astrological reform, calvinism, and cartesianism: copernican astronomy in the low countries,...

E-mail address: sbroeck1 The historical and histo

0039-3681/$ - see front ma

doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2004.0

[email protected] (S. Vanden Broecke).

riographical context is provided in Westman (1994).

tter # 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

3.003

Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 35 (2004) 363–381

www.elsevier.com/locate/shpsa

Essay review

Astrological reform, Calvinism, andCartesianism: Copernican astronomy in the

Low Countries, 1550–1650

Steven Vanden Broecke

Department of the History of Science and Technology, The Johns Hopkins University, 3505 North Charles

Street, Baltimore, MD 21218, USA

The Calvinist Copernicans. The reception of the new astronomy in the Dutch Repub-

lic, 1575–1750

Rienk Vermij. Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Amster-dam, 2002, pp. xþ 433, Price EUR 49.00 hardback, ISBN 90-6984-340-4.

1. Introduction

An interesting shift has characterized the study of Copernican astronomy sincethe Second World War. From being a privileged point of departure for grandnarratives of scientific change, heliocentrism was gradually reclaimed by lovers ofhistorical detail and sceptics of philosophical globalism. This change is well reflec-ted in the textbook tradition, where Thomas Kuhn’s The Copernican revolution(1957) or Alexandre Koyre’s La revolution astronomique (1961) remain indis-pensable for a more comprehensive account of Copernicus’s legacy.1 However,Rienk Vermij’s new book on Dutch Copernicanism suggests that a reversal of per-spective is at hand. Here is a study that manages to cover almost two centuries,while simultaneously drawing on an intimidating wealth of little known primarysources.Vermij’s primary focus is not on the reception of Copernicus’s De revolutionibus.

Instead, this book traces the genesis of a uniformly ‘‘heliocentric’’ interpretation ofCopernicus’s work in the Dutch Republic between 1575 and 1750. How did the

S. Vanden Broecke / Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 35 (2004) 363–381364

sixteenth-century exception become our rule? Vermij’s answer revolves around fourhistorical configurations, which yielded the modern equation ‘‘Copernicanism=he-liocentrism’’ by the 1650s.Vermij initially argues for the existence of a common ‘‘Leiden interpretation’’ of

De revolutionibus, characterized by a strong commitment to Copernican harmonies,among Dutch scholars in the period 1575–1610. Next, he describes a two-stage dia-lectic between academics and outsiders, which initiated a ‘paradigm shift’ (p. 374)around 1650, away from the Leiden interpretation. Finding that Leiden scholarswere ‘too much the defenders of tradition’ (p. 52) to accept full heliocentrism,Vermij first turns his gaze to the assimilation of practical mathematicians in themargins of academic life. Only these mathematicians, ‘who had earlier been formedin a different way of life’ (p. 99), fully appreciated Copernican cosmography. Thesecond modification underlies the change of heliocentrism from a mathematicalinto a natural philosophical doctrine. Vermij attributes this change to ‘people with-out any formal mathematical or philosophical education’ (p. 5), claiming thatGalileo’s telescopic discoveries and 1633 trial created a broader audience for such‘‘physicalization’’. Finally, Descartes’s natural philosophy introduced these changeswithin Dutch university life. In the process, heliocentrism became the basis of aphysical rather than a mathematical discipline, thereby acquiring academic signifi-cance in its own right. This was possible because the debate on Cartesianism wastied up with the broader theological and political power struggles that pervadedDutch society in the middle of the seventeenth century. Vermij’s account drawsupon several dominant themes in the current historiography of early modernastronomy. Local interpretations of astronomical practices, disciplinary hier-archies, Renaissance aesthetics, court patronage, new natural objects and philoso-phies, have all been assigned a crucial role in shaping the history ofCopernicanism. A critical review of Vermij’s interpretive framework highlights thespecificity of the local Dutch context, while enabling us to test both traditional andmore recent approaches to the Nachleben of Copernican astronomy.

2. Heliocentrism and astrological reform

For the better part of the sixteenth century, mathematicians in the Holy RomanEmpire championed a purification of ancient astronomy. Taking their cue fromRegiomontanus, German astronomers cultivated a singular commitment to obser-vational and theoretical practices, even in comparison with the Italian professors ofastronomy.2 It seems safe to suggest that this contrast at least partially reflectedlocal differences in defining the astronomer’s ‘‘professional’’ role. While Italiancourts and universities generally respected traditional ties between astronomy andmedicine, the free cities of southern Germany and the Viennese court began to

2 See Pantin (1999), pp. 238–239. For a good example of observational practices in the wake of Regio-

montanus, see Kremer (1980).

365S. Vanden Broecke / Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 35 (2004) 363–381

grant greater disciplinary freedom to astronomy by the end of the fifteenthcentury.3

In contrast with these local differences in the kind of astronomical activity thatwas pursued, we also find considerable agreement about one of its central purposes:making reliable astrological predictions. Late medieval and Renaissance astronomycan be interpreted as a ‘‘science of the stars’’ that comprised both the study ofangular positions (‘‘science of the motions’’) and the study of astrological effects(‘‘science of judgments’’).4 The intimate connections between these ‘‘sciences’’ areclearly illustrated by the fact that the terms ‘‘astronomy’’ and ‘‘astrology’’ wereoften used interchangeably to denote either or both sub-disciplines.Beginning in the 1520s, Protestantism gave a new impetus to these astrological

interests, thus allowing Germany to maintain its astronomical pre-eminence untilthe turn of the sixteenth century. Astrological propaganda played an importantrole in legitimizing the early phases of the Lutheran revolt.5 Philipp Melanchthon’spedagogical reforms also promoted astronomy as a means to decode the divineLaw through celestial signs and omens.6 To this end, Wittenberg astronomersdeveloped a highly influential local interpretation of De revolutionibus, which madethe book palatable for academic instruction by defusing Copernicus’s disciplinaryhooliganism.7

