article on essar steel algoma plant
TRANSCRIPT
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Panglobal on Canada/ U.S. issues
Algoma Steel
July 2005
Institute of
Power Engineers
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Editor-
George Reid
Contributors
Robert CummingAlgoma Steel
Tony ConnerTBP IndustrialSteam SystemsJohn Cerniuk
Wayne Kirsner,P.E.
A. Banweg,Nalco Company
3 Headlines
4 Nuts and Bolts
6 Man, This Blows
8 Condensate Induced
WaterHammer
12 Power Engineering
A North American Profession in
Transition
14 Nalco water treatment
Institute of
Power EngineersTab l e o f Con ten ts
Check us out at http://www.nipe.ca
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Ontarios New Energy
Market Emerges
Ontarios energy minister Dwight
Duncan announced new developments in
the Ontario energy market that will add
another 1600MW to Ontarios energy
supply to help offset the replacement of its
coal plant .
Headlines
National IPE
Convention
The 2005 annual IPE
national convention will be held in
Toronto this year from September
14 through to the 18th. The main
convention will be held at the Days
Inn and Conference Centre at 6257
Airport Road Mississauga Ontario.
For all the details check out the
Toronto branchs web site at
Bruce nuclear
The potential restart of Units 1and 2 at the Bruce facility would
result in an additional 1,540megawatts of electricity generatingcapacity, which is enough to power
over one million homes across
Ontario. Restarting these units wouldalso potentially replace over 20 per
cent of Ontario's current coalcapacity and related harmful
emissions
New Brunswick PointLepreau Nuclear Station
The province of New
Brunswick and Atomic Energy of
Canada Ltd are looking into
extending the operational life of the
Point Lepreau nuclear station. With
this project the operational life of the
station will hopefully be extended 25
years..
www.ipe.org
http://www.energy.gov.on.ca/index.cf
m?fuseaction=english.news&body=y
es&news_id=91
http://www.canelect.ca/english/a
rticle.html?SMContentIndex=4&
SMContentSet=0
http://www.energy.gov.on.ca/index.cf
m?fuseaction=english.news&body=yes
&news_id=93
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The most common flanges found in
general industrial & institutional steam plants are
Class 125 & 250 cast iron, Class 150 & 300forged steel. These are used to connect flanged
components, such as boilers, valves, strainers,
pumps, etc.
Cast iron components like valves &strainers are typically much cheaper than cast
steel, for the same sizes. This is because iron is
much easier to cast than steel. This lower cost forcast iron components that are dimensionally the
same, means that they are often chosen over steel,
especially in the 125/150 Classes. As with mostthings, cost should not be the only consideration.
It is very common for boiler safety valves
to be set for 150 PSIG, while the boiler fires tomaintain a header pressure of 125 PSIG. Systems
like this are routinely filled with Class 125 cast
iron gate & globe valves, control valves, strainers,
trap bodies, etc., because everyone is looking atthe operating pressure. These Class 125
components drop nicely between Class 150
flanges. Theyre a perfect fit. Unfortunately, if thesafety valves protecting these steam system
components lift at anything over 125 PSIG, the
installation does not meet pressure piping coderequirements. Even if the safety valves are set for
125 or below, the installation still may not be
code compliant.
If a Class 125 cast iron flanged componentis connected to a Class 150 steel flange (which is
very common), more factors come into play. 125
cast iron flanges have a flat face designed for afull-face gasket, while 150 steel flanges have a
raised face, designed for a ring gasket. For
pressure piping applications, it is required by theASME B31.1 Power Piping Code that the raised
face on the Class 150 flange be removed, and that
a full-face gasket be used to join the 125 & 150
flanges.
Flanged JointsBy Tony Conner of TBP Industrial Steam Systems
The use of a full-face gasket leaves no
gap between the flanges outside of the bolt circlediameter. If this gap exists, it can allow the
relatively thin and brittle cast iron flange to spring
into it, possibly splitting the flange when the
flange bolts are tightened. If a ring gasket is usedto join two Class 125 flanges, then low strength
bolts, such as A 307 Gr B, must be used, along
with nuts of a corresponding material. In addition
to a minimum listed tensile strength, these boltsalso have maximum tensile strength, meaning that
the fastener will fail before the flanges, if thebolts are over-torqued during installation.
