Working Paper

By

Peter W. Connors, PhD

8165906821

COALITION EFFORTS TO LEGITIMIZE THE NEW IRAQI GOVERNMENT

Introduction and Background

The years 2005 and 2006 were demanding times for Coalition Forces in Iraq. The

election of a Transitional National Assembly and Provincial Councils, the writing of a

new constitution, a national constitutional referendum, the Council of Representatives

election, the naming of Nouri al-Maliki as Prime minister and the appointment of his

cabinet, the rise of Sunni-Shia sectarian violence, the numerous attempts at national

reconciliation, the Sunni awakening, and the prelude to the “troop surge” all took place

within this timeframe. This chapter will review in detail each of these governance-related

accomplishments and occurrences, as well as Multi-National Force-Iraq’s efforts to set

the conditions for successful elections, to integrate legitimacy and democratic principles

into all levels of Iraqi government, to help build institutions, and to improve the daily

lives of everyday Iraqi citizens across the country. The United States’ strategic objective

in OIF was for Iraq to be unified, democratic, and federal, and be capable of governing,

defending, and sustaining itself in order to ultimately become an ally in the war on

terror.1 Thus, vigorously pursuing MNF-I’s key governance line of operations and

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helping Iraqis legitimize their new government was paramount in the minds of MNF-I

Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines during 2005 and 2006.2

At its 4,987th meeting on 4 June 2004, the United Nations Security Council

adopted Resolution 1546 which authorized full sovereignty for the Interim Government

of Iraq and ushered in a new phase in Iraq’s transition to democracy. The Resolution

reiterated the right of the Iraqi people to determine their own political future and set forth

a timetable for electing a Transitional National Assembly (TNA), forming a transitional

government, drafting a permanent constitution, and establishing a constitutionally elected

Parliament. Annexed to Resolution 1546 was a memorandum from United States

Secretary of State, Colin L. Powell, acknowledging Iraq’s request for the continued

presence of Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) to maintain security, deter terrorism,

facilitate reconstruction, and assist the Iraqi people in their transition to democracy.3

As a key component of full spectrum operations, fostering effective governance in

Iraq had always been a top priority for Coalition forces. In the summer of 2003, CJTF-7

commander, Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, declared Governance one of four lines

of operations in his campaign plan. The 4th Infantry, 82d Airborne, and 1st Cavalry

Divisions followed suit, proclaiming governance a key “pillar” of their respective plans

of operation. When General George Casey assumed command of MNF-I in June 2004,

he reaffirmed the critical nature of good governance, particularly in a society heretofore

unfamiliar with the democratic process. Casey considered creating a secure environment

for the January 2005 TNA elections his most significant mission and credited the goals

and objectives outlined in UN Resolution 1546 with providing critical guidance.4

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Summary of Key Events Leading to Democracy in Iraq

On 20 March 2003, President George W. Bush declared war on Iraq and the United

States launched Operation Iraqi Freedom the next day. By 9 April, Baghdad had fallen

and Lieutenant General (Ret) Jay Garner and his Organization for Reconstruction and

Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) arrived shortly thereafter to assume administrative

responsibility for post-war Iraq. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) under the

leadership of L. Paul Bremer, U.S. Presidential Envoy and Administrator in Iraq,

succeeded ORHA in May. Bremer quickly issued two controversial CPA Orders – No. 1

disbanding the Baath Party and No. 2 dissolving the Iraqi Armed Forces. Later that

month, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1483 that lifted

economic sanctions against Iraq and officially acknowledged the U.S.-led administration

in the country. Next, Bremer appointed a 25 member Iraqi Interim Governing Council

(IGC) that was inaugurated in July. As the year ended, an agreement was reached

between the United States and the IGC to transfer sovereignty to an Iraqi interim

government by 30 June 2004 and former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein was captured

by U.S. forces near his hometown of Tikrit.5

The Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), Iraq’s interim constitution, was

approved by the IGC in March 2004. The TAL specified a system of checks and

balances and the subordination of the military to civilian rule, as well as an Iraqi bill

rights.6 In June, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1546 that appointed an

interim government in Iraq and authorized continued U.S. military presence in the

country; the IGC dissolved; and the U.S. transferred power to the 33-member Iraqi

Interim Government (IIG), led by newly-designated Prime Minister Iyad Allawi. During

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the remainder of 2004, the IIG concentrated on preparations for the 275-member national

assembly and provincial council elections, which took place as scheduled on 30 January

2005. Fifty-eight percent of eligible Iraqis voted despite a Sunni boycott, and the United

Iraq Alliance, a Shia coalition, won a majority of assembly seats. Jalal Talabani and

Ibrahim al-Jaafari were selected president and prime minister, respectively, in April.

Over the spring and summer, assembly delegates negotiated the terms and conditions of

the new Iraqi constitution. The Iraqi electorate then ratified the proposed permanent

constitution by a 79% majority in a referendum vote on 15 October. In what became the

third national election of the year, Iraqis voted once again in December – this time to

select members of a new parliament (the Council of Representatives or CoR) to four-year

terms of office. This time, more than 50% of Sunnis participated, violence at the poles

was minimal, and the United Iraqi Alliance won 128 of the 275 total seats.7

Efforts to form a national unity government in Iraq were deadlocked, however, for

nearly four months until 22 April 2006, when Shia compromise candidate, Nuri al-

Maliki, was nominated and approved as the new prime minister. Sectarian violence

continued to escalate during the remainder of 2006, prompting the bipartisan Iraq Survey

Group to declare the situation in Iraq as grave and deteriorating and to call for a change

of U.S. policy. In January 2007, President Bush announced his own revised strategy for

Operation Iraqi Freedom. Entitled The New Way Forward in Iraq, the President’s plan

directed the deployment of additional 21,500 U.S. troops (the surge) to provide increased

security for the citizens of Baghdad and Anbar province and exhorted the new Iraqi

government to vigorously pursue reconciliation initiatives and to improve delivery of

essential services.8

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Partnership and Understanding - Overview of the MNF-I Governance LOO

As with the CJTF-7 campaign plan, governance was one of the lines of operation

for MNF-I beginning in 2004. Establishing a secure environment, fostering Iraqi self-

reliance, and legitimizing Iraq’s new government were all key elements of the MNF-I

strategy. In accordance with U.N. Resolution 1546, creating safety and security in

advance of the January 2005 Iraqi TNA elections was a primary Coalition objective,

followed subsequently by a major effort to promote the new Assembly’s legitimacy in the

eyes of Iraqi citizens. Coalition forces, who were initially liberators, then occupiers,

would now move on to become supporters, protectors, and partners with Iraqis as the

December 2005 Parliamentary elections approached. MNF-I, whose headquarters was at

Camp Victory near BIAP, established MNF-I (Fwd) at the presidential palace in the

International Zone, downtown Baghdad, to further enhance engagement and cordial

relations with Iraqi officials and to assist them with various democracy issues, such as the

rules of law, tribal concerns, provincial and local governance, Sunni/Shia reconciliation,

reconstituting working-level bureaucracies, and becoming self-sufficient in conducting

their own affairs. MNF-I (Fwd) was staffed with strategic planners, policy experts, and

STRATCOM and Civil/Military officers, and was led by MNF-I’s Deputy Commanding

General, British Army Lieutenant General Sir John Kiszely.

By the end of 2005, Iraq’s 18 Provincial Councils, that were powerless under

Saddam’s authoritarian regime, were now up and running, along with 90 District

Councils, 194 city or sub-district councils, 437 neighborhood councils, and 660 Iraqi

community associations supporting grassroots democracy.9 General Casey encouraged

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MNF-I Soldiers to view the constitutional referendum and parliamentary elections with a

sense of irreversible momentum pushing the Iraqi people forward on the road to

democracy. He also called for joint efforts with the U.S. Embassy to reach out to Sunni

Arab countries for support of the constitutional and political process in Iraq. As a

supplement to the official MNF-I campaign plan, Casey further set the conditions for

post-election success in Iraq by outlining a seven-point plan to defeat foreign fighters,

secure Iraq’s borders, build ministerial capacity, transfer security responsibilities to the

ISF, refine Iraq’s justice system, provide adequate funding for reconstruction, redefine

the MNF-I mandate, and sustain the Coalition. Continued stability, however, was still the

bedrock issue in Iraq and crucial to Iraqi’s successful completion of the political

process.10

MNF-I Support of the January 2005 Iraqi National Assembly Election

During the summer and fall of 2004, the insurgency in Iraq continued to escalate.

U.S. forces and the Iraqi government became increasingly concerned that insurgent-held

areas would not be pacified prior to the January 2005 elections. A series of successful

offensive operations, however, carried out by a combined force of U.S. and Iraqi

Soldiers, sent a powerful message to both insurgents and Iraqi citizens alike that the

Interim Government would not tolerate interference with the upcoming national

elections. Nevertheless, a limited amount of election-related violence continued

throughout the country, prompting the Iraqi Islamic party, the largest mainstream Sunni

Muslim party, to withdraw from the race in late December.11 Despite the dissention,

Prime Minister Allawi dismissed the notion of postponement and insisted that the

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elections would go ahead as planned on 30 January 2005. In a similar demonstration of

support, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani proclaimed in a fatwa that all Iraqi citizens had a

duty to vote in the upcoming elections. Sunnis, on the other hand, discouraged

participation in the voting, apparently fearing retribution from the majority Shiites if they

gained political power.12 And on January 23rd, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, in an effort to

dissuade Iraqi citizens from voting, released an internet recording declaring a bitter war

against democracy and all those who seek to enact it. Zarqawi went on to denounce the

Interim Iraqi Government “as a tool used by the Americans to promote the lie that is

called democracy.”13

In further anticipation of the January elections, MNF-I took steps to increase

combat power in Iraq to help maintain security. Additional U.S. forces were quickly

deployed to Iraq and several units, already there, had their tours extended until after the

election. In all, the pre-election force in Iraq increased by nearly 12,000 Soldiers,

Marines, and British Royal Highland Fusiliers. Iraqi police and military forces assumed

primary polling-site security duty, while significant numbers of U.S. troops patrolled the

streets and waited behind-the-scenes, ready to provide immediate backup whenever

necessary.14

As insurgent violence continued, officials from the Independent Electoral

Commission announced the closing of Iraq’s international borders in an effort to tighten

security.15 Less than a week later, Iraq’s government proclaimed an 8pm to 6am

nationwide curfew, restricted election day driving to officials only, prevented traveling

between provinces, banned weapons, cancelled all leave for Iraqi police and military

forces, declared January 29-31 holidays, and announce closure of Baghdad International

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Airport for three days during the election.16 On election day, Iraqi police and military

forces assumed primary polling-site security duty, while significant numbers of U.S.

troops patrolled the streets and waited behind-the-scenes, ready to provide immediate

backup whenever necessary.17

Election Day in Iraq – 30 January 2005

Although 45 Iraqis were killed in violence on election day, the anticipated rise in

insurgent attacks never fully materialized. By day’s end, an estimated 8.4 million

citizens had voted, representing a surprising 60% turnout. Along with the 275

representatives who were elected from 111 political parties to the Transitional National

Assembly, provincial councils were established in each of the 18 provinces and a new

Kurdish legislature was elected. 140,000 election workers and 6,000 organizing officials

had worked tirelessly at 5,000 polling places to make this historic election day a

remarkable success. In many instances, Iraqis had to wait in long line to cast their votes.

Most were proud to do so.

There was dancing in the streets, and Baghdad took on the air of a carnival town.

“It’s like a wedding. I swear to God, it’s a wedding for all Iraq. No one has ever

witnessed this before, no one has ever seen anything like. And we did it ourselves,”

proclaimed Mohammed Nuhair Rubaie from Baghdad’s Tunis neighborhood.18 Hamid

Azawi raised his purple finger so everyone could see and said, “Whatever they do, I

would still vote. Even if I were dead, I would still participate. The vote comes from the

bottom of my heart.”19 After casting his vote, Prime Minister Allawi addressed the sense

of hope that those who had voted were now feeling when he noted, “This is the starting

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point on the path to democracy, rule of law, prosperity, and security for Iraq and the

entire region.”20

In a show of pride, Iraqi citizens continued to display their ink-stained fingers for

several days after the election. At the U.S. State of the Union address in Washington the

following week, members of Congress dyed their own index fingers purple as a show of

support for the Iraqi people and their successful election. President Bush had closely

followed the Iraqi election returns. He would later compliment those who had voted.

“For millions of Iraqis, it was an act of personal courage,” he said, “and they have earned

the respect of us all.”21

Although the majority of Sunni Arabs had boycotted, and the insurgents had

threatened widespread attacks, and many Iraqis had thought that Americans would

manipulate the vote, the 2005 election was, nonetheless, an enormous achievement. The

election’s success was not without cost however. One U.S., 10 British, and eight Iraqi

Soldiers, along with 26 Iraqi civilians, were killed on election day. In all, 260 insurgent

attacks occurred (four times the daily average) throughout Iraq in an effort to disrupt

election procedures.22

Iraqi Legislative Election Results

On February 13, 2005, after nearly two weeks of counting the votes, the

Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI) announced the results. One hundred

eleven electoral alliances had candidates running in the election and 8.55 million Iraqi

citizens had voted. Only about a dozen alliances received sufficient votes to earn seats in

the 275-member Transitional National Assembly. The Assembly’s first order of business

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was to choose a three-person presidential council, a president and two deputies, that

would appoint a prime minister. Drafting a new Iraqi constitution was to be the

Assembly’s next immediate undertaking.23

As was expected, Iraq’s majority Shiites won nearly half (4.1M / 48.2 %) of the

votes – enough to control 140 of the 275 Assembly seats. The United Iraqi Alliance

(UIA), also known as “the Shia house,” “the clerics’ list,” or the “list of 169,” fielded a

slate of 228 Shiite political candidates and was tacitly supported by Grand Ayatollah Ali

al-Sistani.24 The UIA consisted of three separate electoral alliances: the Supreme Council

for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) led by Shiite cleric Abdel al-Hakim, the Dawa

Party headed by Interim Vice President Ibrahim al-Jaafari, and the Iraq National

Congress (INC) whose leader was Ahmed Chalabi.25

The Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan won the second-largest bloc of

votes (2.2M / 25 %), thereby earning 75 Assembly seats. These favorable results

enhanced the Kurdish alliance’s chances of preserving autonomy in northern Iraq. Two

principal sub-parties made up the Kurdish alliance: the Kurdistan Democratic Party and

the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan led, respectively, by Sunni Kurds Massoud Barzani and

Jala Talabani.26 U.S.-supported interim Prime Minister Ayad Allawi and his Iraq List

party came in third place (1.2M / 14 %), while the Sunni Arab alliance, The Iraqis, led by

Interim President Ghazi al-Yawar, was fourth (150,680 votes / 1.8 %).27

The Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq followed principles of the Hare

System of Proportional Representation in establishing guidelines for the January Iraqi

elections. This system, also known as “single transferable vote”, was developed by

