Assessment of Community Planning forMass Transit: Volume 2—Atlanta Case

Study

February 1976

NTIS order #PB-253680

O F F I C E O F T E C H N O L O G Y A S S E S S M E N T

DIRECTOR’S OFFICE

Emilio Q. Daddario, Director

Daniel V. De Simone, Deputy Direcfor

URBAN MASS TRANSIT ADVISORY PANEL

George Krambles, Chairman, Chicago Transit Authority

Walter J. BierwagenArnalgamated Transit Union

. Robert A. BurcoOregon DOT

Jeanne J. FoxJoinf Center forPolitical Studies

Lawrence A. GoldmuntzEconomics and Science Planning

Dorn McGrathGeorge Washington Llniversiiy

Bernard M. OliverHewlett-Packard Corporaficm

Simon ReichGibbs and Hill

Thomas C. Sutherland, Jr.Princefon Uniuersify

Frederick P. SalvucciMassachusetts DOT

Stewart F. TaylorSanders and Thomas, Inc.

OTA TRANSPORTATION PROGRAM STAFF

Gretchen S. Kolsrud, Program Manager

Mary E. Ames Larry L. JenneyV. Rodger Digilio Bev JohnsonThomas E. Hirsch, 111 Teri Miles

CONTRACTORS

Skidmore, Owings and Merrill System Design Concepts, Inc.

.,.111

PREFACE

This report on urban transportation planning in the Atlanta, Georgiametropolitan area is one of nine case studies undertaken by the Office ofTechnology Assessment to provide an information base for an overallassessment of community planning for mass transit.

The findings of the overall study are reported in the summarydocument, An Assessment of Community Planning for Mass Transit, which forms thefirst volume of this series. The assessment was performed at the request ofthe Committee on Appropriations of the U.S. Senate, on behalf of itsTransportation Subcommittee.

The study was directed by the Office of Technology Assessment’sTransportation Program Staff with guidance and review provided by theOTA Urban Mass Transit Advisory Panel. The firms of Skidmore, Owingsand Merrill and System Design Concepts, Inc., were contractors for thestudy. This assessment is a joint effort, identifying different possible pointsof view but not necessarily reflecting the opinion of any individual.

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INTRODUCTION

This report assesses how one of nine majorUnited States metropolitan areas made its decisionsabout the development or modernization of railtransit.

The assessment of the nine cities attempts toidentify the factors that help communities, facingcritical technological choices, make wise decisionsthat are consistent with local and national goals fortransit. The study investigates the following issues:

● Are there major barriers to communicationand cooperation among governmentalagencies involved in transit planning andoperating ? Do these barriers interfere withmaking sound decisions?

● Do transit decisions reflect the combinedinterests of all major , public groups, in-cluding citizen organizations, trade unions,the business community, and others ?

● Does the planning process provide enoughinformation about the advantages anddisadvantages of alternative courses ofaction to provide a solid basis for makingdecisions ?

● Does the availability or lack of financing, orthe conditions under which financing hasbeen provided, unnecessarily limit therange of options that are considered?

The ultimate purpose of the work has been tocast light on those prospective changes in nationaltransit policy and administrative programs whichmight improve, in different ways and to differentextents, the way communities plan mass transitsystems. The nine cities were selected to representthe full range of issues that arise at different stagesin the overall process of planning and developing atransit system.

San Francisco, for example, has the first regionalrail system built in decades, while Denver isplanning an automated system, and voters inSeattle have twice said “no” to rail transit fundingproposals.

The assessment of transit planning in each of thenine metropolitan areas has been an inquiry into anevolving social process. Consequently, the studyresults more closely resemble historical analysisthan classical technology assessment.

This study employs a set of evaluation guidelinesto orient the investigation in the nine metropolitanareas and to provide the basis for comparativejudgments about them. The guidelines werederived from issues identified during preliminaryvisits to the metropolitan areas, a review of Federalrequirements for transit planning, and an in-vestigation via the literature into the state-of-the-art in the field.

The evaluation guidelines cover major topicswhich were investigated during the case assess-ment process. They deal with the character of theinstitutional arrangements and the conduct of thetechnical planning process.

GUIDELINES FOR ASSESSMENT:INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

Some of the most significant influences ontransit planning are exerted by the organizationsresponsible for conducting the planning andmaking the decisions. Three guidelines were usedto evaluate the institutional arrangements in thenine metropolitan areas:

●

●

●

Agencies responsible for various aspects oftransit decisionmaking should cooperateeffectively in a clearly designated “forum”.

The participants in this forum should haveproperly designated decisionmakingauthority, and the public should haveformal channels for holding decision-makers accountable for their actions.

Citizens should participate in the transitplanning process from its beginning andshould have open lines of communicationwith decision makers.

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GUIDELINES FOR ASSESSMENT:TECHNICAL PLANNING PROCESS

The technical planning process provides theinformation that public officials and their con-stituents draw upon in making plans and decisions.Four guidelines were used to assess the technicalplanning process in the nine metropolitan areas:

Broad, explicit goals and objectives shouldguide technical planning and decision-making.

A range of realistic alternative solutionsshould be developed.

The evaluation of these alternatives shouldgive balanced consideration to a full rangeof goals and objectives.

A practical and flexible plan for financingand implementation should be developed:

During visits to each of the nine metropolitanareas, the study team interviewed the principalrepresentative of the transportation planning

institution and other main participants in the localplanning process. The visits were supplemented byinterviews with UMTA officials in Washington.Pertinent documents-official plans, reports,studies, and other material—were reviewed in eachcase.

The information thus collected was used incompiling a history of the transit planning processin each case area, organized around key decisionssuch as the decision to study transit, the selection ofa particular transit system, and public ratificationof the decision to pay for and build the system. Themain political, institutional, financial and technicalcharacteristics affecting the conduct of the plan-ning process were then assessed in light of theevaluation guidelines.

The same set of guidelines used in assessing eachcase metropolitan area was employed in making ageneralized evaluation of the metropolitan ex-perience. The results of the generalized evaluationare summarized in the report, An Assessment ofCommunity Planning for Mass Transit: Summary Report,issued by the Office of Technology Assessment inFebruary 1976.

CONTENTS

SUMMARY AND HIGHLIGHTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

METROPOLITAN SETTING . . . . . ● . . . . ● . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

General Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Existing Passenger Transportation Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3Transportation Planning Institutions . . . l 0 0 0 . . 0 0 . . . . 0 0 8

CRITICAL HISTORY OF TRANSIT PLANNING ANDDECISIONMAKING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Decision to Study Transit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11Decision to Creates Regional Transit Authority . . . . . . . . . . . 12Decision to Reject the Rail Rapid Transit

Proposal in 1968 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ● . . . 1 6

Decision to Approve the Rapid Rail TransitProposal in 1971 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Progress Toward Implementing the RapidTransit Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

CHRONOLOGY OF THE TRANSIT PLANNING PROCESS . . . 23

ASSESSMENT OF THE PLANNING ANDDECISIONMAKING PROCESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Institutional Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27Technical Planning Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

SUMMARY CASE ASSESSMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

6’7-377 O - 76 - 2

Summary and Highlights

Artist’s sketch of the MARTA transit vehicle

● The original impetus behind Atlanta’srapid transit system came fromdowntown-oriented business interestsand forward-looking regional planners.Planners believed a transit system wouldrelieve highway congestion and helpshape future growth. Businessmen sawtransit as a way to reinforce Atlanta’s bidto become the regional center of theSoutheast.

. Thus, from the beginning support fortransit was derived from the desire topromote Atlanta’s growth. This fact led toa sophisticated appreciation of therelationship of transit to land use plan-ning, and to a tradition of cooperationbetween transportation and land useplanners.

● Atlanta’s forum for transportation plan-ning, the Atlanta Regional Commission(ARC), institutionalizes this pattern ofcooperation by bringing regional land use

planning and transportation planningunder a single organizational roof. TheARC structure allows the responsibilitiesof the various agencies to be clearlydelineated while encouraging integrationof land use and transportation planning.

● Atlanta’s transit planning history reflectslittle overt rivalry between the region’stwo modal agencies, Metropolitan AtlantaRapid Transit Authority (MARTA) and theGeorgia Department of Transportation(GDOT, the highway-planning agency).However, underlying the appearance ofcooperation has been a tendency for thetwo modal agencies to negotiatedecisions out of public view.

• On the other hand, the MetropolitanAtlanta Transit Overview Committee,created by the Georgia State Assembly tomonitor MARTA’s activities, brings adegree of public accountability andvisibility to the Atlanta process.

1

. Although originally transit decision-making was dominated by businessinterests, MARTA had made significantimprovements in involving citizens in theplanning process by 1971, when thedecisive protransit referendum was held.Since then, as the plan becomes reality,more complaints are heard from affectedcitizens.

. The quality of the technical work inAtlanta is generally regarded as havingbeen excellent for its time. Yet, theinformation often came too early or toolate to be optimally useful in guidingdecisionmaking.

● In addition, political considerations in-fluenced the information made availableto the public and decisionmakers. Theonly rigorous evaluation of transportationalternatives in Atlanta concluded that a

predominantly bus transit system wouldattract as much patronage as the propos-ed rail system—and at less cost. In the endthese findings were modified due to thepolitical inadvisability of serving only partof the community with rail while offeringless desirable express bus service to otherparts of the region.

. When the transit bond issue was passed in1971, local supporters were relying on theFederal Government to finance two-thirds of the cost of the entire system.Since then, the estimated cost of con-structing the system has grown from $1.3billion to over $2 billion while the Federalshare for capital assistance has risen to 80percent. When UMTA recently pledged$800 million–10 percent of its totalcapital budget—to support the MARTAsystem, some transit advocates feltshortchanged because the sum will buyonly 13.7 miles of rapid transit.

Metropolitan Settingl

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

Since 1950 Atlanta has become the majoreconomic and cultural center in the southeasternUnited States. During this period the city hasexperienced unprecedented expansion in down-town construction. Atlanta’s ambitious campaignto become a city of international importancecoupled with its downtown orientation helpedstimulate interest in a rapid rail transit system.

Although the Atlanta metropolitan area isgrowing fast, it remains a city with a relatively lowpopulation density (3,775 and 560 persons persquare mile in the center city and suburban ringrespectively—see Figure 2). Most of the populationgain over the past decade has occurred in Atlanta’ssuburban ring. The center city comprised 47.9percent of the area’s population in 1960; but by1970 this percentage had dropped to 35.7 percent.Evidence of dispersal of population centers isprovided by the addition of 10 counties to theStandard Metropolitan Statistical Area after 1970census data were processed. 2 The increase in thenumber of work trips to and within Atlanta’ssuburbs is another indicator of suburbanization(see Figure 3).

Although the suburbs have grown faster,Atlanta’s center city has remained stable and insome ways has gained vigor. Downtown real estatevalues grew as middle- and high-rise offices rose onPeachtree Street. The population of the center citygained 1.8 percent between 1960 and 1970, anddensity also increased. Likewise, the number ofwork trips to center city destinations increasedslightly. In comparison, in many other older U.S.metropolitan areas center city population andemployment dropped during the same period.

I See Figure 1, center fold.2 The 10 counties added to the AtIan ta SMSA after 19i’o are

Cherokee, Butts, Henry, Forsyth, Fayette, Douglas, Newton,Rockdale, Paulding, and Walton. The earlier boundariesincluded s counties: Fulton, De Kalb, Clayton, Gwinnett, andCobb.

EXISTING PASSENGERTRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS

As in many cities of relatively low density,Atlanta’s highway network is more fully developedthan its transit system. The circumferential loop,Interstate 285, is augmented by radial interstatehighways intersecting in Atlanta’s central businessdistrict. Interstate 20 crosses the region east towest. The northeast to southwest corridor isserved by Interstate 85 and the northwest tosoutheast corridor by Interstate 75. The latter tworoutes merge to parallel the Peachtree Ridgethrough central Atlanta, Citizen action over thepast few years has halted further expansion of thefreeway system, but the existing network is one ofthe best developed of any major city on the easternseaboard.

Until 1972 Atlanta was served by a privatecompany, the Atlanta Transit System (ATS).Principally a bus operation, ATS had a reputation asone of the best-managed transit companies duringthe 1960’s. Trolley coaches ran until 1963.Patronage held relatively steady during the 1960’sbut took a downward turn at the end of the decade(see Figure 4). During the same period thepercentage of work trips carried by public transitfell 20.4 percent, while the portion usingautomobiles rose by 84 percent (see Figure 3). By1971, with ridership at its lowest point ever andfares at their highest, public takeover was propos-ed.

In 1971 Atlanta voters authorized a three-pointprogram of transit improvements. The programhinged on a pledge of Federal capital assistance fortransferring ATS ownership to the MetropolitanAtlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA), forpurchasing new buses, and for constructing a rapidrail system, A short-range package promised newroutes and other service improvements in the bustransit system. Transit fares were lowered from 40

cents to 15 cents. A long-range 50-mile rapid railtransit system was augmented by 14 miles ofexclusive busways (see Figure 5). A l-cent hike inthe sales tax was authorized to provide the localshare of support for the program. Final design is

3

LAND AREA (1970)(square miles)

C e n t e r C i t y 1 3 1 . 5Suburban Ring 1 , 5 9 7 . 5

Entire SMSA 1 , 7 2 8 . 0

POPULATION

Suburban C e n t e rRing C i t y

1960 529,733 487,455

1 9 7 0 8 9 3 , 7 4 3 4 9 6 , 4 2 1

DENSITY(populat ion/square mile)

Suburban C e n t e rRing C i t y

1960 332 3,707

POPULATIONPercent Change 1960-1970

+68.7%

Suburban C e n t e rRing C i t y

1970 560 3,775

FIGURE 2: ATLANTA METROPOLITAN CHARACTERISTICS

S o u r c e : Urban Transportat ion Fact Book, American Inst i tute of Planners andt h e M o t o r V e h i c l e M a n u f a c t u r e r s A s s o c i a t i o n o f t h e U . S . , I n c . , 1 9 7 4 .