It is against this background that the first part of Vermij’s study (focusing onLeiden University in the period 1575–1610) acquires particular significance. Itargues for the existence of a ‘‘Leiden interpretation’’ which, contrary to the ‘‘Wit-tenberg interpretation’’, emphasized the ‘‘harmonious’’ or ‘‘symmetrical’’ virtues ofCopernican heliocentrism. This claim is particularly interesting from an insti-tutional perspective: although serious appreciation of Copernican harmoniesemerged in several places in northern Europe after the 1570s, this remained a pre-dominantly courtly phenomenon. How can we explain the academic success of theLeiden interpretation?Vermij singles out three relevant factors: (1) minimal theological control over the

arts curriculum (pp. 17, 30); (2) humanist support of mathematics as ‘a key to theunderstanding of reality’ (p. 32); (3) respect for traditional moral and religiousnotions of order (p. 99). Their combined impact led to a strong local interest in theancient ‘‘Capellan’’ world system, which places Mercury and Venus (but not theearth or superior planets) in heliocentric orb. According to Vermij, Leiden scho-lars regarded the Capellan arrangement as ‘‘Copernicus lite’’: it preserved the har-monious flavour of the original, without its religious calories.These explanations are somewhat self-refuting. The combination of factors (1)

and (3) implies a contradiction that is easily resolved by Vermij’s own examples of

3 Westman (1980a); Grossing (1983); Schoner (1994); Shank (1997), pp. 268–269.4 Vanden Broecke (2003), pp. 12–19; for a similar argument using different terminology, see French

(1996).5 The classic study remains Warburg (1920). See also Zambelli (1982); Westman (1990).6 On Melanchthon’s astrology, see Caroti (1986); Pantin (1987); Kusukawa (1995).7 Westman (1975a); Barker & Goldstein (1998).


theological censorship; this rules out parameter (1). As for the second element,Vermij points out that Wittenberg humanists propagated the same ideas aboutmathematics (p. 19). So the mystery remains: what was it about the Capellan har-monies that attracted the interest of Leiden astronomers?It is noteworthy that the first two ‘‘authentic’’ depictions of the Capellan arrange-

ment both appeared in the Rhineland in 1573. One was published in an astronomicaltextbook by Valentin Naibod, professor of mathematics at Cologne.8 The other wascontained in a manuscript letter by Gerard Mercator, cosmographer to the Duke ofCleves at Duisburg.9 Moreover, both mathematicians seemed to favour an astrologi-cal reading of this new system. Consider Naibod’s earlier commentary on Alcabi-tius’s Introductorium (1560), a common astrological textbook in late medievaluniversities. In his section ‘On the nature of the planets’, Naibod exerts himself toexplain the traditional astrological virtues of planets from their size, speed, and rela-tive distance from sun and moon. Although Naibod’s discussion does not advocatethe Capellan arrangement, we encounter several suggestions that Mercury is ‘carriedaround the sun’.10 Likewise, Mercator emphasized that: ‘the stars are more nobleand beneficial as they are further removed from the centre [of the universe]’. Follow-ing this general rule, Mercator assigned supervision over the rational soul to thethree superior planets, while the Sun–Venus–Mercury and Moon–Earth systemswere responsible for the sensitive and vegetative souls respectively.11

The introduction of the Capellan system served to consolidate astrologers’claims by providing mathematical support for their accounts of celestial influence.There is ample reason to assume that these tactics were also carried over into theLeiden milieu. Joannes Heurnius, professor of medicine, urged his students to studyastrology, and specifically commended Naibod’s astrological commentary for itsstatements on planetary effects.12 Rudolf Snellius, professor of mathematics, beganto teach Aratus in 1591.13 In his subsequent edition of a unique Aratea manuscript,Hugo Grotius displayed much more enthusiasm for its astrological content thanfor its Capellan diagram.14 Willebrord Snellius used the Capellan system to sup-port his astrological reading of the 1618 comet.15 These interests were reinforcedby extensive scholarly contacts between Leiden and the Danish astronomer Tycho

8 Westman, (1975b), pp. 322–326.9 Vermij (1994).10 Naibod (1560), p. 236. For further references to the astrological work of Alcabitius, see Vanden

Broecke (2001).11 Vermij (1994), p. 237.12 Heurnius (1609), p. 168b.13 He left behind a heavily annotated edition of Aratus’s Phaenomena (3rd century B.C.), bound with

Proclus’s popular textbook De sphaera. See Molhuysen (1911–1937), Vol. 7, p. 1153.14 Grotius was one of the few astrological consultants to be contacted by the French court after the

birth of Louis XIV in 1638. Campanella and Morin were among the others. See Minois (1996), p. 358.

Grotius’s favourite part of the Aratea also appeared in a Dutch prognostication for 1640. See Salman

(1999), p. 71 n. 186.15 Nouhuys (1998), pp. 351–352, 532–536. Snellius placed the 1618 comet at essentially the same dis-

tance as Tycho’s 1577 comet.


