List of Cases in Constitutional Law I 1. La BUgal-B’Laan v. Ramos, GR 127882, Dec 1 2004 2. Bondoc v. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792 (1991) 3. Aytona v. Castillo 4 SCRA 1 (1962) 4. Kilosbayan v. Guingona, Jr. 232 SCRA 110 (1993) 5. Sambeli v. Province of Isabela GR 922\79, June 18, 1992 6. PRC v. De Guzman, GR 134629, Aug 31, 1999 7. PHILCONSA v. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 (1966) 8. Bengzon v. Drilon, 208 SCRA 133 (1992) 9. Sinon V. CSC, 215 SCRA 410 (1992) 10. Sanchez v. COMELEC, 114 SCRA 462 11. Tan v. COMELEC, 142 SCRA 727 (1986) 12. Compana General de Tobaccos v. Board of Public Utility, 34 Phil 136 (1916) 13. Guingona, Jr. v. Gonzales , 214 SCRA 789 (1992) 14. Villena v. Secretary of the Interior, 67 Phil 451 (1939) 15. People v. Gacott, Jr. GR. No. 116049, July 13, 1995 16. Supangan, Jr. v. Santos, GR 84663, August 24, 1990 17. Tanada v. Angara GR No. 118295, May 2, 1997 18. Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil 192 19. Herrera v. Board of Tax Assessment Appeals, 3SCRA 186 20. PACU v. Secretary of Education, 97 Phil 806 (1955) 21. Salazar v. COMELEC, 184 SCRA 433 (1990) 22. In Re: Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 (1961) 23. Tobias v. Abalos , 239 SCRA 106 24. Garcia v. Mata, 65 SCRA 517 (1975) 25. Torres v. Gonzales, 152 SCRA 272 (1987) 26. Lapinid v. CSC, 197 SCRA 106 (1991) 27. Garcia et al. vs COMELEC G.R. No. 111511 October 5, 1993 28. In Re: Laureta and Maravilla, 148 SCRA 382 29. Morales v. Subido, 27 SCRA 131 (1969) 30. Doromal v. Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA 354 (1989)

garyjune’04

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La Bugal-B’Laan v. Ramos G.R. No. 127882 December 1, 2004 Topic: Government Powers /Functions; Justiciable and Political Questions FACTS:

The Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before the Court challenges the constitutionality of (1) Republic Act 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act of 1995); (2) its Implementing Rules and Regulations; and (3) the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA), executed by the government with Western Mining Corporation (Philippines), Inc. (WMCP).

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court has a role in the exercise of the power of control over the exploration, development and utilization (EDU) of our natural resources?

HELD:

The Chief Executive is the official constitutionally mandated to “enter into agreements with foreign owned corporations.” On the other hand, Congress may review the action of the President once it is notified of every contract entered into. In contrast to this express mandate of the President and Congress in the exploration, development and utilization (EDU) of natural resources, Article XII of the Constitution is silent on the role of the judiciary. However, should the President and/or Congress gravely abuse their discretion in this regard, the courts may -- in a proper case -- exercise their residual duty under Article VIII. Clearly then, the judiciary should not inordinately interfere in the exercise of this presidential power of control over the EDU of our natural resources.

Under the doctrine of separation of powers and due respect for co-equal and coordinate

branches of government, the Court must restrain itself from intruding into policy matters and must allow the President and Congress maximum discretion in using the resources of our country and in securing the assistance of foreign groups to eradicate the grinding poverty of our people and answer their cry for viable employment opportunities in the country. “The judiciary is loath to interfere with the due exercise by coequal branches of government of their official functions.

The Constitution should be read in broad, life-giving strokes. It should not be used to

strangulate economic growth or to serve narrow, parochial interests. Rather, it should be construed to grant the President and Congress sufficient discretion and reasonable leeway to enable them to attract foreign investments and expertise, as well as to secure for our people and our posterity the blessings of prosperity and peace. The Court fully sympathize with the plight of La Bugal B’laan and other tribal groups, and commend their efforts to uplift their communities. However, the Court cannot justify the invalidation of an otherwise constitutional statute along with its implementing rules, or the nullification of an otherwise legal and binding FTAA contract. On the basis of this control standard, the Court upholds the constitutionality of the Philippine Mining Law, its Implementing Rules and Regulations - insofar as they relate to financial and technical agreements - as well as the subject Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA).

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Bondoc v. Pineda G.R. No. 97710 September 26, 1991

Topic: Legislative (Article VI); HRET – Removal of a Member

FACTS:

Emigdio Bondoc and Marciano Pineda were rivals for a Congressional seat in the 4th District of Pampanga. Pineda was a member of the LDP while Bondoc was a member of NP. Pineda won the election. However, Bondoc contested the result in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. Bondoc won in the protest and was subsequently declared the winner by the HRET.

Meanwhile, one member of the HRET, Congressman Juanito Camasura, Jr. who was a member of LDP confessed to Rep. Jose Cojuangco, LDP’s leader, that he voted for Bondoc even though Bondoc was a member of the NP. He confessed that he believed in his conscience that Bondoc truly won the election. This resulted to Camasura’s expulsion from the LDP. Pineda then moved that they withdraw Camasura from the HRET. They further prayed that a new election be held and that the new LDP representative be appointed in the HRET. This new representative will be voting for Pineda in the reopening of the election contest. Camasura was then removed by HRET’s chairwoman Justice Ameurfina Herrera. Naturally, Bondoc questioned such action before the Supreme Court (SC).

Pineda contends that the issue is already outside the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court because Camasura’s removal is an official act of Congress and by virtue of the doctrine of separation of powers, the judiciary may not interfere.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court may inquire upon the validity of the act of the House of

Representatives which interfere with the disposition of an election contest in the HRET through the ruse of "reorganizing" the representation in the tribunal without violating the doctrine of separation of powers? HELD:

Yes. The SC can settle the controversy in the case at bar without encroaching upon the function of the legislature particularly a part thereof, HRET. The issue here is a judicial question. It must be noted that what is being complained of is the act of HRET not the act of Congress. In here, when Camasura was rescinded by the tribunal, a decision has already been made, members of the tribunal have already voted regarding the electoral contest involving Pineda and Bondoc wherein Bondoc won. The LDP cannot withdraw their representative from the HRET after the tribunal has already reached a decision. They cannot hold the same election since the issue has already become moot and academic. LDP is merely changing their representative to change the outcome of the election. Camasura should be reinstated because his removal was not due to a lawful or valid cause. Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in the HRET. Expulsion of Camasura violates his right to security of tenure.

The 1987 Constitution provides that the Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective members.

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Aytona vs Castillo 4 SCRA 1 G.R. No. L-19313 January 19 1962 Topic: Executive Powers/Limitations [Midnight Appointment] FACTS:

On December 29, 1961, Outgoing President Carlos Garcia appointed petitioner Dominador Aytona as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona took the corresponding oath. On the same day, at noon, President-elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed office; and on the next day, he issued administrative order no. 2 recalling, withdrawing, and cancelling all ad interim appointments made by former President Garcia. There were all-in all, 350 midnight or last minute appointments made by the former President Garcia. On January 1, President Macapagal appointed Andres Castillo as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona instituted a case (quo warranto) against Castillo, contending that he was validly appointed, thus the subsequent appointment to Castillo by the new President, should be considered void. ISSUE:

Whether or not the appointment of Aytona is valid as part of the Executive powers of an Outgoing President who will be leaving his office on the day the said appointment was made? RULING:

No. After the proclamation of the election of President Macapagal, previous President Garcia’s administration was no more than a care-taker administration. He was duty bound to prepare for the orderly transfer of authority the incoming President, and he should not do acts which he ought to know, would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his successor. It was not for him to use powers as incumbent President to continue the political warfare that had ended or to avail himself of presidential prerogatives to serve partisan purposes. The filling up vacancies in important positions, if few, and so spaced to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee's qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted. But the issuance of 350 appointments, including that of the petitioner, in one night and planned induction of almost all of them a few hours before the inauguration of the new President may, with some reason, be regarded by the latter as an abuse Presidential prerogatives, the steps taken being apparently a mere partisan effort to fill all vacant positions irrespective of fitness and other conditions, and thereby deprive the new administration of an opportunity to make the corresponding appointments.

