ASSESSING PARTY FRAGMENTATION

IN PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS

by

GARRETH L. CADA, B.S.

A THESIS

IN

POLITICAL SCIENCE

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Texas Tech University in

Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for

the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Approved

Accepted

May, 1994

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .

CHAPTER

I. INTRODUCTION .

II. LITERATURE REVIEW .

Importance of Political

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1

6

Parties to Democracy . 8

Historical Origins of Political Parties and Party Systems . 9

Approaches to Studying Fragmentation . 24

No~s. 28

III. RESEARCH DESIGN . 29

Dependent Variable . 31

Aggregation Indices . 32

Hypothesis . 36

Notes. 42

IV. DATAANALYSIS. 43

Party System Fragmentation 44

Country by Country Analysis 49

.. 11

Synopsis of Findings .

Notes.

V. CONCLUSION .

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY .

APPENDIX: Irish and Canadian Election Results .

111

88

93

94

99

107

LIST OF TABLES

3.1 Aggregation Indices 1965-1973 37

4.1 Aggregation Indices 1977-1989 45

4.2 Combined Aggregation Indices 47

. IV

LIST OF FIGURES

3.1 Countries Studied . 40

4.1 Austrian Election Results 1965-1992 51

4.2 Belgian Election Results 1985-1992 54

4.3 Danish Election Results 1965-1992. 57

4.4 Finnish Election Results 1965-1992 59

4.5 French Election Results 1965-1988. 61

4.6 German Election Results 1965-1992 63

4.7 Icelandic Election Results 1965-1992 . 65

4.8 Indian Election Results 1965-1992 . 67

4.9 Israeli Election Results 1965-1992 . 69

4.10 Italian Election Results 1965-1992 . 71

4.11 Japanese Election Results 1965-1992 73

4.12 Luxembourg Election Results 1965-1992 75

4.13 Dutch Election Results 1965-1992 . 78

4.14 Norwegian Election Results 1965-1992 80

4.15 Swedish Election Results 1965-1992 82

4.16 Swiss Election Results 1965-1992 . 85

4.17 Turkish Election Results 1965-1992 87

A.l Abbreviations for Canada and Ireland . 109

v

A.2 Canadian Election Results 1965-1992 110

A.3 Irish Election Results 1965-1992 111

. VI

Austria

FPO GAL . KPO . OVP SPO

Belgium

Agalev CVP . Ecolo . FDF 0

FN. PRL 0

PS. PSC . PVV . SP. Vlaams . vu

Denmark

CD. CrPP. CsPP. LIB PP. RLP . SDP . SPP .

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

POLITICAL PARTIES

Freedom Party of Austria The Green Alternative Communist Party of Austria Austrian People's Party Social-Democratic Party of Austria

Ecologist Party-- Dutch Speaking Christian Socialist Party-- Dutch Speaking Ecologist Party-- French Speaking French-speaking Democratic Front Front National Liberal Party-- French Speaking Socialist Party-- French Speaking Christian Socialist Party-- French Speaking Liberal Party-- Dutch Speaking Socialist Party-- Flemish Wing Flemish Nationalist Party People's Union

Center Democrats Christian People's Party Conservative People's Party Liberal Party Progress Party Radical Liberal Party Social Democratic Party Socialist People's Party

. . Vll

Finland

FCP . FCU . FRP . FSPD GU LPP . LWA. NCP . SwPP

France

FN. MRG PCF . PS. PS-affl RPR . UDF URC

Germany

CDU. csu . FDP . Grn/Est . Grn/Wst . PDS . RepP SPD .

Finnish Center Party Finnish Christian Union Finnish Rural Party Finnish Social Democratic Party Green Union Liberal People's Party Left-Wing Alliance National Coalition Party Swedish People's Party

National Front Mouvement des Radicaux de Gauche French Communist Party Socialist Party Socialist Party affiliates Rassemblement pour la Republique

. . Union of the Democratic Front Right-wing Coalition

Christian Democratic Union Christian Social Union Free Democratic Party The Greens (West) Alliance 90/The Greens (East) Party of Democratic Socialism Republican Party Social Democratic Party

Vlll

Iceland

CitP . IP PA pp SDP . WA

India

AGP AIADMK BJP . CPI CPI-m DMK. IND/OTR JaKNC JNP . NOM. RSP . SJD TD

Israel

ADP . NRP . PLfP . UTJ .

Citizen's party Independence Party People's Alliance Progressive Party Social Democratic Party Women's Alliance

Assam People's Council All-India Anna Dravidian Progress Movement Bhara tiya J ana ta Party Communist Party of India Communist Party of India (Marxists) Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam Independents and Others Jammu and Kashmir National Conference J a nata Party Nominated to fill vacancy Revolutionary Socialist Party Samjwadi Janata Dal Telegu Desam

Arab Democratic Party National Religious Party Progressive List for Peace United Torah Judaism

. IX

Italy

FdV . LR/MD . LL/LN LP MSIDN . PDC . PdRC PDS PLI PRI PSDI . PSI sv

Japan

DSP . Ind. JCP JSP LDP . Prog .. SDF .

Luxembourg

CdA 5/6 DGA . GLEI. PCL . PCS . PD POSL.

Green Party The Network Northern League/Lombard League Supporters of Marco Pannella Italian Social Movement-National Right Christian Democratic Party Communist Re-establishment Party Democratic Party of the Left Liberal Party Republican Party Social Democratic Party Socialist Party South Tyrol People's Party

Democratic Socialist Party Independents Japanese Communist Party Japan Socialist Party Liberal-Democratic Party Progressive Party Social Democratic Federation

Five-sixths Action Committee Green Alternative Party Green List Ecological Initiative Communist Party Christian Socialist Party Democratic Party Socialist Workers' Party

X

Netherlands

CDA D'66 . GL GPV . LJ/C . PvdA. RPF . SGP VVD .

Norway

DnA . FfF FMS . FP. KrF . MdG . PP. SI. SP sv

Sweden

CP. FP. KdS . MpG. MS ND SDAP VP.

Christian Democratic Appeal Democrats 1966 Green Links Reformed Political Association Center Democrats Labor Party Evangelical Political Federation Political Reformed Party People's Party for Freedom and Democracy­Netherlands Liberal Party

Norwegian Labor Party Future for Finnmark Candidates for the Environment and Solidarity Progress Party Christian Democratic Party Green Environmental Party Pensioners' Party Stop Immigration Center Party Socialist Left Party

Center Party Liberal Party Christian Democratic Party Green Party Moderate Party New Democracy Social Democratic Labor Party Left Party

. XI

•

Switzerland

AP CDPP EPP . GPS . lA LP RDP . SDP . SPP . SwD WP

Turkey

ANAP DSP . DYP HEP . MCP . RP. SHP .

Automobile Party Christian-Democratic People's Party Evangelical People's Party Green Party of Switzerland Independent Alliance Liberal Party Radical-Democratic Party Social-Democratic Party Swiss People's Party Swiss Democrats Workers Party

Motherland Party Democratic Left Party True Path Party People's Labor Party Nationalist Labor Party Welfare Party Social Democratic Populist Party

. . xu

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In his 1966 study titled "The Transformation of the Western

European Party System," Otto Kirchheimer asserted that party systems

were evolving into a "catch-all model" (184). He argued that party

systems were undergoing a period of aggregation out of which fewer

parties would emerge, each with a greater proportion of the seats in the

legislature. Consistent with Lipset's (1964) end of ideology thesis,

Kirchheimer suggests that in the post World War II period political

parties became more interested in broad based support and immediate

electoral success versus effectiveness at the individual level. This change

in party focus was a result of the blurring of class lines and the perceived

declining salience of ideology in westernized democracies. In sum,

parties weakened their links with society and began to operate one level

removed. Unfortunately, Kirchheimer's assertion that party systems

were becoming more aggregated is highly impressionistic. In addition,

Kirchheimer does not offer any means by which to test his "catch-all"

thesis. Hence, as Dittrich (1987) concurs, it is problematic whether

Kirchheimer's model of aggregated party systems is valid. Therefore, it is

the intention of this study to examine the level of party system

aggregation within seventeen countries utilizing proportional

representation electoral systems.

Within this thesis it will be argued that party systems are not

aggregating, but conversely are fragmenting. Even when some parties

1

still maintain a majority status in their respective countries, that position

is no longer as secure as it once was. Increasingly, these parties are

finding themselves involved in coalition style governments and forced

into the unfamiliar position of making concessions in order to maintain

long-term governmental control. The downside of these concessions is a

decreased ability to pass ideologically consistent policies, a trait

associated with majority party status. Secondly, new parties are

emerging as the traditional parties are unable to address the dynamic

and varied array of new issues facing the government. Kirchheimer's

depiction of party systems is thus rendered insufficient as the assertions

his theory are based upon become dubious.

Kirchheimer initially suggests that ideology limited the scope of

party appeal and thus had to be shed in order for parties to maintain

power and attract greater numbers of supporters. Hence, in an effort to

achieve greater levels of support, parties become more centrist in nature

(when placed upon an ideological continuum). However, this approach

appears to have backfired for those parties which attempted it.

First, as parties became more centrist, their ideological stances on

issues became more opaque. In response to this, voters were unable to

draw distinctions between parties ideologically. Voters found themselves

de facto dealigned from the parties, or more assertively, alienated from

the parties. No longer feeling associated with these centrist parties,

voters were henceforth unwilling to support them: exactly the opposite of

what Kirchheimer asserts should have happened.

2

Second, in some European countries no party has ever emerged as

the majority party, a necessity before a catch-all party can emerge

according to Kirchheimer. Therefore, the following question must be

asked: if the premises upon which Kirchheimer frames his catch-all

party thesis cannot be found to exist, is it reasonable to expect that party

system aggregation has occurred?

The focus of this paper, therefore, concerns the aggregation of

party systems in westernized democracies. More specifically, are party

systems fragmenting or aggregating? It is my contention that party

systems are fragmenting. Though in some countries there still remain

majority parties, their influence is waning; no longer can such parties be

assured of sufficient votes to secure control of the government.

Increasingly, coalition governments are becoming the norm and not the

exception in European politics. While the 1950s and 1960s witnessed

increased levels of support for these "centrist" parties, it is not conclusive

if this is in response to the deideologization of the party. However, as

issue saliency changed and more controversial issues entered the policy

arena, e.g., legalization of narcotics, restricting immigration, and

maintaining a level of cultural distinctiveness, no longer could parties

afford to hedge their stances. Voters look to parties for cues, however, in

a catch-all system, parties are unable to lend these cues. Subsequently,

new parties must emerge that can address these issues and articulate the

interests of the voters; be these parties internal splinter groups from the

original parties, or be they external in origin.

3

While in some countries there exists a dominant party of one type

or another, overall it will be demonstrated that party systems are

fragmenting and greater numbers of parties are becoming active

members in government.

In order to examine whether party systems are fragmenting or

aggregating, some quantifiable measure is necessary. However, as

already mentioned, Kirchheimer himself does not assert an empirically

measurable method for assessing party system aggregation. Rae (1968)

and Mayer (1980) each addressed this short-coming in Kirchheimer's

treatise. Both studies employed a model utilizing parliamentary

representation as their basis for analysis. A question as to the validity of

only using such data arises, however, when considering Downs' (1957)

rational actor model. The same question is applicable when considering

electoral laws, i.e., minimum percentages of votes necessary to achieve

representation in parliament. In short, some parties which are garnering

electoral support may not necessarily be gaining representation in the

government. Accepting this assertion, any measurement of aggregation

solely utilizing the above methodology would be underreported. In order

to rectify such a problem data for the actual number of votes received by

each party needs to be analyzed in conjunction with any model

encompassing aggregate analysis.

When originally writing over a decade ago, Mayer and Rae were

able to make only speculations about the future aggregation of party

systems. With close to fifteen years of new data, speculation now can

give way to knowledge. Utilizing Mayer's aggregation index and

4

descriptive analysis of the popular vote for each country, this study tests

the hypothesis that party system aggregation has decreased from the

levels reported by Mayer in 1980. This thesis will show that aggregation

has become fragmentation. Moreover, this fragmentation of the party

system has increased in the last fifteen years. The breakdown of party

system aggregation will be shown to have taken place in two waves. The

first wave was characterized by the growth of parties espousing concern

for such issues as the environment and social justice-- what have come to

be known as post-materialist values (Inglehart 1977; Mtiller-Rommel

1989). The second (and present) wave is characterized by the emergence

of parties concerned with protecting cultural homogeneity or

geographical issues. These concerns have been classified as ethnological

(Krejci and Velimsky 1981).

When studying the relative aggregation or fragmentation of party

systems, it is apparent that two dimensions of party systems are being

addressed: first, the number and relative size of each party within the

system; second, the ideological basis of each party's appeal. By

ideological appeal it is meant where these parties place themselves on a

left-right continuum. The relative size and number of parties is

represented by the support each party receives from the general

electorate. In the chapters that follow the analysis will focus upon these

two dimensions of party systems.

5

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

With the emergence of mass liberal democracy, i.e., a shift in power

away from the elites, political parties became the locus in the struggle for

governmental control. As Milnor (1969, p. 5) states, "It was the emergence

of mass democracy that both allowed and necessitated the development of

the highly sophisticated structures we today call political parties."

Moreover, Macridis (1967, p. 1) added, "It is generally taken as axiomatic

that no political system can exist without political parties." Concomitant

with the shift in power from the elites to the parties was the development of

party systems: arenas in which the parties interacted and competed for the

control of the government.

Throughout the years, political parties and party systems have

undergone numerous transformations. Mair (1990) recognizes three distinct

periods. During the first period, party systems were characterized by the

existence of mass parties or mass parties of integration (Weber 1946;

Duverger 1954). The second period is distinguished vis-a-vis the catch-all

party model (Kirchheimer 1966). Synonymous with the rise of catch-all

parties was a period of party system stability (Sartori 1968; Daalder 1966;

Rokkan 1977). At the present time, party systems are considered to be

experiencing a breakdown of the catch-all party model, or what scholars are

terming the destabilization of the catch-all party system (Dalton and

Flanagan 1990; Mair and Smith 1990; Mair 1990; Wolinetz 1990; Lijphart

1981; lnglehart 1977).