Brahe.16 As early as 1576, Tycho acquired a copy of Naibod’s astronomical text-book.17 One year later, the Capellan system appeared in a manuscript report onthe astrological significance of the 1577 comet, where it enabled Tycho to explainthe comet’s motion and distance from the earth.18 The Capellan arrangement waslater generalized in Tycho’s famous geo-heliocentric system.19

The early defenders of the connection between planetary virtues and distances(Naibod, Mercator, Heurnius) all shared a connection with the southern universityof Louvain.20 Under the influence of Reinier Gemma Frisius (1508–1555), Louvaincame to host an influential community of mathematicians who actively emulatedtheir colleagues in the eastward parts of the Empire. However, their astrologicalactivity displayed one significant difference. The early reception of Copernicanastronomy at Louvain (1541–1555) was characterized by its lack of conformity withthe Wittenberg interpretation. Gemma publicly refused to consider geocentrictranslations of Copernicus’s theory, and actively promoted the systemic andexplanatory advantages of full heliocentrism instead.21 Gemma too specificallyemphasized Copernicus’s demonstrative approach to planetary distances and dimen-sions. This provided Louvain mathematicians with an important new tool to addressthe astrological critique of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1496), which forcefullyasserted itself in the panic surrounding the prediction of a biblical Flood in 1524.22

The Leiden adoption of the Capellan system testifies to the intricate astronom-ical networks that were woven across northern Europe in the late sixteenth cen-tury. But it was not so much a hermeneutical response to Copernicus’s Derevolutionibus, as it was part of a more general response to astrological criticism,formulated by mathematicians throughout the Low Countries.

3. Copernicanism between court and university

The most important stimulus for astrological practice came from the decen-tralization of political power in the Republic, which turned provincial and townauthorities into the most visible consumers of printed prognostications. In general,these magistrates delegated such tasks to university professors, medical doctors, orsurgeons.23 Nevertheless, there is some evidence for a strong private interest in

16 Several Leiden humanists had ample opportunity to study these innovations in the 1590s. Pontanus

was Tycho’s apprentice from 1593 until 1595, while Willebrord Snellius followed his example a few years

later. See Christianson (2000), pp. 337–339, 358–361. Accommodations were made for Janus Dousa Jr’s

imminent visit to Hven in 1595 (Dreyer, 1913–1929, Vol. 7, pp. 372, 374). Although this failed to materi-

alize, Dousa did recommend one of Tycho’s most valuable assistants, Johannes Tengnagel, in 1595. See

Christianson (2000), p. 366.17 Westman (1975b), p. 324.18 Christianson (1979), p. 136.19 Thoren (1979), p. 60.20 Vermij (2002), p. 58, dismisses this connection as largely irrelevant.21 Vanden Broecke (2003), Ch. 6; Hallyn (1998).22 Vanden Broecke (2003), Chs. 3 & 4.23 Salman (1999), p. 356.


astrological consulting among the members of the Orange dynasty. In 1571,Joannes Stadius composed a private analysis of the birth chart of Justinus of Nas-sau, son of William of Orange.24 As late as 1660, Albertine-Agnes, second daugh-ter of stadholder Frederik Hendrik, commissioned an analysis of her personalchart through Christiaan Huygens. Despite his public criticism of political predic-tions, Ismael Boulliau eagerly acquitted himself of the task.25

These examples qualify the frequent claim that the Republic never had a courtculture, and that the university dominated its scientific life.26 This is further sub-stantiated by the most well known Dutch mathematicians of this period: SimonStevin and Philips Lansbergen. Stevin publicized his Copernican ideas in the innercircle of stadholder Maurice of Nassau. Lansbergen dedicated his astronomicalwork to the provincial Estates of Zealand—despite the fact that he was neitherprofessor, doctor, nor surgeon, and found himself far removed from the academiccentres of Franeker, Groningen, Harderwijk, and Leiden.27 The constitutional sys-tem of the Republic certainly reinforced the distribution of academic standards andhierarchies throughout Dutch society; but its social universe also placed great valueon individual honour and authority.28

Stevin and Lansbergen were also the only two public defenders of ‘‘full’’ helio-centrism in the early Republic. Vermij explains their attitude by attributing idio-syncratic world-views and generation gaps, an approach that is stronglyreminiscent of Kuhn’s classic studies on The Copernican revolution (1957) and Thestructure of scientific revolutions (1962). Like Kuhn’s paradigms, however, theyraise thorny problems when we try to account for scientific change. For instance,why did Stevin and Lansbergen internalize Leiden enthusiasm for astronomicalharmonies, but not its religious qualms about heliocentrism?29

Robert Westman solved these problems by interpreting Copernicanism as a shiftwithin a common disciplinary matrix, rather than the adoption of a differentworld-view. Seen from this perspective, Copernicus and his followers emerge asdefenders of the libertas philosophandi, the mathematician’s right to propose andjustify philosophical claims.30 Westman also observed that these initial claims weremore successful outside the university, especially in the context of princely courts.Although this approach seems attractive for the Dutch Copernicans, it also invitesus to consider the local nature of the libertas philosophandi. Mario Biagioli arguedthat the courtly patron of another Copernican astronomer, Galileo Galilei, privi-

24 Vanden Broecke (2003), p. 234 n. 27.25 Nellen (1994), pp. 300–303; Salman (1999), p. 85 n. 280.26 Vermij (2002), pp. 11–15; Berkel (1998), p. 18. For a recent critique of this view, see Morke (1992).27 One must not overlook the importance of Dutch provincial and town magistrates as patrons of natu-

ral science. An excellent illustration is offered in the dedicatory letters of Petrus Forestus’s Observa-

tiones. See Heesakkers (1996).28 Morke (1992), p. 77. For the social role of university learning in the Republic, see Grafton (1988).29 Vermij attributes ‘a mechanic’s view of the universe’ to Stevin or ‘biblicism, with Hermetic and

occult elements’ to Lansbergen, but concedes that Stevin ‘may well have thought about [heliocentrism’s]

moral dimensions’ (p. 99).30 Westman (1980).