From the ASME B31.1 Power Piping
Code: When bolting Class 150 standard steelflanges to flat face cast iron flanges, the steel
flange shall be furnished with a flat face. Steel
flanges of Class 300 raised face standard may be
bolted to Class 250 raised face cast iron.Many people dont realize that the
fasteners themselves also need to be codecompliant. There are a huge number of fastenergrades available. Among the most common are
SAE Gr. 5 and Gr. 8. However, these are not
listed as approved for use in pressure piping,falling under ASME B31.1. The most commonly
available code compliant grade is B7, which can
be either studs, or bolts. B7 will be in raised
lettering on bolt heads, or stamped into one end offactory-cut studs. B7 material is also available in
a range of diameters, as lengths of threaded rod,
which can be cut field-cut to length. Thematching nut grade is 2H, which has a noticeably
heavier wall and higher profile than the
corresponding size of SAE grades. The 2H willbe shown in raised lettering on one face of the
nut. The B7 studs and 2H nuts are suitable for
most of the steel flanged piping joints found intypical powerhouse applications. Table 112 in the
B31.1 Code lists
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For those that think this is all academic,with no relationship to the real world, please
refer at the photographs below. These are
posted on Wayne Kirsners websitewww.kirsner.org . Hes a professional engineer
from Atlanta, who specializes in the
investigation of steam system water hammerevents resulting in fatalities. Note that the valve
itself (a Class 150 cast steel) did not fail. The
flange fasteners however, did fail, resulting inthe death of the operator. Note that the fatality
DID NOT occur as a result of operator error,
but rather a piping design flaw. Steam valves
should not be installed in vertical piping runs.Where it is not possible to avoid this, an
overseat drain must be provided so that any
accumulated condensate on top of the valve
disk can be drained, prior to opening the valve.It is NOT POSSIBLE to slowly crack the
valve, in order to avoid condensation induced
water hammer. It is not clear (the accident
may still be under investigation) if the correct
grades of bolts or studs & nuts were used to join
this flange. Even if they were code compliantfasteners, it is obvious that they were subjected
to forces beyond what they could withstand,
with the nuts being stripped-off. It is certain thatany plant people involved in the accident
investigation regarding this failure would verymuch like to be able to assure the investigatorsthat the correct size & grade of fasteners were
used, and that all of the available threads were
fully engaged
approved fastener grades & materials for various
applications. The use of steel flanges and
components eliminates trying to keep track of thevarious requirements regarding flange faces and
fasteners.
From IPTs Industrial Fasteners
Handbook by Bruce Basaraba:
The functional (clamp load) strength of any nutand bolt system is dependent upon both the proof
load strength of the bolt and the proof load
strength of the nut. Functional nut strength is
determined by both nut hardness and the shape ofthe nut. Nuts generally fail under high loading by
thread stripping that begins at the threads next to
the bearing surface of the nut.When tightening flange bolts, the nut
acting against the flange is subjected to very high
stress. Because of this, the wall of the nut tends todilate or mushroom the bottom of the nut against
the flange. If the nut fails, it typically results in
the nut threads stripping progressively from the
inner (against the flange surface) outward, muchlike undoing a zipper. This dilating or
mushrooming of the nut can only be controlled by
strengthening the nut wall through heat treatment,or by increasing the thickness of the nut wall and/
or height of the nut. The use of 2H nuts vsmany other grades such as SAE, means that afastener with a heavier wall that resists
mushrooming, and the higher profile provides
more threads to engage.
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Steam turbines play a vital role in many
of todays industrial and commercial
operations. Applications range from small,single-stage units used to drive pumps, all the
way up to the large, multi-stage turbines that
produce thousands of megawatts of power.Steam turbines are found in many industrial
applications ranging from co-generations to
pulp and paper production, where the majority
of their use is for the generation of power.
Steel mills are no different. They oftenhave large steam-driven turbo-generator units
used to supply some of the power demand for
the mill. However, the need for steam turbines
at a steel mill does not stop at the electricalgrid. Most integrated steel mills that operate a
blast furnace require a high volume of low
pressure air called wind in order to operate.This wind is usually supplied by a steam
turbine driven blower. These units are known
as turbo-blowers and are basically large aircompressors. These units are vital to the safe
operation of a blast furnace.