A S t a n d a r d M e t r o p o l i t a n S t a t i s t i c a l A r e a ( S M S A ) i n c l u d e s a c e n t e r c i t y ( o rc i t i e s ) , u s u a l l y w i t h a p o p u l a t i o n o f a t l e a s t 5 0 , 0 0 0 , p l u s a d j a c e n t c o u n t i e so r o t h e r p o l i t i c a l d i v i s i o n s t h a tw i t h t h e c e n t r a l a r e a .The ten new counties added to thei n c l u d e d i n t h e s e f i g u r e s .

4

a r e e c o n o m i c a l l y a n d s o c i a l l y i n t e g r a t e d

Atlanta SMSA s ince the 1970 census are not

WORK TRIP DISTRIBUTION

28%

25%

1960 1970

Center City to Suburban Ring

Suburban Ring to Center City

Beginning and Ending in Suburban Ring

Beginning and Ending in Center Ci ty

WORK TRIP MODE1960

3%1970

FIGURE 3: ATLANTA SMSA TRAVEL CHARACTERISTICS

Suburban Ring

Center City

Source: Urban Transportation Fact Book, American Institute of Planners andthe Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the U.S., Inc., 1974.

A Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) includes a center city (orcities) , usually with a population of at least 50,000, plus adjacent countiesor other political divisions that are economically and socially integratedwith the central area.

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——

VEHICLE MILES OPERATED(mi l l ions o f mi les )

+16.1 +16.8’+19.4 +24.6peak Year= 1974 (24.6 mill ion miles)L O W Y e a r = 1 9 6 1 ( 1 5 . 9 m i l l i o n m i l e s )

1 9 6 0 1 9 6 5 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 4

REVENUE PASSENGERS(mi l l ions o f Passengers )

P e a k Y e a r = 1974 (56 .0 mil l ion r i d e r s )L o w Y e a r = 1 9 7 1 ( 4 4 . 4 m i l l i o n r i d e r s )

NET OPERATING REVENUE( m i l l i o n s o f d o l l a r s )

peak year= 1965 ($818,578)LOW year= 1974 (-$17,003,983)

+53.4 +51.1 +48.3 +56.o

+ 0 . 8 2

1 9 6 0 1 9 6 5 1 9 7 0 1 9 7 4

FIGURE 4: ATLANTA TRANSIT OPERATIONS 1960-1974’

Source : Urban Transportation Fact Book, American Institute of Planners andthe Motor Vehic le Manufac turers Assoc ia t ion o f the U .S . , Inc . , 1974 .

IAt lanta Trans i t Sys tem; Metropol i tan At lanta Rapid Trans i t Author i ty ,

D a t a n o t a v a i l a b l e f o r 1 9 7 2 .A Standard Metropol i tan S ta t i s t i ca l Area (SMSA) inc ludes a center c i ty (orc i t i e s ) , usua l ly wi th a popula t ion o f a t l eas t 50 ,000 , p lus ad jacent count ieso r o t h e r p o l i t i c a l d i v i s i o n s t h a t a r e e c o n o m i c a l l y a n d s o c i a l l y i n t e g r a t e dw i t h t h e c e n t r a l a r e a .

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//

I i

FIGURE 5 : ATLANTA - ADOPTED RAPID RAIL SYSTEM

\

Source: Metropol i tan Atlanta Rapid Transi t Authori ty

;7-371 O - 76 - 3

.I

/

--

~ Rapid Rail Transit Line

E---., Busway Rapid Transit Line

F·_·-j County Boundary

-..... .... ,

I I \

, I I I I

•

' .... ----~

-------....... -----

Future Extensions of Rapid Rail Transit Line Major Highways

7

underway on a portion of the rail system, and ning and programming in the region. i ARC isformal groundbreaking took place in February essentially a merger of the Atlanta Region1975. Metropolitan Planning Commission, the

Metropolitan Area Council of Health Agencies, and

TRANSPORTATION PLANNING the Atlanta Area Transportation Study (AATS),the organization originally created to coordinate

INSTITUTIONS transportation planning in the region.

The transportation planning relationships

TABLE I.—Federal Assistance to Atlanta Transit Programs between the modal agencies (the transit authorityFrom F.Y. 1962 to May 31, 1975 MARTA and the Georgia DOT) and ARC are

institutionalized in the Atlanta Region Transporta-Type of Assistance Federal Share Total Costs tion Planning Program (ARTPP) that was adopted

Capital Grants . . . . . . . . . . . $239,809,000 $621,360,000 in 1971. Under the ARTPP agreement, transporta-Technical Studies . . . . . . . . 9,066,000 14,401,000 tion policymaking is handled by an ARC subcom-

TOTAL . . . . . . . . . . . . $248,875,000 $635,761,000 mittee called Transportation Policy Subcommittee,

Source Urban Mass Transportation Adminlstratlon

The institutional setting for planning rapidtransit in the Atlanta metropolitan regiontraditionally has fostered cooperation betweentransportation planners and regional comprehen-sive planners. The relatively close relationship isreflected in the complex organizational structurethat coordinates transportation planning withother regional planning functions in Atlanta.

which includes representatives from ARC, MAR-TA, GDOT, and (since 1971) each jurisdictionparticipating in the ARC. Technical issues aredecided by the Technical Coordinating Committee(TCC), which is made up of the chief technical staffpersons from the participating bodies. TheTechnical Coordinating Committee (TCC) reportsto the Transportation Policy Subcommittee (TPS).TPS technically is a subcommittee of ARC’sCommunity Development Planning Liaison Com-mittee, which is one of ARC’s three principalcommittees. 5

The ARC board theoretically has final reviewTABLE 2.—Federally Recognized Agencies over TPS policy decisions. In practice most dis-

Designation Agencyagreements are arbitrated within TPS itself. ARC’sstaff has been directly involved in overseeing and

A-95 Atlanta Regional CommissionMPO Atlanta Regional Commission

coordinating work the city and MARTA are doingon environmental impact analysis and station areaimpact studies.

Atlanta Regional Commission (ARC)

The Atlanta Regional Commission was created in1971 by an act of the State legislature. Seven of theregion’s counties currently participate in ARC.Modeled after the Metropolitan Council inMinneapolis-St. Paul, ARC is the Federal grantreview agency from the regions and the agencycharged with coordinating all transportaion plan-

~ The Urban Mass Transportation Administration and theFederal Highway Administration require Governors todesignate a Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO) in eacharea to carry out the “continuing, comprehensive transportationplanning process . . . carried out cooperatively. . .“ (the “3-C”process) mandated by the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962 andthe Urban Mass Transportation Assistance Act of 1974.According to joint UMTA-FHWA regulations published inSeptember 1974, MPO’S must prepare or endorse (1) a long-range general transportation plan, including a separate plan forimprovements in management of the existing transportationsystem; (2) an annually updated list of specific projects, called thetransportation improvement program (TIP), to implementportions of the long-range plan; and (3) a multiyear planningprospectus supplemented by annual unified planning work

j Circular A-95 of the Offices of Management and Budget programs.requires one agency in each region to be empowered to review ‘ 5 ARC members are assigned to one of the three “liaison”all proposals for Federal funds from agencies in that region. committees: Health and Social Services Planning LiaisonCircular A-9.5 replaced Circular A-82, which was created to Committee, Governmental Services Liaison Committee, andimplement Section 204 of the Demonstration Cities and Community Development Planning Liaison Committee. EachMetropolitan Development Act of 1966 (42 U.S.C. 3301). committee has staff support.

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Metropolitan AtlantaRapid Transit Authority (MARTA)

The Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid TransitAuthority is the principal transit operator in theregion and the body charged with the design,engineering, and construction of the rapid transitsystem. MARTA was created by an act of theGeorgia General Assembly in 1965 to perform arange of tasks:

The authority shall exist for purposes ofplanning, designing, leasing (as lessee),purchasing, acquiring, holding, owning, con-structing, improving, equipping, financing,maintaining and administering a rapid transitsystem within the metropolitan area, andoperating same, or contracting therefor, orleasing (as lessor) the same for operation byprivate parties.

Four counties and the City of Atlanta participatein MARTA: Fulton, De Kalb, Clayton, andGwinnett. Clayton and Gwinnett voted not to takepart in MARTA’s transit development programauthorized in 1971.

City of Atlanta

The City of Atlanta also is a major actor on theregional scene. Formally, it participates in theprocess through its membership on the ARC andMARTA boards and through the ARTPP process.The city also has created a special MARTA LiaisonOffice to coordinate and expedite city actions on

MARTA plans and construction activities, and itsDepartment of City Planning is working on StationArea Impact Studies with ARC, MARTA, and localcommunity organizations.

Georgia Department of Transportation (GDOT)

On the State level, the Georgia Department ofTransportation plays a major role in Atlanta’stransit planning activities. Formerly called theState Highway Department, GDOT was involvedheavily in the AATS program before it wasincorporated into ARC. GDOT maintains a specialbranch for planning and programing in Atlantametropolitan area.

The Georgia Department of Transportation wasestablished in November 1972. It is governed by theState Transportation Board. A Mass Transporta-tion and Aeronautics Division was established todeal with questions of mass transit and gradually istaking on a more active role.

Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid TransitOverview Committee (MARTOC)

The Georgia General Assembly created theMetropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit OverviewCommittee in June 1973. MARTOC oversees thefiscal operations of both the bus and rapid transitactivities of MARTA. The overview committee,which was inspired by the example of the Office ofthe Legislative Analyst in California, serves as anombudsman for the public as well as an instrumentof the General Assembly.

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Critical History ofTransit Planning and Decisionmaking

The following history covers the decisionmakingprocess for Atlanta’s rapid transit system from itsbeginnings in post-World War II highway needsstudies to the present day. The discussion isorganized around five major phases of the planningand decisionmaking process: (1) early interest inrapid transit, culminating in the decision of theState legislature to create the Metropolitan AtlantaTransit Study Commission in 1962; (2) effortsleading to the establishment in 1965 of a regionaltransit planning, construction, and operatingagency; (3) initial transit system planning and thedefeat of the rapid rail proposal in the referendumof 1968; (4) subsequent replanning and theapproval of the 61-mile rapid rail-busway system in1971; (5) the period since 1971 of system design,neighborhood impact study, and financial decision-making. The historical narrative is intended toprovide a framework for the discussions that followof the institutional structure and technical process.The history is summarized in a chronological listingin the following section (see page 23).

DECISION TO STUDY TRANSIT

Early support for rapid rail transit in Atlantagrew out of a creative alliance between regionalplanners and downtown civic and business leaders.The first official mention of the need for rapidtransit came in a series of regional planning reportsin the 1950’s. The idea caught on with a core groupof businessmen interested in establishing down-town Atlanta as a commercial center of nationaland even international importance. They were ableto persuade the State legislature to sponsor thefirst full-scale transit planning study in 1962.6

The Metropolitan Planning Commission (MPC)7began to explore the idea of rapid transit in tworeports it prepared in 1950 and 1954. The first,entitled Up Ahead, was a regional plan thatenvisioned a freeway system with a loop around thecity. The second was an update called NOW forTomorrow. Although both reports dealt primarilywith freeways, they mentioned the long-rangeneed for rapid transit.

MPC took another, closer look at the regionalhighway network after 1954. In two reports, Accessto Central Atlanta and Crosstown and Bypass Expressways,MPC analyzed the existing and projected capacityof the highway network and concluded thatincreased highway construction alone would not beadequate to meet transportation needs. Thereports suggested that rapid transit was needed tosolve the problem and that work to plan a systemshould begin immediately.

MPC’S recommendations were not welcomed bythe Georgia State Highway Department. Thehighway agency believed highways could be anadequate solution and therefore disputed the MPCconclusions. The highway planners also had a stakein protecting their highway appropriations fromthe possibility of encroachment by transit builders.However, the argument between the highway andtransit factions never developed into a public battlein Atlanta the way it did in Washington, D. C.,whose early transit planning occurred during thesame years. The MPC reports instead lay thegroundwork for subsequent steps in the transitplanning process.

The movement behind rapid transit began togather momentum in 1960. Three reports werepublished in 1960 and 1961 dealing directly withthe subject of rapid transit.

b A particularly valuable source of information about and T The Metropolitan Planning Commission (MPC) was Atlan -analysis of the evolution of MARTA and early transit planning ta’s regional planning agency at that time. MPC had a two-in Atlanta is provided by Julian Rodney Johnson’s “MARTA: The county scope. Its successor, the Atlanta Region MetropolitanMetropolitan Atlanta Transit Authority, a Brief History,” Planning Commission, was created in 1970 and had a five-History Honors Paper, Emory University, Atlanta, 1970. county membership.