leged the ‘aesthetics of ‘‘good sport’’’ over the ‘epistemological status of theclaims’.31 By gaining the title of court philosopher, Galileo simply became a suit-able duelling partner for the Aristotelians: ‘What the Medici gave him was theright to argue with the philosophers on equal footing’.32 This analysis has receivedample criticism, which need not be rehearsed here.33

The history of Copernicanism in the Low Countries can help us to resolve thedifficulty of harmonizing court patronage with the legitimation of scientific change.Gemma Frisius, for instance, made philosophical statements only about commonlyreceived tenets of school philosophy like uniform circular motion or the need toprovide propter quid demonstrations. These topics belonged to a typically academicsymbiosis between astronomy and natural philosophy.34 Such tactics were notuncommon: already in the late Middle Ages, scholastic commentators relatedastrological effects to the ordering of the planets, thus providing an occasion forthe mutual adjustment of philosophical and mathematical claims.35 However, thistradition was substantially altered after Copernicus, when astrological concernscame to motivate higher-level choices about the adoption of astronomical models.In other words, the court astronomer’s freedom to philosophize was a function ofhis right—and obligation—to defend astrology. By the time we reach Lansbergen,these strategies also included alchemical accounts of the earth’s diurnal motion.36

As a corollary to this conclusion, we should also question the common claimthat telescopic observations in themselves propelled a physical interpretation ofCopernican astronomy, by making ‘people look at the heavens with a different eye’and allowing them to ‘wonder about the physical appearance of the things in hea-ven’ (p. 111). When Galileo published his famous observations in March 1610,Kepler did not need a telescope to accept and promote the findings of his Italiancolleague.37 Instead, he seized upon Galileo’s ability to shed new light on an exist-ing problem: the sizes and distances of planets and comets.38 The same conclusionseems to apply in the Low Countries, where Hortensius used this device to extendLansbergen’s investigations of celestial dimensions.39 The telescope provided animportant new tool, without radically altering the questions.40

31 Biagioli (1993), pp. 74–77. A similar approach was recently applied to the work of Tycho Brahe. See

Jardine (1998), pp. 55–58.32 Biagioli (1993), p. 227.33 Shank (1994); Biagioli (1996); Shank (1996). For a more general critique, see Westman (1994), p. 98.34 Vanden Broecke (2003), pp. 164–168, 181–183.35 Jardine (1982), pp. 185–186.36 Vermij (2002), pp. 92–97.37 Caspar (1959), pp. 192–198; Chevalley (1984).38 Rosen (1965), p. 22. On the telescope and knowledge of cosmic dimensions, see also Van Helden

(1985), pp. 65–76.39 On Hortensius, the ambitious epigone of Philips van Lansbergen, see Vermij (2002), pp. 126–129;

Berkel (1998), pp. 63–84; Van Helden (1985), pp. 101–104. Lansbergen only records telescopic data for

the angular size of first magnitude stars. See Lansbergen (1662), p. 72. Around 1622, he urged Isaac

Beeckman to build a telescope. See Waard (1939–1953), Vol. 2, p. 294.40 For a much broader perspective on the pre-history of the Galilean telescope, see Dupre (2002).


4. Inexcusable before God: the Calvinist Copernicans

The Copernican libertas philosophandi not only involved negotiations about theboundaries between mathematics and natural philosophy; it covered the relationbetween mathematics and theology as well. This second topic became particularlyimportant in the Dutch context, which was marked by an academic polarizationbetween Remonstrants and Contra-Remonstrants that led to the ostracization ofthe former faction at the synod of Dort (1618/1619).The work of Simon Episcopius, one of the leading Remonstrant theologians

of this period, suggests that the dimensions of the Copernican universe acquirednew meaning within the context of intra-Calvinist strife. In the course of alengthy discussion of the question why vast heavenly bodies should serve theminute bodies of man or the earth, Episcopius reproduced Philips Lansbergen’sCopernican revision of cosmic distances as evidence. Asserting the theologicalirrelevance of these astronomical differences, Episcopius emphasized that: ‘theperfection of a being is not to be calculated from its mass and quantity, but fromits worth or more excellent capacity’.41 Theologians such as Grotius or Episcopiuslegitimized this position by emphasizing man’s freedom and duty to use rightreason.42

Interestingly, Philips Lansbergen (1561–1632) displayed a similar willingness toobfuscate the boundaries between theological and intellectual virtues. After a longcareer as Calvinist minister, the Provincial Estates of Zealand awarded Lansbergenwith an annual pension, which allowed him to move to Middelburg and devote histime to a long-standing project of astronomical reform.43 Lansbergen probablymade his greatest impact, however, within the domain of Reformed theology. In1594, he published a commentary on one of the standard texts of Dutch Reformedorthodoxy, the Heidelberg Catechism, which contained a discussion of man’s natu-ral knowledge of God through innate belief and the divine order in nature. Com-pared to other commentators, Lansbergen placed an unusual emphasis on theprovidential disposition of nature. Not surprisingly, he advocated astronomy as theprivileged means to uncover this providence.44 In his Commentationes in motumterrae (1630, orig. 1629), he stated that: ‘God intended to teach us that not onlythe earth, but also the heavens were created for our benefit’. But he also specifiedthat these benefits were essentially anagogical: ‘so we would have certainty aboutpossessing the Heavens in the afterlife to the very same extent that we grasp itslaws and measures in this one’.45 Formerly the exclusive preserve of astrologicalinterests, the dimensions of the Copernican universe now became a theologicalissue as well. Even within the theological Commentationes, Lansbergen’s cosmologyserved to provide astrological explanations for the heavy snowfall and intense cold

