assessment of isil finances

Matthew Thomas 25/01/16

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Financial Assessment of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant

Key Points ISIL has access to multiple forms of funding which makes it difficult to targeting the

group’s financial network.

Collection of Ransoms, Taxation and Extortion, and Antique Trafficking should be the main

priorities of targeting due to their value as finance sources to ISIL

Attacking the Financial Network is only one part of a large action required to countering

ISIL which will need to be well coordinated.

Summary This analysis will look at how the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) is funded. The analysis will

first look briefly at the group and its history. The analysis will focus on the main sources of finance

for ISIL before recommending different options and strategies that can be used to counter the group

financially. The analysis will also show that countering ISIL financially will only work with other

efforts to degrade or destroy the group and by self will not defeat the group.

“The Terrorist State”: Past and Present of ISIL Before looking at ISIL funding it is important to gain an understanding of the group from a historical

perspective and its current state, both of which offer a way to see how the group’s finances evolved

as the group did. This allows a better understanding of ISIL to improve the targeting of the group’s

financial assets.

Past (1999-2012) ISIL traces its roots back to 1999 with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi who created Jamaat al-Tawhid wa-I-

Jihad (JTWJ) with financial backing from Usama Bin Laden (UBL) and al-Qaeda. Zarqawi and JTWJ

achieved infamy in the aftermath of the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 with beheadings and suicide

car bombings.1 Zarqawi and his group swore allegiance to UBL in 2004 which resulted in the group

changing its name to al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and Zarqawi gaining access to private donors. The next

change in the group occurred when AQI and other jihadist groups joined together to form the

‘Islamic State in Iraq (ISI)’ ISI then began to establish institutions of governance in the area it

controlled. This initial attempt at governance failed due to the “…over focus on criminal punishment

for individuals based on narrow interpretations of sharia.”2 Through the combination of the US

military’s Surge and the Anbar Awakening, caused by the extreme punishments, AQI lost ground and

leaders which resulted in it going underground before it spectacularly rose again in 2013 with a

significant gains under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.3

1 Zelin, A. (2014). The War between ISIS and al-Qaeda for Supremacy of the Global Jihadist Movement. Research Notes: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, [online] 20, pp. 1-2. 2 Zelin, A. (2014). Op. cit. p. 3. 3 Lewis, J. (2013). Al-Qaeda in Iraq Resurgent: The Breaking the Walls Campaign, Part I. Middle East Security Report 14. [online] Washington D.C.: Institute for the Study of War, p.7.


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Present (2013 onwards) Under al-Baghdadi, AQI changed its name to ISIL and expanded into the Syrian Civil war. In late 2013

and early 2014, ISIL captured territory including Raqqa, which serves as the de facto capitol for the

so called ‘Islamic State’, where the group introduced its twisted form of Islam.4 The group has set up

governance and institutions in the areas it took over, often presenting itself as an alternative to the

Iraqi government.5 ISIL then turned its attention back to Iraq with a major offensive launched across

the north of Iraq which resulted in the capture of Baiji, Mosul, and Tikrit.6 On June 29th 2014 after

the success of the offensive, al-Baghdadi declared a Caliphate and the creation of the ‘Islamic State’

with himself as the Caliph.7 After the declaration of the Caliphate, numerous terror groups from

across the globe pledged allegiance to the group include Boko Haram in Nigeria8, ISIL Affiliates in

Libya9 and groups in Afghanistan pledging allegiance to the Caliph10 are examples of ISIL growing

influence across the Islamic world. ISIL has also been expanding its international reach with multiple

attacks by ISIL members and affiliated lone wolves against targets in the Middle East and in the

West, with France bearing the brunt of most attacks, most recently as the November 2015 Paris

Attacks.

Financial Assessment This section of the analysis will provide an in-depth look at how ISIL gets its funds to fund itself

before moving on to look at how ISIL uses the funds it has gained around its territory using the

specific example of the Deir az-Zour province in Syria.