British attorney Thomas Hare in the 19th century, and insures equal representation among

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the electorate in direct proportion to numerical strength.28 Consequently, Iraqi women

turned out to vote in higher-than-expected numbers since approximately 25 % of the seats

in the Transitional National Assembly had been reserved for them. Surprisingly,

Ayatollah Sistani issued a Fatwa encouraging women to vote even if their husbands

disapproved.29

1 DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, Report to Congress, March 2007, 1.2 Lieutenant General John Vines, interview by Contemporary Operations Studies Team, 30 & 31 July 2008, 23; Major General Rick Lynch, “MNF-I Operational Update-22 December 2005,”5. http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index2.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2046&pop=1&page=0&Itemid=128 (accessed 17 September 2008) 3 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1546, 8 June 2004, 1-3, 10. http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/381/16/PDF/N0438116.pdf?OpenElement (accessed 14 May 2008).4 Donald Wright and Timothy Reese, On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute, 2008), 401-405, 419. 5 Hussein Hassan, “Iraq: Milestones since the Ouster of Saddam Hussein,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 19 June 2007, 1-6. www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS22598.pdf (accessed 19 May 2008).6 L. Paul Bremer, interview by Dr. Peter Connors, 20 April 2006, Bethesda, MD, 11.7 Kenneth Katzman, “Iraq: Elections, Government, and Constitution,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 15 June 2006, 6. 8 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet: The New Way Forward in Iraq,” 10 January 2007, 1-3. www.whitehouse.gov/ new s/releases/2007/01/20070110-3.html (accessed 24 June 2008).9 Multi-National Force-Iraq, “Operation Iraqi Freedom Three Year Anniversary Progress Fact Sheet,” 23 March 2006, 2. www.defenselink.mil/pubs/word_docs/MNF-I%20Fact%20Sheet%20OIF.doc (accessed 6 June 2008); Multi-National Force-Iraq, “MNF-I Year in Review (2005),” unpublished document on file at the U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute, 30 November 2005, 6.10 Multi-National Force-Iraq, “Planning Guidance for Making Elections Decisive,” unpublished document on file at the U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute, 11 August 2005, 1.11 Karl Vick, “Sunni Party Pulls Out of Iraqi Vote as Doubts Grow,” Washington Post Foreign Service, 28 December 2004, A01.12 Mohamad Bazzi, “Iraq Insurgents in Bid to Rock Religious Relations,” Newsday.com (14 January 2005): 1-2. www.newsday.com/news/nationworld/world/ny-woinsu0114,0,2528582.story?coll=ny-top-headlines (accessed 6 January 2007).13 David Ensor,, Octavia Nasr, Cal Perry, Auday Sadik, and Mohammad Tawfeeq, “Purported al-Zarqawi Tape: Democracy a Lie,” CNN.com (23 January 2005): 1-3. www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/01/23/iraq.main/ (accessed 6 january 2007).14 Rory McCarthy, “US Marines Put On Alert as More Die and Polling Stations Bombed,” The Guardian (28 January 2005): 1-3.15 Adam Jay, “Iraq to Close Borders During Elections,” The Guardian (18 January 2005): 1-4.16 Rory McCarthy, “New Curfew After 15 Iraqi Soldiers are Shot Dead,” The Guardian (23 January 2005): 1-3.17 Rory McCarthy, “US Marines Put On Alert as More Die and Polling Stations Bombed,” The Guardian (28 January 2005): 1-3.18 Anthony Shadid, “Iraqis Defy Threats as Millions Vote,” Washington Post Foreign Service (31 January 2005): A01.

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Iraqi women took their new role seriously. “If anybody thinks we’re just going to

be ornaments in the Assembly,” said Raja al-Khuzai, one of the country’s leading women

politicians, “they’re fooling themselves.”30 In Baghdad on election day, housewife

Amina Hussein exclaimed “It’s a big day, and I want my girls to experience it,” as she

and her husband tried to subdue three giggling preteen daughters at a voting booth in the

downtown Karrada district. “When they are older, God willing, they will vote in many

elections. But this is the one they will never forget,” Amina declared proudly.31

After the successful election, most Iraqis were cautiously optimistic about the

future of their country. Many, however, felt as did Karim al-Saadi, an electrical-goods

salesman from the rough-and-tumble Washash district. “The government that is born on

January 30 will be judged by how it succeeds with important things.” He defined them as

“security, jobs…and getting the Americans out of our country.”32

19 Anthony Shadid, “Iraqis Defy Threats as Millions Vote,” Washington Post Foreign Service (31 January 2005): A01.20 Anthony Shadid, “Iraqis Defy Threats as Millions Vote,” Washington Post Foreign Service (31 January 2005): A01.21 Aparisim Ghosh, “A Vote for Hope,” Time (14 February 2005): 35.22 “Can the Voters Build on Success?” The Economist (5 February 2005): 43-44.23 Anthony Shadid and Doug Struck, “Shiite Slate Wins Plurality in Iraq,” Washington Post Foreign Service (14 February 2005): A01.24 “Iraq’s Election – Sectarian Riddles” The Economist (12 February 2005): 46.25 “Who Won: United Iraqi Alliance,” CBSNews.com (accessed 12 July 2006): http://www.cbsnews.com/elements/2005/01/24/iraq/whoswho668877_0_2_person.shtml26 “Who Won: Kurdish Alliance List,” CBSNews.com (accessed 12 July 2006): http://www.cbsnews.com/elements/2005/01/24/iraq/whoswho668877_0_3_person.shtml27 “Who Won: The Iraqi List,” CBSNews.com (accessed 12 July 2006): http://www.cbsnews.com/elements/2005/01/24/iraq/whoswho668877_0_4_person.shtml; “Who Won: Iraqis Party,” CBSNews.com (accessed 3 September 2006): http://www.cbsnews.com/elements/2005/01/24/iraq/whoswho668877_0_5_person.shtml.28 “The Hare System of Proportional Representation,” The University of Chicago Office of the Secretary of the Faculties (accessed 13 July 2006): http://sof.uchicago.edu/hare/overview.html29 Rod Nordland and Babak Dehghanpisheh, “What Sistani Wants,” Newsweek (14 February 2005): 25-27.30 Aparisim Ghosh, 35.31 Aparisim Ghosh, 34.32 “Can Iraq Rule Itself?” Time (31 January 2005): 26-29.

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NOTE

Insert chart of newly-elected and appointed Iraqi government officials from:

Multi-National Force-Iraq, “MNF-I Year in Review (2005),” unpublished document

on file at the U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute, 30 November 2005, 7.

MNF-I and the Development of Iraq’s Permanent Constitution 2005

Controversy arose immediately among Iraq’s newly elected officials. Disagreements concerning ministerial appointments, Sunni under-representation, and

Kurdish autonomy impeded the TNA’s official formation. By April 2005, however, a

compromise was reached in which several ministries, including defense, were awarded to

Sunnis. Nevertheless, Shias and Kurds continued to dominate most high level positions

in the assembly, including Dawa Party leader Ibrahim al-Jafari designated as Prime

Minister and Jalal Talabani, founder and former secretary general of the PUK, as

president. Al-Jafari and his cabinet were formally approved by full TNA vote on 28

April.

MND – North Central, TF Liberty, 42d Infantry Division

Meanwhile in the provinces, newly elected provincial councils were in turn

electing replacement governors. Lieutenant Colonel Eric Durr, G5 for the 42d Infantry

Division, described the turnover in governorships with Rasheed Hameed, a Shia, elected

in Diyala Province; Dana Ahmad Majid, a Kurd, in Sulamaniyah; and Hamad Hamood

Shekti, a Sunni, in Salah ad Din. In Tamim Province, however, the council was unable to

reach agreement on a new governor for several months due to continued animosity

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between Arab, Turkmen, and Kurdish members, despite the presence of a Regional

Embassy Office (REO) in Kirkuk.33 Although each province was to have a State

Embedded Team (SET), many were not officially staffed due to perceived security

dangers.34 Governance missions, that differed from province to province, fell primarily

on U.S military units according the Durr. In Diyalah, for example, where initially there

was no State Department presence, the 3/3 BCT Civil Affairs Staff Officer (S5), Major

Michael Charlebois, co-located a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) at the

provincial government offices in Baqubah, helped write the provincial constitution, and

met with the governor nearly every day to facilitate a wide range of provincial

governance activities. Similarly, the S5s from 1/3 BCT and 116th BCT focused their

activities on assisting the governors of Salah ad Din and Tamim Provinces, respectively.

Each BCT in the 42d ID was assigned a Civil Affairs company and each battalion then

designated an S5 officer, thereby pushing the governance mission down to the district

level. Soldiers in the 42d, which tracked missions by each line of operation, conducted

more than 1600 individual governance missions, mostly involving meetings with Iraqi

officials at all levels of government and the disbursement of CERP funds, during their

tour of duty in Iraq.35

During OIF II, Major General John Batiste had initiated a series of governor’s

council meetings at 1st Infantry Division headquarters. The provincial governors from

Diyala, Salah ad Din, Tamim, and Sulamaniyah were flown in by helicopter and asked to

33 Regional Embassy Offices (REO) are former Coalition Provisional Authority Regional Headquarters. REOs in Iraq are extensions of the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and are led by Department of State personnel. In 2005-2006, REOs provided administrative and logistical support for Provincial Reconstruction Teams, contracting firms, and other U.S. government agencies operating in their respective regions. 34 The number of U.S. civilians working with Iraqi provincial officials decreased significantly after the CPA dissolved in June 2004. 35 Lieutenant Colonel Eric Durr, interview by Contemporary Operations Studies Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 18 July 2008, 4-7.

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formally report on progress in their respective provinces. Eventually, 42d ID

commander, Major General Joseph Taluto, transformed these meetings into a more

informal gathering of peers and recommended a rotating schedule whereby the governors

took turns hosting the meetings in their provincial capitals. “We are not in charge

anymore,” Taluto told the governors, “you are an elected government, you are running

the show, and we are here to help with security, but it is your province.”36

1st BCT, 1st Infantry Division – Salah ad Din Province

General George Casey told Colonel Mark McKnight, commander 1st BCT, 1st

Infantry Division, to concentrate of four objectives in Salah ad Din Province – protect

Route Tampa37, get Sunnis involved in the political process, train ISF, and set conditions

for the upcoming national referendum and parliamentary elections. What McKnight

quickly realized was that in a counterinsurgency there is not one main effort, but several

main efforts all running simultaneously. 1st BCT was task organized to the 42d Infantry

Division, MND-NC, and arrived in Salah ad Din in January 2005 with ten attached

battalions. McKnight established his main command post at Tikrit, an auxillary CP, first

at FOB Dagger, then FOB Speicher, his tactical operations center at Anaconda, and an

assault command post in Samarra. The Iraqi population in the province was mainly

Sunni in the north, then turning predominantly Shia south of Balad. Also, a large

contingent of disgruntled, unemployed, professional Sunnis - deBathification victims –

resided in Salah ad Din. Colonel McKnight felt that these former regime elements 36 Major General Joseph Taluto, quoted in Lieutenant Colonel Eric Durr, interview by Contemporary Operations Studies Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 18 July 2008, 4-5.37 Route Tampa is the main Coalition supply artery that runs north and south from Kuwait to northern Iraq and is also referred to as Highway 1.

15

represented the bulk of local Sunni resistance encountered by 1st BCT, and as a result, he

considered “the population” a decisive terrain feature. He initiated an IO campaign to

point out to Sunnis the time and resources they wasted fighting the Coalition, and urged

them to stop resisting and to engage more fully with the new central government. Also,

with regard to governance, 1st BCT Soldiers focused on the provincial governor in Tikrit,

Hamood Shekti al Qaisi, and assisted him in setting up and running provincial

institutions. McKnight met regularly with the governor, deputy governor, provincial

police chief, and the local Iraqi brigade commander in an on-going effort to bolster the

legitimacy of these officials in the eyes of everyday citizens. Although dealing directly

with local Sheiks and establishing relationships with tribal advisory councils would

eventually become an accepted way of doing business, McKnight refrained from doing so

for fear of undermining duly elected officials and being seen as circumventing Iraqi

bureaucratic procedures.38

MND – Baghdad 2005

During and after the January 2005 elections, 2d BCT, 10th Mountain Division,

under Colonel Mark Milley, controlled an extensive AOR west of Baghdad. Milley’s

battlespace stretched from the rural areas along the Marine Corps boundary west of Taji

back to the western edge of the Green Zone and included the densely populated portion

of West Baghdad, al-Mansur, Adhamiyah, Kadhamiyah, Ameriyah, the suburb of Abu

Ghraib, and Route Irish.39 Nearly three and a half million Iraqis lived in the 2d BCT’s

AOR – a bewildering mix a Sunnis and Shia Arabs. Nevertheless, Milley was able to 38 Colonel Mark McKnight, interview by Contemporary Operations Studies Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 21 February 2008, 4-7, 12, 15.39 Route Irish is the Baghdad airport road that runs from Route Aeros near the International Zone (Green Zone) to the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP) entry control point.

16

establish acceptable working relationships with both Shia leaders in Adhamiyah and with

Sunnis in Abu Ghraib. As early as the winter of 2005, Colonel Milley began to notice

that Iraqi clerics, Skeiks, and political leaders were tiring of al-Qaeda and continuous

violence. “We did not get to the point where we had the Anbar Awakening,” Milley

explained, “but the population and the leadership was ready for that sort of approach.”40

In eastern Baghdad, 2d BCT, 3d Infantry Division, under Colonel Joseph Disalvo,

relieved 1st BCT, 1st Cavalry Division, in February 2005 and set up headquarters at

Camp Loyalty. Fortunately, Disalvo was given 3d Squadron, 7th Cavalry (3-7 Cav), as a

third maneuver battalion to assist in stabilizing and securing the densely populated east

Baghdad AO which extended from Adhamiyah, Sadr City, and Rusafa in the north, then

south to Tisa Nissan, Zafaraniyah, and Salman Pak. MND-Baghdad directed 2d BCT to

focus on three primary lines of operation – neutralize the AIF, secure the AO, and assist

with reconstruction and governance at the local level. The brigade’s special troops

battalion assumed responsibility for civil-military operations and the disbursement of

CERP funds. Colonel Disalvo involved district and neighborhood council leaders in

prioritizing the various CERP projects. Making local Iraqis part of the decision process

was essential to establishing credibility with the public, Disalvo thought. The 2d BCT

made excellent use of IO to demonize AIF and to convince Iraqi fence sitters to side with

the Coalition. Pamphlets were printed in Arabic with specific messages and distributed

to selected neighborhoods. During million man marches in Sadr City for example,

brigade Soldiers handed out leaflets explaining that peaceful demonstrations and the right

to assemble are what democracy is all about. Colonel Disalvo met regularly with local,

40 Brigadier General Mark Milley, interview by Contemporary Operations Studies Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 18 March 2008, 15-16.