41 Translation taken from Platt (1982), p. 235.42 Platt (1982), pp. 223–225, 234–238, 241.43 Molhuysen (1911–1937), Vol. 2, pp. 775–782; Vermij (1998); Hallyn (1997).44 Platt (1982), pp. 69–73.45 Lansbergen (1651), p. 23. On this passage, also see Redondi (1988), p. 90.


in February 1629.46 More specifically, one could argue that this convergence of dis-courses was stimulated by a shared interest in ‘‘light’’ or ‘‘illumination’’. The cel-estial economy of light was of great interest to many Copernican astronomers inthis period.47 The astronomical interests of young Kepler, for instance, were pro-foundly shaped by this topic.48

Likewise, Simon Stevin devoted the lengthiest of five arguments in favour of theCopernican system to the notion that ‘the Earth is evidently a Heavenly luminary,receiving from the Sun its light’.49 Likewise, Lansbergen used the Copernican gapbetween Saturn and the fixed stars to legitimate the idea of a ‘‘first heaven’’ wheresolar light reigned supreme. This light was instituted by God to impart its vivifyingpowers on earth, and modified by the other planets and satellites in accordancewith the specific needs of living beings. This enabled Lansbergen to connect thepredominance of solar light with the traditional astrological virtues of other cel-estial bodies.50 He then went on to identify a second heaven above Saturn, where amultitude of stars diffused a prodigious quantity of light that prepared us for theblinding light of God in the invisible third heaven.51

In the Anatomy of melancholy (1621), Robert Burton also pointed out how thismotif easily led to the assumption of a plurality of inhabited worlds, thus raisingprofound questions about God’s anthropocentric providence.52 Such implicationswere not lost upon Dutch critics of Copernican astronomy. As early as 1608, UbboEmmius decried Stevin’s notion that the earth was simply one recipient of solarlight among many others, or that the Moon might be inhabited.53 Nicolaus Muler-ius’s denunciation of the earth’s annual motion (1616) was rooted in the notion ofa plurality of worlds.54 Both Emmius and Mulerius were known for their Contra-Remonstrant sympathies, and their concerns may have been elicited by the ‘‘ration-alism’’ of Lansbergen or Episcopius.55 The latter position was somewhat remi-niscent of the Thomist ‘‘grace crowns nature’’, and therefore contradicted Calvin’smore pessimistic view that natural knowledge only served to render man inexcus-able before God.56

The combination of theological debates in the Dutch Reformed Church with alocal interest in cosmological dimensions and the celestial economy of light, trans-formed Copernican astronomy into a problem that struck at the very heart of the

46 Lansbergen (1651), p. 27.47 See Dick (1982), p. 65 [Bruno], pp. 72, 82 [Kepler], p. 86 [Digges]; Rossi (1972). Galileo’s early inter-

action with the telescope was also strongly influenced by the view that Sun, Moon, and Earth are equal

participants in the economy of solar light. See Swerdlow (1998), pp. 249–251.48 Westman (2001).49 Pannekoek & Crone (1955–1966), Vol. 3, p. 125.50 Lansbergen (1651), pp. 18, 20–26.51 Lerner (1996), Vol. 2, p. 131.52 Dick (1982), pp. 85–86.53 Brugmans & Wachter (1911–1923), Vol. 2, pp. 51–52.54 Vermij (2002), p. 51.55 Vermij (2002), p. 50.56 Platt (1982), pp. 4–5, 179. On Aquinas’s opinion, see Jenkins (1997), Ch. 5.


Reformation.57 Could man truly be regarded as inexcusable before God, if observ-ing Creation through astronomy was not enough to gain natural knowledge ofGod? Did God require something of the astronomer that the latter was ‘‘structur-ally’’ unable to give Him? Could our Creator be excused?

5. Cartesian discontinuities

According to Vermij, the 1650s marked a double discontinuity in the Dutch per-ception of Copernicanism. On the one hand, ‘the Copernican system became justthe exponent of this new [Cartesian] view of nature’ (p. 375). It was the Cartesianadoption of heliocentrism, combined with the natural philosopher’s lack of math-ematical expertise, which turned Copernicanism into a ‘definite and recognisableconcept’ (p. 5). On the other hand, theological opposition ‘turned the debate onthe system of the world into a choice between Descartes or the Bible’ (p. 187).How accurate is this assessment?

