MCWP 3-24

Assault Support

U.S. Marine Corps

PCN 143 000070 00

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVYHeadquarters United States Marine Corps

Washington, D.C. 20380-1775

2 August 1999

FOREWORD

Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-24, Assault Support, pro-vides a framework for the development and employment of assault support as-sets in peace, crisis, or war. While this publication covers all aspects of assaultsupport, it focuses on the employment of vertical lift support for Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) operations. The doctrine applies across the fullrange of military operations—from humanitarian assistance to general war.

Assault support doctrine is based on a common understanding of the nature ofwar and on our warfighting philosophy as described in Marine Corps DoctrinalPublication (MCDP) 1, Warfighting. This doctrine provides for fast, flexible,and decisive action in a complex environment characterized by friction, uncer-tainty, fluidity, and rapid change. It also recognizes that equipment is but ameans to an end and thus is independent of any particular technology.

This publication is for commanders and their staffs as a guide to plan assaultsupport missions. It forms the basis for specific tactics, techniques, and proce-dures found in subordinate Marine Corps doctrinal publications, assault supportaircraft Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization(NATOPS) manuals, and tactical manuals within the naval warfare publication(NWP) 3-22.5 series.

This publication supersedes Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 5-30, AssaultSupport, dated 24 June 1994.

Reviewed and approved this date.

BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

J. E. RHODES Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps Commanding General Marine Corps Combat Development Command

DISTRIBUTION: 143 00070 000

Assault Support

Table of Contents

PageChapter 1. Historical Perspective

The Beginnings 1-1The Advent of Helicopters 1-1The Helicopterborne Operations Concept 1-2The Korean War 1-2Post-Korea 1-3The Vietnam War 1-3Post-Vietnam 1-3The Gulf War 1-41991 to Present 1-4

Chapter 2. Role in the Marine Air-Ground Task Force

Types of Operations 2-2The Levels of War 2-3Command Relationships 2-4Capabilities 2-4Limitations 2-6

Chapter 3. Planning

The Marine Corps Planning Process 3-1The MAGTF Air Tasking Cycle 3-2Effective Employment 3-3Mission Classification 3-4Support Requirements 3-5

Chapter 4. Operations

Offensive Operations 4-1Defensive Operations 4-2Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) Operations 4-3

Chapter 5. Command and Control in Amphibious Operations

Navy Tactical Air Control System 5-1Marine Air Command and Control System 5-2

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Chapter 6. Emerging Concepts and Capabilities

Operational Maneuver From The Sea 6-1The MV-22 Osprey 6-1The AH-1Z 6-1The UH-1Y 6-2The KC-130J 6-2Joint Strike Fighter 6-2Common Aviation Command and Control System 6-3

Appendices

A Aircraft Capabilities Guide A-1B Assault Support Request B-1C Glossary C-1D References and Related Publications D-1

Chapter 1

Historical Perspective

The Beginnings

The earliest use of Marine aircraft logistics sup-port is traceable to the 1920’s “Banana Wars.” In1928, First Lieutenant Christian F. Schilt evacuat-ed wounded Marines by air from Quilali, Nicara-gua. His feat introduced medical evacuation andearned him the Medal of Honor. By the 1930’s,Marine aircraft was used to move high prioritycargo and personnel. During World War II, asoperations in the Pacific theater were expanding,the importance of rapid transport became appar-ent. Intratheater air movement of personnel,equipment, and cargo became commonplace.During one critical phase on Guadalcanal whenaviation gasoline was scarce, air operations weremaintained by air resupply alone for several days.Marine air transport flew personnel and criticalmaterials from the United States to Fleet MarineForce units throughout the Pacific Ocean. Marinetransport aircraft had proven themselves as logis-tic support vehicles, but their use as tactical trans-port vehicles had not yet been fully explored.

The Advent of Helicopters

In the early 1930’s the Marine Corps evaluatedthe Pitcairn OP-1 autogyro. Field tested in Nicara-gua during 1932, the four-bladed, stubby-wingedaircraft was found suitable for liaison purposesand medical evacuation of the wounded. Consid-ered unsafe when carrying loads in excess of 200pounds, the OP-1 soon disappeared from activeMarine Corps inventory. In 1935, the MarineCorps tested the Kellett OP-2, a wingless autogy-ro similar to the OP-1, and found its small pay-load to be equally unsatisfactory.

Although the autogyro contributed significantlyto rotary-wing development, it was not until 1939that Igor I. Sikorsky, a Russian-born aircraft

designer, successfully test-flew the first practicalhelicopter in the western hemisphere. WhileSikorsky was the first designer to build a practicalhelicopter, other designers soon followed. In1942, the Bell Helicopter Corporation appeared.An established fixed-wing aircraft builder, Bellexperimented with helicopter technology. In1943, Frank N. Piasecki, a Pennsylvania engineer,founded the P-V Engineering Forum (Piaseckilater became Boeing Vertol). These three manu-facturers, Sikorsky, Piasecki (Boeing), and Belldirectly influenced the early development ofMarine Corps helicopter design and procurement.Today, these companies continue to dominate thedevelopment of Navy and Marine Corps helicop-ter programs.

In 1946 after the Bikini Atoll nuclear tests in thePacific Ocean, Lieutenant General Roy S. Geigerreported that future landing forces would have tomove with a greater degree of surprise and speedthan had been visualized. During these atomictests, an entire fleet of U.S., Japanese, and Ger-man warships was destroyed. LtGen Geiger real-ized that the atomic bomb’s mass destructivecapability and the vulnerability of a concentratedamphibious task force made dispersion a necessi-ty. To sufficiently disperse the fleet and the land-ing force but still mass combat forces at thedesired place and time, a new mode of assaulttransportation was needed.

The goal was to gain relative close contact withthe enemy to lessen the likelihood of a nuclearattack. The theory behind this concept suggestedthat the enemy is less liable to risk their own forc-es in order to destroy their adversary. The prob-lem was how to devise a means of rapid troopconcentration from greatly increased dispersaldistances that coincided with fleet cruising dispo-sitions in the atomic age. After reading LtGenGeiger’s report, Gen Vandergrift, Commandant ofthe Marine Corps (CMC), established a Special

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Board to address the issue. Within the SpecialBoard, a three member Quantico-based commit-tee considered a variety of means to achieve arapid buildup of assault forces including transportaircraft, gliders, parachutists, troop and cargo-car-rying submarines, and also large assault transportseaplanes—a sort of “flying landing ship tank.”

The committee also considered helicopters which,appearing to be superior in characteristics to allother assault vehicles, overcame the effects of dis-persion while reducing exposure of the amphibi-ous task force. The committee knew that thehelicopter’s low speed and perceived vulnerabili-ty was disappointing and that no helicopter withthe capabilities they required yet existed. Howev-er, the relative primitive state of helicopter tech-nology did not deter their enthusiasm.

On 16 December 1946, the Special Board submit-ted an advanced report to CMC recommendingparallel programs to develop a transport seaplaneand a transport helicopter. An experimentalMarine helicopter squadron was also recommend-ed to develop tactics, techniques, and procedures(TTP). Finally, the report recommended that theMarine Corps Schools at Quantico draft a tenta-tive doctrine for helicopter employment.

The Helicopterborne Operations Concept

On 19 December 1946, CMC endorsed the firstknown service document to propose helicopteruse as a tactical vehicle for the transport of com-bat troops from a naval vessel to a landing areaashore.

Carrier-based transport helicopters offered all theadvantages of the conventional airborne operationbut few of the disadvantages. They could be oper-ated from aircraft carriers, with cover and prepa-ratory fires on landing areas provided by aircraftfrom the same ships. With a relatively unlimitedchoice of landing areas, troops could land in com-bat formations and under full control of the flanksor rear of a hostile position. It should be noted

also that transport helicopters offer a means forrapid evacuation of casualties, movement of sup-plies directly from ship to dump, and for subse-quent movement of troops and supplies incontinuing operations ashore. Subsequently,Marine Helicopter Squadron 1 (HMX-1), com-missioned on 1 December 1947, marked the offi-cial beginning of Marine Corps rotary-wingaviation.

The Korean War

The North Koreans invaded South Korea beforedawn on 25 June 1950. On 21 July 1950, GenWallace sent a memorandum to the chief of navaloperation’s (CNO’s) Air Readiness Division re-questing that necessary steps be taken to immedi-ately procure 40 (interim) transport helicopters,preferably of the Sikorsky HO4S-1 type. TheCNO instructed the Bureau of Aeronautics to pro-cure two 15 plane squadrons in 6 months fromcontractor notification. The HO4S-1, renamed theHRS-1, would make history in Korea during1951.

The First Provisional Brigade was formed on 7July 1950, at Camp Pendleton, California. The or-ganization was composed of a reinforced infantryregiment and Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) 33.The air component contained three fighter squad-rons and one observation squadron. Marine Ob-servation Squadron Six, or VMO-6, was equippedwith four helicopters and was the first unit to em-ploy helicopters in combat.

The VMO-6 squadron mission had been officiallydescribed in 1949 as the conduct of “tactical airreconnaissance, artillery spotting, and other flightoperations within the capabilities of assigned air-craft in support of ground units.” In the earlymonths of the Korean war, VMO-6 achieved itspotential to the fullest.

During the counterattack to regain the initiative inearly August 1950, VMO-6 would conduct heli-copter missions in command and control, waterresupply, the first Marine medical evacuations

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(MEDEVAC), artillery spotting, the first Marinerescue of a downed pilot, combat wire laying, andthe first night MEDEVAC by helicopter.

In addition, the first Marine transport helicoptersquadron, Marine Transport Helicopter Squadron161 (HMR-161) was formed at El Toro, Califor-nia on 15 January 1951 and was equipped withthe Sikorsky HRS-1. Deploying to Korea in Au-gust 1951, HMR-161 became involved in combatoperations. It conducted numerous medical evac-uations; external lifts of multiple rocket launch-ers, 75mm pack howitzers, and ammunition;troop lifts; and resupply missions.

Tactics employed during the Korean war hadbeen previously developed and validated byHMX-1 in Quantico. The successful combatrecord of HMR-161 and the rapid movement oftroops and supplies by helicopter were positiveproof that the helicopter was transportation withtremendous potential. A new term had beencoined to describe the rapid movement of troopsby helicopter: vertical envelopment. The maneu-ver emphasized the ability to overcome obstaclesand attack the enemy’s vulnerable flank. In spiteof its flaws, the helicopter proved itself a valuabletactical innovation during the Korean war.

Post-Korea

In the years between the Korean war and the Viet-nam war, the Marine Corps continued to refine as-sault support TTP. CMC wanted to transport adivision and a half of Marines during amphibiousoperations via helicopters. Planners wrestled withthe problem of coming up with the right type ofhelicopters and number of squadrons to realizethat vision.

Along with helicopter development, the MarineCorps pushed for development of amphibiousshipping designed for helicopter operations. Forcereductions caused some shifting of priorities in1958 and 1959, but assault support cemented it-self in the way the Marine Corps would fight bat-tles and win wars.

In the early 1960’s, the Marine Corps received theKC-130 aerial refueling and transport aircraft,adding another dimension to Marine assault sup-port aviation. In 1962, use of the KC-130s as air-borne refuelers allowed an F-8 fighter squadron tocross the Pacific Ocean nonstop.

The Vietnam War

The Vietnam war is sometimes referred to as the“helicopter war.” The first helicopter unitdeployed to Southeast Asia was HMM-362, fly-ing the UH-34D, to the airfield at Soc Trang onthe Mekong Delta in April 1962. Helicopter userapidly expanded. The UH-34 was replaced by theCH-46 and the CH-53 in I Corps. This vastincrease in available lift was soon exploited. By1970, Marine helicopter squadrons were lifting70,000 passengers and 6,000 tons of cargo eachmonth.

At the end of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam,Operation Frequent Wind was executed to evacu-ate U.S. citizens out of the country in the face ofcommunist forces. Evacuation of Saigon wascompleted using helicopters to move personneland equipment from the city to amphibious ship-ping off the coast.

Post-Vietnam

In the years since the Vietnam war, changes in as-sault support doctrine have been instituted and re-fined. Threat systems like the SA-7 Grail andother infrared guided surface-to-air missiles(SAMs) forced changes in doctrine. Greater em-phasis was placed on night operations using nightvision devices (NVDs), and more precise naviga-tion systems were developed for flight duringnight and adverse weather.

Operations were not limited to developing newTTP’s however. On 24 October 1983, the islandnation of Grenada in the Caribbean was in thethroes of a coup. In an effort to safeguard Ameri-can lives, the United States executed Operation

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Urgent Fury. From 24 October to 28 October the22nd Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) conductedhelicopterborne assaults, flew resupply missions,and safely evacuated over 200 U.S. citizens tosuccessfully complete the operation.

Extensive peacekeeping operations in Beirut,Lebanon, and an unsuccessful coup attempt byPresident Corizon Aquino’s opponents are exam-ples of where assault support operations wereconducted. Numerous missions were flown to re-inforce the embassy in Manila and to bolster secu-rity at key communications sites on Luzon.

The Gulf War

Assault support was employed extensively duringDesert Shield in August 1990 and Desert Storm inJanuary 1991. The long buildup before the war al-lowed squadrons to become familiar with thedesert environment and practice with new equip-ment such as the global positioning system (GPS).

1991 To Present

After the Gulf war in February 1991, assault sup-port operations focused on humanitarian assis-tance (HA) operations, disaster relief, andnoncombatant evacuations (NEOs) from war tornareas of the world. Operation Sea Angel in Bang-ladesh in 1991, Operation Restore Hope in Soma-lia in late 1992, Operation Uphold Democracy inHaiti in 1994, the tactical recovery of aircraft andpersonnel (TRAP) mission in Bosnia to rescueU.S. Air Force Captain Scott O’Grady in 1995,and the 1997 NEO in Albania are missions whereassault support doctrine was applied. Though notall of these operations were combat operations,many of the same procedures can be applied dur-ing the conduct of HA operations and NEOs.

Since the earliest assault support operations in the1920’s, doctrine has changed very little. Newequipment allows for increased capabilities, butthe fundamental aspects of assault support remainthe same. As one of the six functions of Marineaviation, assault support provides Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) commanders withincreased flexibility to conduct operations whenand where they choose.

Chapter 2

Role in the Marine Air-Ground Task Force

Marine aviation is renowned for its close relation-ship with the ground combat element (GCE).When in support of a MAGTF scheme of maneu-ver, Marine aviation has the ability to provide sig-nificant firepower and mobility. This helps theMAGTF commander to maneuver within the bat-tlespace to engage and destroy the enemy.

The aviation combat element (ACE) providescombat power and operational capability to theMAGTF. Individual aircraft combined and taskorganized into an ACE, provides a highly capa-ble, responsive, force multiplier to the MAGTFcommander. The ACE’s unique capabilities com-plements other MAGTF elements. The ACE isnot a substitute for any MAGTF element. TheACE contributes to mission accomplishment byproviding all or a portion of the six functions ofMarine aviation to the MAGTF commander.

The functions of Marine aviation should not beconfused with capabilities of USMC aircraft. Thesix functions of Marine aviation—antiair warfare,offensive air support, electronic warfare, air re-connaissance, control of aircraft and missiles, andassault support—are broad descriptions of mis-sions that may be performed by the ACE. Moreinformation on the six functions of Marine avia-tion can be found in MCWP 3-2, Aviation Opera-tions (under development).

Capabilities are what the aircraft are able to do. AUH-1N can conduct assault support by providingcombat assault transport of personnel, or controlaircraft and missiles using organic radios or theAN/ASC-26 communications suite installed inthe cabin. An AH-1W can conduct offensive airsupport (OAS) by firing an AGM-114 Hellfiremissile at an enemy armored vehicle, and it canprovide aerial reconnaissance using the night tar-geting system. The ACE provides multiple mis-

sion capability to the MAGTF through air crewtraining and skillful use of its aircraft.

Assault support uses aircraft to provide tacticalmobility and logistical support for the MAGTF. Itmay be used to enhance the rapid buildup ofMAGTF combat power and to facilitate rapidground force maneuver. Assault support’s usesare normally tactical, logistical, or administrativein nature. Assault support enhances the MAGTFcommander’s ability to concentrate strengthagainst the enemy’s selected weaknesses usingspeed and surprise. The MAGTF commander usesassault support to focus combat power at the deci-sive place and time and exploit opportunities cre-ated during combat. Assault support allows theMAGTF commander to sustain combat power. Byconducting assault support operations, the com-mander can take full advantage of fleeting oppor-tunities throughout the battlespace.

Speed and focus of effort are essential elements ofmaneuver, both of which the MAGTF command-er can apply using assault support. Assault sup-port provides the MAGTF commander with thecapability to move assets over long distancesquickly. The MAGTF can rapidly bring togetherassault support assets from multiple locations inorder to mass forces in a single focus of effort.This ability to rapidly concentrate forces is a hall-mark of naval expeditionary power projection.

Mobility and flexibility, gained by extensively us-ing assault support aircraft in tactical operations,is an important part of Marine Aviation doctrine.Helicopters enhance the mobility and sustainabili-ty of Marine forces during operations well re-moved from their rear areas for extended periodsof time. Improved aircraft design has increasedthe combat radius and load capacity of assaultsupport aircraft, providing more flexibility andfire support to the MAGTF.

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Types of Operations

Assault support involves the use of aircraft to pro-vide tactical mobility and logistical support for theMAGTF, the movement of high-priority cargo andpersonnel within the immediate area of operations,inflight refueling, and the evacuation of personneland cargo. Assault support operations require de-tailed, coordinated, and concurrent planning. Effi-cient execution of assault support operationsrequires thorough knowledge of mission, enemy,terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available (METT-T).

Combat Assault Transport

Combat assault transport provides mobility forMAGTF forces. It is used to rapidly deploy forc-es, bypass obstacles, or redeploy forces to meetthe enemy threat. The increase in mobility, speed,range, and freedom of action provides theMAGTF commander a variety of diverse options.Combat assault transport allows the MAGTFcommander to effect a rapid force buildup at aspecific time and location of his choosing. In thenear future, advanced aircraft designs (MV-22)may further expand these advantages to theMAGTF commander.

Air Delivery

Air delivery operations transport equipment andsupplies to forward operating bases (FOBs) or re-mote areas. Airdrops (parachute or free fall) de-liver equipment and supplies. Airdrops are doneprimarily by fixed-wing transport aircraft. Air-drops are conducted when surface or helicoptertransport cannot fulfill resupply requirements dueto range, closed lines of communications (LOC),lack of adequate airfields, prohibitive ground tac-tical situation, high tonnage, or the need to reduceresponse time. The supported commander selectsthe drop zone (DZ) using the following criteria:

l The drop zone should be free of obstacles.

l Aircraft approach routes are not over enemy-controlled territory.

l The terrain should be flat.

l The DZ should be a rectangular area with pre-vailing wind along the zone’s long axis.

l The terrain should have prominent features.

The best DZ is close to an area with ample coverand concealment. This allows materiel recovery,segregation, inventory, and preparation for distri-bution without exposing personnel to enemy ob-servation or fire.

Aerial Refueling

Currently, Marine KC-130 aircraft serve as air-borne tankers for rotary- and fixed-wing aircraftwith the probe and drogue system. Aerial refuel-ing allows Marine aircraft to conduct flight-ferry-ing operations, extend time on station, and extendmission range.

Air Evacuation

Air evacuation is the transportation of personneland equipment from FOBs or remote areas. Thisincludes flights from areas of operations to securerear areas, MEDEVAC, and extraction of forces.Helicopters and fixed-wing transport aircraft per-form air evacuations.

Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel

TRAP missions facilitate the recovery of person-nel and equipment while avoiding additional loss.The TRAP mission is an implied task associatedwith all MAGTF operations. Specially trained andbriefed aircrews, with a task organized force fromthe GCE are assigned to perform TRAP missions.TRAP missions are conducted when the tacticalsituation prevents the utilization of traditionalsearch and rescue techniques and only when sur-vivors and their locations are confirmed. TRAPmissions stress—

l Detailed planning.l Assigned and briefed aircrews. l Confirmation of survivors and their locations.

By using the TRAP concept, the Marine Corpsfulfills the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) requirement

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for each Service to be able to perform combatsearch and rescue (CSAR). Using TRAP tech-niques, Marine forces are able to perform self-supporting SAR operations and some externalSAR support. SAR is a secondary task, and its ex-ecution should not detract from primary warfight-ing functions. Marine forces currently lack theorganic capability to effectively conduct searcheswhen the survivor’s location is unknown, particu-larly in a medium or high threat environment.

Air Logistical Support

Fixed-wing aircraft perform air logistical supportby providing assault support of Marine groundforces in much the same manner as helicopters.Air logistical support delivers troops, equipment,and supplies to areas beyond helicopter range andlift capability or when surface transportation isslow or unavailable. The Marine Corps’ limitedquantities of transport aircraft restricts their use inamphibious assaults, operations ashore, or contin-gency plans. If large-scale, long-range air opera-tions exceed MAGTF capabilities, additionalsupport should be requested from the joint forcecommander (JFC).

Battlefield Illumination

Fixed-wing or rotary-wing aircraft can be used toprovide light (battlefield illumination) in the bat-tlespace. Battlefield illumination can be visible orinvisible (infrared spectrum) to the naked eye andcan last for a few minutes or several hours.

The Levels of War

The seven types of assault support offer the com-mander a wide range of options with which he canuse to develop operation plans. Assault supportemployment strategy depends on the MAGTF’smission and the enemy’s capabilities. TheMAGTF commander considers assault supportemployment methods during the planning phaseand throughout the operation's execution. Assaultsupport operations vary in intensity throughoutthe operation and may be employed in pursuit oftactical, operational, or strategic objectives.

MCDP 1, Warfighting, states that “in war, tacticsfocuses on the application of combat power to de-feat an enemy force in combat at a particular timeand place.” This explains assault support’s mostcommon use in the levels of war. During assaultsupport operations at the tactical level, aviationmay be employed with ground or naval forcesto—

l Provide mobility to the MAGTF.l Exploit opportunities presented by the enemy

or created by friendly forces.l Rapidly concentrate combat power at the most

advantageous time and place.l Help maintain the tempo of operations and the

momentum of the attack.

The operational level of war is the link betweenstrategic and tactical levels. The goal of a force’sactions at the operational level of war is to gainstrategic results from tactical efforts. TheMAGTF may be the first force to be committed toa theater of operations. The MAGTF command-er’s actions at the tactical level will have strategicimplications as they will shape future operationsin that theater. The commander must decidewhen, where, and how to engage the enemy at aparticular place and time in order to achieve astrategic result. Assault support operations allowthe commander to maintain an advantage in speedand surprise over the enemy. In this way the com-mander can drive the fight in the desired direc-tion. The commander can shape events usingassault support to create favorable conditions forfuture combat operations. This could mean air lo-gistical support to sustain tactical operations overan extended period of time or combat assaulttransport to attack the enemy’s vulnerable flankor rear area. All tactical actions must seek to gainstrategic results.

The strategic level of war is where national strate-gy—the art and science of using political, eco-nomic, military, and informational power—isfocused to attain national policy objectives. As-sault support operations fit within the frameworkof strong military capabilities that can enable thenation to meet its objectives. However, operationsbased on assault support capabilities such asNEOs are directly linked to the national policy of

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safeguarding the lives of American and allied citi-zens. Therefore, assault support operations canhave direct strategic implications.

Command Relationships

The relationship between the MAGTF command-er and the ACE commander typifies MarineCorps command relationships. The MAGTF com-mander provides the ACE commander with themission and the commander’s intent. The ACEcommander determines the most effective methodof employment of ACE assets to accomplish themission and meet the commander’s aim.

A helicopterborne assault is one of the most com-mon assault support operations. Refer to MCWP3-11.4, Tactical Fundamentals of Helicopter-borne Operations (under development) for morespecific information on helicopterborne as-saults. A look at the helicopterborne force willreveal the importance of command relationships.

Helicopterborne assaults require task-organizingboth ground and aviation assets to accomplish theMAGTF scheme of maneuver. The MAGTF com-mander decides to execute the operation. TheACE, GCE, and combat service support element(CSSE) commanders plan the mission together.The ACE commander is responsible for providingmobility and fire support for the assault. The GCEcommander is responsible for planning theground tactical mission to include maneuver andfire support planning. The CSSE commanderplans how to support both the ground and aviationplans. The commanders accomplish this by direct-ing subordinate units to form the helicopterborneforce (see fig. 2-1).

The MAGTF commander decides command rela-tionships. The most important relationship in thehelicopterborne force is the one between the Heli-copterborne Unit Commander (HUC) and the AirMission Commander (AMC). The MAGTF com-mander decides what needs to be done and desig-nates personnel to accomplish it. The MAGTF

commander is the common superior and willmake the final decision if any contentious issuesarise.

Unity of command is the most important and fun-damental consideration during these operations.In a combined arms effort, unity of command pro-motes coordinated action toward a common goalrequired for mission accomplishment.

The AMC is responsible for accomplishing the airmission. He determines what assets are required,such as the number of transport, escort, and sup-port aircraft. He determines the route of flight forthe mission. It is important that he considers pri-mary and alternate routes. Changing routes canaffect the fire support plan. The authority tochange the route may be delegated to the AMC bythe MAGTF commander.

The HUC is responsible for accomplishing theground tactical plan and choosing the required as-sets. The buildup of combat power in the objec-t ive area is cri t ical early on and must beconsidered carefully.

Landing zone (LZ) selection is critical in the earlyphases. The HUC and AMC must agree on pri-mary and alternate LZs. They must be largeenough to land the helicopterborne force in tacti-cal integrity, be clear of obstacles, and most im-portantly, be covered by fire support assets. Theauthority to change LZs may be delegated to theHUC by the MAGTF commander. Also identifiedin the early planning phases is who is supportingwhom. By delegating authority and identifyingsupported/supporting relationships during missionplanning conflict resolution most likely will be re-solved before executing the mission.

Capabilities

Assault support is an integral part of the totalMAGTF effort because of its many capabilities.The MAGTF performs assault support missionsdur ing day , n igh t , and adverse wea the r

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conditions. Reliance on assault support increaseswhen movement of personnel and equipmentmust be done quickly over long distances or overprohibitive terrain. Assault support's principal ad-vantage is its capability to quickly move MAGTFforces and equipment throughout the battlespace.Assault support offers the MAGTF commander awide range of capabilities from improving friend-ly morale to bringing devastating combat powerto bear from any direction to decisive points onthe battlefield. Other capabilities of assault sup-port aircraft are varied. The following areas arenot all inclusive.

Observation

Aircrews performing assault support missions canobserve large areas and report enemy activity andmovement in areas hidden from ground observa-tion.

Flexibility

Diverting assault support aircraft from one mis-sion to another allows the MAGTF commander toexploit fleeting battlefield opportunities. The abil-ity to integrate supporting arms enhances theMAGTF’s combined arms effects. Assault sup-port operations allow the commander to attackfrom any direction, bypass obstacles or enemystrengths and provide responsive reserves or rein-force committed units. The commander can re-supply units in otherwise inaccessible locations.

Employment of aerial refueling or rapid groundrefueling (RGR) provides the means to recoveraircraft, equipment, and personnel from hostileareas. Access to fuel increases the combat radiusor time on station of aviation assets. These op-tions available to the commander have a positiveeffect on friendly morale and destroy enemy

Figure 2-1. Command Relationships of a Helicopterborne Force.

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morale. The MAGTF commander should exploitthe psychological effect that aviation has on bothfriendly and enemy forces.

Use During Limited Visibility

Darkness or limited visibility can provide aunique opportunity for employing assault supportassets. Planning and executing assault supportmissions under these conditions require more pre-cision. The ability to exploit degraded enemy vis-ual acquisition and to strike during periods ofminimum alert greatly enhances aircraft survivaland aids in mission accomplishment.

Limitations

Assault support limitations must be consideredduring planning. Specific assault support limita-tions follow.

Limited Visibility

While darkness or limited visibility can be advan-tageous, it can also present limitations to assaultsupport. Problems can occur when aircraft en-counter difficulties during rendezvous, approach-es, and landings. Troop and cargo loading andunloading are also slower and more difficult.Planners should anticipate delays and increasemission time requirements.

Rotary-wing assault support aircraft currentlyhave no radar capability. Night vision systems areavailable but cannot duplicate daylight condi-tions. Night or limited visibility operations re-quire close attention to planning specific phasesof each mission. Problems can be offset by usingsmaller formations and larger intervals betweenformations to reduce landing zone congestion.Route and LZ selection are important for naviga-tion and safe conduct of takeoffs and landings.

Using NVDs allow aircrews to conduct night op-erations more safely. However, NVD use does notguarantee tactical success. Effective NVD use re-quires a full understanding of their capabilities

and limitations as they apply to each tactical situ-ation.

Weather

Weather at the landing zone is more limiting thanweather en route or at home base. Temperatureextremes and wind velocity can seriously affecthelicopter performance. Low ceilings and poorvisibility decrease assault support effectiveness,influence escort tactics, and hamper fire supportcoordination.

Landing Zone Identification

LZ identification is one of the most difficult as-pects of assault support missions. Improvementsto navigation systems with GPS has helped con-siderably, but still LZs must be identified visuallybefore landing. Proper map study, aerial imagery,aircraft sensors or systems (forward-looking in-frared, GPS), and accurate LZ descriptions willdecrease erroneous identification of LZs. Plannersshould use initial terminal guidance teams or LZmarking whenever possible.

Reduced Radius of Action

Fuel on board determines radius of action or timeon station. Increasing an aircraft’s payload be-yond a certain point reduces the amount of fuel anaircraft can carry and reduces its time on station.Refueling at FOBs reduces this limitation but re-quires additional planning, resources, and coordi-nation.

Communications

Coordination of assault support missions with thecontrolling agencies and fire support assets re-quires reliable radio communications. Real-timeinformation is crucial and cannot be overempha-sized. Thorough communications planning canprovide secure, reliable radio transmissions andenhance alternate means of communications suchas message drop or face to face liaison.

Enemy Defenses

Enemy defenses affect the conduct of assault sup-port missions. Development of sophisticated air

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defense systems deters air support. Local air supe-riority will greatly increase the ability to success-fu l ly conduc t assau l t suppor t miss ions .Suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) maybe required both before and during assault supportoperations. Enemy surface-to-air weapons, fight-ers, and small arms fire must be considered whenevaluating risk and determining routes.

Required Escort Support

The purpose of an escort is to destroy, neutralizeor suppress a threat before it is able to influence

the assault support mission. Assault support assetsdo not posses self-defense capabilities to countera formidable threat. The use of additional assets toensure the safe arrival of MAGTF forces into theobjective area may be required. Most commonly,the assault support mission will incorporatearmed escorts to accompany the assault supportaircraft en route or clear an objective area prior toarrival of assault support assets.

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Chapter 3

Planning

Joint and combined operations require thoroughplanning to ensure success. Planning operationsthat will optimize the MAGTF’s strengths and ex-ploit the enemy’s vulnerabilities is the key to suc-cess. Simple, well-thought-out plans ensure thesuccessful completion of operations. Assault sup-port operations are conducted with other support-ing arms. Offensive air support, artillery, andnaval surface fire support (NSFS) integration re-quires extensive planning and precise executionfor effective assault support employment. SeeMCWP 3-16, Fire Support Coordination (underdevelopment), and FM 6-20-1, The Field ArtilleryCannon Battalion, for more information on indi-rect fires in support of assault support operations.

MCDP 5, Planning, states “Proper planning putsus in the position to act when necessary or advan-tageous and not merely to react to developments.”Central to an assault support operation’s successis a flexible but simple plan.

Flexibility in execution comes directly from awell-understood, integrated, and coherent plan. Abasic plan that is simple and flexible can survivechanges. Assault support missions, by their na-ture, have the potential to become very complex.Simplicity must be maintained, but plannersshould not sacrifice detailed, well-coordinatedplanning.

The Marine Corps Planning Process

The Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP) hasevolved from the 16-step deliberate planningprocess and the rapid planning process. Aviationplanning should follow a similar process or cycle.The only variable is time available to conduct theplanning. The following is a six-step, genericplanning progression that can be entered at anyechelon.

Mission Analysis

The purpose of mission analysis is to review andanalyze orders, guidance, and other informationprovided by higher headquarters and to produce aunit mission statement. Mission analysis drivesthe MCPP.

Course of Action Development

During course of action (COA) development,planners use the mission statement, commander’sintent, and commander’s planning guidance to de-velop several COAs. Each proposed COA mustbe determined suitable, acceptable, and completewith respect to the current and anticipated situa-tion, mission, and the commander’s intent. Ap-proved COAs are further developed in greaterdetail.

Course of Action Analysis

Each friendly COA is examined and evaluatedagainst possible enemy COAs. Environmentalfactors are also considered at this point in the pro-cess. Planners look at strengths, weaknesses,shortfalls, and risks presented by each COA. Po-tential branches and sequels are identified at thistime. Understanding and improving each COA isbest done at this step in the process.

Course of Action Comparison and Decision

In COA comparison and decision, the commanderevaluates all friendly COAs against establishedcri ter ia and then against each other . Thecommander then selects the COA that he feelsmost likely will accomplish the mission.

Orders Development

With the commander’s intent, guidance, and COAselection, the staff develops orders to direct theactions of the unit. Orders serve as the principal

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means by which the commander communicateshis decision, intent, and guidance.

Transition

This is the point where an orderly handover of aplan is made to those who will be executing theplan. The unit executing the plan will have the sit-uational awareness and rationale for making deci-sions required for a coherent shift from plan toaction.

The MAGTF Air Tasking Cycle

The MAGTF air tasking cycle has evolved intosix phases to mirror the joint air tasking cycle. Itis designed to occur over a 36- to 72-hour period.The cycle follows the path of command aviationguidance (which includes apportionment), target/air support mission development, allocation andallotment, tasking, force execution, and combatassessment.

Phase I: Command and Aviation Guidance

The MAGTF commander will provide guidancethrough mission orders, by clearly conveying hisintent, and by designating the MAGTF main ef-fort. The commander’s guidance and objectivesidentify target priorities, procedures, fire supportcoordination measures, and rules of engagement.Apportionment is the determination of the totallevel of effort that should be dedicated to the avia-tion tasks required to accomplish the MAGTF’smission. The ACE commander submits a recom-mendation for the apportionment of the ACE tothe MAGTF commander for approval.

Phase II: Target/Air Support Mission Development

The specific objectives described by the com-mander are used to focus specific target and airsupport mission development. The end product ofthis phase of the air tasking order (ATO) cycle isa prioritized list of targets and a prioritized list ofair support missions.

Phase III: Allocation and Allotment

Allocation is the translation of the level of effortinto total number of sorties (by aircraft type)available for each task. Allocation includes thesubmission of preplanned air support requests bythe ACE, GCE, and CSSE commanders. Pre-planned requests include joint tactical airstrike re-quests (JTARs), assault support requests (ASRs),and joint tactical airlift requests.

Allotment of sorties is then decided to support ex-ecution of the MAGTF mission. For example, 30CH-53E sorties are available for a day during theoperation. The GCE commander needs to conducta helicopterborne assault, and the CSSE com-mander needs to set up a refueling point to sup-port the GCE scheme of maneuver. Eachsubordinate element is given a percentage of the30 sorties to fulfill its requirements.

Phase IV: Tasking

Tasking is the process of translating allocationand allotment decisions into an ATO. The ACEcommander passes on the tasks to the units in-volved. The MAGTF ATO assigns missions andmission support responsibilities to specific squad-rons.

Phase V: Force Execution

On receipt of the ATO, an aircraft squadron com-mander assigns individual aircrews specific mis-sions. Each mission commander then plans themission with support from the ACE staff. Task-organized groups of aircraft then execute the as-signed missions.

Phase VI: Combat Assessment

Combat assessment is the evaluation of the resultsof missions and their effectiveness in accomplish-ing the command objectives. Combat assessmentshould include bomb damage assessment (BDA)and reattack recommendations. The ACE staff as-sessment is forwarded to the MAGTF commanderfor determination of overall mission success andto recommend changes regarding future opera-tions.

Assault Support ___________________________________________________________________________________________ 3-3

Although combat assessment marks the end of theATO cycle, it provides input for the next air task-ing cycle and subsequent command aviation guid-ance, target development, allocation, allotment,tasking, force execution, and combat assessment.In essence, there can be three simultaneousATOs: the ATO in execution, the ATO in produc-tion, and the ATO in planning.

Effective Employment

Several conditions are required for effective as-sault support employment. Assault support effec-tiveness increases when—

l Air superiority has been attained and main-tained.

l Enemy air defenses have been suppressed, neu-tralized, or destroyed.

l Missions are planned so as to use terrain andenvironmental conditions to gain maximum ad-vantage.

l Missions are planned with flexibility as part ofthe command and control plan.

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace

Due to the vulnerability of assault support assets,intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) isextremely important in assault support operations.IPB is the analysis of the environment and thethreat in a specific geographic area. It is designedto support the commander and his staff in makingestimates of the situation and developing COAs.IPB helps the commander to selectively apply andmaximize combat power at critical points in timeand space. IPB determines the threat’s likelyCOA and describes the environment in which theMAGTF is operating and how the environmentmay affect the MAGTF’s plans. More specific in-formation on applying IPB to assault support op-erations can be found in FM 34-130, IntelligencePreparation of the Battlefield.

Threat Levels

Threat levels determine assault support feasibili-ty. There are three general threat levels: low, me-dium, and high. There is no clear divisionbetween these threat levels. Air defense systemsthat present a low or medium threat level for oneaircraft type may present a high threat level foranother aircraft type. A medium threat level dur-ing daylight hours may be a low threat level atnight. Threat level determination allows an air-crew to tailor tactics to a particular situation andenvironment. Threat level planning is based ontype, quantity, and quality of individual weaponsand weapons systems. Control and communica-tions systems used to integrate weapon systemsassist threat level planning. The skill level pos-sessed by the system operator is equally importantto this process.

A low threat level allows assault support opera-tions to proceed without prohibitive interference.Aircrews are free to select tactics that ensure ef-fective use of aircraft capabilities. A low threatenvironment includes small arms and medium an-tiaircraft weapons. Limited optical acquisition an-tiaircraft artillery (AAA) with no integrated firecontrol systems also characterize a low threat en-vironment.

A medium threat level allows acceptable expo-sure time of friendly aircraft to enemy air defens-es. This threat level can restrict assault supportflexibility in the immediate target or objective ar-ea. A medium threat environment includes limitedradar or electro-optic acquisition capability notsupported by fully integrated fire control systems.A fully integrated fire control system which is de-graded because of terrain, weather, or other fac-tors indicates a medium threat environment.

A high threat level exists when the enemy has anair defense system that includes integrated firecontrol systems and electronic warfare capabili-ties. The ability to conduct assault support opera-tions is severely affected in a high threatenvironment. A high threat environment includeseffective communications and control systems,tactical or strategic surface-to-air missiles (SAM),early warning radars, electronic warfare (EW),

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integrated AAA fire control systems, and inter-ceptor aircraft.