17

provincial, and national Iraqi officials, including Deputy Prime Minister Ahmed Chalabi

as well as representatives from the Mahdi Army and Badr Brigade, in the furtherance of

good governance throughout eastern Baghdad. Disalvo even gave his cell phone number

to non-official local leaders, such as Sheiks and tribal chiefs, so that they could call him

directly for help if trouble arose.41

In MND-Baghdad, Colonel David Bishop, commander 3d BCT (Bulldog Brigade),

1st Armored Division deployed under the 3d Infantry Division and headquartered at

Camp Taji, used Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds to reward

local Iraqi leaders in his north Baghdad AOR who cooperated with newly elected

government officials. East of the Tigris River in the Shia city of Al Husseineya, for

example, Bishop spent CERP money to improve essential services, since local politicians

there supported the TNA and were doing their best to control violence. West of the river,

however, in Tarmiyah and Mushada where cooperation was lacking, 3d BCT Soldiers

rarely dispensed CERP funding. Because of the diversity of population in the various

communities north of Baghdad, Colonel Bishop concentrated his personal governance

efforts on municipal and provincial officials, while the 3d BCT battalion commanders

focused their attention on local district and neighborhood councils – Qadas and Nahias.42

Governance in Tall Afar and Ramadi 2005

After the highly successful Operation RESTORING RIGHTS in Tall Afar, Colonel

H.R. McMaster, 3d ACR commander, initiated efforts to re-establish the previously

disconnected links between district, provincial, and national levels of government in 41 Brigadier General Joseph Disalvo, interview by Contemporary Operations Studies Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 21 February 2008, 4-6, 9, 14-18.42 Colonel David Bishop, interview by Contemporary Operations Studies Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 19 February 2008, 23-24.

18

Ninevah Province. McMaster assigned Civil Affairs Team leader, Lieutenant Colonel

Miguel Sapp, an Army Reserve officer and Washington attorney in civilian life, to work

directly with the leaders of Tall Afar’s new city council. The chief of police, ex-Iraqi Air

Defense General Najim al-Jibouri, was appointed mayor, markets and the hospital

reopened, children in uniforms and carrying backbacks returned to school, Sunni and

Shia Sheiks began meeting regularly for lunch, and the Iraqi central government sent

several million dollars to repair damage to the city. By September, conditions in Tall

Afar, a predominantly Sunni city with more than 80 tribes, were set for a safe election.43

Similarly, Colonel Gary Patton believed that he and the Soldiers of 2d BCT, 2d

Infantry Division had sufficiently neutralized the insurgency in Ramadi to allow the

citizens to freely participate in the January election. AQI had threatened to disrupt the

election process in Ramadi, but was unable to do so. And, although turnout was weak

because of the Sunni boycott, all citizens had the right to participate and the freedom to

choose. No Iraqis were attacked or injured going to or returning from al Anbar

Province’s 12 election centers. The freedom of action achieved in Ramadi also facilitated

the 2d BCT’s building public confidence in the Coalition and coordinating more

effectively with local government officials. The physical presence of U.S. forces

engendered Iraqi loyalty, according to Patton, who moved two battalions into Ramadi and

increased security patrolling and offensive operations soon after arriving in AO Topeka

battlespace. Mayor Mohammed Ahmed Dulami returned to Ramadi in early 2005, after

fleeing the city when his office was bombed the previous December. A U.S. Marine

Corps Civil Affairs Detachment was task organized to 2d BCT and was instrumental in

43 Colonel H.R. McMaster, interview by Contemporary Operations Studies Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 7 January 2008, 33; Lieutenant Colonel Chris Hickey, interview by Contemporary Operations Studies Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 25 July 2007, 11, 22, 25.

19

establishing more effective relations with Iraqi officials in Ramadi and improving the

quality of life for residents of the city.44

The Iraqi Transitional National Assembly drafts a New Constitution

The first major issue on the TNA agenda was establishing a Constitutional

Drafting Committee. In May, 55 assembly members were appointed to the initial

drafting committee with SCIRI activist Humam al-Hammoudi appointed chairman. Once

again, however, failure to include a sufficient number of Sunni Arabs on the committee

delayed the drafting process. TNA resolved this impasse in July by increasing Sunni

representation from two to 17 full memberships and by establishing 13 advisory

positions, all filled eventually by Sunnis.45

Significant disagreements arose in July over the first draft of Iraq’s constitution,

which addressed such issues as Islamic law, education, women’s rights, autonomous

regions, oil and gas revenue sharing, and establishing a Federation Council. During the

remainder of the summer, several deadlines were missed as drafting committee members

failed on several occasions to reach consensus. In late August, the committee presented a

final draft of the new Iraqi constitution to the full body of the TNA, which, after

significant additional negotiations, approved the document without Sunni bloc support.

The United Nations then printed five million copies in both Arabic and Kurdish and

distributed them throughout the country. Large numbers of Sunnis, however, still

objected to several provisions of the proposed constitution and threatened to defeat it in

the upcoming 15 October Constitution Referendum vote.46 U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, 44 Colonel Gary Patton, interview by Marine Corps History and Museum Division, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 12 March 2005, 8, 12-17.45 Multi-National Force-Iraq, “MNF-I Year in Review (2005),” unpublished document on file at the U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute, 30 November 2005, 3.

20

Zalmay Khalizad, intervened just days before the referendum and proposed an additional

amendment to the final draft constitution that authorized introduction of further

amendments in 2006 after installation of the post-15 December election government.

These later amendments were to address in greater detail troublesome issues, such as de-

Baathification reform, federalism, unification, and resource sharing. Sunnis, Shias, and

Kurds in the TNA all accepted Ambassador Khalilzad’s proposal, thus leading Sunni

members to subsequently announce that they would now participate in the referendum

process.47

Add “Electoral Process Timeline” from pg 9 “DOS Iraq Weekly Status Report”

http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iraq/2005/06/iraq-weeklyupdate-20050601.pdf

MNF-I Support for the Constitution Referendum Vote and Parliamentary Elections

Despite the deaths of more than 400 citizens in the three weeks prior, Iraq’s

national referendum vote on 15 October 2005 was relatively peaceful in comparison to

the January assembly elections. Shia created posters and flew banners urging passage of

the referendum, while Sunnis encouraged boycotting or “no” votes. Grand Ayatollah Ali

al-Sistani and other members of the ruling council of Shia clerics in Najaf instructed all

Iraqis to vote in favor of the constitution.48 Strict security measures initiated by the Iraqi

government and enforced by Coalition forces and the ISF successfully deterred insurgent

efforts to disrupt the referendum vote. Iraq’s international borders were closed, travel 46 Kenneth Katzman, “Iraq: Elections, Government, and Constitution,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 15 June 2006, 4. 47 Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, interview by Dr. Peter Connors, 30 April 2008, New York, NY, 4.48 “Top Shia Urges Iraq Charter ‘Yes’,” BBC News, 13 October 2005, 1. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4337598.stm (accessed 15 July 2008).

21

between provinces was prohibited, and BIAP was closed to civilian flights. On 10

October, Prime Minister al-Jafari announced a four-day holiday and a nighttime curfew

in preparation for the vote. Vehicular traffic was banned in Baghdad on vote day

requiring most citizens to walk to polling centers. Bags, packages, and cell phones were

restricted from polling areas throughout the country.49 In Taji, for example, although

insurgent attacks doubled prior to the referendum, voters still turned out in record

numbers. Soldiers with the 1st Mechanized Brigade, 9th Iraqi Army Division manned

checkpoints and provided polling station security, while 3,500 U.S. Soldiers from 3rd

Brigade, 1st Armored Division patrolled the outer perimeter of the city and served as a

reserve force, ready to react quickly in the event of an insurgent attack. Eighty insurgents

had been captured and 16 weapons caches uncovered in Taji during joint U.S./Iraqi

combat operation earlier in October. In describing his Soldiers’ commitment to

supporting the Iraqi referendum, 3rd Brigade commander, U.S. Army Colonel David

Bishop, noted that his Soldiers understood the importance of the mission, were focused

on accomplishing it, and were proud to be there.”50 Bishop also put pressure on local

Sunni Sheiks in Tarmiyah, Taji, and Mushada to reduce violence prior to the referendum

by restricting traffic flow, thereby severely limiting the movement of goods and services

in the region. Simultaneously, 3d BCT initiated a powerful show of force involving

artillery, Apache helicopters, and Navy F-18 fighters. Next, Colonel Bishop and his Iraqi

partner, Brigadier General Kassim, commander of the 1st Iraqi Army Mechanized

Brigade, called a meeting of local Sunni Sheiks and convinced them to stop the violence

49 John Guardiano, “Security Good as Millions of Iraqis Cast Constitution Ballots,” American Forces Press Service, 15 October 2005, 1-3. http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=18065 (accessed 14 July 2008).50 Quoted in Kathleen Rhem, “Iraq, American Troops Work Together to Ensure Safe Election,” American Forces Press Service, 14 October 2005, 1. http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=18073 (accessed 12 July 2008.

22

in exchange for reopening the roads and calling off the show of force. The area stayed

relatively calm for the remainder of Bishop’s deployment.51

Similarly, 2nd Battalion, 325th Infantry (3-325 IN), 82nd Airborne Division

provided area security support for the referendum in Tall Afar and throughout largely-

Sunni Ninevah Province. Task Force White Falcon commander, Lieutenant Colonel

Christopher Gibson, reported no terrorist attacks, as 8,000 Iraqis turned out to vote in 2nd

Battalion’s zone of responsibility – the Sarai section of the city. The safe and secure

environment was instrumental in the large numbers of Sunnis and Shia who voted in Tall

Afar. As they patrolled the streets on referendum day, U.S. paratroopers could see up

close a new level of confidence in the eyes of the Iraqi citizens they were protecting. The

large number of ink-stained index fingers told the whole story – together they were

making history.52

In MND-NC, the 42d ID appointed a government elections officer (GEICO) to

oversee division-level support efforts for the referendum vote. In turn, each BCT

designated an elections officer with the specific responsibility for ensuring a successful,

violence-free, referendum in their respective AO. In Salah ad Din, 1st BCT, 3d ID

organized a turnout campaign to encourage Sunnis, who had refused to vote in the

January 2005 election, to participate in the referendum. Banners, posters, radio and

television commercials, and newspaper articles were created by 42d ID Soldiers to get the

message out and to persuade Iraqis to cast their ballots. Soldiers also helped Iraqis

deliver ballots to the numerous polling sites throughout the four-province region. 42d ID

engineers developed and implemented plans to harden the polling stations, but waited 51 Colonel David Bishop, interview by Contemporary Operations Studies Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 19 February 2008, 24.52 James Wilt, “Paratroopers Aid Election Security in Tall Afar,” Defend America, 17 October 2005, 1-3. http://www.defenamerica.mil/articles/oct2005/a101705wm1.html (accessed 14 July 2008).

23

until the last minute to the erect concrete barriers in an effort to conceal the exact voting

locations from insurgents.53 In Diyala Province, Colonel Steven Salazar, commander of

3d BCT, 3d ID, attached to MND-NC, worked vigorously, along with his Civil Affairs

team, to persuade local Sunni leaders to take part in the upcoming referendum vote.

Eventually, Salazar was able to successfully convince Diyala Sunnis that they had erred

in boycotting the January 2005 elections. As a result, Sunnis agreed to participate in the

referendum and turned out in record numbers; however, they typically voted to defeat the

new constitution.54

Prior to the referendum, Coalition and ISF preemptive anti-terror raids in Baghdad

reached 800 daily. During the first two weeks of October, 62 insurgents were killed, 600

were captured, and 27 weapons caches located and destroyed. Major General William

Webster, Jr., commander of Multinational Division Baghdad, credited the high level of

pre-referendum combat operations with limiting terrorist attacks to only 12 on voting day

and with a recent across-the-board decline in insurgent effectiveness.55 In northwestern

Baghdad’s Khadamiyah district, U.S. Army Sergeant Andrew Kisz, a member of 1st

Squadron, 71st Cavalry (1-71 CAV), took pride in seeing Iraqis exercising their right to

vote. “It is very rewarding to see democracy in action in a country that has been denied

these freedoms for such a long time,” Kisz explained, while pointing out how Americans

can often take their own voting rights for granted.56 Lieutenant Colonel Steven Merkel,

53 Lieutenant Colonel Eric Durr, interview by Contemporary Operations Studies Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 18 July 2008, 19-20.54 Colonel Steven Salazar, interview by Contemporary Operations Studies Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 24 January 2008, 31.55 Gerry Gilmore, “Baghdad Raids Helped Preempt Referendum-Day Attacks,” American Forces Press Service, 21 October 2005, 1-2. http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=18007 (accessed 14 July 2008).56 Quoted in “10th Mountain Soldiers Witness Historic Vote, Work with Iraq Army,” American Forces Press Service, 17 October 2005, 1-2. http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=18055 (accessed 14 July 2008).

24

commander of 1st Battalion, 9th Field Artillery (1-9 FA), 2nd Brigade Combat Team,

complimented the ISF for the excellent Baghdad security plan that they prepared and then

executed nearly flawlessly on referendum day. The operation was entirely Iraqi,

explained Sergeant First Class Mark Lewandowski, a member of Task Force Baghdad’s

civil affairs team who helped monitor election preparations. According to 11th Armored

Cavalry Regiment (11 ACR) public affairs officer, Captain Marc Perlini, a larger than

anticipated voter turnout resulted in two polling stations near Abu Ghraib using their

entire allotment of ballots long before the polls closed. Iraqi officials, however, arranged

delivery of additional ballots thus allowing voting to quickly continue. Captain Norm

Stevenson, 3rd Battalion, 7th Infantry (3-7 IN), 4th Brigade Combat Team, likened the

festive mood in Baghdad to one big party. “It almost seems like a holiday here in

Baghdad,” he said, as referendum day voting came to a close.57

Despite inconveniences caused by stringent security, nearly 10 million Iraqis voted

– 63% of the country’s 15.5 million registered voters. Iraqis ratified their new

constitution 78.6% to 21.4%. Although Sunni voters in Sunni-dominated provinces voted

against the constitution – 97% and 82% voted “no” in Anbar and Salah ad Din Provinces

respectively - the charter still passed nationally, since only two, not three, provinces

rejected the referendum by a two-thirds majority.58

MNF-I director of strategic communications, Air Force Brigadier General Donald

Alston, praised both the ISF for successful referendum day security operations as well as

the Iraqi people for their high voter turn out. General Casey characterized the

57 Quoted in John Guardiano, “Security Good as Millions of Iraqis Cast Constitution Ballots,” Armed Forces Press Service, 15 October 2005, 1-3. http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=18065 (accessed 14 July 2008). 58 U.N. Security Council, “Report to the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 30 of Resolution 1546 (2004),” S/2005/766, 7 December 2005, 3. http://www.uniraq.org/FileLib/misc/SG_Report_S_2005_766_EN.pdf (accessed 11 July 2008).