1 1

Two of the repor ts were products o f the newR ich would later become chairman of the MAAtlanta Region Metropolitan Planning Commis- - b o a r d .s i o n ( A R M P C ) . O n e o f t h e m w a s a genera l

discussion called “What You Should Know About Rapid Transit” (September 1960). The other report was an element of the first Atlanta area regional comprehensive plan. . This second report, Atlanta Region comprehensive Plan: Rapid Transit, was issued in June 1961. It called for 60 miles of high-speed rapid rail transit serving five counties at a roughly estimated cost of between $200 million and $215 m i l l i o n .

The central assumptions in the ARMPC plan illustrate the close connection the planners drew between the regional pattern of land use and rapid transit. Transit was viewed as a means for shaping and planning the future of the region. It would foster the vitality of the central business district and Atlanta’s continued health as a regional center i n t h e s o u t h e a s t .

The third report during this period preceded publication of the other two and was more effective in spearheading the civic campaign for rapid transit. This document was called Rapid Atlanta. It was published not by a public agency but by Atlanta T r a n s i t S y s t e m , the city’s privately owned bus company. Prepared by Simpson and Curtin, an engineering consultant f irm from Philadelphia, Rapid Byways proposed a $59 million first phase of a rapid transit system. .The proposal called for 16 miles of rapid rail using existing rail rights-of-way and a downtown conveyor - type , second- leve l distribution system. The recommendations strong- ly in f luenced the P lanning Commiss ion ’ s 1961 p r o p o s a l .

The effectiveness of Rapid Atlanta was due in large part to its roots in the business community. With the publication of Rapid Atlanta in 1960, Atlanta’s core of civic-minded businessmen took the lead in organizing support for rapid transit. The individual behind the Rapid Atlanta plan was Robert Somerv- i l l e , pres ident o f the At lanta Trans i t Sys tem. Somervil le was also a member of the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce. In early 1961 the new

The Chamber worked in c lose coordinat ion wt h e A t l a n t a R e g i o n M e t r o p o l i t a n P l a n n i n g Cm i s s i o n ( A R M P C ) . A R M P C s e n t s p e a k e r s t o lc i v i c o r g a n i z a t i o n s a n d b u s i n e s sg r o u p st h r o u g h o u t t h e r e g i o n d u r i n g 1 9 6 1 . A f r e q uspeaker was Glenn Bennet t , who had been nae x e c u t i v e d i r e c t o r o f t h e n e w l y r e o r g a n i z eC o m m i s s i o n i n 1 9 6 0 . B e n n e t t w a s a t i r e l e s s in f luent ia l suppor ter o f the t rans i t idea and hi m p o r t a n t p o s t s o n a l l t h e p r e - M A R T A o r g a n ibodies. The real action, however, occurred outsthe po l i t i ca l ly and f inanc ia l ly weak reg iona l n i n g a g e n c y .

Two events hera lded the evo lut ion o f po l i t isuppor t for rap id t rans i t in 1961 . 1n Ju ly , At lM a y o r W i l l i a m H a r t s f i e l d a p p o i n t e d a f o u r -m e m b e r a l d e r m a n i c s t e e r i n g c o m m i t t e e t o g ur a p i d t r a n s i t p o l i c y . T h i s c o m m i t t e e f o r m e d nucleus of a group of committees from the varij u r i s d i c t i o n s i n t h e r e g i o n w h i c h , w i t h A R Mb e g a n t o l o b b y m e m b e r s o f t h e G e o r g i a G e nAssembly to look favorab ly on rapid t rans i t . e f f o r t s s o l i d i f i e d i n N o v e m b e r 1 9 6 1 w h e n G onor Ernes t Vandiver he ld a reg iona l conferencecivic and elected leaders.

The conference par t i c ipants reso lved to es taba r e g i o n a l R a p i d T r a n s i t S t e e r i n g C o m m i tc o m p r i s e d o f t h e c h a i r m e n o f t h e f i v e c o u nc o m m i s s i o n s , t h e M a y o r o f A t l a n t a , a n d A t la l d e r m a n i c s t e e r i n g c o m m i t t e e . T h e e x p l i c i t pp o s e o f t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n w a s t o p r o m o t e tenac tment o f mutua l ly acceptab le l eg i s la t ion in1 9 6 2 s e s s i o n o f t h e G e o r g i a G e n e r a l A s s e m b

T h e l o b b y i n g b o r e f r u i t i n M a r c h 1 9 6 2 w h e nleg i s la ture c rea ted the Metropol i tan At lanta Ts i t S tudy Commiss ion to beg in fu l l - sca le t echp l a n n i n g f o r a t r a n s i t s y s t e m . A c t u a l l y , t h i s r e p r e s e n t e d a c o m p r o m i s e f r o m t h e g o a l o f tC h a m b e r t o s e e l e g i s l a t i o n a u t h o r i z i n g a r e gt r a n s i t a u t h o r i ty a p p r o v e d i n 1 9 6 2 . T h e f a cbehind th i s deve lopment are d i scussed in the ns e c t i o n .

president of the Chamber of Commerce, Ivan Allen, named a rapid transit steering committee to DECISION TO CREATE A begin pushing for transit . The committee was REGIONAL TRANSIT AUTHORITYh e a d e d b y R i c h a r d R i c h , a f o r m e r C h a m b e r president, and its membership included Robert Seek ing l eg i s la t ive approva l for a reg iona l t rSomerville. Allen himself would continue his role agency was a log ica l f i r s t s tep for At lanta ’ s t rin transit promotion as Mayor of Atlanta, a post he held from early 1962 through the end of the decade. 8

Johnson, op. cit.

12

advocates. Under the Georgia State Constitution, aconstitutional amendment was necessary before aregional transit agency could be established. Thetransit supporters wanted to take a legislativelyratified blueprint for a transit agency to the polls sothe region could pursue transit planning im-mediately. Although planning did begin onschedule in 1962, the 3-year delay in puttingMARTA together meant no action could be takento implement the first plan. By the time MARTAcame into being in 1966, the technical planningessentially had to begin over again.

Before they could unite behind a transit agencyplan in late 1961 and early 1962, the members of theRapid Transit Steering Committee had to resolvethe touchy question of representation—howshould the positions on the agency’s board bedivided among the participating local governments.Atlanta, particularly lame-duck Mayor Hartsfield,wanted more control than the outlying countieswere willing to part with. The referendumlanguage that finally passed the General Assemblyand went to the polls in November 1962 did notspecify the composition of the agency. It merely laidout in general terms the nature of the powers—taxing, eminent domain, expenditure of publicfunds and the like—that the State would bepermitted to delegate to a lesser jurisdiction for thepurpose of transit planning and implementation.

In spite of attempts to solidfy support for theenabling amendment, the measure met defeat atthe polls. The referendum was put to the statewideelectorate. Most analysts agree the issue failed towin the support of rural voters who mistakenlythought they were committing themselves to payfor a transit system for Atlanta. Opposition wasvoiced also by the trucking industry in defense ofhighway funds. The timing of the referendum alsowas an issue. State constitutional amendmentscould be placed before the electorate only every 2years. Transit promoters thought a delay until1964 would be undesirable. Furthermore, theywanted to make certain Atlanta would be qualifiedto receive the new Federal capital assistance fortransit improvements that was being debated in theU.S. Congress in 1962. As it turned out, the UMTAbill did not pass Congress that year.

After the referendum defeat, the transit sup-porters in Atlanta immediately began preparing for1964, when the transit enabling amendment nextwould be eligible for the ballot. Within weeks of thereferendum vote the Metropolitan Atlanta Transit

Study Commission resolved to form the organiza-tion that came to be known as the Rapid TransitCommittee of 100. The Committee’s members andits 12-person executive committee were appointedfrom the public by city and county executives. Itwas conceived as a strategy for financing andpublicizing the rapid transit campaign. A full-timepublic relations staff was hired and a consultantengaged to advise it. Local governments agreed tofinance the actual referendum campaign. Thecommittee’s executive body included ex-GovernorVandiver as chairman and Planning Commissiondirector Glenn Bennett as secretary. AtlantaTransit System president Robert Somerville alsowas a member. In the secretarial post GlennBennett helped coordinate the civic campaign fortransit with the efforts of his regional planningcouncil. The role was familiar to him. Bennett hadserved as secretary to the Metropolitan AtlantaTransit Study Commission, and he would performthe same function for MARTA in 1966.

In March 1963 the Metropolitan Atlanta TransitStudy Commission was dissolved. Soon afterwarda second group was created by the legislature calledthe Georgia State Study Commission. Its II-person membership included eight State senatorsand three citizens, among whom were AtlantaMayor Ivan Allen and ex-Governor Vandiver. TheStudy Commission reviewed and approved itspredecessor’s transit plan. It also helped theChamber of Commerce and the other Atlantatransit supporters convince the entire Georgiadelegation to the U.S. Congress to support theUMTA legislation, which finally was enacted in1964.

The extensive campaigning by regional and localgroups led to approval of the second transitenabling referendum in the fall of 1964. Argumentsin favor of the measure cited the need to qualify forthe limited Federal funds that the new UMTA actwould make available and the opportunity for eachjurisdiction to withdraw before a transit programwould be implemented. Instead of being presentedas a statewide issue as in 1962, the propositionappeared on the ballots of only five metropolitanAtlanta counties in 1964. Approval from eachcounty was necessary. It came, but barely. Themargin was a slim 403 votes in Cobb County.

The passage of the referendum set the stage inthe General Assembly for legislation to create aregional transit authority. As in 1962, the majorissues were representation on the governing board

13

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Adopted Rapid Rail System

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A Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) includes one or more center cities - each with a population of at least 50,000 within its political boundaries -- plus adjacent counties that are metropolitan in character and are economically and socially integrated with the center city.

and the powers local jursidictions would be willingto give up to the new agency of government. Acompromise was reached in which the City ofAtlanta relinquished some control on the board butcould remain the dominating presence. The agencycould sell bonds and operate a transit system buthad neither taxing authority nor the power ofeminent domain. Under these terms the Assemblyapproved the MARTA bill in March 1966.

Another referendum was required for countiesto ratify participation in the new agency. TheCommittee of 100 was reconstituted to help thePlanning Commission and the Chamber of Com-merce with promotion. Voters were reassured thatjoining MARTA would not entail a long-termfinancial obligation. The MARTA charter requiredcounties to hold public referenda before they couldlevy a tax to support a MARTA project. Fourcounties — De Kalb, Fulton, Clayton andGwinnett–voted to participate in MARTA. CobbCounty was the only jurisdiction to bow out.

The reasons for Cobb county’s negative vote inthis referendum, as in its 1964 predecessor,foreshadowed some of the objections that woulddefeat the proposed rapid rail system in 1968.Recent migrants to Cobb County from the cityfeared that rapid transit would hasten the move-ment of city blacks into the suburbs. The ruralpopulace expressed a general unwillingness tocontribute to a system they felt would not benefitthem directly. In addition, there was an ideologicalconservative objection to what was judged to beexcessive governmental spending. g

To summarize, three characteristics of thecampaign to create MARTA help illuminatesubsequent aspects of the transit planning processin Atlanta. First, the need for Federal aid wasalways in view. The availability of Federal financingis still an issue today. Second, the same nucleus ofcivic and political leaders shepherded the MARTAproposition from beginning to end. Their supportcontinued to be an important factor in Atlanta’stransit planning. Finally, the opposition to MARTAvoiced during the mid-60’s hinted at problems thetransit plan would encounter at the polls in 1968.

DECISION TO REJECT THE RAILR a p i d T r a n s i t

After MARTAturn its attention

q Johnson, op. cit.

16

wasonce

P r o p o s a l i n 1 9 6 8

established, Atlanta couldmore to technical planning.

In short order the consultants updated the 1962plan and adopted a 40-mile system to present at thepolls in 1968. However, adverse study findings inaddition to shortcomings in MARTA’s campaignled to defeat of the MARTA proposal. This sectiondetails the events leading up to that defeat.10

The first task MARTA faced after it wasestablished was a review of the plan developed in1962 for the Metropolitan Atlanta Transit StudyCommission. The Commission had hired the firmof Parsons, Brinkerhoff, Quade and Douglas(PBQD) on the basis of its work for the New Yorksubway system and, in San Francisco, for BART.PBQD prepared a detailed engineering studyproposing a 66-mile five-county rapid rail systemprojected to cost $292 million, The StanfordResearch Institute, also involved in BART plan-ning, followed this study with an implementationstrategy.

In 1967 MARTA, working as before through thestaff of the Planning Commission, hired Parsons,

. Brinkerhoff-Tudor-Bechtel to update the 1962study in light of the Planning Commission’s newpopulation and employment forecasts. The PB-T-Bconsortium had first joined forces as the principalengineering consultants for BART; their work forMARTA was supported by a financial analysisprepared by Hammer, Greene, Siler, Inc., Fewsignificant changes were made in the alinement andextent of the 1962 transit plan. The most importantdifference between the 1962 and 1967 proposalswas cost. The 1967 report proposed a 54-mile four-county system, 12 miles shorter than itspredecessor but some $190 million more expensive.The addition of an Ii-mile segment in CobbCounty (which was beyond MARTA’s jurisdiction)would have raised the total to over half a billiondollars.