Had the appointment of Aytona been done in good faith then he would have the right to

continue office. Here, even though Aytona is qualified to remain in his post as he is competent enough, his appointment can nevertheless be revoked by the president. Garcia’s appointment is hurried maneuvers to subvert the incoming administration and is set to obstruct the policies of the next president. As a general rule, once a person is qualified his appointment should not be revoked but in the case at bar, it may be, since his appointment was grounded on bad faith, immorality and impropriety. In public service, it is not only legality that is considered but also justice, fairness and righteousness.

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Kilosbayan v. Guingona, Jr. 232 SCRA 110 (1993)

Topic: Judicial: Legal Standing; - Business Organization – Corporation Law – PCSO’s Charter

FACTS:

In 1993, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office decided to put up an on-line lottery system which will establish a national network system that will in turn expand PCSO’s source of income.

A bidding was made. Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC) won it. A contract of lease was awarded in favor of PGMC.

Kilosbayan opposed the said agreement between PCSO and PGMC as it alleged that: PGMC does not meet the nationality requirement because it is 75% foreign owned (owned by a Malaysian firm Berjaya Group Berhad); PCSO, under Section 1 of its charter (RA 1169), is prohibited from holding and conducting lotteries “in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity”; The network system sought to be built by PGMC for PCSO is a telecommunications network. Under the law (Act No. 3846), a franchise is needed to be granted by the Congress before any person may be allowed to set up such; PGMC’s articles of incorporation, as well as the Foreign Investments Act (R.A. No. 7042) does not allow it to install, establish and operate the on-line lotto and telecommunications systems.

PGMC and PCSO, through Teofisto Guingona, Jr. and Renato Corona, Executive Secretary and Asst. Executive Secretary respectively, alleged that PGMC is not a collaborator but merely a contractor for a piece of work, i.e., the building of the network; that PGMC is a mere lessor of the network it will build as evidenced by the nature of the contract agreed upon, i.e., Contract of Lease.

ISSUE: Whether or not PGMC has a legal standing to become a contractor/collaborator for the PCSO’s

telecommunications network project? RULING:

No. Although PGMC’s foreign ownership was reduced to 40% though, Section 1 of R.A. No.

1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries “in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity, whether domestic or foreign.” There is undoubtedly a collaboration between PCSO and PGMC and not merely a contract of lease. The relations between PCSO and PGMC cannot be defined simply by the designation they used, i.e., a contract of lease. Pursuant to the wordings of their agreement, PGMC at its own expense shall build, operate, and manage the network system including its facilities needed to operate a nationwide online lottery system. PCSO bears no risk and all it does is to provide its franchise – in violation of its charter. Necessarily, the use of such franchise by PGMC is a violation of Act No. 3846.

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SAMBELI vs. PROVINCE OF ISABELA, ET. AL. GR. No. 92279 June 18, 1992

Topic: The Commission on Audit: Powers/Functions/ Scope and limitations of Authority FACTS:

On October 2, 1987, an agreement was entered into by and between the Province of Isabela and ECS Enterprises, herein petitioner, for the purchase of 300 units of wheelbarrows, 837 pieces of shovels and 1 set of radio communication equipment. Out of the items to be delivered, a partial delivery of 150 units of wheelbarrows and 419 pieces of shovels were made in which the Provincial Auditor allowed the payment of only 50% or P190,338.20 "pending receipt of the reply to the query to the Price Evaluation Division, COA. A second delivery of 150 units of wheelbarrows and 418 pieces of shovels was made and payment of 50% of P380,400.00 was allowed by the Provincial Auditor, bringing the total payments made to P380,538.20 or 50% of P761,077.20 (the total cost of 300 units of wheelbarrows and 837 pieces of shovels).

Based on the findings of the Price Evaluation Division, COA Technical Service Office, Quezon City, the Provincial Auditor advised the Provincial Treasurer that an overprice in the total amount of P619,042.20 exists out of the total price of P761,077.20 offered by ECS Enterprises or an overpayment of P195,893.10.

The Provincial auditor forwarded the matter to the COA Regional Director who formally endorsed the stand of the Provincial Auditor. ECS Enterprises appealed to the respondent Commission on Audit. In a letter dated December 12, 1989, the said Commission denied the appeal and affirmed the position of the Provincial Auditor and the COA Regional Director. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not EXCS Enterprises, after being proven to have overpriced, can compel the COA to authorize the payment of the balance because to act otherwise will constitute an impairment of contract? RULING:

The Court rejects petitioner's contention. In the exercises of the regulatory power vested upon it by the Constitution, the Commission on Audit adheres to the policy that government funds and property should be fully protected and conserved and that irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expenditures or uses of such funds and property should be prevented. On the proposition that improper or wasteful spending of public funds or immoral use of government property, for being highly irregular or unnecessary, or scandalously excessive or extravagant, offends the sovereign people's will, it behooves the Commission on Audit to put a stop thereto. (Tantuico, State Audit Code Philippines, p. 235)

No less than the Constitution has ordained that the COA shall have exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures or use of government funds and properties (Art. IX D, Sec. 2 (2) 1987 Constitution of the Philippines.

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PRC v. De Guzman, GR 134629, Aug 31, 1999

Topic: Principles and Policies Pursued; Priority of Education, Science, Technology FACTS:

The respondents are all graduates of the Fatima College of Medicine, Valenzuela City, Metro Manila. They passed the Physician Licensure Examination conducted in February 1993 by the Board of Medicine (Board). Petitioner Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) then released their names as successful examinees in the medical licensure examination. Shortly thereafter, the Board observed that the grades of the seventy-nine successful examinees from Fatima College in the two most difficult subjects in the medical licensure exam, Biochemistry (Bio-Chem) and Obstetrics and Gynecology (OB-Gyne), were unusually and exceptionally high. Eleven Fatima examinees scored 100% in Bio-Chem and ten got 100% in OB-Gyne, another eleven got 99% in Bio-Chem, and twenty-one scored 99% in OB-Gyne.

For its part, the NBI found that “the questionable passing rate of Fatima examinees in the 1993

Physician Examination leads to the conclusion that the Fatima examinees gained early access to the test questions.”

ISSUE:

Was the act pursuant to R.A. 2382 a valid exercise of police power?

RULING: Yes, it is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right of every citizen to select a

profession or course of study subject to a fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements. But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their exercise may be so regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and general welfare of the people. Thus, persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers.

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Philippine Constitution Association, Inc.(PHILCONSA) vs. Mathay G.R. No. L-25554, October 4, 1966

Topic: Legislative (Article VI): Composition/qualification FACTS:

Petitioner has filed a suit against the former Acting Auditor General of the Philippines and the Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines seeking to permanently enjoin them from authorizing or passing in audit the payment of the increased salaries authorized by RA 4134 to the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives before December 30, 1969.

The 1965-1966 Budget implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker and members of the

House of Representatives set by RA 4134, approved just the preceding year 1964. Petitioner contends that such implementation is violative of Article VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution. The reason given being that the term of the 8 senators elected in 1963, and who took part in the approval of RA 4134, would have expired only on December 30, 1969; while the term of the members of the House who participated in the approval of said Act expired on December 30, 1965.