MAN, This BlowsBy Robert Cumming and photos by Paul Lalonde, Courtesy of
Algoma Steel
Algoma Steel is an integrated steel mill
located in Sault Ste. Marie Ontario. Onsite is one ofthe largest operational blast furnaces in North
America. The furnace, known as #7 Blast Furnace is
the heart of the operation, supplying all of the liquid
iron for the BOSP (Basic Oxygen SteelmakingProcess). At full capacity, the furnace can produce
up to five tons of liquid iron perminute.
A blast furnace is a vessel in which liquid
iron is produced. Raw materials such as iron ore
pellets and coke (large pieces of carbon) are addedto the top of the furnace to form what is called a
burden. The burden is held in suspension by the
wind which is supplied by the turbo-blower. Thiswind, known as cold blast discharges from the
blower at approximately 350 degrees Fahrenheit and
travels through a large line known as a header to the
blast furnace stoves. At the stoves, the wind isheated to approximately 2300 degrees Fahrenheit.
The wind, now hot blast, continues to thefurnace where it collects at what is called the bustle
pipe and then enters the furnace proper through
nozzles called tuyers. The hot blast is then mixedwith fuels like oxygen and natural gas to start a
chemical reaction needed to melt the burden. Once
liquefied, a hole is drilled at the bottom of the
furnace and the liquid iron is poured. The iron isthen sent to the steel making shop where it is
processed into steel. It takes approximately six
hours to melt raw material to liquid iron.
Algoma Steels #7 Furnace
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The #7 Blast Furnace at Algoma Steelgets all of its required wind from #5Turbo-
Blower. This blower was installed in the mid
1970s specifically for #7 Blast Furnace. Theturbine is a 28 stage impulse-reaction machine
built by Brown Boveri. It operates on 600 lbs.
superheated steam and exhausts under vacuum to
a condenser. The machine has five admissionvalves and uses up to 180 000 lbs. of steam per
hour and operates at a rated speed of 3800 RPM
producing up to 30, 800 horse power. Theblower end of the machine was originally a 16
stage axial compressor, but was upgraded in
October of 2002 with a more efficient 13 stageaxial rotor. The rotor is surrounded by a stator
blade carrier that is equipped with adjustable
blades. Both the rotor and blade carrier weresupplied by MAN Turbo.
The controls for this machine were
upgraded in the mid 1990s from the original Pto H controls to the more efficient I to H
controls. The control systems were supplied by
Compressor Controls Corporation. The machine
is operated by three separate control systems : aSpeed Controller maintains the machine at arated speed of 3800 RPM when the unit is
online: aPerformance Controller maintains the
flow of wind to the blast furnace by adjusting the
angle of the blades on the stator blade carrier ;and anAnti-Surge Controller, which is a safety
relief device designed to protect the blower from
surging under a reverse flow condition.
At full production, the blast furnacerequires up to 150 000 CFM of wind at pressures
up to 48 PSI. The Turbo-Blower can easily meet
these requirements.As stated before, a turbo-blower is a key
piece of equipment needed to safely run the blast
furnace. Thus, if anything were to happen to theoperational unit, a stand by would be required to
maintain the blast furnace until the main blower
can be returned to service. Algoma Steel has two
stand-by units that can be used to operate theblast furnace if the need arises. Number 1 Turbo-
Blower is the main stand-by machine, rolling
over at 1200 RPM and is located in the Turbo-Blower Building. This machine is a steam
turbine-driven centrifugal compressor produced
by Ingersol-Rand Company. The second stand-
by machine is #4 Turbo-Blower and it is locatedat the Main Boiler House. This is a smaller steam
turbine- driven axial compressor also produced
by Brown-Boveri. This unit is on a barring gearand can be put into service from a cold start upin two hours.
#1 Turbo Blower
Operating a turbo blower within an integratedsteel mill such as Algoma, has its own uniquechallenges. This can be one of the most complex
systems for a power engineer to operate, due to the
ever-changing operating parameters of these machinesand conditions present at the blast furnace. Although
operating turbo blowers is only one job that a power
engineer may perform in an integrated steel company,it is one of the most critical to the safe and efficient
operation of a blast furnace.
