments concerning the Communist Parties of Texas, and the operations of the Community Party in Texas," was declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too general. In like manner, directions to "seize any evidence in connection with the violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have been held too general, and that portion of a search warrant which authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia which could be used to violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General Statutes (the statute dealing with the crime of conspiracy)" was held to be a general warrant, and therefore invalid. The description of the articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in question cannot be characterized differently. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme court calls to mind a notable chapter in English history; the era of disaccord between the Tudor Government and the English Press, when "Officers of the Crown were given roving commissions to search where they pleased in order to suppress and destroy the literature of dissent both Catholic and Puritan." Reference herein to such historical episode would not be relevant for it is not the policy of our government to suppress any

newspaper or publication that speaks with "the voice of non-conformity" but poses no clear and imminent danger to state security. 14


For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following principles:

1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who may issue warrants of arrest and search: chanrobles virtual law library

2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President or the Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents are ORDERED to return all materials seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order No. 1205. No costs. SO ORDERED.


ManilaSECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 100641 June 14, 1993FARLE P. ALMODIEL, Petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION (FIRST DIVISION), RAYTHEON PHILS., INC., Respondents.

NOCON, J.:Subject of this petition for certiorari is the decision dated March 21, 1991 of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC Case No. 00-00645-89 which reversed and set aside the Labor Arbiter's decision dated September 27, 1989 and ordered instead the payment of separation pay and financial assistance of P100,000.00. Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission and prays for the reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter's decision which declared his termination on the ground of redundancy illegal. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner Farle P. Almodiel is a certified public accountant who was hired in October, 1987 as Cost Accounting Manager of respondent Raytheon Philippines, Inc. through a reputable placement firm, John Clements Consultants, Inc. with a starting monthly salary of P18,000.00. Before said employment, he was the accounts executive of Integrated Microelectronics, Inc. for several years. He left his lucrative job therein in view of the promising career offered by Raytheon. He started as a probationary or temporary employee. As Cost Accounting Manager, his major duties were: (1) plan, coordinate and carry out year and physical inventory; (2) formulate and issue out hard copies of Standard Product costing and other cost/pricing analysis if needed and required and (3) set up the written Cost Accounting System for the whole company. After a few months, he was given a regularization increase of P1,600.00 a month. Not long thereafter, his salary was increased to P21,600.00 a month. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On August 17, 1988, he recommended and submitted a Cost Accounting/Finance Reorganization, affecting the whole finance group but the same was disapproved by the Controller. However, he was assured by the Controller that should his position or department which was apparently a one-man department with no staff becomes

untenable or unable to deliver the needed service due to manpower constraint, he would be given a three (3) year advance notice. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In the meantime, the standard cost accounting system was installed and used at the Raytheon plants and subsidiaries worldwide. It was likewise adopted and installed in the Philippine operations. As a consequence, the services of a Cost Accounting Manager allegedly entailed only the submission of periodic reports that would use computerized forms prescribed and designed by the international head office of the Raytheon Company in California, USA.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On January 27, 1989, petitioner was summoned by his immediate boss and in the presence of IRD Manager, Mr. Rolando Estrada, he was told of the abolition of his position on the ground of redundancy. He pleaded with management to defer its action or transfer him to another department, but he was told that the decision of management was final and that the same has been conveyed to the Department of Labor and Employment. Thus, he was constrained to file the complaint for illegal dismissal before the Arbitration Branch of the National Capital Region, NLRC, Department of Labor and Employment. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On September 27, 1989, Labor Arbiter Daisy Cauton-Barcelona rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that complainant's termination on the ground of redundancy is highly irregular and without legal and factual basis, thus ordering the respondents to reinstate complainant to his former position with full backwages without lost of seniority rights and other benefits. Respondents are further ordered to pay complainant P200,000.00 as moral damages and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus ten percent (10%) of the total award as attorney's fees. 1


Raytheon appealed therefrom on the grounds that the Labor Arbiter committed grave abuse of discretion in denying its rights to dismiss petitioner on the ground of redundancy, in relying on baseless surmises and self-serving assertions of the petitioner that its act was tainted with malice and bad faith and in awarding moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On March 21, 1991, the NLRC reversed the decision and directed Raytheon to pay petitioner the total sum of P100,000.00 as separation pay/financial assistance. The dispositive portion of which is hereby quoted as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby set aside. In its stead, Order is hereby issued directing respondent to pay complainant the total separation pay/financial assistance of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). SO ORDERED.

From this decision, petitioner filed the instant petition averring that:

The public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to (lack of) or in excess of jurisdiction in declaring as valid and justified the termination of petitioner on the ground of redundancy in the face of clearly established

finding that petitioner's termination was tainted with malice, bad faith and irregularity. 3


Termination of an employee's services because of redundancy is governed by Article 283 of the Labor Code which provides as follows:

Art. 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. - The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the worker and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. In case of termination due to installation of labor-saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least one (1) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closure or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to at least one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered as one (1) whole year.

There is no dispute that petitioner was duly advised, one (1) month before, of the termination of his employment on the ground of redundancy in a written notice by his immediate superior, Mrs. Magdalena B.D. Lopez sometime in the afternoon of January 27, 1989. He was issued a check for P54,863.00 representing separation pay but in view of his refusal to acknowledge the notice and the check, they were sent to him thru registered mail on January 30, 1989. The Department of Labor and Employment was served a copy of the notice of termination of petitioner in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code and the implementing rules.