ISSUE:

Does Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution require that not only the term of all the members of the House but also that of all the Senators who approved the increase must have fully expired before the increase become effective?

RULING:

Yes. The Court agreed with petitioner that the increased compensation provided by RA 4134 is not operative until December 30, 1969, when the full term of all members of the Senate and House that approved it will have expired.

In establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the increased compensation for

legislators becomes fully effective, the Constitutional provision refers to “all members of the Senate and the House of Representatives” in the same sentence, as a single unit, without distinction or separation between them. This unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks of the “expiration of the full term” of the Senators and Representatives that approved the measure, using the singular form and not the plural, thereby rendering more evident the intent to consider both houses for the purpose as indivisible components of one single Legislature. The use of the word “term” in the singular, when combined with the following phrase “all the members of the Senate and the House,” underscores that in the application of Art. VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10), the fundamental consideration is that the terms of office of all members of the Legislature that enacted the measure must have expired before the increase in compensation can become operative.

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Bengzon v. Drilon, 208 SCRA 133 (1992) 208 SCRA 133

Topic: Legislative (Article VI); Bills to Laws-Veto Power of the President

FACTS: In 1990, Congress sought to reenact laws, particularly RA 1797, that were “repealed” during the

time of former President Ferdinand Marcos. These laws provided certain retirement benefits to retired judges, justices, and members of the constitutional commissions. Congress contemplated on the need to restore the laws in order to standardize retirement benefits among government officials. However, President Corazon Aquino vetoed the bill (House Bill No. 16297) on the ground that the law should not give preferential treatment to certain or select government officials.

Meanwhile, a group of retired judges and justices filed a petition with the Supreme Court

asking the court to readjust their pensions. They pointed out that RA 1797 was never repealed (by P.D. No. 644) because the said PD was not published which one of the subjects of the case of Tañada v. Tuvera. Hence, the repealing law never existed due to non publication. The Supreme Court then readjusted their pensions.

Congress took notice of the readjustment and in the General Appropriations Bill (GAB) for 1992,

Congress allotted additional budget for pensions of retired justices. Congress however did the allotment in the following manner: Congress made an item entitled: “General Fund Adjustment”; included therein are allotments to unavoidable obligations in different branches of the government; among such obligations is the allotment for the pensions of retired justices of the judiciary.

However, President Aquino again vetoed the said lines which provided for the pensions of the

retired justices in the judiciary in the GAB. She explained that that portion of the GAB is already deemed vetoed when she vetoed H.B. 16297. This prompted Cesar Bengzon and several other retired judges and justices to question the constitutionality of the veto made by the President. The President was represented by then Executive Secretary Franklin Drilon. ISSUE:

Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations bill is constitutional that provides the allotment for the pensions of retired justices of the judiciary? RULING:

No. The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to them in accordance to Republic Act 1797 which was never repealed. The president has no power to set aside and override the decision of the Supreme Court neither does the president have the power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to the repeal of existing laws.

The Supreme Court also explained that the veto is unconstitutional since the power of the president to disapprove any item or items in the appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of said item. It appears that in the same item, the Presidents vetoed some portion of it and retained the others. This cannot be done. The rule is: the Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all; the Executive must veto an entire line item in its entirety or not at all.

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SINON VS. CSC, ET. AL. G.R. No. 101251 November 5, 1992 Topic: Judicial; Nature FACTS: The following are the bases of the petition for certiorari of petitioner Sinon: Resolution No. 97 dated August 23, 1989, issued by respondent DARAB which revoked petitioner's permanent appointment as Municipal Agriculture Officer (MAO) and appointed, in his stead, private respondent Juana Banan (Rollo 17); 2. Resolution dated February 8, 1991 issued by the respondent CSC affirming the aforementioned Resolution of respondent DARAB (Rollo 22); Resolution dated July 11, 1991 issued by the respondent CSC which denied petitioner's motion for the reconsideration of the respondent Commission's Resolution dated February 8, 1991. ISSUE:

Whether or not the CSC committed grave abuse discretion in reviewing and re-evaluating the ring or qualification of the petitioner Sinon? RULING:

The Court disagree. The Placement Committee's function is recommendatory in nature. The agency's Reorganization Appeals Board was specially created and conferred with authority to review appeals and complaints of officials and employees affected by the reorganization. The decision of the agency RAB has the imprimatur of the Secretary of that agency and is therefore controlling in matters of and is therefore controlling in matters of appointment.

Contrary to the allegations of the petitioner, the Court do not find any evidence of grave abuse

of discretion on the part of the CSC when it issued Resolution dated 8 February 1991 which in effect approved the appointment of respondent Banan over petitioner Sinon. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

Clearly, the Placement Committee was charged with the duty of exercising the same

discretionary functions as the appointing authority in the judicious selection and placement of personnel when the law empowered it to "assist" the appointment authority. The same law also allows any officer or employee aggrieved by the appointments to file an appeal with the appointing authority.

Hence, for as long as the re-evaluation of the qualification filed by Banan was pending, the

petitioner cannot claim that he had been issued with a "complete" appointment. The fact that the DARAB is capable of re-evaluating the findings of the Placement Committed only to find that Sinon is not qualified should not be taken as a grave abuse of discretion.

The Court cannot subscribe to petitioner Sinon's insistence that the public respondent CSC had disregarded the findings of the Placement Committee. The truth is, these findings were re-evaluated and the report after such re-evaluation was submitted to and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture. The CSC affirmed the findings of the DARAB.

For as long as the CSC confines itself within the limits set out by law and does not encroach upon the prerogatives endowed to other authorities, this Court must sustain the Commission.

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SANCHEZ VS. COMELEC 114 SCRA 454, 1987 Topic: The Commission on Elections; Powers/Functions/ Scope and limitations of Authority FACTS:

Candidate Sanchez filed a petition praying that Comelec after due hearing, be directed to conduct a recount of the votes cast in the 1987 senatorial elections to determine the true number of votes to be credited to him and prayed further for a restraining order directing the Comelec to withhold the proclamation of the last four (4) winning senatorial candidates on the ground that votes intended for him were declared as astray votes because of the sameness of his surname with that of disqualified candidate Gil Sanchez, whose name had not been crossed out from the Comelec election returns and other election forms.

On July 16, 1987, the COMELEC, by a vote of four to three, promulgated its decision dismissing

petitioner Sanchez’ petition for recount. On July 24, 1987, however, respondent Comelec, by a vote of five to two, reversed its order of dismissal and granted Sanchez’ petition for recount and/or re-appreciation of ballots. ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition for recount and/or re-appreciation of ballots filed with the COMELEC may be considered a summary pre-proclamation controversy or an election protest? HELD:

The Court rules that Sanchez’ petition for recount and/or re-appreciation of the ballots cast in the senatorial elections does not present a proper issue for a summary pre-proclamation controversy.

The scope of pre-proclamation controversy is limited to the issues enumerated under sec. 243 of the Omnibus Election Code. The enumeration therein of the issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy, is restrictive and exclusive. In the absence of any clear showing or proof that the election returns canvassed are incomplete or contain material defects (sec. 234), appear to have been tampered with, falsified or prepared under duress (sec. 235) and/or contain discrepancies in the votes credited to any candidate, the difference of which affects the result of the election (sec. 236), which are the only instances where a pre-proclamation recount maybe resorted to, granted the preservation of the integrity of the ballot box and its contents, Sanchez’ petition must fail. The complete election returns whose authenticity is not in question, must be prima facie considered valid for the purpose of canvassing the same and proclamation of the winning candidates.

The law and public policy mandate that all pre-proclamation controversies shall be heard summarily by the Commission after due notice and hearing and just as summarily decided.