Conservative fears about the cost of the transitproposal were behind a report called Rapid Buswaysthat challenged the ARMPC/MARTA plan. Thereport was commissioned by Robert Somervilleof Atlanta Transit System (ATS) and prepared bySimpson & Curtin, the same consultants whodeveloped the ATS 1960 plan, Rapid Atlanta. RapidBusways called for a 32-mile network of exclusivebusways, at a projected cost of $52 million, as an“interim” approach to Atlanta’s transit needs.

10 For a detai]ed analysis of these events and the 1’%8 bondvote, see Transportation Politics in Atlanta: The Mass Transit BondRe/ermdutn O( 1968, Matthew Coogan et. al., Cambridge, Mass.1970.

——

Busways were to be built on existing railroadrights-of-way in a number of MARTA corridors.Although the report did project that the buswayscould be converted to rapid rail, it built a case forbusways as a permanent solution. Some observersspeculate that ATS was guarding its own interestsin two ways: by asserting the superior servicecharacteristics of busways versus a predominantlyrail system, and by arguing for action that wouldincrease its assets in preparation for the inevitabletakeover of the private bus company by MARTA.

Regardless of the motives behind the report RapidBusways initiated a substantial controversy. MAR-TA rejected its conclusions after a hasty 3-weekreview. 1n December 1967 a faction of the Board ofAldermen led by conservative Everett Millikincalled for a comparative study to lay the issue torest. Soon afterward, the policy committee of theAtlanta Area Transportation Study, made up of theGeorgia State Highway Department, the AtlantaRegion Metropolitan Planning Agency, and MAR-TA, decided to study busways in the context ofpreparing a balanced, long-range transportationplan for the region.

Pressure from the Urban Mass TransportationAdministration (UMTA) was another factor con-tributing to the decision to begin the multimodalreview. One of UMTA’S guidelines for capital grantapplicants required transit proposals to be part oflong-range, areawide transportation planningcovering both transit and highways. The AtlantaArea Transportation Study (AATS) theoreticallywas responsible for highway-transit coordination,but in fact AATS dealt primarily with highwayswhile MARTA focused exclusively on transit.

To meet the UMTA requirement and to resolvethe busway-rail controversy, the AATS policycommittee hired Alan M. Voorhees & Associates inFebruary 1968. The Voorhees recommendationswere not ready in time for the 1968 referendum,although a preliminary report stated that theannual costs of a rapid rail system and a buswayssystem were not much different. The incompletestatus of the Voorhees study was a major plank inthe campaign by MARTA critics to defeat the 1968transit proposal in the referendum.

In the meantime MARTA had published anotherstudy, a major analysis of the effects on Iand use ofthe creation of a rapid transit system. This study,called The impact of Rapid Transit on Metropolitan Atlanta,analyzed the system’s effects on community

facilities, the low-income population, displacementof families and businesses, and the existingmetropolitan circulation system. The report, thefirst UMTA-sponsored study of its type, wasprepared by Eric Hill Associates of Atlanta andWinston-Salem, N. C., and was released in March1968.

The transit impact report listed ways MARTAcould use its power to bring about a majorimprovement in the environment of Atlanta. Itrecommended undertaking a broad analysis of thesystem’s benefits, the preparation of developmentplans for each of the stations, and close coordina-tion of the rapid transit system planning with thecity’s urban renewal program. The report alsosuggested extending the system to serve low-income neighborhoods. The impact study laid thegroundwork for the station area developmentimpact studies and plans that began after 1971.

As work progressed on the impact study and theVoorhees transportation study, MARTA tooksteps toward selecting a system to bring to publicreferendum. A f t e r t h e A t l a n t a RegionMetropolitan Planning Commission transmittedthe 1967 64-mile system to MARTA, the transitagency chose a 44-mile portion for preliminaryengineering. Subsequently, in light of publichearings, the plan was modified and a 40.3-milesystem adopted.

The report outlining this 40-mile system was notpublished until September 1968. At that time, thedecision on whether or not to go to the polls wasfurther complicated by a last-minute revision of thefinancing plan, adjusting cost estimates upwardaccording to a more conservative inflation es-timate. This revision combined with disagreementsbetween Atlanta and suburban jurisdictions overapportionment of the costs to delay the formaldecision to take the transit proposal to the votersuntil the beginning of October—little more than amonth before election day.

The defeat of the MARTA bond issue by anarrow margin in 1968 involved complex reactionsof different political groups. One importantelement was the decision by local transit unions andlabor leaders in general to campaign againstMARTA’s proposal because it did not cite collectivebargaining provisions included in Federal law. Inaddition, there were other political problems withother groups. Conservatives called the plan fiscallyirresponsible. Opposition to the use of the propertytax was strong among lower-income as well as

17

suburban homeowners. Voters in outlying jurisdic-tions felt that the City of Atlanta would get thelion’s share of the benefits from the system.Atlanta’s black community complained it had notbeen involved in the planning and would notreceive adequate service. Some analysts also arguethat local officials from the metropolitan area werenot adequately involved and that the publicitycampaign for transit was handled poorly.

The fragmentation of support in City Hall andthe Chamber of Commerce had been perhaps themost telling harbinger of the defeat to come.Robert Sommerfield had been solidly behindAtlanta’s transit plans prior to commissioning RapidBusways. The dispute created by this report, and theunfinished status of the Voorhees study that wasdesigned to resolve that dispute, raised doubtsamong some public officials who had once beenstrong supporters. Alderman Everett Millikin was amember of the early Rapid Transit SteeringCommittee, but he vigorously opposed the transitproposal in 1968 and financed an advertisingcampaign against it. 11 Perhaps the most critical losswas Ivan Allen, Atlanta’s mayor and one of theinitiators of rapid transit planning in Atlanta. Allendid not directly oppose the referendum proposition,but his campaigning was unenthusiastic.

MARTA had fared poorly in the GeneralAssembly during this same period. A bill containinga number of amendments to the MARTA Act wastabled in 1967 on the strength of opposition fromFulton County and Atlanta delegates. This “om-nibus bill” would have granted to MARTA thepower of eminent domain and a range of additionaladvantages. The bill’s foes argued chiefly thatMARTA had not included local governments indrafting the proposals.

In trying to rectify this shortcoming in 1968,MARTA found it could not gain AldermanMillikin’s support for the omnibus legislation untilthe eminent domain clause had been withdrawn.Negotiation proved futile; in the end GovernorLester Maddox vetoed the bill on the grounds thatit was fiscally irresponsible.

The fact that there was a debate at all in theGeneral Assembly was more important than thearguments that were raised. The publicity helpedreinforce the doubts that were already being heard

I I Mil]lkin was a retired oil company executive, and criticsalleged his anti MARTA campaign was financed by oil money.

closer to home and, indirectly, contributed to thedefeat of the MARTA proposals in referendum.

DECISION TO APPROVE THERAPID RAIL TRANSIT PROPOSAL

IN 1971

Between 1968 and 1971 MARTA applied some ofthe lessons of the first referendum failure.Changes in the planning process and the transitprogram combined with changes in the politicalcontext in Atlanta to lead to victory when thetransit issue was returned for a new referendumvote in November 1971.

In an important step, MARTA enlisted thesupport of labor by amending the MARTAlegislation with collective bargaining provisions. Inaddition, Atlanta’s Mayor Massell appointed thechairman of the central labor council to be vicechairman of the MARTA board. The conciliationsto labor were an important factor in the success ofthe transit proposal in the 1971 election.

Another significant factor was the strongcampaign MARTA mounted to draw both blacksand public officials into the planning process after1968. A third black was appointed to MARTA’sboard in 1971, when the replanning program beganin earnest. The black representation on theMARTA Citizen Advisory Council also wasincreased. MARTA conducted special meetings forofficials from participating governments. A seriesof public meetings and hearings also were held todetermine community needs and expectations.Some observers have argued that the involvementof citizens and local officials was more cosmeticthan substantive, although the meetings did lead tomodifications in the proposed system. The newapproach achieved MARTA’s goal—it helped swingblack communities and suburban officials tosupport of the rapid rail proposal.

MARTA also agreed to improve transit service toblack neighborhoods. The Voorhees study for theAtlanta Area Transportation Study concluded thatservice should be provided to Model Cities housingat Perry Homes via the Proctor Creek spur off thewest line. (The Proctor Creek route had first beenofficially proposed by the impact study in 1968. )The Voorhees cost analysis showed that expressbus in the east-west and Proctor Creek corridorswould provide equivalent service at a total pricesomewhat less than rapid rail. However, bus

18

service was widely regarded by the public to besecond rate. In the face of charges that it would beproviding second-class service for second-classcitizens—the blacks and poor—MARTA made apolitical decision to go to rail in the east-westcorridor.l2 PB-T-B’s preliminary engineeringstudies showed that express bus costs would matchrail if greater right-of-way and constructionstandards were assumed. This language wasincorporated in the final Voorhees report published

‘ in January 1971.

The best selling points in the transit packagepresented to voters in 1971 were not the rapid railproposals. The plan called for short-range busservice improvements in addition to the long-rangerapid rail scheme. Instead of the unpopularproperty tax, a sales tax was to be used forfinancing the local contribution toward the cost ofimplementing the plan. One of the key provisionsin these efforts to get black support for the systemdespite the regressive character of the sales taxwas to peg the fares of the bus system at 15 centsfor 7 years. 13

The 15-cent fare illustrates better than any otherpart of MARTA’s 1971 transit package thechanging balance of power within Atlanta’spolitical community. The election of 1969 installedthe first mayor in decades who was not part ofAtlanta’s business-oriented power structure. SamMassell, the new mayor, was Jewish, and his vice-mayor, Maynard Jackson, was a black. Masse{l’spredecessor, Ivan Allen, had been an importantfigure in the transit effort since his days aschairman of the Chamber of Commerce and hissubsequent election to mayor in 1961. As abusinessman, Allen had strengthened the base ofsupport for transit by building ties with thebusiness leaders. At the same time, his positionamong the power elite was reflected in a transitprogram that alienated the blacks and inner cityAtlantans. The new liberal leadership in 1971backed a transit improvement program tailored tobenefit lower-income communities as well assuburban commuters and shoppers, who were themain concerns of the businessmen. As a result, anew list of community organizations joined the

I z The prator “Street line remained a busway proposal untilafter the 1968 referendum, when public pressure succeeded inconvincing MARTA to change to rail.

13 The plan permitted fares to be raised 5 cents per year to aX)-cent maximum after 7 years. In 1981 the sales tax would dropto % cent, and fares would be set at a rate that would cover halfof the operating expenses.

traditional civic groups —the Chamber of Com-merce, Central Atlanta Progress, and otherbusiness/civic organizations—in support of a rapidrail system for Atlanta.

The plan MARTA sent to the polls in November1971 showed 56.2 miles of rapid rail routes in fourcounties and 14,4 miles of dual lane busway. Votersin Clayton and Gwinnett counties defeated theproposition soundly. They may have been reactingto the fact that only 9 miles of the rapid rail transitwould have served these two suburban counties.Affluent De Kalb County voted in favor. In FultonCounty a recount showed the margin of approval tobe a bare 400 votes.l4 It was a narrowly wonvictory. Had either Fulton or De Kalb countyturned the proposition down, the rail transit planwould have been doomed.

The 1971 vote of support represented a triumphfor Atlanta city interests. In fact, the way theballots were tabulated favored the city vote. In 1968the returns from Fulton and De Kalb counties werecounted in three groups: residents of the cityproper, residents of Fulton County outside the city,and residents of De Kalb County outside the city. In1971 the tabulation followed county lines only, andthe city vote was counted in the totals for Fultonand De Kalb counties. This accounting allowed yesvotes from Atlanta proper, most of which is inFulton County, to be tabulated against no votesfrom the suburban part of Fulton County. As itturned out, the change in the tabulation proceduremay have been the key to the transit victory.Residents of the older parts of Fulton Countyoutside the center city opposed the issue, while thestrongest support came from the city itself.l5

14 Results of the 1971 transit referendum in Atlanta (prior tothe Fulton County recount, which narrowed the margin ofvictory to 400 votes):

PercentCounty Yes No Yes

Fulton . . . . . . . . . . 55,736 53,725 51De Kalb . . . . . . . . 39,441 36,100 52Clayton . . . . . . . . . 3,300 11,147 23Gwinnett . . . . . . . 2,500 9,506 21

Source: Malcolm Getz, The Incidence of Urban Transit in Atlanta,UMTA-sponsored urban transportation and urban affairsproject, Atlanta University School of Business Administration,1973.

I5 Ibid., p. 32.

19

PROGRESSTOWARD IMPLEMENTINGTHE RAPID TRANSIT PLAN

After citizens voted approval in the 1971referendum, MARTA turned its attention toreadying the transit system for construction. In thecourse of this period of final design, MARTA hasexperienced a variety of problems, most of whichare related to finances and to acceptance of thesystem plans at the neighborhood level.

Many of the issues have been addressed by theMetropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit OverviewCommittee (MARTOC). MARTOC was created bythe Georgia General Assembly in June 1973 tomonitor MARTA’s fiscal activities. The jointlegislative committee has sponsored legislationconsidered to be in MARTA’s interest and thus isan active participant in MARTA matters as well as arelatively objective observer.

The most critical issue facing MARTA involvedobtaining the Federal share for construction of therail transit system. Since the referendum, theconstruction cost has risen from $1.3 billion to over$2 billion as a result of delays and costly additions tothe system made since the 1971 vote. The expectedfigure for Federal assistance has risen with the risein the estimated cost and as the ceiling on theFederal share went from 66-2/3 percent to 80percent.