The crux of the controversy lies on whether bad faith, malice and irregularity crept in the abolition of petitioner's position of Cost Accounting Manager on the ground of redundancy. Petitioner claims that the functions of his position were absorbed by the Payroll/Mis/Finance Department under the management of Danny Ang Tan Chai, a resident alien without any working permit from the Department of Labor and Employment as required by law. Petitioner relies on the testimony of Raytheon's witness to the effect that corollary functions appertaining to cost accounting were dispersed to other units in the Finance Department. And granting that his department has to be declared redundant, he claims that he should have been the Manager of the Payroll/Mis/Finance Department which handled general accounting, payroll and encoding. As a B. S. Accounting graduate, a CPA with M.B.A. units, 21 years of work experience, and a natural born Filipino, he claims that he is better qualified than Ang Tan Chai, a B.S. Industrial Engineer, hired merely as a Systems Analyst Programmer or its equivalent in early 1987, promoted as MIS Manager only during the middle part of 1988 and a resident alien. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On the other hand, Raytheon insists that petitioner's functions as Cost Accounting Manager had not been absorbed by Ang Tan Chai, a permanent resident born in this country. It claims to have established below that Ang Tan Chai did not displace petitioner or absorb his functions and duties as they were occupying entirely different and distinct positions requiring different sets of expertise or qualifications and

discharging functions altogether different and foreign from that of petitioner's abolished position. Raytheon debunks petitioner's reliance on the testimony of Mr. Estrada saying that the same witness testified under oath that the functions of the Cost Accounting Manager had been completely dispensed with and the position itself had been totally abolished. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Whether petitioner's functions as Cost Accounting Manager have been dispensed with or merely absorbed by another is however immaterial. Thus, notwithstanding the dearth of evidence on the said question, a resolution of this case can be arrived at without delving into this matter. For even conceding that the functions of petitioner's position were merely transferred, no malice or bad faith can be imputed from said act. A survey of existing case law will disclose that in Wiltshire File Co., Inc. v. NLRC, 4 the position of Sales Manager was abolished on the ground of redundancy as the duties previously discharged by the Sales Manager simply added to the duties of the General Manager to whom the Sales Manager used to report. In adjudging said termination as legal, this Court said that redundancy, for purposes of our Labor Code, exists where the services of an employee are in excess of what is reasonably demanded by the actual requirements of the enterprise. The characterization of an employee's services as no longer necessary or sustainable, and therefore, properly terminable, was an exercise of business judgment on the part of the employer. The wisdom or soundness of such characterization or decision was not subject to discretionary review on the part of the Labor Arbiter nor of the NLRC so long, of course, as violation of law or merely arbitrary and malicious action is not shown.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In the case of International Macleod, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 5 this Court also considered the position of Government Relations Officer to have become redundant in view of the appointment of the International Heavy Equipment Corporation as the company's dealer with the government. It held therein that the determination of the need for the phasing out of a department as a labor and cost saving device because it was no longer economical to retain said services is a management prerogative and the courts will not interfere with the exercise thereof as long as no abuse of discretion or merely arbitrary or malicious action on the part of management is shown.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In the same vein, this Court ruled in Bondoc v. People's Bank and Trust Co., 6 that the bank's board of directors possessed the power to remove a department manager whose position depended on the retention of the trust and confidence of management and whether there was need for his services. Although some vindictive motivation might have impelled the abolition of his position, this Court expounded that it is undeniable that the bank's board of directors possessed the power to remove him and to determine whether the interest of the bank justified the existence of his department.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Indeed, an employer has no legal obligation to keep more employees than are necessary for the operation of its business. Petitioner does not dispute the fact that a cost accounting system was installed and used at Raytheon subsidiaries and plants worldwide; and that the functions of his position involve the submission of periodic reports utilizing computerized forms designed and prescribed by the head office with the installation of said accounting system. Petitioner attempts to controvert these realities by alleging that some of the functions of his position were still indispensable and were actually dispersed to another department. What these indispensable functions that were dispersed, he failed however, to specify and point out. Besides,

the fact that the functions of a position were simply added to the duties of another does not affect the legitimacy of the employer's right to abolish a position when done in the normal exercise of its prerogative to adopt sound business practices in the management of its affairs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Considering further that petitioner herein held a position which was definitely managerial in character, Raytheon had a broad latitude of discretion in abolishing his position. An employer has a much wider discretion in terminating employment relationship of managerial personnel compared to rank and file employees. 7 The reason obviously is that officers in such key positions perform not only functions which by nature require the employer's full trust and confidence but also functions that spell the success or failure of an enterprise. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Likewise destitute of merit is petitioner's imputation of unlawful discrimination when Raytheon caused corollary functions appertaining to cost accounting to be absorbed by Danny Ang Tan Chai, a resident alien without a working permit. Article 40 of the Labor Code which requires employment permit refers to non-resident aliens. The employment permit is required for entry into the country for employment purposes and is issued after determination of the non-availability of a person in the Philippines who is competent, able and willing at the time of application to perform the services for which the alien is desired. Since Ang Tan Chai is a resident alien, he does not fall within the ambit of the provision.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner also assails Raytheon's choice of Ang Tan Chai to head the Payroll/Mis/Finance Department, claiming that he is better qualified for the position. It should be noted, however, that Ang Tan Chai was promoted to the position during the middle part of 1988 or before the abolition of petitioner's position in early 1989. Besides the fact that Ang Tan Chai's promotion thereto is a settled matter, it has been consistently held that an objection founded on the ground that one has better credentials over the appointee is frowned upon so long as the latter possesses the minimum qualifications for the position. In the case at bar, since petitioner does not allege that Ang Tan Chai does not qualify for the position, the Court cannot substitute its discretion and judgment for that which is clearly and exclusively management prerogative. To do so would take away from the employer what rightly belongs to him as aptly explained in National Federation of Labor Unions v. NLRC: 8

It is a well-settled rule that labor laws do not authorize interference with the employer's judgment in the conduct of his business. The determination of the qualification and fitness of workers for hiring and firing, promotion or reassignment are exclusive prerogatives of management. The Labor Code and its implementing Rules do not vest in the Labor Arbiters nor in the different Divisions of the NLRC (nor in the courts) managerial authority. The employer is free to determine, using his own discretion and business judgment, all elements of employment, "from hiring to firing" except in cases of unlawful discrimination or those which may be provided by law. There is none in the instant case.

Finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the National Labor Relations Commission in reversing and annulling the decision of the Labor Arbiter and that on the contrary, the termination of petitioner's employment was anchored on a valid and authorized cause under Article 283 of the Labor Code, the instant petition for certiorari must fail. SO ORDERED.


ManilaEN BANC

G.R. No. L-2216 January 31, 1950DEE C. CHUAN & SONS, INC., Petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL

RELATIONS, CONGRESS OF LABOR ORGANIZATIONS (CLO), KAISAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA KAHOY SA PILIPINAS and JULIAN LUMANOG AND

HIS WORK-CONTRACT LABORERS, Respondents.

TUASON, J.: chanrobles virtual law library

Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc. assails the validity of an order of the Court of Industrial Relations. The order made upon petitioner's request for authority to hire" about twelve(12) more laborers from time to time and on a temporary basis," contains the proviso that "the majority of the laborers to be employed should be native." The petition was filed pending settlement by the court of a labor dispute between the petitioner and Kaisahan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa Kahoy sa Pilipinas. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

At the outset, the appellant takes exception to the finding of the court below that Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc. is capitalized with foreign descent. This question has little or no bearing on the case and may well be passed over except incidentally as a point of argument in relation to the material issues. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It is next said that "The Court of Industrial Relations cannot intervene in questions of selection of employees and workers so as to impose unconstitutional restrictions," and that "The restrictions of the number of aliens that nay be employed in any business, occupation, trade or profession of any kind, is a denial of the equal protection of the laws." Although the brief does not name the persons who are supposed to be denied the equal protection of the laws, it is clearly to be inferred that aliens in general are in petitioner's mind. certainly, the order does not, directly or indirectly, immediately or remotely, discriminate against the petitioner on account of race or citizenship. The order could have been issued in a case in which the employer was a Filipino. As a matter of fact the petitioner insists that 75 % of its shares of stock are held by Philippine citizens, a statement which is here assumed to be correct.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

But is petitioner entitled to challenge the constitutionality of a law or an order which does not adversely affect it, in behalf of aliens who are prejudiced thereby? The answer is not in doubt. An alien may question the constitutionality of a statute (or court order) only when and so far as it is being, or is about to be, applied to his disadvantage. (16 C.J.S. 157 et seq.) The prospective employees whom the petitioner may contemplate employing have not come forward to seek redress; their identity has not even been revealed. Clearly the petitioner has no case in so far as it strives to protect the rights of others, much less others who are unknown and undetermined. U.S. vs. Wong Ku Ark, 169 U.S. 649; Truax vs. Reich, 239 U.S. 39 60 Law ed., 131., and other American decisions cited do not support the petitioner for the very simple reasons that in those cases it was the persons themselves whose rights and immunities under the constitution were being violated that invoked the protection of the courts.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The petitioner is within its legitimate sphere of interest when it complains that the appealed order restrains it in its liberty to engage the men it pleases. This complaint merits a more detailed examination. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

That the employer's right to hire labor is not absolute has to be admitted. "This privilege of hiring and firing ad libitum is, of course, being subjected to restraints today." Statutes are cutting in on it. And so does Commonwealth Act No. 103. The regulations of the hours of labor of employees and of the employment of women and children are familiar examples of the limitation of the employer's right in this regard. The petitioner's request for permission to employ additional; laborers is an implicit recognition of the correctness of the proposition. The power of the legislature to make regulations is subject only to the condition that they should be affected with public interest and reasonable under the circumstances. The power may be exercised directly by the law-making body or delegated by appropriate rules to the courts or administrative agencies.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We are of the opinion that the order under consideration meets the test of reasonableness and public interest. The passage of Commonwealth Act No. 103 was "in conformity with the constitutional objective and . . . the historical fact that industrial and agricultural disputes have given rise to disquietude, bloodshed and revolution in our country." (Antamok Goldfields Mining Co. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 40 Off. Gaz., 8th Supp., 173.)1 "Commonwealth Act No. 103 has precisely vested the Court of Industrial Relations with authority to intervene in all disputes between employees or strikes arising from the difference as regards wages, compensation, and other labor conditions which it may take cognizance of." (Central Azucarera de Tarlac vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 40 Off. Gaz., 3rd Supp., 319, 324.)2 Thus it has jurisdiction to determine the number of men to be laid off during off-seasons. By the same token, the court may specify that a certain proportion of the additional laborers to be employed should be Filipinos, if such condition, in the court's opinion, "is necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling disputes or doing justice to the parties." chanrobles virtual law library

The order in question has that specific end in view. In parallel view the court observed: "Undoubtedly, without the admonition of the Court, nothing could prevent petitioner from hiring purely alien laborers, and there is no gainsaying the fact that further conflict or dispute would naturally ensue. To cope with this contingency, and acting within the powers granted by the organic law, the court, believing in the necessity and expediency of making patent its desire to avoid probable and possible further misunderstanding between the parties, issued the order." chanrobles virtual law library

We are not prepared to declare that the order is not conducive to the aim pursued. The question is a practical one depending on facts with which the court is best familiar. The fact already noted should not be lost sight of - that there is a pending strike and besides, that the employment of temporary laborers was opposed by the striking employees and was the subject of a protracted hearing. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We can not agree with the petitioner that the order constitutes an unlawful intrusion into the sphere of legislation, by attempting to lay down a public policy of the state or to settle a political question. In the first place, we believe, as we have already explained, that the court's action falls within the legitimate scope of its jurisdiction. In the second place, the order does not formulate a policy and is not political in character. It is not a permanent, all-embracing regulation. It is a compromise and emergency measure applicable only in this case and calculated to bridge a temporary gap and to adjust conflicting interests in an existing and menacing controversy. The hiring of Chinese laborers by the petitioner was rightly considered by the court likely to lead the parties away from the reconciliation which it was the function of the court to effectuate. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

