assessment of capacity building needs of ngos in lebanon

ASSESSMENTOFCAPACITY BUILDINGNEEDSOFNGOSIN LEBANONMarch 2009

AssessmentofCapacityBuildingNeedsofNGOsinLebanon

Theassessmentwasdevelopedinpartnershipwith TheCanadianFundforSocialDevelopment(CFSD) ProjectundertakenwiththefinancialsupportoftheGovernmentofCanada ProvidedthroughtheCanadianInternationalDevelopmentAgency(CIDA)

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TABLEOFCONTENTS

I.Introduction

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II.ExecutiveSummary III.AssessmentMethodology&process IV.Findings

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1.GoverningStructure 2.ManagementProcesses

3.HumanResourceManagement 5.ProgramPerformance 6.ExternalRelations V.RecommendationsAnnexes

4.FinancialResourcesandAdministration

I.Documentsconsulted II.CapacityBuildingFramework

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LISTOFACRONYMS

CBO CFSD CIDA CSR FG GA M&E MDGs MoSA MoI NGO NSSF ToR CommunityBasedOrganizations CanadianFundforSocialDevelopment CanadianInternationalDevelopmentAgency CorporateSocialResponsibility FocusGroup GeneralAssembly MonitoringandEvaluation MillenniumDevelopmentGoals MinistryofSocialAffairs MinistryofInterior NonGovernmentalOrganization NationalSocialSecurityFund TermsofReference

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I.INTRODUCTION TheNGOCapacityBuildingNeedsAssessmentonwhichthisdocumentreports,wasexecutedby theNGOResourceandSupportUnit,whichactswithintheCapacityBuildingforPovertyReduction ProjectajointprojectbetweentheUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgram(UNDP)andthe LebaneseMinistryofSocialAffairs(MoSA)inpartnershipwithTheCanadianFundforSocial Development(CFSD)OXFAMQubec,andfinancedbytheCanadianInternationalDevelopment Agency(CIDA).TheassessmentwasimplementedbetweenNovember2008andMarch2009. TheassessmentfitsintotheCFSDsmissionandobjectiveswithrespectto: CreatingopportunitiesforLebanesecivilsocietyactorstoenablethemtotakeonaleadership role; Financingandmanagingsmallprojects,conceivedandimplementedbyLebaneseNGOsand, ReinforcingtheworkcarriedoutbyNGOsthroughitscapacitybuildingprogram. ItalsofallswithintheNGOResourceandSupportUnitsobjectiveofstrengtheningthecapacities ofNGOstoeffectivelyimprovetheircontributiontothedevelopmentprocessinLebanon.This assessmentbuildsonexistingknowledgeandpreviousprojectsbytheNGOResourceandSupport Unit,including: TheresultsofanNGOsurveyimplementedbyCDRincooperationwithMoSAin2005,which includesdataonaround3500activeLebaneseNGOs. ArecentdatabaseofactiveNGOsinLebanonbeingassembledbyLebanonSupportin cooperationwiththeUnit. Thefindingsandrecommendationsinthisdocumentaimtoprovidetheneededknowledgeand informationfordrawingupanddesigningcapacitybuildingplansandtrainingactivitiesthatbetter respondtotheNGOsneedsandrequirementsandthatwouldcontributetoincreasingthe capacitiesandbroadeningtheknowledgeofNGOsandcivilsocietyorganizationstobetter contributetopromotingsocialdevelopmentinthecountry.Itishopedtoalsoserveasauseful sourceofinformationtoimprovecoordinationintheprovisionofservicestoNGOsinthecountry.

MainWorkingTeam AliChahine,MuznaAlMasri,SuadAbiSamra,andRaniaSafar FromtheNGOResourceandSupportUnitCapacityBuildingforPovertyReductionProject (MoSAUNDP): SawsanMasri,MirvatMerhiandLydiaAghnatios FromtheCanadianFundforSocialDevelopment(Oxfam,Quebec): MaryseGuimondandRahmehMansour

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II.EXECUTIVESUMMARY ThisreportpresentstheresultsofaqualitativestudyofthecapacitybuildingneedsofNGOsin Lebanon,commissionedbytheNGOResourceandSupportUnitinpartnershipwithCFSD/OXFAM Qubec,andimplementedbyateamofindependentconsultants.Thesurveytookplacefrom November2008toMarch2009,andcoveredlocalNongovernmentalorganizationsoperationalin Lebanon.TheaimofthestudyistoassessthetrainingandcapacitybuildingneedsofNGOsin Lebanon,andguidethedevelopmentofatailormadecomprehensivecapacitybuildingplanfor NGOsandcivilsocietyorganizationsworkingforsocialdevelopmentinLebanon. Broadly,thestudyfoundthreeinstrumentalaspectsthatimpactalmostallattributesofcapacity withinNGO,namely: i. ii. Funding,whichshapesthewholegovernanceandmanagerialstructureoftheNGO. Limiteddemocraticgovernance,andtheexistenceofarulingelitewithinmostNGOs whichcontrolsallkeyaspectsoftheorganisationincludingitsgovernance,management, andfundingstructures. TensionbetweentheinstitutionalisedprofessionalnatureofanNGO,anditsvoluntary, changedriven,membershipbase.

iii.

MainFindings FindingsongovernanceindicatethatalthoughallNGOshavewrittenmissionandvision statements,thesearemostlytoobroad&notnecessarilycommittedtoorcommunicatedto concernedstakeholders.Implementationthatdivergesawayfromthestatedmission,forthesake offundingandvisibility,isalsocommon.Intermsoflegalregistration,whilethemajorityofNGOs wereregistered,difficultieswereexpressedatdifferenttimeintervalsintheactualregistration processorforNGOswithamajorityofPalestinianmembers,forcinglessdemocraticlegal structures.Theroleofthegeneralassemblyinholdingboardmemberswasgenerally misunderstoodandundermined,andmembershipprocesscontrolled,andthemajorityofNGOs coveredwereledbyasmallnumberofindividuals,withverylimitedturnover,despitethe commitmenttoregularelections. Atthelevelofmanagement,keyfindingsindicateanoverlapinrolesofmanagementandboardin andabsenceofanoverallorganisationalvisionandstructure,andwrittenmanagementprocesses inthemajorityoforganizations.Organizationswithmorethantenstaffoftenhadregular reporting,asopposedtosmallerNGOsthathadlittlereportinganddocumentation,althoughfor allNGOsinformationdocumentedwasnotadequatelysharedwithconcernedstakeholders. FindingsrelatedtohumanresourcesmanagementrevealthatthemajorityofNGOsdonothave sethumanresourcepolicies,jobdescriptionsfortheirstaff,trainingandstaffdevelopmentplans, adequatebenefits,orclearperformanceandcomplaintsprocedures.Asmallerpercentagehasno employmentcontractsorafairrecruitmentpolicy.Improvedhumanresourcemanagementis noticeableinolderNGOswithsecurefunding,andforprojectbasedemployeesinorganizations withinternationalfunding.Thepotentialofvolunteerismisfoundtobepoorlyexploited,dueto thelackofvolunteerrecruitmentandmanagementsystemswithinNGOs.

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Regardingfinancialresourcesandtheiradministration,LebaneseNGOsarefoundtohaveaccess toavarietyofsourcesoffunding,thoughitisestimatedthatabouthalfofsuchfundingdoesnot requisiteaccountability.Inadditions,aroundhalfoftheabovesourcesareattachedtopartisan sourcesandconditionalexpectationsonthepartofthedonor.Onlyfeworganizationsimplement realfinancialplanning,reportingandauditing,andweaknessesexistinbasicdaytodaycashflow management&accountingskills. IntermsofProgramPerformance,NGOswerefoundtocomplywiththeirmissionintheiroverall programdesign,butseveralNGOshadbroadorvaguemissionstatements,andthemajoritydid notadequatelyelaboratethestrategiclinkagesbetweentheirmissionstatements,projectsthey areimplementing,anditsdesiredimpact.Exceptionstotheabovewereorganizationsaimingfor changesinlegislationandpolicyandwhocouldclearlydescribetheimpactoftheirworkonthe broaderdevelopmentprocess.AlmostallnonstaffedNGOsandatleasthalfofNGOswithstaffhad neithersystemicneedsassessmentandplanning,norcomprehensivemonitoringandevaluation systems,andwhenpresent,mostlyinNGOswithinternationalfunding,wereprojectbased& implementedtosatisfydonorrequirements.Theabovesaid,atleasthalfoftheproject beneficiariesinterviewedweresatisfiedwiththeNGOsperformance,andallmentionedthatno otheroptionstofulfiltheneedsprovidedbytheNGOsareavailable. AlthoughLebaneseNGOsprovedtobegenerallywellnetworked,theirexternalrelationsvaried dependingonthetypeofbothNGOandpartner.Mostwerenotcapableofplacingtheirwork withinthenationaldevelopmentagenda,andinrelationwithothermainstakeholders.Different formsofpartnershipsamongstNGOsexist,butspecifictimeboundinitiativesappeartobemore effective,despitethatnetworkingbetweenNGOssuffersfromcompetitionforfundingand visibilityaswellaspersonalandpoliticalconflicts. Cooperationwithgovernmentalauthoritiesisoftenstifledbyministriesbureaucraticworking procedures,anddifferencesbetweenofficialsandNGOrepresentativesunderstandingof developmentpriorities.Atthelocallevel,bettercooperationexisted,especiallybetweennational NGOsandmunicipalities. AsmallnumberofNGOswithclearstrategicmediaplansseemtobeabletocreatereal partnershipswiththemedia,whilethemajorityapproachthemediamainlyforadvertisementand notaspartnersinsocialchange. Inrelatingtodonors,internationalfunders,especiallygovernmentalfundingagencies,were criticizedforcomingwithreadymadesuggestions,disruptingandobscuringaculturallyrooted systemofsocialsupport,andtargetinglargerlocalNGOs.Thatsaid,partnershipwithinternational donorswasfoundtohavesomepositiveimpactonNGOsorganizationaloperation.Othersources offunding,includingindividualdonation,thoughnottransparentandoftenpartisan,werefavored bylargerservicebasedorganizations.NonpartisanCBOsappearedtobearthegreatestburdenin securingneutralfunding. TherelationshipwiththeprivatesectorcontinuedtobelimitedtoafewNGOs,butshowed excellentpotentialforpartnershipwhenNGOsapproachedtheprivatesectorwithapartnership proposalthatissensitivetomutualinterestsofcompanyandNGO.

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Recommendations WiththeaimofimprovedNGOcontributiontosocialdevelopmentinLebanon,thestudy recommendsthatcapacitybuildinginterventionsfocusonstrengtheningstructuralstrategicneeds ofNGOs,andtheirimprovedengagementwiththebroadersocialandculturalenvironmentand partnershipwithalargerarrayofstakeholders,throughthefollowing: 1) Facilitatetheprocessesofdebateandstrategybuildingonprioritydevelopmentneedsand discussionofbestapproachestotacklethemforimproved&synergeticdevelopmentwork. 2) Boostspacesandopportunitiesforinformationsharing. 3) MonitorandparticipateinthereformoflawsandpoliciesthatgoverntheworkofLebanese NGOs. 4) SupporttheadaptationandLebanizationofcapacitybuildingopportunitiestosuittheneedsof theLebanesecontext. 5) Enhancethetrainingefficiencyanditsimpactthroughimprovedselectioncriteriaof participants,posttrainingfollowupmechanisms,andbetterlinkagesbetweentheneedsof specificNGOsandtrainingoffered 6) Diversifythemethodsofcapacitybuildingimplementation,toincludeopportunitiesotherthan training,includingmentoring,coachinganddevelopmentoftoolkitsandtrainingmanuals. 7) ReachouttoCBOsoutsideGreaterBeirut.

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III.ASSESSMENTMETHODOLOGYANDPROCESS Theassessmentreliedonadeskreview,andthreemethodsofqualitativedatacollection,namely focusgroups,casestudies,andinterviews.Toguidethewholestudy,acapacitybuilding frameworkcompromisingthebackboneofalldatagatheringtoolsused.