6

Before continuing it is prudent, as well as necessary, to distinguish

between a party system change and a party change. A party change is any

transformation that occurs intraparty. A party simply altering its name

would be an example of a party change. A party system change, on the other

hand, is any shift in the rules of governing whereby the number of parties,

their relative size, and the ideological distance which separates them shift.

In other words, a change whereby the defining properties of that system are

transformed. Mair (1990, p. 129) states, "A party system changes when that

which is transformed is of systemic relevance, thus necessitating are­

classification of that system." An example of such a change would be the

emergence of a third or fourth party into government in a country long

dominated by only two parties.

Destabilization within the party system is important for a variety of

reasons. Typified by a fragmentation of the party system, destabilization of

the party system it has been suggested, relates to dealignment and cabinet

instability (Dalton, Flanagan and Beck 1984; Mayer 1980; Taylor and

Herman 1971). Concomitant with threatening cabinet stability, is the effect

of fragmentation upon the ability to govern in countries utilizing

parliamentary governmental models, i.e., loosely defined: democracy.

Bille (1990) argues that party system fragmentation strains

democracy by making interparty cooperation difficult, if not impossible. In

other words, as party systems fragment party strength increasingly

decreases and countries come under rule by minority governments. Thus,

fragmentation necessitates coalition style governments-- governments of

compromise and cooperation. However, coalition governments are

7

constantly under attack from bi-polar opposition, i.e., opposition from both

inside and outside of the coalition. In the worst-case scenario coalition '

governments find themselves unable to mount significant challenges to the

current paradigms or implement drastic policy changes in fear of disrupting

the coalition; government becomes paralyzed. This paralysis leads to the

exact outcome that these parties initially were trying to avoid by not passing

drastic policy initiatives: a crisis of legitimacy and the possible failure of the

government.

Given the above assertions, if party systems are fragmenting and as a

result stable mass-led democratic government is becoming a problematic

occurrence, then the validity of party democracy at the aggregate level is

questionable. This would appear to contradict Milnor's and Macridis'

statements regarding the emergence of parties. To fully assess this query, it

is necessary to explore the historical origins of parties and their importance

to democracy.

Importance of Political Parties to Democracy

Political parties are the sine quo non of any mass participatory

democracy. As suffrage was extended, the need to coordinate and organize

voters became necessary (Milnor 1969; LaPalombara and Weiner 1966;

Duverger 1954). The necessity for an agent to act as an intermediary

between the government and the citizenry arose: this agent was the political

party. It is vis-a-vis this function of linking the individual to the system that

political efficacy is created and the system gains legitimacy. As Wildenmann

(1986, p. 6) notes, "party government is the crucial agency of institutional

8

legitimacy." In other words, without political parties the survival of mass

led participatory democracy itself is questionable.

Concomitant with institutional legitimacy vis-a-vis the at large

populace, parties are important to democracy in that they are the vehicles by

which "democratic ideals" are carried out (Macridis 1967). It is the political

parties that nominate candidates that run in regular competitive elections.

It is the political parties that hold each other accountable for policies and

programs. It is the political parties that call for elections in some European

countries. In sum, without political parties, the core tenets of mass led­

democratic could not be realized.

Historical Origins of Political Parties and Party Systems

Accepting the operational definition of parties as the list of functions

described above, political parties have primarily come into existence in only

the last century (LaPalombara and Weiner 1966). To assert otherwise fails

to take into account the function of parties as the mobilizing force between

the individual and the political system described by King and Macridis.

Furthermore, as explained by LaPalombara and Weiner (p. 9), "The real

impetus for the creation of some form of party organization at the local level

in the West is generally thought to be the extension of the suffrage."

In most westernized democratic countries, political parties formed in

response to either internal or external events. The formation of parties in

response to internal patterns highlights most of the European countries

studied here. An internally created political party is one that emerges

gradually from the activities of the legislators themselves in an attempt to

9

maintain power. Returning to the above statement by LaPalombara and

Weiner, as suffrage was extended, the ruling elites understood that it was

necessary to woo the masses if they wished to remain in power; as such,

these elites formed local election committees in order to enfranchise the

masses into supporting their party. In other words, the struggle for political

power which was once limited to the aristocracies and small groups of elites,

became of central concern and involved all segments of the populace. The

United Kingdom serves as an excellent example of internal factors

influencing the emergence of political parties. When looking at the electoral

reforms of 1832, 1867, and 1894, the formation and transformation of

political parties can be found to mirror these legislative shifts.

External patterns of party formation began to occur near the end of

the nineteenth century. Duverger (1955) associates this period with the

growth of anti-parliamentary parties. Prior to this time, it had been argued

that political parties emerged as a means by which elites gained support for

government. However, in this time period, the impetus for organization

comes from sources other than the representatives in parliament. Macridis

(1967, p. 12) posits:

... from persons who are not only uninterested in Parliament, but who desire to stay out of Parliament and even to do away with it. Their [political parties] appeal is directed to a specific class-- mostly to the

working class. . . . Membership is widely solicited and a member pays dues, participates, agitates, and activates. The party emerges as a disciplined movement with a vision and mass support.

LaPalombara and Weiner (1966, p. 10) described the emergence of parties

external the system as follows:

10

Externally created parties are those that emerge outside the legislature and invariably involve some challenges to the ruling group and a demand for representation. Such parties are more recent phenomena; they are invar­iably associated with an expanded suffrage, strongly articulated secular or religious ideologies, and, in most of the developing areas, nationalistic and anti-colonial movements. Such parties may receive their original impetus from such varied sources as trade unions, co­operatives, university students, intellectuals, religious organizations, veteran associations, and so on.

Parties that have their roots external to the political system tend to be

characterized by greater ideological cohesion and discipline among the

members than parties created internally. Moreover, and largely as a result

of the means by which they arose, externally created parties, frequently have

not developed in the existing political order and institutions. This being the

case, these types of parties can strain the system and bring about a crisis of

legitimacy or at least introduce an amount of chaos into the party system.

Mass Integration Parties

The primordial relatives of contemporary mass parties, cadre parties

and caucuses, offered segments of the mass electorate their first venue for

"meaningful" political participation. Caucuses were the archaic form of the

political party structure. However, due to the existence of property

requirements to voting, cadre parties only gave the pretense of enrolling the

mass populace as active participants in the electoral system. Not until

suffrage truly became universal was the establishment of mass parties

possible.

11

Rising out of the framework of cadre parties and parties of individual

representation, parties of integration gained a foothold in the post World

War I electorate through the espousal of socialist norms and ideals. Parties

of integration were often chided for their attempt at appealing to all

segments of the populace. Sigmund Newmann (1956, p. 396) described this

as:

Their [mass parties] organization has been jokingly characterized as extending from the cradle to the grave, from the workers' infant-care association to the atheists' cremation society.

When looking at mass parties circumspectly, though, one can see the

beginnings of a catch-all type system, i.e., as parties try to incorporate

greater numbers of voters within their ranks, they must become more

centrist in nature (a core tenet of catch-all party status). Furthermore, mass

parties served an important role in the system in that by being composed of

individuals who normally eschew the political system, demands are placed

upon the system for things which initially were not part of the role of

government, e.g., issues of social justice and socio-economic inequality. In

other words, the rise of mass parties is congruent with the rise of the

modern welfare state.

Over time, however, the state slowly took on the role of social

adjudicator. Concomitant with the state's acceptance of this role was the

expansion of the welfare state. This attempt at egalitarianism on behalf of

the state, while in theory beneficial to the population, was detrimental to

mass integration parties. In other words, the state slowly co-opted the

platforms and functions carried out by mass integration parties.

12

Catch-All Parties

In an attempt to limit their decline, mass parties of integration shed

no longer relevant ideological baggage. This deideologization gave rise to a

party system in which parties turned more fully to the electoral scene.

parties abandoned attempts at the intellectual and moral encadrement of the

masses, trying to exchange effectiveness in depth for a wider audience and

more immediate success.

Given the above scenario in congruence with Lipset's (1963) end of

ideology thesis, catch-all parties began to emerge onto the electoral arena.

Otto Kirchheimer (1966, p. 179) stated:

Following the Second World War, the old-style bourgeois party of individual representation became the exception. . . . By the same token, the mass inte­gration party, product of an age with harder class lines and more sharply protruding denominational structures, is transforming itself into a catch-all "people's" party. Abandoning attempts at the intellectual and moral encadrement of the masses, it is turning more fully to the electoral scene, trying to exchange effectiveness in depth for a wider audience and more immediate electoral success.

This shift of focus was an attempt by the major parties in a system to move

beyond their original clientele and include new clienteles within the party

system.

The Kirchheimer thesis is bound by a set of parameters. First catch­

all parties reflect the existence of competition in a party system. Second,

only major parties can become successful catch-all parties. Kirchheimer

(1966, p. 187) concluded:

13

A small, strictly regional party such as the South Tyrol ian People's Party; nor a party built around the espousal of harsh limited claims, such as the German Refugees; or a specific professional category's claims, such as the Swedish Agrarians; or a limited action program, such as the Danish single-tax Justice Party can aspire to a catch-all performance.

Third, catch-all status is not sought among the majority of larger parties in

small democracies, e.g., Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland.

Kirchheimer continues his discussion of catch-all parties by listing

five consequences or characteristics of catch-all parties: (1) a drastic

reduction of the party's ideological baggage; (2) a further strengthening of

top leadership groups whose actions and omissions are now judged from the

viewpoint of their contribution to the efficiency of the entire social system

rather than identification with the goals of their particular organization; (3)

a downgrading of the role of the individual party member (the opposite of

the role of the individual in parties of individual representation), due to its

being considered a historic relic; ( 4) de-emphasis of the classe gardee, specific

social-class or denominational clientele, in favor of recruiting voters among

the population at large; and (5) securing access to a variety of interest

groups. Mair (1990, p. 6) suggests:

Kirchheimer depicts a party which has sundered its close links with the mass electorate and has become essentially remote from the everyday life of the citizen ... (in essence) the catch-all party is an organizational phenomenon.

Wolinetz (1979) broke these five points down into a series of

postulates, which are summarized here: (1) voters in affluent consumer

societies are now less motivated by ideology than before; (2) parties have

14

recognized this change; (3) the party response has been to de-emphasizes

ideology and to search for issues and themes that can appeal to the

electorate as a whole rather than to specific groups or classes; (4) these

changes alter the relationship between a party and its supporters; (5) when

one catch-all party succeeds, others imitate it, thus realigning the party

system as a whole.

Turning attention away from the definition of catch-all parties, two

points require further elucidation, first, how did catch-all parties come into

existence, and more importantly, what do they mean for the future of

democracy? Mair (1990) concludes three areas of change that have

expedited the growth of catch-all party systems. First, institutional changes

such as public financing of political parties and the technological growth of

the media occurred. These changes allowed parties to appeal directly to the

voters instead of through traditional organizational structures. Moreover,

given the exponential growth in the electronic media, these parties no longer

had to spend time preparing newspapers and information bulletins.

Second, social change occurred whereby the electorate became more

knowledgeable, well-informed, and competent: Allardt's (1968) cognitive

mobilization thesis. Mair (1990) suggests the cognitive mobilization thesis,

taken in accordance with the increased atomization of society, has

undermined the sense of collective solidarity present in mass integration

parties. Third, and what may seem a bit far-fetched, in addressing the work

of Pizzorno (1981), Mair (1990, p. 10) posits the possibility that social

scientist have been, "approaching the problem from the wrong end." In

15

short, Mair claims posthumously that catch-all parties are the norm and not

the exception in party systems

The formation of the catch-all party was looked upon with deep regret

by scholars (Dittrich 1987; Kirchheimer 1966; LaPalombara 1966). Dittrich

(1987, p. 257) notes, "He [Kirchheimer] expressed dismay at the emergence

of the catch-all party." Kirchheimer (1966, p. 200) himself stated, " ... we

may yet come to regret the passing-- even if it was inevitable-- of the class

mass party and the denominational party, as we already regret the passing

of other features in yesterday's stage of Western civilization." Hence, the

meaning of LaPalombara (1966, p. 6) becomes quite clear when he stated, "it

is abundantly clear that those who write about ideology's decline, with few

exceptions, intend a pejorative denotation and consideration of the term." In

sum, the genesis of catch-all parties is not parallel with the tenets of mass­

based democracy. It is not clear, however, in which direction these scholars

were suggesting party systems would turn, i.e., become strong one-party

authoritarian states, or voters would become totally dealigned from the

system and no longer participate (thus posing the question of a crisis of

legitimacy). One normative conclusion, though, is that the formation of

catch-all parties will have or has had dour consequences for party based

democracy. As has been stated, catch-all parties weaken their links to

society and operate at one level removed. Voters, sensing this shift shed

their partisan beliefs and begin to make choices based upon factors other

then party identification. In short, as Mair (1990, p. 184) suggests, "their

[voters'] horizons widened, their options increased, and in general, they

became more volatile." Accordingly, this increased voter volatility brings

16

about a decline in voter predictability-- a system attribute synonymous with

stability. Hence, the possibility exists that a crisis of legitimacy for

democracy will arise.

Before asserting a dour chord for party-based democracy, however, the

success or failure of the catch-all thesis should be empirically tested. This is

a difficult proposition, though. As Mayer (1980, p. 516) recognized:

Kirchheimer does not assert a statistically measurable party system aggregation as a general principle, even in western democracies. Rather he confines himself to an assertion of a tendency of unspecified scope buttressed by the discussion of a few illustrative examples. It is one of those impressionistic claims impossible to falsify in any definitive sense.

Dittrich (1987) attempted such a study and found no significant evidence to

support the claim that party system were indeed aggregating. It is

important to note, that Dittrich does not measure party system aggregation.

Rather, he provides a limited set of case studies. Findings such as these

lend support for the traditional Rokkanian tenets of the "frozen" cleavage

structure (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Rokkan 1070). Further analysis of

Kirchheimer's thesis can be accomplished using the five summary points

presented on pages 14-15.