Main Sources of Funding The five sources of ISIL funds which are going to be looked at in this analysis is the control and sale

of natural resources such as Oil, extortion and tax systems operating through its territories, ransoms

collected from kidnapping and hostage taking, black market antiquities smuggling and finally,

donations and fundraising from international sources.

Oil Oil is one of ISIL biggest source of income due to its abundance in the region and the price it can

fetch on the market, even with the current low oil prices. The group earns money either directly

from “the petroleum and petroleum products it controls or…from sales of these resources to local

customers.”11 ISIL also earns its money from black market smuggling of the oil to other groups or

nations in the region. Groups such as the Peshmerga12 and nations such as Turkey and Syria have all

been reportedly receiving the oil from ISIL under an agreement between ISIL and the Syrian

4 The Clarion Project, (2015). The Islamic State. Special Report. [online] Washington D.C.: The Clarion Project, pp.10-11. 5 Gardner, F. (2014). 'Jihadistan': Can Isis militants rule seized territory? - BBC News. [online] BBC News. 6 Al-Arabiya, (2014). How ISIS stormed Iraq: a chronology of the militant offensive. [online] 7 The Clarion Project, (2015). Op. cit. pg.11. 8 Agence France-Presse, (2015). Isis welcomes Boko Haram's allegiance and plays down coalition 'victories'. [online] the Guardian. 9 Anderson, J., Bazzi, M. and Schwartz, M. (2015). ISIS Rises in Libya - The New Yorker. [online] The New Yorker. 10 Sarwary, B. (2015). Isis is stealing fighters from the Taliban in Afghanistan. [online] The Independent. 11 Financial Action Task Force, (2015). Financing of the Terrorist Organisation Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). [online] Paris, pp.13-14. 12 Belli, O., Böhm, A., Bühler, A., Kohlenberg, K., Meining, S., Musharbash, Y., Schieritz, M., Senyurt, A., Svensson, B., Thumann, M., Timm, T. and Zimmermann, F. (2014). Islamic State: The Business of the Caliph. [online] ZEIT ONLINE.


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government.13 The reason it is easy for ISIL to sell the oil to hostile groups is due to large local black

market smuggling routes that are established in the area and it only works “because enough corrupt,

criminal or desperate people in the region play along.”14

ISIL had reportedly been selling the oil near the wellhead for $25-$30 USD a barrel whereas oil sold

on the black market at region locations could earn between $60 and $100 USD a barrel.15 In 2014,

ISIL earned an estimated 1 million USD from the black market sale of oil.16 The natural resource

method of funding has two major factors which impact on how much ISIL relies on this source which

are: the price of oil and the US-led coalition targeting of the oil fields and related industry, which

overall results in negative gains for the group and reduction in usefulness of this source of funding.

However if either one of the factors is changed, the sale of natural resources could become a major

source of finance again for the group.

Extortion & Taxes Another form of funding for ISIL is extortion of locals under their control through the imposition of

taxes of numerous types of taxes. One of the taxes involves a taking 5% of all cash withdrawals from

banks under the guise of Zakat17, a principle in Islam which is to give a percentage of earnings to

charity.18 Another sources of funding relying on extortion is in agriculture where ISIL extorts farmers

under the principle of ‘Zakat’ as well as through the confiscation of farm equipment which the group

then rents back to the farmers for a price.19 As ISIL controls farming areas and wheat storage silos, it

can sell the produce and force farmers to work for ISIL which gives the group access to a new area of

funding.20

Other taxes the group have imposed involve vehicles, one tax concentrates on vehicles passing

through areas or crossing borders with ISIL imposing a road tax in North Iraq of $200 USD and a

border tax of $800 USD on the Iraq border with Jordan and Syria.21 One other tax to note is the Jizya

or protection tax for non-Muslims and their districts which are under ISILs control which is presented

as a choice between converting to Islam, paying the tax or being executed.22 The extortion and

taxing method of gain funding is effective for ISIL as it is estimated the taxes can earn the group up

to $30 million a month.23

Ransoms & Hostage Taking A reliable source of funding for ISIL is the collection of ransoms for hostages. The group has another

usage for hostages which is often to use them to send a political message to states fighting against

