asia identity

8/3/2019 Asia Identity

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Critical Asian Studies37:2(2005), 179-208 i6% Taylor&frandsCfoupioutledgeTayior&francisCro

GLOBALIZATION, EDUCATION,AND THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY

IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC

Mark Lincicome

ABSTRACT: This essay examines a resurg ent interest in "regionness" as a response toglobalization, and it looks at how go ver nm ents an d citizens have participated in thediscou rse on forging a new Asia-Pacific co mm unity that has develo ped over the pastfifteen years. Part one distinguishes between "regionalization" and "regionalism" ascompeting visions for the construction of a future Asia-Pacific community. Region-alization, the domin ant paradigm d uring the postcolonial period, centers on inter-state forums dominated by officially recognized political and economic elites whoseek interstate cooperation in order to protect state interests, state power, and na-tional identity from foreign as well as dom estic challeng es. Regionalism, as an alter-native paradigm, envisions the creation of transnational networks inclusive of non-official actors, whose identification with a particular state and set of nationalinterests does not preclude the creation of a regional identity (or identities) andsupport for regional interests. Part two considers the challenges that regionalismpo ses for the nation-state an d its leade rship . It do es so by highlighting the pre ssu refor reform that globalization has brought to bear upon one particular institutionthat theorists of nationalism have long identified as central to the perpetuat ion ofnational identity, national unity, and state authority: schooling. Part three assessesthe current prospects for such reforms by briefly examining recent educational de-velo pm ents in Japa n, Australia, Malaysia, and Sing apore.


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universality. While few scholars who study this phenomenon, and even fewerpolitical leaders and government bu reauc rats who try to grapple with it, predietthe demise of the nation-state in the face of these globalizing forces, few woulddeny that these forces p ose ge nuine challenges to the ways in which states havehitherto elaimed legitimacy and exercised their authority, both at home andabroad . The appre hension over the future of the state that this has given rise tois suceinetiy expressed by Higgott, who defines globalization as

(i) the emergence of a set of sequences and processes increasingly lesshinde red by territorial or jurisdictional barriers and one that enha nces thespread of trans-border practices in economic, political, cultural and socialdomains; and (ii) as a discourse of political knowledge offering one view perhaps the dom inant o ne am ong powerful decision making elites of how to m ake the pos tmode rn world manageable. For many, globaliza-tion as knowledge constitutes a rationalization of government that chal-lenges the language and imagery of a state-centric world and defines thelimits of the possible.^Nowhere has concern over the impact of globalization and its implicationsfor the nation-state been felt more acutely than in the Asia-Pacific. Several rea-sons can be cited for this. First, the history of Western colonialism in this region,which some scholars liken to globalization,^ and which e nd ed only after a seriesof protracted conflicts in the decades following World War II, is still deeplyetched in both living memory and national legend, and it fuels the perceptionthat globalization likewise emanates from the West and amounts to a sinisterform of neocolonialism. Second , the postcolon ial process of nation-state build-ing in much of this region is, therefore, also a comparatively recen t and argu-ably unfinished phenom enon . Third, the Asian financial crisis that crippledmany economies in the region in 1997-1998, and which occasioned the inter-vention of international agencies like the International Monetary Fund, onlyserved to confirm fears of neocolonialism in the minds of many Asians.Predictably, one re sponse to the perceived threat of globalization among po-litical figures such as Malaysia's M ahatir M ohamad, Singapo re's Lee Kuan Yew,and Japan's Ishihara Shintaro has been to mount a shrill rhetorical defense ofthe nation and the authority of the sta te against virtually every facet of the West-em Other; from economic policies and diplomatic strategies to social institu-tions, cultural practices, and even moral values. However, their own complicitsupport for globalization in their respective countries, coupled with tangibleeconom ic, political, social, and cu ltural changes wrough t by mo dernization andglobalization during the postcolonial era, have rendered their strident appealsto state-centered nationalism less compelling than before, and opene d a politi-cal space for other voices to articulate different respons es.This essay examines a resurgent interest in what Higgott calls "regionness"^as a notew orthy alternative re spon se to globalization, and it looks at how gov-


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particular historical m om ent; nor are they mutually exclusive. But their appear-ance and juxtaposition at this particular time presents an opportunity to pon-der the relationship between the global, the national, and the regional in theAsia-Pacific, as well as the fiiture of the nation -state, at the start of a new millen-nium.The body of this essay is divided into three parts, the first of which distin-guishes between "regionalization" and "regionalism" as competing visions forthe con struction of a future Asia-Pacifie com munity. Regionalization. the domi-nant paradigm during the postcolonial period, centers on interstate forumsdominated by officially recognized political and economic elites, who seek in-terstate cooperation in order to protect state interests, state power, and na-tional identity from foreign as well as domestic challenges. Regionalism, as analternative paradigm, envisions the creation of transnationa l netw orks inclusiveof nonofficial actors, whose identification with a panicular state and set of na-tional interests does not pre clud e the creation of a regional identity (or identi-ties) and support for regional interests. While proponents in both camps sharea common vocabulary when they speak of "cooperation" and "mutual respect"in the pursuit of "mutual interests," advocates of regionalism frequently linkthese terms to the pursuit of a communal "identity," shared "values," and ex-panded "rights" for individual members of that community.Part two co ns id er the challenges that regionalism poses for the nation-stateand its leade rship. It does so by highlighting the pressure for change that global-

ization has brough t to bear upo n one particular institution that theorists of na-tionalism have long identified as central to the perpe tuatio n of national identity,national unity, and state authority: schooling. It posits that schooling can eith erpromote or hinder the transition from regionalization to regionalism, depend-ing on whether societies in the Asia-Pacific pur sue (or, at least, tolerate) reformsto the content, practice, and polities of education that encourage (or, at least,permit) a redefinition of national identity and citizenship.Lastly, part three assesses the current prospects for such reforms by brieflyexamining recent educational developm ents in four countries w hose state rep-

resentatives have been at the forefront of recent regionalization efforts: Japan,Australia, Malaysia, and Singapore.Regionalization versus Regionalism

Scholarly disagreement over when to date the onset of globalization in theAsia-Pacific may be due as much to differing inte rpretations of "globalization"as it is to differing inte rpreta tion s of the historical re cord . Samuel Kim locate sthat m om ent in the early twentie th century, following his definition of global-ization asa series of complex, inde pen den t yet interrelated processe s of stretching,intensifying, and accelerating worldwide interconnectedness in all as-


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The early twentieth century is notable not merely for the massive colonialpresenc e of the Western pow ers throug hou t the region, but also for the un prec-edented response to the "Western threat" made by Meiji Japan, which har-nessed the forces of nationalism at home and imperialism abroad to emerge as aviable rival to Western pow er, and as a credible "Asian" mode l of mod ernizationin the eyes of its neighbo rs in the reg ion. Jap an 's m ilitary victory over Russia in1905, which sparked fears of an om inou s "Yellow Peril" am ong W estern observ-ers, served notice that m odernity was not the m ono poly of Western civilization.A decade later. World War I revealed the hollow ness of Western civilization'sclaim of superiority.The effect of these global dev elopm ents amo ng som e Asian reform ers was tospawn a discourse that encompassed both national and transnational visions.They imagined a m od ern China, Korea, Vietnam, or India wh ose new iden titieswere to be defined not only by their independence from Western imperialismbu t also by their e thnic and cultural solidarity with o the r Asians. In his analysisof pan-Asianism and its relationsh ip to the d iscou rse of civilization durin g thistime period, Prasenjit Duara observes that nations need to maintain a dualitybetw een civilization as equal to the nation and civilization as transna tiona l, be-cause they often move between these two positions. "New nation s," he writes,"seek the transnational conception of civilization because it is only as atrans territorial, universal ideal of, say, Islam or Confucianism with itspo-

tential capacity to reveal the truth of the hu man condition and em brace all ofhum anity, that this (civilizational) Self can achieve recognition from the O ther."''However, this duality contains a latent tension. "Because the spiritual im-pulse of a civilization tends to be universalizing, national boundaries are ulti-mately artificial and limiting. The tra nscend ent stance of civilization th us mayperm it a critique of the nation an d... can prod uce the problem of loyalties di-vided between those to the nation and to civilization,"^ This tension even per-m eated pan-Asianism in Japan, "which both fed and resisted the nascen t imperi-alism of that nation."^In the end, Japanese government leaders and ideologues tried to resolve

these divided loyalties by making the Japanese nation coterminous wath Asiancivilization. Not content to have Japan play a supporting role as a partner inAsia's renaissance, they proclaim ed Jap an "the Leader of Asia, the Protector ofAsia, the Light of Asia, " and attempted to impo se a hierarchical structure up onthe region that was keyed to Japa n's national interests. Hence, Japan ese primeminister Konoe Fumimaro's announcement of a New O rder in East Asia in No-vemb er 1938, eighteen mo nths after the outbreak of the secon d Sino-JapaneseWar. Konoe declared that the aim of this New Order, like the war itself, was to"secure etern al stability in East Asia," To that end , "The core of this new ord er isthe establishment of mutual relationships between Japan, Manchuria, andChina in political, economic, cultural and other domains." Eour years later, in