As of now, Atlanta has received $2OO millionfrom UMTA and in May 1975 was promised anadditional $600 million. Although this representsover 10 percent of the total UMTA budget forcapital assistance, it is considerably less than thefull Federal support Atlanta has counted on sincethe earliest days of planning, an assumption basedon alleged promises from John Volpe while he wasSecretary of Transportation. Therefore, manyAtlantans have been surprised and distressed at the$800 million ceiling UMTA has now set; this isenough money to build only 13.7 miles of theproposed 54-mile system approved in referendumin 1971 (assuming an 80 percent Federal-local shareratio). An additional disappointment came on theheels of UMTA’S first announcement when theFederal agency turned down MARTA’s request foran extra $200 million to add 4.7 miles to the 13,7-mile segment.

Publicly MARTA has welcomed the smaller levelof Federal aid, saying that half a loaf is better than

none (13.7 miles is slightly more than half thelength of the 26-mile system MARTA previouslyhad identified as a core system). MARTA figuresthat 10 percent of the total UMTA assistance toU.S. cities is a fairly hefty share, even if it will buyonly 13.7 miles of rapid transit. However, reactionin Atlanta has been strong. One publisher whosepapers strongly supported MARTA in the 1971referendum said, “I am just discouraged by theslowness and the increased cost. I think a referen-dum on MARTA today would fail 2 to 1. I feel guiltybecause [my newspapers] supported MARTA. Wewould still support it, but we would not take theleading position we did.”l6

MARTA’s financial woes are compounded by theweakness of its local financing. The revenues fromthe 1 percent sales tax in the last fiscal year rose lessthan 1 percent, whereas MARTA had budgeted fora 10 percent increase. And MARTA has hinted thatit might be forced to raise the 15-cent bus fare.MARTA’s general manager Alan Kiepper said, “Ifwe are faced with a situation where we have tomake a choice between reducing service and raisingthe fare, it would seem to me that the only choicewould be to raise the fare. ”17

In the meantime, MARTA has been makingprogress toward construction. Land has beenacquired and construction has been scheduledalong much of the east-west corridor betweenHightower and Avondale. The plans have receiveda mixed welcome at the neighborhood level. Afterthe referendum MARTA commissioned an assess-ment of the environmental impact of the rail transitsystem. Following this step MARTA, the AtlantaRegional Commission (ARC),lS and the City ofAtlanta began to collaborate on a procedure formaking station area development plans. Thestation area planning process has been moresuccessful at some sites than at others. In someareas citizens have taken MARTA to court todemand environmental impact reviews wherestation plans have been changed since the referen-dum.

MARTA hopes to have service on the east line ofthe rapid rail system by 1979. However, MARTAstill faces severe problems ahead as it tries to matchinelastic Federal funds with spiraling costs. Onecurrent dispute centers around the length of time

‘“ “Atlanta’s Transit Trauma,” Business Week, August 18,1975.1P [bid+la In 1971 the Atlanta Regional Commission was created to

replace the Atlanta Region Metropolitan Planning Commission.

20

—

that transit construction will disrupt traffic on the closed to business. This issue has not been resolved.main business street, Peachtree Street. MARTA MARTA points out that its proposed method is thealways has planned to use a “cut-and-cover” cheapest available, while some elements of themethod of construction. There has been an uproar, business community predict widespread bankrupt-however, since the business community found that cy of downtown businesses unless an expensivesome sections of Peachtree Street would not be tunneling technique is used instead of cut-and-covered for up to 2-1/22 years, and therefore would be cover construction.

21

Chronology of the Transit Planning Process

1950 Atlanta’s Metropolitan Planning Com-mission published Up Ahead, a regionalplan that recognized a need for transit inthe long range.

1954 An update of the 1950 MetropolitanPlanning Commission plan called NOW@Tomorrow noted the need for rapid transit“within a few years. ”

1959 The Metropolitan Planning Commissionpublished t wo expressway policyreports, “Access to Central Atlanta” and“Crosstown and Bypass Expressway s,”recommending that transit planningstart immediately.

1960 In August, Atlanta’s private transitcompany, the Atlanta Transit System,released Rapid Ailanta, proposing a $59million 16-mile rapid transit system onexisting rail rights-of-way. Downtowndistribution would be provided with a“carveyor” conveyor-type, second-levelsystem. A self-supporting transitauthority was proposed to build and ownthes system, with Atlanta Transit Systemcontracted as operations manager.

In September, the Atlanta RegionMetropolitan Planning Commission (afive-county agency that replaced theMetropolitan Planning Commission in1960) issued a discussion report, WhatYou Should Know About Rapid Transit. Fortycommunity meetings followed askingfor public input in developing theforthcoming transit plan, due one yearlater.

1961 I n J u n e , t h e A t l a n t a RegionMetropolitan Planning Commissionpublished the Atlanta Region ComprehensivePlan—Rapid Transit, calling for a 60-mile,32-station, $215 million system. Theplan recommended creation of a regionaltransit authority.

A regional conference of civic andelected leaders hosted b y G e o r g i aGovernor Ernest Vandiver in Novembercreated a regional Rapid Transit Steer-

ing Committee to pursue transit-enabling legislation in the GeorgiaGeneral Assembly,

1962 In April, the legislature created theMetropolitan Atlanta Transit StudyCommission (MATSC) to undertake astudy program to report the need,advisability, and economic feasibility ofrapid mass transportation of passengers.MATSC hired Parsons, Brinckerhoff,Quade and Douglas to plan.

In November, an amendment to theState constitution to allow the Georgialegislature to delegate transit planningand operating authority to cities andcounties was defeated in a statewidereferendum.

In December, MATSC published itsreport, A Plan and Program of Rapid Transitfor the Atlanta Metropolitan Region. T h ereport recommended a 66-mile, five-count y rail system at a cost of$292,000,000.

1963 In January, Atlanta’s transit leadersformed the Rapid Transit Committee of100 to undertake a full-scale publicrelations campaign promoting rapidtransit.

In March, the Georgia legislaturecreated the Georgia State Study Com-mission on Rapid Transit to work onbehalf of rapid transit for Atlanta afterthe Metropolitan Atlanta Transit StudyCommission disbanded.

1964 In November, an amendment to theState constitution enabling Atlanta toplan and operate mass transit w a sapproved in referendum. Unlike the1962 situation when a statewidereferendum was held, in 1964 the issuewas submitted to Atlanta region votersonly.

1965 In March, the Metropolitan AtlantaRapid Transit Authority Act passed the

23

1966

1967

1968

Georgia State legislature. The MARTAAct created a regional authority but gaveno powers of taxation or eminent do-main.

In June, local referenda were held toratify participation in MARTA. Fulton,De Kalb, Clayton and Gwinnett Coun-ties voted to participate in MARTA; onlyCobb County elected to stay out.

MARTA, created by Georgia legislaturein March 1965, began operating i nJanuary.

In May, the Atlanta Transit Systemunder president Robert Somervilleissued a report recommending a 32-milenetwork of exclusive busways to provide“interim” transit service until comple-tion of rail transit construction. MAR-TA rejected the proposal after a hasty 3-week review.

Also that spring the General Assemblydefeated a set of legislative amendmentsto the MARTA Act that would haveeased financing of the system.

In September, the Atlanta RegionMetropolitan Planning Commission, onbehalf of MARTA, published an updateof the 1962 rail transit plan called RapidTransit for Metropolitan Atlanta. The authorwas t h e c o n s o r t i u m Pars ons,Brinckerhoff-Tudor-Bechtel. The planrecommended a 54-mile, four-countyrail system plus an n-mile futureextension into Cobb County at a totalcost of $421 million.

In January, the newly reconstitutedPolicy Committee of the Atlanta AreaTransportation Study hired Alan M.Voorhees & Associates to develop acomprehensive, long-range regionaltransportation plan. The study wasintended to resolve the busway versusrail controversy generated by the RapidBusways proposal. It was also designed tocomply with UMTA requirements.

In March , the At lanta RegionMetropolitan Planning Commissionpublished The Impactvzpacf of Rapid Transit onAtalnta, The UMTA-sponsored studyanalyzed the effects the rapid transitproposal would have on land use.

In April, an amendment to simplify andstrengthen the MARTA Act passed theGeorgia General Assembly 150 to 51 andwas vetoed by Governor Lester G.Maddox.

In November, MARTA presented a40.3-mile, four-county $750 milliontransit proposal to Atlanta regionvoters, over 55 percent of whom votedno.

1969 In April, the Voorhees team submittedits recommendations to the PolicyCommittee of the AATS, the organiza-tion originally created to coordinatetransportation planning in the region.The draft plan called for a $475 millionpackage consisting of 10 miles of rapidrail, 54 miles of busways, new ex-pressways, and street improvements.

1n May, the AATS Policy Committeedesignated the Voorhees report as theguide for all agencies to use in develop-ing priorities and implementation plans,and requested MARTA and the StateHighway Department to take the lead ininitiating studies that would enable theAATS Policy Committee to reachdecisions on priorities, implementation,and financing.

In August, the MARTA board adopted a2-year work program that includedfurther work on the Voorhees report,refinement of an adopted system in thesame detail as the 1968 plan, a newfinancial plan, and a public informationprogram.

In October, MARTA completed a studyon the possible use of existing railroadtracks for interim commuter service.The study found that, while the conceptwas technically possible, the many gradecrossings, side-tracks, existing trainschedules, slow speeds, and highoperating costs ruled out any suchinterim service.

1970 In January, the AATS Policy Committeerejected the Voorhees study proposal toput busways in the east-west corridor.

In October, MARTA formally declaredits intention to acquire the Atlanta

24

1971

Transit System as early as possibleunder terms to be mutually negotiated.

In January, the final Voorhees report,Development and Evaluation of a Recommended‘Transportation System for the Atalnta Region,was published. The report said both railand bus could provide the needed serviceon the east-west line; they would attractequal ridership; and fixed costs for buswould equal those for rail if three buslanes were built in accordance withMARTA engineering standards.

In March, Governor Jimmy Cartersigned three transit bills passed by theGeneral Assembly. One bill amendedthe Georgia sales tax law to permit alocal sales and use tax for rapid transitpurposes; a second bill authorized a 1percent local sales and use tax inmetropolitan Atlanta for rapid transitpurposes; and the third bill modified andclarified certain provisions in theoriginal MARTA Act.

In August, MARTA adopted a rapidtransit proposal outlined in the Parsons,Brinckerhoff-Tudor- Bechtel reportcalled Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid TransitPlan published in September. The planproposed 56 miles of rapid rail, 14 milesof busways, and 1,530 route miles ofsurface bus operations at a total cost of$1.3 billion.

In the November referendum, De Kalband Fulton county voters authorized a 1-cent increase in the sales tax to imple-ment the transit plan and to makeimprovements in the highway system.

The key selling point was the provisionto reduce bus fares from 40 cents to 15cents.

1972 1n February, MARTA purchased theAtlanta Transit System for $ 1 2 . 8million.

In March, the City of Atlanta adopted aset of goals, policies, and developmentobjectives for MARTA station areas.

In November, MARTA released a draftEnvironmental Impact Statementassessing the transit system. MARTAclaims the EIS process, the first for anUMTA project, delayed its schedule by 1year.

1973 In May, the City of Atlanta PlanningDepartment published the UrbanFramework Concept Plan, which laid forththe process the city would follow instation area development planning.

In June, the Georgia General Assemblycreated the Metropolitan Atlanta RapidTransit Overview Committee.

1974 MARTA continued final design on coreportions of the rail system.

1975 Groundbreaking took place in February.

In May, UMTA offered $600 millioncontract authority to MARTA for a 6-year period, pending Congressionalapproval in appropriations hearings.Because this sum (plus $2OO million inearlier capital grants) will build only 13.7miles of rapid rail, MARTA requested anadditional $2OO million. In June UMTAdenied the request.

25

INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

Atlanta has taken important steps towardcreating an effective institutional structure forregional transportation planning. 19 The traditionof control by a business elite has given way to amore responsive approach to government. Aregional planning agency has been given the meansto coordinate all modes of transportation planningwith regional comprehensive planning. Localjurisdictions are plugged into transportation/landuse planning through studies of the developmentimpact of future transit stations. A special institu-tion in the legislature allows Atlanta State transitplanning to be monitored from a statewideperspective. The most important shortcoming inAtlanta’s institutional arrangement is that themodal agencies (MARTA and GDOT) negotiatedecisions primarily within the forum of thetransportation subcommittee of the regionalplanning agency, out of the public view.

Forum for Decisionmaking

The adequacy of the decisionmaking forum hasimproved significantly over the 15-year period oftransit planning in Atlanta. In the beginning,transit decisionmaking took place outside officialchannels because there were none. Since then acomparatively well-integrated regional forum hasbeen created. Rivalry between modal agencies hasdiminished considerably in recent years. Perhapsmost importantly, transit planning in Atlanta is stilldistinguished by the relatively close relationshipbetween regional comprehensive planning andtransportation planning.