ISIL. This form of funding is suspected to have raise between 20 million USD and 45 million USD

13 US Department of the Treasury, (2014). Remarks of Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen at The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Attacking ISIL’s Financial Foundation”. [online] 14 Belli et al. (2014). Op. cit. 15 Financial Action Task Force. (2015). Op. cit. pg.14. 16 Riechmann, D. (2014). Islamic State group earning $1 million per day in black market oil, U.S. says. [online] PBS NewsHour. 17 Financial Action Task Force. (2015). Op. cit. pg.13. 18 BBC, (2009). BBC - Religions - Islam: Zakat: charity. [online] 19 Financial Action Task Force. (2015). Op. cit. pg.15. 20 Financial Action Task Force. (2015). Op. cit. pg.16. 21 Brisard, J. and Martinez, D. (2014). Islamic State: The Economy-Based Terrorist Funding. [online] New York City: Thompson Reuters, p.5. 22 Spencer, R. (2014). ISIS forces Iraqi Christians to pay jizya, tells them to convert to Islam or face the sword. [online] Jihad Watch. 23 Brisard, J. and Martinez, D. (2014). Op. cit. pg.5.


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between 2014 and 2015.24 These figures should be taken with caution due to the shadowy nature of

paying ransoms and their often cash payments which cannot be traced.

A major target for ISIL is foreign citizens who are paraded on propaganda videos and threatened

with death if no ransom is paid. A key example of this is the kidnapping of Jim Foley and Steven

Sotloff, two Americans. The US does not pay or allow others to pay ransoms for hostages and both

were summarily executed. Whilst the US does not pay ransoms, some European states are suspected

of doing so, as French citizens have been released while American citizens are not.25

The taking of international hostages is only one part of ISIL ransom business as the group also takes

locals hostage and demands ransoms of up to $50,000 for non-Muslims such as Iraq Christians.26 The

business of hostage taking and release is extremely common with middlemen managing contact

between the hostage takers and the families.

Success with taking hostages and collecting by ISIL shows this method can be used to ensure a

healthy future income and taking hostages can be done without controlling territory.

Antiquities Smuggling Another vital source of funding for ISIL is antiquities trafficking and sales from historical sites in the

group’s area of control which includes the sites at Palmyra. Due to demand for historical artefacts

ISIL is guaranteed income due to legitimate pieces from the area gaining $50,000,000 at auction in

New York City in 2007.27 The ability to gain high prices and the abundance of sites to excavate and

steal from makes this an easy way to gain funds for the ‘Islamic State’. The antiquities are excavated

from the ground often by civilians who can sell the items but are taxed by ISIL at around 20%.28 The

group collected around $260,000 in tax from those collecting the antiquities.29

ISIL has heavily bureaucratised the trafficking of Antiquities through the control of the Antiquities

division of the Diwan or ministry of Natural resources who issues permits for those excavating the

sites and the marketing of the antiquities from them.30 This ensures ISIL maintains full control of the

antiquities trafficking and is able to gain a profit from it. The act of organising of ministries to deal

with the antiquities shows how valuable this source of funding is to ISIL.