III.A. DeskReviewandDevelopmentofCapacityBuildingFrameworkThefirststageoftheconsultancyinvolvedgoingthroughexistingliteratureaboutLebanesecivil society,andcapacitybuildingmoregenerally,aswellasdefinewiththestaffoftheNGOSupport unitandCFSD/OxfamQubec,whatcapacitybuildingcomprises. Thefirststeptakenwasdefiningwhatcapacitybuildingmeantforthepartiesinvolvedinthis study,andwithintheLebanesecontextinparticular.Anextensivelistofvariablesandindicators linkedtoincreasedcapacityofNGOsinLebanon,werelaidouttoguidetheassessment,forminga CapacityBuildingFramework(seeAnnexII.CapacityBuildingFramework). AfirstdraftoftheframeworkwascompiledfromtheexistingbodyofLiteratureonCapacity buildingandassessmenttoolsdevelopmentinternationallyandwithintheArabcountries.Usewas alsomadeoftwostudiesonLebanesecivilsocietytocontextualizethisassessment;thelatest CIVICUSCivilSocietyIndexReportforLebanon(2006),andtherecentScopingStudyforHariri FoundationforCapacityBuildingofLocalNGOs,YouthandCommunities(2008).Bothhighlighted thebreadthofcivilsocietyactors,aswellasthesignificanceofsensitivityofthepoliticalsituation (seeAnnexI.Documentsconsulted). ThisdraftwasthenpresentedinaconsultativemeetingwithaselectedgroupofNGO representatives,researchersandcapacitybuildingproviderswhohaveindepthknowledgeof Lebanesecivilsociety,withtheaimofensuringitfitstheLebanesecontext.Inputfromthat meetingandfromtheNGOunitstaffwasthenincorporatedintheframework,andaseconddraft thenfinalizedandusedtoguidetoolsandvariableswhichtheassessmentwillmeasure. MakinguseoftheworkofVanGeene(2003),capacitybuildingwasdefinedastheprocessby whichindividuals;groups;organisations;institutions;andsocietiesincreasetheirabilitiesto:(1) performcorefunctions,solveproblems,defineandachieveobjectives;and(2)understandand dealwiththeirdevelopmentneedsinabroadcontextandinasustainablemanner.Capacity Buildingisregardedinthatcaseasbroaderthanorganisationaldevelopment,sinceitincludesthe overallsystem,theenvironmentorcontextinwhichindividuals,organisationsandsocieties operateandinteract.

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Consideringtheabovedefinitionandinorder toincorporatetheoverallsystem,thesetof indicatorschosentoassessanNGOwere organisedintoatrianglemodelasfollows:Program Performance External Relationships

Crosscuttingvalues 1. TheStructureofanNGO(withsetsof (gendersensitivity,inclusion,and indicatorsforthefollowingissues: nonpartisanpoliticalandreligiouspractice) GoverningStructure;Management Processes;HumanResourcesand Structure:1.GoverningStructure2.Management FinancialResourcesandAdministration) 3.HumanResources4.FinancialManagement constitutesthelargestcomponentand thetriangle'sbase. 2. TheProgramperformanceoftheNGO(withsetsofindicatorsforProgramdesignand Planning;Implementation,MonitoringandEvaluationandResultsAchieved)ononesideof thetrianglemodel.

3. TheExternalRelationshipsoftheNGO(Socialandculturalenvironment;Partnershipswith otherNGOsandnetworks;Relationshipswithgovernmentauthorities;theMediaandthe PrivateSectorand/ordonors)onthesecondsideofthetrianglemodel 4. TheValuespracticedand/orpromotedamongLebaneseNGOs(suchasgenderequity and/ornonpartisanpoliticalandreligiousaffiliation)areplacedatthecoreofthetriangle, astheyareconsideredtobecrosscuttingvalues.

III.B. AssessmentParametersandSamplingDesignTosetthecriteriaforselectionofFocusGroups,casestudiesandtheirparticipants,theconsultants proceededwithaquantitativedataanalysisofMOSAs2004NGOsurveydatabase.Cross tabulationswereusedtoextractrepresentativevariablesandrelevantparametersthat characterizeNGOsinLebanon,andresultedinidentifyingthefollowingparameters: 1. Numberofstaff:Theselectionbasedonnumberofstaffandwasthoughtofasthebest andmostaccessibleparametertodefineNGOsize,asotherparametersandthedata collectedonthemappearedtobeeitherirrelevantorhardtodefine(suchastheannual budget,numberofgeneralassemblymembers,etc).Assuch,threebenchmarkswere decided(giventhatthemediannumberofstaffamongstaffedNGOsis5): NGOswith0staff:77%oftheNGOscoveredbythesurvey. NGOswith5orlessstaff:11.2%oftheNGOscoveredbytheSurveyandaround50% ofstaffedNGOs. NGOswith6ormorestaff:11.7%haveNGOscoveredbytheSurveyandaround 50%ofstaffedNGOs.

Inthefinalnumberoffocusgroupsimplemented,5onlytargetednonstaffedNGOs,while 9targetedNGOswithstaff.AlthoughNGOswithnostaffcompromisedthelargest percentageoftheNGOslistedinthesurvey,thenumberincludedalargenumberofsports

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clubsandfamilialleagueswhichneededtobescreenedout,inadditiontosizablenumber ofinaccuratelycodifiednonrespondentsthesurveyas0staff.The0staffcriteriawas lateramendedtolessthan3staff,asfocusgroupsrevealedthattherewasnota significantchangeintheNGOneedsiftheithaduptotwostaff,whowerepredominantly administrativestaff(suchasasecretaryand/oradriver).Theexistenceofmiddle managementstaffseemedtoconstituteinfactthebenchmarkbetweenasmallanda mediumNGO. 2. Numberofvolunteers,chosentoreflecttheconstituencythatassetatthebenchmarkof 25volunteers,whichisthemediannumberofvolunteersasindicatedbythesurvey: NGOswith25orlessvolunteers. NGOswithover25volunteers.

3. Geographicworkingcontext,fourcategoriesweredefined,basedonestimatedimpactof thegeographiccontextontheneedsofNGOs,andgiventhatthedivisionbasedon GovernorateandCazaandotherdatainthesurveyproducednootherpossiblesignificant variablesrelatedtotheareaofoperation: NGOsworkingnationally. CBOsworkinginanurbancontext. CBOsworkinginaruralcontext. NGOsworkinginPalestinianrefugeecamps. Changecreationbasedprogramming,wheretheNGOhasatleastonework componentthattargetpolicymakersandseekstochangelegislationorpolicy. Servicedeliverybasedprogramming.

4. Natureofactivities,toinclude:

Theconsultantschosenottotakeintoaccountthesectorofactivityasanadditionalparameter, sincethedatabaseindicatedthatagoodpercentageoftheLebaneseNGOswerenoteasily categorizedintoonesectorof.Apartfromtechnicalthematicneedsrelatedtoprogram performance,itwasalsoanticipatedthatthesectorofactivitywouldnotimpactbynecessitythe capacitybuildingneedsofanNGO,atotherlevelsrelatedtomanagement,governance,and externalrelations.

III.C. ResearchMethodsandDataCollection:1.Focusgroups: Seventeenfocusgroupswereimplemented,14ofwhichwerewithNGOrepresentativesdivided basedontheabovementionedparameters.Invitedrepresentativesvariedtoreflectneedsof differentactorswithintheNGO,includingitsleadership,staff,membersandvolunteers.Atthe timethepilotfocusgroupswereconducted,thedesignhadadistinctionbetweenNGOboardand management,withseparatefocusgroupsforeachamongstaffedNGOs.Thislaterproveddifficult toimplement,andNGOleadershipmorebroadlywasinvited,asmostinvitedNGOsdidnothavea

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cleardividinglinebetweenboardmembersandstaffedmanagement. Inaddition,threefocusgroupswereconductedwithothercivilsocietyactors,includingmedia representatives,capacitybuildingproviders,andfundingagencies.Table1belowlistallfocus groupsimplementedandtheselectionmethodofinviteesforeach. InitiallythreepilotfocusgroupswereconductedwithNGOrepresentative,andthefocusgroup designaswellassamplingprocesswasrefinedbasedonthefindingsofthesepilotgroups.The durationoffocusgroup,whichwasfixedat2hours,wasalsoextendedtotwohoursandahalfto coverawiderscopeofthefocusgroupguide(seeAnnexIII.FocusgroupGuides). TheFocusgroupshadquiteagoodattendancerecord,whichcouldbeexplainedbythefactthat NGOswereinvitedbyMOSAandmeetingstookplaceattheconferenceroomoftheNGO ResourceandSupportUnit. 2.Casestudies Threecasestudiesthatwouldallowforadeeperunderstandingofthecapacitybuildingneeds,and theopportunitytocoverwithasingleNGOalltheindicatorssetintheframework,were implemented.TheselectionoftheNGOsfollowedsomeoftheparameterssetfortheresearchas follows: Numberofstaff:toincludeoneNGOwithover10staff;oneNGOwith3to10staff,andoneNGO withnostaff. Geographicworkingcontext:toincludeatleastoneNGOworkinginaruralcontext,oneinan urbancontext,andoneworkingnationally. Natureofactivities:toincludeonecasestudyofanNGOwithchangecreationbased programming. Table1FocusGroupsimplementedandselectionmethod 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 FocusGroup LeadershipofNGOswithover10employees, withmorethan25volunteers LeadershipofNGOswith310employees, withmorethan25volunteers LeadershipofNGOswithover10employees, withlessthan25volunteers LeadershipofNGOswith310employeeswith lessthan25volunteers LeadershipofNGOswith02staffwithmore than25volunteersurbancontext LeadershipofNGOswith02staffwithless than25volunteersurbancontext LeadershipofNGOswith02staffwithless than25volunteersruralcontext RandomsamplefromtheNGOunitsdatabaseofNGOsin Lebanon,registeredonlyingreaterBeirut,Tripoli,Sidon,Tyre, Zahleh,andBaalbeck.Samplewasscreenedtoexcludesports clubsandfamilyleagues. RandomsamplefromtheNGOunitsdatabaseofNGOsin Lebanon,excludingthoseregisteredingreaterBeirut,Tripoli, Sampleselectionmethod RandomsamplefromtheNGOunitsdatabaseofNGOsin Lebanon.Samplewasscreenedtoexcludesportsclubsand familyleagues.

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AssessmentofCapacityBuildingNeedsofNGOsinLebanon 8 9 10 LeadershipofNGO'swith02staffwithmore than25volunteersruralcontext LeadershipofNGOswithover10employees Palestinianrefugeecamps LeadershipofNGOswith110employees Palestinianrefugeecamps MembersandvolunteersofNGOswithout Staff Sidon,Tyre,Zahleh,andBaalbeck.Samplewasscreenedto excludesportsclubsandfamilyleagues. RandomsamplefromlistofNGOsavailableinNon GovernmentalOrganizationsinthePalestinianRefugeeCamps inLebanonreport. http://www.arts.mcgill.ca/MEPP/PRRN/papers/ajial_center/ng o_lebanon.html NGOsleaderswhoattendedapreviousfocusgroupmeeting wereaskedtonominateoneoftheirvolunteers.

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MembersandvolunteersofNGOswithover2 IncoordinationwiththreeNGOcoalitions,onevolunteerof staff Generalassemblymemberwasinvitedfrom5ofthemember NGOsineachcoalition. MiddleManagementStaff(NGOswith6staff ormore) Halfoftheinviteeswereinvitedbasedonrandomsamplefrom thedatabaseofNGOswithover6staff;theotherhalfwas basedonrecommendationsofconsultantsandNGOunitstaff ofspecificemployeesinwellestablishedNGOs. Basedonconsultants;andNGOunitsstaffknowledgeofmain campaignsimplementedinthepast5yearsandorganizations thatimplementedthem(includingcivilmarriage,rightsof peoplewithspecialneeds,combatingviolenceagainstwomen, orwomen'srighttonationality,etc.) Apreliminarylistofinviteeswasdevelopedbasedon knowledgeofconsultants,feedbackofNGOUnitand recommendationsoftwoNGOs,oneUNemployee,andone journalist.Finalinviteesinsuredthatdifferenttypesand politicalaffiliationofmediaoutletswererepresented. BasedontheLebanonSupportDirectory,andconsultationwith NGOUnit,alistofinviteeswasdevelopedtoensure representationofalltypesofdonors(governmental/non governmental,grantgiving/partnershipbased,andavarietyof Arab,European,NorthAmerican,andotherinternational donors). BasedonconsultationwithNGOUnitstaffandtrainers, recommendationsfromNGOrepresentativeinpreviousfocus groups,andknowledgeofconsultants.

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ChangecreationNGOs

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MediaworkerscoveringNGOrelatedwork (TV,radio,sectionsontheenvironment, education,society,andyouthinlocalpapers)

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Managementandprogramdirectorsoflocally basedfundingagencies(international organizationsand/orNGOs,embassies,but alsonationaldonors).

