assisting people need

LINCOLN-DOUGLAS | November/December 2011

Resolved: Individuals have a moral obligation to assist people in need.

Victory Briefs Topic Analysis Book: Lincoln-Douglas November/December 2011 – 11NFL2-Assisting People In Need © 2011 Victory Briefs, LLC Victory Briefs Topic Analysis Books are published by: Victory Briefs, LLC 925 North Norman Place Los Angeles, California 90049 Publisher: Victor Jih | Managing Editor: Adam Torson | Editor: Adam Torson | Topic Analysis Writers: Stephen Babb, Jane Kessner, Christian Tarsney, Adam Torson | Evidence: Chris Theis, Adam Torson For customer support, please email [email protected] or call 310.472.6364.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................................. 2

TOPIC ANALYSIS BY STEPHEN BABB ......................................................................... 8

TOPIC ANALYSIS BY JANE KESSNER ....................................................................... 18

TOPIC ANALYSIS BY CHRISTIAN TARSNEY ............................................................. 32

TOPIC ANALYSIS BY ADAM TORSON ........................................................................ 55

AFFIRMATIVE EVIDENCE ........................................................................................... 70

MORAL DUTY ................................................................................................................................... 70

THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-BENEFICENCE CANNOT BE RATIONALLY WILLED .......................................70

BECAUSE WE REQUIRE OTHERS TO ACHIEVE OUR OWN ENDS WE MUST ACCEPT A DUTY OF BENEFICENCE .............................................................................................................................................71

THE OBLIGATION OF MUTUAL AID DERIVES FROM THE DUTIES OF RESPEC FOR PERSONS .........72

WE ARE OBLIGATED TO PROMOTE THE ENDS OF OTHERS .................................................................73

THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE CREATES AN OBLIGATION TO ASSIST THOSE IN NEED ...............74

KANT REJECTS THE IDEA OF SUPEREROGATION ..................................................................................75

KANT’S CONCEPTION OF IMPERFECT DUTY DOES NOT ALLOW US TO FORGO BENEFICENT ACTS BECAUSE WE HAVE SATISFIED OUR MORAL OBLIGATIONS .................................................................76

WE DO NOT NEED TO CATEGORIZE ACTIONS AS SUPEROGATORY RATHER THAN OBLIGATORY TO APPRECIATE AND ENCOURAGE EXCEPTIONAL MORAL ACTIONS .................................................77

THE FACT THAT OTHER INDIVIDUALS DO NOT FUFILL THEIR OBLIGATIONS DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE OBLIGATION TO AID THOSE IN NEED DOES NOT EXIST ................................................................78

MORALITY OF CONTRACTS ............................................................................................................... 79

CONSTRACTUALISM PLACES A STRINGENT OBLIGAITON TO AID ON INDIVIDUALS ..........................79

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT REQUIRES A DUTY TO ASSIST THOSE IN NEED ...........................................80

IN EXCHANGE FOR PROTECTION BY THE COMMUNITY INDIVIDUALS ARE OBLIGATED TO ASSIST OTHERS ........................................................................................................................................................81

HEGELIAN ETHICS JUSTIFIES AN OBLIGATION TO ASSIST THOSE IN NEED .......................................82

IN ORDER FOR THE STATE TO FULFILL ITS OBLIGATION TO PROTECT THE COMMUNITY WITHOUT BECOMING OPPRESSIVE INDIVIDUALS MUST ASSIST OTHERS TO HELP MAINTAIN THE PEACE ....83

CAPITALISM ..................................................................................................................................... 84

THE CHOICES PEOPLE MAKE IN THE FREE MARKET ARE NOT ALWAYS FREE ..................................84

DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE ..................................................................................................................... 85

NATURAL DUTIES SUCH AS MUTUAL AID APPLY REGARDLESS OF CONSENT ..................................85

ACTS WHICH ARE TYPICALLY NATURAL DUTIES ONLY BECOME SUPEREROGATORY WHEN THE ACT WOULD IMPOSE A GREAT COST ON THE AGENT ...........................................................................86

MUTUAL AID IS A NATURAL DUTY .............................................................................................................87


IT IS MORALLY ARBITRARY TO ALLOW SOCIAL GOODS TO BE DISTRIBUTED BY THOSE ARRANGEMENTS ARISING SPONTANEOUSLY THROUGH THE EXERCISE OF OUR NATURAL LIBERTIES .....................................................................................................................................................88

LIBERAL ATTEMPTS TO SECURE EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY AND SO GIVE PEOPLE WHAT THEY ‘DESERVE’ STILL FALL VICTIM TO MORAL ARBITRARINESS ..................................................................89

JUSTICE REQUIRES AIDING THOSE IN NEED BY REDRESSING ARBITRARY INEQUALITY ................90

THE NATURAL DISTRIBUTION OF TALENT IS NEITHER JUST NOR UNJUST; HOW INSTITUTIONS DEAL WITH IT IS ...........................................................................................................................................91

POSSESSING CHARACTER IS MORALLY ARBITRARY; IT CANNOT JUSTIFY SUPERIOR ENTITLEMENTS ............................................................................................................................................92

THE EXERCISE OF VIRTUES LIKE EFFORT IS A MORALLY ARBITRARY ENDOWMENT AND SO CANNOT CREATE A JUST ENTITLMENT....................................................................................................93

THE ABSENSE OF INDIVIDUAL DESERT CREATES A PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF REGARDING TALENTS AS A COMMON ASSET ...............................................................................................................94

COMMUNITARIANISM ........................................................................................................................ 95

WE ARE EACH OBLIGATED AS MEMBERS OF A COMMUNITY OF MUTUAL AID TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO OTHERS ..........................................................................................................................95

THE LIBERAL CONCEPTION OF OBLIGATION IS TOO THIN; PEOPLE HAVE MORAL OBLIGATIONS BASED ON THEIR PARTICULAR COMMUNITY RELATIONSHIPS, NOT JUST MUTUAL CONSENT .......96

COMMUNAL MEMBERSHIP CREATES OBLIGATIONS OF SOLIDARITY ..................................................97

ECONOMIC INEQUALITY UNDERMINES COMMUNITY SOLIDARITY .......................................................98

PUBLIC PROGRAMS TO HELP THE NEEDY SOLIDIFY COMMUNITY SOLIDARITY ................................99

INDIVIDUALS ARE ABLE TO PRACTICE VIRTUE ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF A PARTICULAR COMMUNITY ...............................................................................................................................................100

GOVERNMENT ACTIONS SYMBOLICALLY AFFIRM THE VALUES OF SOLIDARITY AND HUMAN DIGNITY ......................................................................................................................................................101

INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY AND LIBERTY ARE TWO OF MANY VALUES WE WISH TO SYBOLICALLY AFFIRM, INCLUDING SOLIDARITY AND HUMANE CONCERN FOR THOSE IN NEED ..........................102

VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO HELP THE NEEDY ARE INSUFFICIENT TO SYMBOLICALLY EXPRESS THE VALUE OF COMMUNITY SOLIDARITY ............................................................................103

UTILITARIANISM.............................................................................................................................. 104

THE ARGUMENT FOR GIVING AID RESTS ON A SERIES OF VERY PLAUSIBLE PREMISES ..............104

WE HAVE A DUTY TO ASSIST OTHERS AS LONG AS WE DO NOT SACRIFICE SOMETHING AS MORALLY SIGNIFICANT ............................................................................................................................105

A STRONG DUTY TO HELP THOSE IN NEED BEST PROMOTES UTILITY ............................................106

WHETHER AN OBLIGATION TO ASSIST SEEMS CONSISTENT WITH MY “FAIR SHARE” IS IRRELEVANT ..............................................................................................................................................107

THAT OBLIGATIONS TO BENEFICENCE MIGHT BE DEMANDING BEYOND WHAT SOCIETY NORMALLY REQUIRES DOES NOT MEAN THAT THEY LACK INTERNAL LOGICAL COHERENCE ...108

RELATIONALITY AND RESPONSIVENESS ........................................................................................... 109

SYMPATHY IS A NATURAL MORAL EMOTION THAT COMPELS US TO ACT IN THE FACE OF SUFFERING ................................................................................................................................................109

RELATIONALITY IS A FUNDAMENTAL FEATURE OF THE MORAL SUBJECT .......................................110

THE LIBERAL ONTOLOGY COMMONLY EMPLOYED IN LEGAL DISCOURSE IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO DESCRIBE THE ETHICAL, RELATIONAL SUBJECT .................................................................................111


OUR FUNDAMENTAL VULNERABILITY TO THE OTHER MAKES ETHICS A CORE COMPONENT OF SUBJECT FORMATION ..............................................................................................................................112

RELATIONALITY AFFIRMS THE INESCAPABLY NORMATIVE DIMENSION OF HUMAN LIFE ..............113

DEHUMANIZATION GIVES US A SENSE OF MORAL DETACHMENT THAT ALLOWS US TO IGNORE SUFFERING ................................................................................................................................................114

DEREALIZATION OF THE LIFE OF THE OTHER COMPROMISES MORAL RESPONSIVENESS ..........115

THE UNCHOSEN ADDRESS OF THE OTHER IS THE BASIS OF ETHICS ..............................................116

GENOCIDE ..................................................................................................................................... 117

IT IS A SELF-EVIDENT MORAL FAILURE TO BE FATALISTIC IN THE FACE OF ATROCITY ................117

IT IS EASY FOR OUR SENSE OF MORAL IDENTITY TO BE OVERWHELMED BY BUREAUCRACY THREATS OF PUNISHMENT ......................................................................................................................118

SOLUTIONS TO MORAL CATASTROPHES ARE SUPPORTED BY PUBLIC ETHICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL BARRIERS ...................................................................................................................119

MORAL ATROCITY DEMANDS ACTION ....................................................................................................120

POVERTY ....................................................................................................................................... 121

WE LIVE IN A UNIQUE MOMENT WHERE IT IS POSSIBLE TO ERADICATE CRIPPLLING POVERTY .121

EXTREME POVERTY IS A STATE OF BOTH UNSATISFIED BASIC NEEDS AND A LACK OF HUMAN DIGNITY ......................................................................................................................................................122

POVERTY ABROAD IS MUCH MORE SEVERE THAN DOMESTIC POVERTY IN WEALTHY SOCIETIES .....................................................................................................................................................................123

THE DEVELOPED WORLD HAS ENORMOUS AFFLUENCE ....................................................................124

EVEN PEOPLE OF AVERAGE WEALTH WASTE A TREMENDOUS AMOUNT ........................................125

AFFLUENCE IS LARGELY BASED ON A MORALLY ARBITRARY LOTTERY OF BIRTH ........................126

INDIVIDUALS ARE NOT ASSISTING THOSE IN NEED .............................................................................127

THE UNITED STATES GIVES A TINY AMOUNT OF FOREIGN AID .........................................................128

THE DUTY TO PROVIDE AID IS NOT JUST A GOVERNMENT DUTY .....................................................129

CITIZENS OF AFFLUENT SOCIETIES HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO ASSIST THE POOR ........................130

PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTANCE BLOCKS OUR MORAL INTUITIONS ABOUT HELPING THOSE IN NEED .....................................................................................................................................................................131

FUTILITY THINKING IMPEDES ALTRUISM ...............................................................................................132

DIFFUSION OF RESPONSIBILITY UNDERMINES ALTRUISM .................................................................133

IT DOES NOT TAKE THAT MANY RESOURCES TO RAISE PEOPLE FROM POVERTY ........................134

A COMMITMENT TO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IS EMINENTLY ACHIEVABLE ............................135

WE ARE OBLIGATED TO BEYOND OUR “FAIR SHARE” TO REDRESS GLOBAL POVERTY ................136

DONATING MONEY TO ASSIST THOSE IN NEED IS A DUTY NOT AN ACT OF CHARITY ....................137

LEGAL OBLIGATIONS TO ASSIST ...................................................................................................... 138

MANY COUNTRIES HAVE LAWS REQUIRING INDIVIDUALS TO ASSIST THOSE IN NEED..................138

MANY JURISDICTIONS IN THE US HAVE LAWS REQUIRING INDIVIDUALS TO ASSIST THOSE IN NEED ...........................................................................................................................................................139

BECAUSE IN A SOCIETY INDIVIDUALS RELY ON ONE ANOTHER, EVERYONE IS OBLIGATED TO ASSIST THOSE IN NEED ...........................................................................................................................140

AN OBLIGATION TO RESCUE WOULD SAVE LIVES ...............................................................................141

FAILING TO HELP SOMEONE IN NEED OF ASSISTANCE IS THE SAME AS CAUSING HARM ............142


EVERYONE IN SOCIETY BENEFITS FROM A PRINCIPLE OBLIGATING INDIVIDUALS TO RESCUE THOSE IN NEED .........................................................................................................................................143

LAWYERS HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE PRO BONO SERVICES TO THOSE IN NEED BECAUSE A PORTION OF THEIR MARKETABLE ASSESTS ARE PROVIDED BY THE PUBLIC ...........144

AS OFFICERS OF THE COURT LAWYERS HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE PRO BONO SERVICE .....................................................................................................................................................................145

PRO BONO LEGAL SERVICES BENEFIT SOCIETY .................................................................................146

AN OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE PRO BONO SERVICES IS NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN THE LEGITIMACY OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM .....................................................................................................147

AN ENFORCABLE PRO BONO OBLIGATION IS NEEDED .......................................................................148

THE PRIVLEDGES GRANTED TO LAWYERS AND THE BAR’S MONOLOPOLY ON LEGAL SERVICES CREATES AN OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE PRO BONO SERVICES .........................................................149

ALL LAWYERS SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO FUFILL THEIR PRO BONO OBLIGATION. A VOLUNTARY SYSTEM IS UNWORKABLE .......................................................................................................................150

NEGATIVE EVIDENCE ............................................................................................... 151

MORAL OBLIGATIONS AND SUPEREROGATION ................................................................................. 151

SUPEREROGATION DEFINED ..................................................................................................................151

FAILING TO ASSIST THOSE IN NEED DOES NOT DEVALUE THEM ......................................................152

FOCUSING ETHICS ON DUTY TO THE EXCLUSION OF SUPEROGATORY ACTS IMPOVERISHES A MORAL THEORY ........................................................................................................................................153

CLAIMS THAT THE AFFLUENT HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO ASSIST THE POOR ARE BASED ON A MISGUIDED CONCEPT OF DUE ................................................................................................................154

EVEN IF WE SHOULD HELP THE POOR WE SHOULD NOT BE OBLIGATED TO DO SO ......................155

CONFUSING SYMPATHY WITH OBLIGATION IS DANGEROUS .............................................................156

OBLIGATIONS TO THE SELF MUST COME BEFORE OUR OBLIGATIONS TO OTHERS ......................157

KANT’S DUTY ETHICS LEAVE ACTS OF BENEFICENCE TO THE DISCRETION OF THE AGENT .......158

THE NEEDS OF OTHERS ARE NOT A JUSTIFICATION FOR AN OBLIGATION TO CHARITY ...............159

WE DO NOT HAVE OBLIGATIONS TO THOSE WHO CANNOT RECIPROCATE ....................................160

DISTANT OBLIGATIONS AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY .............................................................. 161

WE HAVE NO OBLIGATIONS TO ASSIST ANYONE OUTSIDE OF OUR POLITICAL COMMUNITY .......161

LEVINAS WANTS TO GROUND POLITICAL NORMS IN THE ETHICS OF PROXIMITY, NOT GLOBAL OBLIGATIONS TO DISTANT OTHERS ......................................................................................................162

BADIOU ARGUES THAT ETHICS BASED ON RECOGNIZING THE VICTIMS OF ATROCITIES REPRODUCES IMPERIALISM, UNDERMINES A SUBSTANTIVE CONCEPTION OF THE GOOD, AND FOSTERS A SELF-SATISFIED CONSERVATISM .....................................................................................163

FRAMING FOREIGN AID IN TERMS OF “ASSISTANCE” PAPERS OVER THE MORAL RESPONSIBILTY OF THE DEVELOPED WORLD FOR GLOBAL POVERTY .........................................................................164

THINKING OF ANTI-POVERTY POLICIES AS “ASSISTANCE” IS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE BECAUSE ACKNOWLEDGING OUR RESPONSIBILITY FOR POVERTY IS CRITICAL TO SOLVING IT ..................165

CAPITALISM ................................................................................................................................... 166

WE NATURALLY BENEFIT FROM THE UNEQUAL ENDOWMENTS OF NATURE; IT IS NOT GOVERNMENT’S JOB TO TRY TO ‘FIX’ THEM .........................................................................................166

A FREE MARKET SYSTEM RESPECTS THE FACT THAT PEOPLE ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR CHOICES.....................................................................................................................................................167


EXTENDED SOCIETY CANNOT BE CENTRALLY PLANNED ...................................................................168

PRIVATE PROPERTY FACILITATES COORDINATION IN A SOCIETY WHERE EACH OF US ONLY HAS PARTIAL KNOWLEDGE, AND THUS FACILITATES SERVING THE NEEDS OF DISTANT OTHERS .....169

OUR INSTINCTUAL ALTRUISM ACTUALLY HARMS THOSE IN NEED ...................................................170

EFFICIENT MARKETS MAKE EVERYONE BETTER OFF .........................................................................171

CENTRAL PLANNING IS BOUND TO FAIL ................................................................................................172

LIBERTARIANISM ............................................................................................................................ 173

WE DO NOT HAVE AN OBLIGAITON TO SACRIFICE OUR FREEDOM TO ASSIST OTHERS ...............173

LIBERTARIANS OBJECT TO REDISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH ON THE GROUNDS THAT DOING SO VIOLATES A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO LIBERTY ..................................................................................174

LIBERTARIANS OPPOSE REDISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH OR INCOME IN ANY FORM ........................175

LIBERTARIANS ARGUE THAT THERE IS NOTHING INHERENTLY WRONG WITH ECONOMIC INEQUALITY SO LONG AS WEALTH IS PROCURED LEGITIMATELY ....................................................176

ONE IS ENTITLED TO PROPERTY IF IT WAS JUSTLY OBTAINED AND JUSTLY TRANSFERRED ......177

TRYING TO CONSTRUCT A PARTICULAR PATTERN OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF GOODS FAILES TO REALIZE THE HISTORICAL CHARACTER OF ENTITLEMENTS ..............................................................178

OUR INTUITIONS TELL US THAT PEOPLE ARE ENTITLED TO WHAT THEY EARN THROUGH FAIR TRANSFERS ...............................................................................................................................................179

DISTRIBUTING RESOURCES TO ATTEMPT TO ACHIEVE SOME DESIRABLE PATTERN REQUIRES CONSTANT REGULATION OF PEOPLE’S CHOICES ...............................................................................180

TAXATION IS ON PAR WITH FORCED LABOR .........................................................................................181

IT IS ILLEGITIMATE TO SEIZE A PERSON’S PROPERTY TO HELP THE NEEDY ..................................182

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT DOES NOT CREATE AN OBLIGATION TO ASSIST OTHERS .......................183

REDISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH IS THE EQUIVALENT OF GIVING PEOPLE A PROPERTY RIGHT IN EACH OTHER’S LABOR .............................................................................................................................184

PERSONS MUS BE INVIOLABLE BECAUSE THERE IS NO OVERARCHING SOCIAL GOOD; ONLY INDIVIDUAL PEOPLE VULNERABLE TO BEING SACRIFICED FOR THE SAKE OF OTHERS ...............185

TO CLAIM THAT ALL ENTITLEMENTS ARE MORALLY ARBITRARY UNDERMINES HUMAN WORTH .186

TO REGARD INDIVIDUAL TALENT AS PART OF THE COMMON PROPERTY OF SOCIETY REQUIRES THE ASSUMPTION OF A RADICALLY DETERMINED SUBJECT .............................................................187

THE ARBITRARINESS OF NATURAL ENDOWMENTS DOES NOT LOGICALLY IMPLY THAT THESE ENDOWMENTS ARE COMMUNAL PROPERTY ........................................................................................188

UTILITARIANISM.............................................................................................................................. 189

SOME UTILITARIANS OBJECT TO REDISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT DISINCENTIVES PRODUCTIVITY ..............................................................................................................189

IT MAY ULTIMATELY MAXIMIZE UTILITY TO FAVOR VALUING CONTEXTUAL MORAL RELATIONSHIPS RATHER THAN AN ABSTRACT OBLIGATION TO HELP ALL THOSE IN NEED .........190

SINGER STRONGLY OVERSTATES THE DEGREE OF RESPONSIBILITY ANY PERSON HAS FOR THE SUFFERING OF DISTANT OTHERS ..........................................................................................................191

THE IDEA THAT ALL PEOPLE’S INTERSTINGS SHOULD BE EQUALLY CONSIDERED IS HIGHLY QUESTIONABLE .........................................................................................................................................192

SINGER FAILS TO ACCOUNT FOR THE FUNDAMENTAL ROLE OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY IN ARGUING THAT THERE IS AN OBLIGATION TO RELIEVE DISTANT SUFFERING. ...............................193

IF OVERPOPULATION IS THE PRIMARY CAUSE OF GLOBAL POVERTY, IT IS NOT THE FAULT OF PEOPLE IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES .....................................................................................................194


ANY DUTY TO AID WOULD HAVE TO BE QUALIFIED BY THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE AGENT KNOW THAT THE AID WOULD ACTUALLY ALLEVIATE SUFFERING .....................................................195

IN THE LONG RUN AID WILL ONLY MAKE GLOBAL POVERTY WORSE ...............................................196

SINGERS ARGUMENT FOR AIDING THE POOR IS BASED ON A NUMBER OF FLAWED ASSUMPTIONS ...........................................................................................................................................197

LEGAL OBLIGATIONS ...................................................................................................................... 198

BAD SAMARITAN LAWS PUNISH INDIVIDUALS FOR BEING A BAD PERSON RATHER THAN COMMITING BAD ACTS .............................................................................................................................198

BAD SAMARITAN LAWS ARE LIKELY TO PUNISH INNOCENT PEOPLE. ...............................................199

BAD SAMARITAN LAWS GRANT POLICE AND PROSECUTORS TOO MUCH DISCRETION ................200

BAD SAMARITAN LAWS ARE BAD FOR SOCIETY ...................................................................................201

BAD SAMARITAN LAWS CREATE POSITIVE DUTIES THAT VIOLATE AUTONOMY .............................202

MANDATORY PRO BONO LEGAL SERVICES ACTUALLY HARM THE POOR ........................................203

A REQUIREMENT OF PRO BONO SERVICES RAISE HOUSING AND OTHER COSTS .........................204

REQUIRED PRO BONO SERVICES WOULD BE INEFFICIENT ................................................................205

THERE IS NO NEED FOR BAD SAMARITAN LAWS .................................................................................206

NON-RESCUES ARE NOT A PROBLEM. IN FACT, MORE PEOPLE DIE ATTEMPTING TO RESCUE OTHERS THAN THERE ARE REPORTED CASES OF NON-RESCUES ..................................................207

BAD SAMARITAN LAWS ARE INEFFECTIVE ............................................................................................208

BAD SAMARITAN LAWS WOULD ACTUALLY INCREASE INSTANCES OF NON-RESCUE ...................209

THE SOCIAL CONTRACT DOES NOT PROVIDE A REASON TO CREATE BAD SAMARITAN LAWS ....210

BAD SAMARITAN LAWS WOULD IMPOSE THE RISK OF INJURY ON INNOCENT BYSTANDERS .......211

BAD SAMARITAN LAWS WOULD EITHER BE UNFAIR OR IMPOSSIBLE TO ENFORCE .......................212

GOOD SAMARITAN DO NOT ACTUALLY WORK ......................................................................................213

THE PROBLEMS OF CHARITIES ........................................................................................................ 214

IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE IF A PARTICULAR USE OF MONEY IS BEST SO THERE CAN NEVER BE A PARTICULAR OBLIGATION TO GIVE TO CHARITY ...........................................................214

IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO MAKE COMPARITIVE JUDGMENTS REGARDING DONATIONS TO CHARITY .215

EMERGENCY AND CHARITABLE AID IS OFTEN ADMINISTERED WITH EXTREME INEFFICIENCY ...216


Topic Analysis by Stephen Babb

While teaching at VBI this summer, I had the opportunity to spend a week working with debaters

on this upcoming topic. It's a great vehicle for introducing debaters to moral philosophy and one

of the more fundamental questions that philosophy engages. As a competitive matter, however,

this topic is quite frankly a disaster. If a poll were taken of our little debate community, I suspect

the vast, vast majority would affirm. It is one of those beliefs that thinking people tend to hold

regardless of political preference, religion, or cultural background... the kind of belief that's so

compelling that even those who don't practice it will still preach it.

As an aside, you may be thinking to yourself: "Thank goodness this topic is so biased for the

AFF. Affirmative debaters need all the help they can get." I wouldn't get too excited, though.

There is a dangerous flipside. Given that the conventional negative positions typically associated

with the topic literature are few and only marginally compelling, negative debaters will likely resort

to all manner of cheap shots and deviant trickery, a matter we will return to shortly.

I think it's important for NEGs to answer the bell on this topic and avoid the temptations of an

easy way out. The shortsighted strategic wisdom of many gurus, coaches, and current debaters

will no doubt clamor otherwise. It's their job, after all, to shove shortcuts down your throats. No

one pays for the best sophistry on the market in order to be told how to do something the hard

way. But, I think there are many instances in which the hard way is also the most enduringly

successful way. Over time, judges will not feel good about negating on this topic if the negative

strategy boils down to technicalities and semantics. There are just too many strong, substantive

reasons to affirm the topic.

Instead, negative debaters should take solace in the empirical reality that, whatever people SAY

they believe about our obligations to help others, they very often don't help others. And, many of

those individuals have no qualms about admitting as much, even embracing it. Our social climate

is especially selfish. Under the banner of freedom, capitalism, and the American way, many

rationalize behavior that is not only un-American, but truly foreign to any conception of a well-

ordered society. Any student of business ethics, for example, will note that community interests

are for a corporation but one among many interests that must be weighed. The primary interest is

typically maximizing the wealth of shareholders. The corporation might as well be a mindless

robot designed to calculate and operationalize those interests. And on the individual level, scores

of people are selfish, myopic, and indifferent to the plight of others. If this is such a controversial

proposition (if there are really no good, substantive reasons to negate...), then why are so many

people and institutions perfectly happy to utterly ignore "people in need"? I think that the best


negative debaters will ultimately be able to explain this reality of human behavior: at some level, a

lot of people don't seem to value the needs of others. If this is such a fundamental tenet of

morality, why aren't more taking notice? After all, other moral obligations appear far more readily

accepted. We don't murder fellow citizens in droves. We don't typically harass, torture, steal,

maim, etc. Our intuitions about negative moral obligations (i.e. not harming others) seem far more

consistent than our intuitions about positive moral obligations. It may be a lot easier to find

"affirmative literature" on this topic, but there seems to be some reason to believe a lot of us

would actually negate this topic... perhaps secretly, or even sub-consciously.

"People in need"

Debaters should resist the urge to overcomplicate this topic. There should not, for example, be

extensive interpretational discussion about what it means for people to be "in need." Whatever

ambiguity one might project upon this kind of phrase, it should go without MUCH saying that

needs are vital interests. Such interests may either reflect imminent risks to a person's life or

basic well being (e.g. a lack of food, water, medical treatment, etc.), or they may express interests

in long-term "infrastructures" that reduce these risks by sustaining access to resources like

shelter, communication, or education. Sure, arguments can be made for definitions that are either

more over- or under-inclusive, but this should be extraneous to the topic's fundamental clash.

What kind of shenanigans should you keep a lookout for? One situation I foresee is a negative

debater advocating a more expansive/inclusive interpretation of "people in need" in order to

exaggerate the AFF's burden (since there may be a morally significant difference between

helping people who are starving and helping people who just happen to be really, really, really

poor). Whatever the semantic and/or logical merits of such a strategy, AFFs who find themselves

in such a situation should take solace in the fact that this kind of NC strategy can create some

uphill battles for the NEG. If nothing else, it probably means the NC doesn't have a very

promising philosophical framework. Rather than rest assured in the substantive value of a

position that fully denies a moral obligation to be beneficent, this kind of tactic is an obvious

shortcut that attempts to parse out technical distinctions between different forms of beneficence.

There is, however, one sense in which I think the NC can legitimately exploit the concept of

people being "in need." Rather than relying on definitional arguments to shift burdens or ground,

the NC could instead directly indict the premise of "need". Necessity should always be interpreted

as a function of some further value. There is no need in general--there are particular needs for

particular things. A person in need of food is in a very different situation than a person in need of

a haircut. It would be silly to just stop here, saying "Oh no, the topic is too ambiguous to affirm it!"

But, I think a well-developed position explaining why moral rules need to be more concrete could

be interesting. It's not that the topic is inconclusive (this would be the weak, skeptical version of


the position); it's that there's something morally counterproductive about overgeneralizing our

ethical commitments.

"Assist"

This is one of those words that appears innocent enough at first glance. Don't be fooled. 1ACs

may emphasize the low threshold for action established by "assist". And, those 1ACs may be

right to do so. Affirmative debaters should harbor no illusions about a given individual's ability to

solve the plights of the needy. On a broad scale, we are of course poorly equipped to do much

about global poverty or starvations. We may be able to donate funds to a charitable organization,

but even if we have the will to do more, we likely do not have the skills or opportunity to do so.

And, even in smaller examples (e.g. of a drowning child), individuals may be unsuccessful in their

rescue. These practical constraints aside, the word "assist" also clearly doesn't imply "solvency."

It doesn't even imply that the agent of action is the exclusive actor. Individuals may each do their

small part to collectively assist people in need. I do think it is important, however, for the NC to

insist on some minimal threshold for action. Sometimes when I'm checking out at the grocery

store, they'll ask if I'd like to donate a dollar to stop cancer or something terrible like that. If me

saying "sure" is all the AC has to defend, that's a lop-sided debate.

Rant #1: AFF will wimp out.

Amidst the apparently universal inability of debaters to win an affirmative ballot, the conventional

wisdom now says AFF debaters should merely become less ambitious. What were they thinking

trying to actually affirm the topic to any significant extent? Fortunately, the gurus of sophistry

found a silver bullet: just affirm a little less. Applied to this topic, the AFF burden might be to

simply prove that individuals have a moral obligation to help SOME people in need. Or, perhaps

they're only obligated to help in a very limited capacity. Or, perhaps only CERTAIN individuals

have such an obligation. Obviously, these attempts to mitigate the burden of affirmation share a

common tendency to more or less defend certain examples of obliged beneficence rather than a

categorical moral rule that requires beneficence in all possible instances to the greatest possible

extent. I think the more reasonable option (almost by definition) is right in the middle: the AFF

should defend, at the very least, a substantial category of moral requirements.

The extreme categorical burden some NCs will no doubt lobby for is simply foreign to any

reasonable discussion of beneficence. Even the more robust demands (expressed, for example,

by Peter Singer) suggest that individuals ought to make sacrifices up until the point those

sacrifices reach a threshold of cost. But, there is little agreement about such a premise, and there

is certainly not a reasonable expectation among most moral theorists for some infinite moral

obligation. There are clearly limits to what we can expect of people. People are not angels, and


our moral discourse must account for that. Additionally, our moral decisions are made within

contexts that we cannot fully control. An imperfect species in a finite world.

On the other end of the spectrum, idiosyncratic examples or narrowly construed moral obligations

seem to fall woefully short of the normative consequences we associate with unqualified

statements about our moral obligations. The topic is clearly a prescriptive statement, and

prescriptions are rules for conduct. If the 1AC is merely highlighting advantages of a particular

charitable action, this is a weak justification for prescribing beneficence as a rule for conduct. At

best, it demonstrates that it would be possible for such conduct to be obligatory. While there is

obviously a wide range of moral theories, the notion of "obligation" is almost always (at least

partially) universal. While I understand the strategic imperative debaters attach to the "plight of

having to affirm," affirmative debaters cannot fully eschew the meaning/usage of words.

Sidestepping the burdens imposed by these words not only deprives our community of important

debate; it often obscures ALL debate by provoking lengthy topicality exchanges. Both debaters

may be "to blame" for these kinds of detours, but the AFFs can help everyone out here by making

them less probable. Accept a reasonable burden. Debate.

Rant #2: NEG treachery will reign.

Once the subject of ridicule and embarrassment, arguments about semantics will play an

important part in a number of NCs. And worse yet, many of these arguments will be under-

developed and barely qualify as coherent claims. Topics like this just make it too easy. It's not

worth rehearsing all the absurdity that will be recycled for yet another two months, but I suspect

that a great many NEG ballots will have nothing to do with arguments for why individuals really

don't have to do jack for people in need. There will be lots of decisions based on disingenuous

arguments about the meaning of morality... lots of decisions based on semantic distinctions... the

usual.

My request is this: if you insist on relying on something other than a stock, substantive approach

to the NC... at least go for a substantive, NON-stock approach rather than generic, under-

developed arguments. There are lots of decent critical positions on this topic. On the one hand,

this topic is a bastion of Western philosophy (discussion of moral obligations, etc.). On the other

hand, it is also a bumper sticker for humanitarianism. The mediocre kritiks will go after Western

philosophy, morality, etc. People will dig up the same three Nietzsche cards that have been losing

rounds for the last ten years. I think the better kritiks will engage the substance of the topic:

humanitarian aid. There's much to be said about the ways the notion of "people in need" serves

as a discursive tool of victimization. Rather than facilitating long-term, sustainable solutions

through an ethic of mutual respect, this logic inherits the tradition of the "white man's burden"

along with a wide range of racist, sexist, and classist assumptions. As always, when these


arguments go wrong, they tend to flail when attempting to articulate harms as terminal impacts. It

will be important to go beyond some trite cultural imperialism story and really unearth the damage

done to those 'constructed' as victims. This may require you to re-think what counts as a harm,

but that's in many ways the point of a kritik.

The Good, the Bad, the Ugly, the Permissible, and the Supererogatory

Far too many affirmative debaters will forget one minor detail: defending that beneficence is

indeed a moral obligation. Demonstrating that a set of actions are permissible or even good (i.e.

beneficial) doesn't necessarily mean those actions are obligatory. In fact, many authors suggest

that especially charitable behavior is "supererogatory," or beyond what we'd ordinarily expect

people to do. This kind of claim isn't especially controversial. Surely, we wouldn't suggest that

individuals are morally obligated to leave their jobs and families in order to commit themselves

exclusively to charitable work. Helping those in need might even be considered a virtue. But not

all virtues constitute categories of obligations. Again, the premise is that while it may be OK or

even good for us to do something, that doesn't mean it's our duty to do so. There's a lot of truth to

these arguments, and any common sense approach to ethics would agree. But, there's also a

limit to what these arguments can accomplish.

First, there's a certain degree of semantic ambiguity that plagues our ability to craft carefully

constructed moral categories. Without stable, concrete referents to anchor our moral dialogue,

what we say with ethical statements may reflect explicit normative consensus or (more likely)

implicit agreement via common usage. Even norms that are codified (i.e. into laws) are to at least

some degree indeterminate. Accordingly, there's some question about what we mean by ideas

like "moral obligation" or "duty" or "permissibility."

Second, at some level, these kinds of negative arguments are premised upon a very skeptical

outlook. The burden of proof is presumed to be on the side of defending positive obligation, rather

than the side of moral isolationism. But, this is a troubling way to arrange the playing field. For

one thing, a skeptical starting point often makes it very difficult to escape nihilist conclusions. The

logical extension of critical theory, for example, tends to preclude any meaningful assertion of

ethical duty altogether. To be sure, criticism and skepticism can be crucial in certain contexts, and

we've known as much since Socrates humbled his Sophist interlocutors. Today, however, a kind

of scientific skepticism and ethical nihilism is already the pervasive outlook in pluralist societies.

Sure, there may be pockets of religious fundamentalism or humanitarian dogmatism that require

a skeptical check. But, it's often the case that a scientific skepticism has itself become a kind of

dogmatic fundamentalism. This suggests that our moral thinking is already clouded by skepticism

of ethical commitment or investment. Raising the bar for ascribing moral obligation exacerbates

this trend, and makes it very difficult for us to justify those ethical commitments. The notion of


helping others is perhaps second only to not harming the innocent in terms of the moral duties we

are said to have. Perhaps the burden of proof should fall on the skeptics.

Third, questions about what we ought to do shouldn't collapse into semantic squabbling. If

morality is to guide our action, then we need to settle what we ought do (whatever we want to call

it). Both debaters should keep in mind that the bottom line question is: do we owe anything to

people in need? They are looking you in the face, begging for food. Should you act? Whether or

not we consider it a duty, obligation, or simply a really good thing seems sort of beside the point.

Oh Good, More Meta-Ethics...

Anyone who knows how I feel about debate would also know I'm not a fan of the bizarre foray into

meta-ethics that typifies so many debates nowadays. But, it's important to clarify that my beef has

a lot more to do with the implementation of these debates than "meta-ethics" as such. It's also

important to note that not all philosophical frameworks are equal. In short, while I always like to

see a good, clean debate about policy-making, who could honestly say they don't want to see a

well-performed debate about philosophy? Indeed, this topic virtually requires such a debate. I

want to offer a couple of recommendations for constructing frameworks on this topic. Whatever

the particular arguments you choose to make, the key to success will be how you make them.

1. There's a difference between demonstrating that your ethical theory is viable and using it to

exclude other ethical theories. Most of the evidence that debaters use in these kinds of debates

isn't very comparative. It may explicate a virtue of the theory they're advocating, or it may isolate

problems with alternative theories, but rarely does it directly and meaningfully compare the theory

advanced by the AC to the NC's proposed alternative. That means you will have work to do in

your rebuttals, with or without evidence. Simply extending evidence from your cases is almost

never adequate. That evidence probably does not do the work you think it does.

2. The more nuanced your argument, the more important it is to be clear. You shouldn't be asking

judges in advance to yell "clear" -- you should be making a proactive effort to slow down and be

clear. Frameworks that go beyond a straightforward call for a utilitarian policy approach should be

handled with care. A lack of clarity may put your opponent at a disadvantage, but it also increases

the degree of randomness that will factor into the judge's decision. That is certainly not to your

advantage.

3. If you are applying a more general philosophical principle to the question of beneficence, you

should be able to find literature making the same application. You should never have to "make

the link" on your own. This is a topic lots and lots of people have written about. If you can't find a

link from your framework authors to the topic in literature, you're probably making a bad


argument.

The Morality of Politics: Egalitarianism, Contractualism, & Communitarianism

John Rawls was a political philosopher. He was principally concerned with discerning a fair and

legitimate scheme for organizing society. You should not be surprised, however, to encounter his

literature in a topic that is ostensibly "about morality". There's an important moral dimension to

Rawls' argument. He suggests that a fair society is one organized according to the principles that

participants would select under conditions in which they knew nothing about their status or

identity. From behind this "veil of ignorance," Rawls posits that people would want social goods

(wealth, resources, opportunities, etc.) to be arranged as equally as possible. This egalitarian

position is contrasted against the typical utilitarian approach to policy-making, framing rights as

moral trumps against the collective interests of others. This same recourse to this kind of

normative guarantee is seen again in Robert Nozick and Ronald Dworkin (also "political"

philosophers). This interplay of normative concepts is, of course, precisely what's so frustrating

with that archetypal 'novice' debate: morality vs. justice.

There are several variants of ethical systems that closely reflect the rationalist approach taken by

Rawls, often dubbed contractualism or contractarianism. Contractualism was introduced by T.M.

Scanlon as a formula for generating the ethical principles that guide action. His basic premise is

that our acts should be governed by a hypothetical assessment of which principles someone

would rationally accept or reject. A contractarian approach is similar, but highlights one of the

differences between ethical theories and those that have a more political implication.

Contractarian theories (e.g. David Gauthier) insist that we subject our ethical decisions to actual

agreement, much like a "social contract" of sorts. This kind of cooperative arrangement is, of

course, a political arrangement. But, in a world where it is increasingly difficult to base ethics on

divine revelation, it is also difficult to separate our moral thinking from these concrete political

spaces.

It should go without saying that there are many adherents to these theories, and they surely

reach a range of conclusions about what kinds of obligations we do in fact have to one another.

Indeed, they will not all espouse the same kind of egalitarianism as Rawls' justice. However, it is

a safe bet that almost all of these authors would affirm the topic. These kind of ethical formulas

rely to large degrees on either the explicit or implicit recognition of other people's interests. The

sense that we ought recognize that which is good and valuable for others is almost built into the

DNA of these theories. In fact, it may be so deeply ingrained that it often haunts the final product

as a latent assumption that yet requires justification (something to look for when others run these

arguments). Two additional warnings:


First, in terms of hypothetical contracts, it is difficult to speculate about what people would agree

upon. It is even more difficult to speculate about such agreement under the kinds of philosophical

conditions these authors imagine. For example, one of the chief criticisms made against Rawls is

that we miscalculate the kinds of decisions people might make behind the veil of ignorance.

Rawls suggests that people would adopt a rationally conservative "maximin" principle that aims to

maximize the minimum status of those most disadvantaged in society (the logic being that no one

would want to risk having nothing, even if it meant they had zero chance to be wealthy, etc.).

Critics have noted that rational decision-making is often far less risk-adverse than Rawls

assumes. While this particular example may have little application to the debates that emerge on

this topic, the key take-away point is that there's nothing scientific about guessing how idealized,

hypothetical actors would make decisions. An even more severe criticism is that using these

imaginary 'rational actors' as a starting point is itself a huge mistake. According to these critics,

human beings are no such thing. We may use rationality, but it would be absurd to think that

exclusively typifies how we make decisions. We also use our emotional attachments, instincts,

habits, etc. as bases for making decisions (even, if not especially, very important decisions). If

this is how people concretely make decisions, there's good question as to how valuable an overly

rationalistic imagination of moral agency can be.

Second, in terms of explicit contracts, you should be careful about how much we can morally

surmise from the agreements people make. One of the oldest answers to contracts in the game is

of course: "a contract with a hit man doesn't make the assassination moral." While this isn't

always the best argument, it hints at something crucial: not all contracts are equal. And,

contractual stipulations may sometimes be a necessary condition for legitimacy, but they are

rarely a sufficient condition. There must typically be additional/external factors supporting the

legitimacy of the contract (e.g. did both parties understand it, was there duress, etc.?).

A final, quick cautionary point: while there is lots of overlap between the moral and political

elements of some of these theories, you should still be careful when using them. There is, for

example, great temptation to simply replicate the classic Rawls vs. Nozick debate that frequented

LD circles over a decade ago. But, many of Nozick's arguments are against a political system that

redistributes wealth against the will of its constituents. These kinds of arguments wouldn't

necessarily reject the notion that we have a moral obligation to help others. They simply reject the

premise that it's the role of the state to enshrine these obligations into policy. When YOU make

arguments on this topic, it is crucial that your conclusions speak to what we as individuals are

obligated to do rather than what the state's government apparatus is obligated to do. The two

responsibilities may, in some cases, be one and the same. But, there is little doubt that we can

make very different kinds of arguments in each instance, and you don't want to find yourself

confusing the two.


The contractually based theories we've discussed so far presuppose that we, as moral actors, are

also rational and construct ethics accordingly. Communitarian authors reach many of the same

political and ethical conclusions, but they do not share the view of morality as a rationally

constructed model for behavior, and nor do they view individuals as principally rational agents.

Instead, we are beings who are socially indebted. This outlook sees human agency as a product

of external influence (family, language, tradition, religion, etc.). Unfortunately, when debaters run

communitarianism, they often stop with this kind of sociological analysis while failing to justify any

subsequent normative/prescriptive conclusions. While the mistakes other debaters often make

shouldn't deter you from investigating this literature further, you should ensure that you don't

make the same mistake. In short, even if we "come from" the community, what do we owe the

community in return? This is the crucial question. A lot of communitarian arguments seem to

succeed as criticisms of Cartesian subjectivity and other ideas we've inherited from the

Enlightenment. It's thusly unsurprising that communitarian literature shares a lot in common with

Continental critical theory. But, it is one thing to understand where previous philosophy falls short,

and it is quite another to defend an adequate alternative. The challenge in running this position is

doing precisely that: explaining why "what we are" has moral implications for "what we should

do." You may be winning that we are "social creatures" all day long, but what does that count for

in terms of our obligations?

Lobbying for Individualism

In one way or another, most negative positions will attempt to say that we really owe one another

nothing at all. We should leave each other alone, respect each other's space, and so on. Perhaps

the purest manifestation of this thinking is objectivism. Typically fodder for jokes or head

scratching, objectivism may indeed be somewhat unavoidable for a lot of debaters on this topic.

The idea (popularized by Ayn Rand) is certainly multifaceted, but its relevant implications include

the belief that the moral thing for people to do is to pursue their own self-interests. Rand was as

much (if not more so) a novelist than a rigorous philosopher. She's besmirched by many in

academia, and certainly doesn't seem like an attractive starting point for us. And yet, making use

of this kind of argument makes some sense for NEGs given the topic. I would recommend looking

into other objectivists who have taken on the mantle of Rand's philosophy in more recent years.

Many of them will no doubt make arguments that are more suitable for a debate case, and they'll

do so without the negative connotation so many associate with Rand directly. I could list some

authors, but I would really just be telling you what Wikipedia said, so I'll direct you there instead

(look under the section "Post-Rand Development").

When this topic was debated over the summer, there was a bizarre twist when it came to these

kinds of NCs. Debaters felt the need to indict moral obligations (or perhaps more specifically,


positive moral obligations) by suggesting that they illegitimately limited individual autonomy. I

think it's important to be clear about what a moral obligation actually "does". There's really

nothing concrete about morality, certainly nothing concrete enough to impinge on a person's

autonomy. Morality doesn't have an enforcement mechanism, and people empirically decide to

take unethical actions all the time. If there were anything physically binding or restrictive about

morality, this wouldn't happen. This should seem like pretty obvious point to most readers. We

call things moral obligations, we think of things as moral obligations, but we certainly have no

ways of giving those moral obligations a magical police force and locking up all those monsters

who violate our ethical code. As obvious as this may be, that did not stop otherwise intelligent

debaters from making arguments about personal autonomy.

The real task for negative debaters is to explain why a person who is utterly free to make her

choices is entirely justified in choosing not help people in need. I think one of the best reasons is

that people have other obligations as well. We must negotiate between our obligations, including

the special duties we have to those in our family, those who depend on us, those who employ us,

and so on. The AC might say, "Just because two obligations conflict, it does not follow that the

secondary obligation is no longer an obligation." But, this is an absurd way to think about

obligations. They do not exist generically in vacuums. An obligation is nothing if not a duty to do a

particular thing in a particular circumstance. Otherwise, the concept of moral duty fails to guide

our action and becomes a vacuous platitude we turn to when convenient. What makes something

obligatory is the notion that, even in the face of other interests, we must do the right thing. The

NC should say, "Yes, we are morally obligated to help people, but we should help those with

whom we share certain relationships. Our obligations should be a function of something other

than need."

End.


Topic Analysis by Jane Kessner

Introduction

In the same vein as this year's September/October topic, this resolution might initially appear to

be either a throwback to the yesteryears of 90s LD, or one of those “not really a fortune”

statements from a fortune cookie. As such, some debaters will inevitably complain that this topic

is boring and assert that they want to debate about “real” and “cool” things, like nuclear war,

terrorism, and environmental collapse. I strongly encourage you to abandon the view that

debating about poverty and ethics is somehow inferior to contrived nuclear escalation scenarios

and get excited about this topic, for a couple of reasons.

First, just like it was in the 90s, LD remains values debate. Our resolutions are vague for a

reason: LD is about debating principles, not pure policy. Obviously, many of our resolutions ask

us to examine, in a philosophical light, somewhat specific policies, and so policy-type arguments

certainly have a place in LD. However, this topic is even more general than are most LD

resolutions. The object of evaluation, assisting people in need, is less specific than nuclear

weapons, treating juveniles as adults in the criminal justice system, private military firms, and so

on. While most of these former topics are clearly questions of applied ethics, the question of this

resolution is more directly ethical. In this sense, it is comparable to past resolutions such as “It is

morally permissible to kill one innocent person to save the lives of more innocent people” and

“When forced to choose, a just government ought to prioritize universal human rights over its

national interest.” On other topics, it is possible for debaters to be successful running cases with

short and poorly warranted frameworks that discuss harms or benefits of some policy without

engaging in deep philosophical inquiry. I think that success on this topic will require debaters to

debate values in a nuanced manner. The central conflict area of this topic is a generalized ethical

question, and so good cases on this topic will have to delve into rather than sidestep normative

philosophy. Not only will this (hopefully) create interesting philosophical debaters on this topic, but

it should also familiarize debaters with a literature base that could be used to improve framework

debates on future topics.

Second, this topic is incredibly “real-world.” All too often, debates become about wildly

improbable scenarios, such as one act of international intervention resulting in global nuclear war

and extinction, or one change in the U.S. legal system suddenly causing complete anarchy! While

these arguments could theoretically be made on this topic, extreme poverty is very much a real

and pressing issue. The impacts of global poverty are existent and devastating, and so instead of


contriving improbable impact stories, debaters can engage in realistic discussions of poverty and

assistance.

Overall, this topic could make for some fantastic debates if approached correctly. Many

philosophers directly address the question of this resolution, and most normative ethical theories

could somehow be applied to this topic. Debaters can also employ great contemporary examples,

ranging from the need for domestic social welfare programs and private charities, to the realm of

foreign aid and charitable international NGOs. Because seasonal holidays mean that there are

usually not a ton of tournaments on the November/December topic, it isn't really necessary to

write “crazy” or incredibly surprising cases. Instead, debaters can use this opportunity to write

nuanced, deep, pre-emptive cases that address a serious day-to-day issue in a philosophical

way.

Definitions and Interpretational Issues

Unlike some other resolutions, anyone who reads this resolution has a basic idea of what it

means. None of the words are particularly rare or confusing. The unclear part of this topic is what

it means to affirm. Does giving a dollar to a homeless person once in a while constitute assisting

people in need? Or, does assisting people in need require such extreme action so as to require

fundamentally changing one’s lifestyle? What renders a person “in need”? Does asserting that

individuals are obligated to assist people in need require the affirmative to defend a world in

which everyone actually provides this assistance?