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Japan 's scheme to control and exploit its neighbors by incorporating theminto a "New Order" of its own invention reminds us that places are not preor-dained; they are created, together w ith the networks of social relations that helpto define their inhabitants. As Higgott explains:"[R|egionness" varies by policy issue and by what the domin ant actors in agiven gro up of coun tries, at a given time, see as their priorities. Shared his-torical, linguistic and/or cultural characteristics traditionally define a re-gion, but with the attempts to construct understandings of region arou ndthe Pacific Ocean, these factors have lost some salience. While there maybe struc tural incentives to regional coope ration (proximity, dramatic tech-nological and economic growth and enhanced interaction flowing fromit) regions are socially constructed they need positive social and politi-cal action to advance them."During th e first four decades after World War II, pan-Asian appeals to a trans-national identity roo ted in a com mon civilization were m uted, and "regionness"tended to follow the paradigm of "regionalization" rathe r than "regionalism." Iwould ve nture three reasons for this outcom e, beginning with w idespread re-vulsion against Japa n's manipulatio n and betrayal of a pan-Asian spirit, symbol-ized by Japanese wartime treatment of its 'Asian brothers." So deep are thosescars that they have stymied Japan ese p rop on en ts of a new Asia-Pacific regional-ism since the early 1980s, when Japan embraced this strategy as a means to copewith the current forces of globalization . That is, citizens in some of the cou ntriesthat Japan hopes to enlist in a new Asia-Pacific regional pa rtnership are wary, viv-idly recalling the w artime hardships they experienced as a result of Jap an's ear-lier promise of "co-prosperity."'"A second reason for the primacy of regionalization after World War II is tied tothe postwar movements for independence from the colonial powers and thedaunting task of constructing nations in place of colonies. Comp ared to region-alism, regionalization is less susceptible to "the prob lem of loyalties divided be-twee n tho se to the nation and to civilization" that Duara finds in pan-Asianism,because the latter explicitly acknowledges the primacy of the nation-state. Tothe leaders of these nascent states, regionalization was seen as a means to har-ness international cooperation to the goal of nation-building.A third rea son for favoring regionalization over regionalism during the fourdecades following World War II can be traced to cold war po litics, in which theformer division be tween Western and Asian civilizations was partially displacedby the ideological division between communism and democracy/capitalism.The cold war was responsib le for creating new states North and South Korea,North and South Vietnam, the Peop le's Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan whose identities, founding myths, political leaders, and institutions of govern-m ent were determ ined in oppo sition to on e another, and in alliance with on e ofthe two major superpowers. The choices open to Asia's leaders were not be-


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economic elites, the best kno wn and most influential of which is the Associationof Southeast Asian Nations (Asean), established in 1967 when its founding m em-bers (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand) signed the BangkokDeclaration. Although this docu men t spoke of promo ting econom ic, social, andcultural cooperation in the region, the organization was established mainly forpolitical-security reasons, which helps to explain why it has been dominated byforeign ministers and has relied on state-to-state cooperation through diplo-macy. ' In the words of Yamakage, "Their objectives w ere to reduc e the threa ts athome and from outside, and to help each other accomplish their individual na-tional goals. The functions of this new regional organ ization for regiona l cooper-ation can be summarized as the pursuit of a good neighbor policy in order topromote mutual trust and regional integration in order to foster nationalunity.''' (emphasis added)'^With the en d of the cold war, the Asean policy agenda has expande d beyondtraditional security issues to include trade andfinance," Why should economicissues now dom inate the agendas of so many private sector and public sector re -gional forums i nt hi sp ar to f the world? There are several reasons . First, the con-temporary disco urse on globalization has always emp hasized econom ic reformas the starting p oint for broade r political and social reforms. ^ Economic dereg-ulation or privatization both within and across national borders is toutedas a catalyst for greater econom ic opp ortu nity and h ealthy com petition; w hich,in turn, expands the middle class; which, in turn, brings pressure from belowfor political deregu lation at the top, culm inating in the global spread of politi-cal, econom ic, and social democracy.Second, it is the po litical and bus iness elites wh o thus have the most to gain bytrying to manage this far-reaching process. Ever since Jap an's Meiji governm entcoined the phrase "rich country, strong military" in the late nineteenth century,governments throughout Asia have pinned their nation-building plans, and theirown legitimacy, on economic m oderniza tion. Besides funding a "strong military" as much to quell dissent at home as to defend the homeland from foreign pow-ers or to project its power abroad a "rich country" may also bolster a reg ime's

popular support, to the extent that citizens believe that their own lives will im-prove as a result. Again, beginning with the Meiji leadership , tho se same govern-men ts have tried to discourage citizens' dem ands for a greater share of politicalpow er by substituting h opes for a higher standard of living, and by prom otingan ideology of economic nationalism.'^A third reason why economic issues have spu rred Asia-Pacific states to experi-me nt with newer regional forums like the Asia Pacific Economic Co operationForum (APEC) and its East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) is that they can bediscursively framed as matters of a diplomatic, bureaucratic or techn ocratic na-

ture, requiring th e authority and exp ertise of the ruling elites in order to be re-solved. This reduces th e possibility of public "interference" in th e negotiation


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w hat has resulted from this elite dom ination of the discourse on regional co-opera tion am ong Asia-Pacific states? First, it has meant that elite interes ts havedominated the official regional agenda. Second, it has meant that these eliteshave structured regional alliances so as to retain con trol over the policy-makingprocess, and to favor policies that protect their interests. According to Wood-side, the belief in an Asia-Pacific communityhelps to m aintain separate national elites with an identical concern for itsperp etua tion in very uneasy coexistence with each other, while encourag-ing them to think that they must take greater account of each other thanthey need take of the vast pop ulatio ns they govern. In its early stages theacceptance of the belief is more the sum of provisional elite allianceswithin a large region than it is the reflection of even the beginning of theunification of an "Asia-Pacific" consciousness that might weaken the re-gion s far-flung ethnic or racial divisions.'"However, over the past fifteen years or so, as the conditions that favoredregionalization and interstate forums like Asean have changed, evidence of apossible paradigm shift has slowly emerged to challenge the status quo. Theend of the cold war, together with the maturation political, economic, andsocial of societies such as the PRC, South Korea, Malaysia, and Singaporesince the end of World War II a dynamic process that has been strongly influ-enced by the forces of globalization have brought about calls for a differentregional dynamic, referred to thro ugh out this essay as regionalism. These advo-cates for change re pres ent a bro ade r cross section of their respective societiesand profess concern for a broader array of issues than those traditionally fa-vored by government leaders, diplomats, and bureaucrats working throughtheir own state institutions or through interstate forums like Asean.In contrast to radical groups like Jemaah Islamiah, which seeks to ov enh rowexisting state institutions and leaders in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, andthe Philippines to create a single Islamic state in their place, those who embracethe principles I have ascribed to regionalism are inclined to view existing stateagencies and interstate forums like Asean and APEC as potential allies in theirquest to build a more closely integrated Asia-Pacific community. For some, thismeans trying to reform the m embersh ip, policy priorities, and decision-makingprocedures that dominated these bodies during the postwar era of region-alization. For exam ple, in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, which precipi-tated a crisis of confidence in the future of Asean itself not only with respectto its policy priorities, but also with respect to its traditional co de of conduct,known as the 'Asean way,""* scholars like Tay and Estanislao have urged politicalelites themselves to take the initiative:Accordingly, the Asean governments must be willing to recognize the ris-ing voice and influence of civil society and non-government organiza-tions. The greater participation of the p eop les of the region is critical to


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reach out tow ards each othe r and co-operate mo re intensely in the pursu itof common interests.^"Others have taken a mo re proactive app roach, by participating in nongovern-mental organizations (NGOs) or launching other private-sector initiativesaimed at addressing, on a local and/or regional level, issues like democracy, hu-man rights, poverty, literacy, and environmental degradation that governmentsand organizations like Asean have traditionally been reluctant to take up. Forexample, transnational civil society networks have organized "People's Fo-rums" in conjunc tion with meetings ofAPEC representatives, challenging APECpolicies and putting forward a more egalitarian, democratic agenda.^^Analyzing this trend in Southeast Asia, Shamsul describes these NGOs as newforms of social movements. "If the 'old' ones were established and legitimizedby institutional structures of the state with the primary aim of supporting

well-organized state-sponsored activities of various kinds, the 'new' socialmo vem ents often em erged to articulate differences, plurality and d issent." Aswell, they "tend to reject centralism and stress community empowerment in-stead.""Unlin goes even farther, seeing th e em ergence of NGOs and similar groups incou ntries like Malaysia and Thailand as "evidence of the em erge nce of transna-tional civil society in Southeast Asia," made possible by "processes of globaliza-tion |tha t] have made civil societies less limited by geographical b oun darie s."^'By transn ationa l civi! society he means "the sph ere of ideas, values, institutions,organizations, networks, and individuals located between the family, the state,and the m arket and operating beyond the confines of national soc ieties, politiesand econo mies" (emphasis in original). This, in tu rn, makes it possible to con-ceive of "global citizenship ," w here "citizenship is un de rsto od as participation ,som ething that is realized throug h respo nsible action," rather than as rights andentitle m ents in relation to a state. ^"Responsible action" does not necessarily pit NGOs or other active partici-pants in transnational civil society against states, however. On the contrary,Grugel notes that NGOs are increasingly presen t w ithin go vernance structures,

nationally aswell as globally, thereby blurring the bou nda ry between "national"and "transnation al" forms of activism. Their goal is not to eliminate states, bu t to"make states effective and efficient instruments for their community."^^Regionalism and the Nation-State