The allegation of invalidation of Sanchez’s votes intended for him bears no relation to the

correctness and authenticity and correctness of the election returns canvassed. Furthermore, COMELEC has no power to look beyond the face of the ballots once satisfied of their authenticity (Abes vs Comelec).

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TAN vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 73155 July 11, 1986

Topic: Local Government; Powers/Functions/ Scope and limitations of Authority

FACTS:

This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, effective Dec. 3, 1985. (Cities of Silay, Cadiz and San Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona, and Salvador Benedicto proposed to belong to the new province).

Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite for January 3, 1986. Petitioners opposed, filing a case for Prohibition and contending that the B.P. 885 is unconstitutional and not in complete accord with the Local Government Code because: The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than those living within the territory of the new province of Negros del Norte, were not included in the plebiscite; The area which would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte would only be about 2,856.56 sq. km., which is lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the governing statute, Sec. 197 of LGC.

ISSUE: Whether or not plebiscite was legal and complied with the constitutional requisites of the

Constitution? RULING:

No. SC pronounced that the plebscite has no legal effect for being a patent nullity. Whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries, “the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected” must first be obtained. The creation of the proposed new province of Negros del Norte will necessarily result in the division and alteration of the existing boundaries of Negros Occidental (parent province).

Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be affected. The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte.

Paredes vs. Executive (G.R. No. 55628) should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling precedent. Rather, the dissenting view of Justice Abad Santos is applicable, to wit:

“…when the Constitution speaks of “the unit or units affected” it means all of the people of the municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in the case at bar or of the people of two or more municipalities if there be a merger.”

The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected. The substantial alteration of the boundaries of the parent province, not to mention the adverse economic effects it might suffer, eloquently argue the points raised by the petitioners.”

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Compania General de Tabaccos vs. Board of Public Utility Commissioners Topic: Legislative (Article VI); Limitation-Delegation of Powers FACTS: Petitioner, Compania General de Tabaccos, alleges that it is a foreign corporation organized under the laws of Spain and engaged in business in the Philippines as a common carrier of passengers and merchandise by water. The Board of Public Utility Commissioners ordered petitioner to show cause why it should not be required to present detailed annual reports of its finances and operations of its vessels. After a hearing, the Board ordered respondent to present annually a detailed report of finances and operations of such vessels operated in the Philippines. The Board relied on Sec. 16 of Act No. 2307 for its authority which states that: The board shall have power, after hearing, upon notice, by order in writing, to require every public utility as herein defined to furnish annually a detailed report of finances and operations, in such form and containing such matters as the Boars may from time to time by order prescribe. Petitioner questioned the Board’s authority to require the report on the ground that Act No. 2307 was invalid as constituting an unlawful attempt on the part of Legislature to delegate legislative power to the Board. Moreover, the petitioner contends that the Board’s requirements were cumbersome and unnecessarily prolix and that it would entail an immense amount of clerical work. ISSUE: Whether or not the Act is invalid as constituting an unlawful attempt on the part of Legislature to delegate power to the Board? RULING: Yes. The provision conferring authority on the board is very general and comprehensive. A statute which authorizes a Board of Public Utility Commissioners to require detailed reports from public utilities, leaving the nature of the report, its contents, guidelines it shall follow and the principle upon which it shall succeed, to the exclusive discretion of the board, is not expressing its own will or the will of the State with respect to the public utilities to which it refers. The Legislature delegated to the Board all its powers over a given subject-matter in a manner almost absolute and without laying down a rule or even making a suggestion by which that power is to be directed, guided or applied. Act No. 2307 failed to lay down the general rules of action under which the Board was to proceed, and did not prescribe in detail the contents the reports should contain. Everything was left to the judgment and discretion of the Board which is unrestrained as to when, why, how, to what extent or what it shall act upon. In Interstate Commerce Commission vs Goodrich Transit, the general rules had been laid down for the guidance of the commission, the latter only having to carry out the details. Thus, the court held that “The Congress may not delegate its purely legislative powers to a commission, but, having laid down the general rules of action under which a commission shall proceed, it may require of that commission the application of such rules to particular situations and the investigation of facts, with a view to making orders in a particular matter within the rules laid down by the Congress.”

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Guingona, Jr. v. Gonzales , 214 SCRA 789 (1992)

Topic: Legislative (Article VI); The Commission on Appointments- Composition FACTS:

After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC senators,

3 LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To suffice the requirement that each house must have 12 representatives in the CoA, the parties agreed to use the traditional formula: (No. of Senators of a political party) x 12 seats) ÷ Total No. of Senators elected. The results of such a formula would produce 7.5 members for LDP, 2.5 members for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-PDP-LABAN. Romulo, as the majority floor leader, nominated 8 senators from their party because he rounded off 7.5 to 8 and that Taňada from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the same party to the CoA. This is also pursuant to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who proposed that the elected members of the CoA should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the said compromise. He alleged that the compromise is against proportional representation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the election of Senators Alberto Romulo and Wigberto E. Tañada as members of the Commission on Appointments is in accordance with the provision of Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution?

HELD:

No. It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional membership on the basis of the rule on proportional representation of each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no other manner of application. The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half membership into a whole membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect Romulo. In so doing one other party’s fractional membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latter’s representation in the Commission on Appointments to less than their proportional representation in the Senate. This is clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with its mandate that membership in the Commission be based on the proportional representation of the political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more representation to the LDP and reduced the representation of one political party either the LAKAS NUCD or the NPC. A party should have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly elected senators-members in the CoA. Where there are more than 2 parties in Senate, a party which has only one member senator cannot constitutionally claim a seat. In order to resolve such, the parties may coalesce with each other in order to come up with proportional representation especially since one party may have affiliations with the other party.

15

Villena v. Secretary of the Interior, 67 Phil 451 (1939)

Topic: Executive; Chief Executive– Control Power – Supervision – Suspension of a Local Government Official – Power to suspend comes with the power to remove

FACTS:

Jose Villena was the then mayor of Makati in the 1930s. After investigation, the Secretary of Interior recommended the suspension of Villena with the Office of the president who approved the same. The Secretary then suspended Villena. Villena averred claiming that the Secretary has no jurisdiction over the matter. The power or jurisdiction is lodged in the local government [the governor] pursuant to sec 2188 of the Administrative Code.

Further, even if the respondent Secretary of the Interior has power of supervision over local governments, that power, according to the constitution, must be exercised in accordance with the provisions of law and the provisions of law governing trials of charges against elective municipal officials are those contained in sec 2188 of the Administrative Code as amended. In other words, the Secretary of the Interior must exercise his supervision over local governments, if he has that power under existing law, in accordance with sec 2188 of the Administrative Code, as amended, as the latter provisions govern the procedure to be followed in suspending and punishing elective local officials while sec 79 (C) of the Administrative Code is the genera law which must yield to the special law. ISSUE:

Whether or not the Secretary of Interior can suspend an LGU official under investigation? HELD:

Yes. There is no clear and express grant of power to the secretary to suspend a mayor of a municipality who is under investigation. On the contrary, the power appears lodged in the provincial governor by sec 2188 of the Administrative Code which provides that “The provincial governor shall receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude“.

The fact, however, that the power of suspension is expressly granted by sec 2188 of the Administrative Code to the provincial governor does not mean that the grant is necessarily exclusive and precludes the Secretary of the Interior from exercising a similar power. For instance, Villena admitted in the oral argument that the President of the Philippines may himself suspend the petitioner from office in virtue of his greater power of removal (sec. 2191, as amended, Administrative Code) to be exercised conformably to law.