The answers to each of these questions will determine the division of ground on this topic.

Depending on which interpretations the affirmative chooses, the resolution could mean drastically

different things. Luckily, much of the core philosophical literature will affirm or negate under a

number of different possible interpretations. On this topic, defining the terms in the resolution

using dictionary definitions is less important than explaining, with warrants, what the terms mean

in the context of this resolution and how that influences what each side must defend. With that in

mind, let’s examine the terms:

Individuals

First off, just accept that “individuals” means individual humans. Someone who thinks that they

are clever will inevitably run a case about how individual states should assist people in need, or a

negative with a lot of recycled cards from the September/October topic about how individual


animals can’t possibly be obligated to assist people in need because they are not moral actors!

The literature on this topic is about the individual, human duty of beneficence (which will be

discussed in more detail later on).

One important interpretational issue will revolve around which individuals are the subjects of this

resolution. The resolution does not explicitly include a modifier, suggesting that the affirmative

must prove that all individuals have this duty. Obviously though, it would be unreasonable to force

the affirmative to defend that infants have a moral obligation to assist people in need because

they would be incapable of doing so. But other cases are far less clear. For example, do

“individuals” include people who are in need themselves? Does the affirmative have to defend

that people living in poverty have an obligation to assist people who are in equal or greater need?

I think that it is reasonable for the affirmative to defend the existence of a general, but not

necessarily universal, obligation for individuals who are not themselves in need (and are thus

capable of providing assistance) to assist those who are. There will always be exceptions to the

rule generated by this resolution (ex. Infants), but those exceptions are not relevant to the core

conflict, and so defending the resolution as a general principle provides best access to topical

arguments.

On the resolution, “States out not possess nuclear weapons”, many debaters used the presence

of the plural word “states” to justify running plans arguing that two or more specific states should

disarm. Debaters might likewise be tempted to run plans on this topic arguing that two or more

individuals have an obligation to assist people in need. I think that specific-actor plans on this

topic make much less sense than on previous topics such as nuclear disarmament. Unlike states,

of which there are a manageable and finite number, there are an absurd number of individuals to

choose from, rendering the vast majority of specific-actor plans wildly unpredictable. Also, the

reasons why any particular individual would uniquely have an obligation to assist people in need

would likely be different than the generalized reasons why most individuals have such an

obligation. For example, if the affirmative runs a plan arguing that Bill Gates or Barack Obama or

people working in some specific profession have an obligation to assist people in need, the

justifications are most likely actor-specific. But to justify an actor-specific obligation is to entirely

sidestep this resolution, which questions the existence of an agent-neutral duty of beneficence.

Moral Obligation

This is probably the most important term in the resolution. Because this resolution is so general,

the evaluative term (here, “moral obligation”, on other topics, it might be “ought”, “it is just”, “it is

morally permissible”, etc.) is perhaps even more important than usual. The resolution asks us to


examine the scope of our moral obligations. Are we obligated only to ourselves? To people within

our immediate communities? To everyone? To those experiencing suffering? To those with whom

we enter into explicit agreements? In many cases, once you have proven what morality is and

what our moral obligations are in general, you will have already affirmed or negated.

Traditionally, acts that fall within the realm of morality are categorized as morally obligatory,

morally permissible, or morally prohibited. Merely proving that something is morally good does

not necessarily prove that it is morally obligatory, only that it is morally permissible and would be

nice were it to happen. In order for an act to be morally obligatory, one must have a duty or

responsibility to take that action. If I am morally obligated to assist people in need, then it is

proactively wrong for me to fail to do so.

The ethical framework that you choose will greatly influence what constitutes a moral obligation.

For example, utilitarians would say that if an action produces the greatest amount of good for the

greatest number of people, it is not only morally good, but morally obligatory. If I have a choice

between heroically saving one million lives and heroically saving one million and one lives, the

strict utilitarian would claim that it would be wrong for me to take the former action, wrong for me

to save one million lives when I could have instead saved one million and one. Thus, according to

utilitarianism, we are morally obligated to maximize good consequences. Advocates of other

ethical theories have drastically different conceptions of what our moral obligations are.

Deontologists believe that we are obligated not to use others as means to an end, contractarians

believe that we are obligated to abide by mutual agreements, communitarians believe that we are

obligated to promote the strength of our communities, etc. My basic point here is that the ethical

theory that you choose to advocate will determine what a moral obligation is. Instead of defining

“moral obligation” using a dictionary or in a vacuum, explain what constitutes a moral obligation in

the context of your chosen philosophical system.

Assist

The ambiguity in this term will probably contribute to a large portion of the interpretational debates

on this topic. It is unclear how extensive the assistance needs to be to constitute affirmation. On

one hand, the affirmative probably shouldn’t be able to get away with arguing that people have an

obligation to give a dollar or two to charity now and then. Yet it also seems unfair to force the

affirmative to defend that people ought to give so much to charity that they themselves would

become destitute.


Peter Singer, who is bound to be one of the most oft-cited philosophers on this topic, defines the

scope of assistance when he writes1:

“if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing

anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it. By ‘without

sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance’ I mean without causing anything

else comparably bad to happen, or doing something that is wrong in itself, or failing to

promote some moral good, comparable in significance to the bad thing that we can

prevent.

Affirmatives, especially those running positions inspired by the work of Singer or other utilitarians,

might employ this definition of assistance. In short, we are obligated to assist people in need up

to the point where it requires us to sacrifice something of comparable moral importance. But even

this level of assistance would be extreme. It implies, according to Singer2:

“that we ought to give until we reach the level of marginal utility - that is, the level at

which, by giving more, I would cause as much suffering to myself or my dependents as I

would relieve by my gift. This would mean, of course, that one would reduce oneself to

very near the material circumstances of a Bengali refugee.”

This seems to be an incredibly large obligation for the affirmative to defend. Unfortunately, there

doesn’t seem to be another obvious way in which to non-arbitrarily specify the scope of

assistance. If your affirmative arguments are general enough, you might be able to get away with

saying that the assistance will be “considerable” or “substantial.” As a negative, you should use

CX to press the affirmative on how much assistance they defend, and a depending on their

answer, either a) run a theory argument saying that they are defending too little, b) claim that their

level of assistance is not enough to generate any significant moral benefits, or c) (and most likely)

argue that an obligation to provide such a great amount of assistance is over-demanding (this

argument will be discussed as a negative position later on).

Another question arising from the term “assist” is what type of act constitutes assistance. Does

assistance imply giving money to charitable organizations, directly contributing your services to

an organization (i.e. building houses with Habitat for Humanity, working at a soup kitchen, joining

the Peace Corps), or giving money or services to particular people in need outside of an

institutional context? What about paying taxes that are used to fund welfare programs? The sorts

1 Peter Singer. “Famine, Affluence, and Morality.” Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 1, no. 1

(Spring 1972), pp. 229-243 [revised edition]. 2 Ibid 1


of assistance in the first list seem to pretty clearly constitute assistance. But it is much less clear

whether being coerced to pay taxes that are then used to create welfare programs which assist

people in need constitutes an individual assisting people in need. I think that this could be an

interesting topicality debate. In terms of plans, while I’m not sure how much of a place they have

on this topic at all, plans that specify a broad type of assistance (paying taxes, donating to some

specific charity, etc.) seem more predictable and theoretically legitimate than plans that specify

an actor.

People In Need

This term, like the others in the topic, is fairly ambiguous, but I don’t think that it will become a

huge issue in that many debates. While “people in need” is not a term of art, it pretty clearly

implies people living in some level of poverty. Obviously, ridiculous interpretations are possible.

Debaters could argue that to be “in need” is to be in emotional or spiritual need, or that anyone

who needs a single thing is in need. Generally though, people in need are significantly lacking in

essential resources. If you want a specific cut-off point for how impoverished a person needs to

be in order to be in need, you could use a poverty line, but poverty lines differ drastically between

countries. Once again, I think a vague conception of what constitutes a person in need will suffice

in most rounds. If pressed in CX, you can say something like “people in need lack essential

resources and are at present incapable of staying afloat in their societies.”

Another question is whether the affirmative must defend an obligation to assist all people in need,

regardless of location or relationship to the agent. Certain arguments might justify an obligation to

assist people in one’s own community or nation, but not to assist people in far-off corners of the

world. Once again, this resolution is a very general, agent-neutral statement, and arguing that we

have on obligation to assist people in our families or very close communities seems to rely on

agent-specific duties. I don’t think that one side is clearly more right than the other on the

question of whether an obligation to assist people in one’s own larger community or nation

constitutes affirmation.

Interpretations: Final Thoughts

Overall, I think that there are some interesting interpretational questions up for debate on this

topic. I strongly encourage you to engage in these debates substantively rather than just reading

competing definitions, as what matters here is the context of the resolution. Topic literature, such

as Singer’s explanation of assistance, will provide answers to some of these questions. Finally,


while each of these issues can be debated, many of the philosophical positions on this topic are

general enough so as to affirm or negate under a wide array of possible interpretational schema.

Framework

I think that the most difficult part of writing cases on this topic for many debaters will be figuring

out how to structure value and value criterion analysis. Most LD resolutions are questions of

applied ethics. They feature an object of evaluation which is usually some sort of policy (think

economic sanctions, the possession of nuclear weapons, the use of eminent domain, private

military firms, etc.). They also include an evaluative term such as “it is just” or “ought not” or “it is

morally permissible.” On topics such as these, the value and value criterion analysis serves to

establish some sort of normative political or ethical theory (ex. Utilitarianism, deontology,

democratic theory, cosmopolitanism, social contract theory, etc.). Then, the contention-level

arguments link the object of evaluation to that ethical theory, arguing for instance that the

possession of nuclear weapons uses people in the target nation as a means to an end.

This resolution is different. It is much closer to being a direct ethical question than are typical LD

resolutions. Once you have established a particular ethical theory, you have likely already done

most of the work needed to affirm or negate. For example, once you’ve established that

utilitarianism is true, it is fairly clear that helping impoverished people will increase net benefits.

Likewise, once you’ve established the libertarian theory that individuals do not have positive

obligations to others, it is quite obvious that you negate. Many moral philosophers directly answer

the question of this resolution. It is not necessary to justify a moral theory and then spend 4

minutes linking the action of the resolution to that moral theory because the moral theory itself

encompasses or implies the action of the resolution (assisting people in need).

So what are debaters to do? One option is to get rid of values and value criteria altogether. You

can instead run syllogistic cases. For example, argue in Section 1 that if utilitarianism is true, then

you affirm, because helping impoverished people clearly maximizes utility. Then, Section 2 would

feature a number of reasons why utilitarianism is true. Burdens-based cases are also an option. A

simple negative case might argue that the affirmative has the burden to prove that positive

obligations exist at all, as they are arguing in favor of a specific positive obligation. Then, the

negative contention would establish that positive obligations do not exist.

However, a lot of judges like values and criteria, and a lot of debaters are used to debating with

that structure. Luckily, values and criteria do have a place on this topic, though I think that re-


conceptualizing them a bit would improve the quality of framework debates. If you are running a

utilitarian affirmative, instead of having a value of morality and then a criterion of “maximizing life”,

consider making your criterion a quality that a moral theory must have in order to be a coherent

and acceptable moral theory. Some people in the debate community refer to these as “meta-

ethical” standards. This criterion does not have to be something that philosophers would consider

meta-ethical. Rather, the idea here is to establish a standard that ethical theories (such as

utilitarianism, deontology, contractualism, etc.) must meet in order to be preferred ethical

theories. Here is an example: imagine that you are running a utilitarian affirmative case. Your

value is morality, your criterion is “consistency with universalizability.” You justifications for your

criterion explain why in order to be an adequate moral theory, a moral theory must be

universalizable. Then, your contention has two parts. In Subpoint A you argue that utilitarianism

(controversially) is the only ethical theory that can truly be universalized (applied in all situations).

In Subpoint B, you argue that assisting people in need maximizes utility. Subpoint B should be

very quick and easy to win. This same basic case structure can be used regardless of your

particular ethical theory.

I think that this type of case structure is appropriate for the resolution because it allows us to

delve more deeply into comparing ethical theories on what is a fundamentally ethical topic.

Setting up criteria that ethical systems must conform to in order to be coherent ethical systems

allows us to ask foundational questions like: what is morality in the first place? What is a moral

obligation? What specific qualities render one ethical system superior to another? These are

questions that we must answer before determining whether morality entails an obligation to assist

people in need.

Affirmative Positions

A good starting point for affirmative literature is the concept of beneficence. According to the

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy3:

“The term beneficence connotes acts of mercy, kindness, and charity, and is suggestive

of altruism, love, humanity, and promoting the good of others. In ordinary language, the

notion is broad; but it is understood still more broadly in ethical theory, to include

effectively all forms of action intended to benefit or promote the good of other persons.

3 Beauchamp, Tom, "The Principle of Beneficence in Applied Ethics", The Stanford

Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =

<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/principle-beneficence/>.


The language of a principle or rule of beneficence refers to a normative statement of a

moral obligation to act for the benefit of others, helping them to further their important and

legitimate interests, often by preventing or removing possible harms.”

Thus, defending a general principle of beneficence towards people in need affirms. There are a

number of ways to go about justifying a principle of beneficence, each of which constitutes a

potential affirmative position.

Utilitarianism

The first major affirmative option is to adopt a utilitarian view. According to utilitarianism, an act is

right if it results in the greatest good for the greatest number; if it increases happiness and

reduces misery to the greatest extent possible. Peter Singer is one of the major advocates of this

view who has applied it specifically to the issue of assisting people in need. He explains his

argument using a compelling analogy4:

“if it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without thereby

sacrificing anything morally significant, we ought, morally, to do it. An application of this

principle would be as follows: if I am walking past a shallow pond and see a child

drowning in it, I ought to wade in and pull the child out. This will mean getting my clothes

muddy, but this is insignificant, while the death of the child would presumably be a very

bad thing. The uncontroversial appearance of the principle just stated is deceptive. If it

were acted upon, even in its qualified form, our lives, our society, and our world would be

fundamentally changed. For the principle takes, firstly, no account of proximity or

distance. It makes no moral difference whether the person I can help is a neighbor's child

ten yards from me or a Bengali whose name I shall never know, ten thousand miles

away. Secondly, the principle makes no distinction between cases in which I am the only

person who could possibly do anything and cases in which I am just one among millions

in the same position.”

Essentially, proximity and the existence of other potential helpers are not morally significant. If

utilitarianism is true and we are morally obligated to maximize happiness (and thus minimize

suffering), and assisting people in need would reduce suffering without compromising anything of

comparable moral importance, then individuals have a moral obligation to assist people in need.

This position is simple, logical, and persuasive to a wide variety of judges. The difficulty here will

be defending utilitarianism against a barrage of criticisms. However, there is a great deal of

4 Ibid 1


diversity within utilitarianism, both in terms of interesting and nuanced justifications for the theory

and variations such as rule utilitarianism. Delving into this field of literature will allow you to

construct a number of distinct utilitarian affirmatives.

Kantian Beneficence

You might be thinking: “wait, if utilitarianism is an affirmative position, then shouldn't Kant

negate?” Certain aspects of Kantian theory could be used to craft a negative case, but Kant also

wrote good arguments for the affirmative. Kant believed in a principle of beneficence, as the

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy5 explains:

“Kant notoriously rejects the utilitarian understanding of a supreme principle of

beneficence, but he still finds a vital place in the moral life for beneficence. He seeks

universally valid principles of duty, and beneficence is one such principle. A motive of

benevolence based on sentiment—so admired by Hume—is morally unworthy in Kant's

theory unless the motive of benevolent action is a motive of duty. Kant argues that

everyone has a duty to be beneficent, i.e. to be helpful to others according to one's

means, and without hoping for any form of personal gain thereby. Benevolence done

from friendly inclination he regards as “unlimited” (a term subject to different

interpretations, but meaning “having no boundaries in potential scope”), whereas

beneficence from duty does not place unlimited demands on persons. This does not

mean that the limits of duties of beneficence are clear and precise. While we are

obligated to some extent to sacrifice some part of our welfare to benefit others without

any expectation of recompense, it is nonetheless impossible to fix a definite limit on how

far this duty extends. We can only say that every single person has a duty to be

beneficent, according to that person's means and that no one has an unlimited duty to do

so.”

Kant argues that a principle of non-beneficence would not be universalizable, because if we were

to will a maxim of non-beneficence, people would only help others if it were to their own

advantage. So, we must reject non-beneficence and accept a positive duty of beneficence.

Rawlsian Ethics

A third affirmative position centers around the contractual work of John Rawls. Rawls argues that

we must determine proper moral principles based on whether rational beings would hypothetically

5 Ibid 3


consent to them. Moral principles must respect the rationality of other human beings; they must

be norms to which each member of society would agree. Yet in the real world, our moral

judgments are rendered impure and biased by each of our particular gender, race, age, class,

and position in the world. Thus, in order to determine optimal moral principles, we must imagine

what rules hypothetical rational beings behind the veil of ignorance, stripped of all identity and

characteristics, would consent to. Rawls argues that, behind the veil of ignorance, hypothetical

rational beings would choose principles that benefit the least advantaged. From behind the veil,

when we do not know who we will be in the world, there is always the possibility that we

ourselves will be the least advantaged members of society. Thus, we would never choose

policies that would leave us destitute in the case that we were the least advantaged. Instead, we

would choose policies that ensured welfare for the least well off in society. The case would then

go on to (easily) argue that a moral principle advocating benefitting the least advantaged implies

a moral obligation to assist people in need.

Communitarianism

Drawing on the work of Michael Sandel and Amitai Etzioni, communitarians argue that the

government should not merely arbitrate between conflicting rights claims and protect negative

rights. To do so is to treat human beings as atomistic, isolated, singular creatures. But

communitarians claim that humans are fundamentally social animals. Our identities come from

our communities, we do not exist apart from them. Individual rights are meaningless without a

communal enforcement mechanism, and so the community is the primary rights-holder.

Communities have value apart from the individuals of whom they composed. Consequently, we

are each obligated to the community as a whole and should be considered based on our situation

within the community. If we are obligated to the community, then we are obligated to assist

people in need because a) people in need are members of the community (especially if you

include cosmopolitan arguments in this case and claim that there is a global community), and b)

having members in extreme need places stress on the community and tears at the communal

fabric. Thus in order to fulfill our obligation to advance our communities, we must help those

within our communities who are in need.

No Act/Omission Distinction

This case would argue that there is no distinction between violating someone's rights or infringing

upon a side-constraint and failing to protect their rights. Every time we fail to step in and stop a

preventable death abroad, someone dies. So, our failure to assist people in need constitutes a

massive moral wrong. Refraining from beneficence uses people as a means to an end by


tolerating their suffering in exchange for our extra few dollars or hours that we don't truly need.

We thus have a moral obligation to assist people in need in order to halt these constant rights

violations.

Levinas/The Other

Levinasian ethics emphasize acceptance of those who are entirely different from ourselves and

who we cannot hope to fully understand. Levinas advocated “ethics of the Other” and says that

we must embrace rather than shirk the Other. We can only understand ourselves and our own

subjectivity through encounters with the Other. The specific arguments for this theory are rather

nuanced and feature some language that is difficult to decipher, so be sure to read this literature

thoroughly before running this case position. In short, the argument is that only by assisting

people in need can we truly embrace the other and recognize that we are intertwined with them.

Only by recognizing the needs of the ignored can we express moral love for the Other.

Negative Positions

Instead of defending a duty of beneficence, most negatives will defend a duty of non-maleficence;

the concept that we must not proactively harm others.

Over-Demandingness

This position would argue that the obligation generated by the affirmative puts too much of a

strain on the individual, it demands too much of us. To meet Singer's standard, for example, we

would have to put aside most of our life projects and devote a large amount of time and resources

to assisting people in need. Moral systems must be grounded in the real world; we must be

capable of fulfilling our moral obligations in order for them to bind us to act. Thus, if our moral

obligations are over-demanding, they are no longer binding upon us. The morality advocated by

the affirmative simply asks too much of us.

Libertarianism

Robert Nozick argues that morality is a system of constraints, and we are essentially free to do as

we wish until we violate the side-constraints of others. We do not have positive duties to help

others, only the negative duty of non-interference. Thus, we do not owe anything to people in

need, and so do not have an obligation to assist them. Beneficence is a nice thing to do, but it

goes beyond the call of duty, it is supererogatory, not obligatory. This case could be run in a more


directly deontological manner if you argue that assisting people in need constitutes overriding out

own side-constraints and individual value. Or, it could simply deny the existence of positive

duties.

Ethical Egoism

A la Ayn Rand, this theory says that what one morally ought to do is whatever is in one's own

self-interest. It rejects altruism, and says that the only way to truly value ourselves and humanity

is to care solely about our own life projects. We degrade ourselves and allow ourselves to be

used when we stifle our own creative ambitions for the sake of others. Assisting people in need

would detract from the resources that we devote to ourselves. If we only have the obligation to

further our own self-interest, then we certainly do not have an obligation to assist people in need.

Contractarianism

This general category of case would contend that only contracts or mutual agreements are

capable of obligating us to act. Morality must be binding, and only contracts which we agree to in

self-interest can motivate us to abide by the rules of morality. We cannot be obligated to alter our

actions in regard to agents much less powerful than us because there is no penalty for breaking

our agreement with them, and so the agreement was never truly mutual or binding. Only contract

can generate moral obligations, and we would never consent to a contract to assist people in

need. Look into David Gauthier and Peter Vallentyne.

Counterproductive Effects

Unlike the other positions listed which are highly philosophical, this position is basically just a

criticism of foreign aid, or charity in general. The argument is that end ends up in corrupt hands or

creates dependency and results in a worse end state than existed before the aid was given.

Basically, any consequentialist harms of assisting people in need fit into this category. I don't find

this position especially persuasive because the fact that we are horrible at implementing aid

programs does not deny the existence of a moral obligation to help people as best we can.

Arguments about how aid will always be inherently bad because it creates psychological and

habitual dependency are somewhat better.

Moral Nihilism


This set of arguments denies that moral obligations exist by way of denying that morality exists.

There are a number of different ways to arrive at the nihilist's conclusion, but the basic idea is that

we cannot know moral facts about the world, nothing is either moral or immoral. If there is no

such thing as morality, or at least a morality that is binding upon us, then it is impossible for us to

have any moral obligations, not to mention the particular obligation to assist people in need. I

think that these arguments have more of a place on this topic than on other topics, but a lot of

judges are sick of these positions, and there is so much great, topic-specific literature to employ.

So, while nuanced versions of the NC might be strategic, I urge you not to run a recycled nihilism

NC every round.

Concluding Thoughts

Obviously, there are more possible cases on this topic. The ones listed above are drawn from the

core philosophic literature. I recommend that literature base as a starting point; branch out from

there. This topic will provide a great laboratory in which to experiment with advanced framework

debates. Try running a philosopher who you're unfamiliar with or structuring a framework

differently. It's true that this topic could become boring if debated poorly, but if debaters are willing

to truly internalize the core topic literature and run nuanced, positional cases, it will prove

considerably more interesting. Using real libraries and philosophical databases where full texts

are available will prove instrumental to success on this topic. Good luck!


Topic Analysis by Christian Tarsney

I generally try to start these analyses by saying something upbeat and encouraging about the

topic, to make the case that there are good and interesting debates to be had for the next two

months. It seems especially necessary with respect to this resolution, since I know that a lot of

people—probably a solid majority—are less than thrilled with it. Or just hate it.

So I want to make it clear that I’m not just whistling in the dark, or saying the nice things I’d try to

say about any topic, when I claim that this topic is actually pretty sweet. Here’s my case: First, to

get this out of the way, a lot of people seem to be wrongly assimilating this topic to the same

category as the Trolley Problem resolution of a few years back (“It is morally permissible to kill

one innocent person to save the lives of more innocent people.”). There were at least a couple

things wrong with that topic: First, it was trying its best to force debaters into 45-minute util/deont

debates every round, with literally nothing further to do beyond making what would ordinarily be

standards6 arguments. Second, it expressed what seemed an awful lot like a categorical moral

judgment across a range of radically morally disjoint contexts.

This resolution doesn’t really do either of those things. While it certainly does call for debates

about moral theory, it doesn’t only call for those debates—there is both affirmative and negative

offense to every major moral theory, as we’ll see shortly (ethical egoism is of course a plausible

exception, but even there it’s not obvious). And, relative to the Trolley Problem topic, there are

more interesting contributions from moral theories other than deontology and utilitarianism.

With respect to the problem of context, there is obviously some of that—in particular, an

indistinction between cases of immediate, proximate need (babies in puddles) and ones of

relatively distant, long-term need (starving children in Africa), which present substantially different

moral considerations. My guess is that, de facto, everyone will just end up debating the starving

children and leaving the drowning babies, since the latter are a much less interesting debate at

the post-ethical theory level (i.e., leave negatives little ground other than extreme egoism,

skepticism, or weird debate bastardizations of deontology) and there are difficulties with the

affirmative limiting their position to an obligation that people only have in a strong sense in fairly

rare circumstances. (If most of us never actually see a drowning baby or moral equivalent, is it

6 Brief soapbox moment: The trend towards calling arguments for a normative theory “framework”

rather than “standards” arguments, even when there is actually an explicit standard in the case, creates pointless confusion with interpretative framework (definitions, burdens analysis, etc.), and facilitates profoundly stupid arguments like “normative AFC” that exploit the confusion in-round. The only reason to talk that way is a desire to slavishly ape policy, when the kinds of debates we’re actually having pretty clearly demand a different vocabulary.


still correct to say that “Individuals have a moral obligationX”, full stop? Do we have, in some

sense, “merely potential” obligations? I think most debaters will smartly shy away from these

questions, given the difficulty of resolving them clearly in round.)

On the flip side, here’s what’s cool about the topic: First, the depth and variety of positions—as I

suggested above, it’s not just that every major ethical theory in the philosophical literature weighs

in on the topical question in a unique way, but also that within almost all those theories there are

interpretative and/or normative debates to be had as well (that distinction should make more

sense once we start talking about arguments).

Second, the explicitly individual actor is something that we get only rarely, and while I’m sure it’s

what some people like least about the topic, but it seems to me that this is mainly because debate

(or at least national circuit debate) has a tendency to give people the vague, usually unstated,

and wholly unjustified impression that questions of individual morality are vague and wishy-washy

where questions of state morality are concrete and well-defined. This impression arises, I think,

because there is much more written about the particular actions of states, real or potential, than

about any particular actions of individuals, and so the literature on individual morality tends to be

more abstract, relying on thought experiments rather than case studies. But of course all the

same vague, hard-to-define and hard-to-answer questions of moral theory lurk in the background

of every question of state policy (unless we manage to shut up that little voice asking “why” with a

plan text and some O’Donnell cards). In any case, it’s interesting to get a little variety in actor

sometimes.

Third, and more particularly, this resolution asks a moral question which is not, like the Trolley

Problem, one that for the vast majority of us is merely abstract. I would encourage you, in

debating this topic, not to lose sight of the fact that you are very much among the actors in the

resolution, and that the arguments you’re debating have implications for what you ought to do, not

merely if you happen to one day find yourself living out a philosophical thought experiment, but

every single day of your lives. This is actually the second topic in a row that’s had this feature,

and what’s happened on the animal rights topic so far has been pretty cool—a lot of debaters

have actually taken the arguments they’ve been reading, cutting and running seriously, and tried

to modify their behavior in response to those arguments. On this topic, it should be a lot easier. I

would suggest the following, if you want to make debating this topic a little bit personally

meaningful: Take $25 (or whatever amount makes sense for you, whether it’s less or more), set it

aside right now, and at the end of the topic, do something with it. Spend some time on websites

like GiveWell and Giving What We Can, read up on Kiva, look at other possible kinds of

philanthropic giving (e.g., check out the Singularity Institute), think about what kinds of good you


might want to do and how effective a fixed quantity of money can be at doing that thing. If you

conclude, from reading the philosophical literature, that you don’t have a moral obligation to assist

people in need, and you don’t feel otherwise motivated to, then take the money and buy

something awesome for yourself. But if you do feel the pull, moral or otherwise, donate the

money to wherever you think it will make do the most good (or meet whatever other criteria you

decide are important). The fact that there are thousands of debaters, most of whom will grow up

to be pretty well off, debating this topic and thinking about these arguments is pretty cool, so try

and take advantage of it while you’re busy winning rounds.

Anyway, those are my general thoughts about the topic. The rest of the analysis will be divided

into three parts, tackling framework issues, affirmative arguments and negative arguments. I’ll try

to give a comprehensive survey of what I think are all the major positions on each side of the

topic, but I’ll spend a lot more time on some than others just because I have more non-obvious

things to say about them. I’d suggest skipping over the sections that don’t interest you, and

reading any of the longer sections that have to do with arguments you’re either interested in

running or worried about answering.

Framework

“IndividualsA”

To begin with, we have the perennial problem of bare plurals, brought to us by the wording

committee’s hatred of explicit quantification. Does “individuals” mean all individuals, most

individuals, or just a plurality? Affirmatives looking to parametricize will no doubt assert the last of

those options, wrongly thinking that in doing so they’ve made an argument for it (“’Individuals’ just

means two or more, soX”). Negatives looking to make any number of silly arguments (what

about individuals in long-term comas??) will assert the first. But it’s clear that, contextually, the

correct interpretation is something like the middle one. Here’s one way of cashing it out that I

would recommend when you’re affirming, both because it will be fairly easy to sell to judges and

defend theoretically, and because, for what it’s worth, it seems to be more or less correct:

“Individuals” means individuals, paradigmatically, i.e. individuals who are not exceptionally

situated with respect to the circumstances relevant to the resolution. (Similarly, “Dogs have four

legs” means something like “Dogs who have the ordinary number of legs, have four.”) Thus, we

assume that the individuals in question are not themselves in need, and have some capacity to

assist others who are (although it could be argued that the former, at least, is not a paradigmatic

feature of the human condition—don’t point this out, though), and are not otherwise in exceptional

circumstances. In other words, winning that there are some individuals who don’t have an


obligation to assist those in need doesn’t negate unless the facts about those individuals which

give rise to the lack of an obligation are normal facts about human beings (or individuals)

generally. (Whether “normalcy” implies statistical normalcy or something moreXnormative, I’ll

leave it to you to think about.)

If you really want to debate the drowning-baby cases for whatever reason, you could read the

resolution as analogous to something like “People ought to help old ladies cross the street”—in

other words, with a sort of hidden “Xwhen the opportunity presents itself” qualification, but this

probably doesn’t get you very far, since the response is just that the opportunity is constantly

presenting itself, even if not in such an immediate way. The argument might then be that what is

really meant is “Xwhen a good enough opportunity presents itself,” just as it’s not incumbent on

me to race three blocks in an effort to meet old ladies at intersections when I see them

approaching one from a distance. But then, intuitively at least, the circumstances under which the

obligation arises seems exceptional rather than normal with respect to the set of circumstances in

which it could arise (i.e., the vast majority of my chances to help people in need are morally

optional), which seems like questionable affirmative ground.

“Ahave a moral obligationA”

Two points about “moral obligation”. First, it’s important to distinguish obligation from mere moral

prescription. Generally, it is thought that some prescriptions have the force of obligation, while

others are supererogatory—good but not obligatory, usually because they “go above and beyond

the call of duty”. Deontological and contractarian theories are explicitly theories of obligation, such

that all the prescriptions they generate have the force of duty (although I’m sure there are people

in either camp who would like to leave room for supererogation), but for utilitarians or virtue

ethicists it’s not at all clear that obligation even has a place in the picture (as we’ll see below), and

if it does, the affirmative needs to do some work explaining what that is.

The general, default line about moral obligations is that they’re the things we can be appropriately

blamed for not doing. Supererogatory acts, on the other hand, are those we can be praised for

doing, but can’t be blamed for not doing. What’s unclear is what determines the appropriacy of

blame—it might be properties of the action or of the actor’s character, but it might also be facts

about the act of blaming itself. For instance, one way for utilitarians to mitigate the force of

demandingness objections (complaints that utilitarianism asks too much of actors) is to say that,

although we ought to always act in the way that produces the greatest possible net utility, we are

not obligated to do so in the above sense because, beyond a certain point, blaming people for not

acting better is not itself productive of utility. If we morally condemn people who give 90% of their


income to charity because giving 92 would produce more net utility, it less to motivate greater

generosity in future than to undercut their motivation to act generously at all.

The bottom line, though, is that for theories which don’t render all prescriptions as obligations,

there aren’t too many constraints on where the line for obligation can be drawn, and this issue

really shouldn’t be that much of a problem for affirmatives in most rounds (although some

negative arguments can problematize it, as we’ll see). Just say that actions are obligatory if we

are blamed by the theory for not doing them, and that if the theory prescribes one course of

action as better than alternatives, it blames us for not taking it. This is essentially stipulative, but

that’s not a problem on face—negatives have to do substantial work to explain why we can’t just

interpret “moral obligation” that way within whatever your ethical theory happens to be.

Second point: Beyond what counts as a moral obligation, there are further questions about (a)

what it means to have a moral obligation and (b) how we characterize the obligations that we

have. We touched on this briefly in the preceding section, talking about obligations that only arise

circumstantially—it would seem odd to say that I “have an obligation to save the astronauts on

the International Space Station from certain death,” although I would very likely have that

obligation, were the opportunity to arise. This touches on negative arguments about the

effectiveness of charity, which might be interpreted as implying that we aren’t, as a rule, in a

position to actually assist people in need (but wouldn’t, obviously, deny that there might be baby-

in-puddle circumstances where we can). The second question, about characterization, raises the

same point in a different way—it would seem similarly odd to say that I have an obligation to

assist people in need merely on the grounds that I have an obligation to assist my immediate

family members, when they’re in need, or because I’m a plumber and have an obligation to do my

job, which involves assisting people in need. On a first pass, we might say that “having an

obligation to assist people in need” means “having an obligation to assist any person in need,

when I have the opportunity to assist them, merely by virtue of the fact that they are a person in

need and I can assist them (and perhaps some facts about me).” But this statement of the

obligation is absurdly strong—certainly, we’d want to allow a qualifier like “Xwhen I can do so at

reasonable cost to myself/at less cost than the harm I prevent to them.” So what qualifiers do we

allow? I don’t think there’s an obvious answer. If we had obligations, say, only to the needy in our

own country, or only to those who were in need through no fault of their own, I don’t think there’s

a fact of the matter as to whether we “have an obligation to assist people in need”. The ambiguity

here is semantic, rather than moral, and given that it’s not determined by the semantics I suppose

it’s just down to theory debate to resolve on a case by case basis. So hopefully it just won’t come

up too much.


“Ato assistA”

One issue here, which we’ve already mentioned: Does “assist” imply a result of doing

good/preventing harm, or merely an intention? And if a result, an immediate or a long-term result?

This only really affects negative efficacy arguments, and as we just established, there’s some

reason to think that even if we grant the aff the strongest (“long-term result”) interpretation of

“assist,” the arguments might negate anyway. Here too I think there’s just a semantic ambiguity,

but the theoretical considerations are a little more straightforward—it seems to me that the

negative ought to have ground for these arguments for any number of great theoretical reasons

(and because a moral prescription that’s contingent on facts about the results of our actions

which are, if the neg arguments are right, hard or impossible to predict at the time we’re acting is

pretty useless and not particularly worth debating). So I would say just give the neg that ground,

and be prepared to defend either a non-consequentialist moral theory or the claim that certain

kinds of assistance/charity are reliably, predictably effective.

“Apeople in need.”

There’s one final framework debate which, while interesting and in many ways quite relevant to

the division of topical ground, is not likely to play out nearly so often as the ones we have

discussed up to this point—namely, what sorts of circumstances qualify someone as “in need.” I

encourage you to think carefully about this question in framing your affirmative positions, since it

will give you ammunition against negative arguments which might otherwise be difficult to answer.

Here’s the trouble, as I see it: saying that “p is in need”, in ordinary usage, means something

much stricter than “There is some x of which it is true that p needs x,” or even “There is some x of

which it is true that p is in need of x.” To say that someone is “in need” is not even a mere

intensification of this claim—e.g. that there are many things which he needs or something he

needs very badly. For instance, there’s nothing unreasonable about saying that someone’s (very

much) in need of their morning coffee, but we obviously wouldn’t merely on that account

characterize them as being “in need”.

Unfortunately, because “in need” is not (as far as I’ve been able to discover) a term of art in any

particular field, you’re going to have trouble finding a definition that says as much. You’ll find

some definitions in dictionaries of phrases, but the ones I’ve seen so far are not particularly

careful on this point. And in any case, the ordinary usage of the phrase, while it exhibits certain

clear boundaries, remains importantly ambiguous—I don’t think that “in need” must denote only

financial or material need, for instance, although you might reasonably think so. Some uses, for


instance in the context of juvenile justice, seem to refer to broader psychosocial types of need

(making the phrase roughly synonymous with “at-risk”); there’s also an apparent closeness with

phrases like “in need of assistance” (Is someone at the side of the road with a flat tire a “person in

need”? What about someone who’s been injured in an accident? What about someone who

hasn’t been injured but will be—in a minute, a day, or ten years—unless we intervene?).

Here’s why it matters: If the resolution is read narrowly as something like “Individuals have a

moral obligation to give to the poor,” negatives can compellingly argue that our obligations are not

so specific—that I can discharge whatever duties I may have through other sorts of beneficent

action, towards people who are not in this sense “in need”—i.e. it is not the case that I can be

held morally blameworthy merely because I haven’t given to (or otherwise assisted) the poor, and

therefore I don’t have a moral obligation to do so, even if doing so might fulfill some moral

obligation I do have.

The more broadly “in need” is defined, the harder this argument is to make. But beyond a certain

point, the broadening of the definition seems out of line with usage. This debate will come into

focus against various negative counter-advocacies—if I am better off, morally, spending any time,

effort and money that might have gone towards helping the poor (or otherwise obviously needy)

on, say, nuclear non-proliferation efforts, there might be some very loose, tenuous sense in which

this counts as “assisting people in need”—after all, everyone needs to not die in a nuclear war—

but this construal seems like a pretty substantial stretch of ordinary usage.

The outcome may just be that the benefit of the doubt (or, the benefit of irresolvability) goes to

affirmatives on this debate, since the majority of judges will already be irrationally disposed

against most of the negative positions that would push the issue. But it seems to me that a core

part of the topical debate, or what ought to be the topical debate, concerns whether our other-

regarding duties are tied to particular people and their particular needs, or whether they can

relate to states of affairs which we have duties to bring about or prevent (without regard to the

identities of those we will effect), so I hope that these counter-advocacies do get debated. In any

case, think about the question, and try to have at least a persuasive example of usage going

each way.

Affirming

Broadly speaking, I see three kinds of affirmative strategies on this topic: (1) Defend a moral

theory which yields a generalized obligation for individuals; (2) defend a more particular obligation

as incumbent on most or all individuals in light of a moral theory; or (3) defend a state (or


otherwise collective) obligation, and then argue that this generates an obligation for individuals to

bring about the fulfillment of that obligation through political action (or some equivalent), again in

light of a moral theory. Note that none of these strategies involve parametricizing to a single actor

or small class of actors, although I’ll suggest a conceivable way of doing that in what follows. The

first four sections below deal will moral theories that might affirm all on their own, while the last

two discuss ways of integrating those theories with more particular advocacies via strategies (2)

and (3) above, respectively.

The utilitarian/consequentialist affirmative

The simplest affirmative position there is: You ought to help people in need because it produces

more good for them than cost for you. 7 I won’t say too much about this position, since most of the

standard arguments for and against utilitarianism are fairly well-rehearsed in debate. But I will just

briefly suggest one way of bridging the gap (which may be a little larger than it immediately

seems) between utilitarianism and affirmation.

There are two questions a utilitarian affirmative has to answer after making arguments for

utilitarianism. First, does “assisting people in need” actually increase their net utility? And second,

does it produce more positive utility for the recipient of the assistance (or other who might benefit)

than it costs the one doing the assisting, or anyone else? The first of these questions might seem

trivial, but it’s not obvious that it is. Ordinary acts of assistance—helping someone jump their car

battery—don’t seem to hinge, for the appropriacy of the descriptor, on the unanswerable question

of whether the jump-ee goes on to lead a better life, all things considered, than he or she would

have without the jump.

The second question is even more difficult—in fact, seems over-general to the point of being

unanswerable. Obviously there are acts of assistance which do not produce net positive utility—

Sir Walter Raleigh throwing his cloak over a puddle to prevent Queen Elizabeth from getting her

shoes wet. Even for someone who is very badly in need, it might be that the only way to assist

them involves some enormous self-sacrifice or harm done to another. And it is not clear, if there

are multiple avenues open for assisting a given person in need, or many, whether I am merely

obligated to take one of those avenues, if it by itself will be insufficient to remove anyone from

7 Whether the good at stake is happiness, preference-satisfaction, or something else is, as the

section heading indicates, up to the debater running the position. In what follows, I’ll restrict myself to utilitarianism out of convenience, since I don’t see much of a strategic reason for anyone to run any non-utilitarian version of consequentialism but I don’t want to perpetuate the confusion among many debaters that utilitarianism is merely consequentialism. The utilitarian proposes a very particular theory of how consequences are to be ethically assessed, which other consequentialists deny.


need. If I have a moral obligation to assist people in need, does any amount of assistance

discharge it, or do I continue to have the obligation as long as there are people in need whom I

can assist in any way. But finally, apart from those questions, it is not obvious even in the most

ordinary cases of assistance, what all the consequences are—I may actually succeed in assisting

the one starving child in Africa, but perhaps I also make some contribution to propping up a

dictatorial regime; perhaps the stress of figuring out where and how to donate the money, and

going through the process of actually doing it, produces more disutility for me than whatever

money makes it to Africa produces for the child there (after all, as debaters all know, you can’t

measure utilities).

Here’s the line of argument I would suggest, which doesn’t answer all of these questions but

gives a plausible enough story to at least establish a presumption in favor of assisting people in

need, and leave it to the neg to make the arguments that it doesn’t deal with. The idea is this:

“People in need,” as a matter of usage, refers primarily to people in poverty (you can give other

theoretical reasons to prefer this limitation as well, and at any rate an obligation to this class of

people would be an obligation to assist people in need, since presumably no one has an

obligation to assist all people in need). If people are in need in this sense, and we ourselves are

not (remember the motivations for this restriction from the framework section), then at least one

way of assisting them is by transferring resources—money or other material goods which they are

in need of. There may be other means open to us as well, but if utilitarianism is true, then it

seems reasonable (at first glance) to say that we are obligated to do x if and only if there is at

least one way of doing x that produces more net utility than any way of not doing x. So, a

sufficient condition for our having an obligation to assist people in need is its being the case that a

transfer of, say, money to someone in need from someone not in need produces net positive

utility. And the reason we might think that it does is the general truism that money (like most other

goods or resources) produces diminishing marginal utility—i.e., each additional dollar I receive

does me less good than the dollar before it. In general, this is true because of the range of things

I can buy with my money, I will use however much money I have to buy the ones which bring me

the greatest utility per dollar for that amount of money. The more money I have, the wider I have

to cast my net for things to spend it on, and as a result the less utility I’ll get from each additional

dollar. Intuitively, a dollar means more to someone struggling to feed themselves than to

someone struggling to decide between paint schemes on their third yacht.

The diminishing marginal utility of money is not a necessary truth, and there are some obvious

exceptions to it (the dollar that allows me to just barely avoid starvation yields much more value

for me than the dollar before it, which would have allowed me to almost avoid starvation). And

getting even from that generalization to the generalization that assisting people in need produces


net positive utility requires a lot of fudging (assuming, among other things, that the scales of

diminishing utility are relatively invariant across persons, that the transaction costs of giving to

those in need don’t overwhelm the increase in marginal utility, and that there are no offsetting

opportunity costs, i.e. that the money could otherwise have gone only to personal consumption

among people further along their marginal utility curves). But a brief explanation of diminishing

marginal utility is sufficient, I think, to establish a presumption that assisting people in need

produces net positive utility. The negative can then argue that the obligation thereby established

is merely contingent and circumstance-dependent (but that’s fine as long as all the resolutional

actors are in the right contingent circumstances—and if utilitarianism is true, any obligations there

are more specific than the obligation to maximize utility will be contingent in this way); contest the

restriction of resolution actors to people not in need (but this is both textually and theoretically

hard to support, as we discussed earlier); contest your characterization of obligations under

utilitarianism (presumably via scalar util—see below), make arguments about efficiency and

unintended effects (transaction costs), or defend a counter-advocacy (opportunity costs), all of

which you’ll just have to deal with on their own terms. But you won’t be in the position of just

naively asserting that assisting people in need must be net utility-positive, which I hope I’ve

convinced you is not at all obvious.

The deontological affirmative

I don’t have too much to say here, but the deontological argument for affirmation is that we have

what Kant called a “duty of beneficence,” or a duty of charity, that requires us to be positively

concerned with the wellbeing of others and give assistance where assistance is needed. It’s hard

to formulate an argument for this claim in terms of the means-ends formulation of Kant’s ethics,

since merely ignoring people’s suffering doesn’t seem to use them instrumentally in any obvious

way. It’s easier in terms of a universal law formulation, which is how Kant himself presents the

argument. I’ll admit that I find his presentation ambiguous, but there are two arguments he might

be making, or at least that you might make. One is that it’s simply impossible to will a maxim that

people not assist people in need (or be permitted not to assist people in need), because doing so

would require you to will that you not be helped when you are in need, and it’s humanly

impossible for us not to desire help—and to will that others help us—in cases where our lives are

endangered, we’re experiencing extreme suffering, etc. This argument doesn’t seem very good,

since at best it’s a contingent fact about our psychologies that shouldn’t dictate the content of

morality—an addicted smoker may find it psychologically impossible to will that s/he not smoke a

cigarette while still endorsing, as a moral principle, that s/he ought not smoke the cigarette or

even that others should try to prevent it.


The second potentially Kantian argument is essentially contractarian—that it would be irrational

not to will a maxim that people should help those in need, because it is in my interest that

everyone does so, given that I will then receive help when I am in need, which more than offsets

the cost of providing assistance to those in need myself. Whether this sort of argument is what

Kant might have had in mind or not, it seems to me that once the argument is put in these terms,

it loses any distinctively deontological character, and you’re better off just running it as

contractarianism. So, let’s go there next.

The contractarian affirmative

Contractarians claim that moral rules stem from our agreement to constrain our behavior in cases

where mutual constraint is mutually beneficial, but individual constraint is not (in a direct or

obvious way) individually beneficial. David Gauthier, the best-known contemporary contractarian,

argues that it is in each of our best interests to be the sort of beings who can genuinely bind

ourselves to such constraining agreements, i.e. who have a disposition to abide by our

agreements even when particular acts of compliance are not beneficial to us, because our

dispositions are detectable and will determine the willingness of other agents to cooperate with us

in various contexts, and thus the number of opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperative

action we’ll have available to us.

Contractarians are notoriously hedgy about the exact content of the rules which our interest

dictate that we enter into, and thus about the exact content of morality. But the intuitive argument

is that morality, so conceived, includes a duty to assist those in need since we all benefit from the

agreement on balance, accepting a small cost when we are not in need in exchange for a much

larger benefit when we are. (Notice that this requires you to win more or less the exact same

claim about diminishing utilities we were agonizing over in the section on utilitarian affs, plus quite

a bit more.) Even if we are not certain that we’ll ever find ourselves on the receiving end of other

people’s assistance (or, assistance of the particular kind we’re rendering), the risk that we will

might still make the expected utility of assisting positive. And even if it’s not, one might think that

the norm requiring assistance to those in need comes “packaged” with a whole code of social

morality, which we just choose to either enter into or remain outside of in its entirety, and which

secures enough of our interests, in a wide enough array of contexts, that it is likely to be

universally beneficial.

There are a lot of answers to this line of argument, and a lot of links you need to win in order for it

to hang together, so I’d recommend against contractarian AC’s unless you’re particularly gripped

by the position and feel confident defending it against objections. Just be prepared to explain how


we infer the existence of an agreement to assist those in need, the exact content of the

agreement (i.e. who it requires us to help when and how much), whether it is “packaged” in the

way described above, if so why and if not why trust fund babies should enter into the agreement

in the first place, how we know whether other people have in fact entered into the agreement and

are complying with it, and how we deal with uncertainty about membership/compliance when

deciding whether we’re obligated to aid a particular individual (plus, of course, how we establish

that aid is net beneficial, and that the expectation of aid against the commitment to giving aid will

come out to net positive expected utility for at least most individuals).

The virtue-ethical affirmative

I include this only for completeness, since virtue ethics can affirm if you want it to. The claim is

that there’s a virtue of charity or benevolence, and that this virtue obligates us to assist people in

need. You can find plenty of virtue ethicists defending the former claim, but the latter will be quite

a bit more difficult, as we’ll discuss in the section on virtue-ethical negatives below.

Parametricized affirmatives

So here’s the thing, which will seem counter-intuitive to a lot of people but is nevertheless true:

This topic has the potential to give rise to some really excellent and interesting empirical debates

over parametricized advocacies—not plans, per se, and there will be important structural

differences with plan debates (see below), but great empirics debates nonetheless. Whether or

not that potential will be realized is up to you, but if empirics is what you want to be debating, then

this topic can be absolutely great for you (at least while you’re affirming—the situation for negs is

more tricky, as we’ll discuss in a bit).

A lot of debaters will assume that, because the topic seems to ask such a high-level question of

moral theory, you have to spend most or all of the AC justifying your moral theory, but remember

what we said earlier—moral theory alone doesn’t settle it (at least at the level of

deontology/utilitarianism/virtue ethics/contractarisnism). The fact that there’s a further question,

internal to any of these moral theories, of whether it’s best read as giving us duties to those in

need has important ramifications for choice of affirmative strategy, in more ways than one.