The decision by the MAGTF commander to em-ploy assault support assets must be carefullyweighed against the risk involved. Assault sup-port aircraft are a finite resource, subject to multi-ple requirements from subordinate elementcommanders with tactical and logistical needs.

An estimate of the situation based on METT-T isa useful tool in determining those planning con-siderations that will affect assault support missionplanning. The analysis of METT-T is crucial alsoto determining the commander’s estimate. TheMAGTF commander’s analysis using the missionand the GCE commander’s estimate of the tacticalsituation determine in large part the ACE com-mander’s strategy to support the mission. TheACE commander’s estimate of supportabilitysummarizes aspects that influence any proposedCOA. Planners must analyze the impact of avia-tion factors upon the particular situations and thendetermine how assault support assets can be bestemployed in support of the MAGTF command-er’s concept of operations and the ground schemeof maneuver.

More specific considerations for employment ofassault support during the planning process fol-low. In addition, more detailed information onmission planning can be found in FMFM 5-70,MAGTF Aviation Planning.

Availability

The quantity, type, operational status, and capa-bility of aircraft assigned determine assault sup-port availability. The proximity of FOBs to thearea of operations also affects availability.

Aircraft Capability

Although specific aircraft are best suited to per-form certain missions, each squadron’s tasksrequire similar capabilities across the board. Ver-satile, multiple mission capable aircraft are essen-tial in MAGTF operations and are the foundationof Marine Corps aviation doctrine. The CH-53E(primarily an assault helicopter) can perform air-

borne control and coordination for assault supportoperations, while a UH-1N (primarily a utilityhelicopter) can provide combat assault transportof troops, supplies, and equipment. The versatilityof assault support aircraft gives the MAGTF com-mander many options when considering missionexecution.

Aircrew Currency/Proficiency

Aircrew training and experience levels are impor-tant considerations that mission planners oftenoverlook. Aircrews must be properly trained forthe mission to be performed. MCO P3500.17,Training and Readiness Manual Volume 3, (Vol-ume 2 for the KC-130) provides a syllabus thatwill ensure aircrews are current in missions thatthey may be tasked to fly. Aircrew proficiency isdetermined by many factors such as number offlight hours a crew member has, number of timessimilar missions have been flown by the crewmembers, and length of time elapsed since the lasttime that similar mission has been flown.

Air Defense

Air defense considerations affect the MAGTFcommander’s COA. The air defense threat and thetype of assault support requested determine thedegree that the threat must be reduced. If theMAGTF commander determines that assault sup-port employment is essential to accomplish themission, the commander assigns high target prior-ity to enemy air defense weapons. This ensurescontinuous employment of integrated supportingarms to destroy or neutralize the air defensethreat.

Mission Classification

The ACE executes assault support missions as ei-ther preplanned or immediate missions. The ACEexecutes both types of support in response to spe-cific requests. To request assault support, unitsuse the ASR or the joint tactical airlift request.The type of request determines the type of sup-port. See appendix B for more information on theASR.

Assault Support ___________________________________________________________________________________________ 3-5

Preplanned Missions

Preplanned missions are performed according tospecific tasking and time availability. Planningshould be done far enough in advance to permitdetailed mission coordination. Preplanned mis-sions allow the ACE commander to manage airassets more effectively. Preplanned missions areeither scheduled or on call. Mission requests arecompleted at the requesting unit and forwarded upthe chain of command to the senior fire supportcoordinating center (FSCC). The requests are thenpassed to the ACE where they are included in theappropriate ATO.

Scheduled Missions

Scheduled missions are executed at a specifictime. Aircrews are assigned a mission executiontime. Scheduled missions provide effective coor-dination and economical aircraft use and requireapproval from each intermediate command level.

On Call Missions

On call mission aircraft are configured for a par-ticular mission and placed in an appropriateground or air alert readiness condition. The sup-ported unit specifies the required support period.

Typically, detailed mission planning and aircrewbriefing of all mission-essential information is notpossible. Scheduled air support requires that therequesting commander identify his requirementsand set a specific mission time well in advance.This is often impossible on a fluid, dynamic bat-tlefield. On call missions allow the requestingcommander to identify specific requirementswithout setting a specific time.

Immediate Missions

Immediate missions meet requests that arise dur-ing battle. They are not normally identified farenough in advance to permit detailed mission co-ordination and planning. Response time, or theaction cycle, begins with the request and endswith execution. Response time is a prime consid-eration. An example of an immediate missionmay be diverting aircraft from a preplanned mis-sion to fill an immediate assault support request.

While the diverted aircraft may not be the propertype or configuration, swift execution can exploitan unexpected enemy weakness or maintain theattack momentum.

The Marine air command and control system(MACCS) handles immediate mission requests.See MCWP 3-25, Control of Aircraft and Mis-siles, and MCWP 3-25.3, Marine Air Commandand Control System Handbook, for more discus-sion on the MACCS. Appropriate command andcontrol agencies monitor and approve the request.Mission details are coordinated and issued whileaircraft are assigned and moved toward the area.Immediate air support requires extensive use ofelectronic communications for effective coordina-tion. This communication may be difficult in ahigh-intensity jamming environment.

Support Requirements

During the planning process, specified and im-plied tasks will indicate the type of support themission will require. Range, enemy defenses, andsize of the helicopterborne force will dictate thesupport requirements needed to ensure missionaccomplishment. Logistics, communications, andsupporting arms integration are all areas wheresupport will be required.

These supporting elements allow assault supportaircrews to concentrate on mission accomplish-ment. Supporting elements degrade the enemy’sair defense capability and reduce the number ofaircraft exposed to enemy weapons, whilestrengthening the commander’s plan with logisti-cal and communications support.

Escort Operations

Escort aircraft provide protection for assault sup-port missions. Attack helicopters and fixed-wingfighter and attack aircraft can escort assault forc-es. Escorts are responsible to the AMC for the fol-lowing:

l Protection from rotary-wing threat aircraft.l Protection from fixed-wing threat aircraft.

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l Protection from enemy ground fire.l Route reconnaissance.l LZ clearing by fire if necessary.l Downed aircraft support.

Employing escort aircraft depends on many fac-tors. Planners should review recent intelligenceand determine the current air defense and groundthreat. If enemy tactics show that assault supportaircraft are the main target, deceptive measurescan be used to simulate a helicopterborne forceand draw the enemy aircraft into contact. Escortaircraft should be positioned where they can pro-vide the greatest protection to the helicopterborneforce.

Assault Force Self-Defense Capability. T h e r emay be a reduced need for attached escort if theassault force has a self-defense capability. Air-craft performance, onboard weapons, aircrewtraining, and low altitude tactics can provide lim-ited self-defense capability. Careful considerationmust be given to the vulnerability of assault sup-port aircraft in an unescorted mission.

Enemy Surveillance Capability. The enemy’sability to detect aircraft will affect the size, rout-ing, and escort tactics of the assault support mis-sion. Smaller more maneuverable formations maybe used if the enemy has sophisticated surveil-lance equipment. The enemy’s surveillance capa-bility will determine the type of escort used. Forexample, a detached escort might be more usefulthan an attached escort because attached escortaircraft increase the formation’s size, therefore in-creasing the chance of detection.

Enemy Air Defenses. Known enemy air defenseassets may be dealt with in different ways. Navi-gation around the SAM sites, preemptive strikes,or SEAD during the assault support mission areoptions available to the commander. All will af-fect mission planning and escort tactics.

Ordnance Loads. Escort ordnance loads dependon the threat and available aircraft. Whenever fea-sible, escort ordnance loads need to be tailored tothe mission and the enemy.

Attached Escort Technique. Attached escor ttechniques provide visual weapons coverage andresponsive fires for threat engagement during me-dium to high threat conditions. Attached escortaircraft maintain close contact with the assaultforce. This close contact can reduce the attachedescort’s speed and freedom of action. Attachedescort aircrews may find themselves in a defen-sive or reactive posture at the start of an engage-ment. If the escorts are in a defensive posture, theentire assault support package may be in this pos-ture also. Consequently, the assault support pack-age and attached escort may be limited inmaneuverability and tactics selection.

Detached Escort Technique. Detached escorttechniques provide reconnaissance and selectedcoverage at predetermined sites en route in low tomedium threat levels. Detached escort aircraftprovide protection by clearing a path for theassault force. Detached escort aircraft try toprevent the enemy from closing with the assaultforce. Detached escort allows escort aircrews toretain the initiative. Detached escort also allowsthe escort platforms more options in tactics selec-tion and engagement parameters due to greaterflexibility in employing all onboard weaponssystems. However, the assault force may sufferserious losses if attacked by enemy forces thatevade the detached escort. This is especially trueif assault support aircraft have a limited self-defense capability.

Combined Escort Technique. Attached and de-tached escort techniques combined may providethe best of both worlds for the assault supportflight. Combined escort provides a defense in-depth, horizontally and vertically, and around theassault support aircraft. Although providing thebest all-around protection for the assault supportflight in all threat levels, combined escort is costlybecause it requires more assets than the other es-cort techniques.

Electronic Warfare. EW aircraft protect assaultsupport aircraft through electronic attack (EA),electronic support (ES), and electronic protection(EP). Electronic attack can be used to deceive theenemy by sending misleading information about

Assault Support ___________________________________________________________________________________________ 3-7

assault forces’ speed, altitude, direction, and size.EW planners can recommend to the mission com-mander EW tactics that will provide the greatestassault force protection. The assault force missioncommander and the EW planner should considerthe following:

l Initial jammer activation requires careful plan-ning to prevent early detection of the assaultforce.

l Preemptive or reactive jammer assignments aresuperior to threat-specific, reactive jammer as-signments.

l The length of time EW support is necessary toprotect assault support aircraft.

l EW aircraft are vulnerable to enemy fighters,since they maintain a constant position and per-form little maneuvering. Fighter coverage im-proves EW aircraft survivability.

l EW aircraft integration with the assault forceand other MAGTF EW assets is critical.

l Threat electronic countermeasures effective-ness.

l Unanticipated threats and responses should beidentified.

l Electronic deception capabilities of both friend-ly and enemy forces must be known.

Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

SEAD reduces assault support aircraft attrition bydegrading enemy air defense system effective-ness. SEAD uses supporting arms (i.e., artillery,NSFS, and aircraft) and other available means todeter, suppress, or destroy the enemy’s air de-fense capability. SEAD should be integrated notonly with assault support aircraft but with othersupporting aircraft. Detection of SEAD aircraftalone may change the enemy’s normal operatingprocedures. High-speed antiradiation missiles(HARMs) or antiradiation missiles (ARMs) cansuppress or destroy radar sites. Because SEAD ef-fects are short-lived, these missions should betimed to give maximum protection to the assaultforce. Mission planners should—

l Determine SEAD requirements.l Determine assets available for SEAD.

l Study the assault force’s route of flight.l Determine which enemy systems pose major

threats.l Determine number of SEAD aircraft required.l Coordinate HARM/ARM timing to provide

maximum assault force protection.l Determine placement of SEAD aircraft in rela-

tion to the assault force and the threat.l Determine the need for fighter aircraft to pro-

tect SEAD elements during ingress and egress.l Set and understand sector responsibilities and

priorities if there are more threats than avail-able assets can cover.

l Review HARM/ARM delivery envelopes andlaunch procedures.

l Keep the mission commander informed ofSEAD capabilities.

Deception Operations

Deception operations are those measures designedto mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion,or falsification of evidence. The goal is to inducethe enemy to react in a manner against his inter-ests. Deception operations may be aimed at the in-dividual who is most influential on enemyoperations in the MAGTF zone. Deception opera-tions are planned to elicit a specific action fromthe enemy, such as committing forces elsewhereor maintaining strength in an area the MAGTF in-tends to avoid. Recent deception operations in-clude the use of the 4th MEB off the Kuwaiticoast during Desert Storm to keep Iraqi forcestied up along the coast.

Successful deception operations must have a tar-get, the story has to be credible, and they mustbring about the desired effect. To provide decep-tion for the assault force, planners should—

l Plan the deception as an integral part of the as-sault force mission plan and coordinate withthe total MAGTF deception effort.

l Vary flight profiles to simulate different mis-sion types.

l Use decoy aircraft or drones to pose a threatfrom a different direction than the actual threat.

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l Use EW to present selected enemy radars ortargets with false information.

l Make the deception detectable by the enemy.l Show deception as a credible threat.l Ensure that the assault force remains undetec-

ted.l Risk deception aircraft in proportion to the ex-

pected gain.l Anticipate the most likely enemy response

based on he enemy’s doctrine and MAGTF in-telligence.

Operations Security

Operations security (OPSEC) assists in denyingthe enemy’s ability to use collection assets to lo-cate friendly forces and determine their inten-tions. The less information the enemy hasconcerning assault support operations, the easierit is to conduct a successful operation. Plannersmust carefully analyze enemy capabilities to de-termine if OPSEC measures are adequate for theplanned mission. OPSEC for assault support mis-sions may be accidentally compromised by us-ing—

l The same ingress and egress routes.l The same frequencies, code words, and authen-

tication procedures.l Flight profiles that place assault support air-

craft in enemy search or early warning radarcoverage areas.

l Radios, radars, radar altimeters, or other emis-sions.

Base of Operations

Operational deployment of assault forces involvesthe relocation of forces to desired areas of opera-tion. Critical deployment factors include the se-lected transportation and the availability ofoperational and support facilities. The decision todeploy forces is based on the assets involved, as-

signed tasks, supportability of the deployed force,and national defense needs.

Because of the ACE’s self-deployment capability,its units may be the first MAGTF forces to arrivein the area of operations. During the deploymentphase, the MAGTF commander may designatethe ACE as the main effort. This is especially truewhen ACE assets are the primary source of trans-portation to the theater for the force. Because ofthe Marine Corps expeditionary nature, opera-tions can be conducted from austere sites. Opera-tions from these sites require careful planning tobe effective.

Forward Operating Base

The MAGTF’s capability to project power isbased on its ability to move to and operate fromany area. The ACE contributes to this capabilityby staying close to the area of operations toincrease responsiveness during all operationalphases. FOBs, whether they are expeditionaryairfields, enhanced local airfields, or forwardarming and refueling points (FARPs) are themeans by which Marine aviation provide thisrapid response capability.

The future of MAGTF operations is moving to-wards the concepts of operational maneuver fromthe sea (OMFTS) and ship-to-objective maneuver(STOM). These concepts will keep most of thesupport assets on ship, reducing the requirementfor building up large supply areas ashore. Thiswill affect response time depending on the loca-tion of the objective area. Assault support plan-ners will have to factor in transit time of aircraftto the objective and allow for multiple refuelingoptions. STOM will aid in the logistical supportof aviation units and increase force protection ofboth aviation and combat service support (CSS)units since they will be ship-based and less acces-sible to the enemy.

Chapter 4

Operations

Marine aviation operates as an integral part of theMAGTF. The MAGTF conducts operations usingthe principles of maneuver warfare to obtain max-imum force capability and versatility.

Assault support, either fixed- or rotary-wing air-craft, can influence offensive and defensive oper-ations by providing tactical mobili ty andlogistical support at the decisive time and place.Helicopterborne assaults offer speed, surprise,and flexibility so the commander can react rapidlyto a changing tactical situation. The helicopter’scapabilities along with fixed-wing lift and rangecapabilities allow the MAGTF to strike over ex-tended distances and terrain barriers. This allowsthe MAGTF to attack when and where the enemyis most vulnerable. Assault support aircraft areprimarily movers of personnel, equipment, andsupplies. Because of the helicopter’s vertical liftcapability, its use in assault support is dominant.It is a primary provider of combat assault trans-port, air evacuation, and TRAP. Fixed-wing air-craft provide significant contributions to theassault support function through air logistical sup-port, aerial delivery, and aerial refueling. Bothfixed-wing and helicopter assault support aircraftprovide battlefield illumination.

Offensive Operations

Offensive operations are the means to decisivevictory; however, victory is rarely the outcome ofany one battle, offensive operation, or offensivemaneuver. The commander’s use of tools deter-mines an operation’s victory or defeat. A com-mander who gains and maintains a superiortempo, sustains the momentum of the offensive,and employs his force with the principles of warand the concept of maneuver warfare in mind ismore likely to achieve victory. Aviation function-ality, because it is inherently offensive, is useful

in offensive or defensive operations in exactly thesame way.

The ACE commander must be concerned withmaintaining tempo, sustaining operational mo-mentum, and effectively applying the six func-tions of aviation in the execution of the offensive.Economy of force is a major factor in the ACE’schoice of options in executing offensive opera-tions.

The helicopterborne assault is the most basic typeof offensive operation conducted by assault sup-port forces. It is the insertion or extraction ofcombat forces. Insertion is the movement of anassault force into an objective area, and extractionis movement of an assault force out of the objec-tive area. When augmented with KC-130s, the he-licopterborne force can conduct a variety ofoffensive operations over long distances.

Attack

An attack is a fast, violent, and coordinated ma-neuver supported by fire conducted to defeat, de-stroy, neutralize, or capture the enemy. Ahelicopterborne attack capitalizes on speed andflexibility to gain maximum surprise. Assaulttransport helicopters support an attack by insert-ing the helicopterborne force on or near the objec-tive. Fixed-wing aerial refueling and transport addsignificant continuity to the attack capability. Ahelicopterborne force can conduct a hasty or de-liberate attack based on the degree of planning,preparation, and coordination involved prior toexecution.

The hasty attack trades preparation time for speedto exploit an opportunity. A hasty attack takesaudacity and relies on speed and surprise toachieve the commander’s objectives before theenemy can effectively respond. There is little timeto plan; orders must be brief. Assault supportplanners rely heavily on training and standing

4-2 ________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-24

operating procedures to make a hasty attack a suc-cess.

The helicopterborne force, as part of a larger op-eration, may conduct a deliberate attack. A delib-erate attack is a preplanned offensive actioncharacterized by maneuver and firepower to closewith and destroy the enemy. Assault support canplay a key role in the rapid massing of forces toconduct a deliberate attack. Mission plannersmust have enough time to develop a detailed plan.Planners collect detailed information about theterrain to select appropriate pickup zones (PZ)s,LZs, DZs, and flight routes. Unlike hasty attackson more familiar terrain and with recently ac-quired intelligence, deliberate attacks deep in theenemy’s rear areas often do not allow aircrews toperform a visual reconnaissance of the flightroutes or objective area. Planners must rely on de-tailed map studies, photographs, and other imag-ery to formulate their plans.

Exploitation

Exploitation is an offensive operation undertakento follow up success in the attack. During the ex-ploitation phase, assault support aircraft may beused to maintain constant pressure on the enemyby providing mobility to the exploitation force, al-lowing it to seize key terrain or engage high-pay-off targets such as command posts, or supportunits deep in the enemy’s rear area. Two chiefcharacteristics of exploitation are speed and vio-lence.

Pursuit

A pursuit is an operation to catch or cut off a hos-tile force attempting to escape, in order to destroyit. Pursuit forces trap and destroy the retreatingenemy with coordinated maneuver and fire. As-sault support aircraft can be used to bypass resis-tance and to deliver forces to seize objectives thatare chokepoints for the retreating enemy. A heli-copterborne force can cut off the enemy and delayits retreat so that coordinated fires from combinedarms can destroy it.