Indeed, if the President could, in the manner prescribed by law, remove a municipal official; it would be a legal incongruity if he were to be devoid of the lesser power of suspension. And the incongruity would be more patent if, possessed of the power both to suspend and to remove a provincial official (sec. 2078, Administrative Code), the President were to be without the power to suspend a municipal official. The power to suspend a municipal official is not exclusive. Preventive suspension may be issued to give way for an impartial investigation.

16

People vs. Gacott, Jr. G.R. No. 116049, July 13, 1995

Topic: Judicial; Rules of Procedure/Admission to the Bar/Discipline FACTS: For failure to check the citations of the prosecution, the order of respondent RTC Judge Eustaquio Gacott, Jr. dismissing a criminal case was annulled by the SC. The respondent judge was also sanctioned with a reprimand and a fine of P10,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law. The judgment was made by the Second Division of the SC. ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in granting the motion to quash; whether or not the Second Division of the SC has the competence to administratively discipline the respondent judge? RULING:

Yes. The error committed by respondent judge in dismissing the case is quite obvious in the light of P.D. No. 1, LOI No. 2 and P.D. No. 1275 aforementioned. To support the Court’s ruling, Justice Regalado relied on his recollection of a conversation with former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion who was the Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary of the 1986 Constitutional Commission of which Regalado was also a member.

The very text of the present Sec. 11, Art. VIII of the Constitution clearly shows that there are actually two situations envisaged therein. The first clause which states that “the SC en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts,” is a declaration of the grant of that disciplinary power to, and the determination of the procedure in the exercise thereof by, the Court en banc. It was not therein intended that all administrative disciplinary cases should be heard and decided by the whole Court since it would result in an absurdity.

The second clause, which refers to the second situation contemplated therein and is intentionally separated from the first by a comma, declares on the other hand that the Court en banc can “order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted therein.” In this instance, the administrative case must be deliberated upon and decided by the full Court itself.

Pursuant to the first clause which confers administrative disciplinary power to the Court en

banc, a decision en banc is needed only where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge, officer or employee of the Judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension of any of them for a period of more than 1 year or a fine exceeding P10, 000.00 or both.

Indeed, to require the entire Court to deliberate upon and participate in all administrative

matters or cases regardless of the sanctions, imposable or imposed, would result in a congested docket and undue delay in the adjudication of cases in the Court, especially in administrative matters, since even cases involving the penalty of reprimand would require action by the Court en banc.

17

Supangan, Jr. v. Santos (G.R. No. 84663) Topic: Local Government; Composition/ Qualifications FACTS:

The validity and legality of the designations/appointments made by the Secretary of the Department of Local Government (DLG) of members/sectoral representatives to the local legislative bodies were assailed in the cases which were ordered consolidated by the Court.

In G.R. No 84663, petitioner Johnny D. Supangan, Jr. was elected KB Chairman of the said municipality of Mabini, Pangasinan. In that same year he was elected KB Provincial Federation President of the province of Pangasinan. The petitioner was appointed by then President Marcos as member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the province of Pangasinan representing the youth sector. He accordingly assumed office, discharged his functions and participated in the deliberations of the said body.

However, on a session hall of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, respondent Marissa Domantay presented a letter written by respondent Secretary Luis T. Santos advising the Sangguniang Panlalawigan that respondent "Marissa Domantay has been named as member thereof to replace Johnny D. Supangan.

Claiming that Sec. Santos has no legal authority to designate private respondent Marissa Domantay representing the youth sector because (a) respondent Marissa Domantay has never been elected a basic qualification for representing the youth sector, and (b) respondent Secretary has no legal authority in issuing his letter dated August 3, 1988 because the term of office of petitioner Johnny D. Supangan, Jr. has not yet expired nor his successor, if any, been elected/appointed and qualified.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government has the authority to designate/appoint

members/sectoral representatives to the local legislative bodies without an enabling law? RULING:

This argument is untenable. Contrary to petitioners' theory, the phrase "as may be prescribed by law is not prospective. Article X, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution commands that all legislative bodies of local governments must have sectoral representatives among its members, and the appointment or designation of individuals thereto must be done in accordance with provisions of law, whether that law exists or has still to be passed. In this case that law already exists in B.P. Blg. 337 particularly Sections 146 and 173. In any event it is still operative, even after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, because the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) provides for the continued operation of all existing laws, not inconsistent with it.

The phrase "as may be prescribed by law" does not and cannot, by its very wording, restrict itself to

the uncertainty of future legislation. Such interpretation would defeat the very purpose of immediately including sectoral representatives in the local law-making bodies. Otherwise, in the interregnum, from the ratification of the Constitution until the passage of the appropriate statute, the sectors would have no voice in the formulation of legislation that would directly affect their individual members. Hence, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the statute in force, at the time of the passage of the Constitution and which provides for the appointment of local sectoral representatives by the President or by the Secretary of Interior, as the former's alter ego, must be enforced. However, prior determination by the Sanggunian itself as to its necessity is a condition sine qua non to a valid appointment. Further, a sectoral representative must actually belong to the sector which he/ she purports to represent, otherwise there can be no true representation.

18

TANADA v. ANGARA 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997 Topic: Principles and Policies Pursued; Priority of education, science, technology self-reliant and independent economic order

FACTS: : This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement. Petitioners question the concurrence of herein respondents acting in their capacities as Senators via signing the said agreement.

The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a “free market” espoused by WTO.

Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts and impair Philippine economic sovereignty and legislative power. That the Filipino First policy of the Constitution was taken for granted as it gives foreign trading intervention.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence of the said WTO agreement? RULING:

Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution “adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity , with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered automatically part of our own laws. Pacta sunt servanda – international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties.

Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered as absolute

because it is a regulation of commercial relations among nations. Such as when Philippines joined the United Nations (UN) it consented to restrict its sovereignty right under the “concept of sovereignty as autolimitation.” What Senate did was a valid exercise of authority. As to determine whether such exercise is wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. The act of signing the said agreement is not a legislative restriction as WTO allows withdrawal of membership should this be the political desire of a member. Also, it should not be viewed as a limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO remains as the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the development of international trade law. Its alternative is isolation, stagnation if not economic self-destruction. Thus, the people be allowed, through their duly elected officers, make their free choice.

19

JOSE O. VERA, ET AL vs. JOSE A. AVELINO, ET AL. G.R. No. L-543 August 31, 1946

Topic: Legislative (Article VI): Nature FACTS:

COMELEC submitted last May 1946 to the President and the Congress of the Philippines a

report regarding the national elections held the previous month. It stated that by reason of certain specified acts of terrorism and violence in the province of Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac, the voting in said region did not reflect the true and free expression of the popular will.

During the session, when the senate convened on May 25, 1946, a pendatum resolution was

approved referring to the report ordering that Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero – who had been included among the 16 candidates for senator receiving the highest number of votes, proclaimed by the Commissions on Elections – shall not be sworn, nor seated, as members of the chamber, pending the termination of the of the protest lodged against their election.

Petitioners thus immediately instituted an action against their colleagues responsible for the

resolution, praying for an order to annul it and compelling respondents to permit them to occupy their seats and to exercise their senatorial prerogative. They also allege that only the Electoral Tribunal had jurisdiction over contests relating to their election, returns and qualifications. Respondents assert the validity of the pendatum resolution.

ISSUES: 1.Whether the Commission on Elections has the jurisdiction to determine whether or not votes cast in the said provinces are valid.

2.Whether administration of oath and the sitting of Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose Romero should be deferred pending hearing and decision on the protests lodged against their elections. RULING:

Case dismissed. The Supreme Court refused to intervene, under the concept of separation of

powers, holding that the case was not a “contest”, and affirmed the inherent right of the legislature to determine who shall be admitted to its membership.