Addressing the first point, if ideology is in decline, it is expected that

voters and parties are no longer as strongly linked as they once were. If this

is the case, then a greater percentage of the electorate should classify itself

as independent. However, reaching such a conclusion would require panel

and wave data from multiple elections. Lacking such data, the trends in

vote for individual parties can be studied, as exemplified by Rose and Urwin

17

(1970) and Maguire (1987). We can also study changes in the

fractionalization index (Rae 1968; Wolinetz 1979; Mayer 1980).

Further, while it has been suggested that voters have become less

concerned with "old" ideologies than before, this does not preclude the

emergence of "new" ideologies. 1 As Dittrich (1987, p. 260) concludes:

Though possibly not comparable with the "old" ideologies, these new phenomena may also involve a coherent and consistent set of ideas capable of guiding political behavior and, perhaps, of leading to the creation of new parties.

Lastly, if catch-all parties are emerging, the electorates of the parties

should more closely resemble each other in that they will appeal to a greater

array of voters; in sum taking on a more heterogeneous nature. It was

exactly this thesis that Rose and Urwin tested in 1969. They found,

however, only a few parties that could be classified as catch-all using this

methodology. Subsequently, Zuckerman and Lichbach (1977) found

concurring results when applying the same scale to West Germany, Sweden,

and Great Britain. 2

The next point is a bit harder with which to contend. How is an

empirical analysis of a party's recognition of the motivation of voters to be

carried out? Besides the problems of surveying members, the question as to

causal order must be addressed. 3 As Sartori (1968, p. 23) so aptly noticed,

"there can be no customers without political entrepreneurs, just like there

cannot be political entrepreneurs without customers."

Next, what is meant by a "de-emphasis of ideology?" Himmelstrand

attempted to answer this question as early as 1970. The best he has so far

18

come up with, is that a de-emphasis of ideology is similar to a

"depoliticization" of the parties, which he defines as, " ... a transformation of

political ideologies into a set of more or less distinct administrative

technologies based upon a widespread consensus based upon what kind of

goals one should try to attain" (p. 65).

This notion of parties de-emphasizing ideology also assumes that

ideology is declining in relevance, something which has already been

suggested not to be occurring. Last, if parties are de-emphasizing ideology,

then an ostensible change should be noticeable in the types of goals parties

pursue as well as the rhetoric they embrace: a feat which stretches the

bounds of realism if attempted for more then one country.

The fundamental problem that must resolved when addressing

Wolinetz' fifth point, involves party systems. In short, dominant systems

may be more inclined towards catch-allism then systems with a high number

of parties. Furthermore, given that "catch-all" status is ideological by

definition, what about parties that maintain their level of support across

time while others lose or gain support? Could a party undergo a

transformation into a catch-all party and not lose or gain support?

Additionally, could not a party in becoming a catch-all party still remain

hostile towards other parties in the system? Finally, the fallacy that all

parties behave as vote-maximization parties must be addressed. Central to

the argument of catch-all status is the assertion that parties want to gain

hegemonic control of government. However, this negates a large portion of

the universe of parties discussed by Sartori (1976, p. 327), which includes,

19

"witness parties," "ideological parties," and "responsible parties," none of

which it can be said are trained on vote maximization.

Heretofore discussed, the existence of catch-all parties is problematic

at best. Mayer (1980) suggests just this point when discussing the

implications of party system fragmentation upon cabinet instability.

Furthermore, Wolinetz (1979) posited the same conclusions about catch-all

parties. Rose and Urwin (1970) also found no significant support for the

existence of catch-all parties when asserting heterogeneity as the

operationalization of the concept.

Party System Fragmentation

While it is now suggested that the emergence of catch -all parties is a

dubious prospect, party systems have been undergoing a transformation.

Electoral systems are becoming marred by increasing degrees of volatility

and undergoing (Ignazi 1992; Mair 1989a, 1989b, 1984; Dalton 1988;

Wolinetz 1988; Crew and Denver 1985; Dalton et al. 1984; Daalder and Mair

1983). Because of an increasing level of volatility, that does not appear to be

subsiding, intraparty conflict in the 1980s has pushed the party system into

a state of flux (Mair 1989b). Dalton (1988) has shown an accelerated

decomposition of established party ties. Moreover, the decline of party

identification, the number of party members and the degree of partisan

involvement all indicate that the previous enduring links between the

electorate and established parties are progressively fading (Mair 1984,

1989a; Reider 1989). Out of these party system changes are emerging new

20

parties and/or new political actors for the articulation and aggregation of

demands.

In the last twenty years, it seems clear that the linkage between

historically derived identity and contemporary political appeal is more likely

to be accorded those parties which emerged from the pre-industrial cleavage

structure, e.g., religious, territorial, or cultural divides. While these parties

have persisted, they appear to have achieved as much as they could have

expected. In short, the issues they were oriented towards for the most part

have been addressed in the legislative arena. The prime examples of this

being the agrarian parties becoming more centrist in nature and the merger

of the denominational Christian parties into single political units in

response to the declining salience of issues addressing morality. It must be

noted, however, that outside of the 1993 election in Canada where the

Conservatives were completely removed from parliament, most of these

parties have continued on, only in an increasingly diminished role. Thus the

possibility exists for these parties to re-emerge as dominant in their

respective party systems. However, when looking at contemporary issue

cleavages and the policy initiatives being established by parliaments around

Europe, while the importance of traditional parties can be seen regarding

partisan predisposition, traditional identities bear little resemblance to

contemporary competitive appeals (Mair 1990).

In response to the foregoing discussion, it is suggested that parties are

fragmenting in response to a new issue dimension, i.e., a "new politics"

cleavage. The two dimensions of this scale being the "new right" and the

"new left." The "new right" is characterized by a shift in support from both

21

the old left and right towards a more authoritarian set of views· most '

ostensibly the rise of parties of cultural defense, i.e., parties primarily

concerned with passing legislation protecting and espousing cultural

distinctiveness and autonomy. The "new left" is marked by a shift of voters

from the old left and concerned with post-materialist values (Inglehart

1977). While a discussion of the "new left" and "new right" cleavage

structure would be germane at this point, due to the dynamic nature and

highly impressionistic nature of this cleavage structure, it would take

another thesis to discuss this concept.

Parties of Cultural Defense

The political parties that have been entering the system along the

"new right" cleavage tend towards a more authoritarian set of views. One

dimension of this cleavage involves parties of cultural defense. Drawing

upon the work of Krejci and Velimsky (1981) and Hall (1979) parties of

cultural defense are defined as, any political party that contends elections

upon the sole platform of protecting a unique linguistic, religious, or cultural

identity among its supporters. In order to protect the above unique values,

however, these parties have a tendency to reject imposed social and political

arrangements that place them in disadvantaged positions. In other words,

these groups attempt to seek autonomy from the state. Thus parties of

cultural defense are also defined vis-a-vis behavior oriented towards the

establishment of ethnic autonomy. Hall (1979, p. xxi) suggests, "Behavior

oriented to the establishment of ethnic autonomy may be regarded as a

22

collective effort to create political and social arrangements based on the

ethnic groups' own traditions, values, and Weltanschauungen."

Realignment and Dealignment as Party System Fragmentation

In conjunction with changing levels of support for old and new parties

is the question as to how much of this change is a realignment along the new

politics cleavage and how much is simply dealignment. Given the paucity of

empirical research, any claims would be highly problematic. However, on

face validity alone, any decline in support for the traditional parties in a

system is synonymous with a dealignment. Ostensibly any study of party

systems asserting shifting influence and interparty relations involves some

concept of realignment. Defined as "a durable and significant redistribution

of party support" (Campbell and Trilling 1980, p. 6), this suggests any stable

increase in party system fragmentation is representative of realignment. At

first blush, when discussing realignment in conjunction with fragmentation,

it might appear that a "sectoral" realignment is occurring, i.e., a

redistribution of power among already existing parties (Flanagan 1984).

However, when looking at the number of new parties that have entered

these systems and the dynamic nature of the social groups supporting these

emerging parties, fragmentation more closely mirrors an "ecological"

realignment (Flanagan 1984).

The theory of realignment, while initially designed for application to

studies of the American electorate, does have its uses with regards to

studying party systems in Europe. However, due to the plurality system

used in the United States, such dealignments and realignments are easier to

23

measure. While not the intention of this thesis to study realignment within

the European context, due to parties being formed along more pragmatic

lines, any study of realignment would necessitate the use of indirect

measures, i.e., fragmentation and fractionalization indices or measurements

of variance in party support over time.

Approaches to Studying Aggregation

Prior to 1980, while it had been suggested that party systems were not

aggregating, only of Rae (1968) and Mayer (1980) had attempted to measure

the validity of this claim. Rose and Urwin (1970) focused not on aggregation

per se as much as party volatility from election cycle to election cycle.

Pederson (1979) also concerned himself primarily with the variance in

support accorded the parties within a country between elections. Sartori's

(1976) oft cited one, two, and multiparty typology relied mostly upon formal

modeling. Extensive literature exists studying many aspects of party

systems. Rae (1971) focused on different electoral systems. Cabinet stability

was studied by Daalder (1971) and by Taylor and Herman (1971). The

viability of coalition governments was the focus of research by DeSwaan

(1973), Taylor and Laver (1973), and Franklin and Mackie (1978), . Until

recently, though (Smith and Mair 1990), at the national level studies on the

aggregation of party systems has been studied more in terms of realignment

and dealignment (Dalton et al. 1984).

24

Rae's Aggregation Index

Douglas Rae (1968) operationalizes party fractionalization in terms of

a continuous variable. While this avoids the pitfalls and simplicity of a

simple typology such as Sartori's, Rae makes no distinctions between the

fragmentation of the government and that of the opposition. As will be

addressed in the following chapter, this allows for the possibility of

erroneous findings.

Rae's formula turns on the summation of a simple probability function

measuring chance meetings between members of opposing parties. In other

words, his formula measures the antonym of fragmentation, i.e.,

aggregation. Moreover, Rae only incorporates the relative size of the parties

into his formula and does not consider the number of parties to be of major

importance; hence, parties with only a few representatives would fail to

register on Rae's index. Subsequently, as this study is interested in these

minor and emerging parties, Rae's index would not be a suitable measure for

assessing the suspected trend of increasing party system fragmentation. 4

Mayer's Aggregation Index

Writing in 1980, Mayer was concerned not only with party system

fragmentation, but with cabinet stability as well. Thus, his index is bi­

dimensional and includes measurements for the number of parties in a

system and one measuring the relative strength of the largest party.

Through the incorporation of this second measurement, Mayer gains a check

for stability as well as a level of face validity over Rae. Accordingly, as

Mayer's index is concerned with both the relative size of the parties in the

25

legislature as well as the numbers of parties, his index is better able to

reflect an over time trend of increasing numbers of parties gaining

representation in parliaments. Additionally, the overall decline in support

for once dominant parties can be traced via Mayer's index. Mayer's index,

like Rae's, conceptualizes party system fragmentation as a continuous

variable running from aggregated to fragmented.

When originally written in 1980 Mayer based his assertion of party

fragmentation upon the theoretical position that ideology was still

important, that countries utilizing proportional representation electoral

systems were ideal for fostering fragmented party systems, the rise in

periphery parties of cultural defense, and the notion that the major parties

of the day were unable to adequately address the problems of society.

In the subsequent years, a plethora of studies citing new reasons has

emerged further justifying Mayer's original claim: a continuing dealignment

(Luther 1990; Machin 1990); a breakdown in the organizational structures of

parties (Deschouwer 1990; Bille 1990; Machin 1990); a decline in relevance

of the traditional roles and functions of parties (Mair 1990); an erosion of

the ideologies of the core parties and the concomitant configuration of

persisting ideologies (Deschouwer 190; Machin 1990; Tromp 1990); the rise

of linguistic cleavages (Deschouwer 1990); the rise of anti-party parties (Bille

1990); the rise in saliency of environmental and alternative lifestyle issues

(Roberts 1990; Muller-Rommel 1989); a rise in global unemployment (Luther

1990). Each of these transformations has become associated with

fragmentation and party system destabilization. Essentially, each of these

26

new issue arenas represents an inability on the part of the core parties

within a system to adapt.

In further support of Mayer's thesis is a growing body of literature on

party system change regarding the rise of ethno-political nations. Scholars

such as Mair and Smith (1990), Flanagan and Dalton (1984), and Krejci and

Velimsky have all concluded that a strong dealignment is occurring within

the electorate, and new parties based upon cultural and ethnic cleavages are

forming. As Luther (1990, p. 8) noted in his study on the Austrian party

system:

Reductions in the major parties' domination of the electoral arenas has been the subject of much comment in the recent literature on Austrian politics, where it has been explained as being a consequence of attitudinal change in the electorate, with a substantial and continuing decline in partisan attachment and in the capacity of socio-cultural variables to predict party choice.

The preceding chapter presented an extensive array of scholars who

agree that party systems are fragmenting. However, little agreement can be

found as how to best empirically test this phenomena. Having now laid the

groundwork, this study addresses the task of testing the proposition that

party systems are fragmenting as opposed to aggregating.

27

Notes

1The work of Inglehart (1977) on the materialist/post materialist cleavage, as well as that of Dalton, Flanagan, and Beck (1984) on the "new politics" dimension are examples of such research.

2In presenting these findings it would appear that the end of ideology in an impressionistic claim.

3The same question as to causal order must be asked when addressing the fourth point made by Wolinetz as well.

4Further methodological concerns will be addressed in Chapter III.

28

CHAPTER III

RESEARCH DESIGN

In their seminal empirical work addressing party systems and

governmental stability, Taylor and Herman (1971, p. 28) invoked the

political convention of A. Lawrence Lowell (1896), who posited that

governments based upon the parliamentary system must consist of, "two

parties, and two parties only ... in order that the parliamentary form of

government should permanently produce good results." By contrast, Arian

and Barnes (197 4) found a high level of stability in systems where there

existed a dominant party. The ensuing question which must be asked is how

many dominant party and/or highly aggregated party systems exist? A

related question is to what extent are party systems fragmented or

fragmenting?