One of the best examples of assault support air-craft use during offensive operations is Operation

Dewey Canyon, conducted during the VietnamWar in the upper A Shau Valley and southern DaKrong Valley from 22 January through 14 March1969. This was a multi-battalion operation involv-ing the 9th Marine Regiment and two battalionsof the 1st South Vietnamese Army Division.

On D-day, 22 January 1969, initial LZs were pre-pared by fixed-wing air strikes. The first landingsoccurred at 0800. In the rapid buildup that fol-lowed, CH-46s, under a protective umbrella ofgunships and observation aircraft, brought 1,544Marines and 46 tons of cargo into two LZs. By theevening of 24 January, a battery of 105mm howit-zers were in place.

Over the next two months, the Marines conducteda series of leap-frogging maneuvers with helicop-ters to establish multiple fire support bases in theA Shau Valley. During Dewey Canyon, Marinehelicopters flew 14,893 sorties for 5,050 flighthours, moved 3,515 tons of cargo, and lifted21,841 troops.

During the March 1969 withdrawal from the AShau more than 350 tons of cargo and 1,400Marines were transported out of two fire baseswithout a casualty. Perhaps the most notable itemof the operation was the fact that only one heli-copter was lost in spite of adverse weather and adetermined enemy.

Defensive Operations

Defensive operations are often less decisive thanoffensive operations. The defense is a force’scoordinated effort to defeat an attacker andprevent it from achieving its objectives. An effec-tive defense is never passive. Commanders mayassume the defense in one area in order to massforces in another area. Commanders conduct thedefense only until they can resume the offensive.The ACE’s role in defensive operations requiresthat the inherently offensive functional capabili-ties of Marine aviation focus on operations andmaneuvers that benefit from an aircraft’s speed,mobility, and flexibility. The ACE is no lessdynamic in defensive operations than in the

Assault Support ___________________________________________________________________________________________ 4-3

offense and continuously seeks to create andexploit opportunities to defeat the enemy.

During defensive operations, the commander or-ganizes the battlespace into three areas in whichthe defending force performs specific functions(see fig. 4-1). These areas can be further dividedinto sectors. A defensive sector is an area as-signed to a subordinate commander. In the com-mander’s sector the subordinate commander isprovided maximum latitude to accomplish his de-fensive operations. The three sectors are the secu-rity area, the main battle area, and the rear area. Ahelicopterborne force can defend against an infan-try-heavy threat by using the helicopter’s mobilityto achieve a maneuver advantage over the enemy.This allows the helicopterborne force to operatein the security area, main battle area, or rear area.Fixed-wing assault support functions in the de-fense are typically aerial refueling, air evacuation,and air logistical support.

Figure 4-1. Organization of the Battlespace.

Security Area

Actions in the security area are designed to de-ceive the enemy on the location of the main battlearea, cause the enemy to deploy early into attackformations, and make the enemy vulnerable to the

effects of combined arms. Assault support aircraftcan move engineers and equipment into and outof the security area in support of the MAGTF’sbarrier plan. They can provide mobility for recon-naissance teams or fire support teams placed infront of the main battle area. Battlefield illumina-tion employed in the security area can expose anenemy entering the security area.

Main Battle Area

The main battle area (MBA) is where theMAGTF fights the decisive battle. It extends rear-ward from the forward edge of the battle area(FEBA) to the sectors given to the unit’s subordi-nate elements. The helicopterborne force’s superi-or mobility allows the commander to defend ingreater scope. It fights a series of battles in depth,attacking from the front, flanks, and rear while us-ing minimal forces to maintain surveillance overthe rest of the assigned sector. Battle positionsthroughout the MBA should be selected and pre-pared along likely avenues of approach. Primaryand alternate LZs and PZs should be selected foreach battle position, in order to facilitate the rapidvertical movement of forces and supplies wherev-er and whenever they are required.

Rear Area

The rear area extends forward from a command-er’s rear boundary to the rear main battle area ofresponsibility of the commander’s subordinateunits. The rear area is provided primarily for theperformance of combat service support functions.Assault support aircraft are normally employed totransport supplies and sustain operations of theMAGTF. Other functions of assault support air-craft in the rear area are transport of quick reac-t ion or reserve forces, sensor insert , andreconnaissance of potential infiltration points.

Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) Operations

The post-Cold War world is a world in crisis. TheMarine Corps provides the Marine expeditionary

4-4 ________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-24

unit (special operations capable) (MEU[SOC]) toreact properly to these events. This MAGTF iscontinuously forward deployed to react quickly tocrises. The MEU(SOC) possesses specific mari-time capabilities based on its expeditionary andamphibious nature. These capabilities are a re-finement of the traditional capabilities of Marineforces afloat. These capabilities do not transformMEU(SOCs) into dedicated special operationsforces (SOF). Rather, they make them far moreuseful as forward-deployed forces capable ofdealing with a wider range of contingency andcrisis response situations.

The mission of the MEU(SOC) is to provide thegeographic combatant commanders the capabilityto conduct conventional amphibious and selectedmaritime special operations at night, during ad-verse weather, from over the horizon, under emis-sion control (EMCON) conditions, from the sea,and by surface or air. Due to its unique trainingand focus, MEU(SOC) forces are capable of com-mencing mission execution within 6 hours of no-tification. Assault support plays an important rolein these missions and provides direct action sup-port or intelligence gathering for the MAGTF.The ACE, especially in MEU(SOC) operations,brings a significant amount of firepower to thebaseline MAGTF. Inherently light and expedi-tionary in nature, the MEU(SOC) gains from theACE the mobility and responsive fire supportnecessary in small-scale, rapidly executed evolu-tions. Within most MEU(SOC) missions, assaultsupport plays a significant role in deployment andsustainment of the force.

The MEU(SOC) ACE is built around a Marinemedium helicopter squadron (HMM), reinforcedwith utility, attack, heavy-lift assault support heli-copters, and fixed-wing attack aircraft. It often in-cludes additional fixed-wing assault supportaircraft (shore based). The MEU(SOC) ACE isnormally task-organized to provide assault sup-port, offensive air support, limited antiair warfare,control of aircraft and missiles, electronic war-fare, and aerial reconnaissance.

The inherent capabilities of a forward-deployedMEU(SOC) are divided into four broad catego-

ries: amphibious operations, direct action opera-t ions, mil i tary operat ions other than war(MOOTW), and supporting operations. MCO3120.9A, Policy for Marine Expeditionary Unit(Special Operations Capable) [MEU(SOC)], formore information.

Amphibious Operations

Amphibious operations include amphibious as-saults, raids, demonstrations, and withdrawals.They can be conducted on short notice, at night,under EMCON conditions via helicopter and/orsurface means over extended ranges. Amphibiousoperations are discussed in greater detail in chap-ter 5.

Direct Action Operations

Direct action operations is the capability to con-duct short-duration strikes and small-scale offen-sive action. In-extremis hostage rescue (IHR) andTRAP are some examples of the many operationsthat make up this category. Precision raids, am-bushes, and direct assault using close-quarter bat-tle skills are all tactics used during direct actionmissions.

TRAP is a direct action mission that satisfies theJoint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) requirement that eachbranch of the armed forces maintain its ownsearch and rescue (SAR) capability. SAR is de-fined as a specialized task performed by rescueforces to effect the recovery of isolated personnelfrom a hostile environment during wartime orcontingency operations. Recognizing the uniqueenvironments of maritime and amphibious opera-tions, the Marine Corps fulfills this requirementwith the TRAP mission.

TRAP is part of the assault support planningchecklist and is usually planned as part of a heli-copterborne assault. Aircraft and crew are usuallyearmarked for TRAP as either dedicated or as oncall to be flown by an aircraft conducting thecombat assault transport.

A TRAP mission is a raid that relies on specificand flexible force packaging designed to defeatthe threat, protect the force, and successfully

Assault Support ___________________________________________________________________________________________ 4-5

recover isolated personnel without any loss to thepackage. The 8 June 1995 recovery of “Basher52” (Captain Scott O’Grady, USAF) from war-torn Bosnia proved that detailed mission analysis,specific force packaging based on the threat,quick reaction, and adherence to sound tactic,techniques, and procedures (TTP) led to missionsuccess.

Military Operations Other Than War

Included in MOOTW are NEOs, humanitarian as-sistance, and disaster relief. These operations fo-cus on deterr ing war, resolving confl ict ,promoting peace, and supporting civil authoritiesin response to domestic crises. The ACE can pro-vide air logistical support by moving supplies andpersonnel throughout the operations area.

MOOTW include many situations that challengea commander. Assault support operations providethe commander with many options in meetingthese challenges.

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations. N E O sare characterized by uncertainty. Noncombatantsmay include U.S. citizens, U.S. military person-nel, citizens of countries friendly to the U.S., orthird country nationals (TCN). The Department ofState plans for evacuations of U.S. citizens andTCN. The Department of State also determineswhen that plan will be executed.

NEOs require the commander to consider thingsnot usually associated with offensive or amphibi-ous operations. A NEO is similar to a raid. Thereis a rapid insertion followed by a planned with-drawal. The use of minimal forces to provide se-curity for the evacuation forces and evacuees isimportant. Diplomatic considerations significant-ly influence the execution of a NEO. Situationsmay change as the NEO is conducted, dependingon the political situation within the country andthe threat. A NEO may take place in a permissive,uncertain, or hostile environment.

Permissive environments are characterized by lit-tle or no resistance from the host nation or itsarmed forces. ACE participation is minimal in a

permissive environment, and noncombatants maydepart the country via civil airline traffic. Militaryassistance, in the form of security forces, may bethe primary focus of the NEO.

The degree of danger to the noncombatants is theconcern in an uncertain environment. The host na-tion’s military forces may be supportive of, neu-tral to, or opposed to the NEO. Assault supportoperations may be the only ACE participation dueto political sensitivities. Innovative planning isnecessary to ensure that fire support assets cansupport the NEO should the situation deteriorate.

A hostile environment can be characterized bycivil unrest or full scale war. ACE participationcan be expected to be at a maximum to insertcombat forces, conduct convoy escort, and pro-vide fire support. Operation Frequent Wind is anexample of a NEO conducted under hostile condi-tions.

Following the withdrawal of most United Statescombat forces from the Republic of Vietnam andwith the fall of Saigon imminent, contingencyplanners prepared for the evacuation of the lastAmericans in Vietnam.

Evacuation forces consisted of the 9th MarineAmphibious Brigade (MAB), which includedRegimental Landing Team 4 and ProvisionalMarine Aircraf t Group (PROVMAG) 39.PROVMAG 39’s organic assets, 34 CH-53s, 27CH-46s, 6 UH-1s, and 8 AH-1s, were augmentedwith 10 USAF H-53s. After surveys of candidatesites, the decision was made that the evacuationwould take place from the Defense Attaché,Office (DAO)/Air America Complex at Tan SonNhut airfield by C-130 aircraft and 9th MAB heli-copters and from the U.S. Embassy by UH-1s andCH-53s.

On 29 April 1975, the effects of North Vietnam-ese air and artillery attacks against the DAO com-pound and Tan Son Nhut airfield had left therunway filled with abandoned aircraft and vehi-cles, precluding the use of C-130s for the evacua-tion. The evacuation had to be made solely by

4-6 ________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-24

helicopter. At 1215, 9th MAB was notified to be-gin the evacuation.

As 9th MAB Marines began the evacuation effortat the DAO Complex, the Commanding General,9th MAB, received word from the U.S. Embassythat more than 2,000 people needed to be evacuat-ed from the embassy grounds—a number far ex-ceeding the capacity of the three UH-1 and oneCH-53 lifts originally planned. Limited landingspace precluded using large numbers of aircraft toevacuate the grounds. The solution was to divertall available CH-46s to land on the embassy roof-top and to use CH-53s to evacuate people fromthe embassy parking lot.

Helicopter extraction of evacuees continued fromboth the embassy and Tan Son Nhut airfield. Atapproximately 0012 on 30 April, the last of the9th MAB elements at the DAO complex lifted off,returning thereafter to assist with the continuingembassy evacuation. The Commanding General,9th MAB, then focused on evacuating the embas-sy for fear that Saigon might fall to the NorthVietnamese before the end of the morning. Flightsat the rate of one CH-53 and one CH-46 every 10minutes ferried evacuees out of the embassygrounds. At 0458, the U.S. ambassador to Viet-nam left the embassy compound aboard a 9thMAB CH-46. The last security element left theembassy at 0753, landing aboard Task Force 76ships at 0825, ending Operation Frequent Wind.The ensuing action, Operation Frequent Wind,would result in the extraction of nearly 7,000 per-sons from the approaching North Vietnamese on-slaught on Saigon. Remarkably, the extractionwas completely carried out by helicopters, mostlyMAGTF aviation.

Typically, MEU(SOC) units have conductedNEOs. However, NEOs may require a larger

force to accomplish the mission. The example ofOperation Frequent Wind illustrates that fact.

Humanitarian Assistance Operations. Assaultsupport is especially important in HA operations.A force larger than a MEU(SOC) may be in-volved in HA operations. Usually, a joint taskforce (JTF) will be tasked with the execution ofthe relief effort. In a disaster, transportation infra-structures (roads, bridges, or railways) may bedamaged or destroyed. This will hinder evacuat-ing and assisting the affected population.

The MAGTF uses assault support assets to movehomeless or injured evacuees to safe areas and todeliver food, medicine, and other vital supplies.The following factors should be considered whenplanning a disaster relief operation:

l Language problems.l Coordination with local authorities.l Special medical requirements of evacuees.l Environmental conditions.

Supporting Operations

Supporting operations may include tactical decep-tion operations, JTF enabling force operations,and port and airfield seizures. All of these opera-tions are in support of larger operations. The 15thMEU’s participation in Operation Restore Hopein Somalia in December 1992 was an example ofa supporting operation. The Marines came ashoreto secure the port and airfield, enabling the shipsfrom Maritime Prepositioned Squadron-2 to off-load their supplies. The Marines then improvedthe port facilities and roads out of Mogadishu, So-malia. This allowed follow-on forces from I MEFand the U.S. Army 10th Mountain Division toconduct relief operations in the country.

Chapter 5

Command and Control in Amphibious Operations

An amphibious operation is a military operationlaunched from the sea by Navy and landing forcesembarked in ships and craft with the purpose ofintroducing the landing force ashore to accom-plish an assigned mission. Amphibious operationsmay include assaults, raids, demonstrations, andwithdrawals. Refer to Joint Publication 3-02,Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, formore information.

Assault support provides the landing force withthe ability to rapidly focus and project decisivecombat power ashore and provides the MAGTFthe speed, mobility, and flexibility necessary toaccomplish the mission.

Assault support transport helicopters used in theship-to-shore movement are subordinate landingforce elements. The ACE executes the ship-to-shore movement according to the landing plan.The plan includes arrangements for shifting con-trol of aviation operations to the commander,landing force (CLF) when the situation ashorepermits.

Navy Tactical Air Control System

During the ship-to-shore movement, the com-mander, amphibious task force (CATF) coordi-nates and controls air operations through theNavy tactical air control center (TACC). Withinthe Navy TACC, the helicopter coordination sec-tion (HCS) coordinates helicopter operations. Seefigure 5-1.

The HCS decentralizes control of the helicoptership-to-shore movement to the helicopter direc-tion center (HDC). The HDC is aboard ships ca-pable of handling helicopter operations. The HDCcoordinates all assault support helicopter opera-tions through the TACC. The HDC maintainscontinuous radar surveillance of aircraft operatingin its assigned control area.

The plan for ship-to-shore movement is very de-tailed and jointly developed. It requires precisecoordination and timing. MCWP 3-31.5, Ship toShore Movement, covers this information in great-er detail.

As soon as practical, the CLF establishes aircontrol facilities ashore. This extends the amphib-ious force’s aviation control capabilities, increas-es surveillance, and accelerates response.Initially, air control agencies ashore operate in astandby status and monitor all air control circuits.The CATF and CLF decide when to transfercontrol from agencies afloat to agencies ashore.The transfer may be sequential as functions of the

Figure 5-1. Navy Tactical Air Control System.

5-2 ________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-24

MACCS become operational. Control agenciesafloat continue to monitor communicationscircuits and are capable of resuming control, ifrequired.

Marine Air Command and Control System

The Navy TACC controls all aviation assets,while afloat, in support of CLF. Once control ispassed from CATF to CLF, the Marine tactical aircommand center (TACC) and its other subordi-nate agencies manage MAGTF aviation assets.The Marine TACC is the senior MACCS agencyand provides centralized command and directionof subordinate activities. See figure 5-2. The Na-vy TACC then becomes a TADC and assumes amonitoring status. Other aviation control agenciesfollow.

Figure 5-2. Marine Air Command and Control System.

Tactical Air Direction Center

During the build up of landing force combat pow-er ashore, the CLF establishes a Marine tacticalair direction center (TADC) to act as a coordinat-

ing agency between the other MACCS agenciesand the Navy TACC afloat. The TADC is identi-cal in organization, capabilities, and facilities tothe Marine TACC. The TADC remains subordi-nate to the Navy TACC until control of aviationhas been passed ashore. The Navy TACC afloatthen becomes a TADC subordinate to the MarineTACC.

Tactical Air Operations Center

The tactical air operations center (TAOC) is un-der the operational control of the Marine TACC.The sector antiair warfare coordinator (SAAWC)commands the TAOC. The TAOC is the primaryantiair warfare (AAW) agency of the MACCS. Itdetects, identifies, and controls the intercept ofhostile aircraft and missiles and provides airspacemanagement and operational assistance. TheTAOC can perform limited TACC functions.

Direct Air Support Center

The direct air support center (DASC) is the aircontrol agency of the MACCS primarily responsi-ble for the direction and procedural control of airoperations directly supporting the MAGTF’sground combat element (GCE). It processes andcoordinates requests for immediate air supportand coordinates air missions requiring integrationwith ground forces and other supporting arms.The DASC is usually the first principal MACCSagency ashore. It functions in a decentralizedmode of operation, but is directly supervised bythe TACC.

The DASC is established by the Marine air sup-port squadron (MASS) and processes immediaterequests for air support, coordinates aircraft em-ployment with other supporting arms, managesterminal control assets such as forward air con-troller (airborne) (FAC[A]) and assault supportcoordinator (airborne) (ASC[A]) supportingground forces, and provides procedural control ofassigned aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, anditinerant aircraft transiting through its assigned ar-ea. The DASC can employ a DASC (airborne)(DASC[A]) aboard a KC-130 and provide extend-ed line of sight communications with low flyingaircraft. The DASC will normally be co-located

Assault Support ___________________________________________________________________________________________ 5-3

or electronically linked with the senior fire sup-port coordination agency ashore.

In a MEF operation with multiple maneuver ele-ments (divisions) within the GCE, the DASC maybe located with the MAGTF force fires coordina-tion center (FFCC). This location will centralizethe management of close air support (CAS) andassault support aircraft between the GCE maneu-ver element and meet the commander’s intent formaneuver and fire support.

The DASC will usually deploy air support ele-ments (ASEs) to each major maneuver elementFSCC, to provide it with the necessary links to theMACCS, in order to request and coordinate directair support. ASE size and composition will varyand can be expanded or reduced as the current sit-uation requires (consistent with the assets avail-able). The DASC only has the capability toprovide “procedural control” for aircraft operatingin its area. In amphibious operations, the DASCwill normally land in the same scheduled or on-call wave as the senior fire support coordinationagency phased ashore.

Several employment options are available for theDASC, including an airborne configuration in aKC-130. MASS assets are tailored to provide sup-port based on the mission. A MEF could require atask organization that uses the assets of more thanone MASS. At the MEU level, a MASS detach-ment is task-organized as an ASE, and its capabil-ity is reduced due to its size. The size andcapability of the MEF DASC depend on the num-ber of units that request air support and the num-ber of aircraft that execute air support missions.