From the foregoing, we can anticipate that the transition from reg ionalization toregionalism, shou ld it proceed in the Asia-Pacific, will be a slow and contentio usprocess, since it involves seismic shifts in the state's relations of power and au-thority on two different fronts simultaneously: o n the dom estic front, vis-a-vis itsow n citizens (and, for that matter, noncitizens such as migrant wo rkers); and onthe international front, vis-a-vis rival states and their citizens. This situation has


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Among the various challenges that regionalism presents to the state and itsrepresentatives, two will be taken u p in the remaind er of the essay: identity andcitizenship. Throughout the period of postwar regionalization in the Asia-Pa-cific (and long before that, in the case of Japan), nation-states have expendedconsiderable resources to create and perpetuate among their citizens notionsof identity that centered on the nation, and concepts of citizenship that cen-tered on the state. Studies of nation-building and state formation in the m odernera routinely assign to schooling a significant role in this process. Schools notonly provide mem bers of a society with the practical knowledge and skills lit-eracy and numeracy required of a modern workforce. By requiring all citi-zens to submit to a standardized curriculum in subjects that pro m ote a nationalimaginary including language arts, history, civics, and morals schools arealso said to contribute to the crea tion of what Anderson famously calls an "imag-ined community," through the formation and dissemination of a common na-tional identity and a shared national consciousness where none existed be^fore.^^ Even so, most scholars treat schooling as just one among various institu-tions and activities that contribute to this outcome.

According to G ellner's classic study of nationalism, however, providing uni-versal, compu lsory access to schools that teach a standardized curriculum is notsomething that individual states in the industrial age elect to do. Rather, it issom ething that all states are compelled to do. In fact, writes Gellner, it is the sin-gle most im portant function of the m od em state, because without it mo dern so-ciety cannot reprod uce itself:tN]ationalism is, essentially the general imposition ofa high culture o n so-ciety, where previously low cu ltures had taken up the lives of the majority,and in some cases the totality, of the pop ulation . It means the generalizeddiffusion of a school-mediated, academy-supervised idiom, codified forthe requirements of reasonably precise bureaucratic and technologicalcommunication. It is the establishment of an anonymous, impersonal so-ciety, with mutually substitutablc atomized individuals, held togetherabove all by a shared c ulture of this kind, sustained by folk c ultures repro -duced locally and idiosyncratically by the micro-groups themselves.'"Furthe rmore, writes Gellner, since only the state com ma nds the resourc es nec-essary to support an educational system on such a grand scale, its monopolyover schooling is also the state s principal source of pow er and legitimacy; m oreimportant, even, than its monopoly over the legitimate exercise of violence.^^Little wonder, then, that the so-called late-developing nations of Asia havetypically p laced a high value on the spread of education and on centralized statecontrol of schooling. Following the precede nt set by the Meiji governm ent in Ja-pan, which pioneered the introduction of universal, compulsory education inAsia beginning in the 1870s, state governments have not merely promoted

schooling, but have sought to define the aims and con tent of school educationaccording to a national economic, political, and social agenda. (In Jap an's case,


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that was housed in every school. As part of its plan to civilize the rest of Asia, italso required non-Japanese subjects in the territories it occupied to do thesame.)

Significantly, when Gellner published his theory more than two decades ago.just as the discourse on globalization was gaining momentum, he did not fore-see any diminution of either nations or nationalism. Rather, "differences be-tween cultural styles of life and communication, despite a similar economicbase, will remain large enough to require separate serving, and hence distinctcultural-political units, whether or not they will be wholly sovereign." " Thenumber and scale of nationalist movements around the globe from Palestine,to Chechnya, to Aceh that the world has witnessed in the decades since hemade that prediction would seem to prove him right. Still, it is hard to ignorecertain countervailing, if paradoxical, evidence to suggest that during thosesame decades, the real and perceived effects of globalization in the Asia-Pacificregion may have altered the conditions that made nationalism the only form ofsocial organization open to the modern imagination, and that made educationthe monopoly of the state. In panicular, as globalization has intensified eco-nomic competition between countries, states throughout the world have em-braced ideas like economic rationalism and managerialism, which advocate de-regulating services traditionally provided by the state. Education has beenthoroughly implicated in the shift to economic rationalism, which Mok andWelch describe as "the subversion of the social good to that of the economicgood: the promotion of productivity and economic growth, the pursuit of moreeconomistic forms of efficiency, and the development of a more competitiveand performative culture." Encouraged by supranational bodies like the Orga-nization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the WorldBank, which have publicly supported the move to a less centralized form of pub -lic management, states have enlisted education in their transition from a "wel-fare state" to a "competition state"^' by granting more autonomy to publicschool administrators, expanding the number of private schools, introducingschool choice, emphasizing critical thinking and problem-solving skills overrote memorization of information (traditionally supplied through state-autho-rized textbooks), encouraging life-long learning, and so forth.

At the same time, the pressure to compete in the global economy hasprompted government leaders and officials with authority over schooling to en-courage students to acquire foreign language skills and a more cosmopolitanawareness of the world beyond their own national borders. In light of thesechanges, the question to be addressed in the final section of the essay iswhether, in response to globalization, education in these societies can be liber-ated from its exclusive focus on the nation to incorporate a truly regional andglobal perspective into the (formal and informal) curriculum? Are schools incountries like Japan, Malaysia. Singapore, and Australia now poised to help nur-


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Education Reform and the Prospects for RegionalismOne sign that prop onen ts of regionalism have already attracted the atte ntion ofdefenders of regionalization is the latter's selective appropriation of the for-mer's terms of reference to "community," "culture," and "values." Of course,this does not mean that the two camps agree on what these terms shou ld mea n.A case in point is the well-publicized campaign to restore 'Asian values" that wastaken up by political and business elites in countries like Malaysia, Singapore,Korea, and Japan beg inning in the early 1980s. Rhetorically, their adm oni tion totheir fellow Asians to revive and reinstate "traditional" indigenous values exhib-ited some of the characteristics of early twentieth -centu ry pan-Asianism tha t wasdiscussed earlier. To begin with, their Asian values mantra pu rpo rted to elevateissues of a spiritual or moral nature g rounde d in civilization and cu lture above issues of a worldly, material nature grounded in political economy.Second, it contained a transnational element that seemed to extol regionalidentity and citizensh ip as m uch as national identity and unity. Finally, it struck adefensive tone that was, at times, explicitly directed against the alleged dangersof Westernization and globalization.

However, a closer look at this campaign reveals its ties to the dom inant para-digm of regionalization and its conceptual d istance from regionalism. To beginwith, there was no substantive agreement about what values were "Asian," orwhat made them distinctly Asian. The tendency during this period to affix the"Asian" label to values such as harmony, cooperation , co nsensus, placing societyabove self, and respect for authority had less to do with reviving a neglected re-gional heritage than with inventing a national one. In Malaysia and Singapore, aprimary goal was to neutralize longstanding ethnic tensions between Malays,Chinese, and Indians, while in Korea and Japan itwas to neutralize political ten-sions pitting leftists against conservatives, economic tensions pitting laboragainst management, and generational tensions pitting youth against their el-ders. Again, it must be emphasized that these goals were defined largely by theruling elites, and primarily reflect the interests of these elites. ^ The irony is thatwhile they tended to frame the revival of Asian values as a defense against thetide of globalization and Westernization, the ir aim was to enlist Asian values inadvancing economic development that was depe nde nt upon globalization.