25

referendum as a decisive defeat for the insurgents and as a prime example of Iraq’s

“irreversible momentum” on the road to democracy.59 U.S. Secretary of State

Condoleezza Rice and U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad each complimented the ISF

and the citizens of Iraq for making the constitutional referendum an historic success.

Rice declared that continued political progress in Iraq would quash the will of the

insurgents, while Khalilzad praised the high level of Sunni participation in the

referendum process.60 Finally, President Bush expressed appreciation to all Iraqis on

behalf of the American people for meeting the referendum milestone. “Thank you for

doing what is right… to set the foundations for peace for future generations to come,” the

President acclaimed in a speech from the south lawn of the White House.61

Next in the Iraqi political process was the 15 December 275-seat Council of

Representatives (CoR) national election. Slightly more than 7,500 candidates from 361

political parties registered for the elections. Sunnis participated to a far greater extent

than they had in the past by running candidates from the Iraqi Islamic Party, the National

Dialog Council, and the Iraqi People’s General Council. Shia representation included the

United Iraqi Alliance, the Fadila Party, and Iraqi Hizballah. The Iraq National Accord

led by former Prime Minister al-Allawi, Ahmed Chalabi’s Iraq National Congress, and

the Kurdish Alliance each ran separate slates.62

59 General George W. Casey Jr. “March to Democracy Continues,” This Week in Iraq, 19 October 2005, 1. http://www.defenselink.mil/home/articles/2005-10/a092105dw1.html (accessed 14 July 2008).60 John Guardiano, “Rice, Khalilzad: Iraqis Win, No Matter Referendum Result,” American Forces Press Service, 16 October 2005, 1-2. http://defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=18063 (accessed 14 July 2008).61 President George W. Bush, “Bush Congratulates Iraqis on Successful Election,” Office of the White House Press Secretary, 17 October 2005, 1-2. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/10/20051016-2.html (accessed 14 July 2008).62 Kenneth Katzman, “Iraq: Elections, Government, and Constitution,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 15 June 2006, 4.

26

Two hundred thirty CoR seats were set aside for Iraq’s 18 provinces. The number

of seats allocated per province was determined based upon the ratio of registered voters

in a particular province to the total number of voters in the country. As an example,

Diyala Province’s 624,000 voters represented 4.3% of the total electorate (14,379,169).

Therefore, 10 CoR seats were awarded to Diyala – 4.3% of 230 seats, rounded up. The

remaining 45 compensatory seats were awarded to parties that accumulated more than

30,000 votes nation-wide, but did not win seats at the provincial level.63

The Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq announced the official CoR

election results on 10 February 2006. Sunni membership increased from 17 seats on the

TNA to 60 in the CoR. The Council then met for the first time on 16 March. Although

the UIA and Kurdish Alliance collectively had won 181 CoR seats, their coalition broke-

down over the nomination of Ibrahim al-Jafari to remain Iraq’s Prime Minister. Once

again, U.S. Ambassador Khalilzad intervened with a series of compromises that

eventually led to Jafari’s withdrawal, the election of President Jalal Talabani and Vice

Presidents Tariq al-Hashimi and Adil Abd al-Mahdi, and the subsequent nomination of

the Da’wa Party’s Jawad al-Maliki as Prime Minister on 22 April.64 Strong support from

a coalition of 30 plus Dawa loyalists led by Moqtada al-Sadr pushed al-Maliki over the

top.65 The CoR approved the majority of al-Maliki’s cabinet appointments on 20 May,

however, ongoing sectarian bickering delayed naming of the Defense, Interior, and

National Security Ministers until 8 June. MNC-I commander, Lieutenant General Peter

Chiarelli, had anticipated that Iraq’s new prime minister would be in place by 31 January,

63 Multi-National Force-Iraq, “MNF-I Year in Review (2005),” unpublished document on file at the U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute, 30 November 2005, 23-4.64 Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, interview by Dr. Peter Connors, 30 April 2008, New York, NY, 4-5.65 Dr. Judith Yaphe, interview by Contemporary Operations Studies Team, Washington, D.C., 29 April 2008, 15.

27

the date of President Bush’s State of the Union Address. Instead, the Iraqis took nearly

six months to seat a new government, during which time governmental administration

essentially came to a standstill. Ambassador Khalilzad noted, however, that although

everyone would have like the government to form more quickly, the al-Jafari

negotiations, the Golden Mosque bombing in Samarra, and the increase in sectarian

violence all negatively impacted the pace of the proceedings.66 General Casey described

the tenuous circumstances in Iraq as the coexistence of violence and progress.

Add photo from last page of “Iraq 2006 Year in Review”

http://www.mnf-iraq.com/images/stories/daily/2007/February/2006annualreort.pdf

Add bio of al-Maliki, page 16, “Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security”

http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/106174.pdf

Add “Organizational Structure of the Government of Iraq” page 6, Measuring

Stability and Security in Iraq August 2006

www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/Security-Stability-ReportAug29r1.pdf

Add “Progress Toward a Democratic Iraq 2006” page 8, Measuring Stability and

Security in Iraq August 2006

www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/Security-Stability-ReportAug29r1.pdf

66 Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli, interview by Dr. Peter Connors, 28 April 2008, Washington, D.C., 5-6; Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, interview by Dr. Peter Connors, 30 April 2008, New York, NY, 5.

28

Add “Permanent Government 2006 Parliament Seat Distribution” page 22, Iraq’s

New Political Map

http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr179.pdf

MNF-I – Setting Conditions for a Successful Referendum and Election 2005

During the fall of 2005, MNF-I and ISF troops initiated a series of tactical

offensive operations throughout Iraq designed to further disrupt the insurgency and set

the conditions for a successful 15 December election. For example, 1,000 Iraqi Army

soldiers and 2,500 Marines and Soldiers from Regimental Combat Team – 2 kicked off

Operation STEEL CURTAIN in the western Euphrates River Valley to restore Iraqi

sovereign control along the Syrian border in the Al Qaim region of Al Anbar Province.

This was the first major operational employment of ISF soldiers who, along with their

coalition counterparts, first cleared, then established a permanent security presence in the

towns of Husaybah, Karabilah, and Ubaydi, including the Ramana area north of the

Euphrates. Although sporadic, the house-by-house fighting was heavy at times, since the

region was a key terrorist transit route and training location. After the towns were seized,

Iraqi soldiers provided displaced citizens with food, water, and blankets. During the 17-

day operation, 139 insurgents were killed and 256 captured, including Sadiq Ayadah

Husayn Matar, the AQI Emir of Sadah. In Husaybah, Marine Lieutenant Colonel Todd

Ryder, 6th Civil Affairs Group operations officer, assisted in establishing a Civil-Military

Operation Center (CMOC) where local and regional Iraqi government officials could

29

meet with ISF and Coalition representatives to air grievances and discuss requirements

for rebuilding the city.67

Task Force Baghdad Soldiers from the 1st Battalion, 184th Infantry (1-184 IN) and

Iraqi Security Forces from the 4th Public Order Brigade and 1st Commando Brigade

searched homes, cleared neighborhoods, and detained suspected terrorist during

Operation CLEAN SWEEP in southern Baghdad prior to the election. Similarly, 3rd

Battalion, 7th Infantry Soldiers captured insurgents and uncovered weapons caches near

central Baghdad, while troops from 1st Battalion, 184th Infantry captured additional

terrorist suspects in the Dora district.68

Beginning 16 November, MNF-I launched a series of Operations – PANTHERS,

BRUINS, LIONS, TIGERS, SHANK, RAMS, and SKINNER – to similarly disrupt

insurgent activities in the Al Anbar Provincial capital of Ar Ramadi, where the al

Zarqawi network had intimidated local citizens in a coordinated effort to prevent them

from voting. Hundreds of Iraqi Army soldiers, along with Soldiers and Marines from the

2nd Brigade Combat Team, successively struck terrorist stronghold throughout the city

over the next three weeks. Thirty-two insurgents were killed and three high-value

terrorist targets were captured in the Sophia district of eastern Ramadi. Twenty-three

medium machine guns, three sniper rifles, artillery and mortar shells, RPG rounds, and

plastic explosives were discovered in the northern parts of the city. In separate raids,

67 Multi-National Force-Iraq, “Operation Steel Curtain Update,” release A051116e, 16 November 2005, 1-2. http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=3133&Itemid=128 (accessed 16 July 2008). 68 Multi-National Force-Iraq, “Iraqi, U.S. Forces Make Clean Sweep of South Baghdad,” release A051117f, 17 November 2005, 1-2. http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=3125&Itemid=128 (accessed 16 July 2008); Multi-National Force-Iraq, “U.S., Iraqi Forces Keep Baghdad Streets Safe for Election,” release A05123b, 13 December 2005, 1-2. . http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2956&Itemid=128 (accessed 16 July 2008).

30

Coalition forces and ISF also targeted terrorist safe houses in central Ramadi, the

southern Tammim area, and the western Sufia district. Overall, the combined operations

resulted in the capture of dozens of AQI insurgent cell members, the destruction of

multiple weapons caches, the discovery of a bomb-making facility in Ramadi’s central

shopping district, and a 60% reduction in terrorist attacks. The citizens of Ramadi were

now peacefully awaiting their opportunity to vote in the 15 December parliamentary

elections.69

The past summer, Operation SWORD helped establish a long-term Coalition-Iraqi

security presence in Hit. In December, 500 Soldiers from 2nd Battalion, 114th Field

Artillery (2-114 FA), 1,500 Marines from 13th MEU, and 500 Iraqi Army soldiers from

the 2nd Brigade, 7th IA Division conducted Operation IRON HAMMER to clear the Hai

al Becker region, across the Euphrates from Hit, of terrorists and insurgents. Hai al

Becker had long been a safe haven for AQI and served as a center for producing car

bombs and improvised explosive devices.70

Numerous additional pre-election occurrences helped bolster Iraqi citizen’s

confidence in their new government. For example, Coalition forces captured New Baath

Party leader, Hamid Sharki Shadid and Ahmad Nimah Khudayyir Abbas, Jaysh al-

Mujahideen propaganda chief in November. Additionally, Colonel Mark McKnight,

commander 1st Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division, officially turned control of

FOB Danger over to Iraqi officials less than a month before parliamentary elections.

Although the Coalition had already given up 24 other operating bases, transferring FOB

69 Multi-National Force-Iraq, “Operation Skinner Concludes,” release A051210k, 10 December 2005, 1-2. http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2966&Itemid=128 (accessed 16 July 2008).70 Multi-National Force-Iraq, “Operation Iron Hammer Enters Final Stages,” release A051203f, 3 December 2005, 1-2. http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=3014&Itemid=128 (accessed 16 July 2008).

31

Danger, formerly Camp Iron Horse, was symbolically significant for Iraqis, since this

base was located on the 1000 acre Saddam Hussein palace complex in Tikrit.71 Also,

telephone, television, and internet services were restored to Iraqis in al Anbar Province

after two months down time resulting from terrorists’ cutting the fiber optic cable

connections. Coalition leaders considered reconnecting Anbar electronically with the rest

of Iraq instrumental in the larger-than-expected Sunni turnout on election day.

Various MNF-I commanders met with Iraqi political leaders from around the

country to assess their election needs and pledge Coalition support. Lieutenant Colonel

Thomas Kunk, commander 1st Battalion, 502d Infantry (1-502 IN), 2d Brigade Combat

Team, 101st Airborne Division and local sheiks discussed road improvements, relations

with the Ministry of Agriculture, and unique election requirements for south Baghdad.

General Casey and Multi-National Division Central South commander, Polish Army

Major General Piotr Czerwinski, met with Iraqi provincial governors, police chiefs, and

ISF leaders at Camp Echo to review election requirements and preparations in

Diwaniyah, Babil, and Wasit Provinces.72

Soldiers from A Company, 425th Civil Affairs Battalion, attached to Task Force

Baghdad, organized an election conference for Iraqi women in the Al Rashid District.

Officially sponsored by the Al Rashid Women’s and Children’s Committee, the meeting

addressed such election-related issues as progress within the Iraqi government, voter’s

rights, voting procedures, and candidate characteristics.73 Iraqi detainees, imprisoned at

the Camp Bucca, Abu Ghraib, and Fort Suse MNF-I Theater Internment Facilities, were

71 Multi-National Force-Iraq, “Iraqi Government Takes Control of Coalition Base in Tikrit,” release A051123c, 23 November 2005, 1-2. http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=3087&Itemid=128 (accessed 16 July 2008).72 Multi-National Force-Iraq, “General Casey Participates in Election Conference, release A051206j, 6 December 2005, 1-2. http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2991&Itemid=128 (accessed 16 July 2008).

32

given the opportunity to vote in the parliamentary elections on 12 December, three days

ahead of schedule. Ninety percent of those eligible cast their ballots in what was seen by

all Iraqis as an example of the rule of law in action, and yet another positive step on the

road to democracy.74 ISF soldiers and Iraqi police also voted in advance, since they

would be providing security on national election day for the more than 6,000 polling sites

throughout the country.

As with the January TNA election and the October referendum, on 15 December,

Iraqi police secured the immediate area surrounding each polling station, while ISF and

Coalition Soldiers formed the second and third rings of protection and served as quick-

reaction forces on 15 December. Two hundred twenty-five thousand ISF troops were on

hand in Baghdad alone. Several inconsequential incidences of small-arms fire were

reported election day morning across Baghdad. A rocket attack wounded three Iraqis in

central Baghdad, two mortar rounds struck east Baghdad, and in Sadr City, a small group

of armed insurgents hassled voters at four polling locations. A bomb blew a hole in the

polling center at Karmah in Anbar Province the night before the elections. No casualties

were reported and MNF-West and ISF troops quickly repaired the facility before the polls

opened next morning. Voter turnout was excellent in Fallujah and Ramadi, while

participation was higher than expected in Husaybah, Karabilah, and Ubaydi due in part to

Operation STEEL CURTAIN and the permanent presence of ISF security.75

73 Multi-National Force-Iraq, “Election Conference Educates Women of Baghdad,” release A051213d, 13 December 2005, 1-2. http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2955&Itemid=128 (accessed 16 July 2008).74 Multi-National Force-Iraq, “Detainee Voter Turn Out Overwhelming,” release A051212e, 12 December 2005, 1-2. http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2958&Itemid=128 75 Multi-National Force-Iraq, “Iraqi Forces Safeguard Polling Sites against Attacks,” release A051215h, 15 December 2005, 1-2. http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2943&Itemid=128

33

Although 2005 had been a turbulent year, MNC-I Commanding General John R.