5.1. Cartesians and mathematical astronomers

The first ‘‘break’’ revolves around the notion that astronomical ‘calculations bythat time had become the field of practitioners, many of whom did not even knowLatin’ (p. 159). Although this important development did occur, Vermij does notreally explain it, and suggests a disintegration of the previous ties between human-ist learning and academic astronomy instead (p. 159).58 His diagnosis is interesting,however, because it resonates with a widely held view that Dutch mathematics inthis period was essentially ‘‘practical’’, that is, placed ‘squarely in the center of theevery-day life of Dutch society’.59

Jim Bennett forcefully challenged the historical adequacy of a divide betweenmathematical scholars and craftsmen.60 While scholars and craftsmen offered compa-rable services, their attempt to capture this in terms of ‘‘theory’’ or ‘‘practice’’ usuallyconstituted a strategy of social distinction that consciously referred to academicdidactic discourse. The implications of this simple point can be observed in theone area where mathematical astronomy mattered most: astrological predictions.In each of the three Dutch universities that existed at the beginning of the seven-

teenth century, we find mathematics professors who taught astrology and publishedastrological works. Among these teachers, Adriaan Metius (Franeker) and

57 Reijer Hooykaas clearly showed that there was no direct correlation between Copernicanism and

Remonstrant beliefs. See Hooykaas (1976), pp. 40–41. However, one can defend the weaker claim that

the events in the Reformed Church produced new theological sensibilities vis-a-vis Copernican astrologi-

cal discourse.58 The downward trajectory of Dutch academic mathematics after the second quarter of the seven-

teenth century is signaled in Berkel (1999), p. 53; Alberts et al. (1999), p. 377.59 See Berkel (1999), pp. 17–19. Berkel also connects this with the constitutional structure of the Dutch

Republic. A more extended version of this argument in Berkel (1998), pp. 11–26.60 Bennett (1986).


Nicolaus Mulerius (Groningen) fall on different sides of the distinction betweenscholars and practitioners.61 However, both men published astronomical andastrological textbooks, or planned to do so.62 Both men engaged in joint observa-tions of the skies.63 And, last but not least, both men authored extremely popularannual almanacks, which displayed the same reluctance towards astrological prog-nostications.64

Such reluctance was easily abandoned when a monstrous phenomenon such asthe 1618 comet called for interpretation. Indeed, the comet’s appearance convincedeven Willebrord Snellius (Leiden) to publish an astronomical description cumastrological reading. Snellius was a strong advocate of the latter project, but simul-taneously emphasized the inadequacy of contemporary astrology, which neededfirmer grounding in natural philosophy and teratology. Indeed, Snellius’s parallaxresults, Capellan cosmology, and discovery of an occult moving power in the Sun,were presented as progenitors of this future astrological art.65 Only one yearearlier, however, Mulerius published similar ideas as improvements upon theastronomical art. In his commentary on Copernicus’s De revolutionibus I.10,Mulerius accepted Tycho’s claim that the heavens were ‘most rare and liquid’, andnot filled with ‘real or solid orbs’. Concomitant questions about celestial motorswere solved with Kepler’s theory of a magnetic solar virtue.66

These observations suggest that Dutch academic ‘‘astronomers’’ interpreted theirdiscoveries as both astronomical and astrological events. But this double meaningwas gradually affected by new boundaries between public and private discourse;academic astrology only came to enter public discourse under exceptional circum-stances.67 But public innovations in astronomy and celestial physics were con-sidered a legitimate means to compensate for the absence of regular astrologicalresults, as Snellius’s contribution makes clear.68 Not surprisingly, this phenomenoncorrelates nicely with patterns of academic authorship of almanacks. Leiden Uni-versity never played a significant role in the Dutch almanack trade.69 Professors atGroningen only remained actively involved until c. 1650, while the names of Frane-ker academics appear throughout the seventeenth century.70 Seen from this per-spective, it matters little who qualifies as ‘‘theoretician’’ or ‘‘practitioner’’. Muchmore important is the fact that practitioners such as Snellius or Mulerius investedconsiderable effort in the theory of their discipline. Theorica formed an important

61 For the distinction betweenMulerius–theoretician andMetius–practician, see Vermij (2002), pp. 45, 56.62 Jorink (1997), pp. 77–78; Thorndike (1923–1958), Vol. 8, pp. 54–55, 134.63 Jorink (1997), p. 81.64 Salman (1999), pp. 49, 60–61.65 Nouhuys (1998), pp. 532–536.66 Mulerius (1617), pp. 22–23.67 One could suggest that a clear distinction between astronomy and astrology, or between motions and

judgments, was a by-product of these changing boundaries.68 Elsewhere, I argued that a similar pattern emerged in the Southern Netherlands around 1540. See

Vanden Broecke (2003), pp. 137–146.69 Salman (1997), p. 121.70 Salman (1997), p. 187 ff.


trust-seeking tool in a society that placed great stock in academic and—for the time

being—astrological expertise.This may also provide us with the missing historical link between Copernican

astronomy and Cartesian physics. Against Vermij, who denies the existence of such

a link, I suspect that Descartes’s teacher Isaac Beeckman prepared a successful

integration of astrology, Copernican astronomy, and mechanical philosophy. Con-

sider the detailed weather observations that Beeckman kept from November 1612

until March 1615, and which he even managed to supplement with comparativematerial from Montauban in 1613.71 In 1628, the magistrate of Dordrecht built an

observation tower for Beeckman, where his weather observations ‘could be com-

pared to the heavens’, and to a ‘variety of [other] observers’ that would ‘reveal the

physical causes better and more extensively’.72 With this astro-meteorological

enterprise, Beeckman continued a tradition that was introduced in the Low Coun-

tries by Louvain astronomers of the 1540s, with the intention of reconstructing

astrological physics.73

This last goal was also served by Beeckman’s cosmological speculations. In 1616,he attributed geocentrism to the action of the ‘‘virtues’’ of planets and fixed

stars, which balanced each other at the center of the earth. Immediately after this,

Beeckman added that heliocentrism could be explained in a similar manner, but on

the assumption that the earth and other planets have a different nature than the

fixed stars and the Sun, and hence cannot be affected by their virtues. In

this arrangement, only the Sun could exert its powers on the planets, repelling

them in accordance with their proper size and nature.74 This interpretation mir-

rored Lansbergen’s approach to celestial light: heliocentrism was supported by a

distinction between solar and stellar light, and consequently also between theplanets (illuminated by the Sun) and the fixed stars (self-luminous). Not surpris-

ingly, Beeckman linked celestial ‘‘powers’’ and ‘‘light’’ in his conclusion to these

speculations:

The power of stars [i.e., planets] is not pure light, unlike the splendor of the Sun

. . . but a productive substance, mixed with light, that brings forth all virtues

and souls among us.75

There is a stark contrast between these positive statements on the nature of

celestial ‘‘light’’/‘‘power’’, and Beeckman’s general lack of commitment on theissue of world systems.76 Beeckman famously combined his account with one

important new element: a causal narrative of atomic matter in motion that aimed

at sidestepping theological complications. It should be clear, however, that this

71 Waard (1939–1953), Vol. 1, p. xxxvi.72 Ibid., Vol. 3, p. 85.73 Vanden Broecke (2003), Ch. 7.74 Waard (1939–1953), Vol. 1, pp. 100–101.75 Ibid., p. 101.76 Berkel (1983), p. 163.


‘‘physico-mathematics’’ simultaneously extended local traditions of astrologicalreform.These local developments shed new light on the curious presentation of Cartesian

cosmology in Book III of the Principia philosophiae (1644). Descartes urged hisreaders to apply the ‘‘light of reason’’ to God’s creation, but also warned them notto think that all things were created for man’s direct use. Now stripped of Calvinistanagogy, this attitude was still very similar to Lansbergen’s ‘‘rationalism’’, andDescartes’s next step only reinforced the connection. As the basis for the effects heset out to describe, Descartes produced a historia that consisted of heliocentriccosmic distances, the restriction of self-luminosity to the Sun and fixed stars, andthe ontological connection between earth and planets.77 This narrative undoubtedlyfacilitated a seamless integration of the Cartesian vortices in the Dutch tradition ofheliocentric astrological reform. Traces of a similar approach appear in HenricusRegius’s homespun variety of Cartesian physics, which integrated the Cartesianvortices in a ‘‘three heavens’’ theory that was strongly reminiscent of Lansbergen.78

It also explains Kirchmaier’s report of an astrological reading of the work ofJohannes de Raey, the main defender of Cartesianism at Leiden.79

These views evoke an interpretation of Cartesianism as a natural-philosophicalsystem, designed to support ‘‘vocational’’ natural disciplines such as medicine andmathematics.80 It is no surprise, then, that mathematical astronomers appealed tothe new system when they defended Copernicanism. In virtually any of these cases,however, the higher authority of theology was tacitly implied. A full two yearsbefore the publication of Descartes’s Principiae, Voetius’s protege Jacob Ravens-berg linked Copernicanism with Cartesian vortices, while yielding to the ultimateauthority of the theologians. Likewise, it was only after theologians such as JacobDu Bois criticized the religious credentials of Copernicanism, that Daniel Lipstorpor Christoph Wittichius adopted Cartesian physics in support of the earth’s motion(1653).81 From that point onwards, however, Copernicanism also ceased to be thecentral topic of this debate.82

This suggests that the connection between Dutch Copernicanism and Cartesian-ism was hardly essential. Indeed, the astronomical scepticism of Cartesians andanti-Cartesians indicates that they were more concerned to commit to an academic

77 Adam & Tannery (1964–1976), Vol. 8.1, pp. 80–84.78 Regius (1646), p. 55.79 Thorndike (1923–1958), Vol. 7, p. 559.80 Verbeek (1992), pp. 84–85.81 Before the debate erupted, the theologian Wittichius also taught mathematics (1651). See Molhuysen

(1911–1937), Vol. 10, p. 1233. Lipstorp became court mathematician at Weimar in 1653. See Vermij

(2002), p. 142. In accordance with common seventeenth-century usage, Lipstorp adopted the category of

‘‘physico-mathematics’’ in his Copernican discourse to blur the boundaries between natural philosophy

and mathematics (while leaving the validity of theological reservations intact).82 Copernican astronomy was not even mentioned when Petrus van Mastricht, Voetius’s successor at

Utrecht, joined the debate against Wittichius in 1655. See Vermij (2002), pp. 260–261. Likewise, Witti-

chius’s reply of 1656 ‘says hardly a word on the question at hand, i.e. the motion of the earth’, accord-

ing to Vermij (2002), p. 264. But was the motion of the earth really the central topic of debate?


disciplinary hierarchy than to a specific set of ‘‘world-views’’.83 It may be moreuseful to describe Dutch Cartesianism as a catalyst for disciplinary tensions withinthe structure of the medieval university.84

After 1650, the status of almanack authorship took a final downward turn inmost regions of the Dutch Republic.85 This was probably related to an importantboom in prophetic treatises, almanacks, and prognostications in 1652, and to thegeneral unrest that surrounded the eclipse of 11 August 1654.86 From this pointonwards, prominent mathematicians either abandoned the almanack business orrestricted themselves to the calculation of astronomical ephemerides. Once again,this forged new links between natural philosophy and Copernican astronomy. Butwhile the Amsterdam mathematician Dirk Rembrandtz van Nierop embraced Car-tesianism, the Franeker professor Johannes Holwarda preferred to develop a philo-sophia novantiqua. Despite the dwindling interest in astronomy at Dutchuniversities, Cartesian natural philosophy did not monopolize Dutch Copernican-ism after 1650.87