Further evidence that the Asian values deb ate was driven primarily by domes-tic political considerations on the part of the ruling elites is that by the early1990s the debate itself was being quietly shelved. During this period, further ad-vances in globalization rendered the political virtue of Asian values into some-thing of a political vice. Asian values were fine, unless they ended up stiflingcompetition, discouraging the acquisition of foreign languages and a cosmo-politan outlook, or public receptivity to foreign investment and modern tech-nology. ^ Furthermore , the 1997-98 Asianfinancialcrisis revealed num ero us ex-amples of corporate and political corrup tion in high places, which contrad icted


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The growing tensions between rcgionalization and regionalism, and the re-sulting contradictions that beset thes e states" shifting positions tow ard th e re-cent Asian values campaign, are also reflected in the educationa l reforms thathave been devised in response to globalization.JapanEducation in Japan has com e in for heavy criticism in recent years for doing ex-actly what Gellner insists that educatio n in any mo dern society must do. Booksbearing titles like Cartels of the Mind'''' and An E mpire of Schools''^' accuse Japa-nese bureaucratic and corporate elites of systematically undermining the dem-ocratic educational reforms that were introduced during the American-ledAllied O ccupation following W orld War II, in ord er to re turn the schools to a ver-sion of Meiji-era state contro l and elite domination . According to Brian McVeigh,in place of genuine education, the Japanese state now serves up "educational

nationalism": a "conflu-ence of statist, ethnic, andracialist ideological cur-forges "a pow-

Flyer (printing date unknov^'n) advertising the sale of Chikyu no

ing and national senti-ments."^"Given these accusa-tions, it may come as a sur-prise to learn that morethan any other nation inthe Asia-Pacific, Japan haspersistently attempted toreform its educational or-ganizat ion, curriculum,and teaching practices in

order to cope with thechallenges of globaliza-tion. If these attempts areto have any real chance ofm o v i n g J a p a n b e y o n dre g iona l i z a t ion to thethreshold of regionalism,however, state representa-tives will have to resolvethree contradic t ions oftheir own creation.


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movem ent in 1984, whe n then p rime minister Nakasone took the extraordinarystep of appo inting an Ad Hoc Council on E ducational Reform to critique Japa-nese education and recom men d reforms ne eded to groom the next generationof citizens for life in the twenty-first century. The Council's findings, publishedin a series of reports betw een 1985 and 1987, provided both the rationale andthe framework for the Ministry of Education's ongoing drive to "international-ize Japanese education" (kyoiku no kokusaika). Appearing throughout theserepo rts is the ph rase "coping with internationalization" {kokusaika e no taio),which en capsulates the Coun cil's view of internationalization as a challenge tothe p reserva tion of Japane se identity, nation al unity, and econ om ic pow er. Ja-pan m ust prepare to "cope" with an increasingly interdep end ent comm unity ofnation s that is open ly critical of Jap an 's econ om ic self-centeredness and cul-tural insularity, and that expects all members including Japan to act re-sponsibly for the welfare of the w hole . To mee t this challenge, education musttrain future gene rations of "cosmopo litan Japa nese " (sekai no naka no Nihon-jin) wh o can help Japan assume a role in the new w orld order comm ensuratewith its stand ing at the forefront of the most advanced nation s, and make posi-tive contributions not only in the economic arena, but in education, science,and culture as well.^^The problem with this prescription for educational reform, from the stand-poin t of prom oting regionalism and cultivating a regional identity, is that it re-mains firmly rooted in the state-based ideologies of national identity and

regionalization, Nakasone himself repeatedly stated that tomorrow's cosmo-politan Japan ese must be socialized to "contribute to the international comm u-nity with ^Japanese consciousness" by imbuing them w ith a thoroug h knowl-edge of, and a deep respect for, tbe distinctive (and some would contend,superior) attributes of Japan ese tradition and culture . While Lynne Parmenterhas identified som e subtle chan ges in the M inistry's 1998 curriculum guidelines(which went into effect in 2002) when compared with the preceding 1989guidelines (which had been in effect since 1992), the fundamental rationale andaim of internationalization remains unchanged:National identity is prioritized over individual, international, and globalidentities. At no point does M onbusho [the Ministry of Education] advo-cate any attachment to tbe world gro up or international society. Instead, ituses the international context to reinforce attachment to the nationalgroup, thus strengthening national group boundaries.^^

The most blatant exam ple of this was the Ministry's decision to ma nda te (in the1989 curriculum gu idelines) tbe display of tbe H inomaruflagand the singing ofthe Kimigayo anthem in the schools, in keeping with the Coun cil's recom men-dation for more attention to the cultivation of patriotism am ong stu den ts. Thismove, which continues to be oppose d by some local school teachers and princi-pals, was later backed by tbe Jap ane se Parliament, which gran ted legal recogni-


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active pursuit of a regionalidentity (or identities). Ifthe government's renewedemphasis on patriotism isany indication, then Japanstill has a long way to go.

Tbe second contradic-t ion that has hamperedprogress toward meaning-ful educational reform ispoli t ica l : tbe continuedconcentration of authorityover education in the handsof the state. As alreadynoted, the widely publi-cized drive to "internation-alize" was conceived by ag o v e r n m e n t - s p o n s o r e dcouncil and has been or-chestrated by the Ministryof Education. As just noted,the Ministry has played avigorous role by periodi-cally revising the nationalcurriculum guidelines thateveryone from textbookwriters and publishers toschool officials and teach-ers, is expected to follow.The advantage of this ap-proach is that it sets mini-

This page is from a sixth-grade social studies textbook:Shinpen Atarashii Shakai [new edi t ion. New Society! (Tokyo:Tokyo Shoseki, 1995), p. 54. This excerpt highlights japan'sgovernmenta l and nongovernmenta l contr ibut ions to thedevelopment of less advanced countr ies in Asia and Afr ica.

mum standa rds for curriculum reform for school districts thro ughou t the coun-try. The disadvantage is that it risks perpe tuating elite, bureaucratic interferencein education at the local level. Significantly, such interference has been recog-nized as a deeply ingrained problem in Japanese ed ucation, prom pting concur-rent efforts at "liberalization" (jiyuka) or deregulation, such as granting localschool districts m oreflexibility n how they implement the standard curriculumguidelines. For instance, a num ber of prefectures have elected to establish newprograms in international studies, some of which are housed in new interna-tional high schools, that offer studen ts co ncentra ted foreign language study inassorted Asian and Western languages (English, German, Chinese, Korean) often taught with the help of native speakers mo re intensive study of world


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try's guidelines for most subjects in the curriculum, has meant that teachershave frequently been left to devise their own teaching strategies and materials.These, in turn, have found their way into commercially published handbooksfor the profession, handbooks that are not subject to the M inistry's scrutiny orauthorization.^' Thus, the relative ind epe nde nce that teachers have come to ex-ercise in deciding how educ ation for international und erstan ding " actuallytakes place in their own classrooms offers some potential for resolving both theideological and the political contradictions inherent in the Ministry's reformprogram.However, that potential is threatened , in turn, by a third contradiction that,depending on one's perspective, could be described as ideological, political,economic, and/or structural: the ostensibly meritocratic, but unmistakablycompetitive system of entrance exams for high school and university. The prob-lem is not just that the system is competitive, but that the con tent of the examshas long favored rote memorization of empirical information over critical think-ing and analytical skills, social education, practical experience , and personal re-flection. The deleterious effects of this system have long been recognized by theauthorities, including Nakasone's Ad Hoc Council, whose reports combined acall to internationalize Japanese ed ucation with calls to develop student s' indi-vidual character (kosei). creativity (sozosei), independence ijiyu), self-disci-pline ijiritsii), and personal responsibility (jiko sekintn).'^ More recently, theMinistry of Education admitted that in spite of the phenom enal quantitative ex-pans ion of up pe r secondary e duca tion after World War 11, insufficient attentionhas been given to "the extreme diversification of stu den ts' a ttributes, includingabilities, aptitudes, interests, concerns, and career paths.'"^ To remedy thisoversight.Prefectures and individual schools are.. .working to diversify educationalcontent and teaching methods to reflect local and school conditions,course and subject characteristics, and students' abilities, aptitudes, andcareer plans. Efforts have also been made to develop differentiatedschools through such measures as the establishment and restructuring ofcourses and the introduction of a sub-course system to reflect internation-alization, the shift to an information-oriented society, and other socialchanges. To provide additional impetus for efforts in these areas, newtypes of uppe r secondary schools have been established to provide a flexi-ble response to social change and the diversified needs of studentsthrough approaches that are not bound by traditional frameworks. Sus-tained efforts are still being made in these areas by prefectures as well asindividual schools."In addition to these steps, the entrance exam system has undergo ne mod est

revisions, such as supplementing multiple choice questions with an essay re-quire ment and a fore ign-la ngu age (English) listening com prehensio n exercise,


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In spite of or, perh aps, because of these persistent structural and ideo-logical constrain ts, school teach ers, university students , and faculty have joineda cross section of othe r Japanese citizens to establish hom egrown NGOs to ad-vance the cause of global citizenship, on the o ne hand , and regionalism, o n theother. The Japan NGO Center for Interna tional Co operation (Kokusai KyoryokuNG OSenta; known by the acronym Janic), a netwo rking NGO founded in 1987,has identified mo re than on e h und red Japan ese NGOs whose overseas activitiesencompass poverty reduction, educational support, medical and healthcareservices, env ironm ental pro tectio n, and assistance for refugees. While not all ofthese NGOs specifically target Asia or the Asia-Pacific, a num be r of them do. Forexam ple, among the seventy NGOs that belon g to Janic are th e Asian Comm u-nity Trust, the Asian Rural Ins titute, Bridge Asia Jap an , th e Association of Medi-cal Doctors for Asia, the Institute for Himalayan Conservation, and the JapanAsian Association and Asia Friendship Society. Othe r Janic m emb ers, such as theDevelopment Education Association and Resource Center, produce educa-tional materials and s pons or sem inars to educate Japan ese citizens abou t globalissues such as sustainable deve lopm ent, and about the con cept of global citi-zenship itself, which is reflected in Janic 's own vision statem ent:To con tribu te to th e realization of a global society wh ere pe op le a re lib-erated from hunger, poverty and the violation of human rights, wherepeople live in barmony with their natural surroundings, wbere peopleare assured of equal and fair opportunity to participate in choosing thedirection of their society, and where people mutually respect diverse cul-tures an d values, while living together*^