Vines considered Coalition accomplishments to have been highly significant. Creating a

democratic government – one in which men pass the laws and determine their own fate –

was the antithesis of the Islamic extremist viewpoint.76 Developing the Coalition Public

Information Center and targeting the IO message in Arabic directly at the Iraqi people,

convincing many citizens to support their new government and to renounce violence,

urging Sunnis to participate in the electoral process, and using polling data to assess the

results were among the governance line of operations techniques used by MNC-I to

change Iraqi behavior and attitudes. “You can’t kill your way out of the problem,” Vines

observed. “Ultimately you want to influence the civilian population.”77 And Soldiers,

Sailors, Air Men, and Marines of MNF-I, MNC-I, and the MNDs/MNF did exactly that

in 2005 by providing guidance, counsel, and overwatch as Iraq transitioned to

sovereignty – interim government to TNA, written constitution to ratified constitution,

and the election of a permanent legislature.

Legitimizing the New Government of Iraq – MNF-I Focus in 2006

Sectarianism, Shia militias, external influences, and internal corruption were

foremost among numerous serious issues facing the new CoR members as they took

power in the spring of 2006. Societal polarization threatened the formation of a stable,

democratic, state. The much-anticipated government of national unity had not yet

materialized and most Iraqi citizens were still not receiving essential services they had

long been promised. Strengthening the new government’s legitimacy and helping all 76 Lieutenant General John R. Vines, interview by Contemporary Operations Studies Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 30-31 July 2008, 22.77 Lieutenant General John R. Vines, interview by Contemporary Operations Studies Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 30-31 July 2008, 10.

34

Iraqis achieve an expanded level of self-reliance became a primary focus for MNF-I

leadership in 2006. General Casey’s five lines of operations remained essentially the

same – security, governance, economic development, strategic communications, and

transitioning responsibility/authority for running their own country over to Iraqis on an

accelerated timetable. This meant that Iraqis across the board should become more

involved in solving their own problems and using their own resources. As the year

progressed, MNF-I troops redoubled their efforts throughout the country to create a

secure environment in which the new CoR could begin operating. Restoring stability and

civil authority would lead to greater self-reliance and independence, and ultimately be

instrumental in further legitimizing both the CoR and the GoI in the eyes of all Iraqis,

including Sunnis.

For the majority of 2006, sectarian violence instigated by Sunni insurgents,

terrorist extremists, and Shia militias presented enormous challenges for both Iraq’s new

unity government and Coalition forces. “We will succeed in Iraq, but it will take

patience, courage, and resolve from all of us,” General Casey noted in describing the

precarious situation facing MNF-I troops in October 2006.78 In an effort to resolve

grievances, Prime Minister al-Maliki developed a National Reconciliation and Dialogue

plan and hosted three meetings in Baghdad with civil, political, tribal, and religious

leaders to formally discuss pertinent governance issues, such as federalism, disbanding

militias, sectarianism, and de-Baathification reform. A fourth and final conference, for

religious scholars, was scheduled for early 2007, but never convened.79 Also, during

78 General George Casey quoted in Multi-National Force-Iraq, “Iraq: 2006 Year in Review,” February 2007, 3. http://www.mnf-iraq.com/images/stories/daily/2007/February/2006annualreport.pdf (accessed 22 February 2008).79 Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, “Iraq’s National Reconciliation and Dialogue Project,” U.S. Department of State press release, 25 June 2006, 1. http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/2006/68301.htm (accessed 22 June 2008).

35

2006, the CoR enacted five key legislative initiatives addressing fuel importation, foreign

investment, constitutional review, Kirkuk oversight, and establishing semi-autonomous

regions. In October, CoR established a Central Committee for Peace and Security and

announced that Baghdad security checkpoints would, henceforth, be manned equally by

Shia and Sunni troops. The Council continued work on additional laws covering oil and

gas revenue sharing, de-Baathification reform, provincial elections, and the creation of

new national symbols. Unfortunately, on several occasions, the CoR failed to reach a

quorum due to political infighting and boycotts by Sunnis and Sadrist from the Unified

Iraqi Coalition party.80

Frustrated with lack of progress during the fall of 2006, Prime Minister al-Maliki

ordered a crackdown on militias and threatened to reshuffle Iraq’s cabinet ministers. In

December 2006, Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, chairman of the Supreme Council for Islamic

Revolution in Iraq, and Iraqi Vice President and leader of the Iraqi Islamic Party, Tariq

al-Hashimi, met in Washington with President Bush to discuss compromises required for

an all-encompassing, sustainable, political settlement in Iraq. The U.S. Department of

State devoted considerable resources to expanding good governance both nationally and

locally in Iraq with programs such as banking reform, pension system revitalization,

national waterway system development, healthcare delivery, education enhancement, and

human resource management. State Department Ministry Advisory Teams, in

accordance with the National Capacity Development Program, assisted key Iraqi

ministries with strategic planning, budgeting, training, personnel management, and other

core functions. Embedded Coalition Transition Teams provided similar, broad-based,

80 Multi-National Force-Iraq, “Iraq: 2006 Year in Review,” February 2007, 3-5, 12. http://www.mnf-iraq.com/images/stories/daily/2007/February/2006annualreport.pdf (accessed 22 February 2008).

36

mentoring support to senior officials at Iraq’s Ministries of Defense and Interior.81 In

total, the U.S. budgeted $787 million in 2006 for national capacity building and reform in

Iraq. Funded programs included ministerial capacity building, anti-corruption efforts,

transitioning from a cash economy, banking sector reform, market-based economic

transformation, women’s education, terrorist interdiction, and refugee assistance. As the

Funding Annex to President Bush’s “National Strategy for Victory in Iraq”

stipulates…“2006 will be a critically important year: it is a year of transition to greater

Iraqi self-reliance, which requires helping Iraqis sustain their infrastructure, and build

greater Iraqi civilian capacity at the national, provincial, and municipal levels for better,

more responsive and more transparent governance.”82 Although limited progress was

made in each of the respective funded program areas, tangible results had not yet

materialized as 2006 ended.

As for Coalition Forces, 2006 was to be the year of transition, turning battlespace

over to the ISF, and drawing down from 100 to 50 FOBs. Unfortunately, however,

lengthy delays by Iraqi politicians in forming a government of national reconciliation, the

Golden Mosque bombing in Samarra, the rise of sectarian violence, and the inability of

the various ministries to begin providing services for everyday citizens dictated that

MNF-I/MNC-I remain in overwatch status for longer than originally anticipated.83

Throughout the year, MNF-I Soldiers helped mitigate hostilities between rival political

groups in Iraq, aided the ministries in providing essential services for the Iraqi people,

81 U.S. Department of State, “Report to Congress: Section 1227 Report on Iraq,” 5 January 2007, 1-15. http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rpt/1227/80963.htm (accessed 19 March 2008).82 U.S. Department of State, “Advancing the President’s National Strategy for Victory in Iraq: Funding Iraq’s Transition to Self-Reliance in 2006 and 2007 and Support for the Counterinsurgency Campaign,” February 2006, 1-6. www.state.gov/documents/organization/62352.pdf (accessed 19 March 2008).83 Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli, interview by Contemporary Operations Studies Team, Washington, D.C., 28 April 2008, 2-4.

37

and assisted the GoI in curtailing lawlessness and corruption nationwide. Finally, on 28

November 2006, the United Nations Security Council unanimously approved Resolution

1723, extending the MNF-I mandate for one more year.

Governance and Corruption in Salah ad Din

In Salah ad Din Province in 2006, Colonel Michael Steele, commander 3d BCT,

101st Airborne Division, allocated 70 percent of his time to interacting with Iraqi Army

and political leaders. Steele met several times a week with provincial governor Hamad

Hamood Shekti in an effort to encourage him to take a more proactive leadership role in

promoting good provincial governance. He also took exception to the heavy Coalition

emphasis on non-lethal and non-kinetic operations. The vast differences between

Western and Arabic cultures could not be bridged by building community projects. In

Colonel Steele’s view, the population would not turn in the Coalition’s favor and the

hearts and minds of Iraqi citizens could not be won. The primary focus of Coalition

forces should be tracking down and killing or capturing the enemy. Insurgents should

fear U.S. Soldiers and should be keenly aware that the Americans are there to fight.

Colonel Steele also felt that the coalition was remiss in not prosecuting

racketeering and black marketing more aggressively in Salah ad Din. He points out that

Governor Hamood owned 45 gas stations between Bayji and Ash Sharqat and four

20,000-gallon tanker trucks that ran continuous round trips to the oil refinery in Bayji.

Although many of the gas stations were dysfunctional, they were somehow still receiving

their daily allocation of fuel. When Steele tried to take control of the refinery and crack

down on corruption, he was ordered to back off. In his opinion, black market petroleum

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was the primary funding source for the insurgency in Iraq. Similarly, Colonel Steele

believed that CMOC and PRT project construction money, after being turned over to

Iraqi politicians, was being siphoned off by the insurgency. He sites the case of an

insurgent detainee who tried to buy his way out the holding pen with two stacks of

$10,000 each in hundred dollar bills. The sequential serial numbers on the bills were

quickly traced back to a CMOC that had previously operated out of Tikrit.

In another example of government corruption, Steele had two interpreters dress as

regular Soldiers and pretend to be his security detail for a CERP funds allocation meeting

with the Iraqi Provincial Reconstruction Council in Tikrit. None of the Iraqis in the

meeting knew that Steele’s “security detail” Soldiers understood Arabic. An argument

soon developed over which projects to fund. The deputy governor then called for calm

and, according to the disguised interpreters, whispered in Arabic to the governor not to

worry – to agree to any project - we are not going to build the project anyway – we just

want the money. After the meeting, Steele was enraged when he found out what the

Iraqis had said. He refused to provide any further funding unless a specific project

demonstratively improved the lifestyles of local citizens or unless 3d BCT received

something tangible in return, such as the names and locations of High Value Targets in

Salah ad Din. He also began bypassing Iraqi political leaders and officials and gave

project funding directly to local Sheiks, thereby re-introducing the cultural hierarchy that

had worked well for centuries in Iraq.84

Stabilizing the Fault Line

84 Colonel Michael Steele, interview by Contemporary Operations Studies Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 13 March 2008, 14, 19, 32-37.

39

In Taji, meanwhile, 1st BCT, 4th Infantry Division replaced 3d BCT, 1st Armored

in January 2006. The AO remained essentially the same – from Baghdad north to Taji,

then to an area east of the Tigris and west to Abu Ghraib. MND-B assigned all five

battalions of 1st BCT the primary mission of training the ISF and then transitioning the

Taji battlespace to them. At the time, however, sectarian violence was disrupting the

region around Taji, forcing brigade commander James Pasquarette to focus resources on

stabilizing the fault lines between Sunni and Shia population centers, in addition to

conducting counterinsurgency missions against Sunni insurgents, AQI, and Shia militias.

Local Iraqi citizens were losing faith in the ISF and their newly elected government and

began to rely more broadly on American Soldiers for security. Pasquarette then initiated

a series of information operations to prop up the GoI, condemn sectarian violence, and

denigrate terrorist activity.

During operation TIGRIS WAVES in March, 1st BCT isolated and cleared

Tarmiyah of AQI insurgents, who had terrorized the townspeople. Colonel Pasquarette

left an entire battalion in Tarmiyah to provide on-going security for the locals and soon

gained their trust and confidence. As Pasquarette explained, “the light went on…you

have to be there…you can’t commute to this fight.”85 1st BCT soon began spending

more time outside their FOB by putting teams of U.S Soldiers, Iraqi police, and ISF in a

series of Joint Security Stations (JSS) throughout the Taji AO on a 24/7 basis to

strengthen local security. Additionally, battalion and company commanders from 1st

BCT helped organize four Qadas and 12 Nahias in and around Taji. Colonel Pasquarette

assigned responsibility for the brigade’s CERP program to his Special Troops battalion

85 Colonel James Pasquarette, interview by Contemporary Operations Studies Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 4 January 2008, 16.

40

commander and appropriate amounts of funds were regularly allocated for projects that

were mutually agreed to by the U.S. officers and the Iraqi councilmen. The money

helped build goodwill and created much-needed jobs for working class Iraqis. As was

noted with the 3d BCT, 101st Airborne Division in Salah ad Din Province, however,

Pasquarette occasionally discovered stacks of cellophane-wrapped, sequentially-

numbered, hundred dollar bills during raids on insurgent strongholds and safe houses.86

Sunnis – Odd Men Out inDiyala

“The Sunnis, the Shias, and the Kurds all want democracy as long as they are in

charge,” is the way Colonel Brian Jones, commander 3d BCT, 4th ID, described the

confusing governance situation in Diyala Province during 2006.87 Legitimizing local and

provincial governments was a line of operation that Jones and his Soldiers worked hard,

but in “Little Iraq,” convincing Shias, Kurds, and Sunnis to all agree on anything was

next to impossible. Since Sunnis, who represented an ethnic majority in Diyala, had

boycotted the January 2005 elections, Shias and Kurds controlled the provincial council

and refused to share power with them – Sunnis were always odd man out.

In addition to dealing with these three principal ethnic groups, Colonel Jones also

faced a near bewildering array of insurgents, subgroups, tribes, and political parties, such

as al-Qaeda, FRE, JAM, the Badr Corps, Qads forces from Iran, Shia death squads,

Sadrists, Dawas, SCIRIs, Iraqi Islamic Party members, Muslim Ulama Councilmen, Shia

al-Tamimi tribesmen, Azawis, Dulaimis, al-Majams, Jibouris, and a significant criminal

element. Nevertheless, Jones made substantial progress in dealing with Sunnis and in 86 Colonel James Pasquarette, interview by Contemporary Operations Studies Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 4 January 2008, 5-10, 16, 19-22. 87 Colonel Brian Jones, interview by Contemporary Operations Studies Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 6 February 2008, 15.

41

convincing them to participate in the provincial political process. However, in mid-2006

after Major General Ahmed al-Kozaee, commander of the Iraqi Army’s 5th Division in

Diyala, was abruptly relieved of duty, his replacement, Major General Shakir Halail

Husain, a strict sectarian Shia, cracked down on the Sunnis who had cooperated with the

3d BCT destroying the alliances that had formed. Colonel Jones later discovered a secret

cell in Prime Minister al-Maliki’s Baghdad office that was bypassing the Ministry of

Defense and issuing orders directly to field commanders to increase sectarian attacks

against Sunnis. This revelation caused Jones to question the motives of the central

government – “what is their agenda?...what exactly did this government want?” he would

ask, while explaining his own motives to provincial leaders – “we are impartial…we are

trying to help you establish a government…we want the majority to rule…we want

minority rights protected.”88 By the time 3d BCT redeployed in November, Diyala

Province was running more smoothly. Colonel Jones met personally with Shia governor

Raad Hameed al-Mulla and his Sunni deputy, Auf Rahim, several time weekly. He also

met regularly with religious and tribal leaders and attended all the council meetings,

while battalion commanders worked the Sheiks and Qadas, company commanders

focused on towns and villages, and 3d BCT’s executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel Chris

Johnson, served as the deputy for PRT Diyala at FOB Warhorse. Despite 3d BCT’s

exceptional job of educating political leaders at all levels, the provincial government in

Diyala was generally reluctant to act on its own without guidance from Baghdad. The

gap between Diyala’s provincial government and Iraq’s central government in Baghdad

was too wide for the two to work in harmony.89

88 Colonel Brian Jones, interview by Contemporary Operations Studies Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 6 February 2008, 20-21, 25-26.89 Colonel Brian Jones, interview by Contemporary Operations Studies Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 6 February 2008, 33-34, 38.