Donations/Fundraising A minor source of funding that could become more important if other routes are cut off is funds

from donations that are given to the group by international backers. This route currently is only a

minor route due to it being less financially viable than others routes and the general self-sufficiency

of ISIL. This is evident in only two individuals being identified and sanctioned for providing money to

ISIL who are Tariq Al-Harzi and Abd al-Rahman al-Anizi.31 Both have provided large sums: Al-Harzi

provided 2 million USD in 2013 and al-Anizi provided 2 million USD a month in 2013. However these

pale in comparison to money gathered from other sources. However if other sources of finance

24 Financial Action Task Force. (2015). Op. cit. pg.18. 25 Mahoney, R. (2015). A year after James Foley and Steven Sotloff murders, more awareness of risks - Committee to Protect Journalists. [online] Committee to Protect Journalists. 26 Belli et al. (2014). Op. cit. 27 Levitt, M. (2015). Countering ISIL Financing: A Realistic Assessment. 1st ed. [pdf] Washington D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, p.4. 28 Taub, B. (2015). The Real Value of the ISIS Antiquities Trade - The New Yorker. [online] The New Yorker. 29 Taub, B. (2015). Op. cit. 30 Keller, A. (2015). US Department of State: Documenting ISIL's Antiquities Trafficking. 31 Levitt, M. (2015). Op. cit. pg.5.


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begin to dry up, this method will become a large source of ISIL funding due to the group having

personal connections across the region.32

Looking at where the funding comes from allows for accurate targeting of the financial network

which is more vulnerable due to its ‘state’ activities such as the provision of services. However due

to the wide range of funding sources ISIL has access to leads to an issue with the targeting of its

financial networks, which will be discussed in the recommendation section of this analysis.

ISIL Expenditure The next step after seeing where ISIL gets its funds from is to look at how it makes use of its finance.

This part of the analysis will use the example of the expenditure figures for 2015 from the Deir az-

Zour province in Syria which is controlled by the group. The information for this part comes from

Figure 1 which is an Arabic document and the table located on the same page contains the figures

translate by Aaron Zelin from its original state (the original location for the document and translation

is provided in the reference section, which also contains further financial information documents

from the province).33

The highest expenditure for ISIL in the Deir az-Zour province is for the fighters’ wage which is

$2,444,600 or 43.68% of the total expenditure for 2015 in this province. The next two areas of

highest expenditure is funding for ISIL ministries which is $1,306,000 or 23.38% which is closely

followed by expenditure for bases which totals to $1,106,000 or 19.8% for the whole province. The

other areas of expenditure are for the Islamic Police with $580,000 or just above 10% and the lowest

expenditure for Deir az-Zour Province is for the Media Centre which is $155,000 or 2.77% of total

expenditure.

With ISIL having 16 provinces34, this leads to the potential estimated expenditure for fighters’ wages

for the whole of ISIL territory being around $39,000,000 and the figure for base expenditure allows

for estimate of $18,000,000 for the whole of ISIL territories. However both of these figures are only

estimates coming from this one province’s data, so should not be viewed as accurate for the whole

of ISIL territory.

To be able to defeat ISIL all methods of countering the group will need be used in tandem from

finances to counter-terrorism strategies and military options. Regarding the financial angle, it is vital

to look at both the sources of funding and ISIL expenditure to be able to identify its strengths and

weaknesses to be able to accurately degrade and destroy the group’s ability to raise funds and stop

them from spending such money. The next section will look at different options on how counter ISIL

financially.

32 Levitt, M. (2015). Op. cit. pg.5. 33 Zelin, A. (2015). The Archivist: Unseen Islamic State Financial Accounts for Deir az-Zour Province. [online] JIHADOLOGY: A clearinghouse for jihadi primary source material, original analysis, and translation service. 34 Roggio, B. (2014). ISIS’ ‘Southern Division’ praises foreign suicide bombers | The Long War Journal. [online] The Long War Journal.