AustraliaWhen it comes to regionalization in tbe Asia-Pacific, Japan and Australia arerarely mentioned in tbe same breath, except in strictly economic and politicalterms: as bilateral trading pa rtne rs an d as staunch diplom atic and military alliesof the Un ited States. And wh en it com es to regionalism, the tw o ap pear to sharenothing in common historically, culturally, linguistically, or ethnically upon which to forge a shared identity. However, as Gavan McCormack pointsout, this assumption overlooks o ne very impo rtant historical similarity: "Like Ja-pan, Australia in the n ineteen th c entury ad opted policies of mon oeth nic, racialsuperiority, denigra tion of its aboriginal inhabitants, chauvinism, and rejectionof Asia. While Japan declared its sloughing off of Asia, Australia declared itselfwhite, and both insisted on their superior racial qualities. Both in recent de-cades d ebate how best to en ter, or, at least associate m ore closely with, Asia."^^

This fact beg ins to explain why Japan and Australia both becam e early advo-cates of Asia-Pacific reg ionalization ,^' and why Australia has b een second only toJap an am ong Asia-Pacific states in attemp ting to in corp orate a regional perspec-tive into its school curricu lum . It also begins to explain why these reforms have


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Bob Hawke (1983-1991). On the domestic front, Whitlam is remembered fortaking steps to eradicate the remnants of the "White AustraUa" policy by outlaw-ing racial discrimination and enacting new programs to improve the rights andwelfare of Aborigines and other ethnic minorities. Abroad, he sought greater in-dependence from U.S. foreign poUey in Asia by withdrawing Australian troopsfrom Vietnam, establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC, Vietnam, andNorth Korea, and promoting human rights, nuclear disarmament, and environ-mental protection.^' While Hawke was more accommodating to American for-eign polic7 than Whitlam. the end of the cold war and the collapse of the SovietUnion during his administration enabled him and Keating (1991-96) to embarkon a new doctrine of "enmeshment" in the Asia-Pacific.'' This doctrine was un-deniably a product of the regionalization paradigm: centering on engagementamong state representatives, acting through regional forums both old (Asean)and new (APEC, Asean Regional Forum), in order to advance an agenda definedby governing elites.

However, in the course of promoting a new era of interstate cooperation be-tween his government and other states bordering the Pacific, tbe Keating doc-trine explicitly promoted a new regional identity, symbolized by the hyphen-ated name 'Asia-Pacific," that was also to be the cornerstone of a new Australiannational identity. Indeed, political opponents both at home and abroad went sofar as to accuse Keating of trying to turn Australia into an Asian nation. "^ Keatingreplied by stating emphatically that 'Australia is not, and can never b e , an 'Asiannation,'" but

[T]hat is a very different thing from asserting, as I believe we must, thatAustralia is a legitimate and central part of the region around us; that weare and have every right and responsibilityto be a charter member ofthe region and its institutions. Whether you call this region Asia, or tbeWest Pacific, or the Kast Asian Hemisphere, or the Asia-Pacific mattersmuch less than our active panicipation in it , our legitimacy in being part ofit. -*This new era of openness to the Asia-Pacific prompted a variety of educa-

tional initiatives that brought the philosophy of regionalism and the idea of a re-gional community one step closer to reality. At the university level, programs inAsian Studies were expanded on Australian campuses, and more Australian stu-dents traveled to neighboring countries to study Asian languages and cultures.Some institutions w ent a step further; opening up branch campuses in coun-tries like Malaysia, geared primarily toward Asian students, many of whom con-ducted part of their studies at home campuses in Australia.

At the pre-college level, an unprecedented drive to introduce the study ofAsian culture in the curriculum during the 199()s has meant that more Austra-lian students now study Japanese than any other foreign language.'^''Just as sig-nificant has been the innovative partnerships between the government, com-


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Usher owned by the variousState ministries of educa-tion and the Universityof Melbourne's AsialinkCentre. Funding for theFoundation comes fromthe Commonwealth gov-e r n m e n t , p a r t n e r s h i p swith each state and terri-tory, gran ts from Asian gov-ernments and nonprofitagencies, and private dona-tions. Its professional stafforganizes team s of academ-ics, curriculum specialists,and teachers to producecurriculum materials, pol-icy statements, and teach-ing strategies for individualsubjects in the curriculum;runs in-service trainingworkshops, conferences,and foreign study tours forteachers; and maintainswebsites containing curric-ular materials and informa-tion about Asia for free dis-tribution to teachers.''^

The As ia Educ a t ionFoundation stands at thec r o s s r o a d s b e t w e e nregionalizat ion and re-gionalism in Australia. This position is reflected in its statem ent of curriculu mgoals for the study of Asia, according to which, students should

understand and appreciate the diversity of environments, cultures, reli-gions and societies of Asia; develop informed attitudes and behaviour to-wards Asian people, events , issues and lifestyles and th e ability to commu-nicate these appropriately and effectively to others; understand theeconomic, strategic and cultural importance of the countries of Asia andtheir links with other countries in the world, particularly Australia; de-velop an aw areness of the diversity of values within Asian societies tha t ex-tends beyond cultural stereotypes; form skills for interacting effectively

Front cover of Voices and Values; Gf/zens/i /p in Asia {Access Asiaseries), by Beth Ci l l igan (Curr iculum Corporation [part of the AsiaEducation Foundation], 1998 [reprinted 2000]). Example of gov-ernment- funded supplementary teach ing mater ia ls produced bythe Asia Education Foundation to promote the study of Asia andAsian languages in Australian primary and secondary schools.


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On one hand, it requires no great leap of the imagination to see howregionalization would stand to benefit from cultivating in Australia's futureworkforce and future elites a better appreciation of Asian peoples andtheir cultures, not to m ention a practical unders tand ing of the econom ic, strate-gic, and cultural links between Asia and Australia. Like Nakasone's cosmopoli-tan Japan ese, this genera tion of Australians would be arm ed w ith the practicalknowledge and skills needed to defend the national intere st on the frontUnes ofthe new global economy and regional security nexus. On the other hand, theFoundation's concluding emphasis on developing "a comm itment to principlesof friendship, peace, social justice, cooperation and mutual respect among allpeop les and nations" resonates strongly with the principles of regionalism, andoffers tacit sup por t for the attend ant conc epts of transna tional civil society andglobal citizenship.Malaysia and SingaporePrior to the recent wave of conce rn over globalization, neither geographic prox-imity nor a com mon he ritage of British colonialism did much to encou rage re-gional cooperation, much less a regional identity, between Australia, Malaysia,and S ingapore. On the contrary, it could be argued th at these very factors havecontinued to hinder all three states from pursuing a coordinated regional re-sponse to globalization. Geographical proximity has meant competition foreconomic and strategic advantage, while the legacy of British colonialism hasplaced a high priority on nationalism and nation building, rathe r than a transna-tional regionalism. The irony of this last point is that European colonialism,which some authors have described as the first historical instance of "globaliza-tion" in Asia, continues to shape the responses of former European colonieslike Malaysia and Singapore to the current wave of globalization includingtheir experiments in regional cooperation nearly a half century after inde-pendence.