Granting that the postponement of the administration of the oath amounts to suspension of

the petitioners from their office, and conceding arguendo that such suspension is beyond the power of the respondents, who in effect are and acted as the Philippine Senate (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 83, 88),this petition should be denied. As was explained in the Alejandrino case, we could not order one branch of the Legislature to reinstate a member thereof. To do so would be to establish judicial predominance, and to upset the classic pattern of checks and balances wisely woven into our institutional setup.

20

Herrera vs. Quezon City Board of Assessment Appeals GR L-15270, 30 September 1961

Topic: Legislative (Article VI): Power to Tax FACTS: In 1952, the Director of the Bureau of Hospitals authorized Jose V. Herrera and Ester Ochangco Herrera to establish and operate the St. Catherine’s Hospital. In 1953, the Herreras sent a letter to the Quezon City Assessor requesting exemption from payment of real estate tax on the hospital, stating that the same was established for charitable and humanitarian purposes and not for commercial gain. The exemption was granted effective years 1953 to 1955. In 1955, however, the Assessor reclassified the properties from “exempt” to “taxable” effective 1956, as it was ascertained that out 32 beds in the hospital, 12 of which are for pay-patients. A school of midwifery is also operated within the premises of the hospital. ISSUE:

Whether St. Catherine’s Hospital is exempt from reallty tax. RULING:

Yes. The admission of pay-patients does not detract from the charitable character of a hospital, if all its funds are devoted exclusively to the maintenance of the institution as a public charity. The exemption in favor of property used exclusively for charitable or educational purpose is not limited to property actually indispensable therefore, but extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of said purpose, such as in the case of hospitals — a school for training nurses; a nurses’ home; property used to provide housing facilities for interns, resident doctors, superintendents and other members of the hospital staff; and recreational facilities for student nurses, interns and residents. Within the purview of the Constitution, St. Catherine’s Hospital is a charitable institution exempt from taxation.

Charitable institutions, churches, parsonages, or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, and non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings and improvements actually, directly and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation (Sec.28 (3), Art. III,1987 Constitution). Important principles in tax exemption of properties: a. Exemption of religious, charitable and educational institutions apply to real property tax only, the test is usage, not ownership; and the (b) the exemption extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of said purposes, such as school for training nurses, nurses' home, and recreational facilities.

21

PACU v. Secretary of Education, 97 Phil 806 (1955) Topic: Judicial; Declaratory Relief/Justiciable Controversy– Civic Efficiency FACTS: The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU) assailed the constitutionality of Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180. These laws sought to regulate the ownership of private schools in the country. It is provided by these laws that a permit should first be secured from the Secretary of Education before a person may be granted the right to own and operate a private school. This also gives the Secretary of Education the discretion to ascertain standards that must be followed by private schools. It also provides that the Secretary of Education can and may ban certain textbooks from being used in schools. PACU contends that the right of a citizen to own and operate a school is guaranteed by the Constitution, and any law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such person could exercise said right, amounts to censorship of previous restraint, a practice abhorrent to our system of law and government. PACU also avers that such power granted to the Secretary of Education is an undue delegation of legislative power; that there is undue delegation because the law did not specify the basis or the standard upon which the Secretary must exercise said discretion; that the power to ban books granted to the Secretary amounts to censorship. On the other hand, the defendant Legal Representative submitted a memorandum contending that 1) the matters presented no justiciable controversy exhibiting unavoidable necessity of deciding the constitutional question; 2) Petitioners are in estoppels to challenge the validity of the said act and 3) the Act is constitutionally valid. Thus, the petition for prohibition was dismissed by the court. ISSUE: Whether or not Act No. 2706 as amended and whether or not there is judicial controversy that needs to be resolved? RULING: The Petitioner suffered no wrong under the terms of law and needs no relief in the form they seek to obtain. Moreover, there is no justiciable controversy presented. PACU did not show that it suffered any injury from the exercise of the Secretary of Education of such powers granted to him by the said law. The State has the power to regulate, in fact control, the ownership of schools. The Constitution provides for state control of all educational institutions even as it enumerates certain fundamental objectives of all education to wit. Furthermore, the power of the courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the interest of litigant require the use of judicial authority for their protection against actual interference. As such, Judicial Power is limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies. The court finds the defendant position to be sufficiently sustained and state that the petitioner remedy is to challenge the regulation not to invalidate the law. On this phase of the litigation the court conclude that there has been no undue delegation of legislative power even if the petitioners appended a list of circulars and memoranda they fail to indicate which of such official documents was constitutionally objectionable for being capricious or pain nuisance.

22

JESUS F. SALAZAR, JR. vs. COMELEC AND BENJAMIN IMPERIAL G.R. No. 85742 April 19, 1990

Topic: The Commission on Elections; Powers/Functions/ Scope and limitations of Authority

FACTS: Petitioner SALAZAR and respondent IMPERIAL were candidates for Mayor of Legaspi City in the

1988 elections. In the course of the canvass, SALAZAR registered objections to the admission of 165 election returns allegedly due to massive irregularities. The City Board of Canvassers (the City Board, for short) overruled the objections.

SALAZAR filed before the COMELEC a Petition for "Declaration of Failure of Election and Holding of New Election, or annulment of Disputed Election Returns, and/or Appeal from the Rulings of the City Board of Canvassers of Legaspi City." In the alternative, Petitioner Salazar asked the COMELEC to order a recount of the votes cast, or to annul the affected returns; and in either case, to set aside the appealed rulings of the Board.

Respondent IMPERIAL filed his Answer denying the alleged irregularities and contending that the Petition stated no cause of action, and that Petitioner SALAZAR's proper recourse was an election protest to ventilate the alleged wholesale irregularities, none of which had ever been reported to the authorities previously. Acting on the verified petition, COMELEC lifted the suspension of proclamation or the effects thereof, and ordered the City Board of Canvassers to reconvene and proclaim the winning candidate for City Mayor. Respondent IMPERIAL took his oath on the same day, 2 March 1988.

Salazar filed this Petition for certiorari seeking to set aside COMELEC’s Resolution which authorized the City Board to proclaim the winning candidate for the position of City Mayor and also prayed that Respondent IMPERIAL be enjoined from discharging the functions.

ISSUE: Whether or not irregularities as enumerated constitute pre-election controversy which can be

invoked to declare failure of election?

RULING: We sustain the challenged Resolutions/Decision of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)

dated 26 February 1988, 21 October 1988, 3 March 1989, and 5 June 1989, and thus uphold the proclamation of Respondent Benjamin S. IMPERIAL.

Cognizance should be taken of the fact that some of the irregularities enumerated are proper grounds in an election contest but may not, as a rule, be invoked to declare a failure of election. Neither, they are proper issues in a pre-proclamation controversy as enunciated in Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 of the Omnibus Election Code.

In finding in the same Resolution that a proclamation having been made, a pre-proclamation controversy is no longer viable. It cannot justifiably argued that the COMELEC was devoid of jurisdiction to do so, the matter of jurisdiction, meaning the light of a tribunal to act in a particular case, being governed by law, since it involves an election controversy generally governed by its own procedural rules.

23

In Re: Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 (1961) Topic: Principles and Policies Pursued: Adoption of International Law FACTS:

Arturo Garcia applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he avers that he is a Filipino citizen born in Bacolod City, of Filipino parentage. He had taken and finished the course of “Bachillerato Superior” in Spain and was approved, selected and qualified by the “Insitututo de Cervantes” for admission to the Central University of Madrid where he studied and finished the law course, graduating there as “Licenciado en derecho”. Thereafter he was allowed to practice the law profession in Spain. He claims that under the provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Profession between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish State, he is entitled to the practice the law profession in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the Philippine Bar?