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Document showing Expenditure for ISIL in 2015 for

Deir az-Zour province and table containing translated

figures from Figure 1.35

35 Zelin, A. (2015). The Archivist. Op. cit.

Expenditure for the bases: “Provision of food” etc. in the centre of the wilaya

$262,000

Expenditure for the bases: “Provision of food” etc. in al-Mayadeen

$130,000

Expenditure for the bases: “Provision of food” etc. in Albukamal

$98,000

Expenditure for the bases: “Provision of food” etc. in the Badiya

$512,000

Expenditure for the bases: “Provision of food” etc.: airport

$104,000

Mujahid allowance [monthly salaries for fighters] from the city centre

$600,000

Mujahid allowance from al-Mayadeen and Albukamal

$480,000

Mujahid allowance from the Badiya $1,360,000

Media centre $155,000

Islamic Police centres $580,000

Diwan al-Khidamat for the centre and countryside of the wilaya

$988,000

Diwan Bayt al-Mal: aid sums $318,000

Total $5,587,000

Figure 1 - Document showing ISIL Expenditure for 2015 in Deir az-Zour Province (Image from Aaron Zelin)


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Assessment of Targeting Options This section of the analysis will look at the options and opportunities available to financially attack

ISIL. It will use the previously mentioned sources of funding to find weak points to attack. This

section will use Figure 2, which is a hypothetical event and flow chart showing ISIL funding sources

and where its spends its money, to identify possible points of attack against ISIL financial network.

This section of the analysis will also look at issues potentially arising from financial targeting of the

group.

The individual steps within Figure 2 show the hypothetical events that would have to occur for

money to flow from the source to ISIL financial ministry and to end up being spent by the group.

Each individual section below will look at potential targeting opportunities against ISIL sources of

funding as well as looking at current and ongoing efforts against funding sources.

Natural Resources The coalition air strikes against the oil fields under ISIL control has begun to reduce the use of this

source of funding. As the oil fields are only part of the trafficking network shown in Figure 2, efforts

against this network should concentrate on the next two steps which are the trafficking/smuggling

section and the sales section. The best area to target should be to be the trafficking step of the oil

trade as the network is at its most vulnerable stage: out of the hands of ISIL and in the hands of

individuals.

The first part of targeting the trafficking section of the oil trade is to identify individuals involved

with the trafficking across the region and subject them to financial sanctions or targeting for law

enforcement measures. The other part of targeting the trafficking section of the trade should be

identifying routes that are used and subject them to military action as well as the targeting of

vehicles used to traffic the oil products.

Targeting this part of the trafficking network will be difficult mainly due to the transactions only

involving cash payments making it hard to identify individuals and tracing transactions back to them.

The other difficulty comes from the embedded nature in local areas of the trafficking routes which

means local nationals will be less willing to assist targeting ISIL networks due to a vested interest in

the trafficking or through threats from traffickers or groups involved in the network. For these

reasons targeting the natural resource source of funding should be a secondary priority due to its

lower impact on ISILs funding.

Tax Collection & Extortion This source of finance provides ISIL with a significant amount of its funding and should therefore be

considered a priority target. As this funding source is internal, targeting needs to be directed at

dismantling the local governance that enables the tax and collection and extortion, and disrupting

the tax collection system run by the group.

The first step in the collection network is local governance system run by ISIL that acts as

government which gives it legitimacy to collect taxes from local businesses and civilians. Targeting

this system will require military targeting of locations important to the local governance by the

group as well as retaking of ground from the group. As some taxes are collected on border areas

which will have to result in cross border operations to control entrances to ISIL territory to remove

their checkpoints and prevent taxes being collected. The next step against this tax and extortion

network is to target individuals involved in the running and upkeep of the network. This will require

intelligence collection efforts to focus on locating the high value targets (HVT) and payment transfer


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routes which will need to be targeted by military or law enforcement efforts to capture the HVTs

and to disrupt the transfer routes.