42

The Capital of al-Qaedastan

Colonel Sean MacFarland and the 1st BCT, 1st AD replaced 3d ACR in Tall Afar

in February 2006. Operation RESTORING RIGHTS, fought by the 3d ACR in

September-October 2005, had significantly reduced al-Qaeda activity in and around the

city. However, since Tall Afar was on the rat line between Rabiyah Port of Entry on the

Syrian border and Mosul, there were still some hot spots, but AQI no longer owned the

city, according to MacFarland. His mission, therefore, was to continue improving

security, build up the Iraqi police force, strengthen local governance by mentoring Mayor

Najim al Jibouri, improve essential services, and to generally stabilize Tall Afar and the

surrounding area.

In May, however, 1st BCT was ordered to Ar Ramadi to replace the 2d BDE, 28th

ID, PAARNG, under MNF-West I MEF. Colonel MacFarland described the stark

differences between Tall Afar and Ramadi, noting that in Tall Afar there was a dog’s

breakfast of religions and ethnicities – Arabs, Kurds, Turkomen, Shia, Sunni, and

Yazidis. Also, Tall Afar had a mayor, a police chief, some basic government services,

and the Shia population was friendly toward Coalition forces. By comparison, Ramadi

was four times larger than Tall Afar, had no mayor, no city council, no services, no

communications, and everyone was Sunni Arab. When MacFarland arrived in Ramadi,

it was dominated by AQI and referred to in the press as the most dangerous city in the

world. General Casey’s and Lieutenant General Chiarelli’s commander’s guidance for

MacFarland was simply to “fix Ramadi, but don’t do a Fallujah.”90

43

Accordingly, 1st BCT began sealing off Ramadi to block the incoming flow of

weapons and AQI fighters. Next, MacFarland initiated neighborhood-by-neighborhood

clear, hold, and build operations, leaving ISF troops behind to provide security. A

network of combat outposts was established and key terrain features secured, thereby

denying AQI safe haven in the city. MacFarland publicly announced that 1st BCT

Soldiers would remain in Ramadi to protect the local citizens until AQI was completely

defeated. This strategic message resonated with the Ramadi Sheiks and was instrumental

in convincing them to begin cooperating with the Coalition. After the highly respected

Sheik of the Abu Ali Jassim tribe was assassinated by AQI in retaliation, several

remaining Sheiks, led by Sheik Sittar of the Albu Risha tribe, met with MacFarland to

announce their intentions of forming an Awakening movement to fight back against al-

Qaeda. Over the next few weeks across the city, tribe after tribe “flipped over” to the

Coalition side and joined the growing Awakening movement in Ramadi. By the time 1st

BCT redeployed in 2007, the Soldiers had helped Iraqis double the physical size of the

government center in Ramadi. The al-Anbar provincial council had appointed a new

mayor, government officials were going to work and doing their jobs, each combat

outpost had been assigned a civil-military operations center, and the first officially

sanctioned Ramadi Reconstruction Conference had been held at Sheik Sittar’s home.

Ramadi, which was once the capital of “al-Qaedastan,” as Colonel MacFarland described

it, was now the “safest city in all of Iraq.”91

90 Colonel Sean MacFarland, interview by Contemporary Operations Studies Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 19 February 2008, 4; General Casey and Lieutenant General Chiarelli were referring to the Second Battle of Fallujah, known as Operation PHANTOM FURY and Operation Al Fajr in Arabic. On 7 November 2004, two U.S. Marine Corps Regimental Combat Teams along with two U.S. Army heavy battalion sized units attacked Fallujah. In what has been described as some of the heaviest urban combat of OIF, 60 mosques, most containing insurgents and their weapons, were destroyed, approximately 30,000 buildings and half the houses were damaged or destroyed, and more than 200,000 residents were displaced. Casey and Chiarelli wanted Ramadi pacified, but with less physical damage than had occurred in Falujah.

44

Provincial Iraqi Control in Najaf and Karbala Provinces

Upon arriving in Iraq in December 2005, 2d BCT, 4th ID, assumed responsibility

for Babil, Najaf, and Karbala Provinces under the Marines in MNF-West. Soon,

however, AOR boundaries were redrawn, leaving 2d BCT with essentially the same

territory to cover, but reporting now to its parent division – 4th ID, MND-Baghdad.

Colonel John Tully moved the 2d BCT into four FOBs - Hillah, Duke, Iskandariyah, and

Kalsu – and opened several new combat outposts in an effort to control the extensive

AOR he had inherited. As with all U.S. brigade commanders in Iraq, Tully’s mission

was to defeat AQI, train the ISF, and build the legitimacy of the Iraqi government at all

levels.

Tully encountered controversy right away, however, in Babil Province, where the

non-sectarian Iskandariyah police chief, Major General Qais al-Mamori, vigorously

attempted to keep Shia militia members off his force. Qais’ efforts were appreciated by

the provincial sheiks, both Shia and Sunni, but Governor Salim al-Muslimawi, provincial

council members, and Iraqi central government representatives, all of whom were

sectarian Shias, argued repeatedly for the chief’s dismissal. Strong support for Qais from

2d BCT Soldiers was instrumental in his remaining in power.92 Colonel Tully found

dealing with the SCIRI and Dawa Party political leaders in Babil Province

counterproductive, and he preferred to work directly with sheiks and local councils to

promote reconciliation and goodwill. In June, Tully organized a meeting at the Babil

Police Academy in Hillah, where Major General J.D. Thurman, commander, Multi-91 Colonel Sean MacFarland, interview by Contemporary Operations Studies Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 19 February 2008, 5-16, 20.92 Qais was promoted to Lieutenant General, but was killed in December 2007 by a roadside bomb near Hilla.

45

National Division-Baghdad, discussed unity, security, and prosperity with more than 100

sheiks from throughout the province. Although significant progress was made in Babil,

governance in the province remained problematic. In comparison, 2d BCT established

excellent relationships with Governor Asaad Abu Galal in Najaf and eventually with Dr.

Aqeel al-Khazali, governor of Karbala Province. As a result, 2d BCT transitioned

Provincial Iraqi Control in Najaf and Karbala Provinces to the 1st and 4th Brigades of the

8th Iraqi Army Division, respectively, during the spring of 2006.93

Persuading Sunni Tribal Leaders in Yusufiyah

The AO for 2d BCT, 101st Airborne Division, at Camp Striker in South Baghdad

during 2006 included the triangle formed by Yusufiyah, Mahmudiyah, and Lutifiyah,

plus Zaidon Market, the Sadr Yusufiyah area, and north to Abu Ghraib. Although this

region was a hotbed of terrorist and foreign fighter activity, little attention had been paid

to it prior to 2d BCT’s arrival. Brigade Commander, Colonel Todd Ebel, regularly

encountered beheaded dead bodies, the ISF brigade assigned to South Baghdad was

severely under-equipped, there had been three different mayors in Mahmudiyah over a

short period of time, and anti- Iraqi government sentiment ran high in the area. AQI

intimidated the local citizenry and skillfully used financial rewards to recruit IED teams

and snipers. Local Sunni Ghartani tribal leader, Sheik Alwan, eventually disclosed to

Ebel that AQI was paying locals far more cash for services than the Coalition was willing

93 Colonel John Tully, interview by Contemporary Operations Studies Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 14 February 2008, 9-10, 17.

46

to pay for comparable support of GoI activities. As a result, 2d BCT began working

more closely with local government officials and increased CERP expenditures for

infrastructure projects in order to foster better relations with the people.

With the help of USAID, Civil Affairs officer, Major Paul Schmidt, established a

micro loan financing center for the farmers of South Baghdad and Colonel Ebel

significantly expanded distribution of the local newspaper, Baghdad Now, which

proclaimed an anti-terrorist, pro-Iraqi government message. During the first week of

March, 2d BCT launched Operation GLORY LIGHT to gain control of the Sadr

Yusufiyah area and to seal off the Shakaria Triangle that ran along the Euphrates River

near Routes Caveman and Malibu. The operation was highly successful in clearing a

prominent insurgent stronghold, in subsequently preventing AQI movement from

Fallujah to Baghdad, and most importantly in convincing Sunni tribal leaders that the

Coalition would fight terrorists and then physically remain in the area to protect the local

citizens. Colonel Ebel felt that Sunni-Shia reconciliation would move more quickly to

fruition if some degree of amnesty could be worked out. Iraqi tribal leaders referred to

this notion as “turning the page,” Ebel explained. “You literally have to close the book

and forgive.”94

Jump-Starting Governance in Western Baghdad

2d BCT, 1st Armored Division, commanded by Colonel Robert Scurlock, Jr.

arrived in Kuwait from Germany in November 2005 and served initially as the

CENTCOM theater reserve. In 2006, however, 2d BCT was split up with 2-6 Infantry

94 Colonel Todd Ebel, interview by Contemporary Operations Studies Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 11 February 2008, 7, 13, 23-24, 28-30.

47

deploying to Baghdad in February and TFs 1-6 and 1-35 joining 1st BCT, 1st Armored

Division in June at Ramadi. By August, the remainder of the brigade moved to Camp

Liberty and assumed operational responsibility under MNC-I for western Baghdad to

include the Sunni city of Ameriyah, Shia-dominated Shula, Ghazaliyah, the Kadhimiyah

and Abu Ghraib areas, and the Mansoor District. 2d BCT was then augmented with 1-22

Infantry and 8-10 Cavalry from the 4th ID and TF 1-23 from the 3d Stryker BCT, and

immediately began “clear, hold, and build” operations in conjunction with TOGETHER

FORWARD II. “Baghdad had become the main effort,” Colonel Scurlock said.

“Sectarian violence was running rampant…we needed to provide stability.”95

In addition, successful Coalition operations in Ramadi were forcing terrorists,

insurgents, and AQI out of al Anbar Province and into western Baghdad, thereby further

exacerbating sectarian hostilities and prompting Shia militiamen to infiltrate the ISF in

even greater numbers. Concurrently, 2d BCT Soldiers were working with Neighborhood

Advisory Councils to jumpstart the Iraqi governance line of operation and with Sunni

sheiks to encourage reconciliation by involving them in the political process. Scurlock

felt that Iraqis did not yet trust their new government to provide appropriate leadership,

and he saw his role as that of ensuring sufficient security for GoI officials to begin

supplying the people with acceptable levels of essential services. 2d BCT also

established non-sanctioned citizen advisory councils to provide input regarding CERP

funds, which Scurlock used extensively for schools, hospitals, trash cleanup, electrical

grid maintenance, and sewage system repairs in Ghazaliyah. Finally, the brigade’s

engineer battalion assisted PRT Baghdad and coordinated civil-military operations in the

95 Colonel Robert Scurlock, Jr., interview by Contemporary Operations Studies Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 23 January 2008, 8.

48

AO. Colonel Scurlock believed in establishing credibility at the lowest levels, and as

such, he assigned battalion commanders to chair meetings, to meet with local officials,

and to conduct business in their respective areas.96

In many ways, 2006 was a disappointing year for the Coalition. The Iraqi

Ministries – Finance, Health, Oil, Electricity, and Agriculture – never developed as

quickly as anticipated. And, although much of the ISF was now adequately manned and

trained, the GoI could not properly sustain a force that large. This required MNF-I to

remain in the role of supplying the ISF and subsequently resulted in delays in

transitioning security responsibilities. MNC-I Soldiers and Marines could clear and hold

areas and begin building small scale projects, but larger scale projects, those that would

convince Iraqis of the legitimacy of their new government, were not forthcoming. MNF-

I IO efforts designed to persuade Iraqi citizens that their new government was one of true

national reconciliation, were impeded by occurrences in Baghdad that led Sunnis to

believe the new GoI was beginning to follow sectarian policies.97 Shia political leaders

had backed away from military action against Moqtada al-Sadr’s militia out of concern

for alienating the Shia constituency in Baghdad.98 Sunnis also perceived increased

support for Shias from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and Hezbollah in Iraq.99

Additionally, the growing Sunnis apprehension was exacerbated by the fact that since

they had boycotted the January 2005 provincial elections, several Sunni-dominant

provinces, such as Diyala, Salah ad Din, and Ninawa, were controlled by minority Shia

96 Colonel Robert Scurlock, Jr., interview by Contemporary Operations Studies Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 23 January 2008, 6-11, 14, 21-22. 97 Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli, interview by Contemporary Operations Studies Team, Washington, D.C., 28 April 2008, 5-6.98 General John Abizaid, interview by Contemporary Operations Studies Team, Tampa, FL, 10 January 2007, 5.99 Dr. Judith Yaphe, interview by Contemporary Operations Studies Team, Washington, D.C., 29 April 2008, 8.

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governments. Sunni participation in future provincial elections would become a critical

issue.100

Reconciliation in Iraq cannot be viewed as a zero sum game – Sunnis needed an

equitable share of political and economic power, according to 2003-2007 CENTCOM

Commander, General John Abizaid. The Iraqi government must have the willpower to

reconcile and then to stabilize under its own control. “We don’t win until the Iraqis are in

charge,” Abizaid explained.101 Americans are typically impatient for progress, however,

and reconciliation and the transfer of authority in Iraq would take time. Iraqis do not

view time as Americans do. “They have a different cultural appreciation of time…what

are one or two years?” Ambassador Khalilzad noted in describing Iraqi perceptions of

how long it took to get things done.102

Capacity Development – Strengthening Iraq’s Government Ministries

Thirty years of centralized control under Saddam Hussein’s regime resulted in a

serious deterioration of Iraq’s principal ministries and institutions. Saddam’ failure to

develop a strong corps of government civil servants resulted in neglected policies, poor

planning, inadequate financing, ineffective personnel practices, and overall weak

management throughout all of Iraq’s ministries. Unfortunately, the three separate interim

governments that successively assumed control of Iraq after Saddam’s fall also failed to

sufficiently develop appropriate ministerial capacity. Despite U.S. efforts to enhance

100 Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli, interview by Contemporary Operations Studies Team, Washington, D.C., 28 April 2008, 8.101 General John Abizaid, interview by Contemporary Operations Studies Team, Tampa, FL, 10 January 2007, 13.102 Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, interview by Contemporary Operations Studies Team, New York, NY, 30 April 2008, 6.

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ministry capabilities, debaathification under the CPA and the ensuing emigration of

numerous competent Iraqi bureaucrats left most ministries without direction. Also, no

U.S. agency was assigned overall leadership responsibility in Iraq – DoS, DoD, and

USAID each operated semi-autonomously, without an integrated approach.