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CapacityBuildingproviders

Eachcasestudyincludedhalfadayworkshop/brainstormingsessionwithmanagement,program, andadministrativestaffmembers(forthetwostaffedNGOs);atleastonefocusgroupwithboard andgeneralassemblymembersandvolunteers;onefocusgroupwiththeNGOsbeneficiariesas wellasinterviewswithpartners,includinggovernmental(municipalities,ministries),privatesector actors,andothers(seeAnnexV.CaseStudyProposal). TheselectionoftheparticularNGOwithwhomcasestudieswerefinallycarriedoutaccordingto theaboveconsiderationswasbasedonconsultationwiththeNGOunitstaff,andthewillingness andtimecommitmentoftheNGOitself(seeAnnexV.CaseStudies).

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3.SemiStructuredInterviews Withthepurposeofincludingavarietyofperspectivesfromotherexternalstakeholdersviews, threeadditionalsemistructuredinterviewswereimplemented,twoprivatesectoractorsinvolved inNGOworkorwithcorporateresponsibilityinitiatives,andonewitharepresentativeoftheAfkar ProgramattheOfficeoftheMinisterofStateforAdministrative(OMSAR).Theinterviewswere basedonasemistructuredquestionnairewithopenendedquestionsthatsoughttheperspective oftherespondentonhis/hercollaborativeexperienceswithNGOs(seeAnnexIV.Interviews Guide).

III.D. LimitationsandConstraintsoftheAssessment1) ThedataoftheNGOsurveypresentedsometechnicalandinformationmanagement constraints,whichsloweddownthesamplingdesignprocessandprovedtobeverytime consuming.Problemsencounteredincluded: a) ThedatafortheNGOswithoutstaffwasinaccurateandthenumber0wasusedbothwhen theNGOhad0staff,andwhentherewasnoresponseattheinitialtimeofdatacollection. b) ConstraintswerefacedwhileexportingdatafromSPSSintootherversionofSPSSorExcel, asallArabicSPSSdatawasnotreadablewhenexported. c) Thegeographicalregions(Caza)werespeltindifferentwaysinArabicandwerenot codified,whichcomplicatedthedataanalysis,especiallywhilesortingtheruralandurban NGOs. d) Someoftheinformationinthesurveywasoutdatedandinaccurate.Theconsultantshadto calltheNGOstoverifythephonenumbers,andmakesurethattheNGOcontactedfitted thenumberofstaffcriteria.Buttheconsultantsalsofaceddifficultiesinknowingtheexact numberofstafforvolunteers,asthereceptionist/staffmemberexpressedacertainreserve towardsgivingthisinformation. 2) Asthesurveywasthemainsourceforsampleselection,representationfromunregistered NGOsorNGOsregisteredinministriesotherthantheministryofinteriorwasprobablylimited. FeedbackonthespecificneedsofsuchNGOswasobtainedfromoneunregisteredNGOand anotherregisteredasanotforprofitcompanywhoparticipatedinfocusgroupsforwhichthe samplewasobtainedthroughconsultationandnotfromthesurvey. 3) AsignificantnumberofNGOsrepresentativesduringfocusgroupmeetingwerecomingmainly tolisttheirdemandsandtocomplainabouttheirlackofresources,whichcontributedto misunderstandingssometimesthathadtobeclarifiedbytheconsultants.Insomecases,the NGOrepresentativeattendingdidnotfitwiththecriteriaandpositionspecifiedinthe invitation,especiallywhenmanagerssentajuniorstaffmember,whowouldnotalwayshave adequateknowledgeoftheNGOsworktomakesignificantcontributionstothepoints discussed. 4) Obtainingappointmentswithministryofficialsforinterviewswasdelayedorhinderedby bureaucraticprocedures,whileintheprivatesectoritwasdelayedbythereluctanceof 13


intervieweesasthestudyfallslowontheirpriorities. 5) ThemainchallengefacedduringthecasestudieswasthedesireofNGOrepresentatives, understandably,toportrayapositiveimageoftheirorganization,obscuringbythatpossible learningondifficultiestheNGOisfacing. 6) Otherproblemsemergedduetotimeconstraints,inparticularduetotheholidayperiodin DecemberandJanuary,aswellastheGazaeventsinJanuary2009thatdelayedthemediaand PalestinianNGOsfocusgroups. The above said it is important to highlight that the support of the NGO unit was invaluable, in providinginputintodifferentstagesoftheassessment,technicalsupportwithSPSS,andthespace forthefocusgroups.

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IV.FINDINGS Broadly,threeissuesarecentraltotheworkonNGOsinLebanonandappeartoimpactalmostall attributesofcapacitywithintheorganisation: 1. Funding:fundingnotonlyimpactswhetherprojectsareimplementedornot,butrather shapesthewholegovernanceandmanagerialstructureoftheNGO.Thisappliestolocal, regionalandinternationalfunding. 2. Limiteddemocraticgovernance:ThemajorityofNGOsareleadbyoneoratbestafew individuals,whocontrolallkeyaspectsoftheorganisationincludingitsgovernance, management,andfundingstructures.Thislimitsconsiderablythegrowthandimpactof NGOs. 3. Difficultyinreconcilingthechangedrivenvoluntarymembershipbase,withthedesired institutionalisedprofessionalnatureofanNGO:FewNGOs,ifany,havebeencapableof retainingastrongmembershipbaseofagroupindividualsworkingtogetherforacommon goal,whileatthesametimeconstructingprofessionalinstitutionscapableofeffective implementationofprograms.

1.GoverningStructure1.1Mission,VisionStatementsandGuidingPrinciples a) FindingsindicatethatthemajorityofNGOshavewrittenmissionandmandatestatementsand alsogeneralgoalsandaims,whichareamongtherequireddocumentsforsubmissiontothe MoIuponregistration.However,thesearentreferredtoduringprojectselectionnor disseminatedtostaffandvolunteers,andinmanytimestheyarecompromisedtosuitthe requirementsofpotentialdonorsortoallowfortheimplementationofactivitiesthatwill maintaintheNGOspresenceandvisibility.Similarly,theNGOsguidingprinciplesofneutrality andnonpartisanshipareamongthemostpronetobecompromisedinthepursuitoffunding frompoliticalpartiesorfigures. b) ThespecialisationandfocusoftheNGOandconfinementtoitsmainmandateandgoalsis oftencompromisedforthesakeofaccesstoresourcesandfundingorgaininvisibilityand maintainingacertainlevelofactivitybyimplementingpopularlynoticeableevents.Thisis especiallytrueofCBOs,especiallythoseworkinginruralareasthatoperateunderbroadand elasticmandateslikecharityorsocialandculturaldevelopment.RuralCBOsspeakoftheir roleasoneoffunnellingaidtothecommunity,whichjustifytheirinvolvementinanytypeor themeofactivitynomatterhowunfocusedordisintegrateditis,aslongasitcontributesto improvingorassistingthecommunity.Afeworganizationstrytonegotiatewithdonorsor tuneindonorspreferencestosuittheirownagendas. 15


1.2LegalBase a) ThedatacollectedshowedthattheNGOshaveestablishedinternalbylawsandstatutesbut mostdatebacktowhentheNGOwasfoundedandhaventbeenreviewedormodifiedexcept infewcaseswhenitwasnecessarytoreducethenumberoftheBoardmemberstoensure quorum.Again,thesebilawsweremainlyestablishedincompliancewithregistration requirementsratherthantoprovideaframeworkfordecisionmakinganddivisionofroles. Theyarerarelyreferredtoexceptduringelectionsorwhenthereisstruggleofpowerwithin theNGO. b) ThelegalobligationsforNGOregistrationimposedbytheLebaneseLawhaveinfluencedthe governancestructureanditsdynamicswithintheNGOs.Forexample,thePalestinianNGOsare mostlymanagedandownedbyitsPalestinianmanagementstaffratheritsLebaneseBoard memberswhowerebroughtinbytheNGOsstaffbecausetheLebaneseLawrestrictsthe percentageofnonLebaneseintheNGOBoards.Eventually,inthiscase,itistheManagement thatrecruitsandemploysthegovernanceandnottheopposite.Insomecase,thissetup createsasortofpatronagesystemofasmallnumberofLebaneseboardmembers,overthe largerconstituencyofPalestinianestablishinggroup.Thesamesortoflegalconstraintappears insomeNGOsestablishedinthepast10years,whenacquiringlegalregistrationforanNGO wasrelativelydifficult,andhaveoptedforotherlegalformslikeanotforprofitcompany,and suchonlyoperatenowundertheguidanceofaboardwithoutalargermembershipbase. 1.3GeneralAssembly a) ThemajorityofNGOleadersinterviewedunderstandtheroleoftheGeneralAssemblyasthat implementingactivities,participatinginsubcommittees,carryingonbasicadministrativetasks ofstaffwhocantbeafforded,andcontributingfinanciallythroughmembershipfeesand fundingifpossible.Theroleofholdingthemanagementandboardaccountable,andproviding strategicguidanceanddirectionweregenerallynotmentioned,norwasitsroleinelectingthe board.ThedegreeoftheownershipofNGOsbyitsGeneralAssemblyisweakenedbythefact thattheNGOisownedbytherulingcore. b) ThetypeoffundingonwhichtheNGOreliesmostalsoaffectsitsgovernancestructureand dynamics.InNGOswherethesourceoffundingissecure(likecontractswithministries)or providedforbyoneormoreindividualmembers,thentheroleoftheGeneralAssemblyasthe highestauthoritywithintheNGOisunderminedforthesakeofthoseindividualfund providers. c) Diversificationandaccessibilitytomembershipisinfluencedbypersonalcontactsand friendshipwithexistingmemberswherethefewnewlyrecruitedmembersarefriendsor relativesofmemberswhobringthemin.SomeoftheNGOsinterviewed,includingthosewith nostaffsupport,arenotinterestedinexpandingtheirmembershipbaseforseveralreasons. Somefearthattheywouldbetakenoverbypoliticalpowersdominantintheirregionthrough enrolmentofahighnumberofpoliticisedmembers.Othersareinterestedinmaintainingthe homogenouscorewhichhasbeencollectivelyrunningtheNGOandisusuallycomposedof individualswithcommoninterestsandbackgroundsthattogetherfoundedtheNGO.Insome NGOs,therulingcorefearsforitspowerandhencebecomesrestrictiveinoffering membershipunlessitensurethenewcomersloyalty.Insuchcase,thenewmembersare

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expectedandrestrainedtobefollowersratherthanequalmembers.Alloftheabove mentionedscenariosleadtouniformityandahigherlevelofaccordwithinthegeneral assemblyandlimitsitsroleinaccountability.Anothercauseforalackofdiversityinthe membershipbaseisrelatedtotheaffiliationoftheNGOwithaparticularpoliticalparty,which automaticallyrestrainsothersfromenrollingregardlessoftheNGOcause,efficiencyoreven impartialityifitexits. d) Thestudydidntindicateanyformsofdirectdiscriminationinselectionofmembersforthe generalassembly.However,someNGOshavetheirownwaysofconservingtheirhomogeneity orexclusiveness.Tostartwith,themissionandvaluesoftheNGOitselfattractvolunteerswho areclosetothesevalues,andanNGOthatispubliclyperceivedtohaveaparticularpoliticalor religiousaffiliationwontappealtovolunteersopposingthesegroupsorbeliefs.Anotherwayis theselectiveandrestrictedprocessofacceptingnewmemberswhereamembershipapplicant isapprovednotwhenthestatedmembershipcriteriaaremet,whichareusuallysimple,but oncetheNGOBoardbelievesthatthispersonsuitsanimplicitunwrittenprofileofamember. e) ThefindingsindicatethatonlyafewmembersandvolunteersunderstandhowNGOsoperate, thegovernancestructureswithinNGOs,andtheirrolesandresponsibilitiesasmemberswithin thegeneralassembly.Mostofthemdonotknowthebylawsoftheirownorganisations. 1.4Board a) MembershipwithinNGOsisseenbymanyindividuals,especiallythosewhoareinmiddleage andhaveestablishedcareers,asanopportunitytogainsocialstatus,accumulateconnections, attractvisibilityorclimbthepowerladder,ratherthanaspacetocontributetoacauseand goals.ThislackofcommitmenttotheNGOandexaggeratedinterestinpersonalmoralgains explainspartiallythephenomenaofmultimembershipinmorethanoneNGO.Thiscreatesa conflictofinterestwheresomeoftheseindividualarecapableofdivergingfunding opportunitiesandconnectionsfromoneNGOtoanother. b) Thewidespreadunderstandingofthemainrolesoftheboardmembersisdecisionmaking, subcommitteemembership,executionofactivitiesandfundraising.FewNGOrepresentatives mentionedsupervision,settingdirection,publicrelationsandensuringaccountability.Itwas alsonotedthatthefulfillmentoftheserolesisdividedamongthemembersaccordingtotheir powerwithintheboard,externalrelations,andsocialbackground.Therulingcoreandkey figureswithintheboardareresponsibleforfulfillingrolesthatrequirehighersocialstatusand powersuchasdecisionmaking,externalrelationsandfundraising.Othersaremainlyactivein projectimplementationandsubcommitteemembership. c) Theinterviewsrevealedthatrotationinleadershipanddemocracyisntestablishednor properlyunderstoodamongmostNGOs.ThemajorityofNGOsinterviewedhavethepersonsin keypostsforseveralmandatesandratioofturnoverinboardmembershipdoesnotexceed 25%ateveryelections.Inonefocusgroupforexample,around70%ofboardmembersof NGOspresenthavebeenontheboardforatleast15years.Inaddition,someNGOsstillhave thesamepresidentsincetheorganizationwasfounded.Thiscanbeexplainednotonlybythe attitudeoftherulingcore,butalsothatofthemembershipascompetitiveelectionsare perceivedbymany,especiallyinruralNGOsasanindicationofinternaldivisionand disagreement.Othersjustifyuncontestedelectionasanindicationofapprovalamong membersoftheperformanceofthoseinoffice.Somefearthatcompetitiveelectionwould leadtodivision,demotivationorobstructionbythelosingcampandtheirwithdrawalfrom 17