As far as the petitioner is concerned, the requirement that majority of the laborers to be employed should be Filipinos is certain not arbitrary, unreasonable or unjust. The petitioner's right to employ labor or to make contract with respect thereto is not unreasonably curtailed and its interest is not jeopardized. We take it that the nationality of the additional laborers to be taken in is immaterial to the petitioner. In its application for permission to employ twelve temporary laborers it expressly says that these could be Filipinos or Chinese. On the face of this statement, assuming the same to be sincere, the petitioner objection to the condition imposed by the court would appear to be academic and a trifle. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We should not close without adverting to the fact that the petitioner does not so much as pretend that the hiring of additional laborers is its prerogative as a matter of right. It seems to be conceded that during the pendency of the dispute the petitioner could employ temporary laborers only with the permission of the Court of Industrial Relations. The granting of the application thus lies within the sound judgment of the court, and if the court could turn it down entirely, as we think it could, its authority to quality the permission should be undeniable, provided only that the qualification is not arbitrary, against law, morals, or established public policy, which it is not; it is an expedient and emergency step designed to relieve petitioner's own difficulties. Also important to remember is that it is not compulsory on petitioner's part to take advantage of the order. Being a permute petitioner is the sole judge of whether it should take the order as it is, or leave it if it does not suit its interest to hire new laborers other than Chinese.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The order appealed from is affirmed with costs to this appeal against the petitioner-appellant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Separate Opinions chanrobles virtual law library

OZAETA, J., with whom concur PARAS, MONTEMAYOR, and REYES, JJ., dissenting: chanrobles virtual law library

During the trial of an industrial dispute between the petitioner and the respondent labor union, the former applied to the Court of Industrial Relations for authority "to hire about twelve more laborers from time to time and on a temporary basis, to be chosen by the petitioner from either Filipinos or Chinese." the court granted the authority applied for but imposed as a condition that the majority of the twelve new laborers to be hired "should be native and only a nominal percentage thereof alien." In imposing such condition the court said:

The hiring of laborers who are not native or Filipino should be discouraged, as it is being discouraged by this court. In these critical moments of unemployment, any competition of alien and native labor would be destructive of our Nation that is in the making. By the act of God, this nation is the Philippines, her soil is the patrimony of the Filipino people, and in this Philippine soil the Filipino laborers must have priority and preference. No capitalistic management can violate this written law, unless it wants to court trouble and conflict. In the hiring, therefore, of laborers, it is the opinion of this court that management, in employing aliens, should be prudent and cautious and should, as much as possible, employ only a small percentage thereof limited to those absolutely necessary and confidential.

The power of the Court of Industrial Relations to impose such condition as to limit the authority of the employer to hire laborers than Filipinos is challenged by the petitioner. "The petitioner is within its legitimate sphere of interest when it complains that the appealed order restrains it in liberty to engage the men it pleases," says the

majority opinion, and we add - "regardless of race or nationality." It is true that no alien laborer who may be adversely affected by the order has been made a party herein. Under the circumstances of the case he could not be expected to have intervened in the incident which gave rise to the order complained of. But his intervention is not necessary in order to determine whether or not the Court of Industrial Relations is empowered by law to impose the condition above mentioned. If the court has no power to discriminate against a certain class of laborers on account of their race or nationality, it has no power to impose the condition in question, and the employer has legitimate right to complain against such imposition.

The Court of Industrial Relations impliedly admits the nonexistence of any statue providing that Filipino laborers must be preferred over aliens; but it claims or adopts an "unwritten law" to that effect and says that "no capitalistic management can violate this unwritten law, unless it wants to court trouble and conflict." Who made such unwritten law? Certainly the Congress of the Philippines, the only entity authorized by the Constitution to make laws, and which does not promulgate unwritten laws, did not do so. The court, therefore, cannot take cognizance of, and much less apply, such supposed unwritten law. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It is sheer usurpation of legislative power for the court to enact or make laws. Its power is confined to interpreting and applying the laws enacted by the legislature. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary


The case of Truax vs. Reich (600 law. ed., 131), which was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States on November 1, 1915, is of pertinent and persuasive application to the question at issue in that, in our opinion, it emphasizes the utter lack of power of the court to impose the condition here complained of; for in said case Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the Legislature of the State of Arizona could not validly enact a law similar to the supposed unwritten law which the Court of Industrial Relations has conceived and has tried to enforce. The law involved in said case pertinently reads as follows:

SEC. 1. Any company, corporation, partnership, association or individual who is, may hereafter become, an employer of more than five (5) workers at any one time, in the state of Arizona, regardless of kind or class of work, or sex of workers, shall employ not less than (80) per cent qualified electors or native-born citizens of the United States or some subdivision thereof. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

SEC. 2. Any company, corporation, partnership, association or individual, their agent or agents, found guilty of violating any of the provisions of this act shall be subject to a fine of not less than one hundred ($100) dollars, and imprisoned for not less than thirty (30) days.

Mike Raich, a native of Austria and an inhabitant of the State of Arizona, but not a qualified elector, was employed as a cook by William Truax in his restaurant, where he had nine employees, of whom seven were neither native-born citizens of the United States nor qualified electors. After the passage of said law Raich was informed by his employer that because of its requirements and because of the fear of the penalties that would be incurred in case of its violation, he would be discharged. Thereupon Raich sued Truax and the Attorney General of Arizona to enjoin them from enforcing the law on the ground that it was unconstitutional because it denied him the equal protection of the laws. Both the District Court and the Supreme Court of the United States upheld his contention. The court said that

the complainant was entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment to the equal protection of the laws of Arizona. "These provisions," said the court, "are universal in their application, to all person within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and the equal laws. . . . The discrimination defined by the act does not pertain to the regulation or distribution of the public domain, or of the common property or resources of the people of the state, the enjoyment of which may be limited to its citizens as against both aliens and the citizens of other states." The court said further:

It is sought to justify this act as an exercise of the power of the state to make reasonable classifications in legislating to promote the health, safety, morals, and welfare of those within its jurisdiction. But this admitted authority, with the broad range of legislative discretion that it implies, does not go so far as to make it possible for the state to deny to lawful inhabitants, because of their race or nationality, the ordinary means of earning a livelihood. It requires no argument to show that the right to work for a living in the common occupations of the community is of the very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of the Amendment to secure. . . . If this could be refused solely upon the ground of race or nationality, the prohibition of the denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws would be a barren form of words. It is no answer to say, as it is argued, that the act proceeds upon the assumption that 'the employment of aliens, unless restrained, was a peril to the public welfare. The discrimination against aliens in the wide range of employments to which the acts relates is made an end in itself, and thus the authority to deny to aliens, upon the mere fact of their alienage, the right to obtain support in the ordinary fields of labor, is necessarily involved.