In the early 1960’s Georgia State law forbade anylocal or regional public agency to finance transitstudies without an enabling amendment to theState constitution. (The transit plan produced bythe Atlanta Region Metropolitan Planning Com-

Assessment of the Planning andDecisionmaking Process

19 Frank C. Colcord, Jr, and Steven M. Polan have published acareful analysis of Atlanta’s institutional arrangements fortransportation planning in Urban Transportation Decisionmaking:Atlanfa Case Study, U.S. Department of Transportation,September 1974.

mission was authorized because it was an elementof the regional comprehensive plan. 20) The stagewas thus set in the beginning for private sectororganizations to dominate the planning process.

After local officials, their supporters fromdowntown Atlanta civic ”groups, and the AtlantaRegional Metropolitan Planning Commissiondecided to pursue transit seriously, the decision-making forum for several years was fragmentedbetween the State legislature, ARMPC, and thecivic leaders. The Metropolitan Atlanta TransitStudy Commission reported to the legislature butturned over technical responsibilities to ARMPC. Anumber of special organizationszl were created tobring together the public and private leaders whowere taking an active interest in transit.

The establishment of MARTA was an importantstep toward informed regional decisionmaking.Technical planning functions were still handled byARMPC, but MARTA’s board of representativesfrom jurisdictions in the region had final say onpolicy. The agency could receive and dispensefunds, although it was not empowered with taxingauthority or the right of eminent domain.

MARTA provided a transit decisionmakingforum, but an effective comprehensive transporta-tion planning institution still was lacking. TheAtlanta Area Transportation Study (AATS) wascreated in 1965 to take responsibility for coor-dinating the transportation planning in the region,but it concentrated on highway work. Its fundscame from the State Highway Department (SHD).After MARTA came on the scene, the AATS PolicyCommittee was reconstituted to include MARTAas well as representatives from regional jurisdic-tions, SHD, and ARMPC. The Policy Committee’smission to improve cooperation and coordinationamong the organizations responsible for transpor-tation planning, however, was only partiallysuccessful.

zo Atlanta Region Comprehen$lve plan: Rapid Transit, Atlanta RegionMetropolitan Planning Commission, June 1961.

21 Joint Steering Committee, 1961; committee of 100, 1 9 6 2 .

27

SHD and MARTA continued to make decisionsoutside the new forum. For example, in 1968MARTA decided to test the transit proposal at thepolls before the Policy Committee’s review (theVoorhees study) of regional transportation plan-ning was complete. ARMPC lacked the, stature toassume its logical role as arbiter in such matters.ARMPC was run by appointed businessmen, hadno regional budget, and never attained credibility y asa power to be reckoned with,

The new regional organization created by theGeneral Assembly in 1971 was designed to providea truly multimodal forum for transportationpolicymaking. The Atlanta Regional Commission isdesignated the 3-C organization and the A-95review agency in the region. 22 To date ARC hasfunctioned fairly well as a comprehensive regionalplanning body with responsibility for transporta-tion.

Nevertheless, critics have noted ARC’s short-comings. First, there is considerable competitionwithin ARC for the power to make transportationdecisions. The procedure for shaping transporta-tion policy was established in a tripartite (MARTA,GDOT, ARC) agreement at the time the AATS wasterminated and ARC established. The process,called the Atlanta Region Transportation PlanningProgram (ARTPP), was recently amended toinclude Atlanta’s mayor and the commissionchairmen of the seven ARC counties. Its embodi-ment is the Transportation Policy Subcommittee(TPS) of ARC. In theory all policy decisions aremade in this subcommittee and subjected to reviewby the Community Development Planning LiaisonCommittee, one of the three subject area com-mittees to which ARC board members are assign-ed.23 Members of the transportation subgroup ofthe Community Development Planning CitizenAdvisory Council also review TPS recommen-dations. The ARC Board of Commissioners gives afinal review and is designated to arbitrate when therecommendations of the subgroups disagree.

In practice the TPS, not ARC, has provided theforum for most policymaking. Disagreements areusually worked out in TPS rather than at the ARCboard level. The Georgia Department of Transpor-tation (GDOT) Action Plan lends legitimacy to thispractice by stating that TPS has ultimate decision-making authority.

22 See footnotes 3, 4 p. 8.23 The others are Health and %cia] Services planning Liaison

Committee and Governmental Services Liaison Committee.

ARC’s board reviews the annual transportationwork program and sets priorities among itselements. To date MARTA and GDOT have notstrictly followed the priorities ARC had set. Onereason ARC does not dominate may be that it stillhas not published its updated regional developmentguide. (The plan was due in summer 1975.) Theguide is expected to provide a rationale for priorityordering and, once priorities are drawn up, a logicfor enforcing them.

Another more important explanation for ARC’sback-seat role is the tradition of mutualbackscratching that is well established in Atlantatransportation politics. MARTA usually has sup-ported GDOT’S (and predecessor SDH’S) highwayinitiatives, just as the highway organizations havestood behind transit. No dispute between the twomodal agencies has surfaced as a major public issue,in spite of internal policy and technical disputesover the years. ARC usually goes along with bothMARTA and GDOT, and neither of the latteragencies tends to welcome ARC suggestions forchange when they do come.

In practice, the ARC-ARTPP process hasoperated smoothly. The ARC agency is legislativelymandated, financed by regional levy, and isgenerally a more credible institution than itspredecessor. Although modal biases have shown upin decisionmaking from time to time, the structureoffers the distinct advantage of bringing transpor-tation decisionmaking under the same roof as landuse planning. ARC has taken the lead in develop-ment planning around future rail transit stations.Theoretically, the ARC board will begin measuringtransportation proposals against land use goals assoon as the regional development guide is com-pleted. The most significant—and potentiallydebilitating—limit to ARC’s power to control landuse development is its lack of authority to reviewlocal zoning regulations.

Accountability of Decisionmakers

Over the years the individuals responsible fortransit decisionmaking in Atlanta have becomemore directly accountable for their actions. Few ofthe early transit decisionmakers in Atlanta official-ly represented the region’s citizens. The situationbegan to change in the 1960’s, and since 1971 theinstitutional structure has involved decision makerswhose authority to make decisions on behalf of aparticular group of citizens is comparatively clearlydesignated,

28

Nevertheless, two major issues involving ac-countability are inherent in Atlanta’s institutionalframework for transit decisionmaking. First,although decision making bodies are structured toencourage a regional point of view, individuals tendto represent the narrower political interests of theconstituent jurisdictions. Second, because manydecisions are negotiated in the TransportationPolicy Subcommittee of the ARC, the process tendsto be removed from the public view.

The business and civic leaders who led the drivefor transit during the early 1960’s were not directlyaccountable for their decisions. They were acting asprivate citizens. The Rapid Transit SteeringCommittee, whose members were officials of thearea’s political subdivisions, was the first organiza-tion to operate with clearly delegated authority anda degree of accountability. Members of theMetropolitan Atlanta Transit Study Commissionalso bore a clearly described responsibility to thepublic by virtue of their appointment by localofficials. Members of the ARMPC board wereappointed businessmen; the ARMPC staff providedmost of that agency’s transit leadership.

Fair representation has been an issue in Atlantatransit planning since the beginning. Debate mostoften has focused on the appropriate compositionof the regional transit authority. MARTA’s tenboard members are appointed by local officials.Office holders were ruled ineligible in order tominimize the influence of local politics on decision-making. Nevertheless, each member comes fromand is associated with a particular county or the cityof Atlanta. The State legislature, through theMARTA Overview Committee (MARTOC), iscurrently giving consideration to the advantagesand disadvantages of a directly elected board, butno action is expected to be taken in the near term.MARTOC is behind a movement to increase therepresentation from De Kalb County on MARTA’sboard. At present six board members represent thecity of Atlanta’s interest—the four membersappointed by the Mayor plus the two from FultonCounty. De Kalb County accounts for 40 percent ofMARTA’s sales tax revenues but is represented byonly two board members. Options that have beensuggested for changing the balance include addingnew De Kalb representatives to the board andreplacing the existing delegates from Clayton andGwinnett Counties with De Kalb representatives.Clayton and Gwinnett citizens voted againstfinancing the MARTA rail system in the 1971referendum and therefore do not participate in the

transit improvement program; yet they retainvoting representation on the MARTA board. TheState legislature approved a compromise measureduring the 1975 session to add one more De Kalbrepresentative to the board. The bill was vetoed bythe Governor on a technicality, but MARTOCexpects the issue to arise again in 1976.

MARTOC itself adds a degree of accountabilityto the transit planning process in Atlanta. It is ajoint committee of State senators and represent-atives with a staff. In theory, MARTOC functionsmore as a watchdog for the public interest than as abody of officials directly accountable to Atlantacitizens. The enabling legislation requires only 4 ofthe 14 voting legislators that sit on MARTOC to befrom the area of MARTA jurisdiction. However, all11 of the appointed committee members~~ werechosen from among Atlanta area legislators due topolitical considerations.

MARTOC has exercised its ombudsman func-tion in several ways. As noted, MARTOC isconcerned with the accountability of the MARTAboard. MARTOC also is monitoring the degree towhich MARTA follows the advice of its consultantsrather than its staff. MARTOC wants to keep thereins tight on PB-T-B to prevent further costoverruns and other difficulties. MARTOC’S con-cern has increased since the turnover in theMARTA board in November 1974. The old boardtended to follow staff recommendations. The newboard hopes to take a more active role in order toincrease its responsiveness to the public. In early1975 the board voted to side with PB-T-B againstthe MARTA staff on the critical issue of theautomated train control system. The staffrecommended semiautomation that could beupgraded to full automation when a large enoughportion of the system was on line to justify theconsiderable extra cost. PB-T-B, developers of thecontrol system, argued for full automation fromthe beginning. Although the board went on recordin favor of the PB-T-B system, the recent decisionto build a 13.7-mile trunk system instead of 26miles inspired a change of heart. In June 1975 theboard reversed i t se l f and approved asemiautomated system for the initial rail segment.

24 The Governor appoints six members, the president of thesenate appoints three, and the speaker of the house appoints twomembers; the remaining three members are chairmen of threecommittees, The lieutenant governor and the speaker of thehouse are ex officio members of MARTOC.

29

The structure of the ARC also gives rise toimportant accountability issues. The fact that mostdisagreements are worked out in the Transporta-tion Policy Subcommittee of the ARC means thatmany important policy decisions take place behindthe scenes. In addition, the fact that all members ofthe ARC’s board of commissioners are eithercounty and city officials or private citizens ap-pointed by the elected officials jeopardizes theARC’s goal of offering a regional perspective. For inpractice many of the board members bear allegianceto the jurisdictions that appoint them rather thanto the regions as a whole. Therefore, to the extentthat the transit policy is shaped in the ARCTransportation Policy Subcommittee, it is theproduct of decisionmakers with local and mode-oriented interests.

Public Involvement

The effectiveness of citizen participation hasfigured as a prominent issue in Atlanta transitplanning since the preparations for the 1968referendum. MARTA’s failure to bring the publicinto the decisionmaking process except in aperfunctionary way was cited as a major reason forthe defeat of the transit issue in 1968. Conversely,much of the credit for the 1971 success wasattributed to MARTA’s vigorous communityrelations campaign. Since 1971, however, a numberof citizen groups have been expressing dissatisfac-tion with aspects of the MARTA program forpublic participation.

The dominating role of civic leaders in pre-1970Atlanta transit planning does not imply involve-ment of the general public. To the contrary, most ofthe protransit interests were businessmen with aconcern for upgrading Atlanta’s business district.They were not transit consumers. 25

Planners waited until 1968 to initiate a formalprocess of citizen involvement. Even then therewas no vehicle for citizen input provided by theARMPC. MARTA had begun an informal publicinformation and education program shortly afterthe agency was created in 1966. The approach useda monthly newsletter, slide shows, and speeches,

25 They were in fact highway consumers. Transit was the keyto strengthening downtown, but transit ranked second placebelow highways in the Chamber of Commerce’s list of prioritycivic projects in 1960. Antihighway citizen activists havecommented scathingly that the business community seemed towant transit service for their maids and uncontested newfreeways for their own travel.

but it reached an audience composed mostly ofbusinessmen, civic leaders, and public figures—notthe general public. MARTA scheduled the formalpublic hearings required by its enabling legislationto occur at the end of the planning process, afterpreliminary engineering had been done and theplans had been presented to local jurisdictions.

Twelve hearings were held in April and May of1968. Citizen testimony at one of the hearings ledto reconsideration of a route alternative and to anadditional hearing on the segment in question. Theopinions expressed resulted in a number of minorchanges in the proposed system. However, nomajor changes, such as were recommended in thetransit impact study, came about as a result of thehearings. Many blacks in particular were angeredby being solicited for their views at such a late date.

The black community had been expressinggrowing dissatisfaction with the transit proposal asthe 1968 election approached. Their complaintscentered on their lack of involvement throughoutthe planning process and on the inadequate serviceto poor black neighborhoods. Blacks voiced disap-proval as early as 1966, when the SummitLeadership Conference threatened to opposeMARTA unless service to black communities wasimproved. In spring 1968, after the transit impactstudy had been published, the Summit LeadershipConference reiterated its threat of nonsupport.Other criticisms were aimed at MARTA’s minorityhiring practices and the lack of representation onMARTA’s board. (There was one black on theboard at the time, a banker.) In October 1968 anumber of black civic organizations, including theSummit Leadership Conference and the NAACP,jointed in public opposition to the transit proposal,arguing that their requests for changes had beenignored. Their constituencies agreed, and theMARTA issue was defeated in every precinct thathad a black majority.