theNGO. d) InNGOswithnostaff,membersarelesslikelytorunforboardmembership,asthelackof administrativesupportmeansthattheburdenofsuchtasksfallsontheelectedboard members.ThereisalsohesitationinrunningforpostsinNGOsthatarepredominantlyrunby oneindividual,usuallythepresident,whereasizeablegapexistsbetweenhis/herskillsand thatofothermemberswhoarerecruitedasassistantsratherthanequalmembers,andthe loyaltyofsuchmembersistowardstheindividual(s)andnottheNGO. e) Findingsstronglyindicatethelackinseparationbetweenmanagementandgovernanceinthe majorityofNGOs,eitherduetounawarenessoftheimportanceofsuchaseparation,or intentionallytoaccumulatepowerorgainbenefits.InNGOsthatlackmanagerialstructure,this integrationisjustifiedasalongasdecisionsaremadeintransparentandparticipatoryways. However,inmanycases,seniormanagementstaff,duetotheircompetenceandknowledge, arecapableofdirectingtheNGOsgovernanceinsteadoftheotherwayround.Inothercases, boardmembersarebeingemployedbytheNGO,whilemaintainingtheirpositiononthe board,creatingaprobleminaccountability,especiallyinissuesrelatedtomanagement recruitment,salaries,benefits,andperformanceevaluation,wherethesameindividualswho shouldbesupervisingtheperformanceofthemanagementarethemselvesthemanagers.This isnotrestrictedtopowerfulorrulingmembersbutalsotoclosememberswhoawait employmentopportunitywhentheNGOisgrantedafundedprojectinwhichtheyareoffered apaidpost.

2.ManagementProcessesa) TheleadershipofNGOsismostlyconcentratedinone(PresidentorDirector)orgroupof individualswhichcanbecalledarulingcorewhoarecapableofmakingdecisionsonbehalf ofthewholeNGO.ThisrulingcoresometimesstemsfromtheNGO'sfounders,whohavebeen abletomaintainpowerandprivilegesoverothermembersduetotheirqualifications, performance,commitment,socialstatus,accesstofunding,memberspersonalloyalty,or dictatorshipleadershipstylecombinedwithothermembersindifferenceorobedience.This patternofpersonalleadershipratherthancollectiveleadershipisverycommonand establishedamongtheLebaneseNGOs.ThisturnsmanyLebaneseNGOsfrominstitutions wheredecisionmakingandmanagementsystemsfollowsetproceduresintoentitiesranlike personalbusinesses. b) ThemajorityofNGOslackanoverallorganisationalvisionandstructurethattheyperceive wouldbeanappropriatestructurethatcouldhelptheNGOachieveitsgoals.Forexample,the majorityofNGOsdonthaveanoverallorganisationalchartthatclarifiestherelationship betweenprogramsontheonehandandothersupportstructureslikeadministrationand financeontheother.ThereexistsalsonovisionoftheorganizationaldevelopmentoftheNGO overasetperiodoftime,toensurethatithasthenecessarystructuresandresourcesto implementtheprogramcommitmentsithas. c) WrittenmanagerialproceduresareoftenabsentinNGOs.Tasksandresponsibilitiesofdifferent departmentsarenotallocatedaccordingtoclearorganisationallines,butratherthemajority ofNGOs,especiallywithlessthan10staff,arecharacterisedbyalackofinstitutionalisation, wheredecisionmakingishighlycentralisedandisverymuchshapedandreflectstheleaders individualpersonality. 18


d) Whilemostorganizationswithahighnumberofstafforalargemembershipbasehadasystem ofannualreportingonprogramperformanceandbudgetexpenditure,veryfewofthesmaller staffedNGOs,andthemajorityofnonstaffedorganizationshadaregularreportingsystem otherthanbasicfinancialreporting.Forexample,inthethreecasestudiesexaminedforthis assessment,onlyonehadyearlyprogramandfinancialreportsavailable,whichwere presentedtothemembershipanddiscussedingeneralassemblymeetings.EvenamongNGOs witharegularreportingsystem,almostallexpressedtheneedforimproveddocumentation systemsandskills. e) Withinstaffedorganizations,afewoftheorganizationshaveregularstaffmeetingsfor informationsharingorregularsystemsforinformationexchange.Also,almostallstaff interviewedsaidthattheyreceivednoformalinduction,andwereonlygivenbasic introductorydocumentsorevenbrochurestointroducethemselvestotheworkoftheirnew employer.

3.HumanResourceManagement3.1StaffManagement a) TheMajorityofNGOsdoesnothaveasethumanresourcepolicythatiswrittenand distributedtostaff.Also,themajorityofdonthavejobdescriptionsfortheirstaff,despitethe factthatsomerecruitlargenumbersofemployees.AfewofthesmallNGOsinterviewedwhich havestafflessthan10,alsomentionedthattheydonthaveemploymentcontractswiththe staff. b) VeryfewNGOshaveasystematicannualstaffperformanceappraisalsystem.Almostnoneof theNGOsaskedhadasystematicmechanismofprovidingregularandcomprehensive feedbackonstaffperformance. c) TrainingofstaffisnotplannedbutisassignedadhocaccordingtowhatisofferedtotheNGO onshortnotice,andstaffinterviewedmentionedthatamongallthetrainingtheywere offered,veryfewwererequestedbythestaffthemselves.Thisisattributedtothelackofan annualorsemiannualtrainingprogramortimetableofofferedworkshopsthatallowsthe NGOstoplanthetrainingoftheirstaffaccordingtothemesandtimeavailability.Addtothat, onceatrainingopportunityisavailable,theselectionofwhichstafformemberistoattendcan beinfluencedbyeitherpersonalfavouritismortheavailabilityofthepersonsregardlessof his/herprofilesuitabilitytothethemesoftheworkshop. d) ManyofthefocusgroupparticipantsbelievethatNGOsoffereasieraccesstoajobcompared toprivateorpublicsectorespeciallyaftergraduationandatthesametimeofferagoodforum togainessentialsocialandmanagerialskills.Havingtheopportunitytoserveagreatercause, iftheyperceivetheiremployertobecontributingpositivelytowardsitalsomotivatesfewof thejuniorlevelemployees.StillthelifecycleofemploymentinNGOsislimitedbyfactorsthat pushmiddlemanagementorspecializedstafftoquitduetoabsenceofcareerdevelopment opportunities,leadershipstyle,frustrationduetolackofparticipationandtransparencyin decisionmakingorhighersalariesofferedininternationalNGOs.Afterquittingtheytendto starttheirownNGO,gethiredbyInternationalNGOs(couldbethepartnerofthelocalNGO whichhe/shehasquit),orbecomeindependentconsultants.

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e) ThestudyindicatedthatonlysomemainstreamNGOsthatemploymorethan10staffandis projectbasedfunded,havesetclearandtransparentrecruitmentprocedures.Thiscanbe partiallyrelatedtodonorsrequirements.Ontheotherhand,mostofruralNGOsorsmall NGOswithlessthan3staffdontannouncejobvacanciesorestablishastandardrecruitment procedurebuttendtorecruitthoseacquaintancesthatmightfitthepost. f) ThedatagatheredsuggestedthatmostoftheNGOsdontoffersufficientbenefitsand insurance.TheminorityofNGOswhichdooffersuchbenefits,mainlyNGOswithmorethan10 stafforthosewhichrunservicecentres,offertheirstaffopenemploymentcontractswithNSSF subscriptionandterminationbenefits.WhilestaffinNGOswithfundedprojectsareoffered timeboundcontractswithadequatebenefitsduringthecontractperiod(life,accidentand medicalinsurance)butwithoutanyterminationbenefitsorpensionremuneration. g) Thefocusgroupspointedoutthattheutilizationofconsultantsonshorttembasesparticularly fortechnicalpostspreventsknowledgeaccumulationwithintheinstitution.Theconsultants priorityistocarrythetasksandnottocoachthepermanentstaff;henceverylittleexpertiseis retainedwithintheNGO. h) Accordingtothediscussions,theinternalpersonnellawsarentestablishedorsufficiently elaboratedinmostoftheNGOs.InNGOsthatofferopenemploymentcontracts,thestaff regulationsaremainlythosedictatedbytheLebaneseLabourLaw.InNGOsworkingonfunded projectsbasis,thestaffregulationsaremuchmoretailoredandelaboratedandsometimes adoptedfromthoseofitsmaininternationalpartner. i) ThestudyindicatedsignificantdisparitiesinthesalariesofseniorandjuniorstaffinNGOswith projectfundedstaff.Forexample,inaprojectof6corestaff(excludingjuniorpostssuchas secretaryanddriver),thehighestsalaryisaboutseventimestheamountofthelowestsalary. Suchgapisanindicationofimbalancedscaleandbiastowardsseniorstaffwhomostprobably havesetthebudget. j) NoneoftheNGOrepresentativesinterviewedstatedthatthereisanestablishedsystemto reportandfollowuponcomplaintsofemployeesandvolunteersoranorganizedstructurefor staffrepresentationinleadershipmeetingsandindecisionmakingactivitiesrelatedto employmentissues.InmanyparticipatingNGOs,staffdonotevenknowwhomtoreporttoin caseofacomplaint. 3.2VolunteerManagement a) ThestudyrevealedthatNGOsdontrelymuchonvolunteerstoimplementactivitiesand arentactiveinrecruitingnewoneseventhosewithnostaffstructureorfewvolunteers.The NGOseitherfailtoallocatesuitabletasksforthevolunteersthatmatchtheirskillsand personalpreferencesordemotivatethembykeepingthemidleandinactiveforlongperiods. FewNGOs,mainlythoseworkinginurbancontexts,whoseprogramsappealtoyouthand universitygraduates,areutilizingthesepotentialsandskillsbutthemainobstacleisthetime availabilityforsuchvolunteers,whoareeitherstudyingorsearchingforapermanentjob. b) FindingssuggestpoorunderstandingofvolunteerismconceptsanditsroleinCivilSocietyasa toolfordevelopmentandcommunityparticipation.Confusionexistsinthedistinctionbetween avolunteerandaparttimeemployee,andseveralNGOs,especiallythoseworkingin Palestiniancampsprovideregularfinancialrewardstovolunteers,butwithlittlealternative formsofrewarding.Vaguenessalsoexistsintheboundariesbetweenavolunteeranda

