atilio a. boron - empire and imperialism, a critical reading of michael hardt and antonio negri
DESCRIPTION
In 2001, the Harvard scholar Michael Hardt and the independent Italian left wing intellectual Toni Negri published a modern critique of imperialism. The book was widely criticized by left wing intellectuals who felt that the book posed unfortunate implications for political resistance to imperialism, and that it ignored both the experience and intellectual analysis of thinkers from the South. Atilio Boron is one of those. He argues that Hardt and Negri's concept of "imperialism without an address", though well intentioned, ignores most of the fundamental parameters of imperialism. The nation state, far from weakening, remains a crucial agent of capitalism, deploying a large arsenal of economic weaponry to protect and extend its position and actively promoting globalization in its own interests.TRANSCRIPT
Empire & Imperialism A Critical Reading of Michael HardL and Antonio Negri
AnUO A BORON
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About this book
Harvard acholar Mic:hael Hardt and Italian 1�l'twing intelJ«tuaJ Toni
NelJrl's major book, Emplrr, quickly became 0 huge bestseller wh�n it WH publlahed in the United States. It W85 widely lauded by or
gans, such a' the NN York TiIJlt:s, not usually known for their think·
ing in terms of empi� and Imperialism. But many intellectuals in
other parts of the world - among them Atillo Boron - �re deepl)'
disturbed by the book, reeling that It was analytically misconceived,
undermiMCI poUlkai resistance to imperialism, and igaomllhe
concme experience and inteUmual analysis of the Third World.
Alilio Boron argues that Hardt and Negri's concept of 'imperial
ism without an address', however well intentioned their commit
ment to buman emancipation and a Muer world, Ignora the
fundamental parametrrs of modern imperialilm. Professor Boron
unpicks thrir argumenl5 and confronts them wim me social, «a
nomic and political �alides of intensified capi:talm exploitation in
today's world. Among Ihe trenchant prunts he makes:
The nation Illite, rar trom being weak�ned, remaiM a crucial
ag.:nt of th� capltallll! core, deploying a la� anenal of eco
nomic weaponry to protect and extend its position, and actively
promoting globalization in hs own interests. It is only the state
in the periphery thaI has �n dramllrlcally wukC'ned - in frla·
lion both 10 transnational corporations and to l-ore states and
supranalional enlitie5like the US and the EU.
Hardt and Negri are also wrong, he argues. in picturing produc·
lion under globalization 115 disregarding nalional frontiers, This
does nOI apply to labour. nor to cutting-ed� t«hnology.
And their substltulion or a nebulous 'mullitude' for identiftable
social forces lind antagonistic social groups merely confuses
political reality, as does the'lr curious depktion or Ihe' super
rxploiled Third World migrant worker as II postmodem hem who
is changing Ihe world.
Boron conclud� that Empirt is • libertarian pessimist product
of thtl defeat of th� socialist left in the 11)805 and 1990S. Ics authof5
have ablUldoned social theory In favour of a poetic abstraction
which rovers up the reality of a globalization process whose more
cynical apologists do nOI helltale in p�senllng as a proJ«tion of
American power,
Critical prflUeforthu book
'11Ii5 i51 a pGWI!rful polemic, in the best RnH of the word, ap.inst
a t'uneatly fashionable book. But it I. also mont than tbaL Bt)'ond
his lRnchant enpguuent with lbe arpnnen15 of Marcil and Negri,
Boron offen. In acceuibJe prolllC, his own insightful and eloquent
IInalyais of today" "globalized" world and the posaibilities of Its transformation. lhe fruitful rombinadan of theoretical ripr and
clarity, empiriaal analysis and polldcal passion is jlUt tIw kind 01 thingW'e need on the lelL' EU.n /rIeiHitU Wood, alllho,ofEmp� orCaplw
'Atillo Boron moantl a �re, but neceauy, critidam of the
poslllolU put forward by Hardt and Negri, who ... have aligned
themselva with the anempt by IntelllJent rigbcwingel1l to neutral·
iu the potential for popular mobJUaadon on the part of mO¥mlentl
supportive of a different Idnd of gJobalhation.' SamJr A min
''nIe IiCOpe oflhis lucid and careful disSft'tion of widely held beliefs
about the emerging world order extends well beyond lf1tt inftuential
study that is Ita immediate targft.. Boron strips away layer after layer
of mlrrundentanding concerning "old imperialism" and its cumnt