Now here is this irony more apparen t than in Malaysian and Singaporean ed-ucational policies that, in different ways, have perpetuated the race-based so-cial, econom ic, and political divisions institu ted by the British, and for the sam epurpose: social engineering and contro l. The introd uction of ethnic Indian andChinese imm igrants into the Malay Peninsula to serve in the colonial adminis-tration and in colonial-sanctioned trade and industry helped to thwart a unifiednationalist revolution against British control following World War II. Instead,independence came about gradually, with British consent and cooperation,which left the colonial system of race-based social relations intact. Thus, fromthe outset, the overriding challenge facing the postcolonial leadership hasbeen: How to forge a common national identity and promote national unityamong numerically and economically unequ al popu lation s of "Malays," "Indi-ans," and "Chinese" (and, in the case of Malaysia, tribes like the Orang Asili)?* *


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the Challenges

III! Ml'

I. thr prntK i

been placed in an untena-ble position of promotingMalay cultural, political,and economic hegemonyw h i l e a l s o e n d o r s i n gmulticulturalism and tol-erance for the nation'sChinese and Indian "mi-norities." To redress per-ceived social and eco-nomic inequities amongt h e p r i n c i p a l e t h n i cgroups and shore up itspolitical support amongthe Malay majority, thegovernm ent ha rnessededucation to its New Eco-nomic Pol icy , whichsought to increase thebumiputra share of cor-porate equity from 2.5percen t in 1970 to 30 per-cen t by 1990. Accordingly,English-language instruc-tion a vestige of colo-n ia l p r iv i l eg e w asphased out and BahasaMelayu became the me-dium of instruction, al-though Chinese and Indian elites managed to secure public funding for Chi-nese and Tamil edu cation at the primary level; a racial quo ta system wasimplem ented that favored bumiputra stud ents in admission to tertiary schools;

and special secondary schools, program s, and scholarships for bumiputra stu-dents were also provided." The interethnic conflicts that these affirmative ac-tion policies unwittingly provoked help to accou nt for the em phasis that cameto be placed u po n values education in the curriculum, beginning in the 1980s.As note d earlier, instruction in "Asian values" was never in tended to pro m ote aregional identity in respo nse to globalization. Rather, it was designed to so othethese interethnic tensions and promote a still-elusive national identity.How ever, wh ile the nation rem ains the primary referent for Malaysian educa-

tional policy. Lee has identified a num be r of recent reforms attributable to glob-alization, som e of which have imp ortant implications for the develop me nt of a

A page from Education in Malaysia, publ ished in 1997 by Malay-sia's Ministry of Education (p. 28).


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mainly Australian schools to establish branch campuses in Malaysia. Theseschools appeal not only to foreign students from Australia and othe r parts of theAsia-Pacific, but also to Malaysia's own eth nic m inorities (Chinese and Indians)who have been disadvantaged by their government's quota system for thebumiputra. These schools permit M alaysian students to complete their educa-tion abroad, while acting as a bridge to s tudents' rccn tiy into Malaysian society,armed with a more cosmopolitan outlook and English-language competence.Ironically, the transformation of English from the language of colonial oppres-sion to the language of international business, science, and technology has alsomade it a potential medium for enhanc ed regional c oope ration among Asia-Pa-cific nations.The prob lem with relying on private schools to foster a transnational ou tlookand cross-cultural communication skills is twofold: not only does it exclude amajority of Malaysian students ; it also exacerbates existing socioeconomic classdivisions. According to Lee, those intra-ethnic class divisions are a direct by-prod uct of the governm ent's affirmative action programs that were aimed at thebumiputra, and loom as a greater source of potential social instability thaninterethnic divisions.^' In light of these p ersistent social tensions and the ongo -ing struggle to arm the popu lace with the basic skills seen as necessary to makethem productive and self-sufficient, it is little wo nder that the governm ent viewsa curriculum geared tow ard im parting a transnational identity as a luxury thatcontemporary Malaysia simply cannot afford at present.^'^ Thus, while Malay-sia's Ministry of Education recognizes that "There is certainly a need to developan awareness of the Asean and to instill an Asean spirit and a sense of kinshipamong the young in mem ber cou ntries," it is content to proceed on the assump-tion that M alaysian students will acqu ire the "Asean spirit" as a con seq uence ofthe instruction they receive in Malaysian morals and citizenship , since the "posi-tive values found in Malaysian societies and advocated by the various religions,traditions and cultures of different c om mu nities.. .are also consonant w ith uni-versal values."^^The contradictions in heren t in these policies appear to haun t the activities of

Malaysian NGOs, as well, although any connection betw een them can only beinferred. On the one ha nd, notes Weiss, "Malaysian activists on the w hole seemcomfortable with assuming some transnational (particularly regional) role,even if most still view them selves as Malaysians above all.... Frequently, a senseof (Southeast) Asian identity com plem ents, bu t does not replace or transce nd, aspecific national identity," particularly because of the platform provided byAsean.*^ On the other hand, many Malaysian NGOs remain overtly orientedaround ethnicity; a situation that the state has been happy to exploit by install-ing vertical structures to incorporate and control key social groups under aform of statist democracy'"^Thus, even as "the concept of a national culture that would underpin the


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un It 2Du e: .

Viii i li.TM- l i -rf i l l l . i imiiL si i i i ir cit mil n i i t l i i i r f ( o i l ' l i . i i m *vuill(r,tlillillfS ;ill[| [luu- I1II|M< 1 1111 iJur lialiriH. Mulcll lllr- llhliUi l i r l.-fi iviili i l i i - ap|)n>[)ii.11.- [j|ir4-> on lli i- rinhl In drawing lilint ihc IMIXCS

Some of Singapore'sCDnitraints andvulnerabil i t iesHow Singapore handlestKese constraints andvulnerabl l iries

Small land area Recruit ing workersfrom other countries

Lack of manpower Establ ishing friendlyties with othercountries

Shortage of water Reclaiming more landfrom the sea

Dependence onothercountries for ourbasic needsBuymg water fro mother countries

Ramorrbar that, iJotprte being a (moil notion, Singapore 'na'woriiod fiord lo overcome ite corntrainti mid vulnerobllltlet

the development of a new con-cept of citizenship that is moremulticultural and less focusedon national identity.^Compared to Malaysia, con-ditions in neighboring Singa-pore would appear, at firstglance, to be more conduciveto reorienting edu cation awayfrom over t ly na t iona l is t ic ,statist priorities, in favor ofpromot ing g rea te r in t e rna -t ional compe tence, a transna-tional perspective, and a re-gional identity among its citi-z e n s . I n d e e d , S i n g a p o r ewould seem to have more incomm on with Japan in this re-gard: two island nations, poorin natural resources savefor their well-educated andhigh ly d isc ip l ined popu la -t ions, and keenly dependentupon amicable relations (eco-nomic, diplomatic, cultural)with othe r nations for their fu-ture development. This senseof dependency is vividly cap-tured by Kwok Kian-Woon inhis introduction to Singapore

2001, published by the Ministryof Information and the Arts, in which he states that "the island-city-na-tion-state has always been a work in progress, a child of globalization, re-sponding to historical, economic, technological, social, and cultural forcesoutsid e of itself like a top that is spinning , with its poin ted end barely alwaystouching the ground. It cannot afford to spin out of contro l. Nor can it affordto lose its momentum or it may not spin at all."^^ These similarities are re-flected in their programs for educational reform. With respect to English-lan-guage education, for example, Japanese students now commence study inprimary school (rather than m iddle school) like their counter parts inSinga-pore, wh ere English has bee n the m edium of instru ction in primary and sec-ondary school since 1987.*'** And, like Jap an, S ingapore durin g the late 1980s

From Civics and M oral Education: Pupil's Book 2B (Singa-pore: Curriculum Planning and Development Division,Ministry of Education, 2000), 47. Excerpt from Unit 2,"Singapore and the World," of a pupil's workbook.


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However, to an even greater exten t than Japan , S ingapore's ed ucation policyrespo nses to globalization rem ain firmly grou nde d in a nationalist perspectiveand harnessed to elite priorities. In practice, this has meant that education inSingapore, like its counterpart in neighboring Malaysia, remains captive to thepolitics of ethnic and national identity. Following Singapore's independencefrom Malaysia in 1965, its ethnic C hinese p op ulation adroitly leveraged its ma-jority status to insure its con tinued political, econom ic, and cultural dom inancew ithou t having to reso rt to the kind of affirmative action policies and prog ram sthat have proved divisive in Malaysia. Instead, un de r the b an ne r of "unity in di-versity," the government of Singapore has tried to fashion a national identitythat officially recognizes and celebrates the country's Chinese, Malay, and In-dian ethnic groups, while subtly shaping each group's definition and expres-sion of its own ethnicity, and while managing relations within and betweenthese groups.^'Thus, return ing to the example of English-language instruction, Wang notesthat English is no t only mean t to conn ect S ingapore to the rest of the wo rld; it isalso meant "to act as the neu tral bridge linking the various ethnic com mu nitieswhich make up the po pulatio n of Singapore, " ^ since it is the only language theyall have in common. Similarly, Wee observes that as the 1980s concept of apan-Asian capitalist culture started to weaken in the early 1990s, the state 's pu r-suit of "national cu lturalism procee ded but now via a sim ultan eou s affirma-tion of the national and the global, rather than the regional or the pan-Asian.