It’s possible, when you affirm, to spend five minutes and thirty seconds justifying utilitarianism,

and then thirty seconds making one or two quick, general, intuitive arguments that (a) individuals

not uncommonly find themselves in conditions where they have the opportunity to assist one or

more people in need with a reasonably high degree of reliability and (b) that such assistance will


generally be net utility positive. But given the difficulties we ran into trying to justify (b) with

sufficient clarity and generality, it might be more strategic to spend two or three minutes justifying

util, and then the rest of the AC defending the net positive utility of a particular opportunity for

assistance that’s available to most or all individuals. You sacrifice some ammunition on the

ethical theory debate, but based on my experience at least, it’s unlikely that you’ll be able to

invest a fourth or fifth minute in the AC standards analysis all that usefully without knowing what

ethical theory the neg will defend. And you can always throw the general, diminishing-marginal-

utility arguments in there in case the parametrics debate goes south on you (which it really

shouldn’t in this case—that way you’re parametricizing is fairly modest, and pretty clearly textual).

So what kinds of assistance could you defend? The simplest way to go is to just pick a charity to

defend and cut cards indicating that it saves lives and/or mitigates suffering cost-effectively.

GiveWell and Giving What We Can, which I mentioned earlier, are both great resources for this

stuff. VillageReach, which is GiveWell’s top-recommended charity, is a pretty good default

option—fairly good data showing that it’s effective, not a lot of potential disadvantages (what it

does is idiosyncratic enough that it will avoid just about any generic disadvantages to other kinds

of Third World charity), and generally the sort of thing that ought to be obligatory for a

consequentialist if anything is. I’m sure there are other, more creative possibilities out there that

don’t involve donating to institutions, but I haven’t thought of any really great ones yet, so I’ll leave

that to you.

I hinted earlier that you can’t treat these positions like plans, and here’s why: First, if you were to

parametricize to a single actor, you would lose the advantage of, you know, actually textually

affirming the resolution (to the extent that that matters to you); but on top of that, there’s no

particular basis, within most of the literature you’ll find on leveraged charity, for that kind of

limitation—most of it is addressing the marginal effects of ordinary individuals donating money or

otherwise supporting a charity. You could conceivably find authors saying (or argue, based on

more general stuff that authors say) that, for instance, Bill Gates should support such-and-such

charity through the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (and hey, just say Bill and Melinda should

both do it, and you’re right back to being textual!), and I suppose I’m not averse to a position like

that per se, but you do lose a lot of the motivation for reading a plan in the first place, namely

specificity of evidence (unless in turns out that there’s a big store of hyper-specific evidence on

what Bill and Melinda have moral obligations to do with the giant piles of money they’re giving

away). You could also defend a single-actor position as a test case—i.e., unless the negative can

show that the AC position depends on some unique feature of your particular actor, the result

generalizes to other individuals, but in general this seems like more trouble than it’s worth. (One

position I think would be kind of awesome, if anyone feels like writing it, is to parametricize to one


or more of the individuals in the room—yourself, you and your opponent, or the two of you and

the judge. As I suggested earlier, the great thing about this topic is that it gets us to debate

choices that each of us actually makes on a daily basis, and I’d be sympathetic to the argument

that there’s something wrongheaded about debating those questions in the abstract when we

could be debating them in relation to our own lives and decisions here and now.)

Second, given that you will most likely be stuck with multiple actors, you pretty definitely do not

want to engage in any kind of multi-actor fiat, because that is not at all what your authors or

evidence will be talking about. Every person in America may have an obligation to give some

money to VillageReach, but only because, and contingent on the fact that, not enough of us have.

If all but one of us gave VillageReach one hundred dollars, it would have far more money than it

could usefully handle, and the last person would not be obligated to give it another hundred.

Charitable organizations experience diminishing marginal utility too, albeit differently, and while

it’s perfectly conceivable that a given organization could adapt itself, institutionally, to handle

billions of dollars, the literature on an group like VillageReach is not going to speak to that

question—it’s going to consider the marginal impact of a hundred or a thousand dollars, not a

billion. I suppose you could defend everyone giving ten dollars to an already huge charitable

organization like Bill and Melinda’s, but I don’t see the advantage. In general, you’re better off

advocating that we each, individually, have an obligation to give to such-and-such organization,

but not that it is obligatory that we all give to it. Thus, you are defending a class of actions, but not

a single action or a conjunction of several actions, as a plan would do.

Final point, because this should be obvious but isn’t: running a parametricized advocacy, whether

with a plan text or not, doesn’t relieve you of the need to defend a moral theory (and neither does

saying “I defend a net benefits calculus.”). If you were to just observe, as an interesting fact, that

your position is consequentialist, make the diminishing marginal utility argument in two seconds,

and sit down with 5:45 left in the AC, you wouldn’t have given the judge a reason to affirm, since

the most important claim on which your argument depended would be without a warrant. Reading

5:45 of additional nonsense at the post-moral theory level while still neglecting to actually warrant

your moral theory doesn’t make the situation any better.

Political/institutional affirmatives

So, if you’re just desperate for a state actor, here’s the way to make it happen: You argue that

most if not all assistance is indirect in some sense, e.g. giving money to a charitable organization

so that it can assist people in need, so “assist” in the resolution can’t mean “assist directly.” This

rules out what might loosely be thought of as effects-topicality objections to state actor positions.


Then the argument is just that states have moral obligations to adopt policies (or, a policy) which

assist people in need in certain ways, and that as members of the body politic, we have an

obligation to ensure that our government does so through voting, petition, etc. You’ll probably

have to parametricize to countries with reasonably democratic governments, or do some work to

explain why you don’t need to. And you’ll also have to explain how my actions can count as

“assisting people in need” even when they fail to bring about any act of assistance on the part of

the government (unless you want to argue that people are morally blameworthy for their

government’s failure to adopt a policy no matter how much effort they invested in trying to bring

the policy about), but the argument can be made.

The only advantage I can see to this kind of position is that it’s conducive to certain reasonably

interesting arguments about transnational obligations, e.g. Thomas Pogge’s arguments for global

redistribution to rectify inequalities resulting from disappropriation of natural resources. If the best

way of helping people in need (or that way you want to defend in round) requires a state to

coordinate collective action, then it’s plausible that our obligation is not to try to solve problems or

alleviate need individually, through private charity, but rather to lobby for the appropriate state

action. So if you want to run Pogge or something similar, think about going this route, but

otherwise it just creates extra work for no real strategic payoff.

Negating

Same basic drill as with affirmative arguments, but I’ve mixed up the order of the positions to

make it a little more logically sequential. Should be fairly self-explanatory.

Egoism

To start with the obvious: The easiest way to negate is to argue that individuals have no other-

regarding obligations whatsoever. Ethical egoism claims that individuals ought, ethically, to

pursue their own interests and wellbeing, and that the interests of others have no direct ethical

significance for me—they have significance at all only insofar as I adopt them as my own. Most

ethical egoists concede that we do have certain unconditional negative duties towards others,

typically stemming from the internal structure of our own interests (e.g. Rand argues that the use

of force against others is necessarily self-harming since it’s inconsistent with one’s nature as a

rational being, which is what one must ultimately value if one values anything at all). But nearly all

deny that we have any unconditional positive duties towards others—we have only such duties as

we assume, say through contract, and perhaps not even those.


Arguments for ethical egoism tend to be motivated by at least one of two related doctrines:

Internalism about reasons, and agent-relativity of value. The former is the claim that, for

something to be a reason for me to act, I must find it internally motivating. If one is offered a

“reason” which exercises no such hold on the intentions of the person being reasoned with—“You

ought to do x because if you don’t, people on the other side of the world will suffer”—it is simply

not a reason at all. The latter is the analogous claim, couched in the language of a value theory:

Things do not have value simpliciter, but only in relation to particular subjects capable of

experiencing value/making evaluative judgments. In other words, nothing is good or bad

impersonally, and what it good for one person need not be good for another.

The strategic value of ethical egoism as a negative position is that it’s very clear about how it

negates, and leaves very little room for affirmatives to generate offense. Additionally, the

arguments for the position are fairly straightforward, and interact at a high level (i.e., possibly

preclusive) with most affirmative standards justifications. Of course, good affirmatives will think

carefully about how their positions interact with egoist negs, and if they’re smart, there will be

some offense available to them—namely, contractarian arguments, which follow the egoist all the

way to his intended conclusion, but then argue on game-theoretic grounds that it is rational to

bind ourselves to certain kinds of (mutually reciprocated) obligations towards others.

Contractarians are often vague about their exact normative conclusions, i.e. what obligations we

have towards others in particular, but as we discussed earlier, there’s a fairly clear argument in

the context of the resolution: it’s to my advantage to be the sort of person who helps others when

they’re in need—indeed, who can bind myself to an obligation to do so—since just such people

will receive help when they themselves are in need. And even if I am unlikely to find myself in

need, my entire membership in a moral community (which advantages me in other ways) may

hinge on accepting their particular obligation. Egoist negs must be prepared to deal with these

arguments (and probably shouldn’t be run at all against contractarian affs, since all the NC will do

is get you to the AC’s starting position).

Efficacy/unintended consequences

Egoism is the only moral theory that directly and unequivocally negates, but fortunately for

negatives, as we mentioned earlier, there are offensives possibilities within just about any theory.

The first way of negating, with respect to consequentialist moral theories, is to question whether

we have the capacity to reliably render assistance to those in need without inflicting greater harm,

either on them, ourselves, or others, than we do good. If you spend some time reading any of the

really serious literature on the effects of various kinds of charity, it should become clear to you

that this is almost never as obvious as we’d like it to be. Among the worries about charity: (i) that


money is simply mismanaged and spent inefficiently, with more going to overhead than to the

intended recipients of the charity; (ii) that charities either don’t understand the problems they’re

dealing with or don’t have the tools or knowledge base to solve those problems, so that they end

up pouring money into programs that don’t work, e.g. distributing condoms to people who won’t

use them; (iii) that private organizations are better at addressing short-term needs than long-term,

underlying structural problems, and as a result merely postpone the solution of those problems by

papering over their immediate effects; (iv) that charity may trade off with government spending on

the poor, resulting in no net benefit; and (v) that charities may actually prop up bad regimes,

either by allowing them to siphon off money or by softening the worst crises which might

otherwise motivate internal political reform.

It’s not clear how this position deals with the fact that some charities (e.g. VillageReach) pretty

clear avoid these problems and manage to be effective. Part of the argument has to be that

people make very bad decisions about where and how to donate money—basing the choice more

on their own immediate emotional satisfaction than on any rational and informed estimate of the

good their donation is likely to do. But does my incompetence at performing simple tasks—or lack

of interest in figuring out how to perform those tasks correctly—absolve me of any obligation to do

those tasks? This is maybe not as implausible as it seems (if we’re not obligated to do things

beyond our physical capabilities, how could we be obligated to do things beyond our intellectual

capabilities?), but it does seem implausible. Also, as we’ve seen already, it’s not clear how this

interacts with interpretations of “to assist.” This position does strike me as an important piece of

negative ground, but it’s probably only worth running against non-parametricized consequentialist

affirmatives that explicitly commit themselves to defending charitable giving generally. This is

especially true since, if you just want to defend consequentialism and get from there to negation,

a much better path isX

Scalar utilitarianism

There is a second, very different way in which utilitarianism might negate—namely, by

questioning whether utilitarianism is properly interpreted as giving rise to “moral obligations” at all.

What scalar utilitarians point out is this: The notion of moral obligation is, to some extent,

artificially shoehorned into a moral theory that, structurally, has no need for it, and in fact seems

somewhat hobbled by it. Utilitarianism ranks actions, outcomes, or states of affairs in terms of

their net balance of happiness over unhappiness. The resulting moral properties are scalar—i.e.,

roughly, arranged on a scale from worst to best, along which moral properties can be

continuously varied.


If we wanted to work moral obligation into the picture, there would be two ways of doing it: First,

by labeling only the best of all our available actions as morally obligatory; second, by setting

some threshold of permissibility, such that all the actions above it on the scale are permissible, all

those below it are impermissible, and, of course, we are obligated to pick one of the actions from

the permissible portion of the scale. The second approach seems arbitrary, the first seems overly

demanding (among the usual whinges with respect to utilitarianism is that it holds us morally

blameworthy for anything less than extreme self-sacrifice towards maximizing the good).

But perhaps more importantly, neither seem particularly well-motivated. Utilitarians certainly want

the ability to talk about what we ought to do, but there are ways of doing this weaker than moral

obligation (with its connotations of blameworthiness and so on), and nothing internal to

utilitarianism itself forces the appearance of the stronger sort of prescription. On top of that,

talking of “obligation,” “permissibility” and “prohibition” seems to merely obscure what really

matters to utilitarianism, namely the scalar qualities themselves—if we merely label some

category of actions “permissible,” we obscure the fact that some of them are better than others

(and ditto for “impermissible”), and seem to create a false impression that there is a greater moral

difference between actions immediately on either side of some arbitrary threshold than between

actions within, say, the category of the permissible separated by a greater gap in relative utilities.

I’ll let you troll around JSTOR and PhilPapers to find the relevant articles, and I would encourage

you to do so, if nothing else to answer utilitarian affirmatives. The argument for moral obligation

within the overall theoretical framework of utilitarianism is much weaker than the argument

against, so this ought to be a fairly winnable debate for negatives.

Purely negative deontology

The position here is fairly self-explanatory—deontology, under a means-ends and/or universal

law formulation, only yields negative duties of non-interference and non-maleficence, rather than

any positive duties of aid or beneficence. This is a popular understanding of deontology in

debate, but certainly incorrect in terms of what most deontologists actually believe and argue, and

not obviously derivable from anything internal to the structure of deontology itself. Arguments for

negative constraints that would prevent a government from compelling us to assist others (à la a

Nozickian rights theory) do not establish this conclusion, since we could still perfectly well have

positive duties of beneficence which are merely not enforceable. Most arguments for this position

that I can imagine will really be arguments for egoism, so I’ll cut this section short and refer you to

those.


Imperfect duties

This is a more interesting deontological neg position: Most affirmatives running deontology will

just assume that a “duty of beneficence” is precisely what’s referred to in the resolution, and that

proving the existence of such a duty is self-evidently sufficient to affirm. But if you think about it

for a minute, this seems to be true only on the broadest possible interpretation of who counts as a

“person in need”—namely, “anyone who is a potential recipient of beneficent action”. If what it

means to be “in need” is understood any more narrowly, the deontological affirmative runs into a

problem, namely that, as they’re standardly understood, positive deontic duties are what Kant

called “imperfect,” meaning that they are both defeasible (i.e., can be overridden by other moral

considerations based on circumstances) and multiply attainable (i.e., can be fulfilled in more than

one way). It’s the second condition that’s particularly problematic, because if there are ways of

fulfilling any generalized duties of beneficence I have which don’t involve assisting people in

need, then those duties do not yield an obligation to do so—assisting people in need is merely

one of many ways I could fulfill my obligations, just if, even if I had an obligation to assist those in

need, that would not yield a specific obligation to work in soup kitchens, or build Habitat for

Humanity houses.

We’ve already talked about the ambiguities of “people in need,” but there are some cases which

seem particularly resistant to being construed in those terms. For instance, if I devote all of my

beneficent/charitable efforts towards anti-proliferation and denuclearization efforts, it’s pretty

plausible that I’m fulfilling my general positive duties perfectly well (even if I receive some benefit

by decreasing the risk of my own death, it won’t nearly compensate the effort I put in), without

obviously “assisting people in need.” The difficulty, for a position like this, is explaining precisely

why we should exclude the strained sense in which, for instance, anyone at risk of being harmed

in some way is “in need” of efforts to alleviate that risk—again, the issue seems to be merely

semantic. But it’s also hard to make an argument that all beneficent actions must involve

assisting people in need, and sans an argument to that effect, especially under a deontic theory

which doesn’t care about the quantity of good done by one course of action versus another (at

least in and of itself), it’s reasonable to think that the presumption is in favor of there being other

ways to fulfill a duty of beneficence. It may be a tough position to resolve clearly in the face of

certain responses, but for negatives that can be an advantage, especially since the argument can

be articulated pretty quickly, so I think it’s worth considering.

Counter-advocacies


I put this topic here because I think you can glean strategic advantage from counter-advocacies

on this topic within both utilitarian and deontological standards structures (and because of its

close connection to the imperfect duties argument). I say “strategic advantage” advisedly,

because it’s important to notice that given the wording of the topic, your counter-advocacy doesn’t

need to have material/impact-based advantages (i.e. net benefits), although it certainly wouldn’t

hurt to have them. Counter-advocacies negate by the exact same logic as the imperfect duties

position we just described—the existence of a possible course of action which would fulfill all my

moral duties without assisting anyone in need indicates that I do not have a duty to assist people

in need—at best, assisting people in need might be one realization of a more general duty. (I also

say “counter-advocacies” advisedly, and so should you, in part because very few affirmatives will

be running anything that could properly be described as a plan, but in larger part because very

few of the counter-advocacies that negatives should consider running are appropriately plan-like

in their own right to be called counterplans.)

If you like, you can run counter-advocacies offensively by arguing that there’s a time or resource

tradeoff between assisting people in need and some other, more morally worth project, but this is

probably the wrong argument to be making (since there will at least be instances—babies in

puddles—where the marginal cost/benefit ratio of assisting someone in need is so low that the

position becomes pretty difficult to sustain). The better strategy, I think, is to fudge a little bit—on

face, the negative position is just that the counter-advocacy represents another, at least equally

morally acceptable way of fulfilling whatever duty we have to do good in the world, generally

speaking, but if pressed, the line is just that you’re negating on balance, defending the counter-

advocacy as at least as good or better under non-exceptional circumstances, and conceding that

we may in exceptional cases have duties to assist people in need. Just about any negative will

have to concede this anyway, so it’s not a real difficulty for the position.

So, what is the position? Well, there are a few things it could be, but a good place to start is as

we did above, by thinking about forms of charity or philanthropic action that don’t intuitively qualify

as “assisting people in need”. Denuclearization is one possibility. A better one, I think, that’s more

clearly competitive (in the relevant sense) with most affirmatives, is the Singularity Institute.

Without going into too much detail, the Singularity Institute is a non-profit organization in Silicon

Valley that works on artificial intelligence, and particularly on the problem of ensuring that an

artificial intelligence, once developed, will make decisions that are in accord with broadly human

values. There’s a very serious argument to be made, and a lot of people of a utilitarian

persuasion make it, that the marginal utility of giving to the Singularity Institute or an organization

like it vastly outweighs that of more conventional forms of philanthropy, both in terms of the

marginal impact that a given donation can have (a problem like designing ethical AI is less


intractable to small quantities of money than a problem like global poverty), and in terms of the

magnitude of the stakes. Check it out, and see if you’re convinced. There are plenty of other

possible counter-advocacies out there as well, which I’ll leave it to you to research—the scope for

interesting positions here is broad enough that I hope a lot of you pursue it is one option in your

negative arsenal.

Contractarian negatives

Contractarianism negates if either (a) it is not in the interests of most or all individuals to constrain

themselves to an agreement that would require them to assist people in need, or (b) there is in

fact no such agreement, as evidenced by most people either not assisting people in need other

than out of their own immediate interests or preferences, or not doing so with any expectation of

reciprocity. We’ve already covered a number of arguments for (a)—just bear in mind, again, the

issue of “packaging”—even if an agreement among all of us to assist each other when in need

would not have net positive expected utility for me, it may be that the entire structure of morality is

presented to me on a “take it or leave it” basis, such that it’s in my interests to bind myself to this

obligation, among others, in order to be part of the broader moral agreement.

The second kind of argument for negation under contractarianism is less straightforward, and

hard to resolve in either direction. People do seem to generally help others in need to a certain

extent, and under certain circumstances, which might act as evidence of a general moral

agreement. But whether the norm that is tacitly agreed to is as strong as the one expressed by

the resolution is non-obvious, especially since we know that, if explicitly queried, people would

disagree about the moral rule they were following and the source of that rule. And in particular,

many or most of the people who are disposed to help those in need are not so disposed out of

any sense of cooperative agreement or expectation of reciprocity—they are either simply acting

on their natural dispositions and preferences, and thus not constraining themselves to a rule, or

else acting on what they take to be an unconditional moral imperative (usually religious), which

holds with respect to both participants and non-participants in the norm.

Finally, Gauthier’s version of contractarianism at least doesn’t seem to do anything to explain the

rationality of entering into an agreement when I can free-ride on the benefits without entering in—

it only establishes the rationality of compliance with the agreements I have entered into. If the

people helping me, when I’m in need, will most likely have no idea whether I’ve agreed, explicitly

or tacitly, to help those in need myself, whether or not I enter into the agreement makes very little

difference towards my receipt of benefits even if the participants in the agreement would like, all

things being equal, to enforce a requirement of reciprocity.


I don’t have much to say about these arguments other than that they’re obvious difficulties for a

contractarian affirmative (and for contractarianism is general, if it wants to preserve more than a

nub of conventional morality), and I don’t see any easy way around them (the contractarian

affirmative can maybe say that our disposition to enter into mutually beneficial but non-

enforceable agreements is also detectable by other agents—in essence, that if we’re nice people,

we’ll enter into moral agreements, and people can tell whether other people are nice and will

decide whether to treat them nicely/morally accordingly—but without getting too far into this line, it

doesn’t seem very promising). So, this is a position that might be worth thinking about, if nothing

else as case turns to contractarian affs.

Virtue-ethical negatives

Again, included mainly for completeness, but virtue ethics perhaps has some utility as a negative

position, only because the generally accepted interpretation of virtue ethics is that it doesn’t give

rise to obligations per se—utilitarianism and deontology are, it is standardly thought, duty-based

ethical theories, where virtue ethics is “character-based”. Whether this distinction really holds up,

I’m not sure, but if you’re really desperate to roll out that Aristotelian naturalism file your lab

leaders made you cut over the summer, then it’s something to think about—same strategic

upside as scalar util, but harder for a lot of affirmatives to generate offense to, with the only

downside being crappy warrantingX

Skeptical negatives

Nothing at all to say here, really, except that skepticism negates on this topic as clearly as it does

on any topic, and seems like a pretty natural position for negatives to take. Watch out for non-

cognitivist positions which deny that ethical statements take truth values, especially when

combined with explicit truth-testing frameworks—a lot of debaters running skepticism make this

mistake, but you can’t (or shouldn’t) accept a burden to prove the resolution false and then run

arguments which imply that it doesn’t take a truth value. And be sure to think about how whatever

skeptical arguments you want to run interact with the various ethical theories the affirmative might

defend—for instance, most of the skeptical arguments run in debate do literally no damage to

contractarian positions, or to constructivist versions of deontology. Oh, and make sure that you

don’t claim that there’s an even-if story with your non-skeptical arguments when in reality you’re

defending a moral theory to which we’re driven by skeptical objections to other theories precisely

because it survives those objections (e.g. the two mentioned above, emotivism, prescriptivism,


etc.). But run smart and interesting skeptical arguments, interact them correctly with affirmative

standards justifications, and you can have some fun debates with them.

So, those are my thoughts. Nice, open-ended topic, and if nothing else a chance to learn your

ethical theory for standards debates on future topics. Good luck, and have fun!


Topic Analysis by Adam Torson

The November/December LD resolution is the most wide-ranging topic I have ever seen. That is

good in the sense that there are many interesting positions you can develop, but problematic in

the sense that there are many viable strategies which will try to avoid substantive clash.

Interpretation

I am fearful that the vast number of potential interpretations of this topic will cause an enormous

number of debates to come down to a clash between tricky framework spikes and implausible

constructions of what the resolution means. I will begin by offering this advice: in the framework,

less is more. You can’t preempt every wonky interpretation, and if you try to judges will pull their

hair out. Instead, construct an elegant, straightforward interpretation of the topic and prepare to

defend it. Force your opponent to be the one to muddy the water, if muddy it must be. If your

interpretation is reasonable and you are adequately prepared to fend off silly alternatives, you will

find most judges sympathetic.

A. Individuals

There are two important questions implied in the term “individuals.” First, does the resolution

include individuals acting in an institutional capacity – e.g. in the name of a government, on behalf

of a corporation, etc.? Second, does the resolution require the affirmative to defend a rule for all

individuals, or may she defend a rule that applies only to a particular group?

The first question implicates how broad the resolution will be. There is a ton of literature about

whether there can be political obligations to help people in need, for example by funding social

welfare programs or public safety initiatives. (As I will discuss below, there is also an open

question as to whether we can conflate political and moral obligations). Furthermore, people act

in institutional capacities all the time. Our roles as citizens and the agreements we have made to

work for particular business entities are two of the primary sources of normative obligations for

most people. I feel as though I have to follow the law, I have to go to work, etc. When we say that

a government ought to do something, what we really mean is that individuals acting in the name

of government ought to do something. For example, if the government ought to fund the Head

Start program, what that really means is that a member of Congress should introduce legislation

to fund Head Start, the members of the House and Senate should vote in favor of that legislation,

the President should sign it into law, and individuals working for executive agencies should send

the money to the appropriate programs. The program directors should spend the money on the

various things the program needs to succeed. Individual citizens should pay their taxes to support


the initiative. In other words, this argument claims that a government or corporate obligation is an

individual obligation.

On the flip side, perhaps this interpretation is too broad; it essentially suggests that the term

“individuals” means any agent that could possibly act. Moreover, the agency of institutions like

governments or corporations is different than that of individuals. Their “decisions” are the product

of an aggregation of preferences from many different individuals, whether that is voters,

Congressmen, boards of directors, shareholders, etc. They have their own idiosyncratic rules,

resources, and constraints. Conflating these norms with the types of moral norms that apply to all

individuals as such is imprecise and overbroad, you might argue.

The second question has to do with the degree to which the affirmative can specify a particular

context in which she or he affirms the resolution. There are a series of topical advocacies which

have to do with the obligations of particular groups – e.g. that doctors should be required to

render medical assistance in an emergency or that lawyers should have to provide a certain

number of pro bono hours of legal services to the poor. On the one hand, it seems unfair to force

the affirmative to defend an obligation to help the needy for all people in all situations. On the

other hand, the topic is sufficiently broad that allowing this type of specification may make it

virtually impossible for the negative to prepare a responsive advocacy. A middle ground might be

allowing the affirmative to specify what type of obligation to help it will defend but not who has

that obligation.

B. Have a Moral Obligation

The first interpretive issue raised by this phrase is what it means for an obligation to be “moral” in

nature. Some philosophical positions distinguish morality from other types of obligations, such as

those norms deriving from conceptions of justice, ethics, politics, prudence, etc. On this resolution

it will be particularly important to indicate the status of legal and political obligations. For example,

if the government has an obligation to protect the safety of its citizens, does this amount to a

moral obligation for those government agents charged with implementing safety policies? Often

formalistic distinctions are not compelling. It is difficult to imagine that if the affirmative shows that

there is a political obligation to help the poor that the basis for that obligation does not in some

way derive from moral rules. Insofar as norms are the product of social construction, treating

these terms as functional equivalents of one another seems justified. On the other hand, one can

again argue that the topic has to be narrowed as much as possible to make any substantive clash

feasible, and so perhaps a narrow reading of the term “moral” would focus the debate on

literature about the generic obligation to assist rather than legal or prudential obligations. This


seems like a plausible interpretation given that traditional liberal theories of morality like

utilitarianism and deontology propound sets of moral principles that are supposed to apply to all

rational agents, and which may well be distinguished from pragmatic political obligations.

The second interpretive question is what sense the term “obligation” is used in. For moral theories

like Kantianism or utilitarianism, an obligation is something the agent must do to avoid moral

blameworthiness. In other words, the consequence of failing to fulfill an obligation is that you can

be properly judged a bad or immoral person (or perhaps your omission is immoral). There are not

necessarily any practical means of enforcement for such “obligations,” as a general rule. You may

have a moral obligation not to lie, but if you do so generally the only consequence is that people

will judge you to be immoral. An alternative conception of obligation is legal. This argument would

say that something cannot be truly obligatory unless there is some punishment for failing to

comply with the obligation. This suggests that obligation should be interpreted in a much more

practical way, which likely coheres with a pragmatic, policy-oriented approach to the topic.

Lastly, this phrase raises the issue of supererogation. Often moral philosophy divides actions into

three categories: prohibited, obligatory, and permissible. Actions are generally considered

permissible if either they have no moral implications, or if they are moral goods that are not

sufficiently strong to be considered obligatory. For instance, adopting a stray cat is probably a

morally praiseworthy project, but is not the kind of moral good which I must ensure to avoid moral

blameworthiness. Depending on who is doing the classifying, supererogatory acts are either a

subset of permissible actions or a fourth categorization. They are actions which go beyond our

basic moral duties and are therefore especially worthy of moral praise. As is indicated by a

famous article on this subject, heroism and the extraordinary acts of sainthood would be

quintessential examples. Nobody is obligated to be a hero, but when they do so it is especially

morally praiseworthy.

Whether there is such a thing as supererogatory acts will be an important point of disagreement

in the resolution. Negatives may want to argue that while helping the poor is morally good, it is

supererogatory rather than obligatory. The affirmative will offer a competing moral theory that

does not recognize supererogatory acts. For example, many argue that utilitarianism cannot

recognize acts as supererogatory because there is always an obligation to maximize utility. This

concept may give negatives an option for a position that does not require them to disavow all

obligations to help those in need (a fairly counterintuitive position).

This of course raises the issue of whether “permissibility” negates. It probably does, but be

careful not to let the negative insist that the burden of proof is on the affirmative – that if no


obligation is affirmatively proven the action must be permissible. This topic affords the opportunity

to develop substantive arguments for what makes certain actions permissible rather than

obligatory or prohibited. Do not allow the negative to establish permissibility as a “default” without

any justification for that presumption.

C. To Assist

Assistance is a very open ended concept. In particular it has connotations that are both more and

less immediate in nature. When we say that someone should render assistance to victims of a car

accident, we generally mean that they should do something on the scene like perform first aid

and call an ambulance. We wouldn’t generally conflate this type of assistance with, for example,

recommending a therapist to deal with the stress of recovering from the injuries sustained, or with

paying your taxes to support programs that help to alleviate poverty. Again your interpretation can

expand or narrow the relevant field of available arguments. This also suggests that there are

many different kinds of assistance you can draw on – everything from monetary aid to the use of

medical skills to rescue.

Some definitions of assistance suggest that it has to be motivated by beneficence. In other words,

it should be done out the “goodness of your heart,” rather than from some kind of formal

obligation or to redress a wrong you’ve committed. If that is true, it is not even clear that you can

have an obligation to render assistance. More reasonably, it may rule out “assisting” someone

because you will be punished if you don’t – e.g. a legal obligation. This will not be a common

definition, however.

Note also that defending assistance is a relatively low bar. Assistance does not need to be

substantial and it certainly doesn’t have to completely solve the “neediness” in question. In other

words you don’t have to solve to be topical, but remember that you do have to solve for some

probability of an advantage to justify adopting your position.

Finally, you will find that in some contexts assistance has a more technical definition, as when

Good Samaritan Laws create a duty to assist or shield a person from liability for assisting.

Depending on your position these definitions can be very helpful because they likely exclude

borderline cases such as putting yourself in substantial physical danger in order to render

assistance.

D. People in Need


The question raised by the word “people” is whether the resolution requires that the obligation to

help the needy apply to all people as such, or whether it is okay to defend an obligation to one

person or a limited group of people. For instance, would an obligation to support health centers

on socioeconomically depressed Indian reservations be topical? It does not show in general that

there is an obligation to assist people in need, but it does show that in a particular instance. It

seems unreasonable to suggest that the affirmative must defend a categorical obligation to help

the needy. On the other hand, maybe the affirmative should be required to employ philosophical

arguments to defend the resolution as a general rule, because giving them the right to pick a

particular advocacy on such an expansive topic makes it impossible for the negative to have

specific, substantive answers.

The term “in need” is also enormously broad. Virtually every human being can be said to be “in

need” in some way at any given moment. In general I can think of three approaches to defining

this term.

First, debaters may choose extremely narrow definitions. For example, in some contexts we use

the term “needy” or “in need” to indicate severe economic deprivation or poverty. In other

contexts we might use the term to denote an emergency. For example, victims of a natural

disaster or a car accident are said to be “in need.” It may be prudent to use definitions employed

by institutions such as UN Development Agencies or charities like Oxfam to describe such

conditions. The advantage of this type of interpretation is that it is probably fairly concrete and

precise.

Second, debaters may choose a more moderately narrow conception of people “in need.” For

instance, we might say that when someone’s basic needs are persistently deprived, perhaps

because of political, social, or cultural factors, they are in need. This is broader than the

conception above, because it would allow for cases where needs are deprived by oppressive

governments or discrimination, and would probably employ a more expansive conception of basic

needs – e.g. the right to basic schooling. In other words, you can be in need without being

severely impoverished. This conception of neediness is probably not as severe or as acute as the

type described above.

A third strategy may not try to narrow the resolution in this way at all. Positions which employ a

more broadly philosophical approach – for example by arguing that property rights are either

absolute or non-existent, or which argue about the existence of supererogation – probably don’t

need to be worried about how broadly neediness is constructed.


Affirmative Positions

I have a difficult time coming up with an advocacy that is not plausibly topical on this resolution.

Virtually every worthwhile idea could be characterized as “assisting people in need.” I will suggest

some of the more straightforward approaches to affirming the resolution, but keep in mind that

this list is in no way exhaustive. I have organized these positions into two broad categories to

reflect the most intuitive understanding of the term “people in need;” cases which advocate a duty

to help the poor, and cases which advocate a duty to help people in an emergency. The last

section is about philosophically oriented positions that are less dependent on context.

There are tons of specific advocacies for the mechanisms that could be used to assist the needy

– social welfare programs, foreign aid, affirmative action, debt forgiveness, etc. My analysis will

cover more broadly the justifications for the various major categories of assistance, but remember

that you can advocate implementing them in a variety of ways.

A. Duty to Help the Poor

1. Utilitarianism

Utilitarian philosophers generally argue that we have an obligation to pursue the greatest good for

the greatest number. In the abstract you can imagine that this supports an obligation to help the

needy. Presumptively there is disutility to being economically underprivileged, and poverty is

painful, degrading, and sometimes fatal. Further, money has decreasing marginal utility. Going

from having $10 million to $10.1 million doesn’t increase your happiness as much as going from

$25,000 to $125,000, even though the amount of the increase in absolute terms was the same.

By this logic, you can produce more utility by distributing money to more people who are less

affluent rather than adding to the wealth of those who are already affluent.

More specifically, Peter Singer has argued that we have a moral obligation to help those subject

to poverty across the globe. While it is probably morally praiseworthy to help the poor in your own

country, he argues that the extreme poverty experienced by billions of people outside the

developed world is horrific, and creates a clear moral imperative to act. He argues that people in

the developed world have an obligation to donate a certain proportion of their income to helping

the distant poor. Living a life of luxury while children die of superlatively preventable poverty-

related causes, he says, is morally repugnant. For example, we spend an unbelievable amount of

money on bottled water when we can get safe drinking water out of the tap for free. That is, for all

intents and purposes, letting many children die so that we don’t’ have to drink out of the tap.


2. Distributive Justice

Others argue that respect for basic human dignity requires an obligation to help those in need.

John Rawls, for example, argues that nobody is morally entitled to a certain level of material

prosperity – we either inherit it or gain it by skills or a work ethic that we acquired by nature or

from our upbringing, both of which are beyond our control. In other words, people who are

affluent are lucky, and people who are not affluent are not. Rawls says that is would be strange to

let such morally arbitrary factors as natural skill or inheritance determine who suffers and who

does not. Instead he argues that if we were to design society without knowing what our particular

place in it would be, we would choose a society in which inequality is allowed only to benefit the

least advantaged – e.g. we pay doctors more money so that they go through medical school and

provide medical services to everyone. In such a society there is certainly an obligation to help

those in need, for instance by supporting social welfare programs.

A variation on this argument is often applied to international relations. Where someone is born is

morally arbitrary – a product of the “lottery of birth.” If I am born in the United States I am very

lucky. If I am born in Bangladesh I am likely to experience crippling poverty throughout my life.

Again, if we didn’t know what our position in the world would be, we would implement a set of

norms which protected the least advantaged from the worst effects of poverty. This requires

wealth from the affluent parts of the world to be transferred to people in dire need in

underdeveloped nations.

3. Restorative Justice

Another set of philosophical concepts which might justify assisting the poor are those tied to

restorative justice. Generally the idea is that rather than punishing people or institutions for things

they did wrong, they should restore the victims to their former status. It is increasingly common in

criminal law, for instance, to require vandals to clean up graffiti or pay for the property damage

they caused. The concept relies on the basic intuition that if you cause harm you should be

obligated to remedy that harm.

This concept might be applied in several ways. For example, some have argued that African

Americans who are descended from slaves and who now live in poverty are owed reparations by

the society which undermined their social capital through racist policies for generations. Similarly,

a lot of global poverty is attributable to the legacy of colonialism and ongoing practices which

undermine fair and effective economic development. Insofar as this is true, one can argue that


the developed nations that cause(d) the problems (notably in Western Europe and the United

States) should be responsible for aiding those in need as a result.

4. Sympathetic Morality

Some argue that we don’t need a complicated moral philosophy to recognize things that are

clearly and unequivocally wrong. Jonathan Glover, for instance, suggests that morality should be

a largely empirical study, and essentially that we know atrocity when we see it if we are not

blinded by tribalism or ideology. This is the “never again” logic which says that we have a duty to

prevent the kinds of horrible events that marked the 20th century.

The stunning scope and severity of poverty around the globe almost certainly has to fall into that

category. When literally millions of children die annually of easily preventable diseases and other

poverty-related causes, and many millions more live miserable lives, it is self-evidently imperative

to act and act decisively. This is particularly true in a globalized world where we can communicate

with the global poor, we see the horrific images on television and the internet, and we depend on

the global marketplace for our own wellbeing. We must strive, this position would argue, to get

beyond the psychological barriers that prevent human responsiveness and take responsibility for

helping the global poor.

5. Collective Identity

Some political and philosophical doctrines stress the importance of interdependence and shared

relational bonds in generating moral obligations. Our intuitions tell us that we have certain ties to

our families and communities because our relationships with them are a fundamental part of who

we are. Communitarians like Michael Sandel, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Robert Nozick (in his later

work) all express the idea that caring for those in need in our communities is an obligation by

virtue of our social ties and shared values.

Socialists make a related set of arguments about the role of the state in ensuring the material

wellbeing of each citizen so as to affirm his dignity. Thus public officials have an obligation to plan

the economy so as to ensure that people have equal access to basic goods and services and

equal opportunities for acquiring social capital and other material advantages.

A third tack comes from theories known as the Ethics of Care. Ethics of Care derive from feminist

criticism of liberal moral theories which take morality to be an objective system applicable to all

people equally. Instead they argue for the moral salience of particular relationships and


dependencies, and for the self-evident moral value of promoting a dignified and flourishing life.

The value of care obviously translates easily into an obligation to help those in need, because

such dependency relationships form the backbone of our most basic moral intuitions.

B. Duty to Help In an Emergency

1. Duty to Rescue and Good Samaritan Laws

There are several legal principles which may require individuals to render assistance in an

emergency situation. For instance, if you are a caretaker for a vulnerable person or child, or if you

are a medical professional with a patient in your care, you likely have a duty to take action when

the person in your care is in danger. For example, if a patient has an allergic reaction to a

medication she receives in the hospital, the medical staff has an obligation to fix the problem.

Similarly, if you put a person in substantial danger you are probably legally obligated to rescue

her. This is often called, intuitively enough, the “duty to rescue.” For instance, if you are rock

climbing with a friend and you negligently detach the rope from which your friend is hanging,

sending him plunging into a deep crevice, you have a duty to see to it that he is rescued (or to

rescue him yourself).

Finally, most people have heard the term “Good Samaritan Law.” Thanks to the series finale of

Seinfeld (a sitcom your parents used to watch in the late 20th century), the common

misconception is that these laws require you to help when you see someone in trouble. (In the

show the main characters are sent to jail for standing by and laughing while someone was

mugged on the street). This is not generally what Good Samaritan Laws mean. Usually these

laws protect people who try to assist others in an emergency from being sued. For instance, if I

see someone having a heart attack and I give him CPR, I can’t be sued for accidentally breaking

one of his ribs in the process. That said, there are a few states where there is an obligation to

render assistance in the case of an emergency (and in more states there are laws with such

requirements for doctors and law enforcement officials). There has been some scholarly

discussion of this topic, so expect to see these arguments from time to time.

2. Train Tracks and Drowning Babies

You will see many hypotheticals in the literature designed to demonstrate that our moral intuitions

tell us that in at least certain circumstances we have a duty to be beneficent – that is to help

people in need. Common examples include coming upon a child drowning or a person who has


been knocked unconscious on a railroad track with a train bearing down on him (the Dudley Do-

Right scenario). The authors generally conclude that we would all feel obligated to help (or in

some hypotheticals wouldn’t feel obligated), and this tells us something about our moral

sensibilities. These arguments are generally used to demonstrate that certain moral theories align

more closely with our intuitions – e.g. utilitarianism, contractualism, etc. They are probably not

sufficient for stand-alone positions, but they are common enough that it is probably worthwhile to

think through their theoretical dynamics.

3. Genocide, Famine, and Disaster Relief

There are some acute moral crises which most believe demand a quick and proactive response.

These positions may be plan ACs or more general examples of the kinds of responsibilities we

have to help those in need.

One such crisis is genocide. Since the holocaust many moral theorists have grappled with the

implications of genocide for moral theory. The response of the international community through

international agreements and declarations was that genocide would “never again” be tolerated.

The scale of the disaster is so self-evident that it demands immediate action from the

international community. Our responses to genocide since that time have often been

disappointing, but it seems nonetheless incumbent on nations with the power to stop genocide to

take decisive action when one is going on. Contemporary examples like the genocides in

Rwanda, Yugoslavia, and Darfur demonstrate the terrible consequences of failing to act or of

acting too late.

Similarly, parts of the world are routinely afflicted with famine. Environmental degradation,

fluctuating global food prices, and a lack of modern agricultural techniques (among other factors)

sometimes converge to create a dramatic food shortage in a given region. The graphic images of

starving children and adults and the desperate efforts of aid agencies to get the problem under

control again are self-evidently morally salient.

Finally, we have witnessed recently the tremendous suffering that can be inflicted by natural

disasters. The tsunami in Southeast Asia, Hurricane Katrina on the U.S. Gulf Coast, and the

earthquake in Haiti all demonstrate the tremendous toll such disasters can take. An obligation to

help the victims of such tragedies seems particularly compelling given that it is almost certainly

nobody’s fault when and where a natural disaster strikes. We would all want other people to help

us if we were subject to such random misfortune, and so it seems persuasive to say that we have

an obligation to help others in turn.


In addition to alleviating the suffering these types of crises cause, there are additional

advantages. For example, generating international good will and diplomacy, abiding by

international legal requirements, stabilizing politically and economically important regions, and

combatting terrorism are all potential advantageous side effects of assisting those in need in the

situations just mentioned.

C. Philosophical Positions

1. Against Supererogation

There is a fair amount of philosophical literature on whether there are actions that are morally

praiseworthy that we are nonetheless not obligated to do. For example, both utilitarianism and

Kantian ethics seem to leave no room for supererogatory acts. Utilitarianism says that we always

have a duty to bring about the situation with the most utility. Kantian ethics tend to characterize all

moral norms in terms of duty, even if that duty is “imperfect” so that we don’t always have to

follow it. These positions will tend to (reasonably) assume that there is some moral value to

helping the needy, and the only question is how we should classify that action from a

philosophical perspective.

2. Altruism

Some moral theories argue that altruistic behavior is morally obligatory. For instance, some virtue

ethicists will argue that part of human flourishing – our telos – is acting beneficently. If this is the

case, one could argue that we would translate that into an obligation to act beneficently as a

general rule. This last step is slightly tricky for virtue ethicists, who don’t typically speak in terms

of concrete obligations in particular instances, but the argument is plausible.

Others, like David Hume, argue that our moral sensibilities are largely a product of our passions –

our emotional responses to good and bad acts in the world. If this is true, then the fact that we

react with sympathy toward those in need suggests that we are morally required to help when

possible.

3. The Ethics of the Neighbor

Emmanuel Levinas and a number of subsequent thinkers influenced by his ethical theory (e.g.

Jacques Derrida, Judith Butler) argue that responsibility for the Other is a fundamental part of our


subjectivity. Because we only form a conception of ourselves in connection with the Other and

remain both vulnerable and dangerous to the Other, our very agency is defined by the

omnipresent moral demand of living in a world with other people. While these theories often

formulate moral responsibility negatively (e.g. a duty not to murder the Other), the theories almost

certainly also require some kind of proactive attendance to the needs and particularity of the

Other. Proceed at your own risk – these theories are dense and complicated.

Negative Positions

To be honest, there are not a lot of intuitive and compelling negative positions. It is difficult to say

categorically that we don’t have an obligation to help those in need in any circumstance. I

presume that a lot of negative positions will be advocacy specific Disadvantages and

Counterplans. Beyond that, there is a relatively limited range of common negative positions you

are likely to see.

A. Libertarianism

1. Self-Ownership

Libertarianism is a political philosophy largely based on the value of self-ownership. As a distinct

individual with your own needs and interests, you should not be used as a tool to help other

people. You are valuable as an autonomous, rational “end-in-itself.” Variants of this position can

be used to argue that any kind of obligation to help other people is wrong because it uses people

as a means to an end. For example, Robert Nozick argues in Anarchy, State, and Utopia that

taxation is akin to forced labor because it uses the product of your work for the benefit of other

people.

2. Entitlement Theory

A variation on this position is Nozick’s Entitlement Theory. Nozick criticizes John Rawls’s view,

described above, that people do not have moral entitlements to their property. He says that trying

to evaluate whether a given distribution of property is just based on comparing it to some

favorable pattern (like an equitable distribution) is problematic because it only looks at a snapshot

in time. It argues instead that if property was initially acquired in a permissible way (like a person

constructed it), and transferred in a permissible way (without coercion, etc.), then its ownership is

just. He uses the example of people paying money to watch a famous basketball player. The fact

that the basketball player has more money at the end of their voluntary transactions doesn’t mean


that the distribution is unjust – people willingly gave up their money to see him play, and received

a service which they value in return. Creating an obligation to undo the results of an extended

system of voluntary transactions seems manifestly unjust to Nozick.

3. Free Markets Good

Proponents of capitalist economies, characterized by free markets and the right to private

property, contend that creating obligations outside of voluntary transactions (i.e. putting

conditions on the right to private property) creates market inefficiencies and makes everyone

worse off. F.A. Hayek, for example, argues that markets are the only way for people with limited

information about each other to coordinate so as to serve each other’s interests. We don’t

generally know where our medicine comes from, and the researcher who created the medicine

doesn’t know where his car came from, and the auto-plant worker doesn’t know where his food

came from, but we all somehow coordinated our productive activities to best serve one another’s

needs. This, Hayek argues, is the miracle of prices coordinating production across an extended

society. Creating obligations to be beneficent through taxes or donation to charities or gratuitous

services only serves to distort the price mechanism and create market inefficiencies and

disincentives. For example, if I have to pay higher capital gains taxes I may not invest in a high

risk company with the potential to create a life-saving drug. Free market advocates also argue

that allowing prosperity is important so that people have an incentive to work hard. If they know

that earning a lot of money will only cause them to be forced to give more away, this argument

goes, they are less likely to work hard to be productive or innovative in the first place.

B. Supererogation Rocks – Virtue Beyond Duty

This is the flip side of the affirmative position discussed above. Some argue that classifying every

morally praiseworthy act as a duty is too stringent to be realistic. Acts of virtue that go beyond

what we can reasonably expect other people to do should be especially acclaimed and held up as

an example. Saying that such actions are morally obligatory degrades how extraordinary they

are. We may have a duty to be kind, but the person who sends the winning lottery ticket to charity

is remarkably so. Virtue ethical theories in particular tend to say that the availability of such a

classification is important. In the context of the resolution, a negative debater would argue that

helping the needy is a morally praiseworthy goal, but it should be classified as permissible and

supererogatory rather than obligatory. Particularly given the fact that the topic is so broad, it is

easy to argue that a duty to help others all the time is virtually impossible to fulfill. The acts should

be praised, but not required.


C. Proximate Relationships Trump Distant Ones

Another avenue that might be open to negatives is to criticize the fact that the resolution seems to

suggest a categorical obligation to help those in need. The negative can argue that instead of

having a universalizable obligation, we should favor particular and context dependent obligations

as dictated by our idiosyncratic roles and relationships. In this case you are essentially

demanding that the affirmative defend the universal character of the obligation suggested by the

resolution. You will need to be able to defend the claim that the affirmative does not have the right

to parametricize out of this component of the resolution by running a plan or limiting their

advocacy to a particular context.

1. Social Contract

The social contract says that citizens give up certain rights to the government in return for a

protection of the interests they value. According to this theory, a government is a tool created for

a limited purpose and therefore may only have obligations to its own citizens. A universal

obligation to help the needy clearly runs afoul of this requirement.

2. Hegemony, Colonialism, and Globalization are Bad

There are a variety of positions which cohere around the idea that powerful western states

exercise damaging and unjust power in relation to the developing world. The targets of these

criticisms are diverse; everything from militaristic foreign policy to structural adjustment

requirements for development loans to unregulated international trade. As it relates to the

resolution, this position will likely argue that a supposed obligation to assist is actually a

justification for increased paternalism and control, and to cover up the West’s responsibility for

global inequality by showcasing its “generosity.” Their obligation, if anything, is not to assist but to

discontinue unjust practices and remedy past wrongs.

3. Ethics of Care

As I indicated above, the ethics of care argues that we should privilege local and contextual

obligations of care deriving from interdependency and intimate relationships over broad,

universalized obligations. With this type of negative case it can be plausibly claimed that those

arguments negate rather than affirm.

D. Critical Positions


Whenever there are a small number of intuitive negative positions, you will tend to see more

critical theory. I’ll not give an exhaustive explication of the possibilities here, but you may want to

research philosophies which describe the phenomenology of The Gift. Some theorists argue that

to give aid, particularly when in a relationship of dependency, is degrading and dehumanizing

rather than empowering. People perceive their own identity as tied up in this status of being

subjected, submissive, and dependent. Imagine a person who must constantly thank others for

their generosity because he is so dependent on it. From this it is possible to argue that a

generalized obligation to assist the needy is inappropriate.