EngineersInspectingAdmissonValveson#5Turbo-Blower1
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Condensate Induced Water HammerPart 2continued from last issue
What Happened
For four weeks asbestos workers had been removing asbestos insulation from the 2,200
foot section of steam main known as the G-Line and the 120 foot H-Line. (See Figure
1) Like all steam mains at Fort Wainwright, Alaska, the G and H Lines ran underground
in narrow utilidors filled with pipe. Originally, the contractor had tried to abate thesteam main with the lines energized. This proved to be near impossible for the workers.
Utilidor temperatures reached 160 degree F as insulation was removed from the 325
degree F pipe carrying 80 psig steam. Laborers who had to be suited-up and masked to
work in the asbestos laden environment were dropping like flies from the heat and/or
quitting. The contractor was forced to seek relief from the Owner. A compromise was
negotiated after the first week-- steam would be de-energized at midnight before each
workday, asbestos abators would start work at 4:00 a.m. and finish by noontime at
which time steam would be restored. The asbestos removal contractor would be
responsible for de-energizing and re-energizing the steam line daily. For the threeweeks before the accident this was the procedure. By the beginning of the laborers'
workday, temperatures in the utilidors were still around 120 degree F but, with frequent
breaks to cool off and re-hydrate, conditions were tolerable.
Fig 1 Isometric view of G- and H-Lines (no scale).
This article is from Wayne Kirsner, P.E.
Who investigates industrial steam accidents. For more of his work
visit his web site http://www.kirsner.org
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Unfortunately, the discomfort to the workers was not the only consequence of
removing the insulation from active steam mains that had gone unforeseen. There was
also the effect on the steam traps. 3/8" thermodynamic traps were installed at each
manhole except C-4 which contained a 1/2" trap. At the system's operating conditions,
the 3/8" traps could remove 295 pounds of condensate per hour . With 3-1/2" ofinsulation, 300 feet of 12" pipe generates 41 pounds of condensate per hour.
Thus, for a typical pipe segment, the traps had better than a 7 to 1 safety factor
for condensate removal with the line insulated. With the insulation removed, however,
heat loss increased almost 18 fold so that condensate formation jumped to 729 #'s/hr
over 300 feet of pipe. At this rate of heat loss, the 3/8" traps had less than one-half the
capacity needed to keep up with the condensate production. This was not good.
ThAbatement began at Manhole G-1 and headed south toward C-4 at the rate of
about 125 feet a day. As abatement proceeded down the G-Line, local traps serving the
uninsulated portion of the line were overwhelmed with condensate during the periodthe lines were energized each day. In the first two weeks, however, this didn't cause a
problem. Excess condensate merely rolled down to C-4 on the south end and G-1 on
the North end. Traps on the south end still serving insulated portions of the line had
adequate capacity to remove the excess condensate. On the north end, the steam valve
was left closed so trouble was avoided. After two weeks of daily start-ups without
serious incident, save some minor waterhammers, asbestos crew operators grew
confident that start-up of the steam line was no big deal. By the beginning of the third
week, insulation removal had reached Manhole G-9. Calculations show that at this
point the rate of condensate being generated in the southern section of the G-Line
began to exceed the net capacity of the traps to remove it.
Condensate accumulation during steam operation is potentially destructive, but even
so, as long as condensate is religiously drained everyday before start-up, a catastrophic
waterhammer accident might still be averted. The problem was--condensate wasn't
being drained religiously. The asbestos workers given responsibility for energizing the
steam main daily didn't fully appreciate the danger inherent in starting up a high
pressure steam system with condensate in it.
They did not routinely open drain valves to bleed the system of excess
condensate either at night, when they shut the system down, or at noontime, when theyre-admitted steam through the C-4 valve to re-energize the steam main. Their belief
was that steam admitted through the C-4 valve would blow condensate to the far end
of the main at G-1. Thus, in their view, only the drain at G-1 "really" needed to be
opened at start-up. Accordingly, there was a tacit understanding that the bleeder valve
at G-1 would be opened daily by the quality control supervisor for the prime
contractor, and any condensate that wasn't drained at start-up, they apparently thought,
would be mopped up by traps after start-up.
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This had the likely effect of sweeping undrained condensate residing against the G-1
valve on the north end of the line south to C-4, and completely filling the H-Line as
explained in the sequence of figures a thru c in sidebar at end of article.