This was p rescien t, given how prob lem atic the Asian-Pacific "triad p ow er' wasabout to become with the Asian [financial] crisis, and given the already poorcommunity sense in the Pacific."^^ Thus, along w ith its grea ter em phasis on flex-ibility, creativity, lifelong learning, and information technology, the governmentof Singapore also introduced a new National Education program centered oncitizenship training, in ord er "to strengthen the develop me nt of national cohe-sion, instinct for survival and confidence in the future."^'This po sture is reflected in the textbo oks ap prov ed by the M inistry of Educa-tion for primary and secondary school stu den ts. For example, on e second grade

pup il's workbo ok for civics and moral education is divided into four units, cov-ering "Our C itizenship," "Be a Part of Total Defence," "Sustaining Sing apore'sGrow th," and "Singapore and the W orld." Their com mo n refrain is the nee d forSingaporeans to work together to protect the nation from the various "con-straints and vulnerabilities" that threaten its existence. The overriding goal ofnational survival also frames the text's discussion of Singapore s internationalrelations. Thus, in the un it on "Singapore and the World," pup ils are taught thatSingapore handles its "lack of manpower" by "recruiting workers from othercoun tries," and its "dep end ence on oth er coun tries for our basic needs " by "es-tablishing friendly ties with o the r countries."^"^ The question of Sing apore's con-tribution to the interna tional com munity is not ignored, b ut is portrayed as the


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ConclusionIf the foregoing assessments of educa tion in Japan, Australia, Malaysia, and Sin-gapore are representative of education in the Asia-Pacific region as a whole,then the nation clearly remains the principal referent for education in the re-gion, and the s tate remains the chief arbiter of what passes for education , just asGellner concluded more than twenty years ago. If so , then it would seem un-likely that education is poised to push these societies to move beyond regionali-zation toward regionalism, including the formation of a transnational regionalidentity and sense of community.

What Gellner did not foresee, however, is the extent to which globalizationhas challenged the state's m onopoly over the education and thus, the iden-tity of its citizens. Virtually all of the states examined in this essay have beencom pelled to respond to the dem ands of global capitalism by instituting educa-tional reforms that have the potential to empower their citizens to breach thebord ers of the old national imaginary. Most elites in power have shown a reluc-tance to acknowledge, much less encourage, that potential at the grassrootslevel. It remains to be seen what the citizens themselves elect to do.

States thus face a choice. The transition from regionalization to regionalismdepends to a great extent upon "the rising voice and influence of civil societyand non-governm ent organizations," and with citizens' ability to exercise whatDirlik calls "place-based imagination." Animated by the globalization discoursedescribed by Higgott, this derivative discourse draws rene wed attention to theparticular, through the lens of localism and regionalism. While not necessarilyopposed to globalization, it seeks to create new regional comm unities, or newnetworks of local communities, in order to resist globalization's threat ofmarginalization and to fashion new political spaces in which to influence theprocess of development and its outcomes.^^ States can choose to permit, oreven encourage, grassroots participation in this process. Or they can seek tolimit citizen participation and risk citizen resistance; or pe rhaps even worse, cit-izen apathy and the death of regionalism altogether. In this regard, it is interest-ing to note that even some critics of the nationalistic, authoritarian character ofthe earlier Asian values campaign are slow to dismiss its transformative poten-tial.^^ Even as the Japan ese governm ent, according to one critic, moves to wavethe banner of Asian values in a bid to reestablish its leadership in the region,""gro ups of citizens in Japa n and elsew here are taking a variety of initiatives tochalletige their government's state-centered agendas.^^ In many cases, theyhave sought to minimize cooptation by the state by working through nongov-ernmental organizations or through local governmental bodies to engage di-rectly with their counterparts abroad in a variety of cultural, educational, andeconomic exchanges.

Notes


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search in Asia for this essay. He also wishes to acknowledge the incisive com-ments provided by three anonymous readers of a previous draft . Earlierversions of this essay were presented at Rikkyo University, for the Symposiumon Globalism and Education for Sustainable Development in the Asia-Pacific, 1August 2005, and at Monash University Centre in Prato (Italy), for the SecondIntern ational C onference on N ew Directions in the H um anities, 23 July 2004.2. Richard Higgott. "The Political Economy of Globalisation in East Asia: Th e Sa-lience of'Region Building,'" in Globalisation and tbe Asia-Pacific: Con testedTerritories., ed. Kris Olds, Peter Dicken, Philip F. Kelly, Lily Kong, and HenryWai-chungYeung (London and New York: Routlcdge, 1999), 92.3. See Arif Dirlik, "Introducing the Pacific," in Wh at Is in a Rim? Critical Perspec-tives on the Pacific Region Idea , ed. Arif Dirlik (Bo ulde r: W estviewP ress, 1 993),5.4. This term, borrowed from Higgott, is discussed later in this essay.5. Samuel S. Kim, "East Asia and Globalization: Challenges and Responses." inEast Asia and Globalization, ed. Samuel S. Kim (New York: Rowman and

Littlefield, 2000). 10.6. Prascnjit Du ara, "The Disc ourse of Civilization and Pan-Asianism," in Nationsunder Siege: Globalization and Nationalism in Asia, ed. Roy Starrs (NewYork: Palgrave, 2002), 71-72.7. Ihid.8. Ibid., 75-76.9. This was the slogan of the AAA Movement: a prop agand a cam paign that Japanlaunched in the Dutch East Indies in April 1942, shortly after its military forcessecured control of the archipelago.10. Tomoko Akami, Internationalizing the Pacific: The United States, Japan andthe Institute of Pacific Relations in War and Peace, 1919-45 (London and NewYork: Routledge, 2002), 231-34.11. Higgott, "The Political Economy of Globalisation," 93.12 . Yumei Zhang, Pacific Asia: The Politics of Development (London and NewYork: Routledge, 2003 ), 139-40. M emories ofthe war and the Jap ane se o ccupa-tion forces in East and Sou theast Asia con tinu e to evolve in resp on se to do m es-tic politics: they vary not only between countries, but also between ethnicgroups within a single society. See Wang Gungwu, "Memories of War: WorldWar II in Asia," in War and Memory in Malaysia and Singapore, ed. P Lim PuiH u en an d Diana Wong (Singapore: Institute of South east Asian Studies, 2000 );and Ricardo T. Jose, "War and Violence. History and Memory," in "We Asians":

Between Past and Future, t:^{\. Kwok Kian-Woon, Indira Arumugam, Karen Chia,and Lee Chee Keng (Singapore: National Heritage Society, 2000).13 . Jusu fW ana ndi, ASEAN's Past and the C halleng es Ahead: Aspects of Politics andSecurity," m Reinventing ASEAN, ed. Simon S.C. Tay Jesu s P Estanisla, and H adiSoesastro (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001), 25.14 . Yamakage Susumu, 'A Changing ASFAN and the Implications for Japan," inGaiko Forum 4, no. 1 (spring 200 4): 37.15 . Zhang, Pacific Asia, 138-43. This began in 1992 w he n th e six original m em berstates set up the Asean Free Trade Area (AFTA), an d gained further m om en tu mfollowing the 1997 Asian financial crisis through the so-called "Asean 4-3" for-mula, which brought the Asean mem ber states (now num berin g ten) to gether

with China, Jap an, and South Korea. See also Higgott, T h e Political Econom yof Globalisation," 104.


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17 . Zhang,, Pacific Asia, 144.18. Alexan der W ood side, "T he Asia-Pacific Id ea as a Mobilization Myth," in D irlik,What Is in a Rim.^ 20.19 . The Asean way, among oth er things, "(I) emph asizes the norm of non-interfer-ence in other states' affairs; (2) prefers consensus and non-binding plans totreaties and legalistic rules; and (3) relies on national in stitutions and action s,rath er tha n creating a strong ce ntral bureaucracy." See Simon S.C. Tay and Je-sus Estanislao, "T he R elevance of ASEAN: Crisis an d Ch ang e," inTay et al., eds . ,Reinventing ASEAN, 9-20. Ibid., 20.21. An ders Unlin, Globalization, Demo cratization and Civil Society in So utheastAsia: Ohservations from Malaysia and Thailand," in Globalization and Democ-ratization in Asia: The Construction of Identity, ed. Caterina Kinnvall andKristina Jonsson (New York: Routledge, 2002), 162.22. Shamsul A.B., "Glohalization and Democratic Developments in SoutheastAsia," in ihid., 198-99.23. Unlin, "Globalization," 149.24. Nicola Piper and Anders Uhlin, "New Perspectives on Transnational Activism,"in Transna tional Activism in Asia, ed. Nicola Piper and Anders Uhlin (NewYork: Routledge, 2004), 7-8.25 . Jea n G rugel, "State Power and Transnationa l Activism," in ibid., 33-39.26 . Kim, "East Asia and Glohalization," 25.27. Benedict Anderson, Imag ined Com mun ities: Reflections on the Origin andSpread of Nationalism (Lon don: Verso, 198 3, 1991 ). See also: E.J. Hohsbavmi,Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Program me, M yth, Reality (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1990): Anthony Smith, National Identity (Reno:University of Nevada Press, 1991).28. Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press1983), 57.29 . Ibid., 34.30 . Ibid., 119.31 Ka-ho Mok and Anthony Welch. "Globalization, Structural Adjustment and Ed-ucation Reform," in Globalization and Educationa l Restructuring in the AsiaPacific Region, ed. Ka-ho Mok and An thony Welch (N ew York: Palgrave Macmil-lan, 2003). 7-8.32. Zhang. Pacific Asia, 146-47; C.J.W-L. Wee, "From Universal to Local Culture:The State, Ethnic Identity, and Capitalism in Singapore," in Local Cultures and

the "N ew Asia": The State, Culture, and Cap italism in Southeast Asia, ed.C.J.W-L. Wee (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002), 138-42;Chua Beng Huat, "Living with Capitalism in Asia, Uncomfortably," in "W eAsians": Between Past and Future, 141-45; David Birch, Tony Schirato, andSanjay Srivastave, Asia: Cultural Po litics in the Global Age (Crows Nest, Austra-lia: Allen and Unw in, 200 1), 14-24.33. Birch, Schirato, and Srivastava believe there were racist overtones in thisab rup t d enu ncia tion of Asian values, wh ich they attribu te to Western critics fol-lowing the 1997 Asian fmancial crisis. See Birch, Schirato, and Srivast, Asia:Cultural Politics in the Global Age, viii.34 . Chua, "Living with Capitalism," 146.35. Ivan P Hall, Cartels of the Mind: Japan s Intellectual Closed Shop (New York:WW Norton, 1998).