By 1971 MARTA had made significant im-provements in its approach to public participation.A total of three blacks sat on the board. A minorityhiring program had added blacks to the MARTAstaff. The 60-person Citizens’ TransportationAdvisory Council mandated by law included 24blacks, and MARTA staff periodically met with thecouncil. As the year progressed MARTA began awide-reaching community information campaignthat included a great number of public forums andneighborhood meetings. A black public relationsfirm was hired to run the campaign. Overall,

30

MARTA’s more sensitive attitude toward blacksand the urban poor community in general—reflected in route and station changes, the short-term bus program, and the 15-cent fare as well as inprogress within the citizen participation process—was an important ingredient in MARTA’s successat the polls in 1971. The need to get support fromthis segment of the public is widely cited as thereason MARTA elected to keep rail service on theeast-west corridor and to extend a link to the PerryHomes development.

S i n c e 1 9 7 1 M A R T A ’ s s t a n d i n g w i t hneighborhood groups has lowered. Citizens whoonce gave hearty support to transit raise com-plaints as detailed plans are made to build in theirneighborhoods. The situation is ironic, sinceMARTA appears to have grown increasinglyresponsive to local groups as the implementationprocess advances.

The Impact Council is one of the organizedcitizen groups bringing such charges. The Council,based at Atlanta University, acts as a citizens’advocate and referral service on questions ofrelocation. The Impact Council has been accused of

being more concerned with confrontation withMARTA than with resolution of conflicts, but itacts as a forum for the low-income black communi-ty to voice its concerns.

Most of the controversy involves station areadevelopment. ARC has delegated responsibility forstation area planning to local jurisdictions. In someareas the process has been well received to date, butit is being challenged in other areas. The AshbyStreet Station on the west line is an example of asuccessful planning effort. A local politician with agrass roots constituency was the catalyst for agenuinely participatory process there. The dramathat has unfolded around the Decatur StreetStation illustrates a less happy situation. TheDecatur “charrette”26 of approximately 2 years agowas heralded as a successful application of apioneering technique for melding consensus fromthe diverse group of individuals concerned with thefate of the Decatur Station and its neighborhood.Now the Decatur plan is tied up in three lawsuits

26 T’he ~harrette technique brings people Witti a wide range ofinterests together in a marathon session to iron out differences.

Artist’s sketch of MARTA’s Grant Street station

31

centering around the allegations that the cityarranged for the charrette to be held in closedsession and that it did not include residents andmerchants whose homes and businesses will betaken.

This and other experiences have sullied MAR-TA’s reputation for encouraging effective citizeninvolvement. In addition, Atlanta citizens havebecome concerned with the adequacy of the publicliaison at ARC and other forums. ARC establisheda Citizen Transportation Advisory Task Force tochannel public comments on transportation issues.The mechanism proved inadequate. The Task Forcehad been comprised of 30 citizens chosen by localofficials. Some were establishment businessmen,others were neighborhood activists appointed fortheir interest in transportation issues; the twofactions could not work well together. They wereconstrained by ARC from addressing somematters. The Task Force has been replaced by threea d v i so ry councils covering different “transportation-related subjects. Participants areappointed on the basis of a demonstrated interest inthe issues to be addressed by each council.

TECHNICAL PLANNING WORK

The quality of the technical planning work inAtlanta is generally regarded as having beenexcellent for its time. Yet more often than not itcame too early or too late to be optimally useful inguiding decisionmaking. The 1961 A R M P Cplanz~—an exception to this generalization—didhelp persuade policy makers decide to plan seriouslyfor transit. The technical study that resulted, 28however, came 6 years before the decision wasmade to implement a transit plan. The referendumvote in 1968 was held before the Voorheesalternatives study had reported conclusivelywhether rail was best. Ironically, when thetechnical and political processes finally coordinatedin 1971, the technical information showed too littledifference between the principal alternatives to be apersuasive factor in decisionmaking. In part thisambiguity was created out of political necessity.

Goals and Objectives

Atlanta began planning its transit system beforeformal goal-setting had become a conventional stepin planning. Nevertheless, a number of goals werearticulated from the beginning and were drawnupon to justify decisions if not to make them.

The fundamental goal in Atlanta transit planninghas been the desire to reduce traffic overload onhighways in the region. In addition, Atlanta’stransit planners have embraced the objectives ofchanneling regional growth and enhancing thecenter city. The 1961 ARMPC study and i tspredecessors in the 1950’s touched on all thesepoints. By 1971 the summary version of theofficially approved plan cites the same objectives—and adds explicit mention of the objective ofimproving mobility for transit dependents.

Since 1968 both MARTA and AATS have beenable to direct their transportation planning effortsin light of a set of regional development goals.ARMPC adopted a list of goals in April 1968. BothMARTA and AATS have acknowledged theirallegiance to several of these goals:29

● Encouragement of new growth that fitslocal and regional plans;

● Conservation of established areas;

● Clustering of new growth to avoid incom-patible uses; and

● Encouragement of a balanced transporta-tion system, allowing appropriate levels ofaccessibility y.

The AATS/Voorhees study process between 1968and 1971 was performed in light of a series of“implicit” objectives, according to the final report. soThe AATS work was partially supported byMARTA and undertook the most rigorous evalua-tion of transit proposals in the region. The AATSobjectives were listed as:

• Serving the transit dependent;

• Providing a good highway system to allparts of the region within constraints ofcost and community cohesion;

27 At/n ?Itfl Rfgjon Comprehension Plan: Rapid Transit, Atlanta RegionMetropolitan P]anning Commission, June 1961. IQ See AATS, Del,p[oprncflt a n d E v a l u a t i o n of a Recommmfai

28 A p/fl ?I U?IL/ pro~ratn of Rapid Transit for the Atlanta Metropolitan Transportation System for the Atlanta Region, 197 1; MARTA Draftl<r~lotl, Metropolitan Atlanta Transit Study Commission (Par- Respotlse—Guidelines for Capita/ Granl Se/e(tion, 7972.

sons, Brinkerhoff, Quade & Douglas), December 1962. JO AATS, /Jelle/oprnent and Eualualion, OP. cit.

32

● Providing an alternative to the privateautomobile in order to reduce congestionand give access to the CBD; and

● Focusing highway and transit access toencourage development centers a ttransportation “nodes. ”

Neither AATS nor MARTA developed a formalprocedure for using goals to assist in decision-making. The choices among alternatives were madeon the basis of which alternative produced greatestpatronage at least total cost rather than on whetherit would achieve particular goals. Indirectly,however, the goals were incorporated in thedecisionmaking process. Highest patronage wouldcome from areas designated as growth centers, andboth routes and stations were planned to serve asmany of these centers as feasible.

The twin goals of reducing congestion andcontrolling growth also have come into play in thestation area planning process. The City of Atlantaadopted a node growth/neighborhood preservationdevelopment policy in 1972. The city’s policiesincluded the following:

●

●

●

●

These

Make maximum use of rapid transit topromote mobility and reduce congestion;

Encourage multipurpose activity centersused day and night and discourage stripcommercial development;

Improve the urban environment throughurban design; and

Prohibit new industrial or commercialdevelopment near stations serving low-and medium-density residentia1neighborhoods.

policies have guided the city planningdepartment as it creates station area developmentplans.

Development and Evaluation of Alternatives

Until 1968 alternatives analysis in Atlanta transitplanning was grounded more in public debate thanin technical process. A conventional alternativesanalysis was not published until 1971. Thatevaluation was sufficiently competent technically

to compensate for the shortcomings of the past,although its findings were too ambiguous to guidedecisionmaking clearly.

No formal testing of alternative transit systemswas incorporated in ATS Rapid Atlanta or ARMPC

Rapid Transit plans in 1961. The MATSC plan in1962 briefly investigated improved bus serviceconcepts and the use of commuter rail but rejectedthese options in favor of rapid rail. The first seriouslook at an alternative concept occurred when ATScommissioned its own transit study in 1967.

That study, Rapid Busways, called for exclusivebusways along existing rail rights-of-way as aninterim solution to Atlanta’s transit needs. Thereport stated that about half of the guideways itproposed would later be converted to rail as part ofthe MARTA system. Yet the study also showedthat express buses on exclusive rights-of-way couldserve more people equally fast or faster than theproposed rail system. With this and similarstatements Rapid Busways made a good enough casefor building only busways—instead of rail—tointerest several public groups in the idea. Thus thedebate on alternatives began.

Support for the busways concept came fromfiscal conservatives such as Alderman Millikin anda number of people in the Chamber of Commerce.An incipient rail versus highway controversybecame an underlying issue, however. RobertSomerville, architect of Rapid Busways and head ofthe Atlanta Transit System bus company, hadcritized MARTA for opposing a balanced transpor-tation approach. MARTA allegedly had not giventhoughtful attention to feeder buses; a map in theMARTA public relations document Rapid TransitNow showed feeder bus routes where no streetsexisted. MARTA also demonstrated an apparentprotransit bias by dismissing the Rapid Busways ideaafter a hasty 3-week review.

The Busways report was a contributing factor inthe decision to commission the AATS comprehen-sive transportation study in 1967. consultant AlanM. Voorhees & Associates undertook a thoroughevaluation of alternative system concepts that wasnot completed by the time of the 1968 referendumvote. This fact created the impression that MARTAwas asking for public commitment to a plan thatwas not finished, and it thus helped bring theMARTA proposal to defeat.

The Voorhees/AATS 1971 final report calledDevelopment and Evaluation of a Recommended Transporta-tion System for fhe Atlanta Region described the resultsof comparative evaluation of five basic transporta-tion systems: (1) an expanded bus system usingexisting highways; (2) the 66-mile MARTA systempresented in spring 1968; (3) a 31-mile system of

33

exclusive busways like the one proposed in RapidBusways; (4) a 66-mile system using rail only in thenorth-south corridor and express bus elsewhere;(5) a 65-mile busway system. These comprise arelatively broad range of alternatives for that time.None of the light rail or priority bus laneapproaches that are popular today, however, weretreated by the Voorhees study. Their absence isunderstandable. The streetcar era had passed toorecently for light rail to be taken seriously. And atthat time no precedent existed for giving busespriority over cars on the same right-of-way; theidea simply was not considered practical. 31

Political considerations did not enter theVoorhees process of selecting and evaluatingalternatives, but they did influence the wayMARTA used the Voorhees findings. The resultsof the Voorhees evaluation were first published in1969. 32 That report recommended 54 miles ofbusway and 10 miles of rapid rail. The AATS PolicyCommittee designated the Voorhees report as theguide for all agencies to use in developing prioritiesand implementation plans. Meanwhile MARTAasked for further work from Voorhees beforepublishing the final report. Although MARTAhoped rail would look better this time, Voorheescontinued to recommend busways for the east-west corridor in the draft of its final report. Thedraft was not widely circulated, and UMTA refersto it as the “suppressed report.”

Although the draft was not in fact suppressed, itsrecommendations were changed allegedly underpressure from MARTA. The final text was moreambiguous on the bus-rail issue. MARTA arguedbusways need a third “breakdown” lane for safetyreasons. The cost of the extra lane inflated theVoorhees’ busway figures to more nearly ap-proximate rail costs. The language of the Voorheesreport was amended to say that both bus and railcould provide needed service on the east-west line;that buses would attract the same ridership as railat a somewhat lower cost; but that the cost wouldbe the same if greater construction and safety

31 SeVera] members of the UMTA staff who were reviewingthe technical process in Atlanta grew curious about the prioritybus alternative. Using the Voorhees numbers, they adjusted theassumptions and got a rough estimate that total operating costson the east-west corridor would have been 50 percent less ifpriority bus lanes had been substituted for the exclusive buswayproposal.

32 5UMmflrY ~~ Hig A/lght$: Recommended Transportation program, ALM_IM. Voorhees & Associates, Inc., April 1969.

standards were adhered to for buses as shown inthe MARTA/PB-T-B preliminary engineeringreport. Most observers agree the changes weremotivated by political necessity. The black com-munities along the east-west line would not havesupported a plan that offered them “second-class”bus service while giving whites “first-class” railservice.

MARTA drew heavily on the Voorhees alter-natives evaluation when it applied for its firstcapital grant from UMTA.JJ In its applicationMARTA offered two reasons for its decision todrop its east-west busway concept. First, it pointedout that the Technical Coordinating Committee ofARC-ARTPPJQ had voted against busways and forrail in April 1970 because of restrictions to long-range service expansion and the technical problemsincumbent in locating a large underground buswaytransfer in downtown Atlanta’s narrow “gulch. ”Second, MARTA explained that an all-rail trunksystem (with busway feeders) was judged to bebetter than a mixed rail-bus concept because it (1)would require fewer transfers and hence would be“more functional and desirable’’ 35; (2) would attractmore patronage largely because of the transferissue; and (3) was slightly less expensive perpassenger. MARTA also presented as rejectedalternatives a 1969 commuter rail study 36 and a1971 analysis of the “no-build” alternative. 37 Thealternatives package thus was relatively com-prehensive and the comparative evaluationrelatively convincing.

Following a November 1971 MARTA boardresolution, MARTA (with ARC and represent-atives from local governments) undertook anenvironmental assessment of the already adoptedsystem. The procedure followed requirements ofthe National Environmental Policy Act of 1970 andtherefore presented and evaluated alternatives tothe proposed system at points where it was found

33 see Draft R e s p o n s e - G Uidelines for capttal G r a n t Selection,Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, September1972.