E. Theory

Given the enormous ambiguity of this topic and the limited number of intuitive negative positions,

don’t be surprised to see more than the normal amount of theory. While I never recommend that

this be the A-Strat when negating, it is important to be prepared when affirmatives take

advantage of the topic’s ambiguity to run wonky positions. From the perspective of the affirmative,

you should also be prepared for the inevitability that some negatives will simply decide to prepare

theory instead of trying to research substantive answers to the incredibly broad range of possible

advocacies.

Conclusion

Given the enormous breadth of this topic, your judges will be grateful to any debater who tries to

generate substantive argument comparison and clash. That will require a lot of work, especially

on the negative, but that work will definitely pay off. Best of luck to everyone!


AFFIRMATIVE EVIDENCE

MORAL DUTY

THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-BENEFICENCE CANNOT BE RATIONALLY WILLED Barbara Herman [Prof. of Philosophy and Law, UCLA] “Mutual Aid and Respect for Persons” Ethics, Vol. 94, No. 4 Jul., 1984, p. 586 We are not like the wanton in that there are ends that we may be unwilling to forgo because of their value to us-because of the sense or meaning their pursuit gives to our lives. (The stoic represents an extreme form of attachment to a single end.) We are like the wanton in that even ends that we may be unwilling to give up can be given up nonetheless. Ends, however, that are necessary to sustain oneself as a rational being cannot (on rational grounds) be given up. Insofar as one has ends at all, one has already willed the continued exercise of one's agency as a rational being. The ends which must be realized if a person is to function (or continue to function) as a rational, end-setting agent come from what Kant calls the "true needs" of human agents.'5 They are the conditions of our "power to set an end" that is the "characteristic of humanity" (DV 51). The ends set to meet our true needs are like all other ends-we cannot guarantee that we can realize them unaided. But in contrast to all other ends, we cannot, on rational grounds, forgo them. Thus neither the wanton, nor any human agent, may permanently alienate what may be necessary to satisfy true needs. Willing universal nonbeneficence thus conflicts with what, as dependent rational beings, we must will, if we will anything at all.


BECAUSE WE REQUIRE OTHERS TO ACHIEVE OUR OWN ENDS WE MUST ACCEPT A DUTY OF BENEFICENCE

Barbara Herman [Prof. of Philosophy and Law, UCLA] “Mutual Aid and Respect for Persons” Ethics, Vol. 94, No. 4 Jul., 1984, p. 587 If we are asked to imagine a life independent of things (objects) to be used as means, we cannot do so, for our existence depends on them straightforwardly. The adequacy of our skills to our needs is a contingent state of affairs. The very bounty of nature and ease of life that might make us feel we will never have to place new demands on ourselves are not of our making or within our control. Thus it would not be rational to "freeze" our skills if we could not also control our circumstances.'6 This is parallel to the idea that I mean to capture in saying that, unless one could guarantee in advance that one will not require the help of others as means to ends one could not forgo, it would not be rational to will universal nonbeneficence. It is a fact of our nature as rational beings that we cannot guarantee that we shall always be capable of realizing our ends unaided, as it is a fact of our nature that we need things and skills to pursue our ends. If what we lack is some thing, we cannot call on that object to serve our need; nor can we obtain new skills and abilities at will. But we can call on the skills and resources of others to supplement our own. The willing of a world of nonbeneficence thus conflicts with the practical consequences of the conditions of human rationality: the natural limitations of our powers as agents. This does not involve questions of risk and so of prudence. The natural limits of our powers as agents set the conditions of rational willing within which prudential calculations are made. It is because these limits are not transcended by good fortune that considerations of risk and likelihood are not relevant.'7 Because we are dependent rational beings with true needs, we are constrained to act in certain ways (toward ourselves and toward others). Thus the argument to defeat the maxim of nonbeneficence goes through: the world of universal nonbeneficence is not a world that it is rational for any human agent to choose. And since differences among persons with regard to their neediness, strength, et cetera do not affect the argument, the duty of beneficence that emerges is of the same degree or stringency for all persons.


THE OBLIGATION OF MUTUAL AID DERIVES FROM THE DUTIES OF RESPEC FOR PERSONS

Barbara Herman [Prof. of Philosophy and Law, UCLA] “Mutual Aid and Respect for Persons” Ethics, Vol. 94, No. 4 Jul., 1984, p. 597 The duty of mutual aid has its ground in the facts that we are dependent beings and beings with ends it is not rational for us to forgo: ends set by "true needs" whose satisfaction is a necessary condition for the exercise of rationality. As we are rational agents, we set ends. We are able to formulate and act from a conception of the good. If to set ends is to put oneself to the realization of more or less complex goals and projects, one respects one's humanity in oneself by developing those capacities needed to realize a wide variety of ends (DV 51). Thus an imperfect rational being must acknowledge the obligatoriness of developing his powers and talents: they are necessary conditions of the possible expression of his rationality. As a person's true needs are those which must be met if he is to function (or continue to function) as a rational, end-setting agent, respecting the humanity of others involves acknowledging the duty of mutual aid: one must be prepared to support the conditions of the rationality of others (their capacity to set and act for ends) when they are unable to do so without help. The duty to develop (not neglect) one's talents and the duty of mutual aid are thus duties of respect for persons.


WE ARE OBLIGATED TO PROMOTE THE ENDS OF OTHERS

Barbara Herman [Prof. of Philosophy and Law, UCLA] “Mutual Aid and Respect for Persons” Ethics, Vol. 94, No. 4 Jul., 1984, p. 597 There are passages in the Groundwork and in the Doctrine of Virtue that suggest this stronger version of a duty of beneficence. We are to take the ends of others as our ends, to further them as we can (G 430). We are to take the happiness of others as an obligatory end (DV 47). It would then seem that we may limit our helping activity only when it would put us in the position of needing help ourselves, or when helping would prevent our doing something else we had a duty to do, or when we disapprove of the pursuits we are to lend a hand in promoting (DV 47, 122). Otherwise, wherever we can help we must.


THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE CREATES AN OBLIGATION TO ASSIST THOSE IN NEED

Pablo Gilabert [Concordia University] “Kant and the Claims of the Poor” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. LXXXI No. 2, September 2010 The first formulation of the categorical imperative is the Formula of the Universal Law (FUL), according to which you ought to ‘‘act only in accordance with the maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law’’ (G 4:421). FUL introduces a test of universalizability to be used when assessing, impartially, the moral correctness of an agent’s maxim of action (see KpV 5:67–71; MS 6:225–6). We should only act on maxims that we can conceive and will without contradiction to become universally available to all. 7 If we cannot conceive our maxim to be universally available or we cannot will that it be so, then we are morally demanded not to follow it. Positive duties of assistance to others in need result, according to Kant, from the fact that we cannot will a maxim of never helping others in need to become universally available. Even though a world of universal non-assistance is a possible one (we can conceive it), it would not be one we could rationally will to live in. As imperfect and not omnipotent creatures, we are bound to need help from others, and can therefore not want to live in a world where no one would have an obligation to provide that help to us (G 4:423; see also MS 6:393, 451, 453). Kant’s discussion of duties of assistance in relation to FUL is very brief, but visits the first and third features of basic positive duties: their being focused on basic needs and their being symmetrical, mutual requirements on all persons toward each other.


KANT REJECTS THE IDEA OF SUPEREROGATION

Marcia Baron [Prof. of Philosophy, Indiana University, Bloomington], “Kantian Ethics and Supererogation,” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 84, No. 5 (May, 1987), pp. 237-262 One set of reasons for thinking that Kant would reject Hill's proposal can be gleaned from the Methodology of the Critique of Practical Reason. 17 Kant is concerned in that section with the question of how "we can make the objectively practical reason also subjectively practical" or, in other words, how "we can secure to the laws of pure practical reason access to the human mind and an influence on its maxims" (155 [151]). After proposing that "educators of youth" present their subjects with examples from biographies, so that "by comparing similar actions under various circumstances, they could begin to exercise the moral judgments of their pupils in marking the greater or less moral significance of the actions," Kant remarks:

But I wish they would spare them examples of so-called noble (supermeritorious) actions, which so fill our sentimental writings, and would refer everything to duty only and the worth which a man can and must give himself in his own eyes through the consciousness of not having transgressed his duty, since whatever runs up into empty wishes and longings for unattainable perfection produces mere heroes of romance, who, while priding themselves on their feeling of transcendent greatness, release themselves from observing the common and everyday responsibility as petty and insignificant [K2 158/59 (155)].

Two concerns of relevance to our discussion are evident in the passage just cited. First, Kant worries, if emphasis is placed on heroic deeds, morality will seem too remote and, for the most part, optional. This is closely tied to Kant's conviction, reiterated throughout the second Critique, that the motive of duty is weakened by romantic enthusiasm for "actions called noble, magnanimous and meritorious" (161 [157]).18 If identified too closely with heroic feats, morality might come to be thought of as a sort of spectator sport, or perhaps as a profession. It would be one of a number of fields in which those with a special gift for it might excel, but which is beyond the reach of most.'9 This is, of course, very much at odds with Kant's conception of morality as being within everyone's reach and incumbent on all. The second concern is that, insofar as one manages to maintain some appreciation of that part of morality which would still fall under the heading of duty, one will feel that supererogatory acts substitute for fulfilling morality's requirements. Worse yet, there is a real temptation so to substitute (if one chooses supererogatory acts of the nonheroic, nonsaintly variety). One can puff up with self-satisfaction at having done something "extra" for someone; it is more difficult to feel smug and superior about doing what, one believes, anyone in those circumstances is morally required to do.


KANT’S CONCEPTION OF IMPERFECT DUTY DOES NOT ALLOW US TO FORGO BENEFICENT ACTS BECAUSE WE HAVE SATISFIED OUR MORAL OBLIGATIONS

Marcia Baron [Prof. of Philosophy, Indiana University, Bloomington], “Kantian Ethics and Supererogation,” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 84, No. 5 (May, 1987), pp. 237-262 On Kant's picture one cannot both have a maxim of beneficence and regard one's "work" as over. This is not because having the maxim of beneficence entails the odd mind-set of Susan Wolf's moral saints, who strive to do as much as possible and to make their every action as virtuous as possible.28 But, although a miaxim of beneficence does not require that one seek to maximize with respect to the happiness of others, neither does it permit one to say, "Ah, I have met my weekly quota; now I can relax." Having this maxim is incompatible with drawing a line around one's "own life" or "own projects" and seeing morality the way one might see mowing the lawn (or as a child might see doing his homework or performing his boyscout deeds): as something to get out of the way.


WE DO NOT NEED TO CATEGORIZE ACTIONS AS SUPEROGATORY RATHER THAN OBLIGATORY TO APPRECIATE AND ENCOURAGE EXCEPTIONAL MORAL ACTIONS

Marcia Baron [Prof. of Philosophy, Indiana University, Bloomington], “Kantian Ethics and Supererogation,” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 84, No. 5 (May, 1987), pp. 237-262 If we do not emphasize the supererogatory, how can we pay due regard to instances in which someone does far more to fulfill an imperfect duty than do many others who themselves cannot be faulted for having too legalistic or minimalist a conception of what they ought to do? In both cases they really do have the right spirit about what they are doing; they are not trying to get duty or morality "out of the way." They take it seriously; they do not treat it the way most of us treat, say, house cleaning. And, we are assuming, neither Maria nor Jill is primarily aiming to impress others or to buttress a personal sense of moral superiority. In such a case, we surely need to have a way of according a special moral status to some of Maria's actions. What better way than by deeming her actions supererogatory? This argument is compelling only if we are unimaginative. The strategy is not only unnecessary; it is even inadequate to meet the problem at hand. Which acts will count as supererogatory? Only the really time-consuming ones? Or perhaps those she finds most unpleasant? Or those which most of us would find especially difficult or unpleasant? None of this looks promising. Furthermore, how are we to distinguish the Marias from the Mother Theresas? These are not small, isolated problems; they are symptomatic of a general misdirection. The supererogationist approach assumes that we need a way to accord a special moral status to certain actions. But is this really what is needed? No. What deserve special recognition are their characters. It is not that some particular actions of Maria's should be characterized in a way that sets them apart from her other actions and from Jill's actions; what is ultimately impressive is the character that Maria's decision to work on an emergency hotline reflects. Long before Urmson wrote "Saints and Heroes" we have had available to us another way of according special moral status to the conduct of a Maria or a Mother Theresa: we speak of their virtues, of their character, of their remarkable commitment to good causes. Not only do we have available to us this way of recognizing the special goodness of a Mother Theresa, Kant does as well. The Doctrine of Virtue is, after all, about virtue; it is very much in keeping with Kant's ethics to speak of a person or his character as virtuous. Kant's notion of virtue as "the strength of man's maxim in fulfilling his duty" (54 [394]), or "fortitude in relation to the forces opposing a moral attitude of will in us" (38 [380]), may seem to lend itself better to recognizing the virtue of someone who fulfills a perfect duty at enormous cost to himself than to discerning the special goodness of Maria as contrasted with Jill, or Mother Theresa as contrasted with either of them. But it is suited to the latter as well: virtue is revealed by the extent to which, and the way in which, one fulfills such duties of virtue as "participating actively in the fate of others" (126 [457]). Kant says that it is not so much a matter of "the degree to which one follows certain maxims," but rather of "the specific quality of the maxims" (65 [404]). Although Maria and Jill both adopt maxims of beneficence, their more specific maxims differ, and some of their differences reflect a differing degree of virtue.45


THE FACT THAT OTHER INDIVIDUALS DO NOT FUFILL THEIR OBLIGATIONS DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE OBLIGATION TO AID THOSE IN NEED DOES NOT EXIST

Elizabeth Ashford [Department of Moral Philosophy, University of St. Andrews] “The Demandingness of Scanlon’s Contractualism” Ethics 113 January 2003 p. 290-1 However, since the primary and underlying principle of benevolence is an individual one, the agent’s complaint that the slackers are acting unfairly is unlikely to be relevant to the demandingness of her obligations to those in need. The conscientious agent’s complaint at being faced with an obligation to make extreme sacrifices to help those in need as a result of others’ failure to give any help at all has considerable force when it is directed at the slackers. It may well legitimate her exerting pressure on the slackers to perform their fair share of the burden of giving help, when she is in a position to do so. This indicates that a principle that compels compliance with an equitable distribution of the burden of giving aid, through a system of state taxation to fund aid to poor countries, cannot be reasonably rejected. 18 Until such a system of taxation is in place, however, individual agents have to address the question of how much aid they should give, given others’ failure to give any aid at all. In this context, if the agent refused to give more than her fair share of aid, this would be unlikely to ensure that the burden of giving aid was fairly shared. Rather, it is highly likely that the agent’s refusal to give more than her fair share of help would have no impact on the slackers and would have a drastic impact on certain individuals in desperate straits who would not be helped and otherwise would have been. Those in need are clearly not the ones who are acting unfairly, but it is they who would suffer if she let her complaint against the slackers determine the amount of aid she gave.


MORALITY OF CONTRACTS

CONSTRACTUALISM PLACES A STRINGENT OBLIGAITON TO AID ON INDIVIDUALS Elizabeth Ashford [Department of Moral Philosophy, University of St. Andrews] “The Demandingness of Scanlon’s Contractualism” Ethics 113 January 2003 p. 290-1 The conscientious agent’s complaint at the unfairness of her onerous obligation to give help under the Stringent Principle may involve an objection to the gratuity of her predicament; she is being morally obliged to sacrifice core components of her well-being, as the result of others’ lavishing money on trivial items that are completely inessential to their well-being. It is worth emphasizing, though, that the gratuity objection is even stronger in the case of those in dire straits. Many, for example, lack the ten dollars needed for a simple cure for an eye disease that will, if untreated, cause immense pain, blindness, and eventual death. Others have to see their children die through lack of food. I conclude that the consideration of the comparative strength of the objections to principles governing obligations to help those in need, by those who will benefit and those who will be burdened by such principles, leads to an exceedingly demanding principle of aid that cannot reasonably be rejected. The demands such principles place on agents are comparable to those imposed by utilitarian obligations to help those in need. The extreme demandingness of both contractualist and utilitarian obligations to those in need is not an objection to either view, I suggest, but an appropriate response to morally salient features of the current state of the world. In our world, we would expect any theory grounded on the claim that each person has equal moral status to hold that agents have extremely demanding obligations to give aid. The extreme demandingness of utilitarian obligations to give aid arises from the vast scale of extreme and easily preventable suffering. 19 The extreme demandingness of contractualist obligations to give aid arises from the combination of the drastic and irrevocable impact on others of not being helped with the fact that there are constantly so many in this position that the long-term cost of giving help soon becomes extremely high. Thus, whether we understand impartiality along utilitarian or Kantian lines, and take the moral point of view to be founded on equal concern or equal respect, we reach the same conclusion concerning the demandingness o obligations of aid. 20 It can plausibly be claimed that both utilitarian and Kantian contractualist obligations to those in need would be considerably less demanding if the state of the world were relevantly different. 2


THE SOCIAL CONTRACT REQUIRES A DUTY TO ASSIST THOSE IN NEED

Steven Heyman [Prof. Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology] “Foundations of the Duty to Rescue” Vanderbilt Law Review. Vol. 47, 1994. In the passage quoted above, Kant develops a structure of public right and obligation much like the one that I outlined in connection with the prevention of criminal violence.'

47 By virtue of the social

contract, the state has an affirmative obligation to preserve the lives of its members. This obligation includes not only the protection of life, liberty, and property against violence, but also the provision of means of sustenance to those unable to provide for themselves. In return for such preservation, individuals have an affirmative duty to assist the state in preserving the lives of their fellow citizens by contributing their property to this end. By generalizing Kant's argument, we can develop a rationale for a general public duty to rescue. First, although Kant's discussion focuses on the state's duty to provide sustenance, he indicates that this duty derives from the state's more general obligation to preserve the lives of its members. That obligation would extend to preserving life in an emergency. Second, although this passage seeks to establish the individual's duty to pay taxes, Kant also recognizes the state's right to require citizens to perform services.

148

When generalized in these two respects, Kant's argument would recognize an obligation of citizens to perform actions necessary to enable the state to fulfill its duty to preserve the lives of its members. This reading of Kant yields a general public duty to rescue parallel to the duty to prevent criminal violence outlined above.

149 The state is bound to preserve the life of an endangered

person, such as one who is drowning. Although the state generally fulfills this duty through its own officers, on some occasions an officer will not be present or will require assistance. In such situations, the state reasonably may impose an obligation on every citizen present to assist in preserving the life of a fellow citizen.


IN EXCHANGE FOR PROTECTION BY THE COMMUNITY INDIVIDUALS ARE OBLIGATED TO ASSIST OTHERS

Steven Heyman [Prof. Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology] “Foundations of the Duty to Rescue” Vanderbilt Law Review. Vol. 47, 1994. This Part has sought to challenge this understanding through a reading of Locke and other classical liberal writers. According to Locke, individual liberty is not absolute, but is limited by the law of nature. The content of that law is not exhausted by the prohibition against harming others. Instead, natural law also requires individuals to preserve mankind by preventing violence.

162 This obligation relates to

matters of justice rather than morality. In addition, individuals have a natural duty to assist others in need. Although this obligation is generally one of charity or morality, it becomes a duty of justice in cases of extreme necessity.

153 For classical liberal thought, then, affirmative obligations do not

necessarily conflict with individual liberty. Indeed, even free and independent individuals in a state of nature would have obligations to aid and protect others, by virtue of their common membership in the natural community of mankind.

1" When individuals enter into civil society, the political

community assumes responsibility for preserving the lives of its members against violence and other forms of harm. In return for this preservation, individuals undertake to assist the community in performing this function.

165 In this way, the natural duty to aid and protect others is transformed

into a civic one. Once again, this is not a mere moral obligation, but a fundamental responsibility of citizenship that can provide the basis for a legal duty.


HEGELIAN ETHICS JUSTIFIES AN OBLIGATION TO ASSIST THOSE IN NEED

Steven Heyman [Prof. Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology] “Foundations of the Duty to Rescue” Vanderbilt Law Review. Vol. 47, 1994. In addition to protecting the formal rights of citizens, the state also has a duty to secure their particular welfare. This is the responsibility of what Hegel calls "the police," or what we would call the welfare state.

282 A principal function of the police is to ensure the security of persons and

property, not only by preventing crime and bringing perpetrators to justice, but also by protecting against other kinds of contingencies that threaten harm to citizens.

283 The provision of basic fire,

rescue, and emergency services seems to be an excellent example of the sort of function Hegel has in mind.

284 Hegel further holds that the state has a duty to secure the livelihood of its citizens.

Initially, it was the responsibility of the family, the natural ethical community, to provide for the needs of its members.

2" The rise of civil society, however, undermines the economic self-

sufficiency of the family, and thus its ability to provide for those needs. More fundamentally, civil society tends to undermine the family itself by transforming its members into independent actors who must pursue their economic well-being in the larger society.

286 Individuals thus become

dependent for their livelihood upon civil society, which takes the place of the family with respect to individual needs.

2*

7 The society thereby assumes a responsibility both to provide education to enable

individuals to earn their own living,288

and to provide for the needs of those unable to provide for themselves, because of either their own incapacity or larger economic forces.

289 Hegel thus adopts

the view nascent in Hobbes, Locke, and Blackstone, and more fully developed by Kant, that the state has an obligation to ensure the subsistence of its members.

290 In sum, Hegel holds that the

state has a duty not merely to protect the formal rights of its members, but also to secure their particular welfare, by protecting them against criminal violence, preserving them from other forms of harm, and ensuring that they have means of subsistence. These services, Hegel emphasizes, are not mere benefits that the state can bestow or not as it chooses, but rights inherent in belonging to the community.

291 Like earlier writers, Hegel also holds that citizens owe reciprocal

duties to the state.292

In particular, the citizen is obligated to perform services necessary for the common good.

293 This obligation generally takes the form of a duty to pay taxes.

29* The principle of

subjective freedom, which is central to morality and which lies at the foundation of the modern state, dictates that the state generally should not commandeer particular services, but should obtain them on a voluntary basis in exchange for payment.

295 As Hegel recognizes, however, there

are exceptions to this general rule.296

The nature of trial by jury, for example, requires that citizens have a legal obligation to perform jury service when called.

297 Although Hegel does not

directly address whether the law should impose a duty to rescue, a compelling argument for such a duty can be made on Hegelian grounds. As we have seen, Hegel would hold that the state is obligated to prevent harm to one of its members in an emergency situation. When none of its own officers are present, however, the state can act only through its citizens. If citizens had no duty to act in such cases, the state would fail to fulfill its obligation, thereby undermining its ethical relationship with its citizens. By virtue of this relationship, citizens have a responsibility to assist the state in fulfilling its functions, which themselves serve the purpose of securing the rights and well-being of citizens. For these reasons, the state may properly impose such a duty on its citizens. Finally, because this duty relates to outward matters—to external action and to the preservation of life and other outward interests—it can be made a legal and not simply a moral duty-

293


IN ORDER FOR THE STATE TO FULFILL ITS OBLIGATION TO PROTECT THE COMMUNITY WITHOUT BECOMING OPPRESSIVE INDIVIDUALS MUST ASSIST OTHERS TO HELP MAINTAIN THE PEACE

Steven Heyman [Prof. Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology] “Foundations of the Duty to Rescue” Vanderbilt Law Review. Vol. 47, 1994. Hegel's criticism of Fichte suggests a farther response to the liberal or libertarian opposition to a duty to rescue, which was considered earlier.

301 According to that view, the sole legitimate end of

the state is to secure the rights of individuals. This end requires the existence of state force to protect individuals against violence and wrong. To the extent that this force is insufficient to protect against violence, the state fails in its function. On the other hand, if the state had sufficient force for this purpose, that force would be so great as to leave no security against oppression by the state itself. As Hegel suggests, the only solution to this dilemma is for the force of the community ultimately to be conceived of not as external force but as the activity of the citizens in preserving their own rights against violence. For this reason, I would argue, imposing a duty to rescue (at least in the context of criminal violence) is more consistent with a libertarian or liberal position than is relying solely on state power to protect individual rights.


CAPITALISM

THE CHOICES PEOPLE MAKE IN THE FREE MARKET ARE NOT ALWAYS FREE Michael Sandel [Prof. of Government, Harvard University], Justice: What’s The Right Thing To Do?, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, p. 81-82 The first objection holds that, for those with limited alternatives, the free market is not all that free. Consider an extreme case: A homeless person sleeping under a bridge may have chosen, in some sense, to do so; but we would not necessarily consider his choice to be a free one. Nor would we be justified in assuming that he must prefer sleeping under a bridge to sleeping in an apartment. In order to know whether his choice reflects a preference for sleeping out of doors or an inability to afford an apartment, we need to know something about his circumstances. Is he doing this freely or out of necessity? The same question can be asked about market choices generally – including the choices people make when they take on various jobs. How does this apply to military service? We can’t determine the justice or injustice of the volunteer army without knowing more about the background conditions that prevail in the society: Is there a reasonable degree of equal opportunity, or do some people have very few options in life? Does everyone have a chance to get a college education, or is it the case that, for some people, the only way to afford college is to enlist in the military? From the standpoint of market reasoning, the volunteer army is attractive because it avoids the coercion of conscription. It makes military service a matter of consent. But some people who wind up serving in the all-volunteer army may be as averse to military service as those who stay away. If poverty and economic disadvantage are widespread, the choice to enlist may simply reflect the lack of alternatives. According to this objection, the volunteer army may not be as voluntary as it seems. In fact, it may involve an element of coercion. If some in the society have no other good options, those who choose to enlist may be conscripted, in effect, by economic necessity. In that case, the difference between conscription and the volunteer army is not that one is compulsory while the other is free; it’s rather that each employs a different form of compulsion – the force of law in the fist case and pressure of economic necessity on in the second. Only if people have a reasonable range of decent job options can it be said that the choice to serve for pay reflects their preferences rather than their limited alternatives.


DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

NATURAL DUTIES SUCH AS MUTUAL AID APPLY REGARDLESS OF CONSENT John Rawls [James Bryant Conant University Professorship at Harvard University], A Theory of Justice (Revised Edition), Cambridge: The Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press (1971), p. 98-99 Whereas all obligations are accounted for the by principle of fairness, there are many natural duties, positive and negative. I shall make no attempt to bring them under one principle. Admittedly this lack of unity runs the risk of putting too much strain on priority rules, but I shall have to leave this difficulty aside. The following are examples of natural duties: the duty of helping another when he is in need or jeopardy, provided that one can do so without excessive risk or loss to oneself; the duty not to harm or injure another; and the duty not to cause unnecessary suffering. The first of these duties, the duty of mutual aid, is a positive duty in that it is a duty to do something good for another; whereas the last two duties are negative in that they require us not to do something that is bad. The distinction between positive and negative duties is intuitively clear in many cases, but often gives way. I shall not put any stress upon it. The distinction is important only in connection with the priority problem, since it seems plausible to hold that, when the distinction is clear, negative duties have more weight than positive ones. But I shall not pursue this question here. Now in contrast with obligations, it is characteristic of natural duties that they apply to us without regard to our voluntary acts. Moreover, they have no necessary connection with institutions or social practices; their content is not, in general, defined by the rules of these arrangements. Thus we have a natural duty not to be cruel, and a duty to help another, whether or not we have committed ourselves to these actions. It is no defense or excuse to say that we have made no promise not to be cruel or vindictive, or to come to another’s aid. Indeed, a promise not to kill, for example, is normally ludicrously redundant, and the suggestion that it establishes a moral requirement where none already existed is mistaken. Such a promise is in order, if it ever is so, only when for special reasons one has the right to kill, perhaps in a situation arising in a just war. A further feature of natural duties is that they hold between persons irrespective of their institutional relationships; they obtain between all as equal moral persons. In this sense the natural duties are owed not only to definite individuals, say to those cooperating together in a particular social arrangement, but to persons generally. This feature in particular suggests the propriety of the adjective “natural.” One aim of the law of nationas is to assure the recognition of these duties in the conduct of states. This is especially important in constraining the means used in war, assuming that, in certain circumstances anyway, wars of self-defense are justified (§58).


ACTS WHICH ARE TYPICALLY NATURAL DUTIES ONLY BECOME SUPEREROGATORY WHEN THE ACT WOULD IMPOSE A GREAT COST ON THE AGENT

John Rawls [James Bryant Conant University Professorship at Harvard University], A Theory of Justice (Revised Edition), Cambridge: The Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press (1971), p. 100-101 I shall say very little about the other kind of principles for individuals. For while permissions are not an unimportant class of actions, I must limit the discussion to the theory of social justice. It may be observed, though, that once all the principles defining requirements are chosen, no further acknowledgments are necessary to define permissions. This is so because permissions are those acts which we are at liberty both to do and not to do. They are acts which violate no obligation or natural duty. In studying permissions one wishes to single out those that are significant from a moral point of view and to explain their relation to duties and obligations. Many such actions are morally indifferent or trivial. But among permissions is the interesting class of supererogatory actions. These are acts of benevolence and mercy, of heroism and self-sacrifice. It is good to do these actions but it is not one’s duty or obligation. Supererogatory acts are not required, though normally they would be were it not for the loss or risk involved for the agent himself. A person who does a supererogatory act does not invoke the exemption which the natural duties allow. For while we have a natural duty to bring about a great good, say, if we can do so relatively easily, we are released from this duty when the cost to ourselves is considerable. Supererogatory acts raise questions of first importance for ethical theory. For example, it seems offhand that the classical utilitarian view cannot account for them. It would appear that wea re bound to perform actions which bring about a greater good for others whatever the cost to ourselves provided that the sum of advantages altogether exceeds that of other acts open to us. There is nothing corresponding to the exemptions included in the formulation of the natural duties. Thus some of the actions which justice as fairness counts as supererogatory may be required by the utility principle. I shall not, however, pursue this matter further. Supererogatory acts are mentioned here for the sake of completeness. We must now turn to the interpretation of the initial situation.


MUTUAL AID IS A NATURAL DUTY

John Rawls [James Bryant Conant University Professorship at Harvard University], A Theory of Justice (Revised Edition), Cambridge: The Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press (1971), p. 297-298 Similar reasoning supports the other natural duties. Consider, for example, the duty of mutual aid. Kant suggests, and others have followed him here, that the ground for proposing this duty is that situations may arise in which we will need the help of others, and not to acknowledge this principle is to deprive ourselves of their assistance. 4 While on particular occasions we are required to do things not in our own interests, we are likely to gain on balance at least over the longer run under normal circumstances. In each single instance the gain to the person who needs help far outweighs the loss of those required to assist him, and assuming that the chances of being the beneficiary are not much smaller than those of being the one who must give aid, the principle is clearly in our interest. But this is not the only argument for the duty of mutual aid, or even the most important one. A sufficient ground for adopting this duty is its pervasive effect on the quality of everyday life. The public knowledge that we are living in a society in which we can depend upon others to come to our assistance in difficult circumstances is itself of great value. It makes little difference that we never, as things turn out, need this assistance and that occasionally we are called on to give it. The balance of gain, narrowly interpreted, may not matter. The primary value of the principle is not measured by the help we actually receive but rather by the sense of confidence and trust in other men’s good intentions and the knowledge that they are there if we need them. Indeed, it is only necessary to imagine what a society would be like if it were publicly known that this duty was rejected. Thus while the natural duties are not special cases of a single principle (or so I have assumed), similar reasons no doubt support many of them when one considers the underlying attitudes they represent. Once we try to picture the life of a society in which no one had the slightest desire to act on these duties, we see that it would express an indifference if not disdain for human beings that would make a sense of our own worth impossible. Once again we should not the great importance of publicity effects.


IT IS MORALLY ARBITRARY TO ALLOW SOCIAL GOODS TO BE DISTRIBUTED BY THOSE ARRANGEMENTS ARISING SPONTANEOUSLY THROUGH THE EXERCISE OF OUR NATURAL LIBERTIES

John Rawls [James Bryant Conant University Professorship at Harvard University], A Theory of Justice (Revised Edition), Cambridge: The Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press (1971), p. 62-63 In the system of natural liberty the initial distribution is regulated by the arrangements implicit in the conception of careers open to talents (as easlier defined). These arrangements presuppose a background of equal liberty (as specified by the first principle) and a free market economy. They require a formal equality of opportunity in that all have at least the same legal rights of access to all advantaged social positions. But since there is no effort to preserve an equality, or similarity, of social conditions, except insofar as this is necessary to preserve the requisite background institutions, the initial distribution of assets for any period of time is strongly influenced by natural and social contingencies. The existing distribution of income and wealth, say, is the cumulative effect of prior distributions of natural assets – that is, natural talents and abilities – as these have been developed or left unrealized, and their use favored or disfavored over time by social circumstances and such chance contingencies as accident and good fortune. Intuitively, the most obvious injustice of the system of natural liberty is that it permits distributive shares to be improperly influenced by these factors so arbitrary from a moral point of view.


LIBERAL ATTEMPTS TO SECURE EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY AND SO GIVE PEOPLE WHAT THEY ‘DESERVE’ STILL FALL VICTIM TO MORAL ARBITRARINESS

John Rawls [James Bryant Conant University Professorship at Harvard University], A Theory of Justice (Revised Edition), Cambridge: The Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press (1971), p. 63-64 The liberal interpretation of the two principles seeks, then, to mitigate the influence of social contingencies and natural fortune on distributive shares. To accomplish this end it is necessary to impose further basic structural conditions on the social system. Free market arrangements must be set within a framework of political and legal institutions which regulates the overall trends of economic events and preserves the social conditions necessary for fair equality of opportunity. The elements of this framework are familiar enough, though it may be worthwhile to recall the importance of preventing excessive accumulations of property and wealth and of maintaining equal opportunities of education for all. Chances to acquire cultural knowledge and skills should not depend upon one’s class position, and so the school system, whether public or private, should be designed to even out class barriers. While the liberal conception seems clearly preferable to the system of natural liberty, intuitively it still appears defective. For one thing, even if it works to perfection in eliminating the influence of social contingencies, it still permits the distribution of wealth and income to be determined by the natural distribution of abilities and talents. Within the limits allowed by the background arrangements, distributive shares are decided by the outcome of the natural lottery; and this outcome is arbitrary from a moral perspective. There is no more reason to permit the distribution of income and wealth to be settled by the distribution of natural assets than by historical and social fortune. Furthermore, the principle of fair opportunity can only be imperfectly carried out, at least as long as some form of the family exists. The extent to which natural capacities develop and reach fruition is affected by all kinds of social conditions and class attitudes. Even the willingness to make an effort, to try, and so to be deserving in the ordinary sense is itself dependent upon happy family and social circumstances. It is impossible in practice to secure equal chances of achievement and culture for those similarly endowed, and therefore we may want to adopt a principle which recognizes this fact and also mitigates the arbitrary effects of the natural lottery itself. That the liberal conception fails to do this encourages one to look for another interpretation of the two principles of justice.


JUSTICE REQUIRES AIDING THOSE IN NEED BY REDRESSING ARBITRARY INEQUALITY

John Rawls [James Bryant Conant University Professorship at Harvard University], A Theory of Justice (Revised Edition), Cambridge: The Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press (1971), p. 86-87 First we may observe that the difference principle gives some weigh to the considerations singled out by the principle of redress. This is the principle that undeserved inequlities call for redress; and since inequalities of birth and natural endowment are undeserved, these inequalities are to be somehow compensated for. 17 Thus the principle holds that in order to treat all persons equally, to provide genuine equality of opportunity, society must give more attention to those with fewer native assets and to those born into the less favorable social positions. The idea is to redress the bias of contingencies in the direction of equality. In pursuit of this principle greater resources might be spent on the education of the less rather than the more intelligent, at least over a certain time of life, say the earlier years of school. Now the principle of redress has not to my knowledge been proposed as the sole criterion of justice, as the single aim of the social order. It is plausible as most such principles are only as a prima facie principle, one tha tis to be weighed in balance with others. For example, we are to weigh it against the principle to improve the average standard of life, or to advance the common good. 18 But whatever other principles we hold, the claims of redress are to be taken into account. It is thought to represent one of the elements in our conception of justice. Now the difference principle is not of course the principle of redress. It does not require society to try to even out handicaps as if all were expected to compete on a fair basis in the same race. But the difference principle would allocate resources in education, say, so as to improve the long-term expectation the least favored. If this end is attained by giving more attention to the better endowed, it is permissible; otherwise not. And in making this decision, the value of education should not be assessed solely in terms of economic efficiency and social welfare. Equally if not more important is the role of education in enabling a person to enjoy the culture of his society and to take part in its affairs, and in this way to provide for each individual a secure sense of his own worth. Thus although the difference principle is not the same as that of redress, it does achieve some of the intent of the latter principle. It transforms the aims of the basic structure so that the total scheme of institutions no longer emphasizes social efficiency and technocratic values. The difference principle represents, in effect, an agreement to regard the distribution of natural talents as in some respects a common asset and to share in the greater social and economic benefits made possible by the complementarities of this distribution. Those who have been favored by nature, whoever they are, may gain from their good fortune only on terms that improve the situation of those who have lost out. The naturally advantaged are not to gain merely because they are more gifted, but only to cover the costs of training and education and for using their endowments in ways that help the less fortunate as well. No one deserves his greater natural capacity nor merits a more favorable starting place in society. But, of course, there is no reason to ignore, much less to eliminate these distinctions. Instead, the basic structure can be arranged so that these contingencies work for the good of the least fortunate. Thus we are led to the difference principle if we wish to set up the social system so that no one gains or loses from his arbitrary place in the distribution of natural assets or his initial position in society without giving or receiving compensating advantages in return.


THE NATURAL DISTRIBUTION OF TALENT IS NEITHER JUST NOR UNJUST; HOW INSTITUTIONS DEAL WITH IT IS

John Rawls [James Bryant Conant University Professorship at Harvard University], A Theory of Justice (Revised Edition), Cambridge: The Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press (1971), p. 87-88 In view of these remarks we may reject the contention that the ordering of institution s is always defective because the distribution of natural talents and the contingencies of social circumstance are unjust, and for ignoring injustice, as if the refusal this injustice must inevitably carry over to human arrangements. Occasionally this reflection is offered as an excuse for ignoring injustice, as if the refusal to acquiesce in injustice is on par with being unable to accept death. The natural distribution is neither just nor unjust; nor is it unjust that persons are born into society as some particular position. These are simply natural facts. What is just and unjust is the way that institutions deal with these facts. Aristocratic and caste societies are unjust because they make these contingencies the ascriptive basis for belonging to more or less enclosed and privileged social classes. The basic structure of these societies incorporates the arbitrariness found in nature. But there is no necessity for men to resign themselves to these contingencies. The social system is not an unchangeable order beyond human control but a pattern of human action. In justice as fairness men agree to avail themselves of the accidents of nature and social circumstance only when doing so is for the common benefit. The two principles are a fair way of meeting the arbitrariness of fortune; and while no doubt imperfect in other ways, the institutions which satisfy these principles are just.


POSSESSING CHARACTER IS MORALLY ARBITRARY; IT CANNOT JUSTIFY SUPERIOR ENTITLEMENTS

John Rawls [James Bryant Conant University Professorship at Harvard University], A Theory of Justice (Revised Edition), Cambridge: The Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press (1971), p. 89 Thus it is incorrect that individuals with greater natural endowments and the superior character that has made their development possible have a right to a cooperative scheme that enables them to obtain even further benefits in ways that do not contribute to the advantages of others. We do not deserve our place in the distribution of native endowments, any more than we deserve our initial starting place in society. That we deserve the superior character that enables us to make the effort to cultivate our abilities is also problematic; for such character depends in good part upon fortunate family and social circumstances in early life for which we can claim no credit. The notion of desert does not apply here. To be sure, the more advantaged have a right to their natural assets, as does everyone else; this right is covered by the first principle under the basic liberty protecting the integrity of the person. And so the more advantaged are entitled to whatever they can acquire in accordance with the rules of a fair system of social cooperation. Our problem is how this scheme, the basic structure of society, is to be designed. From a suitably general standpoint, the difference principle appears acceptable to both the more advantaged and the less advantaged individual. Of course, none of this is strictly speaking an argument for the principle, since in a contract theory arguments are made from the point of view of the original position. But these intuitive considerations help to clarify the principle and the sense in which it is egalitarian.


THE EXERCISE OF VIRTUES LIKE EFFORT IS A MORALLY ARBITRARY ENDOWMENT AND SO CANNOT CREATE A JUST ENTITLMENT

John Rawls [James Bryant Conant University Professorship at Harvard University], A Theory of Justice (Revised Edition), Cambridge: The Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press (1971), p. 274 Moreover, none of the precepts of justice aims at rewarding virtue. The premiums earned by scarce natural talents, for example, are to cover the costs of training and to encourage the efforts of learning, as well as to direct ability to where it best furthers the common interest. The distributive shares that result do not correlate with moral worth, since the intitial endowment of natural assets and the contingencies of their growth and nurture in early life ar arbitrary from a moral point of view. The precept which seems intuitively to come closest to rewarding moral desert is that of distribution according to effort. 39 Once again, however, it seems clear that the effort a person is willing to make is influenced by his natural abilities and skills and the alternatives open to him. The better endowed are more likely, other things equal, to strive conscientiously, and there seems to be no way to discount for their greater good fortune. The idea of rewarding desert is impracticable. And certainly to the extent that the precept of need is emphasized, moral worth is ignored. Nor does the basic structure tend to balance the precepts of justice so as to achieve the requisite correspondence behind the scenes. It is regulated by the two principles of justice which define other aims entirely.


THE ABSENSE OF INDIVIDUAL DESERT CREATES A PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF REGARDING TALENTS AS A COMMON ASSET

Michael Sandel [Prof. of Government, Harvard University], Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Second Edition), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1998), p.98 For Rawls, on the other hand, the absence of individual desert creates a presumption in favor of regarding the distribution of talents as a common asset. The lack of desert or a pre-institutional concept of virtue means that institutions are unconstrained by antecedent moral claims in their pursuit of the primary virtue of social justice. In this sense, the analogy of manna from even is apt. The array of assets dealt by fortune is neither just nor unjust. ‘These are simply natural facts. What is just and unjust is the way that institutions deal with these facts’ (102). There is no reason to let assets and the benefits that flow from them lie where they fall. This would be simply to incorporate and affirm the arbitrariness of nature. The discovery that virtue and entitlements await social institutions rather than constrain them is a reason to pursue justice all the more insistently, not a reason to freeze arbitrariness in place.


COMMUNITARIANISM

WE ARE EACH OBLIGATED AS MEMBERS OF A COMMUNITY OF MUTUAL AID TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO OTHERS Barbara Herman [Prof. of Philosophy and Law, UCLA] “Mutual Aid and Respect for Persons” Ethics, Vol. 94, No. 4 Jul., 1984, p. 587 The dependency argument against a policy of indifference, then, does not simply yield a duty to help others. It defines a community of mutual aid for dependent beings.2" Membership in the community is established as much by vulnerability (and the possibility of being helped) as by rationality (and the capacity to help).22 It may well be that this is not the sole duty to help others that we have. Other arguments might yield duties with different requirements, different scope (some of which might apply to angels as well). In this case it is the fact of dependency- that we are, equally, dependent (again: not that we are equally de-pendent)- that is the ground of the duty to help. I may not be indifferent to others not because I would thereby risk the loss of needed help (this is not a duty of fairness or reciprocity) but because I cannot escape our shared condition of dependency. The claim of each of us on the resources of the others is equal. The argument that defeats the maxim of nonbeneficence leads, positively, to a duty of mutual aid. Membership in the community of mutual aid is more inclusive than it may first appear. Those we are unable to help can still belong to our community of mutual aid and so be obliged to help us. Imagine a race of rational dependent beings, capable of helping us, yet outside the reach of any help we have to offer. Perhaps they live too far away; perhaps we do not possess food that would nourish them; et cetera. But that someone may be unable (as it happens) to be helped is the way things are among us as well. Our need for help is no guarantee that the help we need will be available or possible. Membership in the community of mutual aid gives one's need a valid claim on the resources of the community. The claim does not (necessarily) fail to be acknowledged when left unmet. So long as there is no ultimately unbridgeable barrier to mutual help between us and this other race-so long as it is not true that nothing we could ever do, under any possible circumstances, could be of help to them, while they continue to be able to help us23 their inclusion in the community will stand.


THE LIBERAL CONCEPTION OF OBLIGATION IS TOO THIN; PEOPLE HAVE MORAL OBLIGATIONS BASED ON THEIR PARTICULAR COMMUNITY RELATIONSHIPS, NOT JUST MUTUAL CONSENT

Michael Sandel [Prof. of Government, Harvard University], Justice: What’s The Right Thing To Do?, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, p. 224-225 From the standpoint of the narrative conception of the person, the liberal account of obligation is too thin. It fails to account for the special responsibilities we have to one another as fellow citizens. More than this, it fails to capture those loyalties and responsibilities whose moral force consists partly in the fact that living by them is inseparable from understanding ourselves as the particular persons we are – as members of this family or nation or people; as bearers of that history; as citizens of this republic. On the narrative account, these identities are not contingencies we should set aside when deliberating about morality and justice; they are a part of who we are, and so rightly bear on our moral responsibilities. So one way of deciding between the voluntarist and narrative conceptions of the person is to ask if you think there is a third category of obligations – call them obligations of solidarity, or membership – that can’t be explained in contractarian terms. Unlike natural duties, obligations of solidarity are particular, not universal; they involve moral responsibilities we owe, not to rational beings as such, but to those with whom we share a certain history. But unlike voluntary obligations, they do not depend on an act of consent. Their moral weight derives instead from the situated aspect of moral reflection, from a recognition that my life story is implicated in the stories of others.


COMMUNAL MEMBERSHIP CREATES OBLIGATIONS OF SOLIDARITY

Michael Sandel [Prof. of Government, Harvard University], Justice: What’s The Right Thing To Do?, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, p. 234-235 Of course, not everyone agrees that we have special obligations to our family, comrades, or fellow citizens. Some argue that so-called obligations of solidarity are actually just instances of collective selfishness, a prejudice for our own kind. These critics concede that we typically care more for our family, friends, and comrades than we do for other people. But, they ask, isn’t this heightened concern for one’s own people a parochial, inward-looking tendency that we should overcome rather than valorize in the name of patriotism or fraternity? No, not necessarily. Obligations of solidarity and membership point outward as well as inwar. Some of the special responsibilities that flow from the particular communities I inhabit I may owe to fellow members. But others I may owe to those with whom my community has a morally burdened history, as in the relation of Germans to Jews, or of American whites to African Americans. Collective apologies and reparations for historic injustices are good examples of the way solidarity can create moral responsibilities for communities other than my own. Making amends for my country’s past wrongs is one way of affirming my allegiance to it. Sometimes solidarity can give us special reason to criticize our own people or the actions of our government. Patriotism can compel dissent. Take for example two different grounds that led people to oppose the Vietnam War and protest against it. One was the belief that the war was unjust; the other was the belief that the war was unworthy of us and at odds with who we are as a people. The first reason can be taken up by opponents of the war whoever they are or wherever they live. But the second reason can be felt and voiced only by citizens of the country responsible for the war. A Swede could oppose the Vietnam War and consider it unjust, but only an American could feel ashamed of it.


ECONOMIC INEQUALITY UNDERMINES COMMUNITY SOLIDARITY

Michael Sandel [Prof. of Government, Harvard University], Justice: What’s The Right Thing To Do?, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, p. 266-267 But there is a third, more important reason to worry about the growing inequality of American life: Too great a gap between rich and poor undermines the solidarity that democratic citizenship requires. Here’s how: As inequality deepens, rich and poor live increasingly separate lives. The affluent send their children to private schools (or to public schools in wealthy suburbs), leaving urban public schools to the children of families who have no alternative. A similar trend leads to the secession by the privileged from other public institutions and facilities. 43 Private health clubs replace municipal recreation centers and swimming pools. Upscale residential communities hire private security guards and rely less on public transportation. And so on. The affluent secede from public places and services, leaving them to those who can’t afford anything else. This has two bad effects, one fiscal, the other civic. First, public services deteriorate, as those who no longer use those services become less willing to support them with their taxes. Second, public instuttions such as schools, parks, playgrounds, and community centers cease to be places where citizens from different walks of life encounter one another. Institutions that once gathered people together and served as informal schools of civic virtue become few and far between. The hollowing out of the public realm makes it difficult to cultivate the solidarity and sense of community on which democratic citizenship depends. So, quite apart from its effects on utility or consent, inequality can be corrosive to civic virtue. Conservatives enamored of markets and liberals concerned with redistribution overlook this loss.


PUBLIC PROGRAMS TO HELP THE NEEDY SOLIDIFY COMMUNITY SOLIDARITY

Michael Sandel [Prof. of Government, Harvard University], Justice: What’s The Right Thing To Do?, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, p. 267-268 If the erosion of the public realm is the problem, what is the solution? A politics of the common good would take as one of its primary goals the reconstruction of the infrastructure of civic life. Rather than focus on redistribution for the sake of broadening access to private consumption, it would tax the affluent to rebuild public institutions and services so that rich and poor alike would want to take advantage of them. An earlier generation made a massive investment in the federal highway program, which gave Americans unprecedented individual mobility and freedom, but also contributed to the reliance on the private automobile, suburban sprawl, environmental degradation, and living patterns corrosive to community. This generation could commit itself to an equally consequential investment in an infrastructure for civic renewal: public schools to which rich and poor alike would want to send their children; public transportation systems reliable enough to attract upscale commuters; and public health clinics, playgrounds, parks, recreation centers, libraries, and museums that would, ideally at least, draw people out of their gated communities and into the common spaces of shared democratic citizenship. Focusing on the civic consequences of inequality, and ways of reversing them, might find political traction that arguments about income distribution as such do not. It would also help highlight the connection between distributive justice and the common good.