The DASC maintains communications connectiv-ity with the other MACCS agencies, the FSCC,FFCC, aircraft under its control, UAV squadron(s), and joint and other Service air support organi-zations. The DASC also requires connectivitywith forward-based air assets to request launch insupport of ground forces. See MCWP 3-25.5, Di-rect Air Support Center Handbook, for more in-formation.

The DASC operates through several air controlorganizations. These organizations follow.

Tactical Air Control Party. A tactical air con-trol party (TACP) is a subordinate operationalcomponent of a tactical air control system de-signed to provide air liaison to land forces and forthe control of aircraft (Joint Pub 1-02). It is locat-ed within the GCE and provides ground com-manders with the means to access direct airsupport. In the Marine Corps, tactical air controlparties are organic to infantry divisions, regi-ments, battalions, and other combat arms units.TACPs establish and maintain facilities for liai-son and communications between parent unitsand airspace control agencies, inform and advisethe ground unit commander on the employment ofsupporting aircraft, and request and control airsupport. The TACP is a MACCS agency, but ad-ministratively it is not part of the MACG.

Tactical Air Coordinator (Airborne). A tacticalair coordinator is an officer who coordinates,from an aircraft, the action of combat aircraft en-gaged in close support of ground or sea forces(Joint Pub 1-02). Within the MACCS, the tacticalair coordinator (airborne) (TAC[A]) is a navalaviator or naval flight officer and the senior aircoordinator having air authority over aircraft op-erating in the assigned area. The primary missionof the TAC(A) is to act as an airborne extensionof the DASC, TACC, or FSCC, and to contributeto coordination among the tactical air control par-ties, airborne forward air controllers, and the firedirection of artillery and naval gunfire.

Forward Air Controller (Airborne). A forwardair controller is a specifically trained and quali-fied aviation officer who exercises control fromthe air of aircraft engaged in close air support ofground troops. The forward air controller (air-borne) is normally an airborne extension of thetactical air control party (Joint Pub 1-02). Withinthe Marine Corps, the FAC(A) is a naval aviatoror flight officer who is specifically trained, quali-fied, and designated to perform air reconnaissanceand surveillance, conduct terminal control of air-craft engaged in OAS operations, control artilleryand naval surface fire support missions, act as a

5-4 ________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-24

radio relay, and control landing zone prepara-tions.

Assault Support Coordinator (Airborne). Anassault support coordinator (airborne) is an avia-tor who coordinates, from an aircraft, the move-ment of aviation assets during assault supportoperations (MCRP 5-12C). The ASC(A) is anexperienced aviator with extensive knowledge ofthe MACCS who acts as an airborne extensionof the DASC. The ASC(A) assists in providingsituational awareness to the assault force, relaysrequests to the DASC, exercises launch authori-ty for immediate and on-call missions, coordi-

nates with the TAC(A), and provides routingrecommendations to the air mission commander.

Helicopter Support Team. A helicopter supportteam is a task organization formed and equippedfor employment in a landing zone to facilitate thelanding and movement of helicopterborne troops,equipment and supplies, and to evacuate selectedcasualties and enemy prisoners of war (Joint Pub1-02). Within the Marine Corps, helicopter sup-port teams (HSTs) are accessed from the forceservice support group (FSSG), specifically, thelanding support company of the support battalion.

Chapter 6

Emerging Concepts and Capabilities

As innovations move the Marine Corps to newways to fight from the sea, a proven concept willremain as part of the foundation of our operations.Assault support operations will remain a corner-stone of ship-to-objective maneuver. The mobili-ty, speed, and flexibility provided by assaultsupport aircraft, combined with the remainingfive functions of Marine aviation, provide thecommander wide-ranging options in combat andnoncombat operations. Assault support began inthe 1920’s as a means of resupplying the Marineon the ground. Assault support has become a wayfor the commander to project power throughoutthe battlespace.

Operational Maneuver From the Sea

Operational maneuver from the sea (OMFTS) is aconcept for the projection of naval power ashore.OMFTS is based on innovations in military sys-tems and equipment that diminish the natural bar-riers of the sea and shoreline. OMFTS alsocapitalizes on significant enhancements in infor-mation management, battlespace mobility, andconventional weapons accuracy and lethality.

The heart of OMFTS is the maneuver of navalforces at the operational level. The aim is to ex-ploit a significant enemy weakness to deal a deci-sive blow. Ship-to-objective maneuver (STOM) isa concept envisioning the projection of forcesashore in their tactical formations to a decisiveplace and in sufficient force to ensure mission ac-complishment. Landing forces will engage enemyforces only as required to achieve the freedom ofaction to accomplish operational objectives.

STOM is not just a traditional amphibious opera-tion conducted from a greater distance. It is a tac-t ical concept for conduct ing amphibiousoperations in support of OMFTS. STOM resulted

from the combining of maneuver warfare con-cepts with OMFTS’s objectives. STOM empha-sizes tactical mobility, operational speed (ortempo), and operational flexibility to counter ene-my strengths and exploit enemy weaknesses. Pro-jected operations using STOM will rely onemerging and existing platforms such as the ad-vanced amphibious assault vehicle (AAAV), thelanding craft air cushion, and the CH-53E in addi-tion to the aircraft and command control systemimprovements described below.

The MV-22 Osprey

The MV-22 Osprey has the radius, payload, andsurvivability to realize STOM. Acquisition of thismedium-lift tiltrotor aircraft represents an enor-mous improvement in our ability to project com-bat-ready forces from over the horizon asenvisioned in OMFTS.

The MV-22 will fly twice as fast, five times asfar, with three times the payload of our aging me-dium-lift CH-46 helicopters. These unique capa-bilities give the MAGTF commander maximumability to strike further, move faster, and build upcombat power ashore more rapidly. The MV-22will provide the operational capability to exploitgaps and rapidly insert assault forces while otheraircraft systems allow penetration into hostile ar-eas with less chance of detection by the enemy.

The AH-1Z

Soon after the turn of the century, the MarineCorps will receive the first deliveries of its newdedicated attack helicopter, the AH-1Z. Adver-tised as an upgrade to the AH-1W Cobra, theAH-1Z is a new aircraft with new technology.

6-2 ________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-24

This aircraft comes at a time when the need for animproved rotary-wing attack aircraft is greatest.

Additional blades, an increase in fuel-carrying ca-pability, and an increase in airspeed mean a sig-nificant increase in combat radius over the currentAH-1W. Other enhancements include a substan-tial increase in ordnance payload. The AH-1Z willcarry 16 precision-guided munitions per aircraftwith the ability to simultaneously carry air-to-airweapons (AIM-9). This wide array of ordnancewill give the MAGTF commander the ability totailor the ordnance load to the threat. An auxilia-ry power unit installed in the AH-1Z will give theaircraft an improved austere FOB/FARP opera-tional capability. This will give the commandermore flexibility as the helicopter will be more re-sponsive and have more time on station. The addi-tion of an integrated cockpit will reduce pilotworkload and enhance the accuracy of ordnancedelivery. The new AH-1Z will bridge the firepow-er capability gap between today’s aircraft and thenext generation aircraft.

The UH-1Y

Throughout the Marine Corps’ aviation history,its leadership has always looked to get the mostout of its acquisition dollar. Multi-mission ormulti-role aircraft have been attractive for theirusefulness in a variety of combat missions. Noother aircraft exemplifies this more than the ven-erable UH-1 series of helicopters.

Around the year 2005, the Marine Corps is pro-jected to receive its newest version of utility heli-copter known as the UH-1Y. The UH-1Y is billedas an upgrade to the current UH-1N. Similar tothe AH-1Z modernization effort, the upgrades forthe UH-1Y are to include a four-bladed all com-posite, hingeless, bearingless rotor system andnew drive train components. These improvementswill increase payload by 44 percent and airspeedby 32 percent. In addition to the improved dynam-ic components, the UH-1Y will receive an inte-grated glass cockpit. This cockpit is planned toinclude digital communications, an upgraded sur-vivability suite and moving map display. Most of

these systems will be accessible via “hands-oncontrols” actuation. The result will be a cockpitmanagement system that allows pilots the abilityto focus more attention toward mission accom-plishment and less on routine cockpit duties. Thisimproved airframe will be on the cutting edge ofnew technology and lead the way in filling theMarine Corps requirement for a utility helicopter.

The KC-130J

Providing substantial lift, inflight refueling, andlogistical resupply will be a challenge in an OM-FTS environment. The aging fleet of KC-130 se-ries aircraft has been up to the challenge in thepast. Unfortunately, much like the CH-46E, thecurrent F and R models are in need of relief astheir service life reaches the 40-year mark.

In most respects, the aircraft has changed littlesince its inception in the 1950’s. The J modellooks almost exactly the same as older KC-130models, but it has updated avionics and engines,and a reduced crew requirement. The J model’sengine upgrade is the most significant change tothe aircraft.

The increased performance of the engines meansthat the aircraft will be able to haul more (fuel orcargo) farther, get there faster, and operate out ofsmaller airfields. The updated avionics suite willallow for better automated mission planning andcommunications software. The new commandand control suite will enable the DASC (A) to bet-ter perform the mission. At the present time, refu-eling transfer rates (aerial and ground) willremain consistent with older KC-130 models. Theplanner’s bottom line is that the aircraft will be amore capable force multiplier with longer, fasterlegs.

Joint Strike Fighter

The short takeoff and vertical landing joint strikefighter variant being designed for the U.S. MarineCorps and for the Royal Navy in Britain employs

Assault Support ___________________________________________________________________________________________ 6-3

a direct lift system for short takeoffs and verticallandings with uncompromising performance. Fea-tures of this envisioned aircraft are—

l A 30- to 36- foot wingspan with no wing folds.l Internal and external payload capability.l Supersonic flight.l Precise weapons delivery through the integra-

tion of onboard avionics and external data sys-tems.

l All-weather ordnance delivery.l Reduced radar signature through the use of ad-

vanced reduced observable design.l Increased pilot situational awareness through

improved sensor and avionics integration.l Aircraft readiness enhanced by self-diagnostic

systems onboard.l Multiple service use emphasizing common

parts, shared supply systems, and joint repairfacilities. These measures should keep costsdown.

Common Aviation Command and Control System

Currently the MACCS exists to provide the ACEcommander the ability to control aircraft and ex-ploit opportunities on the battlefield. TheMACCS can provide the commander a real-timepicture of the battlespace. Additionally, theMACCS provides the commander the means toplan future tactical air operations and to employall six functions of Marine aviation to their fullestextent.

The common aviation command and control sys-tem (CAC2S) will integrate the functionality of

all current MACCS agencies. It will replace themajor pieces of communications equipment of theTACC, TAOC, DASC, and airborne DASC, airtraffic control detachment (ATC), and the com-mand and control of the low altitude air defense(LAAD) battalion. CAC2S will allow the ACE toconsolidate C2 functions at a single facility sig-nificantly reducing the logistical footprint of theexisting MACCS.

CAC2S hardware will be modular and capable ofbeing assembled in a variety of configurations, in-cluding shipboard operations, to meet MAGTFrequirements. Plans include airborne operations ina variety of current and future Marine Corps air-craft.

During amphibious operations, the system will in-terface with a host ship. The system’s communi-cation keeps the commander appraised of thetactical situation while moving to the objective ar-ea. The commander will be able to conduct mis-sion planning using the system. The commanderwill maintain situational awareness during opera-tions and a common air picture regardless of loca-tion.

This system will be compatible with other Servic-es command and control systems. If the MAGTFis the first unit deployed to the region, theMAGTF commander could remain in control ofthe JTF, and the ACE commander could retain theoverall command of the aviation assets as actingjoint force air component commander. Leaderswith the greatest situational awareness can retaincommand of the joint operation.

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Appendix A

Aircraft Capabilities Guide

This ready reference of MAGTF aircraft may be referenced for initial operational planning only. Aircraftperformance is affected by many variables such as temperature, atmospheric pressure, humidity, wind,aircraft configuration, and mission requirements. Specific performance parameters are calculated for ev-ery mission. Detailed mission planning requires close liaison with the ACE and use of appropriate opera-tions and tactical manuals.

CH-46EDimensionsHeight ..............................................16 feet 8 inchesWeight................................16,5000 pounds (empty)

24,300 pounds (maximum gross weight)Rotor Diameter ..............................................51 feetLength ..............................................84 feet 4 inches

AirspeedMaximum endurance ................................. 70 KIASMaximum range............................ 110 to 130 KIASMaximum airspeed .................................. 145 KIAS

Fuel CapacityPounds..............................................................4,488Gallons................................................................660

EndurancePayloads.............................................. 4,300 pounds

18 paxEndurance .............................................2 + 55 hours

Weapons SystemsGuns.....................................2 X 50 caliber XM 218

Other SystemsGPS navigation .................Miniature Airborne GPS

Receiver (MAGR) System(Communications/Navigation

Control System [CNCS]configured A/C only)

Communications EquipmentHF ................................................. 1 X AN/ARC-94VHF/UHF ................... 1 X AN/ARC-182 w/KY-58

encryption deviceUHF............................ 1 X AN/ARC-51A w/KY-58

encryption deviceVHF/UHF ................... 1 X AN/ARC-210 w/KY-58

encryption device(CNCS configured A/C only)

Aircraft Survivability EquipmentRWR ......................AN/APR-39(V)1 radar warning

receiverIRCW ...................... AN/ALQ-157 infrared jammerExpendables ..............AN/ALE-39 countermeasures

dispenserMissile warning....................... AN/AAR-47 missile

warning system

A-2 ________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-24

CH-53CH-53D CH-53E

DimensionsHeight............................................ 24 feet 11 inchesEmpty weight ....................................27,000 poundsRotor diameter................................. 72 feet 3 inchesLength ............................................. 88 feet 6 inchesMaximum gross weight.....................42,000 pounds

DimensionsHeight ..............................................28 feet 4 inchesEmpty weight ....................................36,000 poundsRotor diameter............................................... 79 feetLength.............................................. 99 feet 1/2 inchMaximum gross weight .....................73,500 pounds

AirspeedMaximum endurance.................................. 70 KIASMaximum airspeed................................... 130 KIAS

AirspeedMaximum endurance....................................5 KIASMaximum airspeed ...................................150 KIAS

Fuel CapacityPounds........................................................... 13,178Gallons ............................................................ 1,938

Fuel CapacityPounds ........................................................... 15,000Gallons ............................................................ 2,277

EndurancePayload...........................................................37 pax

8,000 pounds internalTypical ................................................. 3 + 00 hoursBest case............................................... 5 + 30 hours

EndurancePayload ................................................. 37 to 55 pax

20,000 pounds internalTypical.................................................. 4 + 00 hoursBest case ..................................... Indefinite with AR

Weapons SystemsGuns .................................... 2 X 50 caliber XM 218

Weapons SystemsSame as CH-53D

Other Systemsnone

Other SystemsFLIR ..................................................AN/AAQ-16B

Communications EquipmentHF...................... 1 X AN/ARC-94 or AN/ARC-174UHF/VHF....................2 X AN/ARC-182 w/KY-58

encryption device or 2 X AN/ARC-210 w/KY-58 encryption device

Communications EquipmentSame as CH-53D

Aircraft Survivability EquipmentRWR..............................................same as CH-53DIRCM................................................................ noneMissile warning .............................same as CH-53D

Aircraft Survivability EquipmentRWR.........AN/APR-39(V)1 radar warning receiverIRCM .................................................AN/ALQ-157Missile warning......... AN/AAR-47 missile warning

system

Assault Support __________________________________________________________________________________________ A-3

UH-INDimensionsHeight .................................................13 feet 1 inchWeight.................................. 6,900 pounds (empty);

10,5000 pounds (maximum gross weight)Rotor diameter ...............................................48 feetLength ..............................................57 feet 4 inchesFuselage width ................................9 feet 4.5 inches

AirspeedMaximum endurance ........................ 55 to 65 KIASMaximum airspeed .................................. 130 KIAS

Fuel CapacityPounds............... 1,329.5 internal; 1,020 additional

w/auxiliary fuel cells (2 maximum)Gallons................ 195.5; 150 additional w/auxiliary

fuel cells (2 maximum)

EnduranceBest case ......................... 1 + 30 (internal fuel only;

1,300 pounds gear/ordnance/pax)2 + 20 (1/2 auxiliary fuel cell;

900 pounds gear/ordnance/pax)3 + 10 (full auxiliary fuel cell;

400 pounds gear/ordnance/pax)Worst case....................... 1 + 15 (internal fuel only;

1,300 pounds gear/ordnance/pax)2 + 00 (1/2 auxiliary fuel cell;

900 pounds gear/ordnance/pax)2 + 45 (full auxiliary fuel cell;

400 pounds gear/ordnance/pax)

Weapons SystemsGuns...............................................7.62mm M2A0E

7.62mm GAU-1750 caliber GAU-16

Rockets .......................2.75 inch rockets, WAFFARTypical mix: CAS.................(14) 2.75 inch rockets,

GAU-16/GAU-17

Other SystemsGPS navigation ................ Doppler GPS Navigation

System (CDNU configuredA/C only)

FLIR................ AN/AAQ-22 Navigation FLIR withLASER range finder and VCR

Miscellaneous ...................................... loudspeaker for PSYOPS missions; AN/ULQ

communications jamming package

Communications EquipmentVHF/UHF ................... 3 X AN/ARC-210 w/KY-58

encryption device(SATCOM available on one

radio only)UHF............................. 1 X AN/ARC-182 w/KY-58

encryption deviceUHF............................. 1 X AN/ARC-159 w/KY-58

encryption deviceVHF............................. 1 X AN/ARC-114 w/KY-58

encryption deviceMiscellaneous ................... ASC-26 communication

package provides 1 X UHFand 2 X VHF radios for

airborne command and control

Aircraft Survivability EquipmentRWR ............................. AN/APR-39 radar warning

receiverAN/APR-44 CW radar

warning receiverIRCM .................................................AN/ALQ-144Expendables ..............AN/ALE-39 countermeasures

dispenserMissile warning....................... AN/AAR-47 missile

warning systemLaser warning.........................................AN/AVR-2

A-4 ________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-24

Ai

AH-1W

DimensionsHeight.............................................. 13 feet 9 inchesWeight ............................... 10,5000 pounds (empty)

14,750 pounds (maximum gross weight)Rotor diameter............................................... 48 feetLength ........................................................... 58 feetFuselage width .................................. 3 feet 7 inches

AirspeedMaximum endurance.................................. 72 KIASMaximum speed....................................... 190 KIAS

170 KIAS (w/wing stores)

Fuel CapacityPounds............................................................. 2,037Gallons ............................................................... 304

EndurancePayload..................2,250 pounds (in addition to full

internal fuel)Typical ...................................................... 2.3 hoursBest case.................................................... 2.6 hours

4.6 hours (with 2 auxiliaryfuel tanks)

Worst case ................................................. 1.8 hours3.6 hours (with 2 auxiliary

fuel tanks)

Weapons SystemsMissiles ............BGM-71 A/A-1/C/D/E/E-5B TOW

AGM-114A/B/C/K HellfireAGM-122A Sidearm

AIM-9L/M SidewinderGuns ................................ 20mm turret (+110 AZM,

+30 elevation -50°)20mm ammo (MK 50 series,

PGU 27/28/31 series)Rockets..................... LAU-61/68 2.75 inch rockets,

7 or 19 shot podLAU-10, 5 inch rocket, 4 shot pod

Typical mix:AAW ..................... 2 X AIM-9, 2.75 inch flechette,

20mm gunOAS......................... Hellfire, TOW, 5 inch rockets,

internal gunArmed RECCE.................Hellfire, TOW, 2.75 inch

rockets, internal gun(Sidearm)

Escort........................Sidewinder, 2.75 inch RP/HE,internal gun, TOW/Hellfire

FAC(A)......................Hellfire, TOW, 2.75 inch RP,internal gun

Other SystemsGPS navigation........................ Embedded GPS/INS

(1686 upgrade)FLIR ...................................Night Targeting SystemLaser .............. Pulsed, 1064 nm, neodymiun: YAG;

laser designator and ranging systemCCTV ..................................................... TV cameraVCR............... SVHS and VHS recording capabilityOptics ..........................................Direct view optics

Communications EquipmentVHF/UHF....................2 X AN/ARC-182 w/KY-58

encryption deviceVHF/UHF....................2 X AN/ARC-210 w/KY-58

encryption device(1686 upgrade only)

Aircraft Survivability EquipmentRWR...................... AN/APR-39V(1) radar warning

receiver (pulsed)AN/APR-44 radar warning receiver (CW)

IRCM..................................................AN/ALQ-144Expendables ............. AN/ALE-39 countermeasures

dispenser

Assault Support __________________________________________________________________________________________ A-5

AV-8BModels........................AV-8B Day Attack (DMT);

AV-8B Night Attack (NVD/FLIR);AV-8B II + RADAR

DimensionsHeight ..............................................11 feet 8 inchesWeight....................................4,600 pounds (empty)

39,000 pounds mixed gross weightWingspan .........................................30 feet 3 inches

AirspeedMaximum endurance ............................... 230 KIASMaximum airspeed .................. 585 KCAS/1.0 IMN

Fuel CapacityPounds.................................................7,759 internal

11,749 with 2 external drop tanks830 with 4 external drop tanks

Endurance...................... Varies significantly withordnance load and mission profile.