The situation, then, 15 minutes before the Accident as Bobby readied to crackopen the C-4 valve, is as shown in Figure 3.
Subcooled condensate filled the steam line on both sides of the C-4 valve as
well as completely filling the H Line. High pressure steam admitted through G-1 had
pressurized the steam main and was sitting atop the condensate on the north side of C-
4. The south side of the valve was also under steam pressure which, based on
testimony, was likely slightly less that that on the north side.
Now, put yourself in Bobby's place, except, assume you know all the
information described above, i.e., in your mind's eye, you can 'see' the build up of
condensate shown in Figure 3 and figure out, based on the ease with which the valve's
handwheel spun, that there is full steam pressure atop the condensate. Ask yourself two
questions:#1. Is this Situation Dangerous? Some steam people would say "no, as long as
there is no fast moving steam, there's no danger of waterhammer. Opening C-4
slowly and incrementally should prevent steam or condensate from moving
quickly and thus prevent a waterhammer." This is wrong, dead wrong.
High pressure steam in contact with subcooled condensate is dangerous. It's a recipe
for Condensation Induced Waterhammer. The sidebar (See sidebar near bottom page)
explains why this type event is 10 to 100 times more powerful that conventional
"steam flow" driven waterhammer.
#2. What Would You have Done in Bobby's place? If your answer is, "I'd first
open the C-4 bleeder valve to drain the condensate," you're toast. Although this is the
answer most steam operators would give, it will trigger the accident. Neither the
bleeder valve nor the steam valve can be opened without provoking this accident. To
understand why, it's crucial for steam fitters and operators to understand the
mechanism of Condensation Induced Waterhammer.
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Introduction
At the heart of most industrial complexes lies a steam-driven utility system. Whether control-ling thermal processes or generating power, modern steam production facilities are extremely complex
and require skilled professionals for efficient, and even more importantly, safe operation. Throughout
North America and around the world, these professionals are known by any number of titles but are
commonly referred to as Power Engineers.
The power and heating plants at the core of every industrial and commercial complex are criti-
cal to the success of each facility. The safe and efficient operation of these plants has been the respon-
sibility of the Power Engineer for more than 120 years in Canada and many parts of the world. As theprofession looks forward to new challenges and opportunities, it is prudent to reflect on where we
have come from and where we may go.
There are many similarities throughout the industries supported by this profession. A North
American design and construction standard for boilers has existed for a number of years. The codewas developed by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers originally in 1914 and has been up-
dated continuously ever since. Recent versions are updated every three years. The most recent version
(2004) has included both SI and USCS units, for the first time since 1983. The code has been adopted
by most jurisdictions that use qualified Inspectors to administer the standards. Uniformity of inspectorqualification is provided through a single group; the National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel In-
spectors.
The pressure and energy created by steam production, if improperly managed, is potentiallydevastating to plant and personnel. The ramifications of boiler accidents have been recognized for
many years. As a result, all facets of boiler design and construction are rigorously specified by profes-
sional and regulatory bodies, closely monitored, and require highly trained and certified professionals.
Why then would we condone a lesser standard for the Power Engineers operating the equipment?
One of the most important differences throughout the industries supported by this profession isa significant variance in operator certification standards and training. The lack of a uniform standard
of training across North America has created an environment wherein unnecessary litigation, insur-ance claims and injuries continue to exist.
Each year, boiler incidents cause billions of dollars worth of damage. At times, injuries andhuman fatalities add to the physical damage resulting from the incidents. According to the National
Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors (NBBI) statistics, the cause of approximately 80% of
these accidents can be directly or indirectly attributed to Operator error.
Power Engineering
A North American Profession in TransitionR. A. Clarke,
President and Chief Operating Officer
PanGlobal Training Systems Ltd.
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On a per capita basis, however, Canada has less than 1/6 th of the number of accidents thatoccur in the US. This serious discrepancy needs to be addressed, ideally with an overall solution
meeting the needs of all stakeholders in a common North American vision.
Specific training and certification standards may exist in each jurisdiction, but in Canada
over the past twenty years what is essentially a single standard has been achieved. Working collabo-
ratively, Industry Groups, Certifying Bodies and Regulators have facilitated the adoption of a uni-versal Certification and Training Standard across jurisdictions. Similar opportunities still exist in
collaboratively developing a broader standard amongst National Board jurisdictions across North
America.