As previously mentioned, nearly all of this funding source is contained with territory controlled by

ISIL which makes operations against it difficult but the best option would be to identify and target

the network of collection and transfer of tax funds to remove this source of funding. Currently there

is no real efforts against this source of funding only piecemeal efforts which include airstrikes against

ISIL financial buildings.36

Hostage Taking & Ransoms This source of finance should also be considered a priority target as it has the potential to bring in

significant amounts of funding for ISIL. This source has two layers: an internal layer where ISIL takes

locals civilians and demands ransoms, and the external layer where international citizens are taken

hostage and are used to collect ransoms or used for propaganda purposes.

The internal network is the hardest to combat as it relies on using fear against the locals to gain

ransom payments from the families which means it less like to gain local support against the

practice. The only targeting option is to identify members of the network from the hostage takers to

the middlemen who set up the ransom deals. After they have been identified they can be targeted

by military and law enforcement means such as raids and arrests. Currently there is no operations

against the internal hostage and ransom layer of this funding source.

The ‘external’ layer of the hostage and ransom source of funding can only really be targeted in two

ways. One way by preventing or outlawing ransom payments being made by individuals, groups or

by countries which should reduce the number of hostages taken as they are no longer financially

viable to the group except for propaganda purposes. This option will prove unpopular to the families

of those taken and to some governments but it is the only real way to prevent further hostage

takings. The second option is not designed to eliminate the threat of hostage takings but is designed

to prevent ransoms being paid which is to conduct raids and rescue hostages. This method will only

work if the hostage’s location is known and within reach but this method could cause backlash and

risk other hostage’s lives as well as the rescue teams.

Antiquities Smuggling This source of finance should be considered a priority target due to its significant value to ISILs

funding. The targeting of this source needs to be at three levels: Preventing historical sites falling

under ISILs control, targeting of the smuggling networks and targeting of dealers in stolen

antiquities.

The first level of targeting needs to concentrate on pushing ISIL off and away from ancient sites to

prevent the group from controlling the site and then issuing permits for those sites which allows

private individuals to take artefacts to sell on to smugglers and dealers. Efforts to stop this part will

require military and law enforcement action against the group and can only occur on the ground in

Syria and Iraq by either local or international armed forces. This option will require commitment on

the ground to protect the sites and prevent them from being captured and exploited.

The second level of the smuggling network to target is the smugglers which, if successful, would

prevent the antiquities from being smuggled out of the areas under ISILs control. This level of the

network is a more realistic target as the smugglers will have to move the items outside of ISILs area

36 Macias, A. (2016). Here's footage from a US-led airstrike that sent millions of dollars of ISIS' cash up in flames. [online] Business Insider.


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of control and across borders, often into Lebanon or Turkey37, to get to the dealers. Targeting of the

network and the individuals can be achieved through law enforcement and border protection

means, which include prosecutions, closing of border routes, raids and seizures of items, or financial

sanctions against individuals, companies or even governments, there is also military options such as

cross border raids. These options against smuggling groups and routes will have their difficulties as it

will require cooperation with local governments and the collection of detailed intelligence on who is

involved, where the crossing points from ISIL territory are and where the network operates.

The third and final level of the smuggling network to target is the dealers of the stolen antiquities

who sell the items on to unsuspecting buyers or those who know where they come from. This

method will require close work with experts in antiquities to identify illegal items. The methods to

dissuade these individuals will require law enforcement and judicial measures such as prosecutions,

barring of individuals from trading antiquities and financial seizures of companies or individuals

trading the antiquities.

The best option available to take down the antiquities smuggling network is to target the dealers

and the smugglers to prevent the antiquities going up stream. Preventative measures against the

dealers such as financial sanctions and risk of disbarment should be enough to prevent the final sale

of goods. Targeting measures against the smugglers such as raids and seizures followed up by

prosecution as well as preventative measures such as border closures will be required to stop the

goods from entering the smuggling stream and disappearing.