Our own Constitution contains a provision similar to the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Section 1 of Article III provides:

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

It is patent that if the lawmaking body itself cannot validly enact the supposed unwritten law conceived or adopted by the lower court, much less could the latter do so.

Section 13 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, invoked by the trial court and by majority of this court as authorizing the imposition of the discriminatory condition contained in the order appealed from, reads as follows:

SEC. 13. Character of the award. - In making an award, order or decision, under the provision of section four of this Act, the Court shall not be restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision any matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of setting the dispute or of preventing further industrial or agricultural dispute.

As correctly stated by Judge Lanting of the lower court in his dissenting opinion:

The reference in the resolution of the majority to section 13 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, authorizing this Court to include in its awards, orders or decisions

"any matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of setting the dispute or of preventing further . . . disputes", is farfetched. This provision certainly does not authorize this Court to go beyond its prescribed powers and issue an order which grossly violates the fundamental law. More specifically, it cannot make any ruling which will produce the effect of discriminating against and oppressing a person or class of persons and deny them the equal protection of the laws, aside from curtailing their individual freedom and their right to live.

As matter of fact the respondent labor union "manifested its conformity to the hiring of additional laborers, provided that it be consulted by the petitioner and that it be given the privilege of recommending the twelve new laborers that are to be hired." And Judge Roldan in his order overruled that proposition by saying : "The stand taken by the respondent labor union is not correct, because it attempts to encroach upon the prerogative of the company to determine and adopt its own policy in the selection of its employees and workers, and the Court should only intervene in questions of this nature when there is discrimination or retaliation on the part of the company, which has not been proven or even alleged in the case bar (Manila Trading & Supply Co. vs. Judge Francisco Zulueta et al., G. R. No. 46853;1 Manila Chauffeurs League vs. Bachrach Motor Co., G. R. No. 49138;2 Pampanga Bus Co. vs. Pampanga Bus Co. Employees' Union, G. R. No. 46739;3 National Labor Union vs. San Miguel Brewery, CIR case No. 26-V, June 12, 1947)." chanrobles virtual law library

Thus the Court of Industrial Relations itself correctly held that the respondent labor union has no right to encroach upon the prerogative of the company to determine and adopt its own policy in the selection of its employees and workers, and that the court itself should not intervene in such selection because there was no proof of discrimination or retaliation on the part of the company. Yet in the dispositive part of its order the court not only intervenes in such selection but compels the company to discriminate against a certain class of laborers. The inconsistency and illegality of the order appealed from are too patent fro argument. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

To hold that the Court of Industrial Relations may, under section 13, impose any condition in its order or award in order to prevent further industrial disputes, regardless of whether or not such condition is in violation of law or of the Constitution, is, in our opinion, thinkable. It goes without saying that industrial dispute must be settled in accordance with law and justice. Suppose that the members of a labor union should demand of an employer that 80 per cent of the new laborers the latter may hire should be Filipinos, or that all of them should be Tagalogs or Ilocanos, and should threaten to declare a strike unless such demand be complied with; would the court be justified in granting such demand under section 13 on the ground that by doing so it would prevent a or strike or lockout and settle an industrial dispute? The negative answer can hardly be disputed, since unreasonableness or illegal demands should not be countenanced by the court. Yet the affirmance by this Court of the order appealed from in effect authorizes the Court of Industrial Relations hereafter to commit such arbitrariness. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

For the foregoing reasons, we vote to modify the appealed order by eliminating therefrom the discriminatory condition in question.



G.R. No. 114337 September 29, 1995NITTO ENTERPRISES, Petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION and ROBERTO CAPILI, Respondents. KAPUNAN, J.: chanrobles virtual law library

This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul the decision 1 rendered by public respondent National Labor Relations Commission, which reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Briefly, the facts of the case are as follows: chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner Nitto Enterprises, a company engaged in the sale of glass and aluminum products, hired Roberto Capili sometime in May 1990 as an apprentice machinist, molder and core maker as evidenced by an apprenticeship agreement 2 for a period of six (6) months from May 28, 1990 to November 28, 1990 with a daily wage rate of P66.75 which was 75% of the applicable minimum wage.

At around 1:00 p.m. of August 2, 1990, Roberto Capili who was handling a piece of glass which he was working on, accidentally hit and injured the leg of an office secretary who was treated at a nearby hospital. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Later that same day, after office hours, private respondent entered a workshop within the office premises which was not his work station. There, he operated one of the power press machines without authority and in the process injured his left thumb. Petitioner spent the amount of P1,023.04 to cover the medication of private respondent.chanrobles virtual law library

The following day, Roberto Capili was asked to resign in a letter 3 which reads:August 2, 1990

Wala siyang tanggap ng utos mula sa superbisor at wala siyang experiensa kung papaano gamitin and "TOOL" sa pagbuhat ng salamin, sarili niyang desisyon ang paggamit ng tool at may disgrasya at nadamay pa ang isang sekretarya ng kompanya.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Sa araw ding ito limang (5) minute ang nakakalipas mula alas-singko ng hapon siya ay pumasok sa shop na hindi naman sakop ng kanyang trabaho. Pinakialaman at kinalikot ang makina at nadisgrasya niya ang kanyang sariling kamay.