Refer to NWP 3-22.5-AV8B,Vol I for specific weapons

load profilesHi Lo Hi profile with 6 Mk 82, DECM, andgun ....................................... Combat radius 170 nm

loiter time 25 minutesLo Lo Lo profile with6 Mk 82, DECM, andgun ......................................... Combat radius 80 nm

loiter time 15 minutes

Weapons SystemsGuns ......................................... GAU-12 25mm gunRockets.............................2.75 and 5 inch HE-Frag,

AT/APERSHEGP, WP, RP, ILLUM, and chaff

Bombs ...................................Mk 81, Mk 82, Mk 83Mk 20 Rockeye, MK 77 Napalm

GBU-12, GBU-16 LGBCBU-72 FAE, CBU-78 Gator

Missiles ......................... AGM-65E Laser MaverickAGM-65F IR Maverick

(night attack only)AGM-122 SidearmAIM-9 Sidewinder

Miscellaneous ........... LUU-2A/B Illuminum flares,Mk 58 Marine Location Marker

Other SystemsGPS navigation ..................Integrated P-coded GPS

targeting systemFLIR.................................1 power navigation FLIRDual mode tracker.............. laser spot tracker with 6

power TV videoCamera ..................... VTR HUD/dual-mode tracker

recorder

Communications EquipmentVHF/UHF .......................2 X RT-1250A/ARC with

KY-58 encryption device

Aircraft Survivability EquipmentRWR ............... AN/ALR-67 radar warning receiverDECM....................... AN/ALQ-164 DECM systemExpendables ..............AN/ALE-39 countermeasures

dispenser

A-6 ________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-24

F/A-18 (Models A/C/D)DimensionsHeight.............................................. 15 feet 3 inchesWeight ................................. 24,500 pounds (empty)

51,900 pounds (maximum T/O)Wingspan ........................................ 40 feet 5 inches

AirspeedMaximum endurance................................ 250 KIAS

(approximate)Maximum airspeed................750 KIAS (NATOPS)

650 KIAS (sea level)

Fuel CapacityPounds................................12,800 (10,800 internal,

2,000 centerline tank)Gallons ...................................1,900 (1,500 internal,

400 centerline tank)

EnduranceTypical ................................................. 1 + 30 hoursBest case............................................... 2 + 45 hoursWorst case ...............................................12 minutesHi Hi Hi profile withcenterline tank ...................................... 2 + 45 hours

Weapons SystemsGuns ...........................................20mm internal gunRockets..............................LAU-10 (5 inch rockets)

LAU-51 (2.75 inch rockets)LAU-61 (2.75 (2.75 inch rockets)

Radar ............................... APG-65 multimode radarMissiles ......................... AGM-65E Laser Maverick

AGM-65F IR MaverickAGM-88 Harm

Walleye I/IIAIM-7 Sparrow

AIM-9 Sidewinder

Bombs.................................................. Mk 80 seriesMk 20 Rockeye, GBU-10/12/16

CBU-59 APAMCBU-78 Gator, Mk 77 Napalm

Mk 36, Mk 40, Mk 4(Destructors)

Mk 52, Mk 55, Mk 56(Bottom/Moored Mines)

Mk 62, Mk 63, Mk 64, Mk 65(Quickstrike Mines)

Miscellaneous.................. Tactical air-launch decoyTypical mix:Air-to-air.............................2 AIM-9, 2 to 4 AIM-7,

6 second 20mmAir-to-ground .................................. 4 to 8 Mk 82 or

2 to 4 Mk 832 AIM-9, 2 AIM-7

Other SystemsFLIR ................................. AN/AAS-38 target FLIR

AN/AAR-50 navigation FLIR(F/A-18C/D only

Laser ........................ AN/AS-1 73 laser spot trackerOn-board recording .......................... HUD recorder,

DDI selectableAN/ASQ-1 73 35mm strike camera

Communications EquipmentVHF/UHF....................2 X AN/ARC-182 w/KY-58

encryption device

Aircraft Survivability EquipmentRWR................AN/ALR-67 radar warning receiverDECM ............................................. 2 X ALQ-126B

AN/ALQ-167 (tacticalcontingency pod)

Expendables ............. AN/ALE-39 countermeasuresdispenser

Assault Support __________________________________________________________________________________________ A-7

EA-6B ICAP 2DimensionsHeight ..............................................16 feet 8 inchesWeight..................................34,000 pounds (empty)

61,500 pounds (maximum T/O)Wingspan .......................................................53 feet

AirspeedMaximum endurance ........................53 to .55 IMN,

aircraft configuration dependentMaximum airspeed ...................... 86 IMN (TJS pod

limitation)Minimum airspeed ..................114 KIAS (minimum

approach speed)220 KIAS (TJS pod operation)

Fuel CapacityPounds........................ 25,400 total; 15,400 internal,

10,000 externalGallons........................... 3,768 total; 2,268 internal,

1,500 external

Endurance..........Varies greatly depending on air-craft configuration and mission profile;

typical pod and external fuel load willresult in approximately 1 hour and

45 minutes loiter without ARHi Lo Lo Hi profile with4 X TJS pods........................ 425 nm mission radius

Weapons SystemsJammers ............ 5 X AN/ALQ-99 tactical jamming

podsRadars ............ AN/APS-130 ground mapping radarMissiles .........................................AGM-88 HARMMiscellaneous .............AN/ALE-41 and 43 corridor

chaff podAN/ALQ-99 on-board receiver system

Typical mix: ................. Load based on enemy orderof battle and threat; typical load

will be 3 to 4 tactical jamming pods,1 to 2 AGM-88 or external fuel tanks

Other SystemsOn-board recording............. AN/ALQ-99 on-board/

tactical jamming system recorderMiscellaneous ............ UHF/VHF, AM/FM regency

scannerUSQ-113 Communications jammer

Communications EquipmentHF ............................................... 1 X AN/ARC-105VHF............................................. 1 X AN/ARC-175UHF............................. 2 X AN/ARC-159 w/KY-58

encryption devices

Aircraft Survivability EquipmentRWR ................................................................NoneDECM...............2 X ALQ-167 tactical contingency

pod (training only)Expendables ..............AN/ALE-39 countermeasures

dispenser

A-8 ________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-24

S

KC-130 (Models F/R/T)DimensionsHeight............................................. 38 feet 4 inchesWeight................................ 90,000 pounds (empty)Maximum gross weight ....155,000 pounds (SLEP)

135,000 pounds (non-SLEP)Length ............................................ 97 feet 9 inchesWingspan ..................................... 132 feet 7 inches

AirspeedMaximum endurance .............................. 240 KIASMaximum airspeed ................................. 350 KIAS

Fuel CapacityTakeoff fuel KC-130F ........................41,406 cargo

65,831 tankerKC-130R/T .........................................59,606 cargo

84,032 tankerEnduranceTypical .......................................................13 hours

Aircraft Survivability EquipmentALQ-157AAR-47ALE-139, APR-39*Night vision lighting*

*Only specially configured aircraft

Air Delivery of Cargo and PersonnelContainer delivery system ..........Up to 16 bundles;

37,248 poundsMilitary free fall.....................................64 jumpersHeavy equipment ................Vehicles, ammo, cargo

(42,000 pounds)Personnel staticline ................................64 jumpers

Short Unimproved Airfield OperationsSize and strength of runway are performance/weight dependent. Standard is 3,500 feet by 60feet.

Mission ProfilesDASC(A) capable, radio relay, battlefieldillumination

Rapid Ground Refueling Flow Rates(pounds per minute)

IFR SPRModel Point drogue panel PodAH-1W 1 59 34 49

2 54 29 44CH-46 1 79 44 59

2 69 35 49CH-53 1 66 40 56

2 56 31 46

Communications EquipmentVHF/VOR...................................... 2 X AN/AR126UHF ....................................2 X AN/ARC-159(V)1HF .............................................. 2 X AN/ARC-190SATCOM*DASC suite........................................ AN/UYQ-3A

*Some aircraft are configured to operate thesesystems

Other SystemsRadar.........AN/APS 133 (weather, ground, beacon

IFF capable) INSGPS*

Celestial Navigation*

*Some aircraft are configured to operate thesesystems

Air Land Delivery of Cargo and PersonnelCargo-configured Airframe Passengers Pallets Troops

0 6 092 1 7672 2 4452 3 3341 4 3224 5 1670 litters with 6 attendants74 litters with 2 attendants

Tanker-configured Airframe Passengers Pallets

40 124 2

Assault Support __________________________________________________________________________________________ A-9

Aerial Refueling Transfer Rates(JP-5 at Standard Daytime Temperature)

1 receiver 2 receivers (pounds per minute) (pounds per minute)

F cargo 980 490 R or T cargo 1,020 510 F tanker 2,040 2,040 R or T tanker 2,040 2,040

A-10 _______________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-24

MV-22The MV-22 aircraft provides a worldwide self-deploying capability (2,100 nautical miles withinflight refueling). It also provides modern avionics that will improve joint interoperability byproviding the capability to transmit, receive, and display information to and from aircraft,ground units, or other Services.

Length ............................................ 57 feet 4 inchesWidth ............................................. 84 feet 7 inchesHeight.................................................22 feet 1 inch

Troop capacity ............. 24 combat-equipped troopsExternal capability........................... 10,000 poundsCruise airspeed ........................................... 230 kts;

130 kts w/external load

Scenario Cruise Airspeed Combat Radius24 combat-equipped Marines 230 kts 272.9 nm10,000 pound internal load 230 kts 270 nm8,000 pound external load (HUMMV) 130 kts 105 nm

Appendix B

Assault Support Request Form

Instructions to Complete

Block Title and Elements Explanation

Section I. Mission Request

1. UNIT CALLED Identifies the unit designation/call sign/preassigned number.

THIS IS Identifies the request originator by unit designator/call sign/preassigned number.

REQUEST NUMBER For preplanned missions, indicates the originator’s request number in series. For immediate missions, this number is assigned by the DASC.

SENT Indicates the time and individual who transmitted the request.

2. REQUEST FOR Indicates whether request is for helicopter or fixed-wing support.

3. MISSION CATEGORIES

PREPLANNED:A. PrecedenceB. Priority

For preplanned requests, enter precedence (block A) and priority (block B). Precedence is stated numeri-cally in descending order of importance, as determined by the requestor. Priority is expressed as shown below.

IMMEDIATE:C. Priority

For immediate requests, enter priority (block C). A precedence entry is not required for immediate requests because, by definition, all immediate requests are precedence #1.

Use the numerical designation below to determine pri-ority (e.g., define the tactical situation) for preplanned (block B) or immediate (block C).

B-2 ________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-24

1. Emergency. Missions which require immediate action and supersede all other categories of mission priority.

2. Priority. Missions which require immediate action and supersede routine missions. For medical evacua-tion (MEDEVAC), use this category for patients who require specialized treatment not available locally and who are liable to suffer unnecessary pain or disability unless evacuated with the least possible delay.

3. Routine. Missions which do not demand urgency in execution. For MEDEVAC, use this category for patients who can be treated locally, but whose progno-sis would benefit by evacuation with the least possible delay.

4. Urgent. (for MEDEVAC only). Evacuation of crit-ically wounded, injured, or ill personnel whose immediate evacuation is a matter of life or death.

RECEIVED Indicates the time and individual who received the request.

4. TYPE MISSION Indicates whether the mission is tactical or administrative.

5. MISSION IS Describes the mission to be performed. Check appro-priate blocks 1 through 12 to identify the mission to be performed. If block 12 (Remarks) is checked, enter an explanation.

6. PAYLOAD IS Describes the type and approximate amount of the payload to be transported. It is necessary to specify, even if a rough estimate, the number of troops. Other-wise ACE planner cannot determine what force is required—aircraft type/number. For internal cargo, include the dimensions of the largest item to be moved. For MEDEVAC, indicate number of casual-ties in block 6A.

7. INSTRUCTIONS Indicates the time/coordinates of the PZ and DZ.

8. LZ DESCRIPTION Contains detailed information on the LZ.

Block Title and Elements Explanation

Assault Support __________________________________________________________________________________________ B-3

9. LZ WILL BEA. UnmarkedB. Marked

Indicates if the LZ will be unmarked or marked. If the LZ will be marked, indicate the color.

10. LZ MARKED WITH Identifies the type LZ marking.

11. COMMUNICATIONS Identifies the call sign and frequency of PZ and DZ controllers.

12. REMARKS

MC PediatricsMM Internal MedicineNP PsychiatrySB BurnsSC Spinal Cord InjurySG OB/GYNSO Orthopedic Surgery

Allows the requestor to add other essential informa-tion not provided for in the request format. For MEDEVAC, include type casualties/wounds, litter, ambulatory status, medical attendant requirements, or any other special considerations. If possible, medical personnel should provide a medical regulating code (MRC):

SS General SurgerySSC Thoracic SurgerySSM Maxillofacial SurgerySSN NeurosurgerySSO Opthamology InjurySSU Urology

ACKNOWLEDGEDBn/regtDivisionOther

Indicates that the request has been copied for concur-rence by the GCE.

Section II. Coordination

13. NSFS Naval surface fire support coordination.

14. ARTILLERY Artillery coordination.

15. AIO/G-2/G-3 Air Intelligence Officer, G-2, G-3 coordination.

16. ESCORT/AERIALREFUELING

Indicates if escort or aerial refueling support is required for the mission. Block A indicates support has been requested. Block B indicates TACC has assigned assets. After assets are assigned, the TACC enters the rest of the data.

Block Title and Elements Explanation

B-4 ________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-24

17. REQUESTA. ApprovedB. Disapproved

Indicates the approval or disapproval of the request.

18. BY Indicates the individual who approved or disapproved the request.

19. REASON FORDISAPPROVAL

Self-explanatory.

20. RESTRICTIVE FIRE/AIR PLAN

A. Is NotB. Number

The restrictive fire/air plan refers to the airspace coor-dination area (ACA). An ACA is a three-dimensional block of airspace where friendly aircraft are reason-ably safe from friendly surface fires. A plan number or code name is issued, as appropriate.

21. IS IN EFFECT

A. From Time ________B. To Time __________

Establishes the time period that the ACA plan will be in effect.

22. LOCATION

A. From Coordinates_______B. To Coordinates_________

Grid coordinates of the start/end points of the ACA centerline.

23. WIDTH (METERS) Defines the ACA from either side of centerline.

24. ALTITUDE/VERTEX

A. Max/Vertex____________B. Minimum______________

ACA in feet above mean sea level. Use block A for VERTEX only.

Section III. Mission Data

25. MISSION NUMBER Indicates mission number.

26. CALL SIGN Flight call sign of mission aircraft.

27. NO/TYPE AIRCRAFT Self-explanatory.

28. EST/ACT TAKEOFF Estimated or actual time the mission aircraft will take off.

Block Title and Elements Explanation

Assault Support __________________________________________________________________________________________ B-5

29. ETA/ATA Estimated or actual time of arrival of the mission air-craft in the objective area.

30. MISSION CANCELLED/DIVERTED

Indicates if mission is cancelled or diverted. By__________ indicates the individual/agency/unit who cancelled or diverted the mission.