Foreign Donations

As ISIL does not heavily rely on foreign donations as a source of funds, therefore this source of

funding should be considered as part of the secondary layer of targeting which should be acted

against if resources and personnel allow or if this source becomes more vital to the group. The

current sanctions being placed on individuals suspected or proven to be funding ISIL is sufficient to

prevent this funding source from becoming more valuable to the group as is criminally charging such

individuals under funding terrorist activity laws that exist. To date only two individuals have been

sanctioned for funding large amounts to ISIL. Other actions that can damage this funding source can

include targeting foreign banks who facilitate the flow of money with sanctions and fines.

Potential Issues This part of the analysis will look at the issues associated with targeting a specific source of funding

for ISIL. One major issue that could arise from financial targeting is the possibility of forcing ISIL to

use a different source which is harder to discover or counter against. This issue can only be solved by

targeting all sources of funding at the same time, which presents its own problems. Another major

concern when targeting the regions ISIL controls is the risk of isolating and antagonising locals who

may be against ISIL or live under ISILs control but rely on the black market and underground

networks ISIL uses to make a living. This is a complicated issue to solve which results in the only

option to solve this issue is being better governance and security in the parts of Iraq and Syria where

the networks are embedded, which in those parts is currently impossible. Another vital issue that

needs to be looked at is that financial target will only go some way to degrading the groups

capability to operate and any financial targeting must be undertaken in cooperation and

coordination with other efforts against the group in different fields such as the cyber dimension, on

the ground and against their ideology.

37 Cox, S. (2015). The men who smuggle the loot that funds IS - BBC News. [online] BBC News.


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Recommendations The primary priority for financial targeting of ISIL should be the targeting of the Tax Collection and

Extortion, Hostage Taking and Ransoms, and Antiquities Trafficking sources of funding. These

sources of funds currently provide the best returns for the group and can be achieved within their

areas of control moreover the targeting of these sources of funding would produce a greater impact

against ISIL. Targeting of the tax collection and extortion source should the targeting of key

individuals involved and the degradation of ISIL governance. The hostage taking and ransom source

should be targeted by preventing ransom payments and targeting of individuals and groups involved

in the hostage taking. Finally the Antiquities trafficking should be targeted at the smugglers and

dealers to prevent the antiquities from being sold and reducing interest from this source therefore

denying ISIL access to finance.

The next layer of priorities of targeting should be the continuation of targeting of oil production sites

and move towards target the trafficking network. Also included in this secondary layer of targeting is

the identification and disruption of foreign citizens who provide financial donations and assistance

to the group.

However, all of these targeting options will have to be reviewed regularly and especially if any major

changes occurs such as ISIL losing control of areas or other sources achieve better financial gains for

the group.


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References Journal Articles

Zelin, A. (2014). The War between ISIS and al-Qaeda for Supremacy of the Global Jihadist

Movement. Research Notes: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, [online] 20. Available at:

http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/ResearchNote_20_Zelin.pdf

[Accessed 18 Jan. 2016].

Reports

Brisard, J. and Martinez, D. (2014). Islamic State: The Economy-Based Terrorist Funding. [online] New

York City: Thompson Reuters, p.5. Available at:

http://accelus.thomsonreuters.com/sites/default/files/GRC01815.pdf [Accessed 20 Jan. 2016].

Financial Action Task Force, (2015). Financing of the Terrorist Organisation Islamic State in Iraq and

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Presentation

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Figure 1 - Zelin, A. (2015). Original Document of ISIL Expenditures. [image] Available at:

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Figure 2 – Thomas, M (2016). Hypothetical Event & Flow Chart showing ISIL Main Sources of Funding

and Expenditure. [image]

Glossary Albukamal – Town and District in Syria

Al-Mayadeen – Town and District within Deir az-Zour Province of Syria

Badiya – An ISIL created District in Syria

Diwan – A ministry

Diwan al-Khidamat – ISIL Service Ministry

Diwan Bayt al-Mal – ISIL Financial Ministry

Jizya - Protection tax for non-Muslims

Mujahid – ISIL Fighters

Wilaya – An ISIL Administrative District or Province