Nakagastos ang kompanya ng mga sumusunod:


Emergency and doctor fee P715.00Medecines (sic) and others 317.04

Bibigyan siya ng kompanya ng Siyam na araw na libreng sahod hanggang matanggal ang tahi ng kanyang kamay.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Tatanggapin niya ang sahod niyang anim na araw, mula ika-30 ng Hulyo at ika-4 ng Agosto, 1990.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Ang kompanya ang magbabayad ng lahat ng gastos pagtanggal ng tahi ng kanyang kamay, pagkatapos ng siyam na araw mula ika-2 ng Agosto. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law

library

Sa lahat ng nakasulat sa itaas, hinihingi ng kompanya ang kanyang resignasyon, kasama ng kanyang comfirmasyon at pag-ayon na ang lahat sa itaas ay totoo.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Naiintindihan ko ang lahat ng nakasulat sa itaas, at ang lahat ng ito ay aking pagkakasala sa hindi pagsunod sa alintuntunin ng kompanya.

(Sgd.) Roberto CapiliRoberto Capili

On August 3, 1990 private respondent executed a Quitclaim and Release in favor of petitioner for and in consideration of the sum of P1,912.79. 4

Three days after, or on August 6, 1990, private respondent formally filed before the NLRC Arbitration Branch, National Capital Region a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of other monetary benefits. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On October 9, 1991, the Labor Arbiter rendered his decision finding the termination of private respondent as valid and dismissing the money claim for lack of merit. The dispositive portion of the ruling reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the termination is valid and for cause, and the money claims dismissed for lack of merit. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The respondent however is ordered to pay the complainant the amount of P500.00 as financial assistance. SO ORDERED. 5


Labor Arbiter Patricio P. Libo-on gave two reasons for ruling that the dismissal of Roberto Capilian was valid. First, private respondent who was hired as an apprentice violated the terms of their agreement when he acted with gross negligence resulting in the injury not only to himself but also to his fellow worker. Second, private respondent had shown that "he does not have the proper attitude in employment particularly the handling of machines without authority and proper training. 6

On July 26, 1993, the National Labor Relations Commission issued an order reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby set aside. The respondent is hereby directed to reinstate complainant to his work last performed with backwages computed from the time his wages were withheld up to the time he is actually reinstated. The Arbiter of origin is hereby directed to further hear complainant's money claims and to dispose them on the basis of law and evidence obtaining. SO ORDERED. 7

The NLRC declared that private respondent was a regular employee of petitioner by ruling thus: chanrobles virtual law library

As correctly pointed out by the complainant, we cannot understand how an apprenticeship agreement filed with the Department of Labor only on June 7, 1990 could be validly used by the Labor Arbiter as basis to conclude that the complainant was hired by respondent as a plain "apprentice" on May 28, 1990. Clearly, therefore, the complainant was respondent's regular employee under Article 280 of the Labor Code, as early as May 28,1990, who thus enjoyed the security of tenure guaranteed in Section 3, Article XIII of our 1987 Constitution.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The complainant being for illegal dismissal (among others) it then behooves upon respondent, pursuant to Art. 227(b) and as ruled in Edwin Gesulgon vs. NLRC, et al. (G.R. No. 90349, March 5, 1993, 3rd Div., Feliciano, J.) to prove that the dismissal of complainant was for a valid cause. Absent such proof, we cannot but rule that the complainant was illegally dismissed. 8

On January 28, 1994, Labor Arbiter Libo-on called for a conference at which only private respondent's representative was present. chanrobles virtual law library

On April 22, 1994, a Writ of Execution was issued, which reads:NOW, THEREFORE, finding merit in [private respondent's] Motion for Issuance of the Writ, you are hereby commanded to proceed to the premises of [petitioner] Nitto Enterprises and Jovy Foster located at No. l 74 Araneta Avenue, Portero, Malabon, Metro Manila or at any other places where their properties are located and effect the reinstatement of herein [private respondent] to his work last performed or at the option of the respondent by payroll reinstatement.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

You are also to collect the amount of P122,690.85 representing his backwages as called for in the dispositive portion, and turn over such amount to this Office for proper disposition.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Hence, the instant petition - for certiorari.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The issues raised before us are the following:I chanrobles virtual law library

WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT AN

APPRENTICE.II chanrobles virtual law library

WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER HAD NOT ADEQUATELY

PROVEN THE EXISTENCE OF A VALID CAUSE IN TERMINATING THE SERVICE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT.

We find no merit in the petition. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner assails the NLRC's finding that private respondent Roberto Capili cannot plainly be considered an apprentice since no apprenticeship program had yet been filed and approved at the time the agreement was executed. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner further insists that the mere signing of the apprenticeship agreement already established an employer-apprentice relationship. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioner's argument is erroneous. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The law is clear on this matter. Article 61 of the Labor Code provides:

Contents of apprenticeship agreement. - Apprenticeship agreements, including the main rates of apprentices, shall conform to the rules issued by the Minister of Labor and Employment. The period of apprenticeship shall not exceed six months. Apprenticeship agreements providing for wage rates below the legal minimum wage, which in no case shall start below 75% per cent of the applicable minimum wage, may be entered into only in accordance with apprenticeship program duly approved by the Minister of Labor and Employment. The Ministry shall develop standard model programs of apprenticeship. (emphasis supplied)