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beneficiarywithinNGOsthathavespecifictargetbeneficiarygroupssuchasyouthand handicapped. c) ResultsshowedalsothatonlyfewNGOshaveappropriatevolunteerrecruitment,motivation, retainingpoliciesandskills.DatagatheredindicatesthatfewNGOscarryadequateand efficientrecruitingactivities.Mostrelyonwordofmouthandmembersbriningfriends.Little oralmostnoinductionandexplanationoftheNGOsmission,goalsandregulationsis provided.Thereislittleunderstanding,asstatedbyvolunteersthemselvesofwhatmotivates volunteerstojoin,andtheirevolvingneedsandmotivesandtocontinuetoservetheNGO overhis/hervolunteerismlifecycleisassociatedwiththegroupageandcareerneeds,besides thedesiretoservethecauseoftheirorganization.Assuch,NGOsarenotabletoretain qualifiedtrainedvolunteersthattheyhaveinvestedin. d) ThestudyindicatedthatvolunteerismamongLebaneseNGOsisverydynamicandabundant duetotheestablishedfreedomswithintheLebanesesocietyanditsdynamiccivilsociety. Someoftheinterviewedvolunteersdescribedvoluntaryworknotasawasteoftimeora leisureactivity,butasanentrypointtoemploymentandpersonalandprofessional development,andanopportunitytogainsocialskillsandexperiencewhichwillqualifythe volunteertoentertheprivatesectorwherehe/shecanestablishacareer. e) AlmosthalfofthevolunteerstakingpartinthestudywereengagedinmorethanoneNGO, andexpressedthatonceanindividualstartsvoluntarywork,especiallyiftheystartatayoung agevolunteerismbecomespartoftheirregularactivities.Thatsaid,someofthevolunteers mentionedthattheypreviouslyleadtheirowncommunityinitiative,withoutevenbeing affiliatedwithanNGO,indicatingadesiretobesociallyengagedthatcouldbecapitalizedon byNGOs. f) OnlyaboutonethirdofthevolunteersinterviewedareorhavebeenmembersoftheirNGO's generalassembly.Somehavesaidtheydidnotwanttobecomemembers,andfeelthatitis acceptabletovolunteerwithanNGOeveniftheyarenothundredpercentinagreementwith theorganizationsaims;theyhavealsofeltthattheirmembershipwouldmeanmore commitmenttotheNGO.Thatsaid,atleasthalfofthosepresent(mainlytheyoungergroup andthePalestinians)donotknowwhatanNGOisbylawandwhatitsgoverningstructureis, andthusdonotknowwhatmembershipreallymeans,andwhattheroleofageneralassembly oraboardis. g) ThesectarianandpoliticalpartisanNGOsareincreasinglyattractingyouthamongthe polarizedLebanesepopulationwhoareinterestedinmanifestingtheirpositionthrough engagementinsuchorganizations.Youthalsoseekpersonalinterestbyapplyingforpartisan NGOs.

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4.FinancialResourcesandAdministration4.1Funding a) ThestudypointedoutthatfundingofLebaneseNGOscomesfromsixtypesofsourcesora combinationofmorethanone,asfollows: 1. Memberscontributionandsocialeventsanddonationsfromindividualswhoare concernedwiththeworkoftheNGOwhichfundsCBOsorsmallNGOswithoutmanagerial structure.Theamountoffundingmadeavailablebythistypeissmallcomparedtoother typesoffunding. 2. Contractingwithoneormoreoftheministries.ItwasinterestingtonotethatNGOs interviewedwhicharepaidbyoneormoreministriesareusuallyNGOsthathaveaservice centre. 3. DiasporaandrichcommunitymembersaremainsourceoffundingforruralCBOs.This sourceisalmostexhaustedorcontrolledbythedominantpoliticalpartieswithintheirarea. 4. Politicalfigures/partiesthatfundsmainlyNGOswithhomogenouspoliticallyaffiliated membersandgeographicalbasedNGOsinbothruralandurbanareas.Itistogainpolitical allegiancefromtheNGOmembersandthecommunityitservesregardlessofthenatureof theNGOsactivities 5. ReligiousdutiesfundingeitherlocallyorfromtheArabicStatesandisbenefitingmainly religiouswelfareinstitutionsorservicecentres.Itismorebasedonpersonalcontactsand individualcredibilitycombinedbyreligiousbrotherhoodsympathy. 6. Projectbasedfundingespeciallyfromwesterndonors(whethergovernmentalornon governmental)andismainlyfocusingonmainstreamNGOsthatcanabideby professionalstandardsofprogrammanagementandalreadyhaveahistoryofworking relationwiththesetypeofdonors. 7. Membershipfees,incomegeneratingactivities,andrevenueofservices:Thissourceis limitedinamount,butthemostinstrumentalinguaranteeinganorganizations independence.TheextenttowhichNGOleadershipisaccountableforitsexpenditure dependsonthegovernancestructurewithintheNGO. b) Accordingtothesetypesoffunding,thegrantcanbeclassifiedintotwotypesbasedon easinesstoaccessandreportback: Easymoneythatdoesntrequireadequateproposalandjustificationnorreporting andfollowup. Difficultmoneythatrequiresprojectproposalandstrictmechanismofmonitoring andreportingtothedonorsaccordingtothedonorsestablishedprocedureswhich couldbeveryslowandcomplicatedhencerestrictingaccesstothesefundstofew mainstreamNGOs.Examplesofdifficultmoneyarefundsgrantedbywestern donors.

c) Anotherclassificationisrelatedtoconditionalexpectationsofthedonorinexchangeof grantingandcouldbelabelledaspartisanmoneywhichcompromisestheNGOneutralityand independence.Aclearexampleofpartisanmoneyisfundsgrantedbypoliticalfigures(type4). 22


Apossibleexamplecanbethefundsdonatedforreligiouspurposes(type5)andalsogranted bywesterngovernmentaldonors(type6)ifthedonatinggovernmentisactivelyinvolved withintheLebanesepolitics. d) Thelevelofpoliticalpolarizationanddivisionhaspushedthepoliticalpartiestoresortalsoto theNGOsectorasameansintheirstruggle.HencetheNGOsectorhasbecomeatargetfor thepoliticalpartiestodemonstratepowerandmobilizefollowerswhiletheirmaintoolto controltheNGOshasbeenthroughpoliticalpressure,fundingofexistingNGOs,or establishingtheirownNGOsthatactuallycompeteswiththeexistingNGOsonaccessingthe beneficiaries. e) TheinterviewsunderscoredthatthetypeoffundingoftheNGOstronglyinfluencesits leadershipstructure,governanceandmembershipbase.Forexamplememberswithclose contactstothefundingsourcesuchaspoliticalreligiousdonorsareelectedandevenallowed tocontroltheNGOforthesakeofbringingfundsintentionallydisregardingthedemocratic practicesofgovernance. 4.2FinancialManagement a) Accordingtointerviews,thosewhocarryexternalauditingarefewandmainlyduetothe donorsrequest. b) TheresultsshowedthattheNGOsingeneralarecapableofsubmittingtheadequatefinancial andtaxationdocumentsasrequestedbylaw.InsmallandruralNGOsthatdonthave dedicatedfinancialstaff,thepreparationofneededaccountingofficialdocumentsis outsourcedtofreelanceaccountants. c) ThefinancialplanninginmostsmallNGOsisdoneforthesakeofformandonlytomeetthe legalobligationofsubmittinganannualbudgettoMinistryofInterioratthebeginningofeach year.Thesetbudgetdoesntreflectanyactualfinancialplanning. d) SomeofthedonorsinterviewedcomplainedaboutthequalityofreportingofsomeNGOsin termsofproperexpensejustificationsandthequalityofinvoicesandreceiptspresentedas wellasthedelayinsubmittingthereportsandfinancialjustification.Thesecomplaintsarenot confinedonlytoNGOswithnoorsmallaccountingstaffsupportbutalsotosomemainstream (established)NGOs. e) TheresultsindicatethatlittledifferentiationexistsbetweenthemembersandtheNGOs assets.ExpensescoveredbyindividualmembersonbehalfoftheNGOarenotunderstood whethertheyaredonationsorloans.Thisambiguity,whichismainlyobservedinruraland smallNGOs,isalsoaccompaniedinmanyinstanceswiththelackoffinancialtransparency towardstheGeneralAssembly. f) SomeNGOsaremoreinterestedinacquiringassetsthaninhowtomaintainthem,utilize themefficientlyandsustaintheirrunningcost.Eventually,NGOsendupwithlargebuildings withemptyfloorsorequipmentpackedthatcantoperateorutilize.Thisismainlyduetoa strongandwidespreadunderstandingwithinNGOleadershipthatorganizational developmentofanNGOismainlyexpansionofitsassets.Anexamplethatreflectsthisaswell asNGOstendencytofavouracquisitionofassets,istheplanofoneNGOseniorrepresentative topurchaseatruckwhichtheNGOneedsonlyfivetimesayearratherthanrentingwhen needed.Therepresentativewastotallyunawareoftherunning,maintenanceanddepreciation costsoftheasset. 23


g) TheinterviewsunderlinedweaknessamongsomeNGOsincashflowplanningandliquidity management.Forexample,veryfewNGOsforecastthecashflowandhenceplantheir paymentsaccordingly,whichinmanycasesleadstosuspensionofactivitiesordelayincash transfers.Thesameappliesfortheirabilityofmakingsoundfinancialchoices.

5.ProgramPerformance5.1ProgramDesignandPlanning a) MostparticipatingNGOsdonotgothroughastrategicprogramplanningprocessandhaveno setsystemsforassessingneedsanddevelopingprogramsaccordingly.Exceptionstothisexist, amongolderwellestablishedcharities,andrelativelynewerorganizations,thatfollowastrict professionalsystemandhaveboardmembershipfromacademiaortheprivatesector. b) Theworkofmostorganisationsinterviewedwascloselytiedtotheirmission,andoverall programdesignwasderivedfromthere.Assuch,thevalueandclarityofprograms implementedtodaywasdependantontheclaritybywhichthemissionwaslaidoutattimeof NGOestablishment,andseveralhadbroadorvaguemissionstatements(likehelpingthe mostdeprivedinLebanon)inwhichanyprogramcouldfit.Anexceptionthisarechange NGOs,whichappearedtobemorefocusedonwhattheyactuallywantoachieve,andcansee theaccumulationoftheirprogramsimpactovertheyears. c) Newprogramsaremostlyinitiatedinoneofthreeways: 1.Boardinitiated:Ideaismainlymotivatedbytheurgetocoveracertaingeographicalarea wheretheNGOhasnopresence,andtryingtofindanissuetoworkon.Thisisusuallyinitiated bytheboardandalreadyhasfundingsecuredforitfromindividualdonors.OneNGOfor examplesaidithasstartedtoconstructacentreforpeoplewithspecialneedsinTyre,but realizedhalfwaythroughthatanotherNGOhasacentreforthesametargetgroup,so changeditsprojecttotargettheelderly. 2.Staffinitiated:middlemanagementorprogramstaffinbranches(whopossiblyliveinthe communitytheyserve)usuallyinitiatetheideaandsuggestittouppermanagementandthen theboard.Therecommendationofthestaffisbasedonanoverallperceptionofaneed(ofa certainareaortargetgroup)andonabasicscopingifthesamesortofprojectisavailable,but isnotfollowedatallbyamorethoroughneedsassessment. 3.Donorinitiated:ThisisthecaseofNGOsthataremostlydependentoninternationalfunding (mostlywestEuropeanandNorthAmerican),wheretheNGOmanagementisapproachedbya fundingagencythatalreadyhasitsownsetagendaorplanandlookingforapartnerto implementit.Alternatively,anNGO'smanagementwouldscopethefundingprioritiesand designaprogramthatbridgestheseprioritiesanditsownmissionorareaorexpertise. d) Inallthreecasesabove,NGOrepresentativementionednosystemicconsultationwith programbeneficiariesandstakeholdersoutsideoftheNGO.Thatsaid,Atleasthalfofthe beneficiariesinterviewedsaidtheyhavemadesuggestionstotheNGOswhichweretakeninto consideration,andthatdetailsofimplementation,likethetiming,werenegotiatedwiththem. Theyalsomentionedthatthecommentsandsuggestionsgiveninevaluationformsareheard, andthatstaffareapproachableforsuggestionsandfeedback. e) Theshapeoftheprojectitselfusuallyfollowstraditionaldesignofotherprogramsalready