Assuming that dominant party systems are frequent by-products of

developing countries where the combination of low levels of mobilization and

independence movements have resulted in parties that dominate the

political arena within the framework of democratic procedures, it is

plausible that one will not find a dominant party or two-party only, i.e.,

aggregated, system in present day advanced industrial democratic states.

Secondly, aggregated systems rely upon the ability of dominant parties to

avoid strict ideological stances; they [dominant parties] must be able to shift

and moderate views in accordance with maintaining a centrist position,

which Arian and Barnes (1971) cite as essential to maintaining a position of

dominance. This policy, however, is in direct opposition to those needs of

present day and emerging regional and single-issue parties, i.e., parties of

29

cultural defense. As Arian and Barns (1971, p. 597) conclude, "The

dominant party must adjust to changes in the society, and the greater the

fragmentation of the society the greater the difficulty it experiences in doing

so." This is due in part to the dominant party policy of differential

mobilization. What Arian and Barns (1971) describe as the propensity of

dominant parties to focus upon groups that make fewer demands than

others and will produce a greater political payoff with minimal effort.

Though the scope of this paper will not allow for an examination of the

dynamics of internal party policy, i.e., the process of differential

mobilization, general conclusions as to what groups are being excluded or co­

opted can be drawn vis-a-vis descriptive analysis of the parties emerging on

the political scene and their roles in either the government or opposition.

In this study it is hypothesized that party systems are fragmenting. A

few random studies exist demonstrating a rise in fragmentation for

individual countries (Daalder's 1987 book which provides five such studies

for the Scandinavian countries is a prime example). Outside of Rae (1968)

and Mayer (1980), however, no scholar has tested system-wide for the

existence of party system aggregation (Wolinetz 1979 did a study

approximating that of Rae, but not as extensive). In addition to Daalder's

book, a growing body of literature (as discussed in Chapter II) demonstrating

a wide array of reasons (in addition to those initially discussed by Mayer) for

a suspected increase in party system fragmentation has come to light in the

recent years. These studies have concluded such things as a continuing

dealignment; a rise in global unemployment; a breakdown in the

organizational structures of parties; a decline in relevance of the traditional

30

roles and functions of parties; the rise of linguistic cleavages; and the rise in

saliency of environmental and alternative lifestyle issues to name a few ' '

have brought about a transformation in the party systems of countries that

has been associated with fragmentation.

It is asserted that party system fragmentation has increased over the

last twenty years. Questions remain, however, as to how much and in which

countries it is more prevalent. While not suggested in the literature, it does

not seem improbable to suspect that strong traditional two-party systems,

e.g., Great Britain, will undergo a lesser amount of fragmentation-- the 1993

elections in Canada and Japan, and the 1991 election in Sweden being three

obvious notable exceptions to this assertion.

Dependent Variable

Party systems will be measured as a continuous variable with

aggregation and fragmentation representing the two poles. Conceptually,

classification of systems as two-party and multiparty are too vague and are

unable to reliably group specific party systems where the similarities within

a category and differences between categories emerge as significant.

Leslie Lipson's (1953) often cited study provides an excellent example

in the difficulties encountered when trying to apply such a typology.

According to Lipson, for a system to be a two-party system it must meet the

following criteria: 1) not more than two parties at any one time have a

genuine chance to gain power; 2) one of these is able to win the requisite

majority to stay in office without help from a third party; 3) over a number

31

of decades, two parties alternate power (1953, p. 338). As Mayer (1980, p.

336) contends, however:

By this formula, Australia would not qualify as having a two­party system. During most of the post-World War II era, Australia had been governed by an apparently indissoluble coalition of the Liberal and Country parties with the Labour party, holding a plurality, in opposition. It is unclear whether Lipson's phrase "gain power" encompasses participation in a governing coalition; nevertheless, Australia clearly did not meet his second criterion. yet it is manifestly clear that the Australian party system operates with greater similarity to the two-party model of Great Britain than to the multiparty models of the Third and Fourth French Republics. . . . Thus one must go through intellectual contortions to construct a definition of a two party system that will include those systems that essentially behave like the classic two-party model-- that is, where two stable and relatively cohesive forces alternate in and out of power.

A further contention with Lipson, Mayer notes, can be taken with regards to

his phrase "gain power." Canada, for example, a country which up until

1993 was controlled by one of two parties, has experienced periods of rule by

minority governments. Furthermore, in the recent election of 1993, three

parties had a realistic chance of becoming the legitimate opposition party.

Moreover, the Progressive Conservatives came in fifth place, and only

managed to retain two seats in parliament. To the point, is "gain power" a

term that applies only to the ruling party? Additionally, is majority status a

pre-requisite for "gaining power"? In Israel, for example, while governed by

a stable Labour coalition until 1977, it was not uncommon for minor parties

to join with the coalition and hence "gain power." Surely such parties do not

adhere to any of Lipson's three criteria. In sum, there are both conceptual

and operational difficulties with Lipson's term "gain power."

32

Additionally, the wide variance of systems represented by the term

multiparty renders the term absurd and virtually meaningless. Ostensibly,

the five party system present in 1986 West Germany is not the same as the

twenty-two party system found in the Netherlands in 1978, or the twenty

party system found in the Israeli parliament in 1986. Given these examples,

it makes more sense to conceptualize party systems as a continuous variable

that as a dichotomous typology.

Rae's Aggregation Index

Douglas Rae (1968) addresses party fractionalization vis-a-vis a

continuous variable. While this avoids the pitfalls and simplicity of a two­

and multiparty categorization, he makes no distinction between the

fragmentation of the government and that of the opposition. This allows for

the possibility of erroneous findings. For example, using Rae's formula,

Israel measures a high level of fractionalization; however, due to the

dominance of the Labour party until 1977, Israel was afforded a high level of

stability. Additionally, if applying Rae's index to a study of India, which will

be discussed presently, a similar conclusion will be reached.

Rae's formula, which is nothing more than the summation of a simple

probability function of chance meetings between members of opposing

parties, measures the antonym of fragmentation, i.e., aggregation.

Furthermore, as it is only sensitive to the relative size of parties in the

legislature and not the number of parties, those parties with only a few

representatives in the legislature would fail to register on Rae's index.

Subsequently, as this study is interested in these minor and emerging

33

parties, Rae's index would not be a viable measure for assessing the

suspected trend of increasing party system fragmentation; in sum, Rae's

index actually underreports party system fragmentation.

Mayer's Aggregation Index

Writing in 1980, Mayer was concerned not only with party system

aggregation, but with cabinet stability as well. As such, his index includes

two dimensions, one measuring the number of parties in the system, and a

second measuring the relative strength of the largest party. As discussed

previously, the relative size of the majority needs to be accounted for in

order to assess cabinet stability and as a check for fractionalization. Errant

conclusions as to how aggregated a system is could arise if one was to study

only the number of parties. In India, for example, a great number of parties

are represented in government (in excess of twenty in some years), however,

before 1989, either the JNP or Congress party were always able to secure a

majority in the Lok Sabha and thereby able to govern effectively and

minimize instability. In this example, however, if only the number of parties

was studied, it would be concluded that India has a highly fractionalized

system. But, when taking into account the size of the largest party, it is

apparent that India is actually reasonably stable and only moderately

fragmented. A converse example of this being Switzerland, where a large

number of parties are represented in parliament, and where the perception

is of a stable and non-fragmented system; however, no single party has been

able to secure sufficient electoral support to accord it majority status and

govern outside of a coalition since before 1965.

34

Mayer calculated his index of party aggregation using the following

formula:

A = 100(8/L)/P.

Where A is the aggregation index, S is the number of seats held by the

largest party in the government coalition, Lis the total number of seats in

the lower house of the legislature, and P the number of parties holding at

least one seat in the lower house. The higher the score the more aggregated

the system (1980, pp. 338-339).

Mayer's index, like Rae's, conceptualizes party system aggregation as

a continuous variable running from aggregated to fragmented, which again

like Rae, avoids the pitfalls of the "oversimplified artificiality" of the two­

and multiparty categorization. Mayer's index, however, gains a level of face

validity over Rae's by accounting for the size of the largest party in

government. Sweden provides a prime example of where the use of Rae's

index yields biased results. During the time period from 1955 through 1991,

Sweden was characterized by a relatively stable two-party dominant system.

Also during this entire period the SDP held continuous power. However,

Rae's index reports a moderate to approaching high level of fractionalization

as early as 1965 and 1973. Mayer's index on the other hand, shows a

relatively low level of fractionalization-- a finding more closely mirroring

reality when studying the Swedish electoral system over the last thirty

years. Accordingly, as Mayer's index is concerned with both the relative size

of the parties in the legislature as well as the numbers of parties, his index

is better able to reflect an over time trend of increasing numbers of parties

gaining representation in parliaments. Additionally, the overall decline in

35

hegemony for majority and dominant parties can be traced through the use

of Mayer's index, i.e., as party system fragmentation increases, hegemony of

the majority party decreases. Table 3.1, reporting Mayer's original findings

is presented here.

When originally written over a decade ago, Mayer's fragmentation

thesis for the most part appears to have been ignored. Apparently, the

possibility of the existence of structural instability that could lead to a crisis

in institutional legitimacy for westernized democracies was not the clarion

call comparative scholars envisioned during the heights of the Cold War. In

the past decade, however, many system-level changes have ensued:

governments have collapsed; countries have been born, reunited, or claimed

independence; and Communism (as practiced by the Soviet Bloc) has proven

ineffective, to name a few. Subsequently, the need has arisen to re-assess

the validity of Mayer's fragmentation thesis.

Hypothesis

Are party systems becoming more unstable? In order to answer this

question, this study tests the following hypothesis: (H1) party system

aggregation has decreased from the levels measured by Mayer in 1965 and

1973. It is expected that countries with electoral systems that allow for the

proliferation of political parties, i.e., countries with proportional

representation electoral systems, will subsequently experience a high level of

party system fragmentation. In keeping with Mayer's original thesis, this

36

Table 3.1: Aggregation Indices

COUNTRY 1965 1973

Austria 16.3 16.9 Belgium 7.4 3.9 Denmark 7.2 2.6

Finland 4.8 3.4 France 7.1 3.7 West Germany 16.4 15.4

Iceland 10.0 7.3 India 13.7 6.2

Israel 5.1 4.7

Italy 5.2 4.7

Japan 15.7 9.2

Luxembourg 10.2 9.4

Netherlands 3.3 2.4

Norway 7.5 4.8

Sweden 9.8 8.9

Switzerland 3.3 2.4

Turkey 8.9 5.1

MEAN 9.33 6.81

VARIANCE 20.17 18.13

T-VALUE* 1.73

* p < .05 Source: Mayer, Lawrence C. 1980. "A Note on the Aggregation of Party Systems," Western European Party Systems. Merkl (Ed). New York:

Free Press. p. 518.

37

study adopts his fragmentation equation as is; accordingly, the same set of

countries is also tested. The data consist of the number of parties holding at

least one seat in the lower house of their respective legislatures measured at

two points in time, 1977 and 1989.

Contemporary Analysis

While Mayer and Rae both address the aggregation of party systems,

they do it within the context of parties actually represented in the

parliament. However, in an era of ever increasing political complexity and

technological advancement, i.e., increased access to the media by fringe

political groups, aggregation may be overreported if only measured as a

function of parties represented within the government. Second legal

barriers restricting access to elected government may exist, e.g., the German

system requiring a party to achieve at least five percent of the popular vote

before they are granted representation in parliament and the British system

which has outlawed Sinn Fein altogether, or the Turkish system, which until

1991, required a party to receive ten percent of the popular vote before it

gained representation in parliament. Regional parties and parties of

cultural defense are most affected by laws such as these. Third, compromise

among elites can slow segmentation, as was the case in Belgium for a long

period of time (Deschouwer 1990). In reality however, these above

mentioned barriers to entry into the political system have and will only

serve to slow fragmentation of parties and the concomitant party systems.

In an effort to correct for these barriers, tables, charts and graphs will

be presented showing the percentage of the popular vote received by the

38

individual parties. Figures will also be presented detailing the number of

seats held by each party. These will be presented for those time periods

originally studied by Mayer in addition to those newly addressed by this

study. As will be shown a larger number of parties actually receive votes

then are represented in parliament, thus supporting the claim that party

system fragmentation is underreported. This brings to bear a possible area

for future research, i.e., a re-conceptualization of the formula for measuring

party fragmentation, one which includes some measure of the total number

of parties receiving votes or takes into account electoral laws. Such items

would probably need to be scaled or assigned arbitrary values; however, it is

obvious that any such scale would possess a high degree of normative value

judgment and subject to criticism.

The data are for the years 1965, 1973, and 1977 are from the

Encyclopedia Britannica Book of the Year. The data for the 1980s and

1990s are from The Europa World Yearbook 1993 and Political Parties of

the World, 3rd Edition. The data consist of the number of parties in each

country holding at least one seat in the lower houses of their respective

legislatures measured at two points in time. The countries studied are listed

in Figure 3.1. Fragmentation indices will be created for 1977 and 1989.

These indices will be interpreted in conjunction with Mayer's original

findings. The measure of fragmentation reported reflects that of the

national election closest in time but not occurring after 1977 or 1989. For

certain countries, a judgment regarding "other parties" and "independents"

had to be made. In these instances, if it could be corroborated by secondary

39

Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France

West Germany Iceland India Israel

Figure 3.1: List of Countries Studied

40

Italy Japan Luxembourg Netherlands Norway

Sweden Switzerland Turkey

sources, "independents" were treated as single-member parties.