variants. He reviews the penlstence of the drive to conllOl natural
resoun:cs, the reliance of transnational firms on a powerful home
state, the dangers of a\'Oiding political economy, and much else. He
brlnp out clearly tbe need for "an adequate s�ial canoeraphyof
1M fteld" where an -emanC'lpatory bame" must be waged If It iii to
havt' any hope of success. In a critique of common illusions about
contemporary aociety. Boron Identifies and strelsn the significance
of social ron:cl thaI have eme� and are enp� In the c1usic: ItNggtes that ronstantly take new forms, but �f1ect much the same
duper institutional factors and conOicling Imerests. 'nib valuable
study develops an Imponanl penpec:tive on present realities and on
what must be done to carry forward .,..t ach�menlJ In emancipa
tion from Injustl�, opprasion, and degradation: NOlI'" C"OIftIkJ
'It is highly appropriate that the IDOl! mnchant and devastating
critique oC Hardt and Negri's mlstakrn and oonfuse'CI notions of a
deterrltorialized and decenacred Empire sbould have come from
one of the most crea� and committed sodali..: intdJcctuals in the
continent that hal had the most 8nt-hand experience of the artUaI workinll of American Impertallam.. Writing in the tradition of-and
in the procca doing much to � - 1M Latin American debates
on dependency, neo-c:olonlalism and imperialism oflhe 19']01, Boron not only confronts Hardt and Nqri's abatraL'rions with .�
prosaic Latin American contemporary mality', but aubj«ts melt
work to a profound th�retical and empirim refutation. Writtrn
\\ith ocepdonal WM and often biting hUmour, this is a book that
especially desenres to be rud by all those ac:tlviIU who, a. Boron
aptly notes in the preface to this new English edition, haw been
Influenced by Hardt and Negri's 'aevere mlatakea of diagnosis and
interpretation, which. il8ccepted by tM group. and orpnlzations
that today are tIyinglo defeat imperialism, could become the cause
or new and long-luting defelts.' Uo Ptmitch. C�Editor, SOCiaUst
Regisler; Carulda R�turh Chair in ComparrzUw Politiclll Economy
and DininpJ.h«J Re.eatrh PrrJ/rllor of Polirica/ SciMC�, York Uniw,.. sity. Canada
Abouc the author
AliIlo A. Boron is Exec:utiw SecrWlry of the Latin American Council
of Social Sciences (Cl.I\CSO) and Professor of Political Theory at the
Unlftnil)' of Buenos Aires. He we. educ:ated In .vpntina and Chile,
before doing his doctoral depft at H8J\IlIJ'd in the United S1ate5.
He ha. taught at some of the mOld important academic IRltlhl
tiona in Argentina. Bra.il, Chile, Mexico and Pueno Rico. In the
Unhed States he has bftn a vilirilll profeBSOl' at the universities of
Columbia, Mrr, Notre Dame and UCLA, and in Britain hu ledUred
at Wuwlck and Bradford u.rtiwnities. He is the author or editor or nint' t>ook. (In a numlwr of IJInguaps), lnefuellng Stall, CapittlUsm tJnd DDrlocrocy in Latill America (1995). His particular interat i5 the
relationship � IlatH. markets and d� durin, the prOCftS of neo-liberaI rntructuring. 10 2004 he was awarded lhto
Cay de las America. Prize for 'Empirr' tlrullmp�rltlIJ.m.
ATILIO A. BORON
Empire and imperialism
A critical rcading of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri
lrilnslalnl by Jessica Casiro
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Contents
Acknowledgements I vill Prc£acC' I t
Prologue to the English-language edition I 6
I On perspectives, the limits of viliibility and blind spots I �3
2 Tbe constitution oftbe empire I �6
3 Markets. transnationa1 corporations and national economies I 42
4 Alternative visions oBhe empire I 58 J The nation-state and the Issue of sOllereignty I 73
6 111(' unsolved mystery of the multitude I 87
7 Notes for a sociology of revolutiona", thinking in times of defeat I gB
• 111e persistence of imperialism I 1 11
Epilogue 1111
Bibliography I 115
Index of proper names I 130
Geneml index 1136
Acknowledgements
A number of people have read all or pan of the manu
script, making possible the completion of this book.
Special thanks are due to Ivana Brighenti, Florencia
F.nghel, Jorge Fraga, Sabrina Gonzaln, Bellina In'y,
Migud Rossi, Jose Seoane, Emilio Taddei and Andrea
Vlahusic for their encouragement, comml'nl5 and
criticism. Jessica Casiro did a superb job of translating
the I1Ilher baroque original Spanish into an austere but
Mill lively Engtish. Of cou rliC , none oflhem should be
blamed for the errors and short<.'Omings of the book,
caused entirely by the stubbornness of its author.