INDIVIDUALS ARE ABLE TO PRACTICE VIRTUE ONLY IN THE CONTEXT OF A PARTICULAR COMMUNITY

Alasdair MacIntyre [Emeritus Professor of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame], After Virtue (3rd

Edition), Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press (2007), p. 220-221 For I am never able to seek for the good or exercise the virtues only qua individual. This is partly because what it is to live the good life concretely varies from circumstance to circumstance even when it is one and the same conception of the good life and one and the same set of virtues which are being embodied in a human life. What the good life is for a fifth-century Athenian general will not be the same as what it was for a medieval nun or a seventeenth-century farmer. But it is not just that different individuals live in different social circumstances; it is also that we all approach our own circumstances as bearers of a particular social identity. I am someone’s son or daughter, someone else’s cousin or uncle; I am a citizen of this or that city, a member of this or that guild or profession; I belong to this clan, that tribe, this nation. Hence what is good for me has to b the good for one who inhabits these roles. As such, I inherit from the past of my family, my city, my tribe, my nation, a variety of debts, inheritances, rightful expectations and obligations. These constitute the given of my life, my moral starting point. This is in part what gives my life its own moral particularity. This thought is likely to appear alien and even suprising (sic) from the standpoint of modern individualism. From the standpoint of individualism I am what I myself choose to be. I can always, if I wish to, put in question what are taken to be the merely contingent social features on my existence. I may biologically be my father’s son; but I cannot be held responsible for what he did unless I choose implicitly or explicitly to assume such responsibility. I may legally be a citizen of a certain country; but I cannot be held responsible for what my country does or has done unless I choose implicitly or explicitly to assume such responsibility. Such individualism is expressed by those modern Americans who deny any responsibility for the effects of slavery upon black Americans, saying ‘I never owned any slaves’. It is more subtly the standpoint of those other modern Americans who accept a nicely calculated responsibility for such effects measured precisely by the benefits they themselves as individuals have indirectly received from slavery. In both cases ‘being an American’ is not in itself taken to be part of the moral identity of the individual. And of course there is nothing peculiar to modern Americans in this attitude: the Englishman who says ‘I never did any wrong to Ireland; why bring up that old history as though it had something to do with me?’ or the young German who believes that being born after 1945 means that what Nazis did to Jews has no moral relevance to his relationship to his Jewish contemporaries, exhibit the same attitude, that according to which the self is detachable from its social and historical roles and statuses. And the self so detached is of course a self very much at home in either Sartre’s or Goffman’s perspective, a self that can have no history. The contrast with the narrative view of the self is clear. For the story of my life is always embedded in the story of those communities from which I derive my identity. I am born with a past; and to try to cut myself off from that past, in the individualist mode, is to deform my present relationships. The possession of an historical identity and th possession of a social identity coincide. Notice that rebellion against my identity is always one possible mode of expressing it. Notice also that the fact that the self has to find its moral identity in and through its membership in communities such as those of the family, the neighborhood, the city and the tribe does not entail that the self has to accept the moral limitations of the particularity of those forms of community. Without those moral particularities to begin from there would never be anywhere to begin; but it is in moving forward from such particularity that the search for the good, for the universal, consists. Yet particularity can never be simply left behind or obliterated. The notion of escaping from it into a realm of entirely universal maxims which belong to man as such, whether in its eighteenth-century Kantian form or in the presentation of some modern analytical moral philosophies, is an illusion and an illusion with painful consequences. When men and women identify what are in fact their partial and particular causes too easily and too completely with the cause of some universal principle, they usually behave worse than they would otherwise do.


GOVERNMENT ACTIONS SYMBOLICALLY AFFIRM THE VALUES OF SOLIDARITY AND HUMAN DIGNITY

Robert Nozick [Prof., Harvard University], The Examined Life: Philosophical Mediations, New York: Simon & Schuster (1989), p. 286-287 WE WANT our individual lives to express our conceptions of reality (and of responsiveness to that); so too we want the sinstitutions demarcating our lives together to express and saliently symbolize our desired mutual relations. Democratic institutions and the liberties coordinate with them are not simply effective means toward controlling the powers of government and directing these toward matters of joint concern; they themselves express and symbolize, in a pointed and official way, our equal human dignity, our autonomy and powers of self-direction. We vote, although we are cognizant of the minuscule probability that our own actual vote will have some decisive effect on the outcome, in part as an expression and symbolic affirmation of our status as autonomous and self-governing beings whose considered judgments or even opinions have to be given weight equal to those of others. That symbolism is important to us. Within the operation of democratic institutions, too, we want expressions of the values that concern us and bind us together. The libertarian position I once propounded now seems to me seriously inadequate, in part because it did not fully knit the humane considerations and joint cooperative activities it left room for more closely into its fabric. It neglected the symbolic importance of an official political concern with issues or problems, as a way of marking their importance or urgency, and hence of expressing, intensifying, channeling, encouraging, and validating our private actions and concerns toward them. Joint goals that the government ignores completely – it is different with private or family goals – tend to appear unworthy of our joint attention and hence to receive little. There are some things we choose to do together through government in solemn marking of our h uman solidarity, served by the fact that we do them together in this official fasion and often also by the content of the action itself.*


INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY AND LIBERTY ARE TWO OF MANY VALUES WE WISH TO SYBOLICALLY AFFIRM, INCLUDING SOLIDARITY AND HUMANE CONCERN FOR THOSE IN NEED

Robert Nozick [Prof., Harvard University], The Examined Life: Philosophical Mediations, New York: Simon & Schuster (1989), p. 287-288 “It is all very well,” someone might say, “to mark human solidarity through official action, but we do that through respecting the rights of individuals not to have their peaceful lives interfered with, not to be murdered, etc., and this is sufficient expression of our human respect for our fellow citizens; not only is there no need to interfere any more greatly in citizens’ lives in order to bind them more closely to their fellows, that interference with individual autonomy itself denotes a lack of respect for it.” Yet our concern for individual autonomy and liberty too is itself in part an expressive concern. We believe these valuable not simply because of the particular actions they enable someone to choose to perform, or the goods they enable him to acquire, but because of the ways they enable him to engage in pointed and elaborate self-expressive and self-symbolizing activities that further elaborate and develop the person. A concern for the expression and symbolization of values that can best and most pointedly, not to mention most efficiently, mbe expressed jointly and officially – that is, politically – is continuous with a concern for individual self-expression. There are many sides of ourselves that seek symbolic self-expression, and even if the personal side were to be given priority, there is no reason to grant it sole sway. If symbolically expressing something is a way of intensifying its reality, we will not want to truncate the political realm so as to truncate the reality of our social solidarity and humane concern for others. Id o not mean to imply that the public realm is only a matter of joint self-expression; we wish also by this actually to accomplish something and make things different, and we would not find some policies adequately expressive of solidarity with others if we believed they would not serve to help or sustain them. The libertarian view looked solely at the purpose of government, not at its meaning; hence, it took an unduly narrow view of purpose, too. Joint political action does not merely symbolically express our ties of concern, it also constitutes a relational tie itself. The relational stance, in the political realm, leads us to want to express and instantiate ties of concern to our fellows. And if helping those in need, as compared to further bettering the situation of those already well off, counts as relationally more intense and enduring from our side and from the side of the receivers also, then the relational stance can explain what puzzles utilitarianism, viz., why a concern for bettering others’ situation concentrates especially upon the needy. If manna descended from heaven to improve the situation of the needy, all without our aid, we would have to find another way to jointly express and intensify our relational ties.


VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO HELP THE NEEDY ARE INSUFFICIENT TO SYMBOLICALLY EXPRESS THE VALUE OF COMMUNITY SOLIDARITY

Robert Nozick [Prof., Harvard University], The Examined Life: Philosophical Mediations, New York: Simon & Schuster (1989), p. 288-289 But don’t people have a right not to feel ties of solidarity and concern, and if so, how can the political society take seriously its symbolic expression of what may not be there? By what right does it express for others what they themselves choose not to? These others should feel – they would be better human beings if they felt – ties of solidarity and concern for fellow citizens (and for fellow human beings, perhaps also for fellow living things), although they do have a right not to feel this. (People sometimes have a right not to do or feel something even though they should; they have the right to choose.) Their fellow citizens, though, may choose to speak for them to cover up that lack of concern and solidarity – whether or not the people themselves realize they are lacking something. This covering up for them may be done out of politeness, or because of the importance to the others of a joint public affirmation of concern and solidarity, if only so they won’t be forced to notice how uncaring and inhumane some of their compatriots are. To be sure, this joint public affirmation is not simply verbal; those spoken for may have to pay taxes to help support the programs it involves. (That a fig leaf was created to cover the shame of their unconcern does not mean they do not have to help pay for it.) The complete absence of any symbolic public expression and marking caring and solidarity would leave the rest of us bereft of a society validating human relatedness. “Well, why don’t those who want and need such a society voluntarily contribute to pay for its public programs rather than taxing the others, who don’t care anything about it?” But a program thus supported by many people’s voluntary contributions, worthy though it might be, would not constitute the society’s solemn marking and symbolic validation of the importance and centrality of those ties of concern and solidarity. That can occur only through its official joint action, speaking in the name of the whole. The point is not simply to accomplish the particular purpose – that might be done through private contributions alone – or to get the others to pay too – that could occur through stealing the necessary funds from them – but also to speak solemnly in everyone’s name, in the name of the society, about what it holds dear. A particular individual might prefer to speak only for himself. But to live in a society and to identify with it necessarily lays you open to being ashamed of things for which you are not personally responsible – wars of oppression or subverting of foreign governments – and to being proud of things you yourself have not done. A society sometimes speaks in our names. We could satisfy the people who object to the joint public expression of caring and solidarity and their attendant programs by eliminating such expressions, but this would leave the rest of us ashamed of our society, whose public voice of concern is silent. That silence would then speak for us. “Just stop identifying with the society, then! You then won’t have to be ashamed of what it does or doesn’t’ do or say.” To accommodate the objector to the public program, then, not only must we thwart our desire and need to jointly mark what we hold to be most central about our interrelations – a desire and need that are continuous with those for personal self-expression – we must stop identifying with our society despite all this means for our emotional life and sense of ourselves. The cost is too great.


UTILITARIANISM

THE ARGUMENT FOR GIVING AID RESTS ON A SERIES OF VERY PLAUSIBLE PREMISES Peter Singer [Professor of Bioethics, Princeton University], The Life You Can Save, New York: Random House (2009), p. 15-16 The above examples reveal our intuitive belief that we ought to help others in need, at least when we can see them and when we are the only person in a position to save them. But our moral intuitions are not always reliable, as we can see from variations in what people in different times and places find intuitively acceptable or objectionable. The case for helping those in extreme poverty will be stronger if it does not rest solely on our intuitions. Here is a logical argument from plausible premises to the same conclusion. First premise: Suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad. Second premise: If it is in your power to prevent something bad from happening, without

sacrificing anything nearly as important, it is wrong not to do so. Third premise: By donating to aid agencies, you can prevent suffering and death from lack of

food, shelter, and medical care, without sacrificing anything nearly as important. Conclusion: Therefore, If you do not donate to aid agencies, you are doing something wrong.


WE HAVE A DUTY TO ASSIST OTHERS AS LONG AS WE DO NOT SACRIFICE SOMETHING AS MORALLY SIGNIFICANT

Peter Singer [Prof. Bioethics at Princeton] “Famine, Affluence, and Morality” Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 1, no. 1 Spring 1972 My next point is this: if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it. By "without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance" I mean without causing anything else comparably bad to happen, or doing something that is wrong in itself, or failing to promote some moral good, comparable in significance to the bad thing that we can prevent. This principle seems almost as uncontroversial as the last one. It requires us only to prevent what is bad, and to promote what is good, and it requires this of us only when we can do it without sacrificing anything that is, from the moral point of view, comparably important. I could even, as far as the application of my argument to the Bengal emergency is concerned, qualify the point so as to make it: if it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything morally significant, we ought, morally, to do it. An application of this principle would be as follows: if I am walking past a shallow pond and see a child drowning in it, I ought to wade in and pull the child out. This will mean getting my clothes muddy, but this is insignificant, while the death of the child would presumably be a very bad thing.The uncontroversial appearance of the principle just stated is deceptive. If it were acted upon, even in its qualified form, our lives, our society, and our world would be fundamentally changed. For the principle takes, firstly, no account of proximity or distance. It makes no moral difference whether the person I can help is a neighbor's child ten yards from me or a Bengali whose name I shall never know, ten thousand miles away. Secondly, the principle makes no distinction between cases in which I am the only person who could possibly do anything and cases in which I am just one among millions in the same position.


A STRONG DUTY TO HELP THOSE IN NEED BEST PROMOTES UTILITY

Peter Singer [Prof. Bioethics at Princeton] “Famine, Affluence, and Morality” Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 1, no. 1 Spring 1972 A third point raised by the conclusion reached earlier relates to the question of just how much we all ought to be giving away. One possibility, which has already been mentioned, is that we ought to give until we reach the level of marginal utility - that is, the level at which, by giving more, I would cause as much suffering to myself or my dependents as I would relieve by my gift. This would mean, of course, that one would reduce oneself to very near the material circumstances of a Bengali refugee. It will be recalled that earlier I put forward both a strong and a moderate version of the principle of preventing bad occurrences. The strong version, which required us to prevent bad things from happening unless in doing so we would be sacrificing something of comparable moral significance, does seem to require reducing ourselves to the level of marginal utility. I should also say that the strong version seems to me to be the correct one. I proposed the more moderate version - that we should prevent bad occurrences unless, to do so, we had to sacrifice something morally significant -only in order to show that, even on this surely undeniable principle, a great change in our way of life is required. On the more moderate principle, it may not follow that we ought to reduce ourselves to the level of marginal utility, for one might hold that to reduce oneself and one's family to this level is to cause something significantly bad to happen. Whether this is so I shall not discuss, since, as I have said, I can see no good reason for holding the moderate version of the principle rather than the strong version. Even if we accepted the principle only in its moderate form, however, it should be clear that we would have to give away enough to ensure that the consumer society, dependent as it is on people spending on trivia rather than giving to famine relief, would slow down and perhaps disappear entirely. There are several reasons why this would be desirable in itself. The value and necessity of economic growth are now being questioned not only by conservationists, but by economists as well. [5] There is no doubt, too, that the consumer society has had a distorting effect on the goals and purposes of its members. Yet looking at the matter purely from the point of view of overseas aid, there must be a limit to the extent to which we should deliberately slow down our economy; for it might be the case that if we gave away, say, 40 percent of our Gross National Product, we would slow down the economy so much that in absolute terms we would be giving less than if we gave 25 percent of the much larger GNP that we would have if we limited our contribution to this smaller percentage.


WHETHER AN OBLIGATION TO ASSIST SEEMS CONSISTENT WITH MY “FAIR SHARE” IS IRRELEVANT

Peter Singer [Professor of Bioethics, Princeton University], “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 1, no. 1 (Spring 1972), pp. 229-243 [revised edition]

There may be a greater need to defend the second implication of my principle - that the fact that there are millions of other people in the same position, in respect to the Bengali refugees, as I am, does not make the situation significantly different from a situation in which I am the only person who can prevent something very bad from occurring. Again, of course, I admit that there is a psychological difference between the cases; one feels less guilty about doing nothing if one can point to others, similarly placed, who have also done nothing. Yet this can make no real difference to our moral obligations. [2] Should I consider that I am less obliged to pull the drowning child out of the pond if on looking around I see other people, no further away than I am, who have also noticed the child but are doing nothing? One has only to ask this question to see the absurdity of the view that numbers lessen obligation. It is a view that is an ideal excuse for inactivity; unfortunately most of the major evils - poverty, overpopulation, pollution - are problems in which everyone is almost equally involved.

The view that numbers do make a difference can be made plausible if stated in this way: if everyone in circumstances like mine gave £5 to the Bengal Relief Fund, there would be enough to provide food, shelter, and medical care for the refugees; there is no reason why I should give more than anyone else in the same circumstances as I am; therefore I have no obligation to give more than £5. Each premise in this argument is true, and the argument looks sound. It may convince us, unless we notice that it is based on a hypothetical premise, although the conclusion is not stated hypothetically. The argument would be sound if the conclusion were: if everyone in circumstances like mine were to give £5, I would have no obligation to give more than £5. If the conclusion were so stated, however, it would be obvious that the argument has no bearing on a situation in which it is not the case that everyone else gives £5. This, of course, is the actual situation. It is more or less certain that not everyone in circumstances like mine will give £5. So there will not be enough to provide the needed food, shelter, and medical care. Therefore by giving more than £5 I will prevent more suffering than I would if I gave just £5.

It might be thought that this argument has an absurd consequence. Since the situation appears to be that very few people are likely to give substantial amounts, it follows that I and everyone else in similar circumstances ought to give as much as possible, that is, at least up to the point at which by giving more one would begin to cause serious suffering for oneself and one's dependents - perhaps even beyond this point to the point of marginal utility, at which by giving more one would cause oneself and one's dependents as much suffering as one would prevent in Bengal. If everyone does this, however, there will be more than can be used for the benefit of the refugees, and some of the sacrifice will have been unnecessary. Thus, if everyone does what he ought to do, the result will not be as good as it would be if everyone did a little less than he ought to do, or if only some do all that they ought to do.”


THAT OBLIGATIONS TO BENEFICENCE MIGHT BE DEMANDING BEYOND WHAT SOCIETY NORMALLY REQUIRES DOES NOT MEAN THAT THEY LACK INTERNAL LOGICAL COHERENCE

Peter Singer [Professor of Bioethics, Princeton University], “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 1, no. 1 (Spring 1972), pp. 229-243 [revised edition] One objection to the position I have taken might be simply that it is too drastic a revision of our moral scheme. People do not ordinarily judge in the way I have suggested they should. Most people reserve their moral condemnation for those who violate some moral norm, such as the norm against taking another person's property. They do not condemn those who indulge in luxury instead of giving to famine relief. But given that I did not set out to present a morally neutral description of the way people make moral judgments, the way people do in fact judge has nothing to do with the validity of my conclusion. My conclusion follows from the principle which I advanced earlier, and unless that principle is rejected, or the arguments are shown to be unsound, I think the conclusion must stand, however strange it appears. It might, nevertheless, be interesting to consider why our society, and most other societies, do judge differently from the way I have suggested they should. In a wellknown article, J. O. Urmson suggests that the imperatives of duty, which tell us what we must do, as distinct from what it would be good to do but not wrong not to do, function so as to prohibit behavior that is intolerable if men are to live together in society. [3] This may explain the origin and continued existence of the present division between acts of duty and acts of charity. Moral attitudes are shaped by the needs of society, and no doubt society needs people who will observe the rules that make social existence tolerable. From the point of view of a particular society, it is essential to prevent violations of norms against killing, stealing, and so on. It is quite inessential, however, to help people outside one's own society.


RELATIONALITY AND RESPONSIVENESS

SYMPATHY IS A NATURAL MORAL EMOTION THAT COMPELS US TO ACT IN THE FACE OF SUFFERING Jonathan Glover [Prof. Ethics, King’s College, London], Humanity: A Moral History of the Twentieth Century, New Haven: Yale University Press (2000), p. 24. Our entanglements with people close to us erode simple self-interest. Husbands, wives, lovers, parents, children and friends all blur the boundaries of selfish concern. Francis Bacon rightly said that people with children have given hostages to fortune. Inescapably, other forms of friendship and love hold us hostage too. The deeper levels of relationships are denied to people who hold large parts of themselves back. And to give yourself means that part of you belongs to the person you care for. There is a constant pull towards new kinds of sympathy and commitment. Narrow self-interest is destabilized. We can also feel sympathy for people we do not know. We may be moved to help by the television reports from refugee camps in Ethiopia. We feel compassion when we hear of a mother visiting her son before his execution. And sympathy may grow with our own experience of what it is to suffer. In Lebanon Brian Keenan was held hostage for five years under grim conditions and was sometimes beaten by his captors. He remembered the experience of hearing another prisoner being beaten: With each tortured cry I felt my own fear claw at and crawl over my flesh. There is a capacity in each of us and sometimes I think even a need to reach out to others in pain. Why that is I didn’t know at the time but have since learnt a lot about it. The more we discover the different degrees and different aspects of our own unhappiness the greater our capacity to sympathize instinctively or to reach out to someone in distress. 3 People vary in how they respond to their own unhappiness. Some grow more shut in and self-absorbed, and some hardly respond to anyone else’s unhappiness. But the alternative, reaching out to others, is widespread, and is a strong constraint on ruthlessness and cruelty.


RELATIONALITY IS A FUNDAMENTAL FEATURE OF THE MORAL SUBJECT

Judith Butler [Professor of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature, University of California, Berkeley], Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence, New York: Verso (2006), p. 22-23. When we lose certain people, or when we are dispossessed from a place, or a community, we may simply feel that we are undergoing something temporary, that mourning will be over and some restoration of prior order will be achieved. But maybe when we undergo what we do, something about who we are is revealed, something that delineates the ties we have to others, that shows us that these ties constitute what we are, ties or bonds that compose us. It is not as if an “I” exists independently over here and then simply loses a “you” over there, especially if the attachment to “you” is part of what composes who “I” am. If I lose you, under these conditions, then I not only mourn the loss, but I become inscrutable to myself. Who “am” I, without you? When we lose some of these ties by which we are constituted, we do not know who we are or what to do. On one level, I think I have lost “you” only to discover that “I” have gone missing as well. At another level, perhaps what I have lost “in” you, that for which I have no ready vocabulary, is relationality that is composed neither exclusively of myself nor you, but is to be conceived as the tie by which those terms are differentiated and related. Many people think that grief is privatizing, that it returns us to a solitary situation and is, in that sense, depoliticizing. But I think it furnishes a sense of political community of a complex order, and it does this first of all by brining to the fore the relational ties that have implications for theorizing fundamental dependency and ethical responsibility. If my fate is not originally or finally separable from yours, then the “we” is traversed by a relationality that we cannot easily argue against; or, rather, we can argue against it, but we would be denying something fundamental about the social conditions of our very formation.


THE LIBERAL ONTOLOGY COMMONLY EMPLOYED IN LEGAL DISCOURSE IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO DESCRIBE THE ETHICAL, RELATIONAL SUBJECT

Judith Butler [Professor of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature, University of California, Berkeley], Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence, New York: Verso (2006), p. 24-25. I am arguing, if I am “arguing” at all, that we have an interesting political predicament; most of the time when we hear about “rights,” we understand them as pertaining to individuals. When we argue for protection against discrimination, we argue as a group or a class. And in that language and in that context, we have to present ourselves as bounded beings – distinct, recognizable, delineated, subjects before the law, a community defined by some shared features. Indeed, we must be able to use that language to secure legal protections and entitlements. But perhaps we make a mistake if we take the definitions of who we are, legally, to be adequate descriptions of what we are about. Although this language may well establish our legitimacy within a legal framework ensconced in liberal versions oof human ontology, it does not do justice to passion and grief and rage, all of which tear us from ourselves, bind us to others, transport us, undo us, implicate us in lives that are not are (sic) own, irreversibly, if not fatally. It is not easy to understand how a political community is wrought from such ties. One speaks, and one speaks for another, to another, and yet there is no way to collapse the distinction bdtween the Other and oneself. When we say “we’ we do nothing more than designate this very problematic. We do not solve it. And perhaps it is, and ought to be, insoluble. This disposition of ourselves outside ourselves seems to follow from bodily life, from its vulnerability and its exposure.


OUR FUNDAMENTAL VULNERABILITY TO THE OTHER MAKES ETHICS A CORE COMPONENT OF SUBJECT FORMATION

Judith Butler [Professor of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature, University of California, Berkeley], Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence, New York: Verso (2006), p. 26. The body implies mortality, vulnerability, agency: the skin and the flesh expose us to the gaze of others, but also to touch, and to violence, and bodies put us at risk of becoming the agency and instrument of all these as well. Although we struggle for rights over our own bodies, the very bodies for which we struggle are not quite ever only our own. The body has its invariably public dimension. Constituted as a social phenomenon in the public sphere, my body is and is not mine. Given over from the start to the world of others, it bears their imprint, is formed within the crucible of social life; only later, and with some uncertainty, do I lay claim to my body as my own, if, in fact, I ever do. Indeed, if I deny that prior to the formation of my “will,” my body related me to others whom I did not choose to have in proximity to myself, if I build on a notion of “autonomy” on the basis of the denial of this sphere of a primary and unwilled physical proximity with others, then am I denying the social conditions of my embodiment in the name of autonomy?


RELATIONALITY AFFIRMS THE INESCAPABLY NORMATIVE DIMENSION OF HUMAN LIFE

Judith Butler [Professor of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature, University of California, Berkeley], Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence, New York: Verso (2006), p. 27. Is there a way that we might struggle for autonomy in many spheres, yet also consider the demands that are imposed upon us by living in a world of beings who are, by definition, physically dependent on one another, physically vulnerable to one another? Is this not another way of imagingin community, one in which we are alike only in having this condition separately and so having in common a condition that cannot be thought without difference? This way of imagining community affirms relationality not only as a descriptive or historical fact of our formation, but also as an ongoing normative dimension of our social and political lives, one in which we are compelled to take stock of our interdependence. According to this latter view, it would become incumbent on us to consider the place of violence in any such relation, for violence is, always, an exploitation of that primary tie, that primary way in which we are, as bodies, outside ourselves and for one another.


DEHUMANIZATION GIVES US A SENSE OF MORAL DETACHMENT THAT ALLOWS US TO IGNORE SUFFERING

Judith Butler [Professor of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature, University of California, Berkeley], Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence, New York: Verso (2006), p. 31-32. We cannot understand vulnerability as a deprivation, however, unless we understand the need that is thwarted. Such infants still must be apprehended as given over, as given over to no one or to some insufficient support, or to an abandonment. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to understand how humans suffer from oppression without seeing how this primary condition is exploited and exploitable, thwarted and denied. The condition of primary vulnerability, of being given over to the touch of the other, even if there is no other there, and no support for our lives, signifies a primary helplessness and need, one to which any society must attend. Lives are supported and maintained differently, and there are radically different ways in which human physical vulnerability is distributed across the globe. Certain lives will be highly protected, and the abrogation of their claims to sanctity will be sufficient to mobilize the forces of war. Other lives will not find such fast and furious support and will not even qualify as “grievable.” A hierarchy of grief could no doubt be enumerated. We have seen it already, in the genre of the obituary, where lives are quickly tidied up and summarized, humanized, usually married, or on the way to be, heterosexual, happy, monogamous. But this is just a sign of another differential relation to life, since we seldom, if ever, hear the names of the thousands of Palestinians who have died by the Israeli military with United States support, or any number of Afghan people, children and adults. Do they have names and faces, personal histories, family, favorite hobbies, slogans by which they live? What defense against the apprehension of loss is at work in the blithe way in which we accept deaths caused by military means with a shrug or with self-righteousness or with clear vindictiveness? To what extent have Arab peoples, predominantly practitioners of Islam, fallen outside the “human” as it has been naturalized in its “Western” mold by the contemporary workings of humanism? What are the cultural contours of the human at work here? How do our cultural frames for thinking the human set limits on the kinds of losses we can avow as loss? After all, if someone is lost, and that person is not someone, then what and where is the loss, and how does mourning take place?


DEREALIZATION OF THE LIFE OF THE OTHER COMPROMISES MORAL RESPONSIVENESS

Judith Butler [Professor of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature, University of California, Berkeley], Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence, New York: Verso (2006), p. 34. How do we understand this derealization? It is one thing to argue that first, on the level of discourse, certain lives are not considered lives at all, they cannot be humanized, that they fit no dominant frame for the human, and that their dehumanization occurs first, at this level, and that this level then gives rise to a physical violence that in some sense delivers the message of dehumanization that is already at work in the culture. It is another thing to say that discourse itself effects violence through omission. If 200,000 Iraqi children were killed during the Gulf War and its aftermath, 7 do we have an image, a frame for any of those lives, singly or collectively? Is there a story we might find about those deaths in the media? Are there names attached to those children?


THE UNCHOSEN ADDRESS OF THE OTHER IS THE BASIS OF ETHICS

Judith Butler [Professor of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature, University of California, Berkeley], Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence, New York: Verso (2006), p. 129-130. Of course, it would be paradoxical if I were now to argue that what we really need is to tether discourse to authors, and in that way we will reestablish both authors and authority. I did my own bit of work, along with many of you, in trying to cut that tether. But what I do think is missing, and what I would like to see and hear return is a consideration of the structure of address itself. Because although I did not know in whose voice this person was speaking, whether the voice was his own or not, I did feel that I was being addressed, and that something called the humanities was being derided from some direcetion or another. To respond to this address seems an important obligation during these times. This obligation is something other than the rehabilitation of the author – subject per se. It is about a mode of response that follows upon having been addressed, a comportment toward the Other only after the Other has made a demand upon me, accused me of a failing, or asked me to assume a responsibility. This is an exchange that cannot be assimilated into the schema in which the subject is over here as a topic to be reflexively interrogated, and the Other is over there, as a theme to be purveyed. The structure of address is important for understanding how moral authority is introduced and sustained if we accept not just that we address others when we speak, but that in some way we come to exist, and it were, in the moment of being addressed, and something about our existence proves precarious when that address fails. More emphatically, however, what binds us morally has to do with how we are addressed by others in ways that we cannot avert or avoid; this impingement by the other’s address constitutes us first and foremost against our will or, perhaps put more appropriately, prior to the formation of our will. So if we think that moral authority is about finding one’s will and standing by it, stamping one’s name upon one’s will, it may be that we miss the very mode by which moral demands are relayed. That is, we miss the situation of being addressed, the demand that comes from elsewhere, sometimes a nameless elsewhere, by which our obligations are articulated and pressed upon us.


GENOCIDE

IT IS A SELF-EVIDENT MORAL FAILURE TO BE FATALISTIC IN THE FACE OF ATROCITY Jonathan Glover [PROF. ETHICS, KING’S COLLEGE, LONDON], Humanity: A Moral History of the Twentieth Century, New Haven: Yale University Press (2000), p. 41-42. We are a species both brutal and sickened by brutality. This conflict between our cruelty and our aspirations goes as far as we can see back in human history. However, it is not parochial to think of our own time as particularly important. The outbreaks of killing are now especially dangerous because technology makes them a threat to the survival of the whole species. Modern technology has also made us more aware of distant atrocities as they happen. As I write this, it is virtually certain that people in the Bosnian town of Cerska are being mutilated, raped and killed because their Islamic religion makes them alien to the soldiers who have captured the town. By the time you read this, it will not be Cerska but somewhere else. We all know that it is always happening somewhere. Unless wea re linked to the perpetrators, we are all revolted by it. This should be enough to make the elimination of these horrors a central human project. Because we live in the first period in history in which there is such full awareness of cruelty and killing as they happen, our response is particularly important. We can start to establish a tradition that, with our knowledge of the atrocities, we find them intolerable and will do what we can to eradicate them. Or we can help to continue a tradition which accepts them fatalistically. Already we can see early faltering attempts at a political machinery of intervention to prevent atrocities and wars. There are international peace conferences, United Nations peace-keeping forces, and international war crimes tribunals. Gradually recognition is growing that violations of national sovereignty may be justified t prevent genocide and other rimes. These responses have obvious problems and failures, but they are a sign that the world will not always accept brutal group acts with resigned fatalism.


IT IS EASY FOR OUR SENSE OF MORAL IDENTITY TO BE OVERWHELMED BY BUREAUCRACY THREATS OF PUNISHMENT

Jonathan Glover [PROF. ETHICS, KING’S COLLEGE, LONDON], Humanity: A Moral History of the Twentieth Century, New Haven: Yale University Press (2000), p. 392-393. Bystanders who looked away did so often because of the dangers of trying to help or protest. Rescuers often risked their lives. It is difficult for those of us who have not been in their position to be very condemnatory. We all hope we would be like the villagers of Le Chambron, while fearing we might be like the people Inge Beutschkron saw peering out from behind curtained windows. The ethical position is fairly unproblematic if left vague. When people’s lives are at risk from persecution, there is a strong moral obligation to do what is reasonably possible to help. It is not enough to seal up the windows against the smell. The world would be a terrible place if the whole truth about this aspect of us was what Norman Geras has called ‘the contract of mutual indifference’: we leave other people in peril unrescued and accept that others will do the same to us. 33 The problems start when we try to make the ethical position less vague. There is room for disagreement over what degree of risk it is reasonable to expect people to run for others. Particularly if rescuing a stranger means putting your family at risk, good people may divide about what morality requires. Except in cases of coercive moral dilemmas, it is harder to find things to say for the free bystanders who refused to help. What comes over most strongly is the contribution made to their failure by distance and by lack of moral imagination. People immersed in bureaucratic rules easily forget what is at stake. A code of ethics for officials should include having the imagination to look through the rules to the human reality. This might undermine the thought that saving people’s lives is ‘merely’ humanitarian. Those bystanders under Nazi rule who protested or helped were people whose human responses and sense of moral identity had not been eroded or overwhelmed. Sometimes the sense of moral identity was bound up with the human responses. And a great difference could be made by the outlook prevalent in a community, whether a country or only a village.


SOLUTIONS TO MORAL CATASTROPHES ARE SUPPORTED BY PUBLIC ETHICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL BARRIERS

Jonathan Glover [PROF. ETHICS, KING’S COLLEGE, LONDON], Humanity: A Moral History of the Twentieth Century, New Haven: Yale University Press (2000), p. 401. The causes of these catastrophes are partly political and social. Solutions to them cannot be purely in the realm of psychology or ethics: the political dimension has to be central. There is a need for proper policing of the world, with a legitimate and properly backed international authority to keep the peace and to protect human rights. There is a need to independent sources of information as alternatives to propaganda. There is a need to avoid large-scale utopian political projects. But the solutions are also ethical and psychological. This is partly because the political solutions need a supportive public opinion. More generally, a climate of opinion can make a difference as to whether a disaster is avoided. The politics and the psychology are interwoven. The psychology is partly about groups and partly about individual differences. One question about those who ran the Gulag or Nazi genocide is about the rest of us too. Could anyone have done these things?


MORAL ATROCITY DEMANDS ACTION

Jonathan Glover [PROF. ETHICS, KING’S COLLEGE, LONDON], Humanity: A Moral History of the Twentieth Century, New Haven: Yale University Press (2000), p. 406. With disasters on the scale of some in the twentieth century, any ethical theory which either justifies them or can give no help in avoiding them is inadequate. The thought at Auschwitz and other places, ‘never again’, is more compelling than any abstract ethical principle. (There is a parallel with a thought sometimes expressed about another part of the philosophy: belief in the existence of the physical world is more compelling than belief in any philosophical theory which purports to disprove it.) If persuaded that an otherwise convincing ethical theory could justify the Nazi genocide, I should without hesitation give up the theory. In reconstructing ethics, revulsion against these thigns which people have done has a central place. It is necessary to see the size and urgency of the problem. For those of us whose everyday life is in relatively calm and sheltered places, the horrors of Rwanda or Bosnia or Kosovo seem unreal. The atrocities can be put out of mind. The television news reports torture or a massacre and we feel relief when it moves on to political scandals or sport. We bystanders look away. Repressing each atrocity maintains the illusions that the world is fundamentally a tolerable place. Yet it is almost certain that, as you read this sentence, in some places people are being killed and in others people are being tortured. Bystanders know enough to see that knowing more will be uncomfortable. Looking away, there is little sense of an enormous evil it is urgent to stop. The first step is not to look away. As Norman Geras has written in his fine book on this topic, ‘Under the sign of a different moral reality, the duty would be to take the pain of thinking about these things. It would be to take it enough to feel obliged to act against them.’ 1


POVERTY

WE LIVE IN A UNIQUE MOMENT WHERE IT IS POSSIBLE TO ERADICATE CRIPPLLING POVERTY Peter Singer [Professor of Bioethics, Princeton University], The Life You Can Save, New York: Random House (2009), p. xii We live in a unique moment. The proportion of people unable to meet their basic physical needs is smaller today than it has been at any time in recent history, and perhaps at any time since humans first came into existence. At the same time, when we take a long-term perspective that sees beyond the fluctuations of the economic cycle, the proportion of people with far more than they need is also unprecedented. Most important, rich and poor are now linked in ways they never were before. Moving images, in real time, of people on the edge of survival are beamed into our living rooms. Not only do we know a lot about the desperately poor, but we also have much more to offer them in terms of better health care, improved seeds and agricultural techniques, and new technologies for generating electricity. More amazing, through instant communications and open access to wealth of information that surpasses the greatest libraries of the pre-Internet age, we can enable them to join the worldwide community – if only we can help them get far enough out of poverty to seize the opportunity. Economist Jeffrey Sachs has argued convincingly that extreme poverty can be virtually eliminated by the middle of this century. We are already making progress. In 1960, according to UNICEF, the United Nations International children’s Emergency Fund, 20 million children died before their fifth birthday because of poverty. In 2007, UNICEF announced that, for the first time since record keeping began, the number of deaths of young children has fallen below 10 million a year. 2 Public health campaigns against smallpox, measles, and malaria have contributed to the drop in child mortality, as has economic progress in several countries. The drop is even more impressive because the world’s population has more than doubled since 1960. Yet we can’t become complacent: 9.7 million children under five still die annually; this is an immense tragedy, not to mention a moral stain on a world as rich as this one. And the combination of economic uncertainty and volatile food prices that marked 2008 could still reverse the downward trend in poverty-related deaths.


EXTREME POVERTY IS A STATE OF BOTH UNSATISFIED BASIC NEEDS AND A LACK OF HUMAN DIGNITY

Peter Singer [Professor of Bioethics, Princeton University], The Life You Can Save, New York: Random House (2009), p. 5-6. A few years ago, the World Bank asked researchers to listen to what the poor are saying. They were able to document the experiences of 60,000 women and men in seventy-three countries. Over and over, in different languages and on different continents, poor people said that poverty meant these things:

• You are short of food for all or part of the year, often eating only one meal per day, sometimes having to choose between stilling your child’s hunger or your own, and sometimes being able to do neither.

• You can’t save money. If a family member falls ill and you need money to see a doctor, or if the crop fails and you have nothing to eat, you have to borrow from a local moneylender and he will charge you so much interest as the debt continues to mount and you may never be free of it.

• You can’t afford to send your children to school, or if they do start school, you have to take them out again if the harvest is poor.

• You live in an unstable house, made with mud or thatch that you need to rebuild every two or three years, or after severe weather.

• You have no nearby source of safe drinking water. You have to carry your water a long way, and even then, it can make you ill unless you boil it.

But extreme poverty is not only a condition of unsatisfied material needs. It is often accompanied by a degrading state of powerlessness. Even in countries that are democracies and are relatively well governed, respondents to the World Bank survey described a range of situations in which they had to accept humiliation without protest. If someone takes what little you have, and you complain to the police, they may not listen to you. Nor will the law necessarily protect you from rape or sexual harassment. You have a pervading sense of shame and failure because you cannot provide for your children. Your poverty traps you, and you lose hope of ever escaping from a life of hard work for which, at the end, you will have nothing to show beyond bare survival. 3


POVERTY ABROAD IS MUCH MORE SEVERE THAN DOMESTIC POVERTY IN WEALTHY SOCIETIES

Peter Singer [Professor of Bioethics, Princeton University], The Life You Can Save, New York: Random House (2009), p. 8-9 In wealthy societies, most poverty is relative. People feel poor because many of the good things they see advertised on television are beyond their budget – but they do have a television. In the United States, 97 percent of those classified by the Census Bureau as poor own a color TV. Three quarters of them own a car. Three quarters of them have air-conditioning. Three quarters of them have a VCR or DVD player. All have access to health care. 5 I am not quoting these figures in order to deny that the poor in the United States face genuine difficulties. Nevertheless, for most, these difficulties are of a different order than those of the world’s poorest people. The 1.4 billion people living in extreme poverty are poor by an absolute standard tied to the most basic human needs. They are likely to be hungry for at least part of each year. Even if they can get enough food to fill their stomachs, they will probably be malnourished because their diet lacks essential nutrients. In children, malnutrition stunts growth and can cause permanent brain damage. The poor may not be able to afford to send their children to school. Even minimal health care services are usually beyond their means. This kind of poverty kills. Life expectancy in rich nations averages seventy-eight years; in the poorest nations, those officially classified as “least developed,” it is below fifty. 6 In rich countries, fewer than one in a hundred children die before the age of five; in the poorest countries, one in five does. And to the UNICEF figure of nearly 10 million young children dying every year from avoidable, poverty-related causes, we must add at least another 8 million older children and adults. 7


THE DEVELOPED WORLD HAS ENORMOUS AFFLUENCE

Peter Singer [Professor of Bioethics, Princeton University], The Life You Can Save, New York: Random House (2009), p. 9-10 Roughly matching the 1.4 billion people living in extreme poverty, there are about a billion living at a level of affluence never previously known except in the courts of kings and nobles. As kind of France, Louis XIV, the “Sun King,” could afford to build the most magnificent palace Europe had ever seen, but he could not keep it cool in the summer as effectively as most middle-class people in industrialized nations can keep their homes cool today. His gardeners, for all their skill, were unable to produce the variety of fresh fruits and vegetables that we can buy all year-round. If he developed a toothache or fell ill, the best his dentists and doctors could do for him would make us shudder. But we’re not just better off than a French king who lived centuries ago. We are also much better off than our own great-grandparents. For a start, we can expect to live about thirty years longer. A century ago, one child in ten died in infancy. Now, in most rich nations, that figure is less than one in two hundred. 8 Another telling indicator of how wealthy we are today is the modest number of hours we must work in order to meet our basic dietary needs. Today Americans spend, on average, only 6 percent of their income on buying food. If they work a forty-hour week, it takes them barely two hours to earn enough to feed themselves for a week. That leaves far more to spend on consumer goods, entertainment, and vacations. And then we have the superrich, people who spend their money on palatial homes, ridiculously large and luxurious boats, and private planes. Before the 2008 stock market crash trimmed the numbers, there were more than 1,100 billionaires in the world, with a combined net worth of $4.4 trillion. 9 To cater to such people, Lufthansa Technik unveiled its plans for a private configuration of Boeing’s new 787 Dreamliner. In commercial service, this place will seat up to 330 passengers. The private version will carry 35, at a price of $150 million. Cost aside, there’s nothing like owning a really big airplane carrying a small number of people to maximize your personal contribution to global warming. Apparently, there are already several billionaires who fly around in private commercial-sized airliners, from 747s down. Larry Page and Sergey Brin, the Google cofounders, reportedly bought a Boeing 767 and spent millions fitting it out for their private use. 10 But for conspicuous waste of money and resources it is hard to beat Anousheh Ansari, an Iranian-American telecommunications entrepreneur who paid a reported $20 million for eleven days in space. Comedian Lewis Black said on Jon Stewart’s The Daily Show that Ansari did it because it “was the only way she could achieve her life’s goal of flying over every single starving person on earth and yelling ‘Hey, look what I’m spending my money on!’”


EVEN PEOPLE OF AVERAGE WEALTH WASTE A TREMENDOUS AMOUNT

Peter Singer [Professor of Bioethics, Princeton University], The Life You Can Save, New York: Random House (2009), p. 11 If you’re shaking your head at the excesses of the superrich, though, don’t shake too hard. Think again about some of the ways Americans with average incomes spend their money. In most places in the United States, you can get your recommended eight glasses of water a day out of the tap for less than a penny, while a bottle of water will set you back $1.50 or more. 12 And in spite of the environmental concerns raised by the waste of energy that goes into producing and transporting it, Americans are still buying bottled water, to the tune of more than 31 billion liters in 2006. 13 Think, too, of the way many of us get our caffeine fix: You can make coffee at home for pennies rather than spending three dollars or more on a latte. Or have you ever causally said yes to a waiter’s prompt to order a second soda or glass of wine that you didn’t even finish? When Dr. Timothy Jones, an archaeologist, led a U.S. government-funded study of food waste, he found that 14 percent of household garbage is perfectly good food that was in its original packaging and not out of date. More than half of this food was dry-packaged or canned goods that keep for a long time. According to Jones, $100 billion of food is wasted in the United States every year. 14 Fashion designer Deborah Lindquist claims that the average woman owns more than $600 worth of clothing that she has not worn in the last year. 15 Whatever the actual figure may be, it is fair to say that almost all of us, men and women alike, buy things we don’t need, some of which we never even use.


AFFLUENCE IS LARGELY BASED ON A MORALLY ARBITRARY LOTTERY OF BIRTH

Peter Singer [Professor of Bioethics, Princeton University], The Life You Can Save, New York: Random House (2009), p. 26-27 You’ve probably already had this thought: You’ve worked hard to get where you are now, so haven’t you earned a right to enjoy it? This seems both fair and reflective of our basic economic values. Yet, when thinking about fairness, you might also consider that if you are a middle-class person in a developed country, you were fortunate to be born into social and economic circumstances that make it possible for you to live comfortably if you work hard and have the right abilities. In other places, you might have ended up poor, no matter how hard you worked. Warren Buffett, one of the world’s richest people, acknowledged as much when he said: “If you stick me down in the middle of Bangladesh or Peru, you’ll find out how much this talent is going to produce in the wrong kind of soil.” Nobel Prize-winning economist and social scientist Herbert Simon estimated that “social capital” is responsible for at least 90 percent of what people earn in wealthy societies. Simon was talking about living in a society with good institutions, such as an efficient banking system, a police force that will protect you from criminals, and courts to which you can turn with reasonable hope of a just decision if someone breaches a contract with you. Infrastructure in the form of roads, communications, and a reliable power supply is also part of our social capital. Without these, you will struggle to escape poverty, no matter how hard you work. And most of the poor do work at least as hard as you. They have little choice, even though most people in rich nations would never tolerate the working conditions in poor countries. Work in poor countries is more likely to involve hard physical labor, because there are fewer machines to do the job; office workers in poor countries in the tropics rarely have the luxury of air-conditioning. If poor people are not working, it is likely because unemployment is higher in poor nations than in rich ones, and that is not the fault of the poor.


INDIVIDUALS ARE NOT ASSISTING THOSE IN NEED

Peter Singer [Professor of Bioethics, Princeton University], “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 1, no. 1 (Spring 1972), pp. 229-243 [revised edition] I write this, in November 1971, people are dying in East Bengal from lack of food, shelter, and medical care. The suffering and death that are occurring there now are not inevitable, not unavoidable in any fatalistic sense of the term. Constant poverty, a cyclone, and a civil war have turned at least nine million people into destitute refugees; nevertheless, it is not beyond the capacity of the richer nations to give enough assistance to reduce any further suffering to very small proportions. The decisions and actions of human beings can prevent this kind of suffering. Unfortunately, human beings have not made the necessary decisions. At the individual level, people have, with very few exceptions, not responded to the situation in any significant way. Generally speaking, people have not given large sums to relief funds; they have not written to their parliamentary representatives demanding increased government assistance; they have not demonstrated in the streets, held symbolic fasts, or done anything else directed toward providing the refugees with the means to satisfy their essential needs. At the government level, no government has given the sort of massive aid that would enable the refugees to survive for more than a few days. Britain, for instance, has given rather more than most countries. It has, to date, given £14,750,000. For comparative purposes, Britain's share of the nonrecoverable development costs of the Anglo-French Concorde project is already in excess of £275,000,000, and on present estimates will reach £440,000,000. The implication is that the British government values a supersonic transport more than thirty times as highly as it values the lives of the nine million refugees. Australia is another country which, on a per capita basis, is well up in the "aid to Bengal" table. Australia's aid, however, amounts to less than one-twelfth of the cost of Sydney's new opera house. The total amount given, from all sources, now stands at about £65,000,000. The estimated cost of keeping the refugees alive for one year is £464,000,000. Most of the refugees have now been in the camps for more than six months. The World Bank has said that India needs a minimum of £300,000,000 in assistance from other countries before the end of the year. It seems obvious that assistance on this scale will not be forthcoming. India will be forced to choose between letting the refugees starve or diverting funds from her own development program, which will mean that more of her own people will starve in the future.” [1]


THE UNITED STATES GIVES A TINY AMOUNT OF FOREIGN AID

Peter Singer [Professor of Bioethics, Princeton University], The Life You Can Save, New York: Random House (2009), p. 26-27 Asked whether the United States gives more, less, or about the same amount of aid, as a percentage of its income, as other wealthy countries, only one in twenty Americans gave the correct answer. When my students suggest that America is generous in this regard, I show them figures from the website of the OECD, on the amounts given by all the organization’s donor members. They are astonished to fins that the United States has, for many years, been at or near the bottom of the list of industrialized countries in terms of the proportion of national income given as foreign aid. In 2006, the United States fell behind Portugal and Italy, leaving Greece as the only industrialized country to give a smaller percentage of its national income in foreign aid. The average nation’s effort in that year came to 46 cents of every $100 of gross national income, while the United States gave only 18 cents of every $100 it earned. Asked what share of America’s national income the United States gives in foreign aid, 42 percent of respondents believed that the nation gives more than four times as much as it actually gave, while 8 percent of Americans thought that the United States gives more than 100 times the actual amount! 15 A majority of people in these surveys also said that America gives too much aid – but when they were asked how much America should give, the median answers ranged from 5 percent to 10 percent of government spending. In other words, people wanted foreign aid “cut” to an amount five to ten times greater than the United States actually gives! Some content that these figures for official aid are misleading because America gives much more than other countries in private aid. But although the United States gives more private aid than most rich nations, even its private giving trails that of Australia, Canada, Ireland, and Switzerland as a percentage of national income, and is on par with giving by people in Belgium and New Zealand. Adding U.S. nongovernmental aid, of 7 cents per $100 earned, to U.S. government aid leaves America’s total aid contributed at no more than 25 cents of every $100 earned, still near the bottom of the international aid league. 16


THE DUTY TO PROVIDE AID IS NOT JUST A GOVERNMENT DUTY

Peter Singer [Prof. Bioethics at Princeton] “Famine, Affluence, and Morality” Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 1, no. 1 Spring 1972 It is sometimes said that overseas aid should be a government responsibility, and that therefore one ought not to give to privately run charities. Giving privately, it is said, allows the government and the noncontributing members of society to escape their responsibilities. This argument seems to assume that the more people there are who give to privately organized famine relief funds, the less likely it is that the government will take over full responsibility for such aid. This assumption is unsupported, and does not strike me as at all plausible. The opposite view - that if no one gives voluntarily, a government will assume that its citizens are uninterested in famine relief and would not wish to be forced into giving aid - seems more plausible. In any case, unless there were a definite probability that by refusing to give one would be helping to bring about massive government assistance, people who do refuse to make voluntary contributions are refusing to prevent a certain amount of suffering without being able to point to any tangible beneficial consequence of their refusal. So the onus of showing how their refusal will bring about government action is on those who refuse to give.