Additionally, where available, the exact number of parties was coded for

"other parties." Lastly, in countries where vacancies in parliament were

filled via governmental appointment, these individuals will be excluded from

the index. This is done in response to these individuals not having had to

demonstrate support from any one party in order to gain office, i.e., lacking

the information as to which parties these people are members of, it is not

possible to measure their impact upon fragmentation as operationalized. 1

The subsequent graphs and figures, while presenting data for all four

years under study, will also include data (where available) from the most

recent election, those held after 1989. Two sets of figures are presented, one

representing the actual number of seats held by each party in the

legislature, and a second set reporting the percentage of the popular vote

received by each party. The gaining level of importance for emerging parties

can be discerned more clearly from these figures, as well as the concomitant

declining support for the traditional parties. Moreover, inferences as to the

effects of electoral laws upon legislative systems can be drawn when

comparing the percentage of the popular vote received by each party. In

Italy in 1991, for example, La Rete/Movimento per la Democrazia (the anti­

mafia party) only received 1.9% of the popular vote, this translated into

twelve seats in parliament. In Norway, however, the Venstre party which

received in excess of 3.0% of the popular vote, gained no representation in

parliament.

Having discussed the theoretical and operational groundwork of party

system fragmentation, attention is now focused on the findings.

41

Notes

1The only country where this methodology was necessary was India and only with data for the year 1991.

42

CHAPTER IV

DATA ANALYSIS

In this study the level and nature of party system aggregation is being

explored. A sample of seventeen democratic countries that have electoral

systems that allow for the proliferation of political parties are studied. The

data analysis will include data from 1965 through 1989. The data for 1965

and 1973 are taken from Mayer's original study and as listed in Table 3.1.

New data collected for the purpose of this thesis will be presented for the

years 1977 and 1989-- a few recent elections such as those held in Italy and

Israel in 1992, as well as the 1991 Swedish and Icelandic will also be

included. The inclusion of hese recent elections allows the conclusions to be

as currently valid as possible.

Where available the percentage of the popular vote received by each

party are provided to supplement the fragmentation indices. These figures

are extremely important to fully explore party system fragmentation in

countries with proportional representation systems and accordingly electoral

laws that prohibit representation unless a party receives greater then a

certain percentage of the national vote. In sum, this allows for the study of

regional parties, e.g., the Bloc Quebecois, the Volksunie and the

Francophones, in the seventeen countries.

The data analysis will consist of three sections. In the first section

the overall fragmentation indices for all the countries being studied will be

presented and discussed. In section two, case study analysis will be done on

the seventeen countries being studied. Part three will consist on an effort to

more fully decipher the level to which party systems are either aggregating

43

or fragmenting. Within these case studies such things as the types of parties

that are emerging and the ones that are losing support will be discussed.

Hopefully, this multi-level approach will give scholars a better

understanding of party system fragmentation, or at least fragmentation

within the countries studied here. Lastly, conclusions as to whether or not

these individual countries are undergoing a transformation so radical that it

will bring about cabinet instability and the subsequent failure of democratic

government can be drawn.

Party System Fragmentation

Table 4.1 shows the aggregation indices for the years 1977 and 1889.

In fifteen of the seventeen countries studied the aggregation index decreased

between the two time periods (symbolic of an increase in party system

fragmentation). In agreement with the conclusion reached by Mayer (1980,

p. 5127), these results, "seem to refute any reasonable interpretation of the

Kirchheimer thesis." The t-value of 6.290 is significant at p < .005. These

data also support Mayer's prognostication that fragmentation would be more

prevalent if studied for elections in the 1980s. These findings support the

conclusion that the countries of Europe are experiencing a period of party

system destabilization. In sum, party system fragmentation appears to be

the more normal trend instead of aggregation for the countries under study.

While only showing a 0.79 decline in the aggregate variance from

1973 to 1977, the variance dropped almost a full seven points between 1977

and 1989. Part of the lack of decline in variance for the data between 1973

44

Table 4.1: Aggregation Indices 1977-1989

COUNTRY 1977 1989

Austria 16.9 7.3 Belgium 6.3 1.8 Denmark 3.4 3.9

Finland 3.0 2.8 France 3.7 2.3 West Germany 8.6 7.5

Iceland 8.3 7.5 India 5.5 4.1 Israel 3.6 1.4

Italy 3.8 2.2 Japan 6.1 5.4 Luxembourg 6.1 5.2

Netherlands 3.2 3.3 Norway 8.1 5.5 Sweden 8.5 7.4

Switzerland 2.5 1.7 Turkey 4.7 2.2

Mean 6.02 3.89 Variance 11.49 4.21 T-Value * 6.29

* p < .005

45

and 1977 could be due to some countries not yet holding elections within this

time period, Austria and France being two examples where this occurred.

Concomitant was a shift from a mean score of 6.02 in 1977 to a mean score

of 3.89, a significant shift downward. These findings support the hypothesis

that fragmentation has increased from the levels measured by Mayer in

1965 and 1973.

Table 4.2 presents the collapsed results of Tables 3.1 and 4.1 It is

very clear when looking at Table 4.2 that fragmentation appears to be a

general trend affecting the party systems of the countries included in this

study. From 1965 to 1989 the overall mean score dropped from 9.33 to 3.89.

Furthermore, in every country except the Netherlands the fragmentation

index lowered; again supporting the claim that fragmentation appears to be

a general trend affecting party systems. The greatest change experienced by

any one country was that of India, where an excess of a twelve point decline

was recorded. However, one might argue that Turkey actually suffered the

greatest change in that a coup occurred in 1980 whereby the existing

political parties were outlawed and a new electoral system was instituted.

Two of the more interesting sets of findings, and while these will be

addressed in more detail on an individual basis in the next section, are those

for Denmark and Norway. Denmark, while initially displaying a tendency

towards fragmentation, i.e., a decrease between the years 1965 and 1973,

from 1973 to 1989 the index increased-- thus suggesting aggregation.

However, the 1989 figure is lower than the one measured in 1965, suggesting

that overall the party system in Denmark has fragmented. In Norway the

question as to whether or not the party system is fragmenting is more

46

Table 4.2: Combined Aggregation Indices 1965-1989

COUNTRY 1965 1973 1979 1989

Austria 16.3 16.9 16.9 7.3 Belgium 7.4 3.9 6.3 1.8 Denmark 7.2 2.6 3.4 3.9

Finland 4.8 3.4 3.0 2.8 France 7.1 3.7 3.7 2.3 West Germany 16.4 15.4 8.6 7.5

Iceland 10.0 7.3 8.3 4.1 India 13.7 6.2 5.5 1.4 Israel 5.1 4.7 3.6 2.2

Italy 5.2 4.7 3.8 2.2 Japan 15.7 9.2 6.1 5.4 Luxembourg 10.2 9.4 6.1 5.2

Netherlands 3.3 2.4 3.2 3.3 Norway 7.5 4.8 8.1 ......

0.0

Sweden 9.8 8.9 8.5 7.4

Switzerland 3.3 2.4 2.5 1.7 Turkey 8.9 5.1 4.7 2.2

Mean 9.33 6.81 6.02 3.89 Variance 20.17 18.13 11.49 4.21

47

problematic. The findings show a reoccurring cycle of periods of aggregation

followed by periods of fragmentation. Ironically, these variations are pretty

stable. For example from 1965 to 1973 fragmentation in the system

increased by 2. 7 points; from 1979 to 1989 fragmentation increased by 2.6

points. This could possibly indicate when new issues enter the policy arena

and the coinciding relative success of the major parties at co-opting these

issues. In other words, a period of increased fragmentation represents the

emergence of a new set of policy issues, while a subsequent decline in

fragmentation represents the success of the established parties at co-opting

these issues. While leaving this point for the moment, it will be addressed

further.

Overall, these findings show strong support for Mayer's fragmentation

thesis. However, the possibility exists that these findings represent a slight

bias. It is posited that fragmentation is being underreported. As discussed

above, most countries have election laws mandating a party receive above a

certain percentage of the popular vote before they are awarded

representation in parliament. In most of the countries in this study a

greater number of parties did receive votes then received representation,

e.g., in Turkey where only three parties are represented in the general

assembly, at least eight received votes in the last election.

Party systems, in accordance with these data appear to be

fragmenting. New parties are entering the political arena all the time.

Parties such as the Bloc Quebecois and the Reform Party in Canada, the

Volksunie in Flanders, the Resemblement Wallon in Wallonia, and the Lega

Nord/Lega Lombarda are examples of these new parties. However, these

48

parties are not the traditional parties formed along economic or mass

interest platforms. Instead these parties are pursing highly exclusive ideas,

i.e., platforms based upon narrow particularized beliefs and norms. For a

further understanding of these cleavages and policy platforms, it is

necessary to study each of these countries.

Country by Country Analysis

In this section, for the seventeen countries studied, percentages of

popular vote received as well as the exact number of seats held in the lower

house of parliament by each party will be presented. From these figures a

better understanding of party system fragmentation can be gained. In most

cases data were available for all four time points studied, where it is not

available, information from secondary sources such as newspapers and

magazines will be used in an attempt to provide further narration of

fragmentation in these countries. The abbreviations used correspond to

those discussed in the List of Abbreviations at the beginning of the study.

As noted previously, a greater number of parties received votes then

received representation in parliament. Additionally, over time a change in

support for minor parties can be witnessed, i.e., Communist parties which

established strong support in some countries in the sixties and early

seventies can be seen to wane in the eighties, so much so as to become non­

existent in some countries by 1989. Conclusions as to the types of parties

entering the system can be drawn as well; i.e., is there a propensity for

parties to emerge on the left or the right of the ideological spectrum, green

parties or parties of cultural defense?

49

Austria

Long considered as having a two-party system, no longer is that claim

valid in Austria. As shown in Table 4.2, up until the eighties the party

system in Austria was highly aggregated. Mter 1945, Austria underwent a

period where the Austrian People's Party (OVP) and the Social-Democratic

Party (SPO) alternated as the majority party. Figure 4.1 shows that these

two parties as well as the Freedom Party (FPO) dominated the scene in the

immediate post-war period; likewise is the case today. However, no longer

do the SPO and the OVP enjoy the margin of support they once did.

Traditionally receiving in excess of ninety percent of the popular vote, in the

1992 election, combined, these parties accounted for only seventy-five

percent of the vote-- the lowest level of support ever recorded for these

parties since before 1930. Coupled with this decline in support for the two

major parties has been increasing support for minor and emerging parties.

For example, the FPO which traditionally averaged approximately six

percent of the popular vote has recently seen a rise in its support. So

dramatic has this increase been, that in 1992 the FPO gained record levels

of representation when they attained a party high of 16.64% of the popular

vote. However, not only the FPO is gaining in support. Parties formed

around alternative issues, i.e., post-materialist or authoritarian values, are

beginning to emerge. In Austria, the United Green Party of Austria (VGO)

and Die Grune are two such examples of parties pursuing post-materialist

values, i.e., environmental, peace, and social justice issues. Both parties

entered the Austrian political scene in the 1980s pursuing the advancement

of environmental issues

50

p e

c e n t

g e

s e a t s

100

40

20

0 1992

60

1992

Parliamentary Support

1986

• SPO GAL

1979

Year

• OVP • KPO

1971

D FPO

Percentage of Popular Vote Received

1986

• SPO GAL

1979

Year

OVP IIIII KPO

1971

D FPO

Figure 4.1: Austrian Election Results 1965-1992

51

1965

1965

However, as indicated by Figure 4.1, these parties were forced to merge in

the late eighties in an effort to obtain even minimal representation in

parliament.

What is behind this change in the Austrian party system? As

reported in Table 4.2, in 1989 the Austrian party system experienced a

decline in aggregation from the levels measured the previous twenty years.

However is this fragmentation and subsequently cabinet instability? To

answer these questions, one must look at other countries. Belgium, a

country with a relatively competitive system until the party fragmentation of

the late 1960s, provides a prime example. During the 1960s, Belgium was

characterized by a system whereby three or four prime parties contested

power with all participating in some level of governance. It appears that

Austria has moved to this point in the 1980s and 1990s. No longer

dominated by two parties, Austria now possesses a competitive party system.

Unlike Belgium, though, Austria is a very homogeneous country with

practically no ethnic differences (Steiner 1972; Gerlich 1987). Almost the

same holds true for religion: more than 90 percent of the population are

Roman Catholic. The one cleavage that does persist in Austria is that of

social class. The party positions on this issue, while fairly explicit, are

however becoming increasingly ambiguous. This is due in part to what

Steiner (1972) and Gerlich and Muller (1983) have termed the emergence of

a "new middle class," which does not easily ally itself with either of the two

traditional parties.

In summary, while no longer a highly aggregated system, future

fragmentation of the party system in Austria appears unlikely. The two

52

traditional parties have moved towards a Downsian middle-of-the-road

position, which has brought about decreased conflict between them and

made cooperation easier. However, possibilities exist for new parties to

enter the system along the materialist-post-materialist value cleavage. New

issues such as environmentalism have arisen which are of special concern to

the "new middle class" and which seem to cut across traditional party lines.

This prospect is problematic, however, as two ecology parties already exist in

the Austrian system. The only likelihood for future party system

fragmentation would be an internal splintering of the traditional parties or

the rise of highly authoritarian parties concerned with cultural

homogeneity-- something long associated with Austrian culture.

Belgium

The data in Table 4.2 clearly indicates increased fragmentation within

the Belgian political system. This fragmentation and subsequent weakening

of the party system (Dewachter 1987) has come about due to an inability of

the ruling parties to solve the ethno-linguistic cleavage. In sum, the attempt

at reconciling this single area led to the fragmenting of the dominant

parties, thus doubling the number of parties as well as increasing the

difficulties for parties to form cabinets. When comparing the data in Figure

4.2, it is obvious that the major impetus to fragmentation was not ideological

but ethno-linguistic. The data reveal both Dutch and French speaking

branches of the same party, e.g., the CVP and PSC, the SP and PS, and the

PVV and PLP.