34 The Technical Coordinating Committee is comprised oftechnical staff representatives from ARC, MARTA, and DOTand should not be confused with its policymaking counterpart,the Transportation Policy Subcommittee.

35 MARTA Dra)t Response, op. cit., p. 96.36 prejlmlnary study Of Commufer Railroad Feasibility for Atlanta

A4etropolitan Region, MARTA, 1969.37 Benefits to the Atlanta Metropolitan Area from the Proposed Regional

Transportation Program, prepared for MARTA by DevelopmentResearch Associates, December 1971.

34

to threaten significant environmental disruption.In fact, most alternatives discussed wererecapitulations of the Voorhees alternativesanalysis. The study identified few major en-vironmental problems serious enough to call fordevising new alternatives. Severe problems werefound at only seven points of intrusion in areas ofecological value, and MARTA agreed to routechanges at four of these points and to put linesunderground in two other parks. With almost two-thirds of the system following existing railroadrights-of-way, the proposal was judged to threatenlittle damage to neighborhoods and communityservices or to historic sites. The environmentalassessment did not challenge the overall plan anddid not evaluate alternative route configurations ormodes of transportation.

Financing and Implementation

Financing issues have influenced Atlanta’stransit planning at several critical points since 1960.Chief among these issues have been (1) thedifficulty of obtaining Federal capital assistance inrecent years, (2) setbacks in guaranteeing the localshare, and (3) escalating construction cost es-timates. The net effect of these obstacles has beento scale down the first phase transit system to askeletal 13.7 miles.

The Atlanta system will be the first major newrapid rail transit project to come on line with the aidof UMTA funds. Since the beginning of transitplanning in Atlanta, the expectation of Federalmoney, and the difficulty in getting it, haveinfluenced decision making.

As early as 1961 the ARMPCplan mentioned theFederal transit funding policies that were underconsideration at that time. It compared the existingsituation to the period shortly before enactment ofthe 1956 interstate highway legislation and statedthat an “early policy breakthrough toward a similarFederaI transit financing program is a distinctpossibility.” These statements were coupled withthe assertion that the proposed system wouldrequire Federal and possibly State aid.

The hope of obtaining Federal aid continued toaffect Atlanta’s transit policy planning. One of thereasons for seeking the transit-enabling con-stitutional amendment in 1962 was to prepare theway for qualifying for the new Federal-aid programthat was debated by Congress that year. The UrbanMass Transportation Assistance bill was defeated,

and so was the State amendment. The need toqualify for Federal aid was offered again as a reasonfor backing the transit amendment when it came upfor consideration in 1964. This time the Federalprogram was a reality, enacted into law with alobbying boost from Atlanta that converted theentire Georgia delegation on Capitol Hill to the sideof transit. Voters in Atlanta were urged to supportthe enabling proposition so Atlanta could get in onthe ground level when the limited new Federalmoney was parceled out.

Even without UMTA aid, Atlanta made good useof the Federal funds that could be obtained, TheMetropolitan Atlanta Transit Study Commissionin 1962 was supported by a HUD 701 grant—theonly planning grant money at the time that wasbeing used for transit purposes. Later, Atlantalobbied to have a technical studies programappended to UMTA in 1965. Congress obliged, andthe next year MARTA received UMTA’S firsttechnical studies grant.

The most direct effect of Federal financing policyon the MARTA system has been and will continueto be exerted through the UMTA capital grantsprogram. During the tenure of former DOTSecretary John Volpe, MARTA alleges it receivedassurances that UMTA would pay its full share ofthe system’s cost. In early 1974 DOT began publiclybacking away from its earlier position bysuggesting it would not provide all the moneyMARTA wanted when MARTA asked for it.

The MARTA Overview Committee (MARTOC)of the Georgia State assembly launched aninvestigation to clarify the situation. MARTOCcollected evidence of “solemn and repeatedassurances from high officials in the FederalGovernment” 38 that MARTA could expect Federalcapital assistance. Such “firm Federal com-mitments” guided MARTA’s prereferendumpromises and helped encourage local support. 39

In April 1975 UMTA put the issue to rest for thepresent, by committing $600 million out of itscapital grant discretionary fund to the Atlantasystem in the form of contract authority, pendingCongressional approval of annual appropriations.

38 Report O( the MARTA Overclieu> Committee, December 19Y4, P.17.

s~ In, 1968, the lack of ~ firm Federal commitment t. the

MARTA system was one of the main issues raised by MARTAcritics in the successful campaign to defeat the transit measurein referendum.

35

The $600 million plus $2OO million in capital grantsalready given to MARTA totaled more than 10percent of UMTA’S discretionary capital grantsprogram over the duration of the present legisla-tion. 4o However, the offer falls $2OO million shortof the amount MARTA feels—and UMTA agrees—is necessary to build a well-functioning coresystem. With the 20 percent local share added, theUMTA funds will build only 13.7 miles of rapidtransit. 41

In late June 1975 UMTA rejected MARTA’sformal request for the additional $2OO million. Theagency offered “no prejudice” status to local moneyused for construction beyond the 13.7-mile trunksegment. If Congress were to provide newauthorization, MARTA could ask for a new capitalgrant and, if UMTA approved the application, couldcredit the already-spent local funds toward the localshare of the new grant. In turning down MARTA’srequest for a larger commitment, UMTA stressedits intention to put no more money into the 13.7-mile segment under any circumstances. MARTAwill be forced to pay for any cost escalations(beyond the 8 percent inflation factor built into itsestimates) with local resources.

Mustering these local resources has been MAR-TA’s second major financing issue. Proposedmoney-raising mechanisms had an importantimpact on popular support in 1968 and 1971.Problems did not disappear after the 1971 referen-dum established a revenue source, however, andlocal financing questions are as critical today asever.

Atlanta transit planners in the beginning aimedat a financing procedure that would assess the localcontribution on a regional basis rather than dependonly on contributions from jurisdictions. Earlyversions of MARTA legislation would have giventhe transit authority taxing power. Conservativepolitics prevailed, and MARTA got bondingauthority. The local jurisdictions would participateby making a rapid transit contract to produce agiven amount over a period of a year or longer. Ifthe local contributions required a tax, they wouldhave to hold a public referendum.

~0 Urban Mass Transportation Assistance Act of 1974.4 I At 13.7 ml]es the north-south route can extend ordy as far

north as the North Station; MARTA claims that extending thenorth route 4.7 miles to Lenox Station would improvepatronage.

The 1968 referendum was technically a vote toapprove a 35-year contract between each par-ticipating jurisdiction and MARTA. The contractscommitted each jurisdiction to raise the propertytax in order to pay off bonds that would be issued tofinance transit construction. Several of the keyfactors in the failure of the referendum measurewere related to financial considerations. First, theproperty tax increase was unpopular. Second, thenature of the referendum (authorization of acontract rather than a direct approval of a bondissue) required the total price over the 35-yearperiod, including interest plus principal, to appearon the ballot. Usually voters are shown only theface value of the bonds, and the true cost of thesystem is thought to have dissuaded some of thevoters. In addition, the insecurity about the Federalcontribution played a role, as mentioned.

The relatively good showing of the transit issuein the 1971 referendum was aided by an importantchange in the financial plan. The sales tax wassubstituted for the property tax. Also, additionalbenefits—the bus improvement program and the15-cent fare—were added to the rapid transitsystem to make the price more palatable.

Today MARTA is having difficulty meeting its1971 promises with the revenue generated by the 1percent sales tax increase approved in 1971. Thereare several causes for this problem. A largeportion—over 40 percent—of the sales tax fund isbeing used to defer operating deficits. MARTA’sledgers reflect the nationwide picture of greatlyincreasing gaps between operating revenue andcosts. As farebox returns dropped, a greaterproportion of the sales tax than expected had to bediverted to pay the operating bills.

To protect the sales tax fund, the MARTAOverview Committee (MARTOC) sponsoredlegislation placing a ceiling of 50 percent on theamount of sales tax revenue that can be spent foroperations. The measure was enacted in 1974. Withoperating deficits rising at an alarming rate inAtlanta as elsewhere, the 50 percent lid has createda ticklish problem. The operating expenditures arenot yet bumping the ceiling; but at 40-44 percentmonthly, they are claiming a growing portion of thesales tax revenues. The only alternative source offunding, if the ceiling is reached, is to increase fares.It is considered unlikely that the 50 percent limititself would be lifted, because the legislature wantsto guarantee a means for raising the local share offuture project costs. The option of hiking fares,

36

however, would go against MARTA’s referendumpromise to keep fares at 15 cents. MARTOC hasreminded MARTA of its simultaneous commit-ment to implement both short-term and long-range transit improvements. Due to shortage offunds, portions of the short-range plan still havenot been put into effect. Resolving this conflict isone of MARTA’s most pressing responsibilities.

The recession also has played a role in thefinancial situation in Atlanta. Sales tax revenuesgrew only 1 percent last year, during which timeMARTA had planned for a 10 percent rise. Thesituation is attributed to a decline in consumerpurchasing, although the matter is being in-vestigated by MARTOC.

The most important reason for MARTA’sfinancial difficulties involves the unexpectedincreases in the cost of completing the long-rangerapid transit system. The cost of the 60-miie systemwas pegged at $1.3 billion in 1971; it is nowestimated to exceed $2 billion. MARTA says delaysin the implementation schedule have caused thecost escalation. Federal requirements for anenvironmental impact assessment allegedlydelayed MARTA’s timetable over a year. Expensive

additions to the systemin cost.

Regardless of theallegations, delay andcalations comprise the

also contributed

accuracy of

to the hike

MARTA’sthe consequent cost es-

third major financial issuethat has affected the transit decision making. In thiscase, the impact has not yet fully been felt. Theextra cost itself is a factor in trimming the initialsystem to 13.7’ miles; UMTA’S $800 million wouldbuild many more miles if costs had stayed at the1971 level.

More importantly, the combination of delay andadditional cost may force reconsideration of theremainder of the adopted system. The 1971 voteapproved the 1 percent sales tax financing for a 10-year period. In order to guarantee a local share overthe 6-year period of UMTA participation that willbegin now, MARTA will have to either return tothe polls for an extension of the sales tax, persuadethe State to increase its contribution, or raise the1.5-cent fare. UMTA says it will not come to therescue. If UMTA policy holds, and if funds are notforthcoming on the State or local level, the Atlantatransit system will look far different from the wayit was originally envisioned.

37

Summary Case Assessment

The purpose of this section is to summarize thetransit planning and decisionmaking process in theAtlanta region in light of the guidelines listed in theIntroduction to the case assessments. The sum-mary, therefore, is divided into two parts: (1)Assessment of the Institutional Context, and (2)Assessment of the Technical Planning Work.

1. ASSESSMENT OF THEINSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

Ž Forum for Decisionmaking.—The AtlantaRegional Commission (ARC) and theAtlanta Region Transportation PlanningProgram (ARTPP), both created in 1971,provide a relatively well-integrateddecisionmaking forum. Under the auspicesof the ARC, land use planning can beclosely coordinated with transportationplanning. However, the tendency of themodal agencies (MARTA and GeorgiaDOT) to negotiate agreements in ARC’sTransportation Policy Subcommittee,below the ARC board level, creates adegree of confusion over where decision-making really occurs.

. Accountability of Decisionmakers.—TheARC and MARTA commissioners respon-sible for transportation planning in Atlantain theory are directly accountable to thepublic through the county governments inwhich they serve or that appoint them. Inpractice, local interests at times supersede aregional perspective, although the systemfunctions well on the whole. The decision-making forum is given a wider perspectiveby the legislative oversight committee, theMetropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Over-view Committee (MARTOC). To theextent decisions are made in the Transpor-tation Policy Subcommittee, they tend tobe removed from public view.

. Public involvement.—In the wake of anextensive community relations campaign,Atlanta citizens felt they were provided

adequate opportunity to contribute to thetransit program that was approved inpublic referendum in 1971. In contrast,insufficient public participation was one ofthe principal reasons for the defeat of the1968 transit proposal. Since 1971,however, as the plan becomes reality, morecomplaints are heard from affectedcitizens.

2. ASSESSMENT OF THE TECHNICALPLANNING PROCESS

● Goals and Objectives.—Atlanta beganplanning its transit system before formalgoal-setting had become a conventionalstep in planning. Nevertheless, the objec-tive of reducing traffic congestion andshaping future growth has guided transitplanning from the beginning. In morerecent years officially formulated goalshave been used to guide station areadevelopment planning.

. Development of Alternatives.-The firstrigorous look at alternatives came with theAATS Voorhees study after MARTA’sfirst transit proposal failed in the referen-dum of 1968. While the Voorhees teamidentified an impressive array of alter-native rail-bus combinations, it ignoredoptions that were not considered practicalat the time, such as priority bus lanes.

. E v a l u a t i o n o f Alternatives.—TheVoorhees evaluation appeared technicallycompetent, but its pro-busway conclusionswere modified to respect the political needto offer rail service in all rapid transitcorridors.

. Financing and Implementation.—Fromthe beginning, transit plans in Atlantawere drawn up with an assumption ofFederal aid, and the lack of firm commit-ment from UMTA has been a recurrentissue. Other problems have been thedifficulty in obtaining the local share andescalating construction cost estimates,

38U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1976 0- 67’-377