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beingimplementedinsameNGOorothersimilarNGOs. f) SmallerNGOsinruralareas,describedlittleneedforplanningandprioritisation,andclaimthat whateverservicetheyprovidetothecommunityispositivebecausetheneedisthereatall levelsandforallthemes. g) Thatsaid,theorganicprocessofdevelopingaprojectthatisstaffinitiated(option2above), hasthegreatestpotentialtoproducerelevantprojectsdespitethefactthatitisnotsystematic, ifthemissionoftheNGOiswellfocusedandadequatedialoguetakesplace.Withinthis process,andwhenagoodprojectdoescomeup,itsactualimplementationisdependanton theavailabilityoffunding. h) Amoresystemicplanningprocessdoesexistwithinorganisationsthatreceiveinternational funding(mostlywestEuropeanandNorthAmerican),butremainslimitedtotheprojectitself, andlittlespaceexistsforsynergybetweenprojectsespeciallyiftheseprojectsarefundedby differentdonors.Absentsynergyisalsoevidentinthatprojectswithinoneorganizationcould havedifferentplanning,monitoringandevaluationmodulesthatfollowtherequirementsof eachdonor,andaremainlyimplementedforthatsake,andnotbynecessitytoimproveproject performance. 5.2Implementation,MonitoringandEvaluation a) ThesourceoffundingforNGOsiscrucialtodecidingwhatprojectsanNGOactually implements,andhow,aswellasthewayitassessesit.ServicebasedandcharitableNGOs, whichrelyonindividualdonorsinLebanonandonAraborreligiousfundingforexampletend tothinkmoreofreachingouttoalargernumberofbeneficiariesandseemnottobe questionedaboutthevalueorthequalityoftheworktheyareproviding.NGOsthatdepend oninternationalfunding,followprojectbasedimplementation,andareencouragedtofollow systemicplanning,implementationandM&E. b) MostNGOsmentionedthattheyhavenosetsystemicmonitoringandevaluationmethods. Mostdonothavesetindicatorsanddonotmeasuretheirprogressregularly.Thisisespecially trueforNGOswithupto2staff,wherenoneoftheNGOsaskedintwofocusgroupssaidthey implementanymonitoringandevaluation. c) AlthoughwithoutsetM&Esystems,manyNGOs(mostlyoperationaloneswithnostaffaswell aschangeNGOs)doquestioninformallytheirprogramsandtheimpactithasachievedand incorporatethelearningfromthatquestioningintotheirfuturework. d) NGOsthathavesystemicM&Eusuallyimplementitbasedontherequestoftheirfunding agency,andthoughitisimplementedthevalueofitontheorganization'sinternallearningis mixed,andagoodpartofM&Eisinvestedinmeasuringoutputsratherthanoutcomes.Whilea fewNGOshavementionedthevalueofgoingthroughthatprocess,forseveralotherNGOsthis hasremainedatimeconsumingexercises,andtheprocessofwhichdoesnotspilloverto otherprojectsnorisitbroadenedtoincludetheoverallNGOimplementationprocessand achievement. e) Beneficiariesweredividedastotheirevaluationoftheirorganizationsimplementation strategy.WhilebeneficiariesinterviewedfromtwoNGOsweregenerallysatisfied,andfeltthe designandimplementationsuitedtheirneeds.Beneficiariesfromathirdorganizationhad manycomplaintsaboutthequalityoftheservicetheyreceive.Unsatisfiedbeneficiaries

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blamedthedeficiencyintheservicetheyreceivetothelackoffinancialresourcesinthe organization,andexcusedthattoanextent,asthiswastheonlyorganizationtoprovidesucha serviceforfree. 5.3ResultsAchieved a) FewparticipatingNGOscouldclearlydescribetheimpactoftheworktheyaredoing.Mostof themdescribedtheirworkasonecontinuoussetofprogramsthatdeliverservicestoacertain numberofbeneficiaries.LittlereflectionisgiventotheaddedvalueoftheNGOscontribution intermsofprioritiesinLebanon,ortothesystemicchangesneededtoensurethe sustainabilityoftheimpactoftheirwork.Sustainabilityisratherthoughtofasthe sustainabilityoftheNGOitselfandthecontinuousimplementationofservices,ratherthan dealingwiththerootcausesoftheproblemsthatcausetheseneeds,orholdingstate institutionaccountableforimprovedservices. b) ChangedrivenNGOs,hadtheclearestviewoftheirimpact,describingoverthelifespanof theirprojectsconcreteresultsincludingachievingchangesinlawandpolicy(relatingtopeople withspecialneedsforexample)andputtingtheissuestheyareadvocatingforontheagenda (likeviolenceagainstwomen).TheseNGOswereclearontheirmissionandonhowtheir programsovertheyearsarecloselytiedtothatmission(theirtheoryofchange),thoughthey donotbynecessityhavegoodprogramspecificevaluationandimpactassessmentprocedures. c) ServicebasedNGOsandNGOsworkinginthePalestiniancamps,especiallythosewithalarger numberofstaffdescribedtheirimpactintermsofthenumberofpeoplereached,claiming thatbytheirworktheyhaveminimisedpossibledamageonmostvulnerablegroups.Inthe caseofPalestinianNGOs,mostdidn'tseevalueorpossibleimpactinanadvocacyapproach towardstheLebaneseGovernmentorinachievinganyrealdevelopmentalimpactintheir communities,giventheharshrealitywithinthecampandtheinabilitytochangeabroader contextthatcontinuestorecreatetheneeds. d) NoneoftheNGOssawthepossiblenegativeimpactoftheirwork(likeaiddependencyand disempoweringlocalstructures). e) Theimpactvarieswhenseenfromtheperspectiveofbeneficiariesinterviewed.Five beneficiariesinterviewedfromtwodifferentorganizationsweregenerallysatisfiedwiththe programswhichrespondedtotheirpriorities.Theyfeeltheyhavepersonallybenefitedand wereempoweredthroughtheirinvolvementinthework.Thisisnotbynecessityanindicator ofqualityprogramming,astheiranswerstootherquestionsgiveageneralimpressionthat theyarerelativelyeasytosatisfy,orarewillingtoacceptwhatisofferedtothemduetolackof otheroptions.Beneficiariesinterviewedfromanotherorganizationwerelesssatisfied,mainly duetothelogisticsofimplementation.Theymentionedotherpolicyrelatedissuesthatwould beinstrumentalinempoweringthem,butthatnoNGOisworkingon.

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6.ExternalRelations6.1SocialandCulturalEnvironment a) GenerallyNGOsdidnotmentiondevelopmentprioritiesinLebanonorMDGsforexampleas keyfactorsthatinfluencetheirstrategicplanning.NGOsratherappearedlimitedtotheirown sector. b) Participantsinonefocusgroupdescribedthescarcityofqualityresearchonsocialissuesasan obstaclethatmakesprioritizingtheirworkmoredifficult.Whenresearchisavailable,theysaid, itisoftenpoliticizedoralteredtofitpoliticalpositions. c) SomeNGOsdescribedbeingpressuredbygroupswithinorrelatedtothesocialcontextthat impedetheimplementationoftheirprograms.Onewomensrightsorganizationforexample mentionedtheoppositionfromsomereligiousauthoritiesoncertainaspectsoftheirwork. d) TherelationshipbetweenthePalestinianNGOsandtheirsurroundingsisonethatmeritsa morethoroughlook.NGOsinthecampsaremajoremployersforPalestinianrefugees,andas sucharecentraltotheeconomiclifeofthecamps,aswellasawayofchannelingfundsand improvingthelivingconditionsinthecampsthroughprovidingemploymentopportunities, regardlessoftheimpactoftheirwork.Thesecuritysituationalsoaddsitstoll;someNGOsare questionedandfeelpressuredbypoliticalfactions,especiallyincampsthatarecontrolledby onefaction,andtoalesserextentincampswerethereareseveralmilitary/politicalplayers. AnotherproblematicrelationshipiswiththearmyinNahrelBaredcamp,wheresecurity measureshavehinderedreliefanddevelopmentefforts. 6.2PartnershipwithotherNGOsandNetworks a) IngeneralcooperationandnetworkingbetweenNGOsisplaguedbycompetitionforfunding andvisibilityaswellaspersonalandpoliticalconflicts. b) TwofactorsseemedtoincreasethesuccessofcooperationbetweenNGOs:i)thecooperation betweenNGOsonspecifictimeboundinitiativesandii)theexistenceofstrongpersonal relationshipbetweentheleadersofthecooperatingNGOs c) ParticipatingNGOsspokeoffourdifferenttypesofnetworkingactivities: 1. MembershipofinternationalnetworksworkingonthethemesthattheNGOcovers, especiallyforNGOswithspecializationofinternationalinterestliketheenvironment, corruption,etc. 2. MembershipofsetregisteredNGOnetworks,LiketheCollectifdesONGauLiban,the LebaneseNGOforum,andthePalestinianNGOForumnationally,andtheNGOforum ofSidonlocally.Membershipinthenationallevelthesenetworksappeartobereservedto largerwellestablishedNGOs,whereasmembershipinthelocalforumsismorediversein termsofsizebutrestrictedgeographically.Successfulcooperationwithinthesenetworks hasbeenhighlightedattimesofcrisis(likethesummer2006waronLebanon),butless evidentintermsoflongertermcooperationforaspecificcauseintimesofstability.In addition,competitionexistsattimesbetweenthesenetworks. 27


3. Partnershipandnetworkingonaspecificthemeorcampaign.Thishasbeenmostly describedinchangefocusedNGOs,andappearstobemostsuccessfulwherethe cooperationisquitefocusedonaspecificprojectandtheme,andnocompetitionexists betweenparticipatingNGOsonfunding.ExamplesofthisisthecooperationofNGOs workingontherightsofpeoplewithdisability,orthecooperationthatbringsNGOs workingonViolenceagainstWomenononesideandviolenceagainstchildrenonthe other. 4. Limitedactivityspecificsupport,whereanorganizationlendsitspremisesforexampleto anotherNGOforaonetimeactivity.ExamplesofthisalsoexistbetweenCBOsandnational organizations,wherethelargernationalorganizationprovidesfundingbutusestheCBOfor directimplementation;anagreementthattheCBOapprovestoentersinceitprovidesit withvisibilityandtheopportunitytoimplementprojectswithinthecommunity. d) Cooperationvariesalsobasedonthetypeoforganization.Palestinianorganizationsseemto havemoresophisticatednetworkingstrategiesamongthem,thoughtheyfeltthattheywere somewhatexcludedfromLebanesenetworks.RuralNGOsarelesslikelytobemembersof networks,althoughtheyareeagertoknowmoreaboutotherNGOsworkingwithintheir sectorsinotherareas. e) Thecontributionofnetworkingtoimproveimpactvaried;whilepartnershipincampaigning hasprovidedrelativelygoodresults,servicebasedorganizationsforexamplementionedthat manyNGOsworkinthesamegeographicalareasonsimilarissueswithlittlecoordination, whileatthesametimemanypeopleinneed,especiallyisdistantruralareasarenottargeted byanyNGO. 6.3RelationshipwithGovernmentauthorities a) OnlyafewNGOs,mostlyadvocacyoriented,haveuptodateknowledgeaboutpolicyrelating totheirwork.Inaddition,fewhavedynamicdialoguebasedworkingrelationshipwiththe governmentauthorities,asopposedtoaconfrontationalcriticalone. b) Someoftheobstaclesinworkingwithsomepolicyandlawmakersaswellasministrystaff,are intheirattitudetowardsandknowledgeofdevelopmentissues,whichsomeNGOs,especially changedrivenNGOssawascontradictorywiththeirdevelopmentvision(inissueslike inclusion,orinstitutionalcare).Disorganizedinstitutionalstructuresofministries,bureaucratic workingprocedures,andlimitedcoordinationbetweenministriesimposeanotherdifficultyin cooperationwithministries.Inaddition,afewNGOsmentionedthattheirdemandsto governmentalinstitutionsareseenaspersonalones,oraregrantedonlybecauseofelectoral orpoliticalgains. c) IntermsoftherelationshipwiththeMinistryofSocialaffairs,onlyfewoftheparticipating NGOsfromruralareasnewabouttheactivitiesoftheministryandtheNGOsupportunit, althoughtheywereeagertocooperatewithit.Themajorityofchangebasedandsmaller organizationscriticizedthesystemthroughwhichtheMinistrypartnerswithNGOs,sayingthat itisreservedforaprivilegedfew.Oneofthelargerservicebasedorganizationscriticized MoSAbysayingitlacksasocialstrategy.,. d) Atthelocallevel,nationalNGOsseemtoberelativelycapableofpartneringwith