In the case at bench, the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent was executed on May 28, 1990 allegedly employing the latter as an apprentice in the trade of "care maker/molder." On the same date, an apprenticeship program was prepared by petitioner and submitted to the Department of Labor and Employment. However, the apprenticeship Agreement was filed only on June 7, 1990. Notwithstanding the absence of approval by the Department of Labor and Employment, the apprenticeship agreement was enforced the day it was signed. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles

virtual law library

Based on the evidence before us, petitioner did not comply with the requirements of the law. It is mandated that apprenticeship agreements entered into by the employer and apprentice shall be entered only in accordance with the apprenticeship program duly approved by the Minister of Labor and Employment. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Prior approval by the Department of Labor and Employment of the proposed apprenticeship program is, therefore, a condition sine quo non before an apprenticeship agreement can be validly entered into. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The act of filing the proposed apprenticeship program with the Department of Labor and Employment is a preliminary step towards its final approval and does not instantaneously give rise to an employer-apprentice relationship. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Article 57 of the Labor Code provides that the State aims to "establish a national apprenticeship program through the participation of employers, workers and government and non-government agencies" and "to establish apprenticeship standards for the protection of apprentices." To translate such objectives into existence, prior approval of the DOLE to any apprenticeship program has to be secured as a condition sine qua non before any such apprenticeship agreement can be fully enforced. The role of the DOLE in apprenticeship programs and agreements cannot be debased.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Hence, since the apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent has no force and effect in the absence of a valid apprenticeship program duly approved by the DOLE, private respondent's assertion that he was hired not as an apprentice but as a delivery boy ("kargador" or "pahinante") deserves credence.

He should rightly be considered as a regular employee of petitioner as defined by Article 280 of the Labor Code:

Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. - The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exists. (Emphasis supplied)

and pursuant to the constitutional mandate to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare." 9

Petitioner further argues that, there is a valid cause for the dismissal of private respondent.

There is an abundance of cases wherein the Court ruled that the twin requirements of due process, substantive and procedural, must be complied with, before valid dismissal exists. 10 Without which, the dismissal becomes void. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of due process. This simply means that the employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Ample opportunity connotes every kind of assistance that management must accord the employee to enable him to prepare adequately for his defense including legal representation. 11

As held in the case of Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., Inc. v. NLRC: 12

The law requires that the employer must furnish the worker sought to be dismissed with two (2) written notices before termination of employee can be legally effected: (1) notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him (Sec. 13, BP 130; Sec. 2-6 Rule XIV, Book V, Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code as amended). Failure to comply with the requirements taints the dismissal with illegality. This procedure is mandatory, in the absence of which, any judgment reached by management is void and in existent (Tingson, Jr. vs.

NLRC, 185 SCRA 498 [1990]; National Service Corp. vs. NLRC, 168 SCRA 122; Ruffy vs. NLRC. 182 SCRA 365 [1990]).

The fact is private respondent filed a case of illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter only three days after he was made to sign a Quitclaim, a clear indication that such resignation was not voluntary and deliberate. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Private respondent averred that he was actually employed by petitioner as a delivery boy ("kargador" or "pahinante").chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

He further asserted that petitioner "strong-armed" him into signing the aforementioned resignation letter and quitclaim without explaining to him the contents thereof. Petitioner made it clear to him that anyway, he did not have a choice. 13

Petitioner cannot disguise the summary dismissal of private respondent by orchestrating the latter's alleged resignation and subsequent execution of a Quitclaim and Release. A judicious examination of both events belies any spontaneity on private respondent's part. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, finding no abuse of discretion committed by public respondent National Labor Relations Commission, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.



G.R. No. 75112 August 17, 1992FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE, Petitioner, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE

APPELLATE COURT, HON. ENRIQUE P. SUPLICO, in his capacity as Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIV, Roxas City and POTENCIANO

KAPUNAN, SR., Respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: chanrobles virtual law library

The private respondents, heirs of the late Potenciano Kapunan, seek reconsideration of the decision rendered by this Court on October 16, 1990 (Filamer Christian Institute v. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 477) reviewing the appellate court's conclusion that there exists an employer-employee relationship between the petitioner and its co-defendant Funtecha. The Court ruled that the petitioner is not liable for the injuries caused by Funtecha on the grounds that the latter was not an authorized driver for whose acts the petitioner shall be directly and primarily answerable, and that Funtecha was merely a working scholar who, under Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code is not considered an employee of the petitioner. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The private respondents assert that the circumstances obtaining in the present case call for the application of Article 2180 of the Civil Code since Funtecha is no doubt an employee of the petitioner. The private respondents maintain that under Article 2180 an injured party shall have recourse against the servant as well as the petitioner for whom, at the time of the incident, the servant was performing an act in furtherance of the interest and for the benefit of the petitioner. Funtecha allegedly did not steal the school jeep nor use it for a joy ride without the knowledge of the school authorities.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

After a re-examination of the laws relevant to the facts found by the trial court and the appellate court, the Court reconsiders its decision. We reinstate the Court of Appeals' decision penned by the late Justice Desiderio Jurado and concurred in by Justices Jose C. Campos, Jr. and Serafin E. Camilon. Applying Civil Code provisions, the appellate court affirmed the trial court decision which ordered the payment of the P20,000.00 liability in the Zenith Insurance Corporation policy, P10,000.00 moral damages, P4,000.00 litigation and actual expenses, and P3,000.00 attorney's fees.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It is undisputed that Funtecha was a working student, being a part-time janitor and a scholar of petitioner Filamer. He was, in relation to the school, an employee even if he was assigned to clean the school premises for only two (2) hours in the morning of each school day.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Having a student driver's license, Funtecha requested the driver, Allan Masa, and was allowed, to take over the vehicle while the latter was on his way home one late afternoon. It is significant to note that the place where Allan lives is also the house of his father, the school president, Agustin Masa. Moreover, it is also the house where Funtecha was allowed free board while he was a student of Filamer Christian Institute.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Allan Masa turned over the vehicle to Funtecha only after driving down a road, negotiating a sharp dangerous curb, and viewing that the road was clear. (TSN, April 4, 1983, pp. 78-79) According to Allan's testimony, a fast moving truck with glaring lights nearly hit them so that they had to swerve to the right to avoid a collision. Upon swerving, they heard a sound as if something had bumped against the vehicle, but they did not stop to check. Actually, the Pinoy jeep swerved towards the pedestrian, Potenciano Kapunan who was walking in his lane in the direction against vehicular traffic, and hit him. Allan affirmed that Funtecha followed his advise to swerve to the right. (Ibid., p. 79) At the time of the incident (6:30 P.M.) in Roxas City, the jeep had only one functioning headlight. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Allan testified that he was the driver and at the same time a security guard of the petitioner-school. He further said that there was no specific time for him to be off-duty and that after driving the students home at 5:00 in the afternoon, he still had to go back to school and then drive home using the same vehicle. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president where both Allan and Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-school. Allan's job demands that he drive home the school jeep so he can use it to fetch students in the morning of the next school day. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It is indubitable under the circumstances that the school president had knowledge that the jeep was routinely driven home for the said purpose. Moreover, it is not improbable that the school president also had knowledge of Funtecha's possession of a student driver's license and his desire to undergo driving lessons during the time that he was not in his classrooms.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allan's house, Funtecha definitely was not having a joy ride. Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a "frolic of his own" but ultimately, for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner school. (See L. Battistoni v.