5.2. Descartes vs. the Bible

Did (mutatis mutandis) anti-Copernicanism boil down to biblical literalism? InDecember 1641, the Utrecht theologian Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1676) launched anall-out attack against Copernican astronomy, in which he claimed that the model(1) contradicted revealed Scriptural truth, and (2) opposed the natural light of rea-son.88 Perhaps as a result of overexposure to standard narratives about the Galileotrial, most historians tend to emphasize the first type of accusation when dealingwith the relation between early modern science and religion.89 I previously argued,however, that Dutch theological debates gave an equally strong impetus to thesecond concern. On the evening of the Synod of Dort (1618), a Contra-Remonstrant list of heterodox doctrines listed exactly one Remonstrant offenceagainst the ‘‘knowledge of our Creator’’: ‘It is in no way possible to have knowl-edge of God without supernatural revelation’.90 We have seen how these transgres-sions became linked with Dutch Copernicanism in the first decades of theseventeenth century. This clarifies why Voetius’s public critique of heliocentrismwas initiated in the context of his anti-Remonstrant polemics (pp. 162–163). It alsoexplains Voetius’s interpretation of the geocentric passage in Ps. 19:6, which:

83 Among the academics that Vermij discusses, I encountered theologically informed astronomical scep-

ticism with Ravensberg, Regius, Heereboord, De Bruyn (Cartesians), De Vries, and Annesley (anti-Car-

tesians).84 See Westman, (1980b), pp. 90–93.85 See Salman (1997).86 See Dupont-Bouchat, Frijhoff, & Muchembled (1978), p. 274; Labrousse (1974).87 See Vermij (2002), pp. 192–197; Berkel (1999), pp. 46–47.88 See Verbeek (1988), pp. 100–101.89 The most recent example of this emphasis on biblical exegesis is Howell (2002). For a notable excep-

tion, see McGahagan (1976), pp. 170–171.90 Platt (1982), p. 111.


Leads us from the Book of Nature and the works of God, to knowledge of ourCreator and in that way inspires piety.91

For Voetius, this text offered geocentric language and a divine exhortation towardsthe practice of natural theology. Unlike most Remonstrants and Socinians, he readit as a statement on how to go to heaven, as well as how the heavens go. The factthat Voetians held on to this position after Copernicans adopted Cartesian naturalphilosophy in their defense, clearly illustrates its importance. In 1655, Petrus vanMastricht, Voetius’s successor at Utrecht, interpreted Descartes as someone whorejects ‘received arguments to prove God from nature’ (p. 260). According to VanMastricht, Cartesians supplemented this with a philosophical analysis that contra-dicts Scriptural statements. The anti-Cartesianism of the Voetian faction, like theiropposition to Copernicanism, cannot be reduced to biblical literalism. Both cri-tiques revolved around a much older and more complex problematic: the relationbetween natural knowledge and salvation.92 This involved not only exegeticalissues, but also questions about skepticism, natural causality, and divine provi-dence.93 Gisbertus Voetius interlaced these issues in a sophisticated ecclesiologicalvision, as Thomas McGahagan has demonstrated.94 This also makes it unlikelythat ‘[two parties] were not quarrelling because they had a disagreement, but . . .created a disagreement because they had a quarrel’ (p. 7).

6. Conclusion

Using the Low Countries as my example, I argued for an interpretation of theCopernican model that emphasizes historical continuity, even across the ‘‘paradigmshift’’ away from Ptolemaic astronomy. Such continuity becomes apparent only byapproaching early modern astronomy on its own terms, that is, by acknowledgingits disciplinary symbiosis with astrology. This strategy reveals how the heliocentricdetermination of cosmic dimensions functioned as a prop for astrological claims.Such features were particularly attractive in the courtly and provincial context ofthe Low Countries, which placed great stock in astrological expertise while heedingthe devastating echoes of Giovanni Pico’s anti-astrological Disputationes (1496).Astrological and astronomical concerns initially overlapped in the Copernican

theorica itself. However, by the early seventeenth century, this common domain alsocame to include questions about the nature of heavenly motors and the celestialeconomy of light. Spurred on by scholastic traditions in natural theology and a localcontext of intra-confessional strife, these novel questions in turn built new bridgesbetween astrological and theological discourse. Contrary to most historicalaccounts, we found that biblical exegesis was not the only, and perhaps not even the

91 Quotations taken from Ruler (1995), pp. 15, 17.92 Verbeek (1992), p. 6.93 Ruler (1995), pp. 271–277.94 McGahagan (1976), pp. 31–104.


main reason to appropriate Copernican astronomy in a religious context. The Dutchevidence suggests that natural theology may have enjoyed some priority in this.The introduction of the telescope in observational practice did not fundamen-

tally alter this basic pattern. But neither did the adoption of Cartesian naturalphilosophy in pedagogical contexts. Instead, we found evidence for a specificallyDutch approach that linked the mechanical philosophy with the aforementionedcluster of astrological concerns. This makes it less surprising that Cartesian physicsand Copernican astronomy did not close ranks until either theological suspicionswithin the academic hierarchy, or the diminishing status of astrological authorshipforced them do so. Although this pattern became more forceful after the middle ofthe seventeenth century, it did not provoke the sudden extinction of mathematicalastronomy or alternative philosophical contexts.There is little need to invoke Kuhnian paradigm shifts to describe the changes in

Dutch Copernicanism around 1650. Instead, our analysis revealed a number ofstable concerns that were simultaneously operational within astronomy, astrology,natural philosophy, and theology. Pace Vermij, the Copernican system was notsimply ‘an icon’, ‘a shibboleth’, or ‘a symbol of the new’ (p. 375).

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