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municipalitiestoimplementprojects.Surprisingly,partnershipbetweenCBOsand municipalitiesdonotoperateassmoothly,especiallyinruralareaswherethemunicipalities haverecentlybeenestablished,andthereratherexistssomecompetitiononfundingbetween CBOsandmunicipalities,orvariationinprioritieswhereMunicipalitiesprioritizeinfrastructure andconstructionneedsoversocialneeds. e) WhileallNGOsworkinginPalestiniancampsdiscusseddiscriminationinlawsgoverning Palestinianrefugeescivilrights,fewseemtohaveattemptedtocooperatewiththeLebanese authoritiesontheworktheyaredoing.Afewreflectedonthepossibilityofcooperationwith themunicipalitiesforinfrastructureissues,especiallywherethepercentageofLebanese withinthecampsishigher.Somepositiveexamplesofcooperationarehighlighted,though seenasexceptions;oneisthecooperationwiththeHigherCouncilforChildhoodonchildrens rights,theotheriswiththeinitiationoftheLebanesePalestinianDialogueCommittee(LPDC), thoughfeltatthestrategiclevel,thisisnotpresentatthepopularlevelwithinthecamps. 6.4RelationshipwiththeMedia a) Ingeneral,problemsofcooperationbetweenNGOsandthemediaareareflectionofthe problemsoftheNGOsthemselvesandtheirworkingcontext,includingthelackofstrategic thinking,poornetworkingbetweentheNGOs,politicalpolarization,andthemarginalizationof ruralNGOs. b) AmainproblemisthatNGOsdealwithmediamainlyasadvertisementandnotaspartnersin socialchange.NGOssometimeswanttopromotetheNGOitselfmorethanitseeksto advocateoreducateonthethemeitisworkingon,oronlywantmediacoveragetofulfill donorrequirements.MediaontheotherhandisinterestedinbettercooperationwithNGOs, andhasseveralneedsthatcanbefulfilledbythem,specificallyforcredibleinformation, reports,statisticsonsocialissuestheyarecovering,andalsoforcontactwithintervieweesor ordinarypeoplefromtheground(thembeingcloselynetworkedontheground).Someissues arespecificallyappealing,thoughsometimeswithdifferentials,astothetypeofmedia(for exampleanissuelikecitizenshipwouldbeappealingtotheprintmediaandnottoTV). c) ArelatedproblemistheabsenceofcoordinationbetweentheNGOs,especiallythoseworking onacommontheme,whichcouldhelpthemtopushforrealawarenessraisingandadvocacy onacertaintopicinpartnershipwiththemedia.RivalrybetweenNGOstoappearonthe media,forcesjournaliststotreadafinelinewhentheywanttoworkonacertaintopic,and whotoapproachandhowinordernottoupsetoneNGOortheother.Inaddition,NGOsdo notalwaysprovideaccurateandcredibleinformationinaformthatiseasilyunderstoodby mediarepresentatives.Whenlookingforspecificdataonanissue,internationalNGOsare morelikelytohavetheinformationthanthelocalNGOs,andevenwhenanNGOisknownto haveinformationinaspecificperiod,thatinformationisnotfollowedthroughon. d) IntermsofthepoliticalaffiliationofeithertheNGOorthemediainstitution;someNGOshave somesortoflongtermpartnershipwithoneoranothermediaorganizationthatguaranteethe publicationoftheirstories,whichinturnlimitstheinterestofothermediaorganizationsinthe samestory.SomeNGOsorindividualswithinthemwouldhesitatetotakepartinaprogramif themediaisknowntobeaffiliatedtoonepoliticalgroup. e) Thereexist,asmediapersonnelhavediscussed,agroupofeliteNGOs,thataretrustedby themedia,eachintheirowntheme,becauseofahistoryofrelationshipwiththemediaanda

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trackrecordoftrustestablishedthroughtheirworkandfundingsources.ThesearetheNGOs thathaveclearstrategicplans,severaldonors,staffandabudgetthatisnolessthan100,000 USdollarsayear.Theirrelationshipwiththemediaisprofessional,theirmediainvitationare sentatleasttwoweeksahead,andpersonalfollowupwithcontactpeopleinthemedia institutionisestablished(andpossiblywithamediacoordinator).Whiletheattentiongivento theseNGOsiswelldeserved,sometimesthisgroupofeliteNGOsgainmonopolyoverwhat comesoftheNGOstothemedia,andpossiblesmalleremergingNGOs,especiallyfromrural areas,donotmanagetogainvoice.TheseeliteNGOsusuallyworkwithdonorsandhavethe skillsofattractivelyadvertisingtheirwork. f) SomeNGOs,especiallythosewithfundingfromaministry,areambivalentaboutrespondingto mediarequestsandoftenviewtheinformationrequestsfrommediaasathreatasifthe mediaorganizationaimssolelyatscrutinizingtheirwork.Theimpressiontheygiveisthatthey prefertobekeptalone,andfeelnovalueofmediacoverage(especiallythosethatareservice oriented). 6.5Relationshipwithdonors a) AgoodpercentageofNGOfundingiseasymoneywhichmeansfundingthattheNGOisnot heldaccountableastohowitspendsit.Whileitishardtodeterminetheshareofthatfrom theoverallNGOfunding,weestimateittobenolessthan50%ofNGOfunding.Inonefocus groupwithNGOsworkingnationallythathaveover10staff,fouroutofthesixorganizations presenthadbetween75and95percentoftheirfundingfromindividualdonations,andthree othershad5090percentoftheirfundingfromtherevenueofservicestheyprovide.While4 outofthesixdidreceiveinternationalgrants,thisamountedtonomorethan530percentof theirbudget,andonlytworeceivedLebanesegovernmentalfundingwhichaccountedto2227 percentoftheirbudget.EasymoneyalsoappearstoconstitutethemajorityofCBOsfunding, inbothruralandurbansettings,especiallyfororganizationsthathaveupto2staff.Thatsaid, evenwithinternationalfunding,whichisthesourcefromwhichchangeandPalestinian organizationsreceivedmostoftheirfunding,accountabilityislimitedtotheinterestofthe donor,creatingthedichotomyfortheNGObetweenbeingaccountabletoitsmembership baseontheonehandandthedonorsontheother. b) NGOshavesuggestedthatfundingagenciescomewithreadymadesuggestions,anditisreally hardtonegotiatewiththemthevalueoftheseprojectsintermsofsocialimpact.Theyclaim thatthereisfunding,butitisonethatdoesn'tsuittheneedsontheground,which,according toNGOrepresentatives,arealsohardtoproperlyassessgiventhelackinstudiesandcredible needsassessments.AttemptstoinitiatedialoguebetweenNGOsanddonorsarenotprevalent andhappenonlywithinternationalnongovernmentaldonorfoundations. c) SomeNGOsclaimthattheydonotreceive(bywayofprinciple)anyexternalfunding,andfeel thatinternationalfundingcomeswithitsownagenda,andratherdisruptsandobscuresa culturallyrootedsystemofsocialsupport.Oneparticipantinparticularactuallyfeltoffended byinternationalfundingthatcomeswithatopdownmodernizationagenda,andclaimingthat theequivalentofhugeamountsofhighlyadvertisedfundsbyinternationalNGOs,areregularly andeasilycontributedbyindividualLebanesedonorstocharityworkinLebanon. d) InternationaldonorstargetlargerlocalNGOs,oralternativelyworkwithlocallybased internationalNGOsthatworkasamediatorbetweenthesmallerNGOsandthedonors.Newly

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emergingconsultancyfirms,thatareregisteredasforornotforprofitcompaniesalsocompete fortheirfunds. e) CBOsareleftwithlittleneutralfundingopportunities,wheretheeasiestaccesstheyhaveisto fundingfromlocalpoliticalgroups,withwhichcomespoliticalallegiancetothedonor's politicalagenda.SomeCBOsfoundnoproblemintakingsuchmoney,astheyalreadyadhere tothepoliticsofthatgroup,apracticemorecommonlyfoundinNGOsthathaveoneperson leadership.Othersclaimthattheycouldtakethemoneyandfindgapsthroughwhichthey couldretaintheirneutrality,thoughmanyothersthoughtsuchaprocessisonlypossiblefor largerNGOswhohavemorecredittotheirnameandcantakefundingfromcompeting politicalsourcesandretaintheirmiddleposition.Still,foragoodpartoftheCBOs,they describedaprocessofexclusionforanyCBOthatdoesnotadherewithoneofthedominant politicalgroupsandtakesitsfunding,andthattheirprojectsareactuallyattacked,andfunding fromothersourcesisobstructed,asanyactivityimplementedbythisCBOisperceivedasa challengetothepoliticalparties'mobilization.Thatsaid,someCBOshavementionedother sourcesoffunding,suchasmembershipfeesanddonationsfromrichercommunitymembers inthediaspora. f) NGOsofvaryingsizesandfundingsourcesstressedtheimportance,ofpersonalrelationsin attractingandsecuringfunding.Assuch,manymembersofCBOssawthatfundraisingwas mainlydonebyapproachingsocial/politicalfigures. g) PalestinianNGOsappearedtohavelessofaprobleminsecuringfundsandhadbetterskillsin establishingrelationswithforeigndonors(eitherfoundationsorinformalgroupingofactivists). 6.6Relationshipwiththeprivatesector a) ThetypeorassociationbetweenthecompaniesandNGOsisofthreemaincategories: sponsorshipoftheNGOsevents,donationmostlyinkindofwhatthecompanyproduces,or anestablishedpartnershiptoimplementacommunitybasedprojectorproductrelated campaign. b) TheinterviewsshowedthatthecompanieshaveinterestinpartneringwithNGOsin communitybasedprojectsforseveralreasons: 1. Matchinginterest,wheremostmissionsofthecompaniesincludeacomponentof developingandimprovingthecommunitiesthroughtheirproductswhichmatchwiththe mainthemeofallNGOsmissions. 2. NGOshaveaccessibilityandbetterknowledgeofthebeneficiariesandcommunities. 3. NGOscanimplementtheseprojectsmoreefficientlythanthecompaniessincetheyalready havetheexpertiseandknowhow. 4. Duetoincreasedcompetitionamongcompanies,theyhavetoresorttoCorporateSocial Responsibility(CSR)asamarketingtool. 5. IfthecompanycarriedoutCSRactivitiesindependently,thepublicwillperceiveits initiative,asapureactofmarketingwhilepartneringwithNGOsinimplementingsuch projectswillgiveanimpressionofgenuineinterestofthecompanyinimprovingthe community.

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c) Nationalcoverage,capabilityofefficientimplementation,nonpartisanandnonpolitical image,andexistingassociationbetweentheNGOspecialty/causeandthecompanysproducts (forexamplegarbagebagsandenvironmentalNGOsorstationaryprovidersandeducational NGOs)areamongthemainattributeswhichcompaniesareinterestedinwhenselecting potentialpartneringNGOs. d) Personalrelationsandcontactsbetweencompaniesmanager/ownersandNGOspersonnel influencethedecisionwhethertosupportanNGOornotandtowhatextent.Usuallysuch supportisadonationinkindorcashandnotpartnershipoveraproject. e) TheresultsrevealedthatmostNGOsapproachthecompanieswithamindsetofwhatcanyou contributeinsteadofaclearproposalofwhatwewantandthisishowwedividethe tasks/inputsbetweenus.Thisshoppinglistattitudedoesntpromotealongterm partnershiprelationbetweentheNGOsandcompaniesandproducesshorttermbenefits. Moreover,NGOsapproachthecompaniesoftenunpreparedandwithlittleunderstandingof thecompanysmission,valuesandcorporatesocialresponsibilityobjectives,minimizingas suchtheprospectsofbuildingpartnership. f) Theprivatesectorrepresentativesinterviewedhighlightedtheirneedtobeinformedabout whichNGOisdoingwhat.Similarly,theparticipatingNGOrepresentativesalsoindicatedtheir needforinformationaboutandaccesstoprivatecompaniesthattheycanpartnerwith.

FeedbackonAvailableCapacityBuildingOpportunitiesforNGOs DatagatheredfromNGOsandCapacitybuildingprovidersinterviewedsuggeststhatthereisno scarcityoftrainingopportunitiesforNGOS,andtheneedisratherfor:

InformationonavailabletrainingopportunitiesreachingNGOsthatneeditmost,including CBOsespeciallyinruralareas. Morespecializedcustomizedtrainingagendasthatprovidedeeperknowledgeofthetheme beingtrainedonandpracticaltoolsforitsimplementation.Manyofthetrainingopportunities areredundant,toogeneralornotcustomizedtofittheparticularneedsofNGOsinLebanon. Ensuringpostworkshopfollowupandprovisionofonthejobsupportifneeded,asmost trainingopportunitiesareavailableasoneoffactivitieswithnofollowup.