RULING:

The Court resolved to deny the petition. The provision of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and

the Exercise of Professions between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish state cannot be invoked by the applicant. Said Treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice the legal profession in Spain, and the citizens of Spain desiring to practice the legal profession in the Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino citizen desiring to practice the legal profession in the Philippines. He is therefore subject to the laws of his own country and is not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish nationals desiring to practice in the Philippines. The privileges provided in the Treaty invoked by the applicant are made expressly subject to the laws and regulations of the contracting state in whose territory it is desired to exercise the legal profession.

The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish

state could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, for reason that the Executive Department may not encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, and the power to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to the Congress of the Philippines.

24

Tobias v Abalos 239 SCRA 106 G.R. No. L-114783 December 8, 1994 Topic: Legislative (Article VI): Structure/Rules

FACTS:

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong.” Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district.

The petitioners contend on the following: (1) Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675

contravenes from the "one subject-one bill" rule provided in the Constitution by involving 2 subjects in the bill namely (a) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (b) the division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.

(2) The division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts under Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution.

(3) The said division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the subject municipalities have attained the minimum population requirements.

(4) That Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5(4) of the Constitution stating that “within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in this section.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RA No. 7675 is unconstitutional? RULING:

No. The aforesaid law is not unconstitutional. The Court dismissed the petition due to lack of merit. Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. The Court ruled that RA No. 7675 followed the mandate of the "one city-one representative" proviso in the Constitution stating that each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative" (Article VI, Section 5(3), Constitution).

As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute with the phrase "unless otherwise provided by law."

As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts, it was the Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself.

25

Garcia v. Mata, 65 SCRA 517 (1975)

Topic: Legislative (Article VI): Appropriation FACTS:

Garcia was a reserve officer on active duty who was reversed to inactive status. He filed an action for mandamus to compel the DND and AFP to reinstate him to active service and readjust his rank and pay emoluments.

Garcia claims that his reversion to inactive status is violation of RA 1600 which prohibits the reversion of officers with at least 10 years of service.

On the other hand, the AFP and DND contend that the said provision of RA 1600 has no relevance or pertinence to the budget in question or to any appropriation item therein. (RA 1600 was an appropriation law for 1956-57). ISSUE:

Whether RA 1600 is valid? Does it contain rider in an appropriation bill? HELD:

No. Section 11 is unconstitutional. Garcia cannot compel the AFP to reinstate him. The incongruity and irrelevancy are already evident. Section 11 of Republic Act 1600 has no relevance or pertinence to the budget in question or to any appropriation item contained therein. Section 11 of RA 1600 fails to disclose the relevance to any appropriation item. RA 1600 is an appropriation law for the operation of government while Section 11 refers to a fundamental governmental policy of calling to active duty and the reversion of inactive statute of reserve officers in the AFP.

It violated Art. VI, Sec. 19, Paragraph 2 of 1935 Constitution: embracing provisions or enactments relating specifically to appropriation. It also violated Art. VI, Sec. 21, Paragraph 1 which provides for bills not embracing more than one subject expressed in the title. It is meant to preclude the insertion of riders in legislation, Riders are provisions not germane to the subject matter of the bill violating the rule on one-bill, one subject. The subject to be considered must be expressed in the title of the act. When an act contains provisions which are clearly not embraced in the subject of the act, as expressed in the title, such provisions are void, inoperative and without effect.

Non-appropriation items inserted in an appropriation measure shall be unconstitutional, invalid and inoperative, therefore, it confers no right and affords no protection.

26

Torres v. Gonzales, 152 SCRA 272 (1987)

Topic: Executive : Executive Clemency – Pardon – Not Subject to Judicial Review/Scrutiny

FACTS: In 1978, Wilfredo Torres was convicted of Estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned by the president

with the condition that he shall not violate any penal laws again. In 1982, Torres was charged with multiple crimes of Estafa. In 1986, then Chairman of the Board of Paroles Neptali Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation of Torres’ pardon. Hence, the president cancelled the pardon. Torres appealed the issue before the Supreme Court averring that the Executive Department erred in convicting him for violating the conditions of his pardon because the Estafa charges against him were not yet final and executory as they were still on appeal. ISSUE:

Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before a person can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence. RULING:

The SC affirmed the following:

1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.

2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.

3. Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process, and because the conditionally pardoned convict had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for which he was conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted with a constitutional vice.

In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the RPC which imposes the penalty of prision correccional, minimum period, upon a convict who “having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon.” Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the President’s executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.

27

Renato Lapinid Vs.CSC, Philippine Ports Authority and Juanito Junsay G.R. NO. 96298 MAY 14, 1991 Topic: The Civil Service; Scope of Authority FACTS:

Petitioner Renato M. Lapinid was appointed by the Philippine Ports Authority to the position of Terminal Supervisor at the Manila International Container Terminal. This appointment was protested by private respondent Juanito Junsay, who reiterated his earlier representations with the Appeals Board of the PPA for a review of the decision of the Placement Committee. He contended that he should be designated terminal supervisor, or to any other comparable position, in view of his preferential right thereto.

Complaining that the PPA had not acted on his protest, Junsay went to the Civil Service

Commission and challenged Lapinid's appointment on the same grounds he had earlier raised before the PPA. In a resolution dated February 14, 1990, the Commission disposed as follows: After a careful review of the records of the case, the Commission finds the appeal meritorious. Foregoing premises considered, it is directed that Appellants Juanito Junsay and Benjamin Villegas be appointed as Terminal Supervisor (SG 18) vice protestees Renato Lapinid and Antonio Dulfo respectively who may be considered for appointment to any position commensurate and suitable to their qualifications, and that the Commission be notified within ten (10) days of the implementation hereof.

Upon learning of the said resolution, Lapinid, who claimed he had not been informed of the appeal

and had not been heard thereon, filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. PPA also filed its own motion for reconsideration twice which were both denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Is the Civil Service Commission authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement by the latter? RULING:

No. Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide.

The only function of the CSC in cases of this nature is to review the appointment in the light of the

requirements of the Civil Service Law, and when it finds the appointee to be qualified and all other legal requirements have been otherwise satisfied, it has no choice but to attest to the appointment.

The determination of who among several candidates for a vacant position has the best

qualifications is vested in the sound discretion of the Department Head or appointing authority and not in the CSC. The CSC cannot substitute its judgment for that of the Head of Office in this regard.

28

Garcia et al. vs COMELEC G.R. No. 111511 October 5, 1993

Topic: Local Government; Powers/Functions/ Scope and limitations of Authority- Recall proceeding FACTS:

Enrique T. Garcia was elected governor of Bataan in the 1992 elections. Some mayors, vice-mayors and members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the twelve (12) municipalities of the province constituted themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate the recall election of petitioner Garcia. They issued Resolution No. 1 as formal initiation of the recall proceedings. COMELEC scheduled the recall election for the gubernatorial position of Bataan.

Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction to annul the Resolution of the COMELEC because the PRAC failed to comply with the "substantive and procedural requirement" laid down in Section 70 of R.A. 7160 (Local Government Code 1991).

The Local Government Code of 1991 was enacted providing for two (2) modes of initiating the

recall from office of local elective officials who appear to have lost the confidence of the electorate. One of these modes is recall through the initiative of a preparatory recall assembly. In the case at bench, petitioners assail this mode of initiatory recall as unconstitutional.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the people have the sole and exclusive right to initiate recall proceedings?

RULING: No. There is nothing in the Constitution that suggest that the people have the "sole and

exclusive right to decide on whether to initiate a recall proceeding, the Constitution did not provide for any mode, of initiating recall elections. The mandate given by section 3 of Article X of the Constitution is for Congress to "enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum . . ." By this constitutional mandate, Congress was clearly given the power to choose the effective mechanisms of recall as its discernment dictates.