53

s e a t 8

p e r c e n t a g e

Parliamentary Support

PW PRL PSC Vlaams VU Ecolo Agalev Rosse FDF FN Others

• 1991 1971

Party

. 1985 11111965

D 1978

Percentage of Popular Vote Received

CVP PS SP PW PRL PSC Vlaams VU Ecolo Agalev Rosse FDF FN Others

• 1991 D 1971

Party

1986 1965

mm 1978

Figure 4.2: Belgian 992--------------------~

54

Moreover, Dewachter (1987, p. 301) concludes, "New parties have

successfully joined the system at a rate of one per decade, thus reducing,

sometimes quite considerably, the electoral and parliamentary size of the

traditional parties." These parties have formed around a variety of issues

and cleavages. The most notable of these being parties representing the

post-materialist, i.e., environmental issues. However, in recent years parties

such as the Front National (FN) representing the authoritarian cleavage,

i.e., cultural defense, have made significant advances in the electoral arena.

The data and literature suggest that fragmentation within the Belgian

party system will continue. Furthermore, the gains made by the extreme­

right in 1991 suggest a further weakening of the traditional and centrist

parties. Lacking any strong national parties, i.e., parties where the support

base transcends the ethno-linguistic cleavage, the possibility of future

governments being formed without the necessity for a coalition is remote.

Concomitant is the reality that at least fourteen different parties have a

legitimate chance at being part of the government.

Belgian politics and society are very complex. One only need look at

the merger of the Christian parties that took place in the seventies and the

subsequent splintering into French and Dutch blocks for an example of this

complexity. The fragmenting of the party system has led to the development

of a federal system within Belgium. There are two political systems, each

with their own party structures and so on. This has allowed for greater

fragmentation to occur within the system and has benefited weaker parties

that otherwise might have failed. In short, fragmentation within the

55

Belgian system is very great and shows no signs of decreasing in the near

future.

Denmark

Long considered a model of party system stability, the ability to

govern Denmark effectively became problematic with the election of 1973.

Figure 4.3 shows how the "electoral earthquake" (Sartori 1976, p. 150)

changed the landscape of the Danish political system from that of a stable

three party system ruled by majority governments to that of one ruled by

minority coalitions encompassing the views of anywhere from three to six

parties. Before passing judgment upon Denmark as a dysfunctional

democracy, though, another look at Table 4.2 and Figure 4.3 is necessary.

The fragmentation figures for Denmark reveal an increase in

fragmentation between the years of 1965 and 1973; however, since 1973 the

system has been again slowly aggregating (a process that was occurring

before the election of 1973). As shown in Figure 4.3, fragmentation in

Denmark appears to occur in cycles. However, in the elections since 1973,

when the Social Democratic Party (SDP) loses support in one election, they

regain a high percentage of the lost support in the following election; the

main opposition parties do not. It is the minor and regional parties that

gain this lost support. Outcomes such as this question the ability of the

traditional parties to maintain an active role in government and to

marginalize extreme parties-- be they left or right. In sum, the future for

Denmark could possibly be like that of Canada, i.e., where the main

opposition party is one pursuing ethnic or regional issues.

56

Parliamentary Support 80

s e

t s

SDP CsPP SPP LIB RLP Party

CD pp CrPP Other

p e r c e n t a g e

50

SDP CsPP

Figure 4.3: Danis

• 1990 • 1973

1987 1965

D 1979

Percentage of Popular Vote Received

SPP LIB

• 1990 1973

ection

RLP Party

1987 ~ 1965

57

CD pp

D 1979

CrPP Other

The party system of Denmark is fragmented; however at the present

time, this fragmentation has not become system challenging to the extent

that democratic rule will be replaced with authoritarianism. If however,

another "election earthquake" like the one in 1973 occurs, the chances are

very good that the Danish system could follow the path of Belgium and

become as fragmented and dispersed as the many islands comprising the

country itself.

Finland

Experiencing only a two-point decline in overall fragmentation

between the years of 1965 and 1989, the Finnish system while fragmented is

not unstable. Comprised of three strong parties and a host of successful

minority parties, elections are characterized by a high degree of competition.

With no party normally able to garner in excess of twenty-five percent of the

popular vote, traditional left or right coalition governments are the norm in

Finnish politics. As support changes from party to party over the years, and

as indicted by Figure 4.4, a majority of this shift occurs between the FCP,

FSPD, NCP, and LWA. The minor parties do not appear to be gaining in

support; thus the question becomes to what extent are regional issues and

issues of cultural autonomy important to the Finnish electorate?

Outside of the Swedish People's Party and the Finnish Rural Party,

Finnish politics are not dominated by regional and cultural cleavages.

Traditional conflicts revolve around socio-economic concerns and the

general welfare of the country. Of important note is the Green Union in

Finland: with regards to support in parliament the GU is one of the

58

s e

t s

p e r c e n t a g e

60

Parliamentary Support

FCP FSPD NCP LWA GU SwPP FRP FCU LPP Others

• 1991 1972

Party

• 1987 • 1965

D 1979

Percentage of Popular Vote Received

FCP FSPD NCP LWA

• 1991 5S 1972

GU SwPP FRP FCU

Party

1987 1965

D 1979

LPP Others

Figure 4.4: Finnish Election Results 1965-1992

59

strongest green parties in Europe. In sum, to date Finland has not seen the

rise of extreme authoritarian parties such as the National Front. The

system is characterized by a level of fragmentation indicative of a high level

of competition between the parties, i.e., a high level of equality among the

parties. While in some countries, those with active extremist political

organizations, this parity among the parties would result in a high level of

competition and subsequently destabilization, in Finland this is not the case.

In the foreseeable future, though, as indicated by a majority of the countries

studied in this thesis, as economic issues are resolved, fragmentation, will

probably increase.

France

With data only available for the years 1973 through 1988 (see Figure

4.5), the findings for France are unclear. It is apparent that fragmentation

of the system has occurred. Furthermore, a majority of this fragmentation

has occurred among the right-wing parties. Groups such as the National

Front with charismatic leader Jean Marie LePen have shown steady

increases in both popular and electoral support, which has translated into

parliamentary representation. Additionally, while not reported here, in the

last round of elections the entire political system shifted to the right as the

socialist government was turned out in favor of one led by the conservative

political parties.

In accordance with the data reported in Table 4.2, the party system in

France has become highly fragmented. Given the present economic

conditions as well as the increased anti-immigrant sentiment that is

60

300

250

200 s e a 150 t s

p e r c e n t a g e

100

50

0

40

PS

Figure 4.5:

Parliamentary Support

MRG PS-affl UDF

• 1988

RPR

Party

• 1978

PCF URC

D 1973

Percentage of Popular Vote Received

Party

• 1988 1978 D 1973

61

FN Others

sweeping the country, fragmentation is likely to continue with parties

espousing extreme-right sentiments, e.g., cultural homogeneity, gaining

support while traditional parties such as the PS wane in relevance.

However, total system wide instability does not seem a plausible outcome in

light of these findings. In sum, the French system, like that of Denmark

could be slowly proceeding towards a federal system with regional parties.

Germany

Prior to the late 1970s, the German party system was characterized by

a high level of aggregation. The CDU/CSU coalition and the SPD being the

two alternating powers in the party system during this time period. Starting

in the 1980s, though, as indicated by the data presented in Figure 4.6, the

German system started to become more competitive and hence the party

system more fragmented. This trend has continued and even gained

momentum to a certain extent due to the reunification of Germany in

November of 1990.

The transformation in the party system of the early eighties consisted

of the emergence of parties espousing post-materialist ideology, e.g., Petra

Kelly's Green Party. This movement, however, appears to have died the

symbolic death of Kelly herself-- in the 1990s the Greens failed to garner

enough support for even one representative in the Bundestag. Recently,

though, the German system has undergone a second transitional wave with

the emergence of ultra-nationalistic and authoritarian parties-- parties the

popular media has termed "neo-nazi" and "fascist." In the election of 1990,

while the Republican party failed to received sufficient support to earn a

62

s e a t s

p e r c e n t a g e

300

250

200

150

100

50

0 CDU SPD

Parliamentary Support

FDP CSU Grn/W st PDS RepP Grn/Est Other

• 1990 1972

Party

1987 ~ 1965

D 1976

Percentage of Popular Vote Received

.1990 1972

Party

1987 • 1965

D 1976

Figure 4.6: German Election Results 1965- 992

63

seat in the Bundestag, recent polls report that in the next election the

Republicans will garner enough support to gain representation. In short, the

challenge to the party system and the subsequent level of aggregation is

presently from the right.

It is unclear whether the German system will continue to fragment or,

like the Austrian system, it has entered a period of true party competition.

If, however, the parties on the extreme right continue to gain support it is

very likely that fragmentation will increase and the party system will begin

to resemble that of Belgium, with political parties becoming regional interest

groups. It must be noted that the aggregation index for Germany may in

actuality be underreported. With the reunification of Germany in 1990, one­

time amendments to the electoral laws were made to give new parties a

better chance of obtaining membership in the Bundestag. Thus, parties

which may have only regional bases of support attained representation in

the Bundestag. Parties that given the traditional election laws would not

have entered parliament.

Iceland

Unlike Denmark or Belgium, party system fragmentation is easier to

interpret in the case of Iceland. While initially a highly aggregated party

system (see Table 4.2 and Figure 4. 7), as aggregate economic conditions have

improved issue venues have changed as well. New parties have entered the

system and challenged the traditional parties for control of the government.

In the election of 1991, at least four parties had legitimate chances at

becoming the recognized opposition party. In short, another party system

64

s e a t s

p e r c e n t a g e

IP

IP

pp

Parliamentary Support

SDP

• 1991 1971

PA

Party

• 1987 ~ 1965

WA

D 1978

Percentage of Popular Vote Received

pp SDP

• 1991 1971

PA

Party

• 1987 ~ 1965

WA

D 1978

Figure 4. 7: Icelandic Election Results 1965-1992

65

CitP Other

CitP Other

one characterized by two dominant parties is now a prime example of a

relatively fragmented party system. Due to the relative homogeneity of the

people of Iceland and its relative geographic isolation, it seems unlikely that

further fragmentation, while it might occur, will result in governmental

instability.

India

The party system of India has long been considered a one-party

dominant system. The Congress party, outside of a short time period during

the late seventies and early eighties, has dominated the reigns of power.

However, as Table 4.2 indicates, holding the reigns of power and the ability

to govern are two separate skills. The party system in India is the most

highly fragmented in this study-- more so than Belgium. Unlike Belgium,

where the cleavages are based upon ethno-linguistic lines, the cleavages in

India are based along the lines of class and regional people's parties.

Another difference between Belgium and India is the amount of civil unrest.

In Belgium, while elections may occur every two years due to the inability of

coalitions to maintain majority status, political assassinations are not as

commonplace as they are in India. The Indian case, then is one of high

fragmentation and high instability.

Due to the high level of instability present in the Indian system, data

is highly speculative and in some cases not available. Figure 4.8 reports the

number of seats held be each party in parliament. It is important to note

the number of parties in the category of "other"; at least six parties are

included here that were not represented before 1991. Also in 1991 a shift

66

s e a t 8

400

aro

Congress JNP CPI-m TD BJP

Parliamentary Support

SJD DMK AGP AIADMK CPI RSP JaKNC INDICYl'R NOM VACANT

Party

• 1991 § 1971

• 1985 • 1965

D 1977

Figure 4.8: Indian Election Results 1965-1992

67

occurred with regards to the mail opposition party, long the role of the JNP.

In 1991 it switched to the BJP-- a party which in 1985 held only two seats in

parliament. Volatile outcomes such as this are indicative of a highly

unstable party system; traditional parties cannot rely upon the electorate to

support them from election to election. While not discussed here these '

results mirror those of Canada in 1993. In that election, the Bloc Quebecois

and the Reform Party, both almost nonexistent in the 1980s moved into the

position of opposition party.

With the electoral gap between the Congress Party and the other

Indian parties closing, it is highly unlikely that one-party dominant

governments in India will continue for much longer. In other words, soon

the Indian party system will be characterized by coalition style governments,

and given the electoral history of India, severe instability.

Israel

The Israeli party system, as mentioned previous, was characterized by

a high level of fragmentation until the late 1970s. However, with either the

Labour or Likud coalition able to establish a sufficient majority to form a

government, Israeli politics could be considered a two-party system. In the

1980s while Labour and Likud were still the key players in Israeli politics, '

new groups of parties entered the party arena. Fragmentation within the

party system in Israel gained significant momentum with the election of

1984 when parties representing extreme Arab interests, and parties

representing extreme Zionist sentiments succeeded in gaining representation

in the Knesset.

68

8 e

• t

•

60

Parliamentary Support

Labour Lilrud Meretz Tzomet Shas NRP UTJ Hadash Moledet ADP Tehi,ya Kach Agudat Omeu PUP

Party

• 1992 11m 1973

• 1984 196~

D 1977

Figure 4.9: Israeli Election Results 1965-1992

69

Traditionally a highly competitive party system, at present time with

the emergence of new parties, the future of the Israeli party system favors

increased competition. As shown in Figure 4.9, it appears this competitive

system will have a right-wing slant to it. If future elections mirror the

recent success of Tzomet, Shas, and Moledet (all right-wing parties

espousing zero-tolerance for a peaceful settlement with the PLO and Arabs),

it suggests a dour tone for present peace efforts. Increased fragmentation

within the Israeli party system may not have a destabilizing influence upon

the government of Israel, but it could affect the already tenuous political

environment in the entire region.

Italy

As reported in Table 4.2, party system fragmentation has been

steadily increasing over the past twenty-five years in Italy. While the PDC

(at least up until March 28, 1994) still maintained control of parliament, its

support shows a steady decrease from 1965 forward (see Figure 4.10).

Rising support is shown for numerous parties, the most notable of these

being the Northern League (LN/LL in Figure 4.10) and the Communist Re­

establishment Party (PRC). What is so amazing about the rising support for

these two parties is the fact that both of these parties were formed only

three years ago in 1991. If one is to hope to argue in favor of the catch-all

model, these data for Italy do not support such a conclusion. Furthermore,

one must also consider Italy a highly fragmented system due to the actuality

of numerous parties having a legitimate chance at gaining sufficient support

to form a government.