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V.RECOMMENDATIONSTherecommendationsbelowaredividedintotwosections;asetofsevengeneral recommendationsontheoverallapproachtocapacitybuildingthatwesuggesttheNGOunit follows,andalongermorespecificsetofrecommendedtopicsforcapacitybuildingactivities, targetaudienceandsuggestedmethodologyofimplementation. 1) Facilitateanation widedebateonprioritydevelopmentneedsinLebanonanddiscussbest approachestotacklethemforimprovedandsynergeticdevelopmentwork:theNGOsunit canplayaninstrumentalroleworkinensuringthecollectiveworkofNGOachievesmore strategicimpactthrough: a) SuggestingprioritydevelopmentthemesandareasinLebanon. b) Commissioningresearchpieces,ormakingavailableexistingresearchonpriority developmentissues,thatwouldallowNGOstomakemoreinformeddecisionson strategicgoalsandtargetaudiences. c) Creatingdialogueopportunitiesbetweenkeyplayers,includinglocalNGOs,International NGOsanddonoragencies,governmentalbodiesincludingministries,councilsand municipalities,andcapacitybuildingproviders.Thesecouldbeimplementedthrough regularseminars,newsletters,orconsultativeworkshop. d) Collatingstrategypapers,basedontheaboveresearchanddialoguethatservesasa theoreticalreferenceforactiveNGOs,allowsforsynergeticimplementationof developmentprojectsandbettermatchbetweendonorspriorities,NGOactivities,and priorityneeds. 2) Boostspacesandopportunitiesforinformationsharing:ThedatabaseofNGOsworkingin LebanonwasseenasaneededresourcebyseveralNGOs,theNGOunitcanextenditsrolein collectinganddisseminatinginformation,throughwebbasedaswellasprintmethods, independentlyorinpartnershipwithexistinginitiatives,onthefollowing: a) InformationaboutlocalNGOs(whichisalreadyavailable). b) InformationabouttheworkofInternationalNGOs,donors,theirfundinginterests,calls forproposalsanddeadlines. c) Contactsofcapacitybuildingproviders,andscheduleofupcomingtrainingopportunities. d) Resources,research,manualsandtoolkitsavailable,especiallyresourcesinArabicorones adaptedtosuittheLebanesecontext. 3) MonitorandparticipateinthereformoflawsandpoliciesthatgoverntheworkofNGOs:As findingsindicatedtheimpactofthelawsthatgoverntheworkofNGOsinLebanonontheir internalgovernanceandmanagementstructures,theunitcanengagewiththeMinistryof Interior,NGOs,andotherinterestedstakeholdersonimprovedlawsandpoliciesregarding NGOregistrationandsupervision,toensurethattheirstructuresaremoredemocraticand bettersuitedtoaddressdevelopmentneeds. 4) SupporttheadaptationofcapacitybuildingopportunitiestosuittheneedsoftheLebanese context:Agoodpartofcapacitybuildingopportunitiesavailablearebasedoninternational modelsthatdonotbynecessitysuittheneedsofaLebanesecontext.TheUnitshould engageindialogueanddevelopmentofimprovedmodelsthatincludeissuesthatareof

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particularrelevancetoNGOsinLebanon,includingpoliticizationofcivilsocietyactivities, crisisproneareas,andimbalancedruraldevelopment. 5) Enhancethetrainingefficiencyanditsimpact,through a) RefinethepretrainingselectionprocessofboththeparticipatingNGOandits representative(s)throughinterviewingandscreeningthesecondedcandidatesor requestingapretestquestionnairetoassesstheactuallevelofneedandinterestwithin theNGOor/anditsrepresentative(s)inthetopicoffered,andpossiblyaletterof commitmentbyparticipatingNGOStofacilitateandimplementapresetfollowupaction planmanifestingtheutilizationoflearningfromthetraining. b) Establishfollowupmechanismsofthetrainingsprovidedtoassessandencouragethe participatingNGOsutilizationoftheskillsandknowledgegained.Suchfollowupcouldbe intheformoffollowupworkshops,posttraininginhousevisitsorinterviews.Thefollow upoftheparticipantsutilizationofthetrainingshouldbejointprocessinvolvingboththe UnitandtheNGOleadership(directsupervisorofthetrainee) c) Continuewiththecostsharingpolicyfortrainingworkshopsofferedbytheunitand divideitproportionallyamongtheUnit,theNGOandpossiblytheparticipant him/herself. d) LinkthetopicsandthemesoftrainingservicesofferedbytheUnitwithaneedorinterest withintheNGOstofacilitateapplicationofknowledgeandskillsgained.Forexample,to providethebudgetingtraininginDecember,onemonthbeforethemonthwhenthe LebaneseNGOsaresupposedtosubmittheirannualbudgetstotheMinistryofInterior. 6) Diversifythemethodsofcapacitybuildingimplementation,toincludeopportunitiesother thantrainingincluding: a) TwiningormentoringbetweenadevelopedNGOandadevelopingNGO,includingjoint planning,fundraising,implementation,evaluationandreporting.Anotherpossibleform ofsuchmentoringistoencourageinternshipsforstaffofsmallerNGOsatlarger,better established.TheUnitcouldsettheToRsofsuchtwinning,bridgethetwopartiesand followuponitsimplementation. b) SimilartothelegaladviceservicebeingcurrentlyofferedbytheUnitwhichneedstobe better,disseminatedotheronetooneconsultationsandinhousecoaching,onspecific topicswouldbeveryuseful,especiallyonorganizationaldevelopment,andforthe adaptationofcertainmodelsorimplementationofskillsNGOshavebeentrainedon.This canbeoutsourcestoexternalconsultantsortoaqualifiedstafffromanNGOthathasthe relevantexpertise. c) Developmentoftoolkitsandtrainingmanuals. 7) ReachouttoCBOsoutsideGreaterBeirut.ThestudyshowedthatmostoftheNGOs, particularlyruralCBOs,areunawareoftheUnitanditsservices,whichtheyfoundrelevant andessential.Thisoutreachapproachcanbeachievedwithoutenlargingtheunitsexisting structure,throughamorerigorouscommunicationstrategy,theMoSAsocialdevelopment centres,andcentresofnationalLebaneseNGOsinruralareas.

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Table2SuggestedTrainingTopics

Governing Structure Theme NGOgovernanceandroleandresponsibilitiesofboardand GeneralAssemblymembers LawsgoverningtheworkofNGOsandtheirmembership TargetAudience NGOBoardand GeneralAssembly members GeneralAssembly members Volunteers All Seminars Strategypapers Training Seminars Pamphlets Seminars StrategyPapers Publicdebates Training Publicationsandseminarsofcasestudiesandmodelsof organizationsstructures Seminars Publicdebates TrainingWorkshops TrainingWorkshops Organizationaldevelopmentconsultancyservice,similar tothelegaladviceavailable,toprovideoneonone supportinorganizationalrestructuringandmanagement. Training Training Training Methodology

Sustaininginclusivevalueswithintheorganization(Gender sensitivity,inclusion,nonpartisanpoliticalandreligious practice)andconflicttransformationskills Buildingorganizationalcommitmentandstaffmotivation Modelsfororganizationaldevelopmentthatcombines institutionalworkwithitsrepresentationalrole.

Boardmembers NGOManagement BoardandGA membersofNGOs withStaff NGOManagement Boardmembersof CBOs NGOManagement

Management Processes

Managerialskills:meetingfacilitation,leadershipskills, conflictresolutionandefficientcommunication Basicadministrative,communication,andorganizational skills Organizationaldevelopmentandrestructuring

Documentationandreportingskills Human Resources Volunteerism:whatisvolunteerismandhowtorecruit, retainandmotivatevolunteers Humanresourceandperformancemanagement

NGOManagement Programstaff Boardmembers Programstaff NGOManagement


Humanresource managers RestructuringandestablishingJobdescriptions NGOmanagers Humanresource managers Financeand administrationstaff Boardmembers NGOmanagement Financestaff Training HandsonSupport Training Training Seminars

Financial Resourcesand Administration

Basicfinancialandaccountingpractices Annualbudgeting,financialplanningandmanagement

Designandmanagementofincomegenerationprojects Boardmembers NGOmanagement Seminars Training Training HandsonSupport(forsmallerNGOs) Training Coaching Toolkits Training Toolkits Training Toolkits Training BridgebetweenNGOsrequestingtrainingwithavailable trainingopportunities

FinancestaffFinancialanalysis,reportingandaudit. Financeand administrationstaff Managementstaff Managementstaff Programstaff NGOBoardsofall NGOs Programstaff Boardmembers Managementstaff Programstaff Programstaff

Program Performance

Needsassessmenttechniquesandtools,includingproblem treeanalysis Strategicplanningandtheoryofchangetools

Projectdesignandproposalwriting Monitoringandevaluation

ThematictopicsrelatedtothespecialisationoftheNGOs suchasworkingwithpeoplewithspecialneeds,childrens rights,primaryhealthcare


External Relationships

Keydevelopmentconcepts

Boardmembersof largerNGOs Staffofcorporate social responsibilitiesin theprivatesector NGOmanagement andprogramstaff NGOmanagement andprogramstaff Boardmembers

Seminars

Improvedcommunicationwiththemedia

Manual/toolkitoncommunicatingwiththemedia, developedbymediapersonnel,andincludesbest practicesaswellascontactdetailsofmediaoutlets Documentation/publicationofcasesofbestpracticesin cooperationandnetworking. Seminars Publicdebates Strategypapers 1.NGOFair 2.Websitetoincludedataonfundingagenciesandtheir callforproposals

NGOnetworking,creatinglongandshorttermpartnerships andcoalitions,

CreatingcommunicationbridgesbetweenNGOsand Funding agencies

NGOManagement andseniorstaff NGOMembersof Board

ANNEXIDOCUMENTSCONSULTEDAbouAssi,Khaldoun.LebaneseCivilsociety:ALongHistoryofAchievementFacingDecisiveChallenges AheadofanUncertainFuture.CivilSocietyIndexCountryReportforLebanon.Beirut:International ManagementandTrainingInstitute(IMTI),CIVICUS:WorldAllianceforCitizenParticipation,2006. CIVICUS:WorldAllianceforCitizenParticipation.CIVICUSCivilSocietyIndex:PreliminaryFindingsPhase 20032005.CIVICUScivilsocietyindexteam.June2006. Elliot,Sue.CouncilforInternationalDevelopmentResourceKit.CouncilforInternationalDevelopment (CID)workshops.Nov.1999. Fernholz,Fernando(Dr.)&MoralesFernholzRosemary(Dr.).AToolkitforMunicipalAssetManagement, SubmittedtoMunicipalFinanceTaskForce.DukeUniversity&RTIInternational.March2007. InternationalFederationofRedCrossandRedCrescentSocieties.CapacityAssessmentandPerformance Indicators(CAPI)forNationalSocieties.Dec.2001. Kirschbaum,Marco.NGOManagerOrganisationalAssessmentTool(OAT).July2004. Levinger,Beryl(EducationDevelopmentCenter)&Bloom,Evan(Pact),withassistancefromtheUnited NationsDevelopmentProgramme(UNDP).(ParticipatoryOrganizationalEvaluationTool)POETUsers ManualParticipatoryOrganizationalEvaluationTool,1998.

MacLeod,Rod.ScopingStudyforHaririFoundationforCapacityBuildingofLocalNGOs,Youthand Communities(draftreport).InternationalNGOtrainingandResearchCenter(Intrac).24Oct.2008. NationalAssociationofNonGovernmentalOrganisations(NANGO).ZimbabweNGOCorporate GovernanceManual.Harare,Zimbabwe:DFID(DepartmentforInternationalDevelopment), DevelopmentCooperationIreland,theEuropeanUnion.May2006.. NGOServiceCenter.TheOrganizationalAssessmentTool.[&inArabic:MarkazKhadamatAlMounazamat GhairAlHoukoumiya.AdatElTakyeemAlMouassassi].Dokki,elGiza,Egypt:Nov.2000 TheStatisticsandDocumentationOffice(AjialCenter).PalestinianNonGovernmentOrganizationsin Lebanon.Beirut:2001. http://www.arts.mcgill.ca/MEPP/PRRN/papers/ajial_center/ngo_lebanon.html TheCatholicInstituteforInternationalRelations(CIIR).CapacitybuildingforlocalNGOs:Aguidance manualforgoodpractice.London,2005. VanGeene,Jouwert.ParticipatoryCapacityBuilding:AFacilitatorsToolboxforAssessmentandStrategic PlanningofNGOCapacity.Zimbabwe:theNationalAssociationofNGOs(NANGO)inZimbabwe;ICCO PSaandPSO,theNetherlandsandJouwertvanGeeneforTheInstituteofCulturalAffairs,2003.

assessment of capacity building needs of ngos in lebanon

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