The law instituted safeguards to assure that the initiation of the recall process by a preparatory recall assembly will not be corrupted by extraneous influences. We held that notice to all the members of the recall assembly is a condition sine qua non to the validity of its proceedings. The law also requires a qualified majority of all the preparatory recall assembly members to convene in session and in a public place. Needless to state, compliance with these requirements is necessary, otherwise, there will be no valid resolution of recall which can be given due course by the COMELEC.

In sum, the petition at bench appears to champion the sovereignty of the people, particularly their direct right to initiate and remove elective local officials thru recall elections. If the petition would succeed, the result will be a return to the previous system of recall elections which Congress found should be improved. The alternative mode of initiating recall proceedings thru a preparatory recall assembly is, however, an innovative attempt by Congress to remove impediments to the effective exercise by the people of their sovereign power to check the performance of their elected officials. The power to determine this mode was specifically given to Congress and is not proscribed by the Constitution.

29

In Re: Laureta and Maravilla, 148 SCRA 382 Topic: Government Powers /Functions; Interdependence; check and balance Facts:

In almost identical letters dated 20 October 1986, personally sent to Justices Andres R. Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera, and Isagani A. Cruz, and a fourth letter, dated 22 October 1986 addressed to Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, all members of the First Division of this COURT, in feigned ignorance of the Constitutional requirement that the Court's Divisions are composed of, and must act through, at least five (5) members, and in a stance of dangling threats to effect a change of the Court's adverse resolution, petitioner Eva Maravilla Ilustre wrote in part: Please forgive us for taking the Liberty of addressing you this letter which we do hope you will read very carefully. The letter called the attention of the magistrates for the dismissal of her case, thus, considering the three minute-resolution: the first dated 14 May 1986; the second, dated 9 July 1986; and the third, 3 September 1986, railroaded with such hurry/ promptitude unequaled in the entire history of the Supreme Court under circumstances that have gone beyond the limits of legal and judicial ethic. Issue:

Whether or not petitioner could be liable for contempt in court and her counsel be imposed of grave professional misconduct? RULING:

Ilustre has transcended the permissible bounds of fair comment and criticism to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice in her letters addressed to the individual Justices; in the language of the charges she filed before the Tanodbayan; in her statements, conduct, acts and charges against the Supreme Court and/or the official actions of the Justices concerned and her ascription of improper motives to them; and in her unjustified outburst that she can no longer expect justice from the Supreme Court. The constitutional right of freedom of speech or right to privacy cannot be used as a shield for contemptuous acts against the Court.

Also, Atty. Laureta has committed acts unbecoming an officer of the Court for his stance of

dangling threats of bringing the matter to the "proper forum" to effect a change of the Court's adverse Resolution; for his lack of respect for and exposing to public ridicule, the two highest Courts of the land by challenging in bad faith their integrity and claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust judgments; for authoring, or at the very least, assisting and/or abetting and/or not preventing the contemptuous statements, conduct, acts and malicious charges of his client, Ilustre, notwithstanding his disclaimer that he had absolutely nothing to do with them, which we find disputed by the facts and circumstances of record as above stated; for totally disregarding the facts and circumstances and legal considerations set forth in the Supreme Court's Resolutions; for making it appear that the Justices of the Supreme Court and other respondents before the Tanodbayan are charged with "graft and corruption" all with the manifest intent to bring the Justices of this Court and of the Court of Appeals into disrepute and to subvert public confidence in the Courts.

Accordingly, respondent Eva Maravilla ilustre is hereby held in contempt and Atty. Wenceslao

Laureta is found guilty of grave professional misconduct, rendering him unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney, and is hereby suspended from the practice of law until further Orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.

30

Morales v. Subido G.R. No. L-29658 November 29, 1968 Topic: Legislative (Article VI): Records and Journals: FACTS:

In the Senate, the Committee on Government Reorganization, to which House Bill 6951 was referred, reported a substitute measure. It is to this substitute bill that Section 10 of the Act owes its present form and substance.

It is be noted that the Rodrigo amendment was in the nature of an addition to the phrase 'who has served the police department of a city for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher,' under which the petitioner herein, who is at least a high school graduate (both parties agree that the petitioner finished the second year of the law course) could possibly qualify. However, somewhere in the legislative process the phrase "who has served the police department of a city or" was dropped and only the Rodrigo amendment was retained."

The present insistence of the petitioner is that the version of the provision, as amended at the behest of Sen. Rodrigo, was the version approved by the Senate on third reading, and that when the bill emerged from the conference committee the only change made in the provision was the insertion of the phrase "or has served as chief of police with exemplary record." In support of this assertion, the petitioner submitted certified photostatic copies of the different drafts of House Bill 6951 showing the various changes made. In what purport to be the page proofs of the bill as finally approved by both Houses of Congress. It is unmistakable up to this point that the phrase, "who has served the police department of a city or," was still part of the provision, but according to the petitioner the House bill division deleted the entire provision and substituted what now is Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court can inquire upon the records or the journal of the legislature to determine whether there was an alteration of a provision in an enrolled bill?

RULING:

Accordingly, the motions for reconsideration are denied. The respect due to the other branches of the Government demands that we act upon the faith and credit of what the officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts of their respective departments. Otherwise we would be cast in the unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine what actually did happen in the labyrinth of lawmaking, with consequent impairment of the integrity of the legislative process. The investigation which the petitioner would like this Court to make can be better done in Congress. After all, House cleaning — the immediate and imperative need for which seems to be suggested by the petitioner — can best be effected by the occupants thereof. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive — on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system — the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree."

31

Doromal v. Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA 354 (1989)

Topic: Executive; Powers/Limitations FACTS:

The petitioner is an incumbent public official charged in a valid information with an offense punishable under the Constitution and under RA 3019 and PD 807. The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in this Court questioning the jurisdiction of the "Tanodbayan" to file the information without the approval of the Ombudsman. The Court annulled the information. Upon the annulment, the Special Prosecutor sought clearance from the Ombudsman to refile it. The Ombudsman granted clearance but advised that "some changes be made in the information previously filed."

A new information, duly approved by the Ombudsman, was filed in the Sandiganbayan 1for which the petitioner filed a "Motion to Quash" . The Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash, and the Special Prosecutor filed a "Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite".

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration for his suspension was also denied by the Court. The petitioner contends that as the preliminary investigation that was conducted prior to the filing of the original information in Criminal Case No. 12766 was nullified by this Court, another preliminary investigation should have been conducted before the new information in Criminal Case No. 12893 was filed against him. The denial of his right to such investigation allegedly violates his right to due process and constitutes a ground to quash the information.

The public respondent argues that another preliminary investigation is unnecessary because both old and new information involves the same subject matter a violation and the petitioner allegedly waived the second preliminary investigation by his failure to comply with the Court's Order. ISSUES:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion: In denying the petitioner's motion to quash the information in Criminal Case No. 12893; and in suspending the petitioner from office despite the President's having previously approved his indefinite leave of absence? RULING:

Petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted. The Sandiganbayan shall immediately remand Criminal Case No. 12893 to the Office of the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation and shall hold in abeyance the proceedings before it pending the result of such investigation, denying the motion to quash. A new preliminary investigation of the charge against the petitioner is in order not only because the first was a nullity but also because the accused demands it as his right.

The preventive suspension of the petitioner is hereby lifted. Since the petitioner is an incumbent public official charged in a valid information with an offense punishable under the Constitution and the laws (RA 3019 and PD 807), the law's command that he "shall be suspended from office" pendente lite must be obeyed. His approved leave of absence is not a bar to his preventive suspension for. Since his preventive suspension has exceeded the reasonable maximum period of ninety (90) days provided in Section 42 of the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines (P.D. 807), it should now be lifted.