CITIZENS OF AFFLUENT SOCIETIES HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO ASSIST THE POOR

Harry van der Linden. [Butler University] “Is Global Poverty a Moral Problem for Citizens of Affluent Societies?” The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 1: Ethics, ed. Harun Tepe and Stephen Voss, 2007. Pogge’s argument for the duty to alleviate global poverty as a duty of justice can be further strengthened, I think, by noting that the affluent sustain an unjust global economic order not only as political citizens but also as workers and consumers. Transnational companies have a great impact on the condition of the global poor and people employed by these companies in the affluent societies need not to uphold the status quo but can instead seek to change corporate conduct in the developing world. Affluent employees can report on how their company may act environmentally destructively in the developing world, fail to provide safe labor conditions, avoid taxation, etc. They may pressure shareholders into changing corporate policies and engage in organizing labor across borders. In disagreement with Bittner, it is often clear that the consumption choices of the affluent are linked to global poverty. Their search for good buys is linked to sweatshops, child labor, even slave labor, under-compensated resources, and environmentally destructive huge monoculture plantations with unhealthy work conditions that destroy local agriculture. Due to past and present ecologically unsound consumption, the affluent consumers also place serious environmental constraints on the economic growth options of the developing countries. Admittedly, it is often not the case that the affluent have consumption choices available to them that are more favorable to the global poor, but consumers can press for political and economic change and compensate for their harmful choices in the form of supporting international aid organizations.


PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTANCE BLOCKS OUR MORAL INTUITIONS ABOUT HELPING THOSE IN NEED

Peter Singer [Professor of Bioethics, Princeton University], The Life You Can Save, New York: Random House (2009), p. 46-47. Researchers seeking to find out what triggers generous responses paid participants in a psychological experiment and then gave them the opportunity to donate some of the money to Save the children, an organization that helps children in poverty both in the United States and in developing countries. One group was given general information about the need for donations, including statements like “Food shortages in Malawi are affecting more than three million children.” A second group was shown the photo of a seven-year-old Malawian girl named Rokia; they were told that Rokia is desperately poor and that “her life will be changed for the better by your gift.” The group receiving information about Rokia gave significantly more than the group receiving only general information. Then a third group was given the general information, the photo, and the information about Rokia. That group gave more than the group that had received only the general information, but still gave less than the group that had received only the information about Rokia. 2 Indeed, even adding a second identifiable child to the information about Rokia – while providing no general information - led to a lower average donation than when only one child was mentioned. The subjects of the experiment reported feeling stronger emotions when told about one child than when told about two children. 3


FUTILITY THINKING IMPEDES ALTRUISM

Peter Singer [Professor of Bioethics, Princeton University], The Life You Can Save, New York: Random House (2009), p. 52-53. In one study, people were told that there were sseveral thousand refugees at risk in a camp in Rwanda and were asked how willing they were to send aid that would save the lives of 1,500 of them. In asking this question, the researchers varied the total number of people they said wree at risk, but kept the number that the aid would save at 1,500. People turned out to be more willing to send aid that saved 1,500 out of 3,000 people at risk than they were to send aid that saved 1,500 out of 10,000 at risk. In general, the smaller the proportion of people at risk who can be saved, the less willing people are to send aid. 16 We seem to respond as if anything that leaves most of the people in the camp at risk is “futile” – although, of course, for the 1,500 who will be saved by the aid, and for their families and friends, the rescue is anything but futile, irrespective of the total number in the camp. Paul Slovic, who coauthored this study, concludes that “the proportion of lives saved often carries more weight than the number of lives saved.’ The implication is that people will give more support for saving 80 lives rather than for saving 200 lives, even when the cost of saving each group is the same.


DIFFUSION OF RESPONSIBILITY UNDERMINES ALTRUISM

Peter Singer [Professor of Bioethics, Princeton University], The Life You Can Save, New York: Random House (2009), p. 53-54. We are also much less likely to help someone if the responsibility for helping does not rest entirely on us. In a famous case that jolted the American psyche, Kitty Genovese, a young women in Queens, New York, was brutally attacked and killed while thirty-eight people in different apartments reportedly saw or heard what was happening but did nothing to aid her. The revelation that so many people heard Genovese’s screams, but tfailed even to pick up the phone to call the police, led to a national debate about “what kind of people we have become.”* The public debate that followed the Kitty Genovese murder led psychologists John Darley and Bib Latane to explore the phenomenon of diffusion of responsibility. They invited students to participate in a market research survey. The students went to an office, where they were met by a young woman who told them to sit down and gave them some questionnaires to fill out. She then went into an adjacent room separated from the office only by a curtain. After a few minutes, the students heard noises suggesting that she had climbed on a chair to get something from a high shelf, and the chair had fallen over. She cried out: “Oh, my God, my foot X” “I X I X can’t move X it. Oh, my ankle. I X can’t X can’t X get X this thing off X me.” The moaning and crying went on for about another minute. 19 Of those students who were alone in the adjoining room filling out he market research survey, 70 percent offered help. When another person who appeared to be a student completing the survey – but was in fact a stooge – was also present, and that person did not respond to the calls for help, only 7 percent offered to help. Even when two genuine students were together in the room, the proportion offering to help was much lower than when there was only one student. The diffusion of responsibility had a marked inhibiting effect – the “bystander effect.” Other experiments have yielded similar results.


IT DOES NOT TAKE THAT MANY RESOURCES TO RAISE PEOPLE FROM POVERTY

Peter Singer [Professor of Bioethics, Princeton University], The Life You Can Save, New York: Random House (2009), p. 141. Just to see what this view would imply, let us assume, for the moment, that Murphy and Appiah are right. What would your fair share be? If we knew the amount of aid needed to ensure that the world’s poorest people have a chance at a decent life, and divided that figure by the number of affluent people in a position to contribute something, this would tell you how much you need to donate to do your fair share of meeting our obligation to the poor. One very crude way of calculating this figure is to estimate by how much the income of the world’s poor falls below the poverty line, and then calculate how much money it would take to move all the poor above this line, to the level at which they have enough income to meet their basic needs. Jeffrey Sachs did this and concluded that in 2001 it would have taken $124 billion a year to raise everyone above the poverty line. The combined gross annual income of the twenty-two rich OECD nations in that year was $20 trillion. Therefore the contribution needed to make up the shortfall is 0.62 percent of income, or 62 cents of every $100 earned. A person making $50,000 per year would owe just over $300. This is hardly a crippling sum. By comparison, in 1999 Americans spent $116 billion on alcohol. 3 Giving just half of this to the poor would cover all Americans’ share of what needs to be done, and still allow those who enjoy a drink to have one or two.


A COMMITMENT TO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IS EMINENTLY ACHIEVABLE

Peter Singer [Professor of Bioethics, Princeton University], The Life You Can Save, New York: Random House (2009), p. 142-143. To get an idea of the kind of sum needed for reducing poverty in a more sustainable manner, we can take as our target, at least until 2015, the Millennium Development Goals agreed to by leaders of all the world’s nations at the UN Millennium Development Summit held in New York in 2000. These goals, chosen because they were challenging but feasible targets to be reached by 2015, include:

• Reducing by half the proportion of the world’s people in extreme poverty • Reducing by half the proportion of people who suffer from hunger • Ensuring that children everywhere are able to take a full course of primary schooling • Ending sex disparity in education • Reducing by two-thirds the mortality rate among children under five • Reducing by three quarters the rate of maternal mortality • Halting and beginning to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS and halting and beginning to

reduce the incidence of malaria and other major Diseases • Reducing y half the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking

water A United Nations task force, again headed by Sachs, estimated how much it would cost to meet these goals. The task force drew on preliminary assessments in Bangladesh, Cambodia, Ghana, Tanzania, and Uganda that suggest that the development goals could be achieved for a per capita annual cost of $70 to $80 in 2006, increasing, as projects are gradually scaled up, to $120 to $160 in 2015. On that basis, the task force reached a global estimate – which the task force warns is provisional, but believes is of “the right order of magnitude” – of $121 billion I 2006, rising to $189 billion by 2015. 5 When we take account of existing official development aid promises, the additional amount needed each year to meet the goals I only $48 billion for 2006 and $74 billion for 2015. Now we can calculate how much each affluent person would have to contribute for the combined sum to meet these totals and achieve these results. According to Branko Milanovic of the World Bank, if we define the “rich” as those who have an income above the average income of Portugal (the lowest-income nation in the “rich club” of western Europe, North America, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand) then there are 855 million rich people in the world. 6 If each of us gave $200 per year, that would total $171 billion, or roughly the amount Sachs’s United Nations task for believes is needed each year to meet the Millennium Development Goals. These goals, as we have just seen, seek merely to halve global poverty, not to eliminate it. But let us put that aside for the moment; to achieve the goals by 2015 would be a good start on the way to eliminating widespread global poverty.


WE ARE OBLIGATED TO BEYOND OUR “FAIR SHARE” TO REDRESS GLOBAL POVERTY

Peter Singer [Professor of Bioethics, Princeton University], The Life You Can Save, New York: Random House (2009), p. 144-146. But most people are not doing their fair share, so we still need to ask: Is our fair share really all that each of us is obliged to do. Here’s yet another version of the pond story to help us think about this question. You are walking past the shallow pond when you see that ten children have fallen in and need to be rescued. Glancing around, you see no parents or caregivers, but you do notice that, as well as yourself, there are nine adults who have just arrived at the pond, have also seen the drowning children, and are in as good a position as you to rescue a child. So you rush into the water, grab a child, and place him safely away from the water. You look up, expecting that every other adult will have done the same, and all the children will therefore be safe, but to your dismay you see that while four other adults have each rescued a child, the other five just strolled on. In the pond there are still five children, apparently about to drown. The “fair-share” theorists would say that you have now done your fair share of the rescuing. If everyone had done what you did, all of the children would have been saved. Since no one is in a better position to rescue a child than anyone else, your fair share of the task is simply to rescue one child, and you are under no obligation to d more than that. But is it acceptable for you and the other four adults to stop after you have rescued just one child each, knowing that this means that five children will drown? This question really amounts to asking: Is the fact that other people are not doing their fair share a sufficient reason for allowing a child to die when you could easily rescue that child? I think the answer is clear: No. The others have, by refusing to help with the rescue, made themselves irrelevant. They might as well be so many rocks. According to the fair-share view, in fact, it would be better for the children if they were rocks, because then you would be obliged to wade back into the pond to save another child. It is not the fault of the children whose lives are at risk that there are other people who could help rescue them but are refusing to do their fair share. The action or inaction of these people cannot make it right for us to let children drown when we could easily save them. 7 Liam Murphy thinks that if you do save one child in this situation, and then refuse to save a second one, you have done nothing wrong. He seeks to explain away the apparent implausibility of this view by saying that your refusal to save the second child when you could have easily rescued him shows that you have an “appalling character,” but not that you have done anything wrong. We might, he says, shun a person who can show such emotional indifference to the pressing needs of a specific person in danger of drowning. 8 But it isn’t just the person’s character that is a problem, it is that he has allowed a child to die when he could have easily rescued that child. What he has done is appalling. He’s like a child who stamps his foot and says “It’s not fair!” A sense of fairness is, as we’ve seen, advantageous for individuals and for the society in which they live, and is probably innate, but when we grow up, we learn that sometimes we have to accept unfairness. We don’t have to like it, and we can certainly rail against the person not doing his share; but in most circumstances, we’ll do what has to be done if the costs of not doing so are high enough. Those who refuse as a matter of principle to do more than their fair share make a fetish of fairness. It’s like having an absolute stance on lying, even in a case where telling a lie would save an innocent person from being murdered. While in both cases – fairness and lying – it’s almost always important to maintain the principle, there are times when doing so is simply wrong.


DONATING MONEY TO ASSIST THOSE IN NEED IS A DUTY NOT AN ACT OF CHARITY

Peter Singer [Prof. Bioethics at Princeton] “Famine, Affluence, and Morality” Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 1, no. 1 Spring 1972 If my argument so far has been sound, neither our distance from a preventable evil nor the number of other people who, in respect to that evil, are in the same situation as we are, lessens our obligation to mitigate or prevent that evil. I shall therefore take as established the principle I asserted earlier. As I have already said, I need to assert it only in its qualified form: if it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything else morally significant, we ought, morally, to do it. The outcome of this argument is that our traditional moral categories are upset. The traditional distinction between duty and charity cannot be drawn, or at least, not in the place we normally draw it. Giving money to the Bengal Relief Fund is regarded as an act of charity in our society. The bodies which collect money are known as "charities." These organizations see themselves in this way - if you send them a check, you will be thanked for your "generosity." Because giving money is regarded as an act of charity, it is not thought that there is anything wrong with not giving. The charitable man may be praised, but the man who is not charitable is not condemned. People do not feel in any way ashamed or guilty about spending money on new clothes or a new car instead of giving it to famine relief. (Indeed, the alternative does not occur to them.) This way of looking at the matter cannot be justified. When we buy new clothes not to keep ourselves warm but to look "welldressed" we are not providing for any important need. We would not be sacrificing anything significant if we were to continue to wear our old clothes, and give the money to famine relief. By doing so, we would be preventing another person from starving. It follows from what I have said earlier that we ought to give money away, rather than spend it on clothes which we do not need to keep us warm. To do so is not charitable, or generous. Nor is it the kind of act which philosophers and theologians have called "supererogatory" - an act which it would be good to do, but not wrong not to do. On the contrary, we ought to give the money away, and it is wrong not to do so


LEGAL OBLIGATIONS TO ASSIST

MANY COUNTRIES HAVE LAWS REQUIRING INDIVIDUALS TO ASSIST THOSE IN NEED Dinah Shelto [Prof. of Law, University of Santa Clara] “The Duty to Assist Famine Victims” IOWA LAW REVIEW, vol. 70, 1985 Continental legal systems, following the tradition of Roman law,

38 generally require assistance to

those in peril and provide criminal and civil penalties for violators. Such statutes exist in Belgium, China, France, Germany, Italy, Denmark, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Switzerland, the U.S.S.R., and Turkey,

39 The obligation applies to

strangers and is not fault based. The French statute is typical: anyone who abstains from rendering assistance to a person in peril when he could do so without risk to himself or to third parties may be punished by up to five years in prison and a fine of 20,000 French francs,

50 The

duty applies if the peril is constant and necessitates immediate intervention, regardless of its cause or nature."


MANY JURISDICTIONS IN THE US HAVE LAWS REQUIRING INDIVIDUALS TO ASSIST THOSE IN NEED

Dinah Shelto [Prof. of Law, University of Santa Clara] “The Duty to Assist Famine Victims” IOWA LAW REVIEW, vol. 70, 1985 Regardless of these arguments, the traditional common-law approach has been severely limited through recent legislative and judicial developments in the United States and other common-law jurisdictions. Vermont

45 and Minnesota

46 have codified a general duty to assist. Penal legislation

throughout (he country and the world requires those involved in an automobile accident, regardless of fault, to stop, give information, and render whatever assistance is necessary,

47

Courts have imposed civil liability for additional damage suffered when one party has failed to render assistance, regardless of fault.

48 In addition, almost all states have encouraged assistance by

enacting "hold harmless" statutes that prevent victims from suing their rescuers.49

California even provides possible governmental compensation for injury, death, or damage suffered by private citizens who render assistance.

50


BECAUSE IN A SOCIETY INDIVIDUALS RELY ON ONE ANOTHER, EVERYONE IS OBLIGATED TO ASSIST THOSE IN NEED

Anthony D’Amato [Prof. of Law, Northwestern University] “The “Bad Samaritan” Northwestern University Law Review Paradigm” Vol. 70, No. 5, 1976, p. 805-7 In any case, argument for a Vermont-type statute need not rest upon moral considerations but rather may be based on pure Hobbesian expediency.

31 Suppose V is drowning and above him on the dock is a coil of

rope which S could easily push into the water. It was argued earlier that S should have no duty personally to V to push over the rope. Even if he had such a duty, S might be judgment-proof, and thus the potential tort liability would not induce him to save the drowning man. Yet, should not V have some "claim" over S sufficient to require S to throw down the rope? Suppose there are 15 S's sitting on the dock and none of them moves; should not V have some means of coercing them to act? V can argue: "I took a risk in these waters even though I cannot swim (or even though I knew I might get a sudden cramp) because I resolved to stay close to the dock, because I knew there was a coil of rope on the dock, and because there were some people around. I did not take the risk because I wanted them to insure me against injuries, since I have no civil entitlement against any of them. But there should be some law forcing them to throw me the rope to save my life at no risk to them."

32 The next step in the argument is to note that V might be any citizen. Everyone

is aware of the existence of other people around him and, at least subconsciously, relies upon that fact. Kitty Genovese walking a city street at night probably relied to some extent upon the fact that the street was lit and there were many neighbors around, some of whom would be at or near their windows and would hear and be responsive to any call for help. If she had been in the middle of a park surrounded only by trees, she would have been assuming a much greater risk. That risk may' have deterred her from walking in a park late at night. But on a city street, even in the evening, she had a right to assume that part of her "environment" was a number of neighbors who could easily call for assistance. V expects strangers in the vicinity to warn or assist him not because they owe him a personal duty, but because they are members of society and ought to act responsibly. To be sure, a legal system might "teach" people that such reliance is unjustified, but here we are considering probable social attitudes in a prelaw hypothetical context. Thus the "Bad Samaritan" in the extreme cases cited at the beginning of this essay was acting antisocially in failing to do what society felt he was ethically obligated to do, even though he was not violating a personal duty owed to the stranger-victim. Since antisocial behavior constitutes a "public wrong,"

83 it can

appropriately be made the subject of a criminal statute. American law has too easily and automatically equated criminal wrongs with civil harms, "violation of statute" as a standard for negligence being one example.

34 Yet there is an important difference even in respect to strictly personal crimes. A murderer harms

society as well as his victim. The distinction is recognized by the fact that the victim's consent does not justify the homicide from the criminal law standpoint. Furthermore, the decision whether to go ahead with the prosecution for any crime is the state's.

36 The victim cannot compel. the state to drop the prosecution,

since the state is vindicating a public wrong in addition to the victim's private injury, which the victim may or may not choose to proceed with in a civil action for damages. Therefore, if a state wishes to enact a Vermont-type statute, it can do so for reasons that are similar to those underlying any other criminal legislation—to protect a distinctly societal interest.

30


AN OBLIGATION TO RESCUE WOULD SAVE LIVES

Jay Silver [J.D. 1981 Vanderbilt University] “The Duty to Rescue: A Reexamination and Proposal” William and Mary Law Review. Vol. 26, Issue 3, 1985. The strongest argument for a universally applicable rescue duty is that lives would be saved and injuries avoided. The existence of a duty would encourage rescue in four subtly different ways: many people would act out of a desire to be law abiding; others would act out of fear of legal sanctions, particularly when witnesses were present; some who are timid would be provided with the necessary motivation to intervene; and still others would be moved to action by a heightened sense of the morality of rescue. This last point rests on the premise that law not only reflects society's moral values, but also helps shape them. As one commentator asserts, "Legal and moral rules are in symbiotic relation; one 'learns' what is moral by observing what other people tend to enforce." 43 Accordingly, a legal duty to rescue would increase the number of persons who feel morally compelled to offer emergency aid. This, in turn, would increase the likelihood that people would render assistance in situations in which the failure to do so would go undetected.


FAILING TO HELP SOMEONE IN NEED OF ASSISTANCE IS THE SAME AS CAUSING HARM

Jay Silver [J.D. 1981 Vanderbilt University] “The Duty to Rescue: A Reexamination and Proposal” William and Mary Law Review. Vol. 26, Issue 3, 1985. No one, however, disputes the need to promote rescue. Instead, the issue is whether such a duty places too great a burden on personal freedom or presents insurmountable administrative difficulties.44 One of the most common criticisms of a rescue duty is that requiring the performance of affirmative acts is unduly coercive and beyond the legitimate scope of government. 45 Omissions, it is argued, should not be punished. There are, however, two flaws in this argument. First, the distinction between acts of commission and those of omission is often meaningless. To use a grim example, most would agree that a mother who intentionally starves her healthy child should not be dealt with by the law any differently than the mother who intentionally poisons her child. Surely, no one would argue that the first mother is less morally culpable simply because starvation is an act of omission. Because the law should not (and does not 46") distinguish between these situations, there seems little reason to exempt other acts of omission which lead to odious results. 47 Second, despite dicta to the contrary, omissions have long served as a basis for liability in our system. Failure to file one's tax return, to stop at a red light, or to install required safety devices in one's factory are just a few examples of punishable omissions.


EVERYONE IN SOCIETY BENEFITS FROM A PRINCIPLE OBLIGATING INDIVIDUALS TO RESCUE THOSE IN NEED

Robert Lipkin [J.D. UCLA School of Law, Prof. of Constitutional Law at Widener University School of Law] “BEYOND GOOD SAMARITANS AND MORAL MONSTERS: AN INDIVIDUALISTIC JUSTIFICATION OF THE GENERAL LEGAL DUTY TO RESCUE” UCLA Law Review. Vol. 31, 1983-84. The result is different when we turn to easy rescues.209

Since an easy rescue involves minimal

danger, and with modem technology can usually be achieved quickly and with certainty,210 the individualist receives two kinds of benefits from a law requiring easy rescue. First, pertaining to

actual rescues, such a law increases the likelihood 211 of his being rescued should he need to be. In exchange for this the individual suffers only minor inconvenience should he ever be required to rescue someone else.212

Second, even if a person is never in need of rescue

himself, the individualist still benefits from a law requiring easy rescue. In this case, the existence of such a law gives the individualist reason to believe that, should he be in need of rescue, the law requires action on his behalf. This knowledge makes him better able to plan his activities and, therefore, enhances his freedom. It is arbitrary and irrational213 for an individualist not to accept

as a general legal duty the principle of easy rescue.214 The principle of easy rescue is justified in

the same way as is the harm princple;215 both are fully justified on individualistic grounds in terms of autonomy and self-interest.216 Adopting the principle of easy rescue does not make one a Good Samaritan; failing to accept it does not brand one a moral monster.217 A person should accept the principle of easy rescue because it enhances his liberty;218 he should accept this

principle because it is in his rational self-interest to do so.219


LAWYERS HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE PRO BONO SERVICES TO THOSE IN NEED BECAUSE A PORTION OF THEIR MARKETABLE ASSESTS ARE PROVIDED BY THE PUBLIC

Helynnn Stephens [Tulane University School of Law] “Price of Pro Bono Representations: Examining Lawyers’ Duties and Responsibilities.” Defense Counsel Journal. Vol. 71, 2004, p. 73 The services of lawyers consist of their accumulated human capital: knowledge, skill, education, experience, reputation, discretion, and good judgment. These are sold to the client as a package, each supplying a benefit to the client, and each justifying a portion of the lawyer's fee.

7 In addition, the attorney-

client relationship creates certain rights of confidentiality and enforceable duties of loyalty. Unlike law-yers' human capital, these assets were created by the public through statutes, judicial codes of conduct, or common law. The argument for mandatory pro bono goes this way: having created the assets and assigned them to lawyers, the public is entitled to recapture some portion of the rent in the form of in-kind services. A portion of lawyers' income is directly attributable to their ability to market "lawyer-commodities" that have been provided to them, at no charge, by the public. The exaction of a pro bono obligation therefore can be seen as a simple recapture of some of the profit derived from access to these assets.


AS OFFICERS OF THE COURT LAWYERS HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE PRO BONO SERVICE

Helynnn Stephens [Tulane University School of Law] “Price of Pro Bono Representations: Examining Lawyers’ Duties and Responsibilities.” Defense Counsel Journal. Vol. 71, 2004, p. 73-4 Everyone should have access to the judicial system. The crisis in legal services creates a need for mandatory pro bono work. A lawyer has the status of an "officer of the court." The duty to provide pro bono service is derived to assist the court in the administration of justice. There has been a tradition of commitment to professionalism that's stronger than a compulsion to a historical obligation. In Mallard v. United States District Court? the U.S. Supreme Court held that § 1915(d) did not require attorneys to take cases that they were requested to handle under that statute. The court in its majority opinion declined to "express an opinion on the question whether the federal courts possess inherent authority to require lawyers to serve" and provide legal services to the indigent. In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy, threw his support to the case for mandatory pro bono:

Lawyers like all those who practice a profession, have obligations to their calling which exceed their obligations to the state. Lawyers also have obligations by virtue of their special status as officers of the court. Accepting a court's request to represent the indigent is one of those traditional obligations. Our judgment here does not suggest otherwise. To the contrary, it is precisely because our duties go beyond what the law demands that ours remains a noble profession.

9

The fact that the justices decided this case by a 5-4 vote also indicates the possibility of the Supreme Court's support for mandatory pro bono. On its face, the Mai lard decision indicates disapproval of compelled legal service in civil cases. However, the fact that the majority limited the scope of its opinion to statutory interpretation, while the positive comment on attorney's obligations to the poor and the fact that the four dissenting justices indicated support for the idea that courts have the inherent authority to compel legal representation of indigents in civil cases demonstrate significant support for mandatory pro bono.

10


PRO BONO LEGAL SERVICES BENEFIT SOCIETY

Helynnn Stephens [Tulane University School of Law] “Price of Pro Bono Representations: Examining Lawyers’ Duties and Responsibilities.” Defense Counsel Journal. Vol. 71, 2004, p. 74 In some cases, the social benefits of broadened legal services may be greater than the distinct value to individual recipients. Litigation often benefits society as a whole. Educating the unsophisticated client in navigating the legal system is priceless. Lawyers have a disproportionate social and political power, which can only be legitimated by assuming an affirmative duty to "cultivate professional public spin ted ness." Another practical consideration centers on the complexity of the legal system. Some lawyers argue that the complexities of today's procedural and substantive laws can be neither understood nor applied effectively by a layperson; therefore, the absence of legal assistance is equivalent to a denial of equal access to justice.

11


AN OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE PRO BONO SERVICES IS NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN THE LEGITIMACY OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM

Helynnn Stephens [Tulane University School of Law] “Price of Pro Bono Representations: Examining Lawyers’ Duties and Responsibilities.” Defense Counsel Journal. Vol. 71, 2004, p. 74-5 People who need legal services are of limited and modest means and have no other alternative to access the legal system but through pro bono assistance. Legislation is written in such a way that it can be interpreted only by lawyers; judicial decisions are crafted so as to be fully intelligible only to the legally trained. The "it's-the-public's-problem-not-ours" argument fails because lawyers have a monopoly that confers a substantial benefit on the profession. Requesting lawyers to expend a percentage of time to assist those in need is nothing more than a fair surcharge for the windfall that accrues from the legal mo-nopoly. Because access by the poor to legal services is a necessary precondition to the legitimacy of the legal process, lawyers must accept a duty of service, notwithstanding that society has shunned the legal needs of the poor.

16


AN ENFORCABLE PRO BONO OBLIGATION IS NEEDED

Barlow F. Christensen [Research Attorney at the American Bar Foundation] “The Lawyer's Pro Bono Publico Responsibility” American Bar Foundation Research Journal, Vol. 6, No. 1 Winter, 1981. P. 15 The failure of many lawyers to do any significant amount of pro bono work is surely one of the most distressing consequences of the traditional voluntary approach to pro bono service. All too willing to bask in the light of reflected honor, claiming the benefits of professional status while refusing to accept the burdens of professional obligation, these lawyers make a mockery of the profession's noble aspirations. And it is here that mandatory pro bono would be likely to have its greatest impact. Without in any way diminishing professional self-image, professional satisfaction, or adherence to the professional ideal-these lawyers have no commitment to the professional ideal to start with-mandatory pro bono would compel a substantial number of lawyers to assume their fair share of the burden of professional responsibility, ensuring at least the substance of public service if not the "spirit of public service."


THE PRIVLEDGES GRANTED TO LAWYERS AND THE BAR’S MONOLOPOLY ON LEGAL SERVICES CREATES AN OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE PRO BONO SERVICES

Barlow F. Christensen [Research Attorney at the American Bar Foundation] “The Lawyer's Pro Bono Publico Responsibility” American Bar Foundation Research Journal, Vol. 6, No. 1 Winter, 1981. P. 16-17 Rights and privileges, by definition, carry with them duties and responsibilities. So with the exclusive privilege of law practice. It carries with it the responsibilities of competence and honesty, for example. And, unlike the same responsibilities that arise out of the traditional professional ethic, those that stem from the lawyer's exclusive status are imperative duties. The duty of competence is enforced by academic qualifications for admission to law practice, by bar examinations, and by civil liability for negligence. The duty of honesty is enforced by disciplinary action for malfeasance and in some instances by criminal sanctions. I submit that the exclusive privilege of law practice also carries with it a similarly imperative duty to see to it that any injury to the public caused by the monopoly is eliminated. This duty does not depend upon the happenstance of people with needs coming to lawyers. Nor does it depend upon the vagaries of individual conscience. It has nothing to do with charity or largesse or benevolence. It is an imperative duty that flows from the exclusive privilege of law practice to every lawyer who claims the privilege. It comes with the territory. But the question remains. Just what is the obligation arising from the lawyer's monopoly? One of the most telling arguments against mandatory pro bono is the contention that unmet legal needs are but a part of the larger social problem of poverty and that it is unfair to expect lawyers to shoulder a burden that properly belongs to the whole of society."' On the surface, at least, this position might seem to have some merit. But does the fact that a problem attributable partly to the profession's privileged status is also part of a larger social problem relieve the profession of any responsibility at all? The so-called energy crisis is a problem of the entire society, but does that fact absolve automobile manufacturers of responsibility for the part of the problem that they helped to create and over which they have control-the designing and building of more fuel-efficient automobiles? Surely not. I submit, then, that to the extent that monopolistic restraints upon the public's use of legal services add to the larger social problem, the legal profession does retain an obligation. Not the whole burden, perhaps, but responsibility for that part of it that exists because of the bar's privileged status. Obviously, to separate that part of unmet legal need attributable to the lawyer's monopoly from the larger social problem of poverty would be impossible. But some other measure of the obligation may be appropriate. Perhaps it could be started in terms of the bar's capacity. Inasmuch as the lawyer's exclusive privilege contributes to the problem of unmet legal need, the profession perhaps should be held to an obligation to take reasonable measures-those measures within its capacity-to alleviate it.


ALL LAWYERS SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO FUFILL THEIR PRO BONO OBLIGATION. A VOLUNTARY SYSTEM IS UNWORKABLE

Barlow F. Christensen [Research Attorney at the American Bar Foundation] “The Lawyer's Pro Bono Publico Responsibility” American Bar Foundation Research Journal, Vol. 6, No. 1 Winter, 1981. P. 18 If the thesis offered above is correct, the obligation stemming from the lawyer's monopoly is an imperative duty of all lawyers who share in the privileges of the monopoly. The extent of the obligation is defined not in terms of the extent of public legal needs to be met but in terms of the bar's reasonable capacity. The essence of the concept of "reasonable capacity" must be the involvement of all lawyers-not just the public spirited and not just those impelled by economic considerations to provide no-fee and low-fee service-in whatever measures are developed to alleviate the injury to the public by reason of the lawyer's monopoly. Nothing that has thus far been done or proposed, short of mandatory pro bono service, offers even slight promise of involving all lawyers. It would appear that a large number of lawyers will not shoulder their part of the professional burden unless they are compelled to it. So, we are led, reluctantly and sadly, to the conclusion that mandatory pro bono must be accepted. Even though one consequence may be the loss, by some lawyers, of professional self-image and professional satisfaction, only a mandatory system of public interest service offers any reasonable prospect of meeting adequately the professional obligation arising out of both the lawyer's monopoly and the legal profession's tradition of public service.


NEGATIVE EVIDENCE

MORAL OBLIGATIONS AND SUPEREROGATION

SUPEREROGATION DEFINED Marcia Baron [Prof. of Philosophy, Indiana University, Bloomington], “Kantian Ethics and Supererogation,” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 84, No. 5 (May, 1987), pp. 237-262 Supererogationists believe that there are acts that fit the following criteria: they are beyond duty and they are morally good and praiseworthy. They are beyond duty in that, as David Heyd puts it, "they fulfil more than is required, over and above what the agent is required or expected to do," and thus are optional (op. cit., 1).


FAILING TO ASSIST THOSE IN NEED DOES NOT DEVALUE THEM

H. M. Malm “Bad Samaritan Laws: Harm, Help, or Hype?” Law and Philosophy, Vol. 19, No. 6, 2000. Views such as Smith's may be highly plausible to some and highly implausible others, given the controversy over the possibility of intrinsic positive rights. Joe Ellin challenges Smith's view by arguing that the claim that an individual's life has intrinsic worth does not entail that others are obliged to spend their own resources to protect it. "My failure to save you implies only that I do not think that the burden of saving you falls on me; it implies nothing of what 1 think about the value of your life. (If I did think your life were worthless, I would give myself the right to kill you, like an insect.)"

14 Rights-based accounts of the duty to aid also suffer from

a version of what I will call the free-rider problem. If my intrinsic worth as a human being is enough to give me a right to your help when I can't save myself and you can save me (at no significant risk to yourself), then I may selfishly put myself in situations that oblige vou to aid.


FOCUSING ETHICS ON DUTY TO THE EXCLUSION OF SUPEROGATORY ACTS IMPOVERISHES A MORAL THEORY

Marcia Baron [Prof. of Philosophy, Indiana University, Bloomington], “Kantian Ethics and Supererogation,” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 84, No. 5 (May, 1987), pp. 237-262 ALTHOUGH von Herbert was, we hope, unusual in finding this alleged problem to be a source of intense personal despair, many others have shared the sense, however vague, that Kant's ethics is in trouble here and that the trouble is traceable to the theoretical framework. The problem is diagnosed in two different ways. Some, like von Herbert, believe that Kant's ethics asks too little, requiring only minimal decency and saying nothing about the "higher flights of morality."2 Others, reading the texts differently, believe that his theory asks too much, demanding total devotion to morality and treating everything worth doing (and perhaps more) as a duty. But, despite their differences, the two sets of critics concur in taking the central problem to be Kant's failure to recognize the category of the supererogatory. Duty, it is said, is just a small part of morality (if indeed it is any part of morality). An ethical theory in which duty takes over is a severely impoverished theory.3 The claim is best understood in light of a set of criticisms to the effect that Kant's ethics and, more generally, Kantian ethics leave little room for friendship, fellow-feeling, loyalty, a sense of community, personal attachment and, indeed, personality. Such objections have been put forth by Julia Annas, Lawrence Blum, Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Slote, Michael Stocker, Bernard Williams, Susan Wolf, and others.4 A number of critics think that the underlying problem is the enormous role that the notion of duty plays in Kant's ethics. His ethics is too minimal because "duty" looms too large. There are in fact two related criticisms here. First, too much value (or too exclusive a value) is assigned to the motive of duty. Second, too much is regarded as part of our duty. The scope of duty is too broad; it should be narrowed so that part of moral conduct can then be seen as beyond duty, i.e., as supererogatory.


CLAIMS THAT THE AFFLUENT HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO ASSIST THE POOR ARE BASED ON A MISGUIDED CONCEPT OF DUE

Jan Narveso [Department of Philosophy, University of Waterloo] “Is World Poverty a Moral Problem for the Wealthy?” The Journal of Ethics, Vol. 8, No. 4 2004. What really is in question is suggested by Temkin^s reference to desert. The claim is that the world's poor, by and large, do not deserve to be poor. Now, this claim can indeed be made out in a sense in which it might be relevant to our present question. In order to see whether il is, though, let us first ask how and why it is that the world's poor are so. And to this there are, generally speaking, good answers, though they are not obvious nor easy- But, very broadly, we must first appreciate that wealth is a function of - again broadly speaking -technology, namely the technology required to enable people to produce whatever kind of wealth is in question at the levels at which "we" (in the "wealthy countries") produce it. That there is huge variation in the level of various groups of people in point of technological advancement is hardly surprising, when one thinks of it. There can be many reasons why people do not get into this sort of thing. It is perhaps worth mentioning that it is virtually not at all due to serious variation in, say, native intelligence- In every community in the world, some people are significantly brighter than others, indeed significantly brighter than most people we know; and yet, only in some of those communities will this be turned to account in the direction of specifically technological development. The brightest minds in the Middle Ages, by and large, confined themselves to esoteric work in favored types of theology or to military conquest -activities not calculated to lead to wealth, at least in the usual sense of the word and in any very direct way. The general point is that we can understand variations in levels of wealth and therefore of poverty, we can see why it happened - and we can see that there emerges from this nothing remotely resembling some kind of general assessment of virtue or vice or desert or undesert, although I am admittedly tempted to ascribe wholesale vice to the many human groups who devote most of their efforts to warring against their fellows. Or rather, the thesis that desert does not much figure in the explanation of poverty and wealth is true unless we take over the term "desert" and relegate it to a very, very narrow function, namely, one in which what is relevant to exchanges of the economic type is by definition "desert." "This is a better car than that; therefore, it deserves to fetch a higher price; this employee is more productive than that one, therefore she deserves a higher wage"; and so on. However, if we do use the term in this very restricted fashion, then while it will be true, as I put it more or less by definition, that typically, at least, people will get more or less about what they deserve, it will also turn out to be quite simply false that, as Temkin insists, the world's poor did not "deserve" their poverty. Of course they do: they do not do the sort of things that deserve, or merit, or amount to a plausible claim for, a higher real price than the price they typically get for the various things they do - a higher level of emolument or "reward" than they in fact get, by and large for the efforts they are able to put forth, such as they are. To be sure, it is uncomfortably true, and probably very much more so in the case of "poor" than of "rich" countries, that fairly typical cases of poverty also include genuine levels of injustice, namely the impositions of kleplocratic taxes and other charges levied on parties to exchange by their typically dictatorial governments. Still, given what they actually have and do, what they get is not worth much if any more than they actually get for their efforts (For that matter, we could just take average market prices as our reference point for this kind of "desert" and so make it simply true by definition that on average, people get what they "deserve"). So we must, in the only sense in which it is relevant, simply reject the thesis that the world's poor "do not deserve" their lot. That there are irrelevant senses of desert in which they do not deserve it may be true, but, pretty obviously, that is quite beside the point.


EVEN IF WE SHOULD HELP THE POOR WE SHOULD NOT BE OBLIGATED TO DO SO

Jan Narveso [Department of Philosophy, University of Waterloo] “Is World Poverty a Moral Problem for the Wealthy?” The Journal of Ethics, Vol. 8, No. 4 2004. Why, indeed, should we care about the very unfortunate in this world? It is obvious why we should care about injustice. Each of us relates to all sorts of people who, in varying ways and degrees, can do us good or harm, and significant among the ways in which they might do us harm are those specifically related to justice. Occasionally we do not get our "just deserts;" more often we are victims of fraud, malice, negligence, or other evils which are inflicted in just the ways that the principles of justice are concerned with. Such things matter enormously. But there simply is not much connection of world poverty with that sort of thing, in general. A much greater factor is simple general human sympathy. Insofar as people are suffering, most of us are sorry to see this, are affected, and may be moved to try to help. But that factor is most obviously relevant in situations of aid, not of poverty. The world's very poor are often very sick, have short life expectancies and high infant mortality, and that is sad. Justice does not require that we improve their situations, though sympathy recommends it. So, for that matter, does a more general interest in good relations with all and sundry. But poverty is a more endemic, basic, enduring sort of thing. For it, "aid" is not the appropriate remedy, as I have already pointed out in my main paper and will re-remind the reader below.


CONFUSING SYMPATHY WITH OBLIGATION IS DANGEROUS

Jan Narveso [Department of Philosophy, University of Waterloo] “Is World Poverty a Moral Problem for the Wealthy?” The Journal of Ethics, Vol. 8, No. 4 2004. It should be noted that people can suffer in all sorts of ways, and many sufferers are no poorer than you or I The things we might be able to do 10 help such people probably will not consist in sending them a check - though it possibly might, for that matter - but there might be other things some of us can do, and it will be just as true that we "ought" to do those things as that we "ought" to go out and help improve the incomes of the very poor. Which, in both cases is not that it is our moral obligation to do them (depending on the exact circumstances of the suffering in question) but that it would be good of us to do so would contribute to our level of moral virtue, if we want to talk that way. And [his is no trivial matter. Sympathy is an important human capacity, and it should be cultivated, not crushed. For that matter, one way to crush it is to confuse it with justice, leaving the sympathetic out in the cold with the bureaucrats who compel their support rather than solicit their sympathetic responses. That is, while we are at it, one of the things we should have against Temkin's way of talking here.


OBLIGATIONS TO THE SELF MUST COME BEFORE OUR OBLIGATIONS TO OTHERS

Alison Hills [Clare College, Cambridge University] “Duties and Duties to the Self” American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 2 Apr., 2003 Could you have a duty of beneficence but no self-regarding duty to promote your own well-being? If your own well-being was of lesser normative significance to you than other people's well-being, then you could have duties to promote other people's well-being but no duties to promote your own well-being.

12 Anti-egoism is the theory according to which the agent's own well-being is less normatively

significant to her than everyone else's well-being. If anti-egoism is true, then there might be duties to others concerning well-being, but no duties to the self. But how could your own well-being be of lesser normative significance to you than the well-being of others? If there is such a normative distinction, it must concern whether or not it is the agents own well-being which will be promoted. Well-being must generate agent-relative reasons for action (reasons that are not valid for every agent), not agent-neutral reasons (reasons valid for any agent).

13 Even if agent-relative reasons are

acceptable, however, anti-egoist theories are much less plausible than egoist theories. Anti-egoism claims that one's well-being has greater normative significance to others than it does to oneself. But the normative significance to you of other people's well-being depends on how important their well-being is to them. You should be concerned about how well other people's lives are going, because their well-being matters to them. The normative significance of other people's well-being depends on the normative significance of each person's well-being to her. Anti-egoism is untenable whether or not agent-relative reasons are acceptable. So we cannot reject duties to the self on the grounds of anti-egoism.


KANT’S DUTY ETHICS LEAVE ACTS OF BENEFICENCE TO THE DISCRETION OF THE AGENT

John Cottingham [Prof. of Philosophy, University of Reading], (2000): Caring at a Distance: (Im)partiality, Moral Motivation and the Ethics of Representation - Partiality, Distance and Moral Obligation, Ethics, Place & Environment, 3:3, 309-313 The absolute requirement to respect people’s autonomy and dignity as human beings is clearly of the utmost importance. In a century that has seen so many terrible violations of human rights, it is all too clear how strongly we need fundamental prohibitions on conduct which treats other humans merely as instrumental to some political or other goal. However, for all their resonance, the Kantian imperatives are clearer for what they rule out than for what they rule in. We may not treat others as means; we may not exploit others and violate their human dignity: these are clear and categorical requirements that apply, irrespective of distance and geography, to every human agent, and protect every human person. However, these unbending negative prohibitions still leave much of our positive conduct undetermined: when I have abstained from any action that fails to respect the personhood of others, I am still, it seems, left a considerable latitude as to how much of my resources I should dispose towards those who are in need far away, and how much I am entitled to spend preferentially on those close to me. The duties of benevolence and charity (the ‘imperfect duties’, as Kant called them) are, it appears, left ultimately within my personal discretion. This is not in itself a criticism of the Kantian ethical framework, but it does suggest that the principle of respect for persons does not, on its own, provide a satisfying answer to the question of how far we ought to care for those who are a long way off.


THE NEEDS OF OTHERS ARE NOT A JUSTIFICATION FOR AN OBLIGATION TO CHARITY

Kathleen Touchstone [Troy University] “Ethical Principles, Charity, and a Criterion for Giving” Reason Papers 30 Fall 2008. Of course, another person’s need cannot be the sole reason for charitable giving even if the need is justified. Although in relative terms, the number of those in such a situation should be few, a single person cannot give even a modest amount to all of them, much less enough to sustain their existence. A principle has been defined as a strategy that if consistently followed will yield success in the long-run. Being productive is principled behavior because it sustains a person’s life. If charitable giving were regarded as principled behavior, then a person should be able consistently to give to others. If charity were on par with productivity, then it would seem to follow that devoting the equivalent time, energy, and resources to charitable activities as one would spend on one’s work would be justified. If charity were regarded as more important than productivity, then more than half of one’s time, effort, and other resources should be devoted to others. In the limit, the elevation of charity as a strategy of behavior to be pursued on a large scale would be suicidal. It would not be a strategy that would yield success in the long-run Not only would the individual’s life be at risk, but also the potential recipients of charity would be as well.


WE DO NOT HAVE OBLIGATIONS TO THOSE WHO CANNOT RECIPROCATE

Al-Noor Nenshi Nathoo [UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY] “Rationalized Selfishness or Reasonable Skepticism? Objections to Singer and Unger on the Obligations of the Affluent” University of Calgary 2001. http://www.utilitarian.net/singer/by/Obligations_of_the_Affluent.pdf At the heart of many claims that our moral horizons ought not extend to distant lands is the suggestion that there is no reciprocal global agreement on which to ground such obligations. Where a system of morality exists, the argument goes, it exists because it is beneficial to all concerned. A Hobbesian state of nature becomes transformed to an orderly society because there is reason for each of its members to want it to be so. A67 society of mutual reciprocity is grounded upon basic contractual rules that enable each member to live without excessive concern regarding conflict arising from the greedy and selfish nature of human beings. But the world of global relations, it is suggested, offers us no such scenario. There is no agreement internationally, tacit or explicit, about such moral or contractual standards. As a result, there can be no commensurate obligations. The view also finds support in the work of David Hume, who arrives at a striking conclusion regarding those not in a position to reciprocate:

Were there a species of creatures intermingled with men, which, though rational, were possessed of such inferior strength, both of body and mind, that they were incapable of all resistance, and could never, upon the highest provocation, make us feel the effects of their resentment, the necessary consequence, I think, is that we should be bound by the laws of humanity to give gentle usage to these creatures, but should not, properly speaking, lie under any restraint of justice with regard to them, nor could they possess any right or property, exclusive of such arbitrary lords. Our intercourse with them could not be called society - which supposes a degree of equality - but absolute command on the one side, and servile . 127

While Hume’s comments here are targeted to the notion of justice rather than duties arising from beneficence, his statements suggest that a principle of obligation of the sort espoused by Unger and Singer would be difficult to defend due to the inherent powerlessness of the world’s poor. As Brian Barry has remarked128 Hume’s claim is even more disquieting if one considers a scenario in which a collection of beings superior to humans in personal characteristics and access to technology were to arrive on earth. Hume would supposedly have it that while humans could appeal to such a race to give us ‘gentle usage’, they could make no complaint of mistreatment or injustice if the newly arrived were to declare the earth their property and proceed to exploit it for their own purposes. The irony of Barry’s observation is surely not lost on those inclined to believe that such similar disdain and moral disregard can be found in present-day attitudes of portions of the industrialized world towards its poorer and more vulnerable counterpart.


DISTANT OBLIGATIONS AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY

WE HAVE NO OBLIGATIONS TO ASSIST ANYONE OUTSIDE OF OUR POLITICAL COMMUNITY Per Bauhn [Kalmar University College] “The End of Duty” Essays in Philosophy: Vol. 9: Iss. 2, 2008.

Thomas Nagel, outlining an argument for a political conception of justice, suggests that separate individuals have no motive to contribute to the establishment of a just social order “without the assurance that their conduct will in fact be part of a reliable and effective system”. 12 However, Nagel’s argument has a further implication, namely, that rights and duties apply only within a political community and not at a global or international level. According to Nagel, the existence of sovereign states “is precisely what gives the value of justice its application, by putting the fellow citizens of a sovereign state into a relation that they do not have with the rest of humanity”. 13 Nagel goes on to argue that “citizens have a duty of justice toward one another” that “is not owed to everyone in the world, nor is it an indirect consequence of any other duty that may be owed to everyone in the world, such as a duty of humanity”, concluding that “[j]ustice is something we owe through our shared institutions only to those with whom we stand in a strong political relation”. 14 Nagel does not deny that we have certain negative duties not to inflict basic harm on members of other political communities, such as killing or enslaving them, but when it comes to the positive duties of socio-economic justice, these only hold between fellow citizens, for the reasons given above. 15 I believe we can sum up his (and mine) arguments under a Principle of Contributive Fairness that should guide the extension of positive duties. According to this principle, we have a positive duty to contribute to common arrangements that protect the agency-related rights to freedom and well-being, only if we can rely on the other duty-holders to do their fair share, not leaving us to do their share, and only if we can rely on the recipients of our contributions to actually need and deserve them, not just letting us do for them what they could and should have done for themselves in the first place. The principle has its basis in the equality of rights of all agents, which implies that no agent should be reduced to the status of a servant or a means to the ends of another. The political community, as a system for coordinating rights and duties, with its various means of control and enforcement at its disposal, is necessary to provide the kind of trust referred to in the Principle of Contributive Fairness.