Note: Add Figure 2, pg 15, GAO- 08-117 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08117.pdf

In many cases, replacement administrators were chosen based on ethnicity rather than

competence. In May 2006 Prime Minister al-Maliki’s new government inherited 34

ministries, all of which had shared responsibility for providing Iraqi citizens with

essential services. Regrettably, however, efforts of CoR legislators to address ministerial

inadequacies after they took office were seriously disrupted by sectarian violence, attacks

by AIF, and on-going instability in Baghdad.103

Note: Add Figure 1, pg 6, GAO- 08-117 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08117.pdf

At the Ministry of Health, for example, years of neglect had created a state of serious

disrepair throughout Iraq’s 240-facility hospital system. Baghdad’s 1000-bed Yarmouk

hospital was able to provide only limited services due in part to insufficient funding and

rampant corruption. Since the beginning of OIF, hundreds of physicians had been

kidnapped or murdered and many more had fled the country. Persistent accusations of

Shia favoritism within the health care system created further distrust of the new

government among Sunnis.104 Despite these setbacks, MNF-I, using CERP funds, had 103 United States Government Accountability Office, “Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq,” GAO-08-117, October 2007, 5-15. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08117.pdf (accessed 21 May 2008).104 In an untranscribed speech at Fort Leavenworth, KS, 22 September 2008, General David Petraeus described the Iraqi Ministry of Health in early 2007 as having been ‘hijacked by Shia militia.”

51

rehabilitated 150 primary care clinics and begun construction on more than 100 new

primary health care centers by yearend 2006. In addition, 5 million Iraqi children and

700,000 pregnant women were vaccinated against infectious diseases, and new medical

equipment was purchased to replace obsolete models. Likewise, the Ministry of

Education, with MNF-I assistance, renovated nearly 6,000 schools and, by early 2007,

supported 500,000 teachers and 6.4 million Iraqi students.105

A Joint Campaign Plan issued in April 2006 by the U.S. Embassy-Iraq and MNF-I

indentified Iraqi ministerial capacity development as a critical strategic objective. This

plan, as did the November 2005 U.S. National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, provided

specific guidelines for capacity development, defined as “activities that lead to the

transfer of knowledge, skills, and abilities across a range of functions over a period of

time…to efficiently establish sustainable operations.”106 While the plan focused on

establishing functional business-type systems to support sustainable infrastructure and

services, responsibilities remained divided between IRMO, USAID, MNSTC-I, and

GRD. In July 2006, the GoI and the United Nations created the International Compact

for Iraq to involve the international community in Iraqi political, economic, and social

development. Finally, in September, Ambassador Khalilzad and MNF-I Commanding

General George Casey established the Joint Task Force on Capacity Development to

coordinate the ministerial capacity building activities of all U.S. government agencies

and to make certain that all such activities were consistent with Joint Campaign Plan

105 Multi-National Force-Iraq, “Operation Iraqi Freedom Three Year Anniversary Progress Fact Sheet,” 23 March 2006, 3. www.defenselink.mil/pubs/word_docs/MNF-I%20Fact%20Sheet%20OIF.doc (accessed 6 June 2008).

52

objectives.107 Nearly $165 million was allocated for ministerial capacity development

projects in 2006, and by early 2007, approximately 380 DoS, DoD, and USAID

personnel were working directly with the various ministries to implement these

projects.108

MNF-I and the Provincial Reconstruction Team Initiative in OIF

During the summer of 2005, newly arrived U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, Zalmay

Khalilzad, suggested establishing Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Iraq, similar

to those with which he had been successful in Afghanistan. Kalilzad had also visited

Kirkuk, where the 116th BCT had already set-up a successful PRT-like organization that

would serve as a model for future reconstruction teams in Iraq.109 Subsequently, Joint

Baghdad Cable 4045, October 2005, officially recommended initiating an Operation Iraqi

Freedom PRT program to help Iraqis develop transparent and sustained provincial

governance capability; promote reconciliation, economic development, security, and the

rule of law; provide essential services; support the Coalition counterinsurgency strategy;

and encourage political moderates.110 Shortly thereafter, Secretary of State Condoleezza

Rice inaugurated PRT Ninawa, the first in Iraq, at FOB Courage, during a surprise visit to

Mosul on 11 November 2006.111

106 Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Status of Ministerial Capacity Development in Iraq,” SIGIR-06-045, 30 January 2007, ii. http://www.sigir.mil/reports/pdf/audits/06-045.pdf (accessed 10 June 2008).107 Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Status of Ministerial Capacity Development in Iraq,” SIGIR-06-045, 30 January 2007, ii-vi, 1-3. http://www.sigir.mil/reports/pdf/audits/06-045.pdf (accessed 10 June 2008).108 United States Government Accountability Office, “Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq,” GAO-08-117, October 2007, 9. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08117.pdf (accessed 21 May 2008).

53

Earlier in OIF, the Coalition Provisional Authority had posted governorate teams to

several Iraqi provinces to help develop local government institutions. As the security

situation deteriorated, however, these teams were eventually consolidated into three

Regional Embassy Offices (REO) in Basrah, Hilla, and Kirkuk. During early 2005,

Brigadier General Alan Gayhart’s 116th BCT in Tamim province worked hand-in-hand

with REO Kirkuk staff members to train provincial Iraqi officials in the basics of good

governance, such as conducting meetings, forming consensus, and following

parliamentary procedures. Their civilian skill sets helped the Idaho Army National

Guard Soldiers work cooperatively with State Department officials and the ethnically

diverse provincial council to significantly improve governance in Tamim – lawyers

mentored Iraqi judges, engineers worked at water treatment plants and sewage disposal

facilities, and police officers assisted Iraqis in setting up Joint Coordination Centers.112

After the January 2005 TNA elections in Iraq, Coalition, State Department, and

Iraqi leaders concluded that three regional offices were insufficient to satisfactorily

monitor, train, and influence Iraq’s local and provincial governments. Thus, the seeds

were sown for once again reaching out to the provinces and initiating the Iraq PRT

program. In addition to PRT Ninawa, the United States managed six other PRTs in Iraq

by the end of 2006:

PRT Tamim…………Kirkuk Regional Air Base PRT Salah al-Din….. Tikrit, Camp Speicher PRT Diyala…………Baquba, FOB Warhorse

109 Brigadier General Alan Gayhart, interview by Contemporary Operations Studies Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 3 January 2008, 15.110 Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, “Action Plan to Build Capacity and Sustainability within Iraq’s Provincial Governments,” Baghdad Cable 004045, 1 October 2005, 1-11.111 Secretary Condoleezza Rice, “Remarks at the Inauguration of the Provincial Reconstruction Team,” 11 November 2005, 1-2. http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/56794.htm (accessed 24 July 2008). 112 Brigadier General Alan Gayhart, interview by Contemporary Operations Studies Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 3 January 2008, 9-10.

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PRT Babil…………..Hillah, Regional Embassy Office PRT Anbar………….Ramadi, Camp Blue Diamond PRT Baghdad………Green Zone, Freedom Building

Three additional PRTs, also established in 2006, were led by the United Kingdom, Italy,

and South Korea – PRT Basra at Basra Air Station, PRT Dhi Qar at Camp Adder in

Nasiriyah, and PRT Erbil at Camp Zaytun, respectively. The Department of State also

created six Iraqi-staffed quasi-PRTs that never established a permanent presence in the

provinces they served. PRTs Najaf, Karbala, Wasit, and Qadisiyah were stationed at the

Hillah Regional Embassy Office with PRT Babil, while PRTs Maysan and Muthanna

were based alongside Italian PRT Dhi Qar at Camp Adder.113

Whereas U.S. PRTs in Afghanistan were comprised primarily of military personnel

and led by an Army Lieutenant Colonel, Iraqi PRTs were staffed with civilians and

commanded by State Department officials who reported to the U.S. Embassy National

Coordination Team at the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office. The intended PRT

complement was sixty to ninety members, including representatives from the departments

of State, Defense, Agriculture, and Justice, USAID, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,

RTI International contractors, Iraqi civilian contractors and interpreters, and

approximately twenty U.S. Army Civil Affairs Soldiers.114

Note: Add PRT ORG Chart from “Status of PRT Program in Iraq, 29 October

2006, pg 22 http;//www.sigir.mil/reports/pdf/audits/06-034.pdf

PRTs in Iraq were organized around five principle areas of program emphasis:

governance, rule of law, economic development, reconstruction, and political

113 U.S. Department of State, “Report to Congress: Section 1227 Report on Iraq,” 5 January 2007, 3-4. http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rpt/1227/80963.htm (accessed 19 March 2008).114 RTI International is a trade name of Research Triangle Institute.

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reconciliation. This chapter will describe only those PRT activities involving governance

and reconciliation. First, however, a brief summary of the impact security had on PRT

operations throughout Iraq is in order. The lack of adequate security adversely

influenced PRT operations across all five areas of emphasis. Progress in improving local

governance was especially constrained due to insurgent intimidation and, in some

instances, assassination of provincial officials, council members, and ministry

representatives, who often refused to attend meetings or perform their assigned duties.

Local Iraqi leaders were reluctant to be seen in public with their U.S. advisors or to be

observed entering or leaving PRT facilities. Conversely, PRT members became

concerned that they were jeopardizing the safety of local Iraqis by openly conducting

official business with them. Cell phone calls and e-mails often replaced face-to-face

meetings. Occasionally, PRT leaders and Iraqi provincial officials arranged for seminars

and conferences to be held outside the country. Although these improvised methods of

doing PRT business were often creative, they were an imperfect alternative to the daily

contact and close working relationships ideally envisioned. As the security environment

in Iraq improved, so too did the efficiency and effectiveness of PRT operations.

PRT Support of Governance and Reconciliation in Northern Iraq

South Korean-led PRT Erbil at Camp Zaytun served Iraq’s Kurdish Region, which

included Erbil, Dahuk, and Sulaymaniyah Provinces where local governments functioned

relatively smoothly.115 PRT Ninawa, headquartered in Mosul, expanded westward by

establishing an office in Tall Afar, while PRT Salah ad Din in Tikrit opened facilities in

115 Brigadier General Alan Gayhart, interview by Contemporary Operations Studies Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 3 January 2008, 8.

56

Samara, Baiji, and Balad. The mixed ethnic population, unresolved Article 140 territorial

issues, and failure of the CoR to pass a Provincial Powers Act made governance in these

provinces, as well as in Tamim province, more problematic.116 Policies established by the

governor and provincial council members in Tamim were often influenced by Kurdish

political parties.117 Arabs and Turkmen, battling for power with Kurds, regularly

boycotted Tamim council sessions and the Shia-dominated Balad city council typically

by-passed Salah ad Din provincial leaders, preferring to work exclusively with central

government representatives in Baghdad.118 Despite these difficulties, however, PRT

members, who trained and coached provincial officials in northern Iraq, observed

significant improvements in Iraqi governance skills throughout 2006 with respect to

organizing and conducting council meetings, establishing local government task forces,

and resolving fuel distribution questions.

In Mosul, PRT Ninawa Deputy Commander, Colonel Bruce Grant, organized his

mix of civilian and military personnel around the basic mission requirements – to build

capacity within the provincial government, to help Iraqi officials become more

independent, and to hasten the development of permanent democratic institutions. Grant

coordinated regularly with 172d SBCT commander, Colonel Michael Shields, who

oversaw the Mosul battlespace, to make certain that their respective messages to local

Iraqi leaders were consistent. In addition, Colonel Grant traveled from FOB Courage to

both the government center and the council hall in downtown Mosul up to four times a

116 Multi-National Force-Iraq, “The Program of the National Unity Government of Iraq,” 7 August 2006, 2. http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1815&Itemid=99 (accessed 22 April 2008).117 PRT Monthly Report, “Kirkuk (Tamim) Governance Assessment,” March 2006, unpublished PowerPoint presentation on file at the U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 3.118 Brigadier General Alan Gayhart, interview by Contemporary Operations Studies Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 3 January 2008, 8.

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week for meetings with the governor and the provincial council chairman. In June 2006,

Grant moved PRT Ninawa south to FOB Marez, which was near the Mosul airfield and

closer to the government center. This move helped facilitate PRT Ninawa’s Provincial

Outreach Program through which provincial officials were transported out to the districts

and sub districts to hear first hand the concerns of local Iraqi citizens, thus making

government more accountable to the people. “Establishing democracy and making an

institution work that had never been in place before was very difficult,” Colonel Grant

emphasized in an interview conducted after he returned to Florida in October 2006.119

At Camp Speicher, just north of Tikrit, PRT Salah ad Din leader Stephanie Miley

concentrated 100% on successfully executing the counterinsurgency mission in

accordance with U.S. national interests. Miley, a seasoned State Department Foreign

Service officer who had previously served in Iraq as acting executive secretary for the

Coalition Provisional Authority, led PRT Salah ad Din for a year beginning April 2006.

She organized the 35-member PRT along four lines of operation – governance, rule of

law, economic development, and infrastructure integration, and saw capacity and

institution building at the provincial government level as her primary focus, along with

convincing Iraqis to begin using their own resources and to recognize that they actually

had a stake in their own future. Large numbers of former regime officials resided in

Salah ad Din, since Tikrit was Saddam Hussein’s hometown. They seriously objected to

the foreign military presence in their province and saw Americans as occupiers, but soon

began working with the civilian-led PRT in what they considered more typical

government-based interactions. At first, Miley had a Blackwater Worldwide security

119 Colonel Bruce Grant, Operational Leadership Experiences interview, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 24 October 2006, 11.

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detachment, but switched to a U.S. military movement team in July. She and members of

her staff traveled nearly every day to Tikrit or to visit the civil affairs teams in Baiji and

Samarra. Miley felt that the 3d BCT, 101st ABN, the unit that owned the battlespace,

neither totally accepted her PRT’s presence, nor fully understood her mission.120 The 3d

BCT concentrated primarily on kinetic activity and, as such, failed to wholeheartedly

appreciate the application of what Miley referred to as soft power – driving out insurgents

by strengthening the foundations of society. 3d BCT, 82nd ABN, was more supportive

of what Miley was attempting to accomplish when they assumed responsibility for Salah

ad Din in September 2006. Miley began meeting with Colonel Bryan Owens and his

staff several time weekly, and she felt that the 82nd Soldiers had a stronger sense of

partnership with the Iraqi people and were more in tune with her desires to help create a

functioning self-government that would eventually lead to a strong, stable, and secure

Iraq.121

Unfortunately, political reconciliation among sectarian local officials and tribal

leaders did not materialize in 2006 as expected by northern Iraq PRT team leaders.