70

8 e a t

•

P. e r c e n t a g e

300

45

PDC

Figure 4.10:

PDS

Parliamentary Support

PSI LN/LL PdRC MSI-DN PRI PLI

• 1992 1972

Party

• 1987 • 196:S

FdV

D 1976

PSDI LR/MplD LP

Percentage of Popular Vote Received

PSI LN/LL PdRC MSIDN PRI PU FdV PSDI LRIMD LP Party

• 1992 • 1987 D 1976

• 1972 1965

ect1on

71

sv au-.

sv Others

The Italian system has been traditionally distinguished by its

ideological patterning, the number of parties and the central paradox of its

having combined a hyper-polticised polity with an apparently stable

electorate. Given the election results of March 1994 this characterization '

still seems valid. Whether or not the replacement of the PDC with the MSI­

DN, i.e., replacing the center-right with the right, is more indicative of mass

disgust with the corruption of the PDC then that of a shift to the right, will

be discerned within the near future. However, given the over time declining

support for the catch-all parties within the Italian system (PDC and PDS),

coupled with the continued increasing support for the Northern League, it

seems problema tic that these catch -all parties will return to power.

Japan

The Japanese party system, while initially one of the most aggregated

(ranking only behind Austria and West Germany in 1965) is quickly

becoming highly fragmented. While not presented here, the 1993 election

saw the Japanese electorate replace over thirty-plus years of one-party

dominant government by the LDP with a seven-party coalition government.

As seen in Figure 4.11, while remaining the dominant party the LDP has

been experiencing a decline in its overall level of support. Centrist and

reform parties such as Komeito and the Progressive party also have

experienced varying levels support in the last thirty years.

Due to the relative cultural homogeneity of the population of Japan, it

appears that fragmentation is occurring in response to the electorate's

dissatisfaction with the corruption-laden LDP and its numerous

72

s e a t s

p e r c e n t a g e

350

LDP

Figure 4.11:

Parliamentary Support

............ ······· ................ .

•••• • •••••••••• • • ··-·· ••••••••••••• •••• ••••••••••••• •••••••••••••••• 0 •••

.. ............... ...... .................... ····················· .............................. .. .

. . .. . ...................... . . . . . ......... •••••••••• •••• •••••••••• ••••••••••••••••••• 0 •••• 0 •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 0 ••

JSP Komeito JCP

• 1990 § 1972

DSP

Party

• 1986 • 1965

SDF Prog. Others

D 1976

Percentage of Popular Vote Received

.. .. ... ... ......... . .. . . ••••• • • • ••••• . . ..... . ........ .. ........ . .. . ........... . .... . ....... . ....... ··-·· ••••• 0 •••••••••••

Ind.

· ·· · ·· · ············· · ······-········-·· •••••••••••••••••••••••••• ··-···· ••.••• 0 •••••.••.••••••••••••••••••••

JSP Komeito JCP DSP SDF Prog. Others Ind.

Party

• 1990 1986 D 1976 §I 1972 • 1965

73

scandals, as well as in response to a legitimate dealignment, with new

parties entering the system espousing strong ideological stances. Given the

election results of 1993, while a coalition government was established based

upon reformist parties, for the most part these parties were splinter groups

of the LDP, in short, it appears the LDP has been replaced with a

fragmented version of its former self. The next round of elections in Japan

will most probably answer this question. If one party is returned to

government, then only a realignment has occurred with the LDP as the

major loser. If, however, a coalition government is again returned to power,

it stands to reason that the Japanese party system has entered the same era

as that of Austria, Denmark and Iceland: the era of party system

competition.

Luxembourg

Table 4.2 shows steadily increasing fragmentation within the party

system of Luxembourg. The traditional centrist parties, the Christian Social

Party (PCS) and the Socialist Workers' Party (POSL), while remaining in

power, are shown to be losing support (Figure 4.12). Unlike most of the

other countries included in this study, however, this shift in support away

from, the centrist parties has taken place in conjunction with a rise in

support for left oriented parties as opposed to rightist. The most successful

of these parties being the Five-sixths Action Committee, which campaigns to

secure improved pension rights for private sector employees, and those

parties representing ecological values, i.e., green parties. Throughout the

74

s e a t s

p

r c e n t a

25

5

0

35

g 1 e

PCS POSL

Parliamentary Support

·········· .. ····· .......................... .

• 1989 § 1974

Party

• 1984 ~ 1965

D 1979

Percentage of Popular Vote Received

PD

········-·····-·· •·••·••···-······· .......................... .

CdA5/6

Party

• 1989 D 1979

1984 § 1974

Figure 4.12: Luxembourg Election Results 1965-1992

75

PCL Others

time period under study, the Communist party of Luxembourg has managed

to remain active, though, it too is suffering from declining levels of support.

Due to the relative cultural homogeneity and its small size (population

of approximately 400,000) it does not seem reasonable to suggest that the

party system in Luxembourg will undergo much radical transformation in

the future. Again, however, as witnessed in the other countries studied, the

once dominant parties (the ones Kirchheimer would suggest as representing

his catch-all model) are seen to be losing the strong support they are

accustomed to. New parties pursuing only a handful of issues and following

strict ideological patterns are showing increasing success. In conclusion,

party system fragmentation in Luxembourg appears to be following that of a

majority of countries in this study. The system is becoming more

fragmented, and accordingly legitimate competition among parties is

emerging.

Netherlands

While fragmentation within the Dutch party system has fluctuated

over the last twenty years, this fluctuation has been a by-product of

declining support for the traditional parties more so than due to an

explosion of new parties into the electorate. For the most part, the problems

that existed in the in the Dutch electoral system twenty years ago still

persist today, and to that point party system fragmentation has not varied

much either. Concomitantly, neither has the problem of unstable coalitions

prone to collapse been solved. In writing about the time period from 1966-

1986, Bart Tromp (1990, p. 96) concluded:

76

The changes in the Dutch party system after twenty years have been unmistakable, if also unimpressive. The number of parties has not changed considerably. Small parties survive to the left and to the right, but their relevance has declined since 1966. The decline of the religious vote has resulted in stronger progressive parties (the PvdA and D'66) and a stronger conservative-liberal party (the VVD), and most importantly, has led to the emergence of the CDA as the dominant center party of Dutch politics. This dominance now rests on some one-third of the vote, however, rather than a majority, as was the case from 1918 to 1963. . . A distinctive (and attractive) ideological identity is also increasingly necessary given that stable electoral attachments have given way to increased volatility, and given that the issues on which the original partisan identities have been built have faded a way and/ or are being replaced by new concerns.

Turning to Figure 4.13, the drastic decline in support for the CDA can

be more fully understood. Able at one time to command over fifty percent of

the popular vote (the 1950s and early 1960s) the CDA was barely able to

covet half of that total in the late seventies.l Formed as a coalition between

the three religious parties (the ARP, CHU, and KVP) in the late seventies in

an attempt to stop the hemorrhage of voter support, the CDA was forced to

abandon its Christian ideology in an attempt to remain a viable option for

the electorate and prevent a mass shift of the electorate to the left or right.

Initially, this "shift" in ideology only managed to add legitimacy to the

burgeoning progressive, reform-oriented movements of the PvdA and D'66.

Surprisingly, throughout this "period of volatility" was the relative stability

in support maintained by the GLand SPG parties-- possibly due to these

parties having a regional influence only. The rise of extreme right parties,

77

s e a t s

80

70

60

50

45

p 40

e r c e n t a g e

Parliamentary Support

CDA PvdA VVD D'66 GL SGP GPV RPF LJ/C Other

• 1991 1972

Party

• 1986 • 1965

D 1979

Percentage of Popular Vote Received

CDA PvdA VVD

• 1991 § 1972

Party

1986 • 1965

GPV RPF LJ/C Other

D 1979

Figure .

78

for the most part has not happened within the Dutch party system. There

have, however, be instances of populist parties emerging for an election cycle

or two. These parties, though, had short lived existences as they were

unable to expand beyond their regional bases of support.

Norway

The data presented in Table 4.2 provide inconclusive evidence about

the general trend of fragmentation within the Norwegian party system.

Experiencing both periods of aggregation and fragmentation, initially one

might draw comparisons to Iceland when looking for answers to this

paradox. Ceteris paribus this analogy seems to hold: both countries ruled by

stable one-party majority governments for the preponderance of the period

under study; traditional parties suffering a decline in overall support; the

emergence of new parties, some more successful then others, but with some

viable enough to challenge for the role as the recognized opposition party or

as members of a coalition government; and approximately three to six

parties gaining representation within parliament at any one time. One

might push this symmetry so far as to say that Knut Heidar (1990, p. 143)

writing about the Norwegian party system was in actuality discussing

Iceland when he commented:

The comparative reference to the party politics of Norway has rarely been described in terms of strife, feud, crisis, or breakdown. The terms have rather been frozen cleavages, stability, consensual, and as Dankert Rustow described it in terms expected to provoke surprise in the 1950s, a working multi-party system.

79

s e a t s

p e r c e n t a g e

45

40

DnA Hoyer FP

DnA Hoyer FP

Figure 4.14:

sv

Parliamentary Support

KrF

• 1989 ~ 1973

SP FfF Venstre FMS MdG

Party

• 1985 .1965

D 1977

Percentage of Popular Vote Received

sv KrF

• 1989 ~ 1973

SP FfF Venstre FMS MdG

Party

. 1985

.1965

80

D 1977

SI PP Others

SI PP Others

Moving beyond this superficial comparison, however, it is possible to

ascertain just how dissimilar these two countries are. Unlike the island

nation of Iceland segments of the Norwegian populace have perceived a

threat to their level of cultural homogeneity vis-a-vis refugees and

immigrants from developing countries. Hence, and as Heidar concurs, there

has been a swing to the right in party ideologies causing a sea change in the

party system. Moreover, as indicated by Figure 4.14, extreme right parties

such as Stopp Innvandringen (SI), which espouses the complete closing of

the Norwegian boarders to immigrants, have entered the system and seen

steady increases in support-- to almost one-half of one percent in 1989 alone.

In retrospect, no longer is the Rokkanian thesis of a "frozen" cleavage

structure valid, nor is Sartori's "predominant party" label applicable.

Furthermore, given the rising importance of the Progressive Party (FP) and

(as supported by the data in Figure 4.14) coupled with the deterioration of

the political cohesion within the non-socialist group of parties, the party

system is appearing increasingly fragmented. The fragmentation of the

party system in Norway has the added dimension of being typified by

alternative parties lacking in reliable parliamentary majorities. It is this set

of circumstances that cause the Norwegian party system thus to more closely

mirror that of Denmark then Iceland in final analysis.

Sweden

Reminiscent of the 1976 "coup" the non-socialist parties again took the

reigns of power from the Social Democrats in 1991 and forced them into the

81

s e a t s

p e r c e n t a g e

160

SDAP MS

SDAP MS

Parliamentary Support

FP

• 1991 § 1973

CP KdS

Party

• 1985 • 1965

ND VP

D 1979

Percentage of Popular Vote Received

FP ND VP

Party

• 1991 1985 D 1979 § 1973 • 1965

Figure 4.15: Swedish Election Results 1965-1992

82

MpG Others

MpG Others

role of opposition party for only the second time in fifty-five years. Relating

to a decline in the fragmentation index of only 1.1 points it is highly unlikely

that this shift in power represents a sea change in the Swedish political

landscape of a stable shift to the right. While support for the SDAP did

decrease almost ten percent in 1991, this was not matched by a coincidental

rise in support for the MS, FP, and CP, i.e., the ruling coalition. What did

occur was a rise in support for the newly formed parties of the ND and MpG.

The MpG, while not attaining sufficient support to warrant representation in

the Riksdag, did, however, post is best electoral showing in gaining 3.4

percent of the popular vote. The ND, a populist right-wing party, entered

parliament for the first time gaining twenty-five seats, placing it almost on

par with such traditional parties as the FP and CP.

The rise of parties such as the MpG and ND coincide with a rise in

support among the electorate for post-materialist and ethno-linguistic

(cultural defense) issues. It is difficult to claim, however, that the

emergence of these parties are symbolic of a rise of the "new politics"

cleavage as it was only in 1991 that these parties first contested elections.

While the center-right parties at present time do appear to be gaining

strength, not to mention control the government, it is premature to conclude

that this is due to a fundamental shift in core beliefs and not reflective of a

punishment of the SDAP for its recent poor handling of the economy and

leviathan welfare structure.

83

Switzerland

The data in Table 4.2 confirm the oft-stated axiom of the Swiss party

system being highly fragmented. As the data indicate, in 1989 only India

had a more highly fragmented party system. The subsequent question being,

how unstable is the Swiss party system. Given the minority nature of the

party system, the answer to the question of instability lies with the level of

fractionalization of the different party alliances. Assuming traditional party

cleavages and alliance structures, the Swiss party system appears to be

highly destabilized. However, the fluid nature of party alliances renders

ideology and issue stances relatively void of explanatory power. As Kerr

(1987, p. 121) explained:

The structure of party alliances is not fixed but fluid, as both government and opposition parties constantly shift their alignments across this ideological space in response to the nature of the issues.

In other words, the multipolarized, fragmented party system is held together

vis-a-vis the fractionalization of party alliances.

Figure 4.16 displays the results from the four time periods under

consideration. As can be seen, the proliferation of parties on the Swiss

political landscape is as prodigious as the most fragmented systems of

continental Europe. Parties representing all facets of the ideological

spectrum exist to some degree. This proliferation of political parties has

been helped by the existence of multiple cleavages running along class,

religious, regional, and linguistic lines. Due to the fluid nature of party

stances, it is not practical to classify the emerging parties in Switzerland as

fundamentally rightist or leftist in nature; however, in the past year

84

s e a t s

p e r

55

c 15 e n t a g

e 5

0

Parliamentary Support

RDP SDP CDPP SPP GPS LP AP lA SwD EPP WP Others

RDP

Party

• 1991 s 1971

• 1987 ~ 1965

D 1979

Percentage of Popular Vote Received

SDP CDPP SPP GPS LP AP lA

Party

• 1987 D 1971

1979 § 1965

SwD EPP WP Others

Figure 4.16: Swiss Election

85

Switzerland witnessed its share of hate crimes against immigrants and the

establishment of its first totally anti-immigrant party.