LEVINAS WANTS TO GROUND POLITICAL NORMS IN THE ETHICS OF PROXIMITY, NOT GLOBAL OBLIGATIONS TO DISTANT OTHERS

Robert Meister [Professor of Politics at the University of California, Santa Cruz], “’Never Again’: The Ethics of the Neighbor and the Logic of Genocide,” Postmodern Culture, Volume 15, Number 2, January 2005 (Article) 5. Levinas is not here referring primarily to the growing medicalization of humanitarian invention, although he does regard analgesia as a paradigmatically ethical response to physical pain (see Kennedy and Rieff). His point is that my ethical responsibility, which merely begins with first aid, does not arise from any previous relationship between sufferer and provider, or from a political history consisting of prior vows or crimes, but from "a past irreducible to a hypothetical present that it once was . . . . [and] without the remembered present of any past commitment"("Diachrony and Representation" 170). Our responsibility to alleviate suffering comes before the past in the sense in which ethics can be said to come before politics. The priority of ethics arises "from the fear of occupying someone's place in the Da of my Dasein": "My . . . 'place in the sun,'" he says, "my home--have they not been a usurpation of places which belong to the others already oppressed or . . . expelled by me into a third world" ("From the One to the Other" 144-5). Levinas's point is that in ethics, unlike politics, we do not ask who came first and what we have already done to (or for) each other. The distinctively ethical question is rather one of proximity--we are already here and so is the other, cheek-by-jowl with us in the same place. The neighbor is the figure of the other toward whom our only relationship is that of proximity. For Levinas, the global movement to give ethics primacy over politics must be accompanied, within ethics, by the effort to give primacy to the ethics of the neighbor--the local over the global. In this way, the global primacy of ethics crystallizes around our horror of the inhuman act (the "gross" violation of human rights) rather than, for example, around the international distribution of wealth or the effects of global climate change. 6. Proximity is, thus, the marker that distinguishes an ethics of the neighbor as a basis for human rights from global concerns about injustice that might also be considered ethical. Proximity is not itself a merely spatial concept--both space and time can be proximate or distant--but it is useful to think of the ethics of the neighbor as a spatializing discourse within ethics, as distinct from a "temporalizing" discourse that subordinates ethics to political rhetorics associated with memory and identity (Boyarin, "Space" 20). The latter is held accountable for the atrocities of the twentieth century because it suggests that the suffering of one's immediate neighbor can be justified through an historical narrative that links it to redeeming the suffering of someone else, perhaps an ancestor or a comrade, to whom one claims an historical relationship that is "closer" than relations among neighbors. To regard proximity of place as the ethical foundation of politics is to resist this tendency from the beginning, and thereby to set the stage for the fin-de- siecle project of transitional justice, which is both the alternative to human rights interventions and their professed aim.


BADIOU ARGUES THAT ETHICS BASED ON RECOGNIZING THE VICTIMS OF ATROCITIES REPRODUCES IMPERIALISM, UNDERMINES A SUBSTANTIVE CONCEPTION OF THE GOOD, AND FOSTERS A SELF-SATISFIED CONSERVATISM

Robert Meister [Professor of Politics at the University of California, Santa Cruz], “’Never Again’: The Ethics of the Neighbor and the Logic of Genocide,” Postmodern Culture, Volume 15, Number 2, January 2005 (Article) Badiou's critique of the politics of victimhood is, first, that it implicitly reproduces the evils of imperialism in a humanitarian guise. Who cannot see that this ethics which rests on the misery of the world hides, behind its victim-Man, the good-Man, the white-Man? Since the barbarity of the situation is considered only in terms of "human rights"--whereas in fact we are always dealing with a political situation. . . . Every intervention in the name of a civilization requires an initial contempt for the situation as a whole, including its victims. And this is why the reign of "ethics" coincides, after decades of courageous critiques of colonialism and imperialism, with today's sordid self- satisfaction in the "West," with the insistent argument according to which the misery of the Third World is the result of its own incompetence, its own inanity--in short, of its subhumanity. (13) Two further objections, Badiou says, follow from this: one is that an ethics grounded in our direct recognition of evil through atrocity stories and the like tends to dismiss any positive conception of the Good as merely desensitizing us to the cruelties committed in its name; the other is that, by attributing Evil to our general insensitivity to the pain of others, humanitarian ethics "prevents itself from thinking the singularity of situations as such" (13-14). Beyond these criticisms, however, is a more profound point that goes to the heart of the Levinasian view: Badiou argues that humanitarian ethics is "nihilist because its underlying conviction is that the only thing that can really happen to someone is death" (35). Humanitarian ethics thus oscillates, according to Badiou, between the implicit conservatism of Western beliefs about "the victimary essence of man" and a nearly pornographic fascination with the power to decide about seemingly exotic victims (because "we" can always intervene) who will die and who will not (34-9).


FRAMING FOREIGN AID IN TERMS OF “ASSISTANCE” PAPERS OVER THE MORAL RESPONSIBILTY OF THE DEVELOPED WORLD FOR GLOBAL POVERTY

Thomas Pogge [Prof. of Moral and Political Philosophy, Columbia University], “’Assisting’ the global poor,” The Ethics of Assistance: Morality and the Distant Needy, ed. Deen K. Chatterjee, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 4

th printing (2007), p.262

It is well to recall that existing peoples have arrived at their present levels of social, economic and cultural development through an historical process that was pervaded by enslavement, colonialism, even genocide. Though these monumental crimes are now in the past, they have left a legacy of great inequalities which would be unacceptable even if peoples were now masters of their own development. Even if the peoples of Africa had had, in recent decades, a real opportunity to achieve similar rates of economic growth as the developed countries, achieving such growth could not have helped them overcome their initial 30:1 disadvantage in per capita income. Even if, starting in 1960, African annual growth in per capita income had been a full percentage point above ours each and every year, the ratio would still be 20:1 today and would nt be fully erased until early in the twenty-fourth century. 13 It is unclear then whether we may simply take for granted the existing inequality as if it had come about through choices freely made within each people. By seeking the problem of poverty merely in terms of assistance, we overlook that our enormous economic advantage is deeply tainted by how it accumulated over the course of one historical process that has devastated the societies and cultures of four continents.


THINKING OF ANTI-POVERTY POLICIES AS “ASSISTANCE” IS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE BECAUSE ACKNOWLEDGING OUR RESPONSIBILITY FOR POVERTY IS CRITICAL TO SOLVING IT

Thomas Pogge [Prof. of Moral and Political Philosophy, Columbia University], “’Assisting’ the global poor,” The Ethics of Assistance: Morality and the Distant Needy, ed. Deen K. Chatterjee, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 4

th printing (2007), p.272

By discussing several global systematic factors in some detail, I hope to have undermined a view that, encouraged by libertarian and more leftist economists alike, most people in the developed world are all too ready to believe: the persistence of severe poverty is due to causes that are indigenous to the countries in which it occurs and thus unrelated to the affluent societies and their governments. This view is dramatically mistaken. Yes, domestic factors contribute to the persistence of severe poverty in many countries. But these contributions often depend on features of the global institutional order, which sustain some of those fffactors and exacerbate the impact of others. In these ways, the non-indigenous factors I have discussed play a major causal role in the evolution of severe poverty worldwide. They are crucial for explaining the inability and especially the unwillingness of the poor countries’ leaders to pusue more effective strategies of poverty eradication. And they are crucial therefore for explaining why global inequality is increasing so rapidly that substantial global economic growth since the end of the cold War has not reduced income poverty and malnutrition 41 – despite substantial technological progress, despite a huge poverty reduction in China, 42 despite the post-Cold-War “peace dividend,” 43 despite a 32-percent drop in real food prices since 1985, 44 despite official development assistance (ODA), and despite the efforts of the international humanitarian and development organizations. If we are serious about eradicating severe poverty worldwide, we must understand the cusal role of such non-indigenous factors and be willing to consider ways of modifying them or of reducing their impact.45


CAPITALISM

WE NATURALLY BENEFIT FROM THE UNEQUAL ENDOWMENTS OF NATURE; IT IS NOT GOVERNMENT’S JOB TO TRY TO ‘FIX’ THEM Milton Friedman [Prof. at University of Chicago; Nobel Prize Winner in Economics] and Rose Friedman [Prof. University of Chicago Law School], Free to Choose: A Personal Statement, New York: Harcourt Brace & Company (1980), p. 136-137 Much of the moral fervor behind the drive for equality of outcome comes from the widespread belief that it is not fair that some children should have a great advantage over others simply because they happen to have wealthy parents. Of course it is not fair. However, unfairness can take many forms. It can take the form of inheritance of property – bonds and stocks, houses, factories; it can also take the form of the inheritance of talent – musical ability, strength, mathematical genius. The inheritance of property can be interfered with more readily than the inheritance of talent. But from an ethical point of view, is there any difference between the two? Yet many people resent the inheritance of property but not the inheritance of talent. Look at the issue from the point of view of the parent. If you want to assure your child a higher income in life, you can do so in various ways. You can buy him (or her) an education that will equip him to pursue an occupation yielding a higher income; or you can set him up in a business that will yield a higher income than he could earn as a salaried employee; or you can leave him property, the income from which will enable him to live better. Is there any ethical difference among these three ways of using your property? Or again, if the state leaves you any money to spend over and above taxes, should the state permit you to spend it on riotous living but not to leave it to your children? The ethical issues involved are subtle and complex. They are not to be resolved by such simplistic formulas as “fair shares for all.” Indeed, if we took that seriously, youngsters with less musical skill should be given the greatest amount of musical training in order to compensate for their inherited disadvantage, and those with greater musical aptitude should be prevented from having access to good musical training; and similarly with all other categories of inherited personal qualitieis. That might be “fair” to the youngsters lacking in talent, but would it be “fair” to the talented, let alone to those who had to work to pay for training the youngsters lacking talent, or to the persons deprived of the benefits that might have come from the cultivation of the talents of the gifted? Life is not fair. It is tempting to believe that government can rectify what nature has spawned. But it is also important to recognize how much we benefit from the very unfairness we deplore. There’s nothing fair about Marlene Dietrich’s having been born with beautiful legs that we all want to look at; or about Muhammad Ali’s having been born with the skill tthat made him a great fighter. But on the other side, millions of people who had enjoyed looking at Merlene Dietrich’s legs or watching one of Muhammad Ali’s fights have benefited from nature’s unfairness in producing a Marlene Dietrich and a Muhammad Ali. What kind of a world would it be if everyone were a duplicate of everyone else?


A FREE MARKET SYSTEM RESPECTS THE FACT THAT PEOPLE ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR CHOICES

Milton Friedman [Prof. at University of Chicago; Nobel Prize Winner in Economics] and Rose Friedman [Prof. University of Chicago Law School], Free to Choose: A Personal Statement, New York: Harcourt Brace & Company (1980), p. 136-137 Still another facet of this complex issue of fairness can be illustrated by considering a game of chance, for example, an evening at baccarat. The people who choose to play may start the evening with equal piles of chips, but as the play progresses, those piles will become unequal. By the end of the evening, some will be big winners, others big losers. In the name of the ideal of equality, should the winners be required to repay the losers? That would take all the fun out of the game. Not even the losers would like that. They might like it for the one evening, but would they come back again to play if they knew that whatever happened, they’d end up exactly where they started? This example has a great deal more to do with the real world than one might at first suppose. Every day each of us makes decisions that involve taking a chance. Occasionally it’s a big chance – as when we decide what occupation to pursue, whom to marry, whether to buy a house or make a major investment. More often it’s a small chance, as when we decide what movie to go to, whether to cross the street against the traffic, whether to buy one security rather than another. Each time the question is, who is to decide what chances we take? That in turn depends on who bears the consequences of the decision. If we bear the consequences, we can make the decision. But if someone else bears the consequences, should we or will we be permitted to make the decision? If you play baccarat as an agent for someone else with his money, will he, or should he, permit you unlimited scope for decision-making? Is he not almost certain to set some limit to your discretion? Will he not lay down some rules for you to observe? To take a very different example, if the government (i.e., your fellow taxpayers) assumes the cost of flood damage to your house, can you be permitted to decide freely whether to build you house on a floodplain? It is no accident that increasing government intervention into personal decisions has gone hand in hand with the drive for “fair shares for all.” The system under which people make their own choices – and bear most of the consequences of their decisions – is the system that has prevailed for most of our history. It is the system that gave the Henry Fords, the Thomas Alva Edisons, the George Eastmans, the John D. Rockefellers, the James Cash Penneys the incentive to transform our society over the past two centuries. It is the system that gave other people an incentive to furnish venture capital to finance the risky enterprises that these ambitious inventors and captains of industry undertook. Of course, there were many losers along the way – probably more losers than winners. We don’t remember their names. But for the most part they went in with their eyes open. They knew they were taking chances. And win or lose, society as a whole benefited from their willingness to take a chance.


EXTENDED SOCIETY CANNOT BE CENTRALLY PLANNED

F. A. Hayek [Nobel Prize Winner in Economics], The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press (1988), p. 75-76 First, there is the question of how our knowledge really does arise. Most knowledge – and I confes it took me some time to recognise this – is obtained not from immediate experience or observation, but in the continuous process of sifting a learnt tradition, which requires individual recognition and following of moral traditions that are not justifiable in terms of the canons of traditional theories of rationality. The tradition is the product of a process of selection from among irrational, or, rather, ‘unjustified’ beliefs which, without anyone’s knowing or intending it, assisted the proliferation of those who followed them (with no necessary relationship to the reasons – as for example religious reasons – for which they were followed). The process of selection that shaped customs and morality could take account of more factual circumstances than individuals could perceive, and in consequence tradition is in some respects superior to, or ‘wiser’ than, human reason (see chapter one above). This decisive insight in one that only a very critical rationalist could recognise. Second, and closely related to this, there is the question raised earlier of what, in the evolutionary selection of rules of conduct, is really decisive. The immediately perceived effects of actions that humans tend to concentrate on are fairly unimportant to this selection; rather, selection is made according to the consequences of the decisions guided by the rules of conduct in the long run – the same long run sneered at by Keynes (1971), C.W.: IV, 65). These consequences depend – as argued above and discussed again below – chiefly on rules of property and contract securing the personal domain of the individual. Hume had already noticed this, writing that these rules ‘are not derived from any utility or advantage which either the particular person or the public may reap from his enjoyment of any particular good’ (1739/1886:II, 273). Men did not foresee the benefits of rules before adopting them, though some people gradually have become aware of what they owe to the whole system. Our earlier claim, that acquired traditions serve as ‘adaptations to the unknown’, must then be taken literally. Adaptation to the unknown is the key in all evolution, and the totality of events to which the modern market order constantly adapts itself is indeed unknown to anybody. The information that individuals or organizations can use to adapt to the unknown is necessarily partial, and is conveyed by signals (e.g., prices) through long chains of individuals, each person passing on in modified form a combination of streams of abstract market signals. Nonetheless, the whole structure of activities tends to adapt, through these partial and fragmentary signals, to conditions foreseen by and known to no individual, even if this adaptation is never perfect. That is why this structure survives, and why those who use it also survive and prosper. There can be no deliberately planned substitutes for such a self-ordering process of adaptation to the unknown. Neither his reason nor his innate ‘natural goodness’ leads man this way, only the bitter necessity of submitting to rules he does not like in order to maintain himself against competing groups that had already begun to expand because they stumbled upon such rules earlier. If we had deliberately built, or were consciously shaping, the structure of human action, we would merely have to ask individuals why they had interacted with any particular structure. Whereas, in fact, specialised students, even after generations of effort, find it exceedingly difficult to explain such matters, and cannot agree on what are the causes or what will be the effects of particular events. The curious task of economics is to demonstrate to men how little they really know about what they imagine they can design.


PRIVATE PROPERTY FACILITATES COORDINATION IN A SOCIETY WHERE EACH OF US ONLY HAS PARTIAL KNOWLEDGE, AND THUS FACILITATES SERVING THE NEEDS OF DISTANT OTHERS

F. A. Hayek [Nobel Prize Winner in Economics], The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press (1988), p. 77-78 Much of the particular information which any individual possesses can be used only to the extent to which he himself can use it in his own decisions. Nobody can communicate to another all that he knows, because much of the information he can make use of he himself will elicit only in the process of making plans for action. Such information will be evoked as he works upon the particular task he has undertaken in the conditions in which he finds himself, such as the relative scarcity of various materials to which he has access. Only thus can the individual find out what to look for, and what helps him to do this in the market is the responses others make to what they find in their own environments. The overall problem is not merely to make use the given knowledge, but to discover as much information as is worth searching for in prevailing conditions. It is often objected that the institution of property is selfish in that it benefits only those who own some, and that is was indeed ‘invested’ by some persons who, having acquired some individual possessions, wished for their exclusive benefit to protect these from others. Such notions, which of course underlie Rousseau’s resentment, and his allegation that our ‘shackles’ have been imposed by selfish and exploitative interests, fail to take into account that the size of our overall product is so large only because we can, through market exchange of severally owned property, use widely dispersed knowledge of particular facts to allocate severally owned resources. The market is the only known method of providing information enabling individuals to judge comparative advantages of different uses of resources of which they have immediate knowledge and through whose use, whether they so intend or not, they serve the needs of distant unknown individuals. This dispersed knowledge is essentially dispersed, and cannot possibly be gathered together and conveyed to an authority charged with the task of deliberately creating order. Thus the institution of several property is not selfish, nor was it, nor could it have been, ‘invented’ to impose the will of property owners upon the rest. Rather, it is generally beneficial in that it transfers the guidance of production from the hands of a few individuals who, whatever they may pretend, have limited knowledge, to a processes, the extended order, that makes maximum use of the knowledge of all, thereby benefiting those who do not own property nearly as much as those who do.


OUR INSTINCTUAL ALTRUISM ACTUALLY HARMS THOSE IN NEED

F. A. Hayek [Nobel Prize Winner in Economics], The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press (1988), p. 80-81 Fifth, there is the question whence then, in the presence of all these difficulties and objections, the demand to restrict one’s action to the deliberate pursuit of known and observable beneficial ends arises. It is in part a remnant of the instinctual, and cautious, micro-ethic of the small band, wherein jointly perceived purposes were directed to the visible needs of personally known comrades (i.e., solidarity and altruism). Earlier I claimed that, within an extended order, solidarity and altruism are possible only in a limited way within some sub-groups, and that to restrict the behaviour of the group at large to such action would work against coordinating the efforts of its members. Once most of the productive activities members of a cooperating group transcend the range of the individual’s perception, the old impulse to follow inborn altruistic instincts actually hinders the formation of more extensive orders. In the sense of inculcating conduct that benefits others, all systems of morality of course commend altruistic action; but the question is how to accomplish this. Good intentions will not suffice – we all know what road they pave. Guidance strictly by perceivable favourable effects on particular other persons is insufficient for, and even irreconcilable with, the extended order. The morals of the market do lead us to benefit others, not by our intending to do so, but by making us act in a manner which, nonetheless, will have just that effect. The extended order circumvents individual ignorance (and thus also adapts us to the unknown, as discussed above) in a way that good intentions alone cannot do – and thereby does make our efforts altruistic in their effects. In an order taking advantage of the higher productivity of extensive division of labour, the individual can no longer know whose needs his efforts do or ought to serve, or what will be the effects of his actions on those unknown persons who do consume his products or products to which he has contributed. Directing his productive efforts altruistically thus becomes literally impossible for him. In so far as we can still call his motives altruistic in that they eventually redound to the benefit of others, they will do this not because he aims at or intends to serve the concrete needs of others, but because he observes abstract rules. Our ‘altruism’, in this new sense, is very different form instinctual altruism. No longer the end pursued but the rules observed make the action good or bad. Observing these rules, while bending most of our efforts towards earning a living, enables us to confer benefits beyond the range of our concrete knowledge (yet at the same time hardly prevents us from using whatever extra we earn also to gratify our instinctive longing to do visible good). All this is obscured by the systematic abuse of the term ‘altruistic’ by sociobiologists.


EFFICIENT MARKETS MAKE EVERYONE BETTER OFF

F. A. Hayek [Nobel Prize Winner in Economics], The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press (1988), p. 84-85 Some persons are so troubled by some effects of the market order that they overlook how unlikely and even wonderful it is to find such an order prevailing in the greater part of the modern world, a world in which we find thousands of millions of people working in a constantly changing environment, providing means of subsistence for others who are mostly unknown to them, and at the same time finding satisfied their own expectations that they themselves will receive goods and services produced by equally unknown people. Even in the worst of times something like nine out of ten of them will find these expectations confirmed. Such an order, although far from perfect and often inefficient, can extend farther than any order men could create by deliberately putting countless elements into selected ‘appropriate’ places. Most defects and inefficiencies of such spontaneous orders result from attempting to interfere with or to prevent their mechanisms from operating, or to improve the details of their results. Such attempts to intervene in spontaneous order rarely result in anything closely corresponding to men’s wishes, since these orders are determined by more particular facts than any such intervening agency can know. Yet, while deliberate intervention to, say, flatten out inequalities in the interest of a random member of the order risks damaging the working of the whole, the self-ordering process will secure for any random member of such a group a better chance over a wider range of opportunities available to all than any rival system could offer.


CENTRAL PLANNING IS BOUND TO FAIL

F. A. Hayek [Nobel Prize Winner in Economics], The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press (1988), p. 86 Meanwhile, among those who, in the tradition of Mandeville, Hume, and Smith, did study economics, there gradually emerged not only an understanding of market processes, but a powerful critique of the possibility of substituting socialism for them. The advantages of these market procedures were so contrary to expectation that they would be explained only retrospectively, through analyzing this spontaneous formation itself. When this was done, ti was found that decentralised control over resources, control through several property, leads to the generation and use of more information than is possible under central direction. Order and control extending beyond the immediate purview of any central authority could be attained by central direction only if, contrary to fact, those local managers who could gauge visible and potential resources were also currently informed of the constantly changing relative importance of such resources, and could then communicate full and accurate details about this to some central planning authority in time for it to tell them what to do in light of all the other, different, concrete information it had received from other regional or local managers – who of course, in turn, found themselves in similar difficulties in obtaining and delivering any such information. Once we realise what the task of such a central planning authority would be, it becomes clear that the commands it would have to issue could not be derived from the information the local managers hd recognised as important, but could only be determined through direct dealings among individuals or groups controlling clearly delimited aggregates of means. The hypothetical assumption, customarily employed in theoretical descriptions of the market process (descriptions made by people who usually have no intention of supporting socialism), to the effect that all such facts (or ‘parameters’) can be assumed to be known to the explaining theorist, obscures all this, and consequently produces the curious deceptions that help to sustain various forms of socialist thinking.


LIBERTARIANISM

WE DO NOT HAVE AN OBLIGAITON TO SACRIFICE OUR FREEDOM TO ASSIST OTHERS Per Bauhn [Kalmar University College] “The End of Duty” Essays in Philosophy: Vol. 9: Iss. 2, 2008. The fact that we too are right-holders is also the reason why the comparable cost to us of helping our recipients to have freedom and well-being matters here. If our claims to freedom and well-being are as good and valid as the claims of our recipients, then the latter cannot justifiably demand of us that we sacrifice aspects of freedom and well-being as basic as the ones they want us to help them have for themselves. We are not morally required to risk our own lives to save the lives of our recipients, nor to make ourselves poor just to provide our recipients with property. (There are exceptions here, when we, as a consequence of special relationships and commitments, acquire duties that may well go beyond a strict equality of rights between agents and recipients. But it is important to note that it does indeed take special conditions of this sort to justify such more extensive duties.


LIBERTARIANS OBJECT TO REDISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH ON THE GROUNDS THAT DOING SO VIOLATES A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO LIBERTY

Michael Sandel [Prof. of Government, Harvard University], Justice: What’s The Right Thing To Do?, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, p. 59-60 The second objection regards these calculations as beside the point. It argues that taxing the rich to help the poor is unjust because it violates a fundamental right. According to this objection, taking money from Gates and Winfrey without their consent, even for a good cause, is coercive. It violates their liberty to do with their money whatever they please. Those who object to redistribution on these grounds are often called “libertarians.” Libertarians favor unfettered markets and oppose government regulation, not in the name of economic efficiency but in the name of human freedom. Their central claim is that each of us has a fundamental right to liberty – the right to do whatever we want with the things we own, provided we respect other people’s rights to do the same.


LIBERTARIANS OPPOSE REDISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH OR INCOME IN ANY FORM

Michael Sandel [Prof. of Government, Harvard University], Justice: What’s The Right Thing To Do?, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, p. 60-61 3. No Redistribution of Income or Wealth. The libertarian theory of rights ruels out any law that requires some people to help others, including taxation for redistribution of wealth. Desirable though it may be for the affluent to support the less fortunate – by subsidizing their health care or housing or education – such help should be left up to the individual to undertake, not mandated by the government. According to the libertarian, redistributive taxes are a form of coercion, even theft. The state has no more right to force affluent taxpayers to support social programs for the poor than a benevolent thief has the right to steal money from a rich persona nd give it to the homeless. The libertarian philosophy does not map neatly onto the political spectrum. Conservatives who favor laissez-faire economic policies often part company with libertarians on cultural issues such as school prayer, abortion, and restrictions on pornography. And many proponents of the welfare state hold libertarian views on issues such as gay rights, reproductive rights, freedom of speech, and the separation of church and state. During the 1980s, libertarian ideas found prominent expression in the pro-market, antigovernment rhetoric of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. As an intellectual doctrine, libertarianism emerged earlier, in opposition to the welfare state. In The Constitution of Liberty (1960), the Austrian-born economist-philospher Friedrich A. Hayek (1899-1992) argued that any attempt to bring about greater economic equality was bound to be coercive and destructive of a free society. 3 In Capitalism and Freedom (1962), the American economist Milton Friedman (1912-2006) argued that many widely accepted state activities are illegitimate infringements on individual freedom. Social Security, or any mandatory, government run retirement program, is one of his prime examples: “If a man knowingly prefers to live for today, to use his resources for current enjoyment, deliberately choosing a penurious old age, by what right do we prevent him from doing so?” Friedman asks. We might urge such a person to save for his retirement, “but are we entitled to use coercion to prevent him from doing what he chooses to do?” 4 Friedman objects to minimum wage laws on similar grounds. Government has no right to prevent employers fom paying any wage, however low, that workers are prepared to accept. The government also violates individual freedom when it makes laws against employment discrimination. If employers want to discriminate on the basis of race, religion, or any other factor, the state has no right to prevent them from doing so. In Friedman’s view, “such legislation clearly involves interference with the freedom of individuals to enter into voluntary contracts with one another.” 5


LIBERTARIANS ARGUE THAT THERE IS NOTHING INHERENTLY WRONG WITH ECONOMIC INEQUALITY SO LONG AS WEALTH IS PROCURED LEGITIMATELY

Michael Sandel [Prof. of Government, Harvard University], Justice: What’s The Right Thing To Do?, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, p. 62-63 According to Nozick, there is nothing wrong with economic inequality as such. Simply knowing that the Forbes 400 have billions while others are penniless doesn’t enable you to conclude anything about the justice or injustice of the arrangement. Nozick rejects the idea that a just distribution consists of a certain pattern – such as equal income, or equal utility, or equal provision of basic needs. What matters Is how the distribution came about. Nozick rejects patterned theories of justice in favor of those that honor the choices peoples make in free markets. He argues that distributive justice depends on two requirements – justice in initial holdings and justice in transfer. 3 The first asks if the resources you used to make your money were legitimately yours in the first place. (If you made a fortune selling stolen goods, you would not be entitled to the proceeds.) The second aks if you made your money either through free exchanges in the marketplace or from gifts voluntarily bestowed upon you by others. If the answer to both questions is yes, you are entitled to what you have, and the state may not take it without your consent. Provided no one starts out with ill-gotten gains, any distribution that results from a free market is just, however equal or unequal it turns out to be.


ONE IS ENTITLED TO PROPERTY IF IT WAS JUSTLY OBTAINED AND JUSTLY TRANSFERRED

Robert Nozick [Prof., Harvard University], Anarchy, State, and Utopia, New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers (1974), p. 151-152 If the world were wholly just, the following inductive definition would exhaustively cover the subject of justice in holdings. 1. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in acquisition is

entitled to that holding. 2. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principles of justice in transfer, from

someone else entitled to the holding, is entitled to the holding. 3. No one is entitled to a holding except by (repeated) applications of 1 and 2. The complete principle of distributive justice would say simply that a distribution is just if everyone is entitled to the holding they possess under the distribution. A distribution is just if it arises from another just distribution by legitimate means. The legitimate means of moving from one distribution to another are specified by the principle of justice in transfer. The legitimate first “moves” are specified by the principle of justice in acquisition.* Whatever arises from a just situation by just steps is itself just. The means of change specified by the principle of justice in transfer preserve justice. As correct rules of inference are truth-preserving, and any conclusion deduced via repeated application of such rules from only true premises is itself true, so the means of transition from one situation to another specified by the principle of justice in transfer are justice-preserving, and any situation actually arising from repeated transitions in accordance with the principle from a just situation is itself just. The parallel between justice-preserving transformations and truth-preserving transformations illuminates where it fails as well as where it holds. That a conclusion could have been deduced by truth-preserving transformations illuminates where it fails as well as where it holds. That a conclusion could have been deduced by truth-preserving means from premises that are true suffices to show its truth. That from a just situation a situation could have arisen via justice preserving means does not suffice to show its justice. The fact that a thief’s victims voluntarily could have presented him with gifts does not entitle the thief to his ill-gotten gains. Justice in holdings is historical; it depends upon what actually has happened.


TRYING TO CONSTRUCT A PARTICULAR PATTERN OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF GOODS FAILES TO REALIZE THE HISTORICAL CHARACTER OF ENTITLEMENTS

Robert Nozick [Prof., Harvard University], Anarchy, State, and Utopia, New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers (1974), p. 151-152 To think that the task of a theory of distributive justice is to fill in the blank in “to each according to his _____” is to be predisposed to search for a pattern; and the separate treatment of “from each according to his _____” treats production and distribution as two separate and independent issues. On an entitlement view these are not two separate questions. Whoever makes something, having bough or contracted for all other held resourced used in the process (transferring some of his holdings for these cooperating factors), is entitled to it. The situation is not one of something’s getting made, and there being an open question of who is to get it. Things come into the world already attached to people having entitlements over them. From the point of view of the historical entitlement conception of justice in holdings, those who start afresh to complete “to each according to his _____” treat objects as if they appeared from nowhere, out of nothing. A complete theory of justice might cover this limit case as well; perhaps here is a use for the usual conceptions of distributive justice. 5


OUR INTUITIONS TELL US THAT PEOPLE ARE ENTITLED TO WHAT THEY EARN THROUGH FAIR TRANSFERS

Robert Nozick [Prof., Harvard University], Anarchy, State, and Utopia, New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers (1974), p. 160-162 It is not clear how those holding alternative conceptions of distributive justice can reject the entitlement conception of justice in holdings. For suppose a distribution favored by one of these non-entitlement conceptions is realized. Let us suppose it is your favorite one and let us call this distribution D1; perhaps everyone has an equal share, perhaps shares vary in accordance with some dimension you treasure. Now suppose that Wilt Chamberlain is greatly in demand by basketball teams, being a great gate attraction. (Also suppose contracts run only for a year, with players being free agents.) He signs the following sort of contract with a team: In each home game, twenty-five cents from the price of each ticket of admission goes to him. (We ignore the question of whether he is “gouging” the owners, letting them look out for themselves). The season starts, and people cheerfully attend his team’s games; they buy their tickets, each time dropping a separate twenty-five cents of their admission price into a special box with Chamberlain’s name on it. They are excited about seeing him play; it is worth the total admission price to them. Let us suppose that in one season one million persons attend his home games, and Wilt Chamberlain winds up with $250,000, a much larger sum than the average income and larger even than anyone else has. Is he entitled to this icome? Is this new distribution D2, unjust? If so, why? There is no question about whether each of the people was entitled to the control over the resources held in D1; because that was the distribution (your favorite) that (for the purposes of argument) we assumed was acceptable. Each of these persons chose to give twenty-five cents of their money to Chamberlain. They could have spent it on going to the movies, or on candy bars, or on copies of Dissent magazine, or of Monthly Review. But they all, at least one million of them, converged on giving it to Wilt Chamberlain in exchange for watching him play basketball. If D1 was a just distribution, and people voluntarily moved from it to D2, transferring parts of their shares they were given under D1 (what was it for if not to do something with?), isn’t D2 also just? If the people were entitled to dispose of the resources to which they were entitled (under D1), didn’t this include their being entitled to give it to, or exchange it with, Wilt Chamberlain? Can anyone else complain on grounds of justice? Each other person already has his legitimate share under D1. Under D1, there is nothing that anyone has that anyone else has a claim of justice against. After someone transfers something to Wilt Chamberlain, third parties still have their legitimate shares; their shares are not changed. By what process could such a transfer among two persons give rise to a legitimate claim of distributive justice on a portion of what was transferred, by a third party who had no claim of justice on any holding of the others before the transfer?* To cut off objections irrelevant here, we might imagine the exchanges occurring in a socialist society, after hours. After playing whatever basketball he does in his daily work, or doing whatever other daily work he does, Wilt Chamberlain decides to put in overtime to earn additional money. (First his work quota is set; he works time over that.) Or imagine it is a skilled juggler people like to see, who puts on shows after hours.


DISTRIBUTING RESOURCES TO ATTEMPT TO ACHIEVE SOME DESIRABLE PATTERN REQUIRES CONSTANT REGULATION OF PEOPLE’S CHOICES

Robert Nozick [Prof., Harvard University], Anarchy, State, and Utopia, New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers (1974), p. 160-162 The general point illustrated by the Wilt Chamberlain example and the example of the entrepreneur in a socialist society is that no end-state principle or distributional patterned principle of justice can be continuously realized without continuous interference with people’s lives. Any favored pattern would be transformed into one unflavored by principle, by people choosing to act in various ways; for example, by people exchanging goods and services with other people, or giving things to other people, things the transferrers are entitled to under the favored distributional pattern. To maintain a pattern one must either continually interfere to stop people from transferring resources as they wish to, or continually (or periodically) interfere to take from some persons resources that others for some reason chose to transfer to them. (But if some time limit is to be set on how long people may keep resources others voluntarily transfer to them, why let them keep these resources for any period of time? Why not have immediate confiscation?) It might be objected that all persons voluntarily will to refrain from actions which would upset the pattern. This presupposes unrealistically (1) that all will most want to maintain the pattern (are those who don’t, to be “reeducated” or forced to undergo “self-criticism”?), (2) that each can gather enough information about his own actions and the ongoing activities of others to discover which of his actions will upset the pattern, and (3) that diverse and far-glung persons can coordinate their actions to dovetail into the pattern. Compare the manner in which the market is neutral among persons’ desires, as it reflects and transmits widely scattered information via prices, and coordinates persons’ activities.


TAXATION IS ON PAR WITH FORCED LABOR

Robert Nozick [Prof., Harvard University], Anarchy, State, and Utopia, New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers (1974), p. 169-171 Taxation of earnings from labor is on par with forced labor.* Some persons find this claim obviously true: taking the earnings of n hours labor is like taking n hours from the person; it is like forcing the person to work n hours for another’s purpose. Others find the claim absurd. But even these, if they object to forced labor, would oppose forcing unemployed hippies to work for the benefit of the needy.

† And they would also object to forcing each person to work five extra hours

each week for the benefit of the needy. But a system that takes five hours’ wages in taxes does not seem to them like one that forces someone to work five hours, since it offers the person forced a wider range of choice in activities than does taxation in kind with the particular labor specified. (But we can imagine a gradation of systems of forced labor, from one that specifies a particular activity, to one that gives a choice among two activities, to X ; and so on up.) Furthermore, people envisage a system with something like a proportional tax on everything above the amount necessary for basic needs. Some think this does not force someone to work extra hours, since there is no fixed number of extra hours he is forced to work, and since he can avoid the tax entirely by earning only enough to cover his basic needs. This is a very uncharacteristic view of forcing for those who also think people are forced to do something whenever the alternatives they face are considerably worse. However, neither view is correct. The fact that others intentionally intervene, in violation of a side constraint against aggression, to threaten force to limit the alternatives, in this case to paying taxes or (presumably the worse alternative) bare subsistence, makes the taxation system one of force labor and distinguishes it from other cases of limited choices which are not forcings. 10


IT IS ILLEGITIMATE TO SEIZE A PERSON’S PROPERTY TO HELP THE NEEDY

Robert Nozick [Prof., Harvard University], Anarchy, State, and Utopia, New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers (1974), p. 170-171 The man who chooses to work longer to gain an income more than sufficient for his basic needs prefers some extra goods or services to the leisure and activities he could perform during the possible nonworking hours; whereas the man who chooses not to work the extra time prefers the leisure activities to the extra goods or services he could acquire by working more. Given this, if it would be illegitimate for a tax system to seize some of a man’s leisure (forced labor) for the purpose of serving the needy, how can it be legitimate for a tax system to seize some of a man’s goods for that purpose? Why should we treat the man whose happiness requires certain material goods or services differently from the man whose preferences and desires make such goods unnecessary for his happiness? Why should the man who prefers seeing a movie (and who has to earn money for a ticket) be open to the required call to aid the needy, while the person who prefers looking at a sunset (and hence need earn no extra money) is not? Indeed, isn’t it surprising that redistributionists choose to ignore the man whose pleasures are so easily attainable without extra labor, while adding yet another burden to the poor unfortunate who must work for his pleasures? If anything, one would have expected the reverse. Why is the person with the nonmaterial or nonconsumption desire allowed to proceed unimpeded to his most favored feasible alternative, whereas the man whose pleasures or desires involve material things and who must work for extra money (thereby serving whomever considers his activities valuable enough to pay him) is constrained in what he can realize? Perhaps there is no difference in principle. And perhaps some think the answer concerns merely administrative convenience. (These questions and issues will not disturb those who think that forced labor to serve the needy or to realize some favored end-state pattern is acceptable.) In a fuller discussion we would have (and want) to extend our argument to include interests, entrepreneurial profits, and so on. Those who doubt that this extension can be carried through, and who draw the ilne here at taxation of income from labor, will have to state rather complicated patterned historical principles of distributive justice, since end-state principles would not distinguish sources of income in any way. It is enough for now to get away from end-state principles and to make clear how various patterned principles are dependent upon particular views about the sources or the illegitimacy or the lesser legitimacy of profits, interest, and so on; which particular views may well be mistaken.


THE SOCIAL CONTRACT DOES NOT CREATE AN OBLIGATION TO ASSIST OTHERS

H. M. Malm “Bad Samaritan Laws: Harm, Help, or Hype?” Law and Philosophy, Vol. 19, No. 6, 2000. First, Steven Heyman argues that the "strongest basis for a legal duty to rescue is to be found not in morality but in the obligations of citizenship."

10 According to Heyman, "government is formed to protect its citizens against

violence" and in exchange for this protection, citizens are obliged to "assist the government in enforcing the laws" against violence.'' Thus, on this view, our duty to aid is a duty owed to the government, as opposed to the potential victim, and it is a duty we have in virtue of our status as citizens of a particular society. As it stands, this defense could easily support the enactment of laws obliging citizens to notify the police of a crime in progress, thereby enabling the police to do the job for which they were specially trained. But it can't support the enactment of laws requiring citizens to actually provide aid, nor laws requiring citizens to aid in non-crime situations. Heyman is aware of this problem and attempts to resolve it by expanding his defense to (a) cover duties to aid in non-crime situations, and (b) show that the duties are owed to other citizens as well as to the state. Stated briefly, he argues that the responsibility of government has expanded to cover the protection of citizens in non-crime situations as well as crime situations, and that, as a result, the citizen's duty has expanded as well. In addition, he argues that social contract theory explains why the duty to aid is also owed to other citizens, since they initially contracted with each other to form the state. But Heyman's arguments are not likely to be widely convincing. One problem is that even if the government's role has evolved into doing more than providing protection against violence, we can't infer from this that it ought to have so evolved nor, more significantly, that citizens have a duty to assist it in every function that it now covers. Providing education to minors is widely regarded as a proper function of government, but it doesn't follow from this that every citizen has a duty to assist in this function other than by paying her taxes.


REDISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH IS THE EQUIVALENT OF GIVING PEOPLE A PROPERTY RIGHT IN EACH OTHER’S LABOR

Robert Nozick [Prof., Harvard University], Anarchy, State, and Utopia, New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers (1974), p. 171-172 When end-result principles of distributive justice are built into the legal structure of a society, they (as do most patterned principles) give each citizen an enforceable claim to some portion of the total social product; that is, to some portion of the sum total of the individually and jointly made products. This total product is produced by individuals laboring, suing means of production others have saved to bring into existence, by people organizing production or creating means to produce new things or things in a new way. It is on this batch of individual activities that patterned distributional principles give each individual an enforceable claim. Each person has a claim to the activities and the products of other persons, independently of whether the other persons enter into particular relationships that give rise to these claims, and independently of whether they voluntarily take these claims upon themselves, in charity or in exchange for something. Whether it is done through taxation on wages or on wages over a certain amount, or through seizure of profits, or through there being a big social pot so that it’s not clear what’s coming from where and what’s going where, patterned principles of distributive justice involve appropriating the actions of other persons. Seizing the results of someone’s labor is equivalent to seizing hours form him and directing him to carry on vairuos activities. If people force you to do certain work, or unrewarded work, for a certain period of time, they decide what you are to do and what purposes your work is to serve apart from your decisions. This process whereby they take this decision from you makes them a part-owner of you; it gives them a property right in you. Just as having such partial control and power of decisions, by right, over an animal or inanimate object would be to have a property right in it. End-state and most patterned principles of distributive justice institute (partial) ownership by others of people nad their actions and labor. These principles involve a shift from the classical liberals’ notion of self-ownership to a notion of (partial) property rights in other people.


PERSONS MUS BE INVIOLABLE BECAUSE THERE IS NO OVERARCHING SOCIAL GOOD; ONLY INDIVIDUAL PEOPLE VULNERABLE TO BEING SACRIFICED FOR THE SAKE OF OTHERS

Robert Nozick [Prof., Harvard University], Anarchy, State, and Utopia, New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers (1974), p. 32-33 Side constraints express the inviolability of other persons. But why may not one violate persons for the greater social good? Individually, we each sometimes choose to undergo some pain or sacrifice for a greater benefit or to avoid a greater harm: we go to the dentist to avoid worse suffering later; we do some unpleasant work for its results; some persons diet to improve their health or looks; some save money to support themselves when they are older. In each case, some cost is borne for the sake of the greater overall good. Why not, similarly, hold that some persons have to bear some costs that benefit other persons more, for the sake of the overall social good? But there is no social entity with a good that undergoes some sacrifice for its own good. .There are only individual people, different individual people, with their own individual lives. Using one of these people for the benefit of others, uses him and benefits the others. Nothing more. What happens is that something is done to him for the sake of others. Talk of an overall social good covers this up. (Intentionally?) To use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, 5 that his is the only life he has. He does not get some overbalancing good from his sacrifice, and no on is entitled to force this upon him – least of all a state or government that claims his allegiance (as other individuals do not) and that therefore scrupulously must be neutral between its citizens.


TO CLAIM THAT ALL ENTITLEMENTS ARE MORALLY ARBITRARY UNDERMINES HUMAN WORTH

Robert Nozick [Prof., Harvard University], Anarchy, State, and Utopia, New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers (1974), p. 213 Here we have Rawls’ reason for rejecting a system of natural liberty: it “permits” distributive shares to be improperly influenced by factors that are so arbitrary from a moral point of view. These factors are: “prior distribution X of natural talents and abilities as these have been developed over time by social circumstances and such chance contingencies as accident and good fortune.” Notice that there is no mention at all of how persons have chosen to develop their own natural assets. Why is that simply left out? Perhaps because such choices are also viewed as being the products of factors outside the person’s control, and hence as “arbitrary from a moral point of view.” “The assertion that a man deserves the superior character that enables him to make the effort to cultivate his abilities is equally problematic; for his character depends in large part upon fortunate family and social circumstances for which he can claim no credit.” 34 (What view is presupposed here of character and its relation to action?) “The initial endowment of natural assets and the contingencies of their growth and nurture in early life ar arbitrary from a moral point of view X the effort a person is willing to make is influenced by his natural abilities and skills and the alternatives open to him. The better endowed are more likely, other things equal, to strive conscientiously. X” 35 This line of argument can succeed in blocking the introduction of a person’s autonomous choices and actions (and their results) only by attributing everything noteworthy about the person completely to certain sorts of “external” factors. So denigrating a person’s autonomy and prime responsibility for his actions is a risky like to take for a theory that otherwise wishes to buttress the dignity and self-respect of autonomous beings; especially for a theory that founds so much (including a theory of the good) upon persons’’ choices. One doubts that the unexalted picture of human beings Rawls’ theory presupposes and rests upon can be made to fit together with the view of human dignity it is designed to lead to and embody.


TO REGARD INDIVIDUAL TALENT AS PART OF THE COMMON PROPERTY OF SOCIETY REQUIRES THE ASSUMPTION OF A RADICALLY DETERMINED SUBJECT

Robert Nozick [Prof., Harvard University], Anarchy, State, and Utopia, New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers (1974), p. 228 Rawls’ view seems to be that everyone has some entitlement or claim on the totality of natural assets (viewed as a pool), with no one having differential claims. The distribution of natural abilities is viewed as a “collective asset.” 43 We see then that the difference principle represents, in effect, an agreement to regard the distribution of natural talents as a common asset and to share in the benefits of this distribution whatever it turns out to be. Those who have been favored by nature, whoever they are, may gain from their good fortune only on terms that improve the situation of those who have lost out. X No one deserves his greater natural capacity nor merits a more favorable starting place in society. But it does not follow that one should eliminate these basic distinctions. There is another way to deal with them. The basic structure can be arranged so that these contingencies work for the good of the least fortunate. 44 People will differ in how they view regarding natural talents as a common asset. Some will complain, echoing Rawls against utilitarianism, 45 that this “does not take seriously the distinction between persons”; and they will wonder whether any reconstruction of Kant that treats people’s abilities and talents as resources for others can be adequate. “The two principles of justice X rule out even the tendency to regard men as means to one another’s welfare.” 46 Only if one presses very hard on the distinction between men and their talents, assets, abilities, and special traits. Whether any coherent conception of a person remains when the distinction is so pressed is an open question. Why we, think with particular traits, should be cheered that (only) the thus purified men within us are not regarded as means is also unclear.


THE ARBITRARINESS OF NATURAL ENDOWMENTS DOES NOT LOGICALLY IMPLY THAT THESE ENDOWMENTS ARE COMMUNAL PROPERTY

Michael Sandel [Prof. of Government, Harvard University], Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Second Edition), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1998), p.98 But Nozick has a further objection, independent of the first, that goes something like this: even if R awls is right that arbitrariness undermines individual possession and hence individual desert, the difference principle is not the inevitable result; something like the principle of natural liberty – and here Nozick prefers to speak in terms of his own version, which he calls the ‘entitlement theory’ – could still be true. For even if no one deserved any of his natural assets, it might still be that people were entitled to them, and to what flows from them. At best, this argument maintains, Rawls’ case for the difference principle is underdetermined by the argument from arbitrariness. To show that individuals, as individuals, do not deserve or possess ‘their’ assets is not necessarily to show that society as a whole does deserve or possess them. Simply because the attributes accidentally located in me are not my assets, why must it follow, as Rawls seems to think, that they are common assets, rather than nobody’s assets? If they cannot properly be said to belong to me, why assume automatically that they belong to the community? Is their location in the community’s province any less accidental, any less arbitrary from a moral point of view? And if not, why not regard them as free-floating assets, unattached in advance to any subject of possession, whether individual or social?


UTILITARIANISM

SOME UTILITARIANS OBJECT TO REDISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT DISINCENTIVES PRODUCTIVITY Michael Sandel [Prof. of Government, Harvard University], Justice: What’s The Right Thing To Do?, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, p. 59 This Robin Hood scenario is open to at least two objections – one from within utilitarian thinking, the other from outside it. The first objection worries that high tax rates, especially on income, reduce the incentive to work and invest, leading to a decline in productivity. If the economic pie shrinks, leaving less to redistribute, the overall level of utility might go down. So before taxing Bill Gates and Oprah Winfrey too heavily, the utilitarian would have to ask whether doing so would lead them to work less and so to earn less, eventually reducing the amount of money available for redistribution to the needy.


IT MAY ULTIMATELY MAXIMIZE UTILITY TO FAVOR VALUING CONTEXTUAL MORAL RELATIONSHIPS RATHER THAN AN ABSTRACT OBLIGATION TO HELP ALL THOSE IN NEED

John Cottingham [Prof. of Philosophy, University of Reading], (2000): Caring at a Distance: (Im)partiality, Moral Motivation and the Ethics of Representation - Partiality, Distance and Moral Obligation, Ethics, Place & Environment, 3:3, 309-313 Things are not, however, as simple for the consequentialist as this line of reasoning suggests. For it is arguable that, if everyone went around striving to maximise global utility, without any regard for the special ties that bind them to those close to home, then the very structures which make for a good human existence—the close relationships of families, loved ones, friends and communities—would be severely threatened. This thought suggests an alternative, ‘indirect’ or ‘institutional’ form of consequentialism: rather than trying to make all our actions maximise directly the general good on the planet, each of us should instead be allowed to give preferential support to the institutional networks that are close at hand (families, friendships and communities); fostering such partiality, so runs the argument, will in the long run serve the total good far more effectively.


SINGER STRONGLY OVERSTATES THE DEGREE OF RESPONSIBILITY ANY PERSON HAS FOR THE SUFFERING OF DISTANT OTHERS

John Kekes [Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the University at Albany], “On the Supposed Obligation to Relieve Famine,” Philosophy 77:503-517 (2002) Singer says that when people are starving it is immoral to have such things as ‘stylish clothes, expensive dinners, a sophisticated stereo system, overseas holidays, a (second?) car, a larger house, private schools for our children, and so on.’ (PE, 232).1 If the ‘so on’ is taken as broadly as Singer undoubtedly intends, it becomes obvious that a very large majority of people in affluent societies is immoral. If, for instance, we put the poverty level in America at 14%,2 then it is a reasonable estimate that about 86% of Americans are guilty of what Singer regards as immorality. Similar estimates hold in other affluent societies. Most people above the poverty level, and many below it, spend money on things that are not necessities. Those to whom this kind of moral exhortation gives an uneasy conscience may be cowed into thinking that there is something to Singer’s claim. But not many of them would think that the immorality they are charged with is terribly serious. If it is a sin to have more than what is necessary, it is a venal, not a deadly, sin. In a different moral vocabulary, it is a minor omission that involves a failure of generosity, not a major commission of a wrong that causes serious unjustified harm to others.