Continued uncertainty over territorial concerns and provincial powers stalemated

progress as sectarian political groups simply held their ground, despite PRT efforts to

promote compromise.122

120 Colonel Michael Steele, commander of 3d BCT, 101st ABN, in an interview with the Contemporary Operations Studies Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 13 March 2008, remarked that having State Department people wandering around on a mystery tour doing whatever they thought was good was in tension with his holistic plan for the battlespace. Steele described PRT Salah ad Din leader Stephanie Miley as “a little Dudley Do-Right” running around wanting to do this and that to help the provincial governor. “You don’t understand the whole picture,” Steele told Miley, “the governor is involved in the black market.” But she was just off “giving open mouth kisses left and right,” Steele explained. “It was completely incongruent with where we were trying to go…and just a constant pain in the butt.” 121 Stephanie Miley, Operational Leadership Experiences interview, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 4 February 2008, 6-12.122 Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Review of the Effectiveness of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq, 18 October 2007, 9-10, 13. http://www.sigir.mil/reports/pdf/audits/07-015.pdf (accessed 3 April 2008).

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PRT Support of Governance and Reconciliation in Western Iraq

As a result of the Anbar Awakening, Sunni Arabs in al Anbar Province turned

against AQI and began to throw their support behind the new Iraqi government. Once

Iraq’s most violent province, Anbar began to show signs of increasing tranquility toward

the end of 2006. After having withdrawn to Baghdad earlier in the year, the Anbar

provincial council was now making plans to return to Ramadi, as were several prominent

sheiks, who had fled to Jordan. The earlier lack of security, however, had limited PRT

Anbar’s efforts to help improve Iraqi governance in the province. Also, ineffective

working relationships between the various levels of government – provincial, city, and

local councils – delayed the timely delivery of essential services and obstructed progress

in establishing province-wide good governance. PRT Anbar officials focused their

attentions on further developing communication skills among all levels of Iraqi political

leadership in the province. Additionally, PRT Anbar leaders skillfully influenced the

Shia-dominated central government in Baghdad to increase federal funding allocations

for Anbar province, which was predominately Sunni.

Since most of the inhabitants of al Anbar were Sunni Muslims, political

reconciliation in the province was not a major obstacle, particularly in light of the

population’s rebuke of AQI. PRT officials were primarily concerned with the

reemergence of festering tribal conflicts over political and economic power in Anbar.

Establishing a reasonable working relationship between the Shia central government and

Sunnis in Anbar also remained a high priority reconciliation issue for PRT Anbar civilian

and military personnel.123

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PRT Support of Governance and Reconciliation in Central Iraq

Since March 2006, PRT Baghdad has operated out of the International Zone with

79 members dedicated to strengthening provincial level Iraqi governance by encouraging

local officials to become more fully engaged in the political process. Despite serious on-

going security risks throughout the city, PRT Baghdad personnel made nearly 1500 trips

during 2006 into dangerous red zone areas for meetings with Iraqi political leaders.

Meanwhile, AQI, expelled from al Anbar by the Sunni Awakening, began migrating to

Diyala Province in mid 2006. Local Sunnis asked the newly arrived AQI to provide

protection against Shia death squads operating in the province. In spite of the

exacerbated security situation, PRT Diyala representatives continued to work directly

with provincial leaders to promote good governance. Coalition forces drove AQI fighters

from Diyala the following year during Operation ARROWHEAD RIPPER.

After the December 2005 TNA elections, Shias continued to dominate the national

political spectrum in Iraq. Sunnis were essentially marginalized as Shias sought to

consolidate political gains. In Baghdad, only a few Sunnis retained ministerial or

bureaucratic positions, while in Diyala, Sunni leaders were often cut off from the Shia-

led central government. To make matters worse, in Diyala, the governor was a Shia, the

deputy governor a Sunni, and the provincial council chairman a Kurd. Each was drawn

to his own sectarian interests, thus making basic governance in Diyala all the more

troublesome. Despite these and numerous additional difficulties encountered, PRT

Baghdad was able to facilitate improvements to the citywide education system and to

123 Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Review of the Effectiveness of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq, 18 October 2007, 13-14, 16. http://www.sigir.mil/reports/pdf/audits/07-015.pdf (accessed 3 April 2008).

61

continue a series of training programs for local officials. At both PRTs Baghdad and

Diyala, members concentrated their efforts on helping Iraqis improve communications

between local, provincial, and central government officials and they began to emphasize

interacting with Iraqi moderates of all persuasions, regardless of ethnic ties.

Political reconciliation was slow to materialize in Baghdad and Diyala provinces

during 2006. In Baghdad, PRT members experienced difficulty identifying and

recruiting competent Iraqis to become involved in reconciliation activities. In many

mixed neighborhoods, only the presence of MNF-I forces prevented ethnic cleansing.

However, Baghdad province’s Shia governor began visiting Sunni districts in 2006, Shia

provincial officials began distributing essential services to some Sunni neighborhoods,

and several local Sunnis showed a willingness to meet with Shia sheiks as the year

progressed. Additionally, In efforts reminiscent of the Sunni Awakening in al Anbar,

PRT Diyala began facilitating local tribal resistance to AQI and other extremist groups

that intimidated Iraqi government leaders in the province.124

PRT Support of Governance and Reconciliation in South-Central Iraq

PRT Babil, co-located at the Regional Embassy Office in al Hillah, serviced five

province in the Shia stronghold of south-central Iraq – Babil, Karbala, Najaf, Qadisiyah,

and Wasit. Growing Iranian influence and convoy security difficulties regularly

interfered with PRT member’s efforts to meet directly with local Iraqi leaders in all but

124 Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Review of the Effectiveness of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq, 18 October 2007, 17-19, 24-25. http://www.sigir.mil/reports/pdf/audits/07-015.pdf (accessed 3 April 2008).

62

southern Babil Province. Sectarian violence and the presence of Shia militias in

ethnically mixed northern Babil frequently disrupted PRT attempts to train and mentor

provincial officials. Additionally, Babil Governor, Salim al-Muslimawi, often competed

with the provincial council for power and influence.125 Similarly, fighting between rival

Shia militia groups prevented all PRT travel to Qadisiyah province during the second half

of 2006. Overall, however, the governance skills of provincial officials improved

incrementally during the year, as leaders in all five provinces prepared to write Provincial

Development Strategy plans.

Political reconciliation in Shia-dominated south-central Iraq was not a significant

problem, except for northern Babil province and along the Babil-Wasit border, where

sectarian violence and insurgent infiltration were nearly unmanageable. Since the

minority Sunnis had no voice in provincial governance, Shia officials made little effort to

reconcile differences. Instead, the three principal south-central Shia political parties –

Organization of Martyr Sadr, Islamic Supreme Council, and Islamic Dawa – fought

amongst themselves for power and prestige in the region.126

PRT Support of Governance and Reconciliation in Southeastern Iraq

In Basrah Province, local political parties battled for control of oil resources and

port facilities during 2006, while comparatively peaceful, nonviolent, conditions

prevailed in Dhi Qar, Maysan, and Muthunna Provinces. Due to increasing violence, the

British PRT at Basrah was forced to relocate from the British Embassy Office to Kuwait

125 PRT Monthly Report, “Babil Governance Assessment,” 31 March 2006, unpublished PowerPoint presentation on file at the U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 3.126 Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Review of the Effectiveness of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq, 18 October 2007, 25-26, 28. http://www.sigir.mil/reports/pdf/audits/07-015.pdf (accessed 3 April 2008).

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in late 2006. A small contingent of PRT members remained in Iraq at Basrah Air Station.

Since Italian-led PRT Dhi Qar at Tallil Air Base near al Nassiriyah faced a relatively

friendly environment, they were able to established excellent working relationships with

provincial officials. The permissive security situation in Muthanna province was

likewise conducive to uncomplicated and productive interactions with provincial

officials. In Maysan Province, however, citizens still harbored considerable animosity

over the lack of U.S support for the ill-fated Gulf War Shia uprising against Saddam. As

a result, Maysan provincial officials severed ties with all Coalition forces after a minor

provocation in early 2006. Henceforth, meetings between PRT representatives and

Maysan leaders were conducted either in Basrah or outside the country. During 2006,

governance in southeastern Iraq improved incrementally with increased participation and

transparency and an overall broader outlook.

Since few Sunnis or Kurds inhabited southeastern Iraq, cultivating political

reconciliation in the region was not a major challenge for PRT members. However,

disputes among Shia factions in Basrah and the increasing presence of JAM in Maysan

distracted and disrupted PRT efforts to advance the principles of good governance in the

region.127

Embedded PRTs and “The New Way Forward”

In January 2007, President Bush announced plans to add 13 more PRTs that would

be embedded with Brigade and Regimental Combat Teams taking part in the “New Way

Forward” surge strategy in Baghdad, Anbar, and Erbil Provinces. The inherent security

127 Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Review of the Effectiveness of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq, 18 October 2007, 29-30, 32. http://www.sigir.mil/reports/pdf/audits/07-015.pdf (accessed 3 April 2008).

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provided by being embedded with B/RCTs would allow ePRTs to spend considerably

more time in the field with Iraqi political officials. Plans called for ePRTs to be staffed

initially with National Guard and Reserve Soldiers, along with DoD civilian personnel,

who would eventually be replaced by State Department contractors. A Foreign Service

officer, who reported to the Office of Provincial Affairs at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad,

commanded each of the new teams, which also included a USAID member, an Army

Civil Affairs officer, and a cultural advisor. Additional specialists were to be added to

respective ePRTs as skills required in particular locations were identified. Whereas the

original PRTs described above dealt with provincial governors and central government

ministerial representatives, ePRTs concentrated on establishing strong relationships with

sub-provincial, district, and municipal Iraqi officials to resolve governance issues,

improve essential services, and facilitate political reconciliation.128

Conclusion - Spiraling Up or Spiraling Down 129

In August 2006, Iraqi leaders and Bush Administration officials agreed on a

series of 18 “benchmarks for progress,” that if successfully implemented, would hasten

political reconciliation and help build a multi-ethnic, multi-sectarian, government in Iraq.

Note: Add list of 18 Benchmarks from CRS 21968

http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/108305.pdf

128 Robert M. Perito, “Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams,” United States Institute of Peace Briefing, March 2008. http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefing/2008/0305_prt.html (accessed 18 March 2008).129 General David Petraeus’s description of the contrasting situations in Iraq from Dexter Filkins, “Exiting Iraq, Petraeus Says Gains are Fragile,” New York Times, 21 August 2008, A6.

65

By January 2007, the GoI had adopted laws relating to investments, geographic regions,

and the Independent High Electoral Commission. The additional benchmark laws

involving important issues, such as constitutional review, oil and gas regulation,

provincial powers, de-Baathification, and curbing militias, were all stalled within the

CoR for a variety of ethnic and political reasons. Also, the long-promised referendum

mandated in the constitution to decide whether Kirkuk would join the Kurdish controlled

region or be divided equally between Kurds, Arabs, and Turkomans as stipulated in a

draft election law, had been postponed several times with no new time table

established.130 It was and is all about power in Iraq – regional versus centralized.

Religion and sectarianism have little to do with problems currently facing Iraqis,

according to Distinguished Research Fellow, Dr. Judith Yaphe, at the Institute for

National Strategic Studies. “It has everything to do with power…how to divide power…

how to share power.”131

The United States’ strategic objectives for Iraq remained unchanged for 2007 – a

democratic, unified, federalist country capable of governing, defending, and sustaining

itself, and willing to serve as an ally in the war on terror. Sectarian violence in 2006,

however, undercut the accomplishments achieved by Iraqis in 2005 with the national

constitutional referendum and legislative elections and significantly encumbered the

timely progress of good governance in Baghdad. Similarly, national reconciliation was

also undermined by sectarian violence, in which Sunnis turned to AQI, and Shia to JAM

and death squads, for support and protection. Numerous attempts by Prime Minister al-

130 Kenneth Katzman, “Iraq: Reconciliation and Benchmarks,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress RS21968, 4 August 2008, 3-6. http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/108305.pdf (accessed 29 August 2008). 131 Dr. Judith Yaphe, interview by Contemporary Operations Studies Team, Washington, D.C., 29 April 2008, 12, 15.

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Maliki to encourage reconciliation and national unity by reaching out to former Baathists

were typically rejected by Sadrists, Baathist leaders, and various Sunni splinter groups.

On the international front, however, al-Maliki was able to re-establish diplomatic

relations with Syria and to reopen the Iraqi Embassy in Saudi Arabia.132

Despite MNF-I / MNC-I efforts to clear, hold, and build, the increases in security

and stability anticipated with Operations TOGETHER FORWARD I and II, had not

materialized in Iraq as of January 2007. Good governance throughout the country was

moving slowly, as was Sunni-Shia reconciliation. Accordingly, President Bush

announced the “New Way Forward,” a revised security initiative designed to provide

further protection for the citizens of Baghdad, to urge the Iraqi government to move

forward more aggressively, and to better cultivate political reconciliation. An additional

17,500 combat Soldiers would be deployed to Baghdad, along with 4000 Marines to

Anbar Province, in order to hold and protect neighborhoods cleared of insurgents. The

new initiative also called for greater cooperation from the Iraqi government in promoting

reconciliation, in accelerating progress on the benchmark issues described above, and in

allowing Coalition combat operations against JAM militias. The “troop surge” would

eventually prove successful in substantially reducing violence in Iraq. Political leaders

would begin fulfilling their obligations, average citizens would go about their daily lives

free from fear, and Sunnis would join in the fight against Al Qaeda. However, would

these achievement lead to reconciliation and would Sunnis ever truly support the Shia-led

government?

132 DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, Report to Congress, March 2007, 1-4.

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Kenneth Katzman, a highly regarded Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs at the

Congressional Research Service, suggests reorganizing Iraq’s political structure in order

to reconcile political differences. Adopting the so-called Lebanon model, in which each

major faction is allocated a certain number of high-level political positions, may be

effective in Iraq – a Shia PM, a Kurdish President, and a Sunni CoR Speaker, for

example. An alternative approach, described as the 80% solution, involves curtailing

efforts to appease Sunnis and simply allowing the dominant Shia and Kurdish factions to

run the country. The hard partition approach involves creating three separate countries

out of present-day Iraq, one Sunni, one Kurdish, and one Shia. Finally, the soft partition

variation would allow Iraqis to form three autonomous regions, each dominated by one of

the major political factions. Decentralizing Iraq in this manner would be consistent with

the notion of federalism denoted in the constitution and would preserve Iraq’s territorial

integrity.133

Regardless of what the future has in store for Iraq, Multi-National Force-Iraq’s

success in bringing peace, prosperity, and democracy to that country must be viewed as a

highly significant accomplishment and can never be underestimated. Governance in Iraq

may never develop as the United States wants it to. But, as Dr. Judith Yaphe points out,

“just as it looks like they are about to do the worst… just as things are at their bleakest,

Iraqis come up with interesting compromises and agreements are reached.”134

133 Kenneth Katzman, “Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress RL31339, 12 August 2008, 56-58. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL31339.pdf (accessed 29 August 2008).134 Dr. Judith Yaphe, interview by Contemporary Operations Studies Team, Washington, D.C., 29 April 2008, 17-18.

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