How do all these conclusions affect the party system in Switzerland?

While not appearing to be underreported, due to the already discussed fluid

nature of the political alliances, the high level of party system fragmentation

in Switzerland is misleading. Given the relative success of the government

at maintaining high prosperity, low inflation, virtually no unemployment,

good industrial relations, and a fair income distribution, it would suggest

that the high level of fragmentation has no impact upon the ability to govern

effectively and make policy. In sum, the government in Switzerland, not

having to address the complex economic, national security, and foreign

policy issues of advanced industrial democracies, manages to violate every

rule of effective government.

Turkey

Party system fragmentation in Turkey represents the "what might

happen" category. In short, a coup in 1980 occurred whereby the existing

political parties were outlawed and a new electoral system was instituted.

This coup it has been suggested happened in response to the inability of the

existing political parties to govern effectively. Oddly enough, the installation

of a new electoral system has not decreased fragmentation (as reported in

Table 4.2). In 1989 with the repeal of the 1980 electoral law mandating a

party receive in excess of ten percent of the national vote, a greater number

of parties entered parliament and now realistically challenge for the reigns

of power.

86

300

250

s e a 150 t s

100

50

DYP

Figure 4.17:

ANAP

Parliamentary Support

SHP

D 1991

RP Party

87

DSP

• 1986

HEP MCP

Lacking sufficient data from the 1960s through the late 1970s, it is

not possible to ascertain over time trends in party formation or party system

transformation outside of that already offered. However, data are available

for the years 1991 and 1986. As can be seen in Figure 4.17, the RP, DSP,

and MCP were all adversely affected by the 1980 "ten percent minimum"

election law. These findings suggest that party system fragmentation within

Turkey is somewhat underreported. These figures further indicate that

party system fragmentation is once again increasing in Turkey. It remains

to be seen whether this will lead to the dour consequences of another coup,

however.

Synopsis of Findings

Up until this point the analysis has focused on the overall level of

fragmentation for all the countries studied and a series of case studies. In

the following section a series of generalizations and conclusions about the

party systems studied will be drawn. Secondly, aggregate level inferences as

to the impact of party fragmentation upon the individual countries studied

will be made and discussed. Lastly, speculations as to the immediate future

of party system fragmentation will be attempted.

For the most part, fifteen out of seventeen countries, the level of party

system fragmentation did increase in the countries studied. Based upon the

numerous figures presented, it has been demonstrated that fragmentation

took place in two waves. The initial wave of the late sixties and seventies

was characterized by a decline in support for the traditional centrist parties,

e.g., Christian and social democratic parties, coupled with an increase in

88

support for parties espousing post-materialist values, i.e., ecological

concerns, the furthering of peace, and the pursuit of social justice. The

second wave beginning in the 1980s and continuing so far through the 1990s

has been characterized by rising levels of support for right-wing and extreme

right-wing parties. This rise, for the most part, has occurred within the

context of continued declining support for the centrist parties, but has also

to a certain extent been to the detriment of the post-materialist parties that

emerged during the first wave of fragmentation. This raises a question as to

the co-optability and level of issue saliency upon which these emerging

parties initially formed. The data presented here suggest that the "new

politics" issues, as they have been defined, are not co-optable by the old

centrist parties. Moreover, the data indicate that post-materialist values are

no longer as germane to the electorate. This outcome suggests that not only

are post-materialist values not co-optable, but they are ephemeral as well.

Party system fragmentation, as characterized by a decline in support

for the traditional parties and increasing support for emerging parties,

occurred at both ends of the ideological spectrum. On the left, parties

emerged pursuing policy stances protecting the environment. These parties

have gained the generic term "green parties". Initially, as many as three or

four different green parties could be found in numerous countries. However,

after this inaugural period, many of these parties found it necessary to form

coalitions in order to maintain representation in their respective

parliaments. From the right, parties extolling the importance of

maintaining cultural homogeneity and the curtailing of immigration have

arisen. A large body of literature discussing the ease with which these

89

parties have formed and garnered support is quickly coming to the forefront

(Betz 1993; Brechon and Mitra 1993; Husbands 1992, 1992a; Knight 1992;

Fysh and Wolfreys 1992; Furlong 1992; Arter 1992; Ellwood 1992; Gallagher

1992; Ignazi and Ysmal 1992; Ignazi 1992; Voerma and Lucardie 1992;

Minkenberg 1992). The most flamboyant of these parties being the National

Front in France with its charismatic leader Jean Marie LePen. In other

words, these findings suggest it is easier to preach intolerance then the

protection of the environment. For the most part, these right-wing parties

have been more successful at maintaining a base of support and affecting

national policy then parties of the left.

Given the existence of these new parties, to what extent are they

impacting the party system and subsequently the government? Outside of

Turkey and India, the emergence of new parties into the system has had the

effect of bringing about greater competition within the party system. In

sum, where there once were one-party dominant and two-party dominant

systems, i.e., highly aggregated, there now exist fragmented systems with a

manageable level of active, viable political parties. In Turkey and India, it is

suggested that the emergence of new parties has a destabilizing effect upon

the party system, so much so, they regularly cause the collapse of democratic

governments. There are two notable exceptions to the above assertion of

increased party system competition: Switzerland and the Netherlands.

Both of these countries had extremely fragmented party systems prior to the

period studied here, i.e., the party systems within these countries were

already typified by a high level of competition.

90

At this point, the argument that increased competition in turn means

increased coalition government, which in turn increases the likelihood of

collapse, i.e., governmental instability and a crisis of legitimacy for

democratic regimes could be logically made. This argument, while enjoyable,

relies largely upon the "what-ir' game, as it is not the purpose of this thesis

to engage in the "what-ir' game, this discussion shall be dropped here. More

to the point, what impact will increased competition have upon the party

systems of these countries? It appears, and albeit that these assertions are

purely speculative and open to much debate, that increased party system

competition has not detrimentally impacted the governmental stability of the

countries studied. For the most part, parties have become more responsive

in accordance with this increased competition. A reversal in the catch-all

trend, so feared by Kirchheimer, appears to be underway; parties are

returning to their origins as links between the electorate and the

government.

What does party system fragmentation mean for the future of

westernized democratic nations? Furthermore, what is the immediate

future of countries that are experiencing fragmentation of the party system?

It is highly unlikely that simple fragmentation within the party system of

democratic nations will sound the death knell for such governments;

however, it does not seem improbable that countries experiencing high levels

of fragmentation will be forced into holding elections at shorter time

intervals due to the inability of coalition governments to maintain stable

majorities. In the immediate future, countries experiencing party system

fragmentation will probably continue to do so in accordance with a shift in

91

the electorate to either the left or the right. In short, the traditional catch­

all parties such as the social democrats and Christian unions will continue

to lose support and slowly be phased out of the system or be relegated to

minority status in the new era.

92

Notes

1 Data for the CDA prior to 1977 consist of summing the support for the ARP, CHU, and KVP.

93

CHAPTERV

CONCLUSION

This thesis has measured the level of fragmentation in the party

systems of seventeen countries utilizing parliamentary models of

government for the time period 1979-1992. In addition, the relative level of

cabinet and governmental stability within each country was assessed vis-a­

vis these measurements.

Prior to this study, only two substantive efforts at measuring party

system fragmentation had been undertaken: one by Rae in 1968, and by

Mayer in 1980. While Rae's index has seen some use in scholarship of the

Scandinavian region of Europe (see Daalder 1987), for the most part these

indices have been ignored.

In the past three years, however, a growing body of literature has

emerged making the clarion call that the catch-all party system has ended

and that an era of party system fragmentation is occurring (Mair and Smith

1990; Mair 1990). If such a claim is to be accepted, then it should be

empirically verifiable. However, for the most part, the literature is devoid of

such tests. At best, a few authors report descriptive statistics of the

percentage of popular vote received for the parties within a country~ at worst

simple normative descriptions are offered.

The concept of party system fragmentation, while not vague in

meaning, may be a bit difficult to quantify or algebraically define. David

Rae's (1968) study is an example. For sake of brevity, the fragmentation

index designed by Rae fails to distinguish between fragmentation of the

94

government and the opposition, in failing to make this distinction Rae's

index becomes an unsuitable explicant of cabinet instability. Mayer's (1980)

index on the other hand was designed for the stated purpose of inferring the

impact fragmentation would have upon cabinet stability. Thus, in borrowing

heavily from Mayer, this study provides analysis of party system

fragmentation from 1979-1992 and suggests the implications the level of

fragmentation will have upon government stability. The contribution of this

thesis is largely in bringing the analysis of the fragmentation problematique

up to date. This allows the application of this work to the new emerging

forces of fragmentation such as cultural defense; forces that could only be

speculated in the original presentation of this material by Mayer.

The data presented in this study reveal a breakdown in the

aggregation of party systems. For the sample studied, in 1965 the mean

level of aggregation was 9.33 (suggesting a high level of aggregation);

however, the mean dropped almost six points to 3.89 (indicative of moderate

to high fragmentation) in 1989.

These findings suggest that party systems have moved into the era of

fragmentation. This new era differs from its predecessor, the catch-all era,

in two important aspects. First, and most importantly, no longer is any

single party assured of achieving an electoral majority through the election

process, i.e., a system of minority governments is emerging. The traditional

catch-all parties, i.e., the Christian democratic parties, or the social

democratic parties have lost their dominant status. The 1994 defeat of the

Italian Christian Democrats and the 1993 defeat of the Canadian

Progressive Conservatives are very recent cases in point. Second, minor

95

parties have a realistic chance at entering government and affecting policy

changes. Two examples illustrating this point being the Bloc Quebecois and

the Populist Reform Party in Canada in 1993. Numerous other differences

exist as well, for example, the emergence of new parties into the system

pursuing post-materialist (environmental) values or authoritarian (cultural

homogeneity) values has occurred.

These findings are supported through the percentage of the popular

vote received by each party as reported throughout Chapter IV. Minor

parties can be seen to be gaining in influence and representation, while the

traditional catch-all parties appear to be waning in influence. The

implications this has for future cabinet instability are unclear. Outside of

Turkey, where a military coup in 1980 caused the entire party structure to

be replaced, no governments have violently collapsed or been forced to resign

by the military. However, in some countries elections every two years are

becoming commonplace (an occurrence not very conducive to stable coherent

rule).

In Chapter I, it was posited that party system fragmentation has

taken place in two waves. The first wave was characterized by the

emergence of parties espousing post-materialist values. The second (and

most recent) wave is characterized by the rise in parties pursuing cultural

and ethnocentric beliefs. The data presented in Chapter IV support this

contention. While these emerging parties have seen increased success in the

recent past, however, their total impact upon the system has not yet been

realized.

96

It has been suggested that fragmentation may only be indicative of a

dealignment of the electorate away from the catch-all parties, with a

realignment towards parties with strong ideological platforms soon to follow.

While not discounting this possibility, in keeping with the data presented

here, it is apparent that any realignment that might occur will manifest

itself in party systems with a greater number of viable parties, with all

enjoying relatively equal levels of electoral support.

It is the position of this researcher that party systems in the process

of becoming more fragmented have also become more competitive-- a positive

for democracy. No longer are voters forced to choose between only two

parties if they wish their vote to be meaningful, i.e., secure representation

within parliament.

Over the course of this thesis party system fragmentation has been

studied. This analysis has focused on the system level and been

accomplished through the use of aggregate data. When looking at the

results obtained in this study many avenues of future research become

apparent. First, while this study focuses primarily on post-industrial

societies, a study of party system fragmentation within the countries of

Latin America and Mrica seems prudent. The only draw back to such

studies being the availability of data. Second, further research needs to be

done into the emerging parties and the cleavage structures upon which they

are forming. An example of such a study would look at the demographic and

socio-economic breakdowns of individuals supporting these emerging parties.

Last, studies more closely focusing on the regional aspects of these emerging

parties need to be carried out in order to fully assess the impact these

97

parties will have upon the party system and the functioning of government.

When addressing these areas of future research, it becomes apparent that

this thesis offers just the beginning witness of the phenomena to be

discovered in this area.

98

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106

APPENDIX

IRISH AND CANADIAN ELECTION RESULTS

107

The countries of Canada and Ireland, while not part of Mayer's

original study in 1980, have been referred to throughout the chapters of this

thesis. The following figures present the election results for Canada and

Ireland up to 1992. Ironically, fragmentation of the Canadian party system

appears to have reached it highest point in 1993, a period for which data

was not easily obtainable. In this election the Bloc Quebecois, a strictly

regional separatist party, shifted from minor party status and became the

recognized opposition party. This occurred in the wake of the complete

removal of the Progressive Conservative Party from parliament, one of the

traditional catch-all parties.

In the case of Ireland, the percentage of the popular vote received by

each party should be noticed. For the time period studied the two

traditional parties, Fianna Fail (Soldiers of Destiny--The Republican Party)

and Fine Gael (United Ireland Party) are each shown to suffer decreasing

levels of popular support. Figure A.1 lists the abbreviations used in Figures

A.2 and A.3.

108

Canada

PCP

LP NDP BCSCP

Ireland

Progressive Conservative Party Liberal Party New Democratic Party British Columbia Social Credit Party

FF Fianna Fail FG Fine Gael PgD Progressive Democrats DL Democratic Left DSP Democratic Socialist

Party

Figure A.l: List of Abbreviations for Canada and Ireland

109

s e a t s

225

1991

Parliamentary Support

1984

• PCP ~ BCSCP

1979

Year

• LP m Others

Figure A.2: Canadian Election

110

1972 1965

D NDP

s

a t s

p e r c e n t a g e

90

FF

FF

Figure A.3:

FG

Parliamentary Support

Labour

• 1992 !IIIllii 1973

PgD

Party

1987 • 1965

DL

D 1977

Percentage of Popular Vote Received

FG Labour PgD DL

Party

• 1992 1987 D 1977

D 1973 • 1965

Irish Election Results 1965-1992

111

DSP Other