THE IDEA THAT ALL PEOPLE’S INTERSTINGS SHOULD BE EQUALLY CONSIDERED IS HIGHLY QUESTIONABLE

John Kekes [Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the University at Albany], “On the Supposed Obligation to Relieve Famine,” Philosophy 77:503-517 (2002) Singer’s answer is that it is the very nature of ethics that requires it. ‘Ethics,’ he says, ‘takes a universal point of view.’ (PE, 11). ‘Ethics requires us to go beyond ‘I’ and ‘you’ to the universal law, the universalizable judgment, the standpoint of the impartial spectator or ideal observer, or whatever we choose to call it.’ (PE, 12). And he goes on, ‘The universal aspect of ethics, I suggest, does provide a persuasive, although not conclusive, reason for taking a broadly utilitarian position.’ (PE, 12). This means that ‘at some level in my moral reasoning I must choose the course of action that has the best consequences, on balance, for all affected’ (PE, 13), where ‘“best consequences” is understood as meaning what, on balance, furthers the interests of those affected.’ (PE, 14). Because ethics is committed to the universal point of view, it must be impartial. Because ethics is impartial, it must consider the interests of everyone equally. Because ethics requires the equal consideration of interests, it must prevent something bad from happening to anyone, anywhere, if it does not involve the sacrifice of something of comparable moral significance. Every step in this argument is questionable as a result of serious difficulties—difficulties that Singer must be aware of, but does not consider. That ethics need not be committed to the universal point of view is shown by the long tradition of Aristotelian eudaimonism, which has been an influential ethical theory for over 2000 years and by value pluralism that is perhaps the most significant contemporary contribution to ethics. Eudaimonists and pluralists argue that there are many reasonable conceptions of a good life, many reasonable ways of ranking many reasonable values, and they deny that there is a universal point of view from which the one true blueprint for reasonable lives, rankings, and values could be derived. That the universal point of view does not commit one to impartiality is made evident by the fact that particular obligations to one’s family, friends, political and religious ideals, and country often take justifiable precedence over impartial obligations that may be owed to everyone. That impartiality does not require the equal consideration of the interests of all those who are affected by one’s action is obvious if it is remembered that treating the interests of good and evil people with equal consideration cannot be a requirement of ethics; that it is often hard to know what people’s interests are; that treating interests with equal consideration presupposes that interests are commensurable, which they are not; and that treating people with equal consideration would often involve a morally highly objectionable form of paternalism. Lastly, that the equal consideration of interests does not impose the obligation to prevent something bad from happening to anyone, anywhere is clear if it is borne in mind that it makes a great difference whether people deserve the bad thing that threatens them, whether they have brought it upon themselves, whether the consequences of preventing it are acceptable, and whether expending resources in this way is warranted by practical considerations, such as the likelihood of success. Singer’s dogmatic assertion about the obligations commitment to ethics creates systematically ignores these serious difficulties.


SINGER FAILS TO ACCOUNT FOR THE FUNDAMENTAL ROLE OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY IN ARGUING THAT THERE IS AN OBLIGATION TO RELIEVE DISTANT SUFFERING.

John Kekes [Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the University at Albany], “On the Supposed Obligation to Relieve Famine,” Philosophy 77:503-517 (2002) It is a simple principle, so there is no need for a great deal of explanation of it. If I decide to do something when nothing forces me, if I understand both the decision and the surrounding circumstances, and if a normally intelligent person could be expected to see that the action is likely to bring about certain specific results, then it is justified to praise or blame, reward or punish, approve or condemn me for the action. The Responsibility-Principle is obviously a basic ethical principle for without it we could not hold people morally or legally accountable. Without the principle the systems of ethics and law, as we presently understand them, would have to be fundamentally revised. One reason for rejecting even the weakened form of the Prevention-Principle that we have some obligation to alleviate the suffering of people in absolute poverty is that this supposed obligation is obviously affected by the Responsibility-Principle. It surely makes a difference to the obligation whether the people living in absolute poverty are responsible for their own suffering. If their suffering is an easily foreseeable consequence of their immoral or imprudent actions, then it is hard to see why other people would have an obligation to alleviate their plight rather than the plight of others who have not brought their suffering upon themselves. Say that some people live in absolute poverty because they have been impoverished by waging an unjust foreign or civil war (as in Rwanda), or because they have murdered or exiled many of those among them who had the necessary know-how to raise living standards (as in Iraq), or because they are strongly devoted to a religion that teaches resignation and whose practice is incompatible with improving their lot (as many do in India). It would be absurd to deny that such considerations require a further revision of even the weakened version of the Prevention-Principle. It should be revised to say that affluent people have some obligation to alleviate the suffering of those who live in absolute poverty, if the sufferers are not responsible for their own suffering. And it should be remembered that if it turns out that affluent people do not have the obligation to alleviate the suffering of some group of people, it does not mean that they have no obligation to alleviate the suffering of some other group. The choice is not between honouring the obligation and doing nothing, but between honouring that obligation and some other obligation.


IF OVERPOPULATION IS THE PRIMARY CAUSE OF GLOBAL POVERTY, IT IS NOT THE FAULT OF PEOPLE IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

John Kekes [Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the University at Albany], “On the Supposed Obligation to Relieve Famine,” Philosophy 77:503-517 (2002) Now all this is likely to strike rampant moralizers as evasive pedantry because they believe that people living in absolute poverty are not responsible for their own suffering. But whether this belief is true is a factual question, and we have no lesser authority than Singer for suspecting that the belief is false. He says: ‘the major cause of absolute poverty is overpopulation,’ (PE, 235) and he repeats the point, ‘I accept that the earth cannot support indefinitely a population rising at the present rate X the best means of preventing famine, in the long run, is population control.’ (WEL, 115). If Singer is right, then the question of whether or not people living in absolute poverty are responsible for their own suffering is answered by considering whether or not they are responsible for overpopulation. Overpopulation is the cumulative result of the combination of individual actions and certain conditions. No individual is responsible for overpopulation. But individuals are responsible for the size of their families. It is an easily foreseeable consequence of their actions that if they increase the size of their families, they will have to divide their resources among more people. If they live in poverty, absolute or other, this will worsen their condition. No reasonable person can fail to see this. If people nevertheless increase the size of their families and end up in or perpetuate their absolute poverty, then they are responsible for their own and their children’s easily foreseeable suffering. Increasing the size of their families is clearly a voluntary action because they could refrain from sexual intercourse, they could enjoy sex without it leading to conception, they could practice such traditional methods of contraception as are available in their context, and they could abort unwanted fetuses. If overpopulation is the major cause of absolute poverty, then it is the imprudent voluntary actions of people living in absolute poverty that is a major contributing factor to their own and their children’s suffering. Singer takes no notice of this whatsoever. He does say, however, that ‘the best means of preventing famine, in the long run, is population control. It would then follow X that one ought to be doing all one can to promote population control. X Since there are organizations working specifically for population control, one would support them rather than more orthodox methods of preventing famine.’ (WEL, 115). These organizations distribute contraceptive devices and teach people to use them. The implication of Singer’s view is that affluent people have the obligation to give up their pleasures in order to enable people in absolute poverty to enjoy the pleasures of sex without having to worry about feeding their offspring. And if affluent people fail to do so because they regard it more important to help others in their own context who do not live in absolute poverty and are not responsible for their suffering, or because they want to give their children the best education their money can buy, then they are immoral. This view would be laughable, if it were not presented with the deadly earnestness and bullying that is the hallmark of rampant moralism. We may conclude, then, that given the Responsibility-Principle and the suffering of others who do not live in absolute poverty, but who are not responsible for their own suffering, the obligation is to helping the latter, not the former.


ANY DUTY TO AID WOULD HAVE TO BE QUALIFIED BY THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE AGENT KNOW THAT THE AID WOULD ACTUALLY ALLEVIATE SUFFERING

John Kekes [Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the University at Albany], “On the Supposed Obligation to Relieve Famine,” Philosophy 77:503-517 (2002) The discharge of this obligation requires ethically committed people to ask and answer the question of why people suffer. The mere fact of suffering is not enough to impose an obligation on anyone because the suffering may be the responsibility of the sufferer. Whether or not it is, can be determined by the application of the Responsibility-Principle. Its application requires making reasonable comparative judgments about the likelihood that the discharge of the obligation in one context rather than another will be effective in alleviating suffering. Singer agrees: ‘we have no obligation to make sacrifices that, to the best of our knowledge, have no prospect of reducing poverty in the long run.’ (PE, 241). We should, therefore, revise the Prevention-Principle once more: affluent people have some obligation to alleviate suffering if the sufferers are not responsible for their suffering, and if it is likely that the aid will reduce their suffering in the long run. One consequence of the latest version of the Prevention- Principle is that whether the obligation holds depends on being able to make reasonable judgments about the sufferers’ responsibility and about the likelihood that the aid will be effective in the long run. Making such judgments requires considerable knowledge of the context in which the sufferers live, which the vast majority of affluent people cannot be expected to have. They would have to be able to answer such questions as whether the aid is likely to reach its intended recipients, rather than being wasted as a result of inefficient distribution, or being stolen by corrupt officials, or being distributed to favoured groups, or being in a form that the recipients would find unacceptable. They would have to be able to judge whether the aid is going to result in superficial short-term relief that merely prolongs suffering or whether it brings about long-term structural changes that would relieve suffering in the long run. If they could not make reasonable judgments of this sort, they would have to accept the judgments of various local politicians and aid workers, and they would have to decide whether these judgments are trustworthy. Since both the politicians and aid workers have a vested interest in attracting aid, there would be a prima facie reason not to take their judgments at face value. Even if these questions were satisfactorily answered, there would be further questions about the causes of the suffering. Is it the result of a natural disaster, corruption, inefficiency, an unjust political system, religious practices, outdated customs, or the voluntary actions of the sufferers? The likelihood is that several factors have contributed to causing the suffering. Judging the effectiveness of the aid is possible only if these causes and their relative contributions are known. Without such knowledge, the aid may just be wasted, and, as Singer rightly says: ‘Any consequentialist ethics must take probability of outcome into account. A course of action that will certainly produce some benefit is to be preferred to an alternative course that may lead to a slightly larger benefit, but is equally likely to result in no benefit at all.’ (PE, 238). Since it is extremely unlikely that people have the knowledge on which reasonable attempts to take probability into account would have to be based, it is hard to see how the conditions stated by the latest revision of the Prevention-Principle could be met.


IN THE LONG RUN AID WILL ONLY MAKE GLOBAL POVERTY WORSE

John Kekes [Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the University at Albany], “On the Supposed Obligation to Relieve Famine,” Philosophy 77:503-517 (2002) It must be granted, of course, that the children are not responsible for the conditions into which they are born and that the leaders, for example, of China, India, Iraq, and various African countries must bear a major share of the responsibility for the awful conditions that prevail in the domains they rule. Decent people cannot but feel pity for the miserable lives of many millions of people. Acknowledging widespread misery is one thing, however, and accepting the obligation to do something about it—an obligation that would be wrong not to meet—is quite another. The hard fact is that the aid that may be given will only be window-dressing that produces, at best, short-term relief and perpetuates the conditions that produce absolute poverty. For the children who are helped will grow into adults who will have children. The temporary improvement of their condition will make the population living in absolute poverty grow faster than it would without aid. And that will make poverty worse in the long run, not better. Nor will the acceptance of the obligation be seen as reasonable if it is born in mind that it will strengthen the rule of the stupid or immoral leaders who are more or less responsible for absolute poverty. It is not easy to behold the pictures of emaciated children that television reports are so eager to inflict on their viewers. The fact remains, nevertheless, that the aid will produce even more emaciated children, unless their leaders are replaced by honest and practical reformers and unless the people who would be the parents of yet unborn miserable children exercise sufficient self-control to avoid having offspring with doomed lives. Given this fact, we must conclude with Singer that ‘we have no obligation to make sacrifices that, to the best of our knowledge, have no prospect of reducing poverty in the long run.’ (PE, 241).


SINGERS ARGUMENT FOR AIDING THE POOR IS BASED ON A NUMBER OF FLAWED ASSUMPTIONS

John Kekes [Prof. of Philosophy, University of Albany] “On the Supposed Obligation to Relieve Famine” Philosophy, Vol. 77, No. 302 Oct., 2002. Every step in this argument is questionable as a result of serious difficulties—difficulties that Singer must be aware of, but does not consider. That ethics need not be committed to the universal point of view is shown by the long tradition of Aristotelian eudaimonism, which has been an influential ethical theory for over 2000 years and by value pluralism that is perhaps the most significant contemporary contribution to ethics. Eudaimonists and pluralists argue that there arc many reasonable conceptions of a good life, many reasonable ways of ranking many reasonable values, and they deny that there is a universal point of view from which the one true blueprint for reasonable lives, rankings, and values could be derived. That the universal point of view does not commit one to impartiality is made evident by the fact that particular obligations to one*s family, friends, political and religious ideals, and country often take justifiable precedence over impartial obligations that may be owed to everyone. That impartiality does not require the equal considera-tion of the interests of all those who are affected by one's action is obvious if it is remembered that treating the interests of good and evil people with equal consideration cannot be a requirement of ethics; that it is often hard to know what people's interests are; that treating interests with equal consideration presupposes that interests are commensurable, which they arc not; and that treating people with equal consideration would often involve a morally highly objectionable form of paternalism. Lastly, that the equal consideration of interests does not impose the obligation to prevent something bad from happening to anyone, anywhere is clear if it is borne in mind that it makes a great difference whether people deserve the bad thing that threatens them, whether they have brought it upon themselves, whether the consequences of preventing ii are acceptable, and whether expending resources in this way is warranted by practical considerations, such as the likelihood of success. Singer's dogmatic assertion about the obligations commitment to ethics creates systematically ignores these serious difficulties.


LEGAL OBLIGATIONS

BAD SAMARITAN LAWS PUNISH INDIVIDUALS FOR BEING A BAD PERSON RATHER THAN COMMITING BAD ACTS Joshua Dressler [Prof. of Law McGeorge School of Law] “Some Brief Thoughts (Mostly Negative) About “Bad Samaritan” Laws” Santa Clara Law Review. Vol. 40, 199-2000, p. 981-2 Criticisms of BS laws begin with legalist concerns with retributive overtones. First, why is the offense called a "Bad Samaritan" law? The name suggests, I think, that we punish the bystander for being a bad person, i.e., for his "selfishness, callousness, or whatever it was"

46 that caused

him not to come to the aid of a person in need. However, the criminal law should not be (and, ordinarily, is not) used that way: criminal law punishes individuals for their culpable acts (or, perhaps here, culpable non-acts), but not generally for bad character. As mortals, we lack the capacity to evaluate another's soul. It is wrongful conduct, and not an individual's status as a bad person or even an individual's bad thoughts,

49 that justify criminal intervention. BS laws may

violate this principle. At a minimum, there is a serious risk that juries will inadvertently punish people for being (or seeming to be) evil or "soulless,"

50 rather than for what occurred on a specific

occasion. One need only consider David Cash and the public's intense feelings of disgust and anger toward him to appreciate why jurors might convict Bad Samaritans less on the basis of the "technicalities" of a statute, and more on the basis of character evaluation.


BAD SAMARITAN LAWS ARE LIKELY TO PUNISH INNOCENT PEOPLE.

Joshua Dressler [Prof. of Law McGeorge School of Law] “Some Brief Thoughts (Mostly Negative) About “Bad Samaritan” Laws” Santa Clara Law Review. Vol. 40, 199-2000, p. 982-3 Second, for retributivists, punishment of an innocent person is always morally wrong, and the risk of false positives— punishing an innocent person—is especially high with BS laws. Consider, for example, the Vermont BS law.

81 To be guilty of this crime the bystander must "know" that another

is at risk of "grave physical harm," and must give "reasonable assistance" if he can do so "without danger or peril to himself." If any one of these elements is lacking, the bystander is innocent and, therefore, in a society committed to the principle of legality, does not deserve punishment. Notice the inherent problem of punishing people for not-doings rather than wrongdoings. When a person points a loaded gun at another and intentionally pulls the trigger, it is reasonable to infer that the actor intended to cause harm. His mens rea is obvious. It is far harder to determine why a person does not act. Return to the Bystander and Blind Person example. The facts stated that Bystander knew what was going on and wanted harm to occur. In the real world, however, it would be exceedingly difficult to reliably determine Bystander's potential guilt. How do we know Bystander realized what was about to happen? Did he see BP? Did he realize BP was about to walk into the street? Did Bystander see the truck? Did he realize the truck driver was not paying attention? Beyond that, why did Bystander not act? Maybe he froze up, maybe he didn't think fast enough, or maybe (reasonably or unreasonably

52) he believed that helping BP would jeopardize his own

safety. For that matter, why did the Genovese bystanders hear the woman scream but fail to act, if in fact that was the case?

53 Is it at least possible that some of the bystanders did not know she

was in dire jeopardy? A person who wakes up from a sleep often fails to appreciate her surroundings. Also, perhaps some of them—even all of them—believed that someone else had already called the police.

64 It may be that, despite the condemnation directed at the Genovese

bystanders, few, if any, of them were guilty of Bad Samaritanism. In view of the inherent ambiguities in such circumstances, if juries take their duties seriously—including the presumption of innocence—few, if any, BS convictions will result. If emotions and bad character attributions rule the day, however, innocent persons will be improperly convicted.


BAD SAMARITAN LAWS GRANT POLICE AND PROSECUTORS TOO MUCH DISCRETION

Joshua Dressler [Prof. of Law McGeorge School of Law] “Some Brief Thoughts (Mostly Negative) About “Bad Samaritan” Laws” Santa Clara Law Review. Vol. 40, 199-2000, p. 983-4 Third, the threat of convicting innocent persons points to a related danger. BS statutes are so rubbery in their drafting that they grant police and prosecutors too much discretion to determine whether and whom to prosecute.

56 The due process clause prohibits the enforcement of penal

laws that "fail [] to establish guidelines to prevent 'arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement' of the law."

56 However, even if the issue is seen as a non-constitutional matter, it is difficult to see how a

prosecutor can fairly determine when charges are proper. Again, the distinction between actions and non-actions demonstrates the vagueness problem. BS laws compel people to make the world (or, at least, a small part of it) better, rather than punish actors for actively making it worse. In the latter case, the identifiable conduct of the accused, and the demonstrable harm caused by those actions, serve to single out the actor as a plausible candidate for prosecution. With laws that punish for nothing, rather than something, there is a need for alternative objective criteria. At least with commission-by-omission liability, there are identifiable criteria, such as the status relationship of the parties, contractual understandings, or the suspect's personal connection to the emergency by having created the initial risk.

57 In contrast, with BS laws, which impose a duty

to aid strangers (potentially, anyone), criminal responsibility is based on imprecise factors (e.g., the duty to provide "reasonable assistance") and nearly unknowable circumstances (e.g., that the stranger is exposed to "grave" physical harm, and that assistance can be rendered without any "danger or peril" to the actor or others).

58


BAD SAMARITAN LAWS ARE BAD FOR SOCIETY

Joshua Dressler [Prof. of Law McGeorge School of Law] “Some Brief Thoughts (Mostly Negative) About “Bad Samaritan” Laws” Santa Clara Law Review. Vol. 40, 199-2000, p. 985-6 There are also utilitarian reasons to question the wisdom of BS legislation. First, if such laws are taken seriously, the costs of investigating and potentially prosecuting bystanders might be prohibitive. Imagine the investigation necessary to decide whether to prosecute any of the Genovese bystanders

60 and, if the decision were to proceed, to determine which of them to

prosecute. Second, to the extent that BS statutes are narrowly drafted to reduce the risk of unfairness, prosecutions are likely to be rare (and convictions even rarer

61). Therefore, it is

unlikely that the threat of punishment will have the desired effect of inducing bystanders to help persons in peril. The muted threat of a misdemeanor conviction is less likely to promote good behavior than the threat of public scorn that follows the publicity of such cases, or a Samaritan's own conscience. Third, to the extent that such laws do, in fact, compel "Good Samaritanism,"

62

there is a risk that the Samaritan will hurt the person she is trying to assist,63

hurt others in the process,

64 or unforeseeably harm herself.

65 Fourth, since BS statutes are not linked to any

prevention-of-harm causal requirement (i.e., it is not necessary to successfully prevent the threatened harm from occurring; it is enough to give it "the old college try"), the costs of such laws may easily outweigh their limited practical benefits. Even supporters of BS legislation concede that the law only helps at the boundaries.

66


BAD SAMARITAN LAWS CREATE POSITIVE DUTIES THAT VIOLATE AUTONOMY

Joshua Dressler [Prof. of Law McGeorge School of Law] “Some Brief Thoughts (Mostly Negative) About “Bad Samaritan” Laws” Santa Clara Law Review. Vol. 40, 199-2000, p. 986-7 There is one final reason to question the wisdom of BS statutes. Not only are positive duties morally less powerful than negative ones,

67 but they also restrict human liberty to a greater

degree.68

A penal law that prohibits a person from doing X (e.g., unjustifiably killing another person) permits that individual to do anything other than X (assuming no other negative duty). In contrast, a law that requires a person to do Y (e.g., help a bystander) bars that person from doing anything other than Y. The edict that "no student may laugh aloud at a fellow student's silly answers to a professor's questions" only marginally restricts a student's autonomy— she can silently laugh at her colleague, sleep through the answer, or walk out of the room to protest the student's stupidity, just to name a few examples. However, a rule requiring a student to "provide reasonable assistance to a fellow student in jeopardy of offering a silly answer to a professor's question," not only is less precise, but also prevents students from doing anything other than help.

69 What is the significance of this point? It is that the United States is a country that highly

values individual liberty: Each person is regarded as an autonomous being, responsible for his or her own conduct. One aim of the law is to maximize individual liberty, so as to allow each individual to pursue a conception of the good life with as few constraints as possible. Constraints there must be, of course, in modern society: but freedom of action should be curtailed only so far as is necessary to restrain individuals from causing injury or loss to others.

70

Few people, except the most ardent libertarians, accept the latter statement in full. The point, however, is that in a society that generally values personal autonomy, we need to be exceptionally cautious about enacting laws that compel us to benefit others, rather than passing laws that simply require us not to harm others. The issue here, after all, is whether criminal law (as distinguished from tort law and religious, educational, and family institutions) should try to compel Good Samaritanism. Traditionally, Anglo-American criminal law sets only minimalist goals. The penal law does not seek to punish every morally bad act that we commit (aren't we glad of that?), and it leaves to other institutions the effort "to purify thoughts and perfect character."

71


MANDATORY PRO BONO LEGAL SERVICES ACTUALLY HARM THE POOR

Jonathan R. Macey [J. DuPratt White Professor of Law, Cornell Law School] “Mandatory Pro Bono: Comfort for the Poor or Welfare for the Rich?” Yale Law School Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper 1646. 1992. Contrary to popular belief, mandatory pro bono will not help the poor. To understand why this is so, one must first understand that the real reason why the poor do not presently consume more legal services is because they are rational. Given their limited wealth, the poor simply would rather spend their money on other things. In other words, legal services are very, very low on a poor person's shopping list. Food is higher. Shelter is higher. Clothing is higher. And even after all of those expenses are covered, lawyers should not be surprised to learn that a poor person might choose to allocate his resources in ways other than hiring a lawyer-like buying a car or obtaining an education The low demand for lawyers' services by the poor and the middle class provides strong evidence that most people regard legal services as an expendable luxury rather than as a necessity:

Except for a narrow range of property-related matters-conveyances, wills, and marital separations-the middle class makes just about as little use of legal services as those who literally cannot afford them. Even prepaid legal insurance plans have proved surprisingly unpopular. Why? Because people do not want to give up what they would have to in order to buy a little more of our lawyer justice, except when the expected benefit is worth the cost. People's priorities are different. 5

In other words, poor people do not hire lawyers because they use their limited resources to buy things that they value more than legal services. Given a choice between $2500 in cash and twenty billable hours of legal services provided by a partner at a Wall Street law firm (valued at around $10,000), most people-middle class or poor-would take the $2500 in cash. In other words, if the lawyers compelled to provide pro bono legal services to poor clients were permitted to negotiate with their indigent clients, both the lawyers and the clients quickly would agree that the clients should accept cash in lieu of legal services. The lawyers could put the time they saved to more productive uses, and the clients could buy some of the virtually infinite array of goods and services they actually need. Everybody would be better off. Thus, requiring lawyers to provide legal services to the poor is wasteful and inefficient. Both lawyers and their clients could improve their circumstances if lawyers could donate money directly to the poor. The poor could then decide for themselves how best to spend this largesse.


A REQUIREMENT OF PRO BONO SERVICES RAISE HOUSING AND OTHER COSTS

Jonathan R. Macey [J. DuPratt White Professor of Law, Cornell Law School] “Mandatory Pro Bono: Comfort for the Poor or Welfare for the Rich?” Yale Law School Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper 1646. 1992. Litigation often produces benefits for plaintiffs and for society as a whole because individuals who expect to pay damages for the harm they cause have an incentive to reduce their harmful activities But pro bono litigation is different. When clients must incur costs to hire a lawyer, they will only bring lawsuits when the expected benefits from litigation outweigh the costs of bringing suit, including the costs of hiring a lawyer. In the case of pro bono lawyering, however, the cost of mounting litigation is reduced to zero, and clients will pursue litigation that produces little or no benefits. Mandatory pro bono significantly exacerbates this problem because lawyers are forced to find client matters to fulfill their pro bono obligations:

[S]uppose that lawyers, looking for ways to fill their quota [of required pro bono legal work], start impeding debt collection or complicating evictions of nonrent-paying tenants. The immediate result is to increase the fees to the lawyers of landlords and merchants, thus increasing the costs of those suppliers [of goods and services to the poor]. The longer-run effect is likely worse: to increase the price or decrease the supply of housing and credit to the poor.8


REQUIRED PRO BONO SERVICES WOULD BE INEFFICIENT

Esther F. Lardent [Chief Consultant to the American Bar Association’s Postconviction Death Penalty Representation Project] “Mandatory Pro Bono In Civil Cases: The Wrong Answer to the Right Question” Maryland Law Review. Vol. 49, 1990. Mandatory pro bono would not only increase the number of attorneys that programs would be required to manage; it also would increase dramatically the administrative complexity of each step in the process of referring a pro bono case. Materials on the administration of voluntary pro bono programs cite essential program elements and operations which ensure successful programs.

100 In a mandatory system, these essential elements, often undeveloped or completely

absent in many voluntary programs, would become critical. For example, recordkeeping must be accurate when there is a threat of sanctions. In the likely event that the obligation is defined broadly, including some kind of partial or total financial buy out, the recordkeeping requirements would become unmanageable for most programs. The likelihood of carryover provisions, in which excess hours or cases in one year would be counted toward the next, would further complicate record-keeping systems, because the body charged with enforcement of the obligation surely will look to the pro bono programs for timely and accurate records on the annual level of participation of each attorney. Training, support, and case monitoring, always critical to the success of a pro bono program, become even more essential when there are reluctant participants. Some substantial funding would have to be provided for litigation related costs, malpractice insurance, and other expenses in an involuntary program. Additional resources would have to be provided to review reports, enforce the obligation, hear appeals, process requests for exemption, and determine whether a particular effort meets the definition for purposes of reporting. Proponents of mandatory pro bono must ask themselves whether it is economically feasible or efficient to increase current funding for pro bono five-fold to accommodate the increased caseload and administrative burdens; whether they are prepared to divert substantial funds from client services to the process of investigating and disciplining nonparticipatory attorneys; and whether most existing programs have the structural framework and expertise, even with additional resources, to accommodate a tidal wave of new cases and new volunteers.


THERE IS NO NEED FOR BAD SAMARITAN LAWS

David A. Hyman [Professor of Law and Medicine University of Illinois] “Rescue without Law: An Empirical Perspective on the Duty to Rescue” University of Illinois College of Law Law and Economics Working Papers, 2005. The frequency of non-risky non-rescue is an important factor in deciding how urgent a problem non-rescue actually is, but other factors are obviously material as well.88 For example, the severity of the adverse consequences that result from non-rescue and the potential adverse consequences from addressing and not addressing non-rescue also need to be factored into the equation. Indeed, some conduct is deemed sufficiently blameworthy that society seeks to deter it (typically through criminal sanctions) virtually regardless of its frequency.89 Thus, personal preferences matter in determining whether anything should be done about nonrescue. Yet, the only cases of non-rescue that can be punished are those that become known – meaning that the maximum potential upside from imposing a duty to rescue must be based on the number of reported non-rescues that occur in the absence of such a duty. Worse still, there are reasons for thinking the imposition of a duty to rescue would decrease the number of reported nonrescues.90 To be sure, many law professors have used instances of non-rescue as the opening wedge for a broader set of arguments about the duties that Americans should owe one another. One can certainly believe that Americans should do more to assist one another than they currently do – but that case should be made based on the facts, and not on highly salient but extraordinarily unrepresentative anecdotes of non-rescue. The verifiable frequency of non-rescue and rescue simply does not support such claims. Those who believe a duty to rescue is necessary have some obligation to either come up with persuasive evidence indicating that the frequency and severity of non-rescue is appreciably higher than demonstrated in this article, or explain why they are relying on atypical outliers to make their case to the general public. Alternatively, they should drop the issue of nonrescue, and instead make their arguments based on the broader issues they are actually concerned about. To be sure, preferences on the desirability of a duty to rescue may be immutable. When this research has been presented to scholars who are enthusiasts of the duty to rescue, they typically respond with one of two arguments: either they assert that the methodology is flawed because there “are lots of non-rescues out there,” or they assert that “one non-rescue is one too many.” The first argument is a common response to empirical legal research; as Professor Maurice Rosenberg once observed, “there are two kinds of empirical studies of law, those that confirm the hunches of lawyers and those that lawyers perceive to be false.”91The assertion that there must be “lots of non-rescues” because the speaker believes it to be so is an assertion of faith, and not a fact. The best response to such faith-based assertions is simple: “In God We Trust, All Others Bring Data.”92 The second argument (“one non-rescue is one too many”) is somewhat more appealing, at least rhetorically. After all, who could be in favor of non-rescue? However, the objective reality, as noted previously, is that the rarer the frequency of non-rescue, the more likely it is that attempts to address it will have no real upside and the potential for substantial downside. The absurd consequences that have already resulted from zero-tolerance policies in other areas of the law show the difficulties that can result from single-minded pursuit of a desired objective. 93


NON-RESCUES ARE NOT A PROBLEM. IN FACT, MORE PEOPLE DIE ATTEMPTING TO RESCUE OTHERS THAN THERE ARE REPORTED CASES OF NON-RESCUES

David A. Hyman [Professor of Law and Medicine University of Illinois] “Rescue without Law: An Empirical Perspective on the Duty to Rescue” University of Illinois College of Law Law and Economics Working Papers, 2005. During the past decade, there are no more than two documented cases of non-rescue each year in the entire United States. Every year, Americans perform at least a thousand nonrisky rescues and approximately two hundred and sixty risky rescues.106 Six times as many ordinary Americans die every year as a result of attempting a rescue as have died from a documented case of non-rescue in the past ten years combined. If a few isolated (and largely unverified and undocumented) cases of nonrescues have been deemed sufficient to justify legislative reform, one would think a total of a thousand documented cases of nonrisky rescue and several hundred documented cases of risky rescue every year should point rather decisively in the opposite direction. When it comes to the duty to rescue, leaving well enough alone is likely to be sufficient unto the day. What of the impact of statutes reversing the no-duty rule? Although three states have had generalized duties to rescue in effect for a combined total of almost eighty years, there is no evidence that these statutes have affected the number of rescues or non-rescues. There is also no evidence that these statutes are being employed in the sweeping manner feared by critics. Further research will be required to determine whether the enactment of these statutes has led to the creation of broader affirmative duties within these states.


BAD SAMARITAN LAWS ARE INEFFECTIVE

EUGENE VOLOKH [Professor of Law, UCLA Law School] “Duties to Rescue and the Anticooperative Effects of Law” Georgetown Law Journal. Vol. 88, 1999-2000. This typology tells us two things. First, and most obvious, duty-to-rescue/ report laws by definition won't do much about the Hopelessly Bad Samaritan. The laws will affect those who are Bad enough that they act wrongly on their own, but are nonetheless so sensitive to the law's normative effect that they are Legally Swayable to being Good. Some people will fall into this category, but I doubt many will: Those who don't respond to the social norm of helping people in distress-at least by calling 911-probably aren't likely to be swayed by the normative effect of a new duty-to-rescue/report law. The law's coercive force, moreover, will be rather low, because the witnesses know they're unlikely to be conclusively identified if they just stay quiet. This suggests that the laws will do relatively little good, something the laws' supporters do not deny; the laws, they often agree, will influence only a few people, but they argue that even this small benefit is justification enough.5


BAD SAMARITAN LAWS WOULD ACTUALLY INCREASE INSTANCES OF NON-RESCUE

EUGENE VOLOKH [Professor of Law, UCLA Law School] “Duties to Rescue and the Anticooperative Effects of Law” Georgetown Law Journal. Vol. 88, 1999-2000. The trouble, though, is that as to the Delayed Samaritan and the Passive Samaritan-two groups usually forgotten in the outrage at the genuinely Bad- the laws may actually be counterproductive.6 Imagine a person who sees a would intervene or at least call the authorities,

some otherwise decent people fail to do this. Some might be afraid, reasonably or not, that the

abusive parent will physically hurt them if they intercede. Others may wrongly feel a sense of

loyalty to their neighbor or wrongly conclude that it's none of their business. Others may misperceive the magnitude of the abuse, thinking that it might be permissible parental discipline;

people are often reluctant to get the police involved unless they're sure that a serious crime is taking place. Still others may be paralyzed with indecision. These are generally unworthy responses, but fortunately, after reflection or after observing other events, some witnesses may change their minds. A gnawing conscience may move them to call the police a day later. Witnessing a second (or tenth) incident of abuse may finally drive them to action. Seeing the child the next day with a black eye may convince them that the abuse was serious and that they are morally obligated to act to stop it. And even if they don't come forward on their own, a visit from the police or from child welfare officials investigating the matter may prompt them to disclose what they saw, thus helping save the child from further abuse. People who react this way may still be morally culpable for their initial failure to aid or to report, but the more practically important fact is that the legal system- and the victim and possible future victims-can nonetheless use their belated help. Delayed Samaritanism and Passive Samaritanism aren't as good as Good

Samaritanism, but they are much better than nothing, and shouldn't be discouraged.Under a duty-to-rescue/report law, though, both the Delayed and the Passive Samaritans in such a situation have already committed a crime by not helping or responding "as soon as reasonably practicable."-7 By the time the remorse sets in, the Delayed and Passive Samaritans are legally guilty,8 and either volunteering or honestly answering police questions will incriminate them. The Delayed and Passive Samaritans therefore have a choice: continue to keep quiet and likely never be conclusively found out to have been a witness, 9 or speak up and risk a criminal prosecution or perhaps a civil lawsuit' ° for their initial failure to act. When silence or "I didn't see anything, officer" is legally cheap and volunteering information risks even a modest legal cost, many will stay mum.1" The same can happen in many other situations, for instance when a person sees a robbery or killing outside her window and at first doesn't report the crime (out of fear for her family, indecision, or a habit of mistrusting the police), or when a frat boy sees a friend raping an

unconscious girl and initially keeps quiet out of misguided loyalty.Thus, in trying to achieve a procooperative effect, duty-to-rescue/report laws may inadvertently cause an anticooperative effect. Instead of inducing cooperation with the social goal of helping crime victims, the laws may deter Delayed Samaritans and Passive Samaritans from coming forward or truthfully answering police inquiries.12 Some Delayed and Passive Samaritans could act on their remorse while minimizing their legal exposure, by calling in an anonymous tip, but such tips are much less useful to the police than are witnesses who actually come forward; and some risk-averse witnesses might be reluctant even to call in an anonymous tip, fearing that it won't stay anonymous.


THE SOCIAL CONTRACT DOES NOT PROVIDE A REASON TO CREATE BAD SAMARITAN LAWS

H. M. Malm “Bad Samaritan Laws: Harm, Help, or Hype?” Law and Philosophy, Vol. 19, No. 6, 2000. A second problem is that Heyman's arguments presuppose particular conceptions of the social contract that critics of his view can reasonably reject. For example, he assumes that the hypothetical contracting agents would agree to a duty to do "whatever is reasonably necessary" to prevent harm to another, rather than agree only to create and fund agencies designed to prevent harm, and agree to have that agreement enforced by the criminal law instead of relying on the honor and goodness people. These assumptions would be plausible were we also assuming that people would not aid others without the threat of criminal punishment. Were that the case, our hypothetical contracting agents could be assumed to have agreed to the laws because then the benefits would outweigh the burdens.

12 But that isn't the case. We have ample evidence that people are

willing to aid others in the absence of a legal obligation to do so and sometimes in the presence of great risk to themselves. Thus, the crucial question isn't whether it would be prudent or reasonable to agree to aid others when we can do so at minimal risk to ourselves. We can assume that it would be. Instead, the crucial question is whether, on the one hand, we'd be better off having that agreement enforced by the criminal law, with all moral costs associated with fairly interpreting and applying the laws (I'll discuss a number of these later), all the societal costs in terms of the time and resources directed towards this as opposed to other, perhaps more serious crimes, and all the personal costs of time, money and emotional distress associated with defending oneself against a criminal charge even if one is ultimately acquitted, or, on the other hand, allow it to remain part of our moral obligations and left solely up to us to decide when the duty applies. Since neither option is clearly unreasonable, Heyman can't legitimately assume that the social contractors would have agreed to bad Samaritan laws. As a result, his arguments are unpersuasive.


BAD SAMARITAN LAWS WOULD IMPOSE THE RISK OF INJURY ON INNOCENT BYSTANDERS

H. M. Malm “Bad Samaritan Laws: Harm, Help, or Hype?” Law and Philosophy, Vol. 19, No. 6, 2000. A particular woman regularly hangs out on a particular street corner in the nightlife area of Chicago. She usually sits up against the wall of a building, offers to expose her breasts for money, utters obscenities, but is otherwise harmless. People who frequent the area have come to regard her as part of the local color. About four years ago, while the woman was engaging in her normal and somewhat annoying behavior, a passerby started to verbally harass her and, according to the reports, make gestures towards physical violence. Another passerby, a local who had apparently become accustomed to the woman's behavior, tried to be a good Samaritan and stepped in verbally to try to stop the harassment. Within a minute or two the harasser turned on the Samaritan and shot and killed him. Illinois does not have bad Samaritan laws and the Samaritan in the preceding case acted solely out of the goodness of his heart. But now suppose Illinois did have the laws, that the Samaritan didn't stop to aid, and that the street woman was ultimately brutally assaulted. In such case it would have been easy for jurors to say, after the fact, that the Samaritan broke the law - that is, that he clearly could have aided the woman at no unreasonable cost to himself. After all, all it would have taken, our hindsight tells us, is that the Samaritan shout "Hey Buddy, knock it off or I'm going to call the police" and perhaps stand by until the harassment subsided.

42 But, obviously, our hindsight can be wrong. Acts that seem clearly

reasonable on a statistical basis can include small risks of great harm. So what should jurors do when, in another case, it appears that the Samaritan could have prevented the harm at no significant risk to herself (especially if they focus only on the likely consequences), yet the accused Samaritan claims "I can't explain it, but my intuitions told me that it would be just too risky to intervene in this particular case"? After all, women are often encouraged to trust their senses when it comes to avoiding danger. "Better to be safe than sorry," they are told, even when being safe means being terribly rude to a innocent stranger or avoiding situations that, on a statistical basis, are extremely safe (e.g., stairwells of parking garages and elevator rides with a single stranger). And since there is no way to clarify within the criminal law when this sense of danger is legitimate, nor to prove, after the fact, that one actually had it, we are left with a dilemma. If we accept this sort of defense, then virtually anyone could escape conviction.

44 But if we don't accept it, then we

are telling people that, as a matter of law, they may not trust their own intuitions or sense of danger and must instead rely on statistical probability or, even worse, on jurors' Monday morning quarterbacking sense of danger in the reported situation.


BAD SAMARITAN LAWS WOULD EITHER BE UNFAIR OR IMPOSSIBLE TO ENFORCE

H. M. Malm “Bad Samaritan Laws: Harm, Help, or Hype?” Law and Philosophy, Vol. 19, No. 6, 2000. More generally, the preceding problems and questions expose the third main dilemma regarding assessments of risk. When determining whether the conduct needed to aid the victim would have been more than minimally risky, should jurors adopt the subjective perspective of the particular Samaritan, taking into account all her thoughts, fears, values, and beliefs, however quirky they may be (e.g., suppose she believed that one could get AIDS from giving CPR)? Or should the jurors adopt the more objective perspective of the "reasonable person" and hold persons responsible for not acting in ways that reasonably prudent people would act? Proponents of bad Samaritan laws strongly favor the latter option and note its use in other aspects of the law (e.g., negligence law).

46 And its adoption is virtually essential if we want to retain a reasonable possibility of

convicting persons for failing to aid because, were we to adopt the subjective standard, almost any accused bad Samaritan could come up with some claim, value, or belief (fabricated or not) which, were it true, would show the needed conduct was more than minimally risky in her eyes. Yet even so, there is something unsettling about adopting the reasonable person perspective with respect to duties to aid. Persons who are exceptionally timid, persons who panic, persons who have false beliefs about the risks to themselves, and even persons who have false beliefs about the need for the rescue, may all be subject to punishment for failing to perform as our hypothetical reasonable person would perform. Yet punishing them would be problematic insofar as they lacked the callous disregard for the welfare of others that is characteristic of our paradigm bad Samaritan and seems to be at the heart of moral culpability.

47 As Mclnnes notes in a different context, the

person who unreasonably perceives a significant risk to herself when no such risk is present may be stupid, but she is no more blameworthy than a person who reasonably (but mistakenly) perceives such a risk.

48 Thus,

punishment in these cases would, in essence, be punishment for being atypical, especially when the Samaritan was unable to determine ahead of time that her views were unlikely to be shared by others.


GOOD SAMARITAN DO NOT ACTUALLY WORK

Eric Brandt “Good SAMARITAN LAWS - THE LEGAL PLACEBO: A CURRENT ANALYSIS'” AKRON LAW REVIEW. Vol. 17, No. 2, 1983. At first impression the Good Samaritan concept appears to be quite wise and potentially beneficial to society. Just the opposite may be true, however. It is this author's belief that Good Samaritan laws lend no more protection from civil liability than do common law principles of negligence. The sole purpose for enacting and maintaining Good Samaritan laws has been to allay the unfounded fears of the public, and physicians in particular, in order to increase their involvement at accident and emergency scenes. This is, in essence, an attempt to achieve an end through ulterior means; an effect know to the medical profession as the "placebo effect." A placebo is a medication prescribed more for the mental relief of the patient than for its actual effect on his disorder. 2 The disorder in this case is the lawsuit and the Good Samaritan laws purport to be the curative medication. As for laypersons, the protection granted by the common law standard of negligence - the reasonable person under the circumstances - is as great as that granted by any Good Samaritan law. Some of these laws even use the same common law standard, and others merely qualify their standards of negligence with words no more denotative than those used in the common law. When a court interprets a statute's standard of conduct and applies that standard to the facts of a case it must consider all the circumstances accompany- ing the emergency situation to determine whether the rescuer's conduct has conformed to the standard. This is in actuality no different from the common law reasonable man standard.


THE PROBLEMS OF CHARITIES

IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE IF A PARTICULAR USE OF MONEY IS BEST SO THERE CAN NEVER BE A PARTICULAR OBLIGATION TO GIVE TO CHARITY John M. Whelan, Jr [Lycoming College] “FAMINE AND CHARITY” The Southern Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 29, No. 1, 1991. In moods when I am troubled by the argument above, I dimly imagine something like this: my $25 is sent to some charity and starving people get to eat $25 worth of food; my money is not sent and these people continue to starve: I imagine that my money can make this significant difference in the life of these starving people, and I wonder how, in the face of their need, I can use it to bring about small pleasures. But these thoughts are a delusion; my money cannot make that difference- No charitable organization will alter the amount of money budgeted for food because my $25 does or does not arrive. Furthermore, it is senseless to think that my money could be, so to speak, "tracked" and we could thereby determine what effect its arriving on some particular day has or lacks. Finally, charities need to pay for all sorts of things—salaries, vacations, paper, advertising, equipment, and so forth—so my $25 cannot be said to make the difference between no food or $25 worth of food for people who are starving. If I do not send my money to some charity, then that charity will have that much less money to pay for all of the things that it needs to buy; it's ability to help people who are starving will be slightly less because I will have failed to pay for a fractional share of all the kinds of things the charity buys* These considerations are enough to prove the following: I cannot send $25 to a charity and bring it about that starving people will get to eat $25 worth of food that they would not have gotten to eat otherwise; therefore, if it is objectionably selfish to eat at the more expensive restaurant, it is not because by doing so I fail to make this significant difference in the lives of the people who are starving. If there is a comparison which calls my purchase of the expensive meal into question, it is not this one. But perhaps that purchase is objectionably selfish for another reason; perhaps it is selfish because it is a failure to pay for a fractional share of everything that a reputable charity needs to buy in order to help people who are starving. In order to get a feel for what this benefit might amount to, consider CARE. In 1989 CARE USA employed approximately 7500 people in 36 developing countries- These people helped provide emergency relief assistance: flood in Bangladesh, earthquake in Armenia, hurricane in the Caribbean, drought and civil war in the Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Mozambique; CARE claims to have distributed approximately 230,000 tons of food; estimates vary about the number of people who got the food, but the number is certainly in the millions. In addition CARE employees helped vaccinate 600,000 children, helped build water systems, distributed food supplements, helped plant 29 million trees, taught farmers about safer more efficient growing techniques, helped thousands of people start and sustain small businesses, and many other things. The cost for doing all of this was $325 million. This means that each failure to contribute $25 to CARE in 1989 was a failure to increase by about one thirteen millionth the net benefit produced by CARE in that year. However, each failure to contribute $25 to charities which help people who are starving was not just a failure to contribute to CARE: it was a failure to contribute to each of the charities which do more or less what CARE does; so it was a failure to increase a much larger benefit by a much smaller fraction. Nonetheless, for my purposes it will be enough to focus on this question: is one thirteen millionth of the just described benefit significantly larger or smaller than the benefit produced by spending $25 for a more extravagant meal? In my view the answer to that question is completely obvious: it has no answer. And if I am right about this, then it follows that no purchase of mine is objectionably selfish because it is a failure to give to a charity like CARE because there is no way to make the comparison which needs to be made if any purchase is to be called into question for being a failure to give to CARE. Note: my conclusion is not that the benefit brought about by my contribution is small in relation to the benefit brought about by my purchase of the meal; my conclusion is that there is no way to make this comparison.


IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO MAKE COMPARITIVE JUDGMENTS REGARDING DONATIONS TO CHARITY

John M. Whelan, Jr [Lycoming College] “FAMINE AND CHARITY” The Southern Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 29, No. 1, 1991. Consider: someone disagrees that the benefit brought about by holding the door for someone whose arms are filled with heavy packages is more important than the exertion she would have to make to bring it about, what could I say to her? For one thing I could ask her to consider what she would want if roles were reversed. But suppose she is a self-reliant egoist ♦ ♦ . then I could ask instead which of these two things would be worse if it happened; you have to struggle through some door with your arms filled with heavy packages or you have to make the exertion necessary to open that same door (not the emotional exertion necessary to open it for someone, just the exertion necessary to open it)? The answer, I take it, is obvious. And again: which would be worse, that you have to forego the enjoyment of a Coke or that you have to continue starving? Again obvious. And now compare: which is worse, that you have to give up the pleasure of a more expensive meal or that each of the people who benefit from CARE in a year have to give up one thirteen millionth of the benefit? With respect to this last question, it seems obvious to me that we have absolutely no idea what the answer is, and no idea how to find out And this feeling of mine can be supported like this: our normal use of predicates like 'objectionably selfish* presupposes that we can confidently sort comparisons of individual well-bong into one of three categories: that x happens to A is worse than that y happens to B, or that x happens to A is better than that y happens to B, or that reasons can be given for either answer, and so we must agree that the answer is uncertain. For example, I can remember as a child arguing about whether it would be worse for someone to lose his sight or his hearing. The argument was interesting because we could think of reasons to argue both sides: it was possible to try to extend our experience; to imagine and compare. But nothing like this is even possible when what we are trying to compare is some individual benefit with the result of the following psuedo-calculation: add the roughly estimated number of benefits of a roughly "estimated" magnitude that CARE, for example, brings about in a year, then subtract the roughly estimated number of losses of the roughly "estimated" magnitude that CARE also produces in a year, divide the result by 325 million, and then multiply by the cost of the frivolous individual benefit. To call something objectionably selfish, to say that it belongs in the same category as the refusal to give a starving child money that was to buy a Coke, is to make a serious charge of immorality. If the charge is to be defensibly made, then it must be anchored in comparative judgments of well-being that almost all of us can immediately appreciate. That is why people are troubled by the (delusory) thought that the money spent on their more frivolous purchases could make a significant difference in the lives of people who are starving. And that is also why the charge cannot defensibly be made when it depends on a comparison between some individual benefit and the fractional part of a net benefit paid for by a contribution to, for example, CARE.


EMERGENCY AND CHARITABLE AID IS OFTEN ADMINISTERED WITH EXTREME INEFFICIENCY

Dambisa Moyo [International Economist and Author] and Niall Ferguson [Harvard Prof. and Historian], Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux (2009). While there are obvious and fundamental merits to emergency aid, criticism can be leveled against it as well as against charitable giving. Charities are often criticized, with some justification, for poor implementation, high administrative costs and the fact that they are on occasion coerced to do their donor government’s bidding – despite the obvious lack of relevance to a local context. For example, in 2005, the United States pledged US$15 billion over five years to fight AIDS (mainly through the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) launched in January 2003). 9 But this had strings attached. Two third of the money had to go to pro-abstinence programmes, and would not be available to any organizations with clinics that offerd abortion services or even counseling. And none months after the 2004 Asian tsunami, for whatever the reason (bureaucracy, institutional inefficiencies or the absence of suitable organizations on the ground to disburse the monies), the charity World Vision had spent less than a quarter of the US$100 million it had raised.

assisting people need

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