31. TERMINATE REQUEST Indicates conditions under which to terminate the request.

32. MISSION RESULTS Self-explanatory, include pilot reports.

Block Title and Elements Explanation

B-6 ________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-24

ASSAULT SUPPORT REQUEST FORM

SECTION I — MISSION REQUEST DATE

1. UNIT CALLED THIS IS REQUEST NUMBER SENT

2. REQUEST FOR

A. q HELICOPTER

B. q FIXED-WING

3. MISSION CATEGORIES

A. q PREPLANNED: PRECEDENCE __________

B. q PRIORITY __________

C. q IMMEDIATE: PRIORITY ________________

4. TYPE MISSION

A. q TACTICAL

B . q ADMINISTRATIVE

TIME BY

5. MISSION IS

A. q ASSAULT TRANSPORT G. q TRAP

B. q LOGISTICAL SUPPORT H. q SAR

C . q AIR EVACUATION I. q ILLUMINATION

D . q MEDEVAC J. q SPECIAL OPS

E. q AERIAL DELIVERY K. q OTHER __________

F. q C2

6. PAYLOAD IS

A. q TROOPS __________________

B. q EXTERNAL CARGO (WT) ____________________

C . q INTERNAL CARGO (WT/CU) _________________

LARGEST ITEM (LxWxH) ________________

7. INSTRUCTIONS

PICKUP TIME COORDINATES LZ TIME COORDINATES

A. _______________________ __________________________________ ____________________________ _______________________________________

B. _______________________ __________________________________ ____________________________ _______________________________________

C. _______________________ __________________________________ ____________________________ _______________________________________

D. _______________________ __________________________________ ____________________________ _______________________________________

8. LZ DESCRIPTION

A. WIND DIRECTION/VELOCITY _________________________________ B. ELEVATION _____________________________________________________ (FT MSL)

C. SIZE _______________________________________________________ D. OBSTACLES _____________________________________________________________

E. FRIENDLY POS _____________________________________________ DIR/DIST ______________________________/_________________________________

F. ENEMY POS ________________________________________________ DIR/DIST ______________________________/_________________________________

G. LAST FIRE RECEIVED TIME/TYPE _______________/______________ DIR/DIST ______________________________/_________________________________

9. LZ WILL BE A. q UNMARKED 10. LZ MARKED WITH A. q PANELS B. q SMOKE C. q FLARES

B. qMARKED WITH COLOR ____________ D. q MIRROR E. q LIGHTS F. q NAVAID G. q OTHER

11. COMMUNICATIONS A. PICKUP ZONE CALL SIGN _______________________________/FREQUENCY (COLOR CODE) _______________________________________

B. LZ CALL SIGN _________________________________________/FREQUENCY (COLOR CODE)________________________________________

12. REMARKS ACKNOWLEDGED

BN/REGT

DIVISION

OTHER

SECTION II — COORDINATION

13. MSFS

16. ESCORT/AERIAL REFUELING A. q REQUESTED B. q ASSIGNEDC. NO/TYPE A/C _____________________________________________ D. CALL SIGN ____________________________________________________________E. COMMUNICATIONS_________________________________________ F. ARMAMENT ____________________________________________________________

17. REQUEST

q APPROVED qDISAPPROVED

19. REASON FOR DISAPPROVAL

20. RESTRICTIVE FIRE/AIR PLAN

A. q IS NOT B. q NUMBER

21. IS IN EFFECT

A. q (FROM TIME) ___________ B. q (TO TIME) ___________

22. LOCATION

A. q _____________________ B. q __________________(FROM COORDINATES) (TO COORDINATES)

23. WIDTH (METERS) 24. ALTITUDE/VERTEX

A. q ___________ B. q __________MAX/VERTEX MINIMUM

SECTION III — MISSION DATA

25. MISSION NUMBER 26. CALL SIGN 27. NO/TYPE AIRCRAFT

28. EST/ACT TAKEOFF 29. ETA/ATA

30. MISSION CANCELLED/DIVERTED A. q CANCELLED B. q DIVERTED BY: _______________________________________

31. TERMINATE REQUEST A. q GO/NO GO DTG ______________ B. q WHEN COMPLETED ________________

32. MISSION RESULTS ACKNOWLEDGE

A. q COMPLETE

B. q INCOMPLETE

C. q OTHER ____________________

TACC

FSCC

DASC

TACP

TADC

SACC

HDC

TACLOG

14. ARTILLERY 15. AIO/G-2/G-3

TIME BY

RECEIVED

18. BY:

ASSAULT SUPPORT REQUEST FORM

SECTION I — MISSION REQUEST DATE

1. UNIT CALLED THIS IS REQUEST NUMBER SENT

2. REQUEST FOR

A. q HELICOPTER

B. q FIXED-WING

3. MISSION CATEGORIES

A. q PREPLANNED: PRECEDENCE __________

B. q PRIORITY __________

C. q IMMEDIATE: PRECEDENCE __________

4. TYPE MISSION

A. q TACTICAL

B . q ADMINISTRATIVE

TIME BY

5. MISSION IS

A. q ASSAULT TRANSPORT G. q TRAP

B. q LOGISTICAL SUPPORT H. q SAR

C . q AIR EVACUATION I. q ILLUMINATION

D . q MEDEVAC J. q SPECIAL OPS

E. q AERIAL DELIVERY K. q OTHER __________

F. q C2

6. PAYLOAD IS

A. q TROOPS __________________

B. q EXTERNAL CARGO (WT) ____________________

C . q INTERNAL CARGO (WT/CU) _________________

LARGEST ITEM (LxWxH) ________________

7. INSTRUCTIONS

PICKUP TIME COORDINATES LZ TIME COORDINATES

A. _______________________ __________________________________ ____________________________ _______________________________________

B. _______________________ __________________________________ ____________________________ _______________________________________

C. _______________________ __________________________________ ____________________________ _______________________________________

D. _______________________ __________________________________ ____________________________ _______________________________________

8. LZ DESCRIPTION

A. WIND DIRECTION/VELOCITY _________________________________ B. ELEVATION _____________________________________________________ (FT MSL)

C. SIZE _______________________________________________________ D. OBSTACLES _____________________________________________________________

E. FRIENDLY POS _____________________________________________ DIR/DIST ______________________________/_________________________________

F. ENEMY POS ________________________________________________ DIR/DIST ______________________________/_________________________________

G. LAST FIRE RECEIVED TIME/TYPE _______________/______________ DIR/DIST ______________________________/_________________________________

9. LZ WILL BE A. q UNMARKED 10. LZ MARKED WITH A. q PANELS B. q SMOKE C. q FLARES

B. q MARKED WITH COLOR ____________ D. q MIRROR E. q LIGHTS F. q NAVAID G. q OTHER

11. COMMUNICATIONS A. PICKUP ZONE CALL SIGN _______________________________/FREQUENCY (COLOR CODE) _______________________________________

B. LZ CALL SIGN _________________________________________/FREQUENCY (COLOR CODE)________________________________________

12. REMARKS ACKNOWLEDGE

BN/REGT

DIVISION

OTHER

SECTION II — COORDINATION

13. MSFS

16. ESCORT/AERIAL REFUELING A. q REQUESTED B. q ASSIGNEDC. NO/TYPE A/C _____________________________________________ D. CALL SIGN ___________________________________________________________E. COMMUNICATIONS_________________________________________ F. ARMAMENT ____________________________________________________________

17. REQUEST

qAPPROVED q DISAPPROVED

19. REASON FOR DISAPPROVAL

20. RESTRICTIVE FIRE/AIR PLAN

A. q IS NOT B. q NUMBER

21. IS IN EFFECT

A. q (FROM TIME) ___________ B. q (TO TIME) ___________

22. LOCATION

A. q ___________________ B. q ________________(FROM COORDINATES) (TO COORDINATES)

23. WIDTH (METERS) 24. ALTITUDE/VERTEX

A. q ___________ B. q __________MAX/VERTEX MINIMUM

SECTION III — MISSION DATA

25. MISSION NUMBER 26. CALL SIGN 27. NO/TYPE AIRCRAFT

28. EST/ACT TAKEOFF 29. ETA/ATA

30. MISSION CANCELLED/DIVERTEDA. q CANCELLED B. q DIVERTED BY: _________________________________________

31. TERMINATE REQUEST A. q GO/NO GO DTG ______________ B. q WHEN COMPLETED ________________

32. MISSION RESULSTS ACKNOWLEDGE

A. q COMPLETE

B. q INCOMPLETE

C. q OTHER ____________________

18. BY

1-2 ________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-24

ASSAULT SUPPORT REQUEST FORM

SECTION I–MISSION REQUEST DATE

1. UNIT CALLED THIS IS REQUEST NUMBER SENT

TIME BY

2. REQUEST FOR A. q HELICOPTER B. q FIXED-WING

3. MISSION CATEGORIES RECEIVED

A. q PREPLANNED: PRECEDENCE_____________ B. q PRIORITY_____________

C. q IMMEDIATE: PRIORITY _______________

4. MISSION TYPE A. q TACTICAL B. q ADMINISTRATIVE

5. MISSION IS

A. q ASSAULT TRANSPORT B. q LOGISTICAL SUPPORT C. q AIR EVACUATION D. q MEDEVAC

E. q AERIAL DELIVERY F. q C2 G. q TRAP H. q SAR

I. q ILLUMINATION J. q SPECIAL OPS K. q OTHER __________________

6. PAYLOAD IS

A. q TROOPS ____________________________________ B. q EXTERNAL CARGO/WT _________________________________

C. q INTERNAL CARGO WT/CU ______________________ LARGEST ITEM (LxWxH) ________________________________

Appendix C

Glossary

Section I. Acronyms and Abbreviations

AAA....................................... antiaircraft artilleryAAAV.................................advanced amphibious

assault vehicleAAW.............................................. antiair warfareABF.....................................attack by fire positionACA .............................airspace coordination areaACE ............................... aviation combat elementAIO .................................... air intelligence officerAMC ................................ air mission commanderARM ..................................... antiradiation missileASC(A) ..... assault support coordinator (airborne)ASE.........................................air support elementASR................................... assault support requestATC ........................................... air traffic controlATF.................................... amphibious task forceATO ............................................ air tasking orderBDA ............................. battle damage assessmentBP....................................................battle positionCAC2S ............... common aviation command and

control systemCAS............................................. close air supportCATF ............ commander, amphibious task forceCE ............................................ command elementCH-46....... medium-assault transport aircraft (Sea

Knight)CH-53...........heavy-assault transport aircraft (Sea

Stallion)CLF ............................. commander, landing forceCMC................Commandant of the Marine CorpsCNO ............................ Chief of Naval OperationsCOA ............................................ .course of actionCOC .............................. combat operations centerCOMINT................. communications intelligenceCSAR ............................combat search and rescueCSS .................................. combat service supportCSSE...................combat service support elementDAO.................................Defense Attache OfficeDASC.............................. direct air support centerDZ ..........................................................drop zoneEA ............................................... electronic attackEMCON ...................................... emission control

ES.................................electronic warfare supportEW ............................................electronic warfareFAC..................................... forward air controllerFAC(A) .............. forward air controller (airborne)FARP ............ forward arming and refueling pointFEBA ....................forward edge of the battle areaFFCC..................... force fires coordination centerFOB...................................forward operating baseFSCC................... fire support coordination centerFSSG..........................force service support groupGCE .................................ground combat elementHA................................... humanitarian assistanceHARM .............. high-speed anti-radiation missileHCS...................... helicopter coordination sectionHDC.............................helicopter direction centerHERS ..............................helicopter expeditionary

refueling systemHMM .......... Marine medium helicopter squadronHR............................................. helicopter requestHST..................................helicopter support teamIPB ......intelligence preparation of the battlespaceJATF .......................... joint amphibious task forceJCS........................................ Joint Chiefs of StaffJFC.................................... joint force commanderJTAR....................... joint tactical airstrike requestJTF .................................................joint task forceKC-130.............. aerial refueling/transport aircraft

(Hercules)LAAD .............................. low altitude air defenseLCAC..............................landing craft air cushionLOC ................................. line of communicationsLST ...................................... landing support teamLZ...................................................... landing zoneMACCS ............Marine air command and control

systemMACG ........................... Marine air control groupMAGTF ...................Marine air-ground task forceMASS....................... Marine air support squadronMBA ............................................ main battle areaMCCP ................. Marine Corps Capabilities Plan

C-2 ________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-24

MCO ......................................Marine Corps orderMCWP ......Marine Corps warfighting publicationMEDEVAC.............................medical evacuationMEF ...........................Marine expeditionary forceMETT-T......mission, enemy, terrain and weather,

troops and support available-time available

MEU.............................Marine expeditionary unitMEU(SOC) ..................Marine expeditionary unit

(special operations capable)MOOTW......... military operations other than warMRC................................ medical regulating codeNATOPS......... Naval Air Training and Operating

Procedures StandardizationNEO ............. noncombatant evacuation operationNSFS.............................naval surface fire supportNVD........................................ night vision deviceNWP..............................naval warfare publicationOAS ..................................... offensive air supportOMFTS .......... operational maneuver from the seaOPSEC .................................... operations securityPROVMAG ............ provisional Marine air groupPZ....................................................... pickup zoneRAO ............................ rear area operations centerRAS............................................ rear area security

RGR ...................................rapid ground refuelingROE ...................................... rules of engagementSAAWC........... sector antiair warfare coordinatorSAM.....................................surface-to-air missileSAR........................................... search and rescueSAW....................................surface-to-air weaponSBF .................................. support by fire positionSEAD..............suppression of enemy air defensesSOC..............................special operations capableSOF ................................ special operations forcesTAC(A)............ tactical air coordinator (airborne)TACC (Marine)....... tactical air command centerTACC (Navy) ................tactical air control centerTACP .............................. tactical air control partyTADC.......................... tactical air direction centerTAOC....................... tactical air operations centerTAR ......................................... tactical air requestTRAP .................. tactical recovery of aircraft and

personnelTTP ................ tactics, techniques, and proceduresUAV................................unmanned aerial vehicleUH-1 .............. assault utility helicopter (Iroquois,

commonly called Huey)U.S. .................................................. United States

Assault Support __________________________________________________________________________________________ C-3

Section II. Definitions

A

air defense—All defensive measures designed todestroy attacking enemy aircraft or missiles in theEarth’s envelope of atmosphere, or to nullify orreduce the effectiveness of such attack. (Joint Pub1-02)

air interdiction—Air operations conducted to de-stroy, neutralize, or delay the enemy’s militarypotential before it can be brought to bear effec-tively against friendly forces at such distancefrom friendly forces that detailed integration ofeach air mission with the fire and movement offriendly forces is not required. (Joint Pub 1-02)

air reconnaissance—The acquisition of intelli-gence information by employing visual observa-tion and/or sensors in air vehicles. (Joint Pub 1-02)

air superiority—That degree of dominance inthe air battle of one force over another which per-mits the conduct of operations by the former andits related land, sea and air forces at a given timeand place without prohibitive interference by theopposing force. (Joint Pub 1-02)

air threat levels—The conditions which relate tothe enemy’s air defense capability against air-borne friendly aircraft. There are three levels ofair threat:

a. low—An air threat environment which permitscombat operations and support to proceedwithout prohibitive interference. Associatedtactics and techniques do not normally requireextraordinary measures for preplanned or im-mediate support.

b. medium—An air threat environment in whichthe specific aircraft performance and weaponssystem capability allow acceptable exposuretime to enemy air defenses. This air threatenvironment restricts the flexibility of tacticsin the immediate target/objective area. It is anenvironment in which the enemy may havelimited radar and/or electro-optical acquisitioncapability at medium ranges, but the air

defense system is not supported by fully inte-grated fire control systems.

c. high—An air threat environment created by anopposing force possessing air defense combatpower including integrated fire control sys-tems and electronic warfare capabilities whichwould seriously diminish the ability of friend-ly forces to provide necessary air support.This air threat environment might precludemissions such as immediate close air support,as the requirement for effective radio commu-nications and coordination may not be possi-ble. (MCRP 5-12C)

antiair warfare—A US Navy/US Marine Corpsterm used to indicate that action required to de-stroy or reduce to an acceptable level the enemyair and missile threat. It includes such measures asthe use of interceptors, bombers, antiaircraft guns,surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles, electronic at-tack, and destruction of the air or missile threatboth before and after it is launched. Other mea-sures which are taken to minimize the effects ofhostile air action are cover, concealment, disper-sion, deception (including electronic), and mobili-ty. (Joint Pub 1-02)

armed reconnaissance—A mission with the pri-mary purpose of locating and attacking targets ofopportunity, i.e., enemy materiel, personnel, andfacilities, in assigned general areas or along as-signed ground communications routes, and not forthe purpose of attacking specific briefed targets.(Joint Pub 1-02)

assault support—The use of aircraft to providetactical mobility and logistic support for theMAGTF, the movement of high priority cargoand personnel within the immediate area of opera-tions, in-flight refueling, and the evacuation ofpersonnel and cargo. (MCRP 5-12C)

assault support coordinator (airborne)—Anaviator who coordinates, from an aircraft, themovement of aviation assets during assault sup-port operations. Also called ASC(A). Formerly

C-4 ________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-24

referred to as helicopter coordinator (airborne) orHC(A). (MCRP 5-12C).

C

close air support—Air action by fixed and rota-ry-wing aircraft against hostile targets which arein close proximity to friendly forces and which re-quire detailed integration of each air mission withthe fire and movement of those forces. Also calledCAS. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combined arms—The full integration of combatarms in such a way that to counteract one, the en-emy must become more vulnerable to another.(MCRP 5-12C)

communications intelligence—See electronicwarfare.

concept of operations—A verbal or graphicstatement, in broad outline, of a commander’s as-sumptions or intent in regard to an operation orseries of operations. The concept of operationsfrequently is embodied in campaign plans and op-eration plans; in the latter case, particularly whenthe plans cover a series of connected operations tobe carried out simultaneously or in succession.The concept is designed to give an overall pictureof the operation. It is included primarily for addi-tional clarity of purpose. Also called command-er’s concept. (Joint Pub 1-02)

counterinsurgency—Those military, paramili-tary, political, economic, psychological, and civicactions taken by a government to defeat insurgen-cy. (Joint Pub 1-02)

D

deception—Those measures designed to misleadthe enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsifi-cation of evidence to induce him to react in amanner prejudicial to his interests. (Joint Pub 1-02)

deep air support—Air action against enemy tar-gets at such a distance from friendly forces thatdetailed integration of each mission with fire andmovement of friendly forces is not required. Deep

air support missions are flown on either side ofthe fire support coordination line; the lack of a re-quirement for close coordination with the fire andmovement of friendly forces is the qualifying fac-tor. (MCRP 5-12C)

demonstration—An attack or show of force on afront where a decision is not sought, made withthe aim of deceiving the enemy. (Joint Pub 1-02)

direct air support center—The principal aircontrol agency of the US Marine air commandand control system responsible for the directionand control of air operations directly supportingthe ground combat element. It processes and coor-dinates requests for immediate air support and co-ordinates air missions requiring integration withground forces and other supporting arms. It nor-mally collocates with the senior fire support coor-dination center within the ground combat elementand is subordinate to the tactical air commandcenter. Also called DASC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

direct support—A mission requiring a force tosupport another specific force and authorizing itto answer directly the supported force’s requestfor assistance. (Joint Pub 1-02)

E

electronic warfare—Any military action involv-ing the use of electromagnetic and directed ener-gy to control the electro-magnetic spectrum or toattack the enemy. Also called EW. The three ma-jor subdivisions within electronic warfare are:electronic attack, electronic protection, and elec-tronic warfare support.

a. electronic attack—That division of electron-ic warfare involving the use of electromagnet-ic, directed energy, or antiradiation weaponsto attack personnel, facilities, or equipmentwith the intent of degrading, neutralizing, ordestroying enemy combat capability. Alsocalled EA. EA includes: 1) actions taken toprevent or reduce an enemy’s effective use ofthe electromagnetic spectrum, such as jam-ming and electromagnetic deception, and 2)employment of weapons that use either elec-tromagnetic or directed energy as their prima-

Assault Support __________________________________________________________________________________________ C-5

ry destructive mechanism (lasers, radiofrequency weapons, particle beams), or antira-diation weapons.

b. electronic protection—That division of elec-tronic warfare involving actions taken to pro-tect personnel, facilities, and equipment fromany effects of friendly or enemy employmentof electronic warfare that degrade, neutralize,or destroy friendly combat capability. Alsocalled EP.

c. electronic warfare support—That division ofelectronic warfare involving actions taskedby, or under direct control of, an operationalcommander to search for, intercept, identify,and locate sources of intentional and uninten-tional radiated electromagnetic energy for thepurpose of immediate threat recognition.Thus, electronic warfare support provides in-formation required for immediate decisionsinvolving electronic warfare operations andother tactical actions such as threat avoidance,targeting, and homing. Also called ES. Elec-tronic warfare support data can be used to pro-duce signals intelligence (SIGINT), bothcommunications intelligence (COMINT), andelectronic intelligence (ELINT). (Joint Pub 1-02)

F

feint—A limited-objective attack involving con-tact with the enemy, varying in size from a raid toa supporting attack. Feints are used to cause theenemy to react in three predictable ways: to em-ploy reserves improperly, to shift supporting fires,or to reveal defensive fires. (MCRP 5-12C)

final protective fire—An immediately availableprearranged barrier of fire designed to impede en-emy movement across defensive lines or areas.(Joint Pub 1-02)

fire support—In Marine Corps usage, assistanceto elements of the Marine air-ground task forceengaged with the enemy rendered by other firingunits, including (but not limited to) artillery, mor-tars, naval surface fire support, and offensive airsupport. (MCRP 5-12C)

fire support coordination center—A single lo-cation in which are centralized communicationsfacilities and personnel incident to the coordina-tion of all forms of fire support. (Joint Pub 1-02)

fire support coordination line—A fire supportcoordination measure that is established and ad-justed by appropriate land or amphibious forcecommanders within their boundaries in consulta-tion with superior, subordinate, supporting, andaffected commanders. Fire support coordinationlines (FSCLs) facilitate the expeditious attack ofsurface targets of opportunity beyond the coordi-nating measure. An FSCL does not divide an areaof operations by defining a boundary betweenclose and deep operations or a zone for close airsupport. The FSCL applies to all fires of air, land,and sea-based weapon systems using any type ofammunition. Forces attacking targets beyond anFSCL must inform all affected commanders insufficient time to allow necessary reaction toavoid fratricide. Supporting elements attackingtargets beyond the FSCL must ensure that the at-tack will not produce adverse effects on, or to therear of, the line. Short of an FSCL, all air-to-ground and surface-to-surface attack operationsare controlled by the appropriate land or amphibi-ous force commander. The FSCL should followwell defined terrain features. Coordination of at-tacks beyond the FSCL is especially critical tocommanders of air, land, and special operationsforces. In exceptional circumstances, the inabilityto conduct this coordination will not preclude theattack of targets beyond the FSCL. However, fail-ure to do so may increase the risk of fratricide andcould waste limited resources. Also called FSCL.(Joint Pub 1-02)

forward air controller—An officer (aviator/pi-lot) member of the tactical air control party who,from a forward ground or airborne position, con-trols aircraft in close air support of ground troops.(Joint Pub 1-02)

forward air controller (airborne)—A specifi-cally trained and qualified aviation officer whoexercises control from the air of aircraft engagedin close air support of ground troops. The forwardair controller (airborne) is normally an airborne

C-6 ________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-24

extension of the tactical air control party. Alsocalled FAC(A). (Joint Pub 1-02)

forward arming and refueling point—A tempo-rary facility, organized, equipped, and deployedby an aviation commander, and normally locatedin the main battle area closer to the area of opera-tion than the aviation unit’s combat service area,to provide fuel and ammunition necessary for theemployment of aviation maneuver units in com-bat. The forward arming and refueling point per-mits combat aircraft to rapidly refuel and rearmsimultaneously. Also called FARP. (Joint Pub 1-02)

forward looking infrared—An airborne, electro-optical thermal imaging device that detects far-infrared energy, converts the energy into an elec-tronic signal, and provides a visible image for dayor night viewing. Also called FLIR. (Joint Pub 1-02)

forward operating base—An airfield used tosupport tactical operations without establishingfull support facilities. The base may be used foran extended time period. Support by a main oper-ating base will be required to provide backup sup-port for a forward operating base. Also calledFOB. (Joint Pub 1-02)

G

general support—That support which is given tothe supported force as a whole and not to any par-ticular subdivision thereof. (Joint Pub 1-02)

H

helicopter support team—A task organizationformed and equipped for employment in a landingzone to facilitate the landing and movement of he-licopterborne troops, equipment and supplies, andto evacuate selected casualties and enemy prison-ers of war. (Joint Pub 1-02). Within the MarineCorps, helicopter support teams are sourced fromthe FSSG, specifically from the Landing SupportCompany of the Support Battalion. Also calledHST.