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38 . Mark Lincicome, "Nationalism, Interna tionalization, and the D ilemma of Edu-cational Reform in Japan," Comparative Education Review 37. no. 2 (May1993): 123-27.39. Lynne Parmenter, "Internationalization in Japane se Education: Current Issuesand Future Prospects," in Glob alization and Educa tion: Integration andContestation across Cultures, ed. Nelly P Stromquist and Karen Monkman(New York: Row man and Littlefield, 200 0), 251 .40. Robert W Aspinall, Teachers' Un ions and the Politics of Educa tion in Japan(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001), 124-27.41. See the following exam ples: "Kokusa i rikai kyoiku" mo ndai ka iketsu shirizu4: Gakushu o meguru mondai ni do kotaeru ka, ed. Maki Masami, ltdKazuhiko, and Takeda Shinichi (Tokyo: Toyokan Shuppansha, 1997; ' 'Sogotekina gakushu" nojissen: Kokusai rikai kyoiku no kangaeka ta, susum ekata, ed.Saito Gunhei (Tokyo: Kyoiku Kaihatsu Kenkyujo, 1997); Tada Takashi, Gakkoni okeru kokusai rikai kyoiku: G urobaru maind o o sodateru (Tokyo: Toyo-kan Shuppansha, 1997); Chiiki ni nezashita kokusai rikai kyoiku jissen jirei

shu, ed. Zenkoku kaigai shijo kyoiku, kokusai rikai kyoiku kenkyu kyogikai (To-kyo: Daiichi Hoki Shuppan Kabushiki Gaisha, 1993); Ningen o kangaeruatarashii shakaika nojugyo 5; "Kokusa ika, johoka shakai d e no ikikata" omanabu, ed. Oyamada Jo, Watabe Yaeko, Kobayashi Kenji, and KomatsuzawaMasato (Tokyo: Toyokan Shuppansha, 1994); Shin gakko kyoiku zenshu 6:Kokusaika to gakko kyoiku, ed. Okuda Shinjo and Nagaoka Jun (Tokyo:Gyosei, 1995).42. Lincicome, "Nationalism," 127.43 . Japanese Government Policies in Education, Science and Culture: New Direc-tions in Schoo l Educa tion: Fostering Strength for Life (Ministry of Education,1994), 20.44. Ibid., 40.45. URL: http:/Avww.janic.org/en/en-index.html.46. Gavan McCormack, The Em ptiness of Japan ese Affluence (Armonk, NY: ME.Sharpe, 1996), 177.47. Dirlik, "Introducing the Pacific," 7-8.48 . Paul Keating, Enga gem ent: Australia Faces the Asia-Pacific (Sydney: Mac-miUan, 2000), 19.49. David Walker. Anxious Nation: Au stralia and the Rise of Asia 1 850-19 39(Qu eensla nd: University of Qu eensla nd Press, 1 999), 4.50. Brian Galligan, Winsome Roberts, and Gahriella Tdfiletti, Australians and

Globalisation: The Experience of Two Centuries (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-versity Press, 2001), 2.51. URL: http:/AvhitIani.alp.org.au/bio.html.52 . Peter Chalk, Australian Foreign and Defense Policy in the Wa ke of the1999/2000 East Timor Intervention (Santa Monica, Calif: Rand Corporation,2001), 10-15; David M artin Jones , "Regional Illusion and Its Aftermath, " in Pol-icy (New South Wales: Centre for Independent Studies, spring 2003).53. At least on e critic accuses Keating and the Labor Party of purs uin g precisely theopposite goal. Hage charges that their pro-Asia discourse and their ideology ofmulticulturalism "should be seen primarily as a NX'hite nationalist strategy di-recte d tow ards Asia," the aim of which is to allow th e Australian n atio n to "as-

sume a non-Eurocentric posture and identity, and to imagine itself as anind ep end en t internation ai subject in Asia rather than in Euro pe." See Ghassan


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55. "To pTen Lan guag es Year 12 1991-2000 (Candidates for Year 12 TertiaryEntrance Subjects)," compiled by Outcomes and National Reporting Section,Budget and Coordination Branch, Schools Division. In 2000, Japanese was themost commonly taught foreign language, Chinese was third, and Indonesianfifth.56. Interview with Kathe Kirby, dep uty directo r and directo r of education , A sialink,29 April 2002. Two ofthe organization's wehsites can be found at: (1) www.asialink.unimelb.edu.au; and (2) www.curriculum.edu.au/accessasia.57. Asia Education Foundation, Studies of Asia: A Statement for AustralianSchools, 2d ed. (Melbourne: Curriculum Corporation, 2000), 6.58. It is im po na nt to remem ber that each of these race-based group s was also inter-nally divided along ethnic and cultural lines.59. Molly N.N. Lee, Educational Change in Malaysia, Monograph Series No. 3(Penang, Malaysia: School of Educational Studies, Universiti Sains Malaysia,2002), 5-6.60. Ibid., 8.61. Interview w ith M olly N.N. Lee, 25 F ebruary 2002.62. Interview with five officials ofth e Cu rriculum Dev elopm ent Co mm ittee, Malay-sian Ministry of Education, 27 February 2002.63. "Malaysia Country Report: Moral Education Program The Malaysian Experi-en ce, " pa pe r pr ese nte d by officials oft he Malaysian Ministry of Education at th eRegional Seminar on Values Education in Asean, Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia),11-14 July 1994, 20-21.64. Meredith L. Weiss, "Transna tional Activism hy Malaysians," in Piper an d Uhlin,li-ansnational Activism in Asia, 130-131, 142.65 . Meredith L. Weiss, "Contesting Race and Nation: M alay Do m inanc e an d M ulti-racial Coalitions in Malaysia," in Starrs, Nations under Siege, 225-27.66. T. Rajamoorthy, "Globalization and Citizenship in Malaysia,' in Globalizationand Citizenship in the Asia-Pacific, ed. Alastair Davidson and Kathleen Week-ley (New York: St. M artin's Press, 1999), 91-94. The a uth or cites three reaso nsfor this skepticism: (1) the ideal of globalization p res up po ses a genuine cosmo-politanism, which is still lacking in this case; (2) globalization has displayed aworldwide tendency to accentuate existing fault lines within society; (3) it isdouhtftil that high economic growth rates supporting the middle class can hesustain ed, w hich might precip itate a political reaction to curren t liberalizationpolicies.67 . Kwok Kian-Woon, "Singapore 2000: A Review," in Singapore 2001 (Singapore:

Ministry of Inform ation and the Arts, 2001), 13.68 . Wang Su Chen, "Which English for Our Schools? Some Thoughts," in Chal-lenges Facing the Singapore E ducation System Today, ed. Jason Tan, S.Gopinathan, and Ho Wah Kam (Singapore: Prentice Hall, 2001), 257.69. Saravanan Gopinathan, "Globalization, the State and Education in Singapore,"in ibid, 11-12.70. Ihid., 7.71. During the 1980s and 1990s, the government attempted to address growingdisparities in educational attainment hetween the majority Chinese and theMalay and Indian minorities by providing support to various ethnically basedgro up s. S ome critics have charge d, h owever, that the se affirmative action poli-

cies are incompatible with the government's espoused multiracial ideals. SeeJason Tan, "Reflections on Singapore's Education Policies in an Age of Global-


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7 3 . Wee, "From Universal to Local Culture," 148.74. Singapore 2001, 221.75 . Curriculum Planning and Dev elopme nt Division, Ministry of Education, Singa-pore , Civics and Moral Education, Pupil's Book 2B Normal (Singapore: SNPEducation, 2000), 47.7 6. Arif Dirlik, "Globalism and the Politics of Place," in Olds et al., Globalisationand the Asia-Pacific: Contested Territories.11. Ibid., 52; Chua, "Living with Capitalism," 151.78. Koichi Iwahuchi, Recentering Globa lization: Popular Culture and JapaneseTransnationalism (Durham , N.C., and London: Duke University Press, 2002),13-14.7 9 . Zhang, Pacific Asia, 147; Chua, "Living with Capitalism," 145-48.


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