Thomas, Can SC 144, 1 D.L.R. 577, 80 ALR 722 [1932]; See also Association of Baptists for World Evangelism, Inc. v. Fieldmen's Insurance Co., Inc. 124 SCRA 618 [1983]). Therefore, the Court is constrained to conclude that the act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties. The clause "within the scope of their assigned tasks" for purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an employer, includes any act done by an employee, in furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damage. (Manuel Casada, 190 Va 906, 59 SE 2d 47 [1950]) Even if somehow, the employee driving the vehicle derived some benefit from the act, the existence of a presumptive liability of the employer is determined by answering the question of whether or not the servant was at the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of his master's business. (Kohlman v. Hyland, 210 NW 643, 50 ALR 1437 [1926]; Jameson v. Gavett, 71 P 2d 937 [1937]) chanrobles virtual law library

Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules implementing the Labor Code, on which the petitioner anchors its defense, was promulgated by the Secretary of Labor and Employment only for the purpose of administering and enforcing the provisions of the Labor Code on conditions of employment. Particularly, Rule X of Book III provides guidelines on the manner by which the powers of the Labor Secretary shall be exercised; on what records should be kept; maintained and preserved; on payroll; and on the exclusion of working scholars from, and inclusion of resident physicians in the employment coverage as far as compliance with the substantive labor provisions on working conditions, rest periods, and wages, is concerned. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In other words, Rule X is merely a guide to the enforcement of the substantive law on labor. The Court, thus, makes the distinction and so holds that Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules is not the decisive law in a civil suit for damages instituted by an injured person during a vehicular accident against a working student of a school and against the school itself.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of employment between an alleged employee and an alleged employer. It invokes a claim brought by one for damages for injury caused by the patently negligent acts of a person, against both doer-employee and his employer. Hence, the reliance on the implementing rule on labor to disregard the primary liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is misplaced. An implementing rule on labor cannot be used by an employer as a shield to avoid liability under the substantive provisions of the Civil Code.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

There is evidence to show that there exists in the present case an extra-contractual obligation arising from the negligence or reckless imprudence of a person "whose acts or omissions are imputable, by a legal fiction, to other(s) who are in a position to exercise an absolute or limited control over (him)." (Bahia v. Litonjua and Leynes, 30 Phil. 624 [1915]) chanrobles virtual law library

Funtecha is an employee of petitioner Filamer. He need not have an official appointment for a driver's position in order that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act, it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner. Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting within the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris

tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee, or in the supervision over him. The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha and Allan. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The Court reiterates that supervision includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of its employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the employer has relations through his employees. (Bahia v. Litonjua and Leynes, supra, at p. 628; Phoenix Construction, v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 353 [1987]) chanrobles virtual law library

An employer is expected to impose upon its employees the necessary discipline called for in the performance of any act indispensable to the business and beneficial to their employer.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In the present case, the petitioner has not shown that it has set forth such rules and guidelines as would prohibit any one of its employees from taking control over its vehicles if one is not the official driver or prohibiting the driver and son of the Filamer president from authorizing another employee to drive the school vehicle. Furthermore, the petitioner has failed to prove that it had imposed sanctions or warned its employees against the use of its vehicles by persons other than the driver.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The petitioner, thus, has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from the unskilled manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle. (Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co., 38 Phil. 768, 772 [1918]). In the absence of evidence that the petitioner had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employees, the law imposes upon it the vicarious liability for acts or omissions of its employees. (Umali v. Bacani, 69 SCRA 263 [1976]; Poblete v. Fabros, 93 SCRA 200 [1979]; Kapalaran Bus Liner v. Coronado, 176 SCRA 792 [1989]; Franco v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 178 SCRA 331 [1989]; Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. Baesa, 179 SCRA 384 [1989]) The liability of the employer is, under Article 2180, primary and solidary. However, the employer shall have recourse against the negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the plaintiff. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It is an admitted fact that the actual driver of the school jeep, Allan Masa, was not made a party defendant in the civil case for damages. This is quite understandable considering that as far as the injured pedestrian, plaintiff Potenciano Kapunan, was concerned, it was Funtecha who was the one driving the vehicle and presumably was one authorized by the school to drive. The plaintiff and his heirs should not now be left to suffer without simultaneous recourse against the petitioner for the consequent injury caused by a janitor doing a driving chore for the petitioner even for a short while. For the purpose of recovering damages under the prevailing circumstances, it is enough that the plaintiff and the private respondent heirs were able to establish the existence of employer-employee relationship between Funtecha and petitioner Filamer and the fact that Funtecha was engaged in an act not for an independent purpose of his own but in furtherance of the business of his employer. A position of responsibility on the part of the petitioner has thus been satisfactorily demonstrated.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of the decision dated October 16, 1990 is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the respondent appellate court affirming the trial court decision is REINSTATED. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

SO ORDERED.

art 25-81 labor cases

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