The future of Power Engineering has many technological and staffing challenges. Rapid ad-
vances in technology, increasing operational automation and the convergence of Power, Heating and
Pressure Plants combine with the aging operator population to add complexity to corporate staffingdecisions. These challenges can be met successfully if an effective partnership model is adopted by
all stakeholders, including; industry, regulators, educators and professional organizations. Together
we can produce a North American Standard.
US and Canadian Historical Perspectives on Operator Certification
Over the years, many schools in Canada participated in the instruction of Power Engineers asindustry and jurisdictions realized that educator-based training preparation produced better qualified
and more importantly, more competent operators. Most of these educators chose to utilize the al-
ready-established instructional materials prepared for SAITs correspondence courses.The wide-spread use of the same instructional material created a uniform educational stan-
dard which in turn naturally produced a pathway towards uniform operator certification. This proc-
ess culminated in 1971 with the formation of the Standardization of Power Engineering Examina-tions Committee (SOPEEC). A sub-committee of the Canadian Chief Inspectors Association (ACI).
, SOPEEC was established to allow for the standardization of power engineering examinations and
certifications as well as to promote the free movement of Power Engineers across Canada. In 1972,SOPEEC approved the SAIT correspondence courses as the standard curriculum and along with its
uniform set of examinations created a national program for education and Certification of Power En-
gineers. At its' inception 2000 students were educated each year within the system. Currently, over
5000 courses are purchased each year from across Canada, the United States, Australia, and the Car-ibbean.
In the US, operator certification standards vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and in manystates, there is no existing standard. Differences in certification standards are seen at the National,
State and Local levels. The largest third party certifying body in the United States is the National
Institute for the Uniform Licensing of Power Engineers (NIULPE) which is recognized in forty onestates and by the US Military. A large portion of US industry has historically depended upon power
engineering training obtained in the military as the basis of background experience qualificationwhen recent direct experience was not documented.
Recognition is different than adoption however, and less than 10 states have formallyadopted regulatory licensure or indeed any standard for certification. In Canada there is one standard
for Operator Certification administered under the authority of Canadas NBBI members (ACI).
The next issue will continue this article with US and Canadian comparisons in accident rates;
design and construction standards; education, training, and certification; and conclusions .
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Evaluation of New Condensate Corrosion Filming
Technologies in Steam Trap Devices
Steam traps are essential for maximizing efficiency in a steam system. It is important to under-stand how corrosion inhibitors affect these units. Since the 1940s, volatile amine treatments have
been used in condensate systems to minimize corrosion. These compounds neutralize carbonic acid
formed in the condensate system and raise the condensate pH to a non-corrosive level. Amine-based
inhibitors are effective if proper concentrations and performance parameters are maintained.Although effective in reducing condensate system corrosion, many of these chemicals are
somewhat hazardous and have permissible exposure limits (PELs) established by the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). If the concentrations of thesecompounds exceed these limits, adverse health effects can occur. Chemical odors can result well be-
low these limits, raising questions about the safety of the inhibitors.
Often, sophisticated monitoring practices are put into place to avoid this problem most commonly inhospitals, universities and commercial buildings. A new, innovative condensate corrosion treatment
was developed in 1998, in response to increasing regulatory,
safety, technical, and economical needs voiced by managers of steam systems. Based on emulsifierscommonly used in the food industry, this chemistry presented concerned facility personnel with a
safer material that met all their regulatory, technical, and
economic needs. As with any new technology, its long-term impact on the steam system equipment,such as steam traps, was unclear as it was brought to market.
By Melissa Kegley, Nalco Company and Jim Daugherty, ArmstrongInternational Inc.
There are four common types of condensate corrosion inhibitors: neutralizing amines, filming
amines, oxygen scavengers, and a new emulsifier technology. The most common type of corrosioninhibitor is the neutralizing amine (such as morpholine, cyclohexylamine, and diethylaminoetha-
nol). These chemicals are volatile, nitrogen-bearing compounds that condense with the steam andneutralize any carbonic acid formed in the condensate system. Neutralizing amines increase the
condensate pH to reduce corrosion.
CORROSION INHIBITORS
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http://www.tbpindustrial.com/
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WHERE IS YOUR BRANCH??
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