I

immediate air support—Air support to meetspecific requests which arise during the course ofa battle and which by their nature cannot beplanned in advance. (Joint Pub 1-02)

M

maneuver warfare—A warfighting philosophythat seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion througha variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected ac-tions which create a turbulent and rapidly deterio-rating situation with which the enemy cannotcope. (MCRP 5-12C)

Marine air command and control system—Asystem which provides the aviation combatelement commander with the means to command,coordinate, and control all air operations withinan assigned sector and to coordinate air opera-tions with other Services. It is composed ofcommand and control agencies with communica-tions-electronics equipment that incorporates acapability from manual through semiautomaticcontrol. Also called MACCS. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Marine air-ground task force—The MarineCorps principal organization for all missionsacross the range of military operations, composedof forces task-organized under a single command-er capable of responding rapidly to a contingencyanywhere in the world. The types of forces in theMAGTF are functionally grouped into four coreelements: a command element, an aviationcombat element, a ground combat element, and acombat service support element. The four coreelements are categories of forces, not formalcommands. The basic structure of the Marine air-ground task force never varies, though thenumber, size, and type of Marine Corps unitscomprising each of its four elements will alwaysbe mission dependent. The flexibility of the orga-nizational structure allows for one or more subor-dinate MAGTFs, other Service and/or foreignmilitary forces, to be assigned or attached. Alsocalled MAGTF . See also aviation combatelement; combat service support element;

Assault Support __________________________________________________________________________________________ C-7

command element; ground combat element;Marine expeditionary force; Marine expeditionaryforce (Forward); Marine expeditionary unit;special purpose Marine air-ground task force.command element—The core element of aMarine air-ground task force that is the headquar-ters. The command element is composed of thecommander, general or executive and special staffsections, headquarters section, and requisitecommunications support, intelligence and recon-naissance forces, necessary to accomplish theMAGTF’s mission. The command elementprovides command and control, intelligence, andother support essential for effective planning andexecution of operations by the other elements ofthe Marine air-ground task force. The commandelement varies in size and composition and maycontain other Service or foreign military forcesassigned or attached to the MAGTF. Also calledCE. See also aviation combat element; combatservice support element; ground combat element;Marine air-ground task force; Marine expedition-ary force; Marine expeditionary force (Forward);Marine expeditionary unit; special purposeMarine air-ground task force. aviation combatelement—The core element of a Marine air-ground task force that is task-organized toconduct aviation operations. The aviation combatelement provides all or a portion of the six func-tions of Marine aviation necessary to accomplishthe Marine air-ground task force’s mission. Thesefunctions are antiair warfare, offensive airsupport, assault support, electronic warfare, airreconnaissance, and control of aircraft andmissiles. The aviation combat element is usuallycomposed of an aviation unit headquarters andvarious other aviation units or their detachments.It can vary in size from a small aviation detach-ment of specifically required aircraft to one ormore Marine aircraft wings. The aviation combatelement may contain other Service or foreignmilitary forces assigned or attached to the Marineair-ground task force. The aviation combatelement itself is not a formal command. Alsocalled ACE. See also combat service supportelement; command element; ground combatelement; Marine air-ground task force; Marineexpeditionary force; Marine expeditionary force(Forward); Marine expeditionary unit; specialpurpose Marine air-ground task force. ground

combat element—The core element of a Marineair-ground task force that is task-organized toconduct ground operations. It is usually construct-ed around an infantry organization but can vary insize from a small ground unit of any type, to oneor more Marine divisions that can be indepen-dently maneuvered under the direction of theMAGTF commander. It includes appropriateground combat and combat support forces andmay contain other Service or foreign militaryforces assigned or attached to the Marine air-ground task force. The ground combat elementitself is not a formal command. Also called GCE.See also aviation combat element; combat servicesupport element; command element; Marine air-ground task force; Marine expeditionary force;Marine expeditionary force (Forward); Marineexpeditionary unit; special purpose Marine air-ground task force. combat service supportelement—The core element of a Marine air-ground task force that is task-organized to providethe combat service support necessary to accom-plish the Marine air-ground task force mission.The combat service support element varies in sizefrom a small detachment to one or more forceservice support groups. It provides supply, main-tenance, transportation, general engineering,health services, and a variety of other services tothe Marine air-ground task force. It may alsocontain other Service or foreign military forcesassigned or attached to the MAGTF. The combatservice support element itself is not a formalcommand. Also called CSSE. See also aviationcombat element; command element; groundcombat element; Marine air-ground task force;Marine expeditionary force; Marine expeditionaryforce (Forward); Marine expeditionary unit;special purpose Marine air-ground task force.special purpose Marine air-ground taskforce—A Marine air-ground task force organized,trained and equipped with narrowly focused capa-bilities. It is designed to accomplish a specificmission, often of limited scope and duration. Itmay be any size, but normally it is a relativelysmall force—the size of a Marine expeditionaryunit or smaller. It may contain other Service orforeign military forces assigned or attached to theMarine air-ground task force. Also calledSPMAGTF. See also aviation combat element;combat service support element; command

C-8 ________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-24

element; ground combat element; Marine air-ground task force; Marine expeditionary force;Marine expeditionary force (Forward); Marineexpeditionary unit. Marine expeditionary unit—A Marine air-ground task force that is constructedaround an infantry battalion reinforced, a helicop-ter squadron reinforced, and a task-organizedcombat service support element. It normallyfulfills Marine Corps forward sea-based deploy-ment requirements. The Marine expeditionaryunit provides an immediate reaction capability forcrisis response and is capable of limited combatoperations. It may contain other Service orforeign military forces assigned or attached. Alsocalled MEU. See also aviation combat element;combat service support element; commandelement; ground combat element; Marine air-ground task force; Marine expeditionary force;Marine expeditionary force (Forward); Marineexpeditionary unit (special operations capable);special purpose Marine air-ground task force.Marine expeditionary unit (special operationscapable)— The Marine Corps standard, forward-deployed, sea-based expeditionary organization.The MEU(SOC) is a MEU, augmented withselected personnel and equipment, that is trainedand equipped with an enhanced capability toconduct amphibious operations and a variety ofspecialized missions of limited scope and dura-tion. These missions include specialized demoli-tion, clandestine reconnaissance and surveillance,raids, in-extremis hostage recovery, and enablingoperations for follow-on forces. The Marine expe-ditionary unit (special operations capable) is not aspecial operations force but, when directed by theNational Command Authorities, the combatantcommander in chief, and/or other operationalcommander, may conduct limited special opera-tions in extremis, when other forces are inappro-priate or unavailable. It may also contain otherService or foreign military forces assigned orattached to the Marine air-ground task force. Alsocalled MEU (SOC). See also aviation combatelement; combat service support element;command element; ground combat element;Marine air-ground task force; Marine expedition-ary force; Marine expeditionary force (Forward);Marine expeditionary unit; special purposeMarine air-ground task force. Marine expedi-tionary force—The largest Marine air-ground

task force and the Marine Corps principal warf-ighting organization, particularly for larger crisesor contingencies. It is task-organized around apermanent command element and normallycontains one or more Marine divisions, Marineaircraft wings, and Marine force service supportgroups. The Marine expeditionary force is capa-ble of missions across the range of military opera-tions, including amphibious assault and sustainedoperations ashore in any environment. It can oper-ate from a sea base, a land base, or both. It mayalso contain other Service or foreign militaryforces assigned or attached to the MAGTF. Alsocalled MEF. See also aviation combat element;combat service support element; commandelement; ground combat element; Marine air-ground task force; Marine expeditionary force(Forward); Marine expeditionary unit; specialpurpose Marine air-ground task force. Marineexpeditionary force (Forward)—A designatedlead echelon of a Marine expeditionary force,task-organized to meet the requirements of aspecific situation. A Marine expeditionary force(Forward) varies in size and composition, andmay be commanded by the Marine expeditionaryforce commander personally or by another desig-nated commander. It may be tasked with prepar-ing for the subsequent arrival of the rest of theMEF/joint/combined forces, and/or the conduct ofother specified tasks, at the discretion of the MEFcommander. A Marine expeditionary force(Forward) may also be a stand-alone MAGTF,task-organized for a mission in which a MEF isnot required. It may also contain other Service orforeign military forces assigned or attached to theMarine air-ground task force. Also called MEF(Forward). See also aviation combat element;combat service support element; commandelement; ground combat element; Marine air-ground task force; Marine expeditionary force;Marine expeditionary unit; Marine expeditionaryunit (special operations capable); special purposeMarine air-ground task force. air contingencyMAGTF—An on-call, combat-ready MAGTFthat deploys by airlift. Air contingency MAGTFsvary in size based on mission requirements andthe availability of airlift. Because they deploy byair, they generally have a limited organic logisticcapability, and require an arrival airfield. Aircontingency MAGTFs usually are activated to

Assault Support __________________________________________________________________________________________ C-9

respond to developing crises, and may deployindependently or in conjunction with other expe-ditionary forces. Also called ACM. See also avia-tion combat element; combat service supportelement; ground combat element; Marine air-ground task force; Marine expeditionary force;Marine expeditionary force (Forward); Marineexpeditionary unit; special purpose Marine air-ground task force; task force. (Proposed change toJoint Pub 1-02)

O

offensive air support—Those air operations con-ducted against enemy installations, facilities, andpersonnel to directly assist the attainment ofMAGTF objectives by the destruction of enemyresources or the isolation of the enemy’s militaryforces. Also called OAS. (MCRP 5-12C)

operations security—A process of identifyingcritical information and subsequently analyzingfriendly actions attendant to military operationsand other activities to:

a. Identify those actions that can be observed byadversary intelligence systems.

b. Determine indicators hostile intelligence sys-tems might obtain that could be interpreted orpieced together to derive critical informationin time to be useful to adversaries.

c. Select and execute measures that eliminate orreduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabili-ties of friendly actions to adversary exploita-tion. Also called OPSEC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

P

preplanned air support—Air support in accor-dance with a program, planned in advance of op-erations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

R

raid—An operation, usually small scale, involv-ing a swift penetration of hostile territory to se-cure information, confuse the enemy, or todestroy installations. It ends with a planned with-

drawal upon completion of the assigned mission.(Joint Pub 1-02)

rear area operations center/rear tactical opera-tions center—A command and control facilitythat serves as an area/subarea commander’s plan-ning, coordinating, monitoring, advising, and di-recting agency for area security operations. (JointPub 1-02)

rear area security—The measures taken before,during, and/or after an enemy airborne attack,sabotage action, infiltration, guerrilla action, and/or initiation of psychological or propaganda war-fare to minimize the effects thereof. (MCRP 5-12C)

rules of engagement—Directives issued by com-petent military authority which delineate the cir-cumstances and limitations under which UnitedStates forces will initiate and/or continue combatengagement with other forces encountered. Alsocalled ROE. (Joint Pub 1-02)

S

special operations—Operations conducted byspecially organized, trained, and equipped mili-tary and paramilitary forces to achieve military,political, economic, or informational objectivesby unconventional military means in hostile, de-nied, or politically sensitive areas. These opera-tions are conducted across the full range ofmilitary operations, independently or in coordina-tion with operations of conventional, nonspecialoperations forces. Political-military consider-ations frequently shape special operations, requir-ing clandest ine, covert , or low visibi l i tytechniques and oversight at the national level.Special operations differ from conventional oper-ations in degree of physical and political risk, op-erational techniques, mode of employment,independence from friendly support, and depen-dence on detailed operational intelligence and in-digenous assets. Also called SO. (Joint Pub 1-02)

suppression of enemy air defenses—That activi-ty which neutralizes, destroys, or temporarily de-grades surface-based enemy air defenses by

C-10 _______________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-24

destructive and/or disruptive means. Also calledSEAD. (Joint Pub 1-02)

surface-to-air weapon—A surface-launchedweapon for use against airborne targets. Futuredevelopments in air defense systems may lead tothe employment of weapons other than missiles.Examples include rockets, directed-energy weap-ons, and air defense guns. (Joint Pub 1-02)

T

tactical air command center—The principal USMarine Corps air command and control agencyfrom which air operations and air defense warn-ing functions are directed. It is the senior agencyof the U. S. Marine air command and control sys-tem which serves as the operational commandpost of the aviation combat element commander.It provides the facility from which the aviationcombat element commander and his battle staffplan, supervise, coordinate, and execute all cur-rent and future air operations in support of theMarine air-ground task force. The tactical aircommand center can provide integration, coordi-nation, and direction of joint and combined air op-erations. Also called Marine TACC. (Joint Pub1-02)

tactical air control center—The principal air op-erations installation (ship-based) from which allaircraft and air warning functions of tactical airoperations are controlled. Also called NavyTACC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

tactical air control party—A subordinate opera-tional component of a tactical air control systemdesigned to provide air liaison to land forces andfor the control of aircraft. (Joint Pub 1-02)

tactical air coordinator (airborne)—An officerwho coordinates, from an aircraft, the action ofcombat aircraft engaged in close support ofground or sea forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

tactical air direction center—An air operationsinstallation under the overall control of the tacti-cal air control center (afloat)/tactical air command

center, from which aircraft and air warningservice functions of tactical air operations in anarea of responsibility are directed. (Joint Pub 1-02)

tactical air operation—An air operation involv-ing the employment of air power in coordinationwith ground or naval forces to:

a. gain and maintain air superiority;

b. prevent movement of enemy forces into andwithin the objective area and to seek out anddestroy these forces and their supporting in-stallations;

c. join with ground or naval forces in opera-tions within the objective area, in order to as-sist directly in attainment of their immediateobjective. (Joint Pub 1-02)

tactical air operations center—The principal aircontrol agency of the US Marine air commandand control system responsible for airspace con-trol and management. It provides real time sur-veillance, direction, positive control, andnavigational assistance for friendly aircraft. It per-forms real time direction and control of all antiairwarfare operations, to include manned intercep-tors and surface-to-air weapons. It is subordinateto the tactical air command center. Also calledTAOC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel—Amission performed by an assigned and briefed air-crew for the specific purpose of the recovery ofpersonnel, equipment, and/or aircraft when thetactical situation precludes search and rescue(SAR) assets from responding and when survi-vors and their location have been confirmed. Alsocalled TRAP. (MCRP 5-12C)

time on station—The time that an aircraft can ac-tually spend performing its assigned mission. Itdoes not include the time transiting to and fromthe operating site. Also called TOS. (MCRP 5-12C)

Appendix D

References and Related Publications

Joint Publications (Joint Pubs)

0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

1-02 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms

3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations

3-02 Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations

3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Opera-tions Other Than War

3-52 Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in a Combat Zone

3-54 Joint Doctrine for Operations Security

3-56.1 Command and Control for Joint Air Operations

3-58 Joint Doctrine for Military Deception

5-0 Doctrine for Planning Joint Opera-tions

Naval Doctrine Publications (NDPs)

1 Naval Warfare

3 Naval Operations (under develop- ment)

5 Naval Planning

6 Naval Command and Control

Naval Warfare Publications (NWPs)

3-09.11M Supporting Arms in Amphibious Op-erations

3-02.1 Ship-to-Shore Movement

U.S. Army Field Manuals (FMs)

6-20-1 The Field Artillery Cannon Battalion

34-130 Intelligence Preparation of the Battle-field

Marine Corps Orders

3120.9A Policy for Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU(SOC))

3500.17 Training and Readiness Manual, Vol-ume 2

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications (MCDPs)

1 Warfighting

1-1 Strategy

1-2 Campaigning

1-3 Tactics

2 Intelligence

5 Planning

6 Command and Control

Marine Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWPs)

3-2 Aviation Operations (under develop-ment)

3-11.4 Tactical Fundamentals of Helicopter-borne Operations (under develop-ment)

3-16 Fire Support Coordination (under de-velopment)

D-2 ________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-24

3-24.1 Shipboard Helicopter Operating Pro-cedures For Air-Capable Ships

3-25 Control of Aircraft and Missiles

3-25.3 Marine Air Command and Control System Handbook

3-25.5 Direct Air Support Center Handbook

3-31.5 Ship-to-Shore Movement

5-1 Marine Corps Planning Process (un-der development)

6-22 Communications and Information Systems

Fleet Marine Force Manuals (FMFMs)

4-3 MAGTF Landing Support Opera-tions

5-40 Offensive Air Support

5-45 Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

5-50 Antiair Warfare

5-70 MAGTF Aviation Planning

6-21 Tactical Fundamentals of Helicopter-borne Operations

7-22 Tactical Fundamentals for Aviation in Cold Weather Operations

8-2 Counterinsurgency Operations

Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP)

5-71 MAGTF Aviation Planning Docu-ments

Miscellaneous

Concept Paper, Forward. . .From the Sea

Concept Paper, Ship-To-Objective Maneuver

Concept Paper, Operational Maneuver From the Sea