Preface
First, a little bit or histol)'. (n september 1001, one of the editors
of New L�ft Rt1I;ew invited me to contribute a chapter to a col
lection of essays to be published by Verso in London. The book
was to contain a series or critical commentaries about Emp;n by
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000); their �pon� wouJd
be added laler) Given that my contribution rrached Inordinate
proponions, it was clear that it could not be included in that
book. Far from being discoura�d, I realized that the work I had
already done. considering the importance of the theme, deserved
a fresh start, so, after broadening some analyses, enlarging on a
few commenlS, adding new data and new refiections, the result
wall thlB book.
What is related in the previous paragraph is the fesuh of his
lOry and circumstances. '[bere �re also more important reasons
Ihat inspired me to write my book. First, th� was the need to
consider vel)' seriously the work of two scholars of the intellectual
calibre of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. Their In�lIectual and
politil.'81 trajectories, so broad and proliflc, es�dally in the case
of the latter, make them deserving of respect and for that reason
1 t'lUlmined vel)' carefully the assenions they made throughout
Empin, 0 polemic that had such a strong public impact. second,
Ihe subject matterofthis book is of great importance: the empire,
or, to use a definition that seems to me more appropriate, the
imperialist system in its current phase.
Th� difficulties in undC'rtaking such a task are many. I sha� the
authors' critical view or capitalism and neoliMral globalization,
, "1"Iw book a�. aftrr rol\5i�Rblt drily. in 100J without thr final rhllprrr by Hardt and Negri. Seor Balakri.bnan (1003).
" and applaud th�ir courage in examining such a crucial topic. \I
.2 In Cart, DO matt� how deeply I disagree with Hardt and Negri'. !
� interp�18tions, I must admit that their nvision and update of
the subject were necessary both because the deficiencies of con
ventional analyses of the left with regard to the transformations
coxperienc:ed by bnperla1ism over the last �nry-fM: years had
become impossible to igno� and needed lII'gmt updating, and
because the shortcomings of the 'pemh unique' on this matter
- spread urbi rt orb; by the lMF, the World Bank and the ideo
logical agencies of the imperiaJ system - to which the neoliberal
theory of globalization gives expression, are even gRater. For
those like t.he writer of this book, to whom the fundamental
mJIsion of both philosophy and political theory is to change the
world aDd not just to interpret it (to dte the weU-known 'Thesl.a
on Feuerbach' by Marx), a correct theoryconstltutet an invaluable
tool with which the popular movements that resist neoliberal
globalization can navigate, with a reasoMble amount of accuracy,
through the lrOubled waten of contemporary eapiblJism. One of
the main factors inspiring this book Is my sttong beUef th.t Hardt
and Negri's reapon� to this chaUenge i, bighly unsatisfactory,
and that it could lead to new political defeats.
It is mdent that a phenomenon such as toclay's imprrialism
- its structure, its logic of functioning, its consequences and
its conuadlctJona - cannot be adequately understood from a
close reading of classic texts by Hilferding, Lenin, Bukharin and
Rosa Luxemburg. Thit is not because they were wrong, a. the
right lOYd to claim, but because capitalism is a changing and
dynamic Jystem that, as Marx and EnpJswrote in the Communist
MQniJ�stD, 'constantly rrvolutionlzes itst"lr. Therefo�, we cannot
understand early nftnry-Hrlt-antury imperialism by mcling only
those authors, but nclth� can we undel'lltalld It without them.
The goal Is to mOft forwards in a reformulation that, depaning
from the Copernican rn'Olution produced by Man's work. which
provides us with an interpretatift due that is essential for explain·
ing capitalist society, will mnlt'rpret with audadty and creativity
the clusic:al heritap of studies on imperialism in the Upt of
the transformations of the prnenL Today's imperialism is not
the same as the one that existed thirty �ars ago; it has changed,
and In some ways the chan� has b�n ftry imponanl, but it
has not changed into iu opposite, as neollberal mystification
suggestl, giving rise 10 a 'global' economy in which we are aU
·interdependent'.lt still exisbl, and it stUi oppresses peoples and
nations and creates pain. destruction and death. In spite of the
changes, il stiD keeps its identity and structure, and it still plays
the same historical role in the logic of the global accumuJation
of capital. Its mutadons. its volatile and dangerous combinadon
of persistence and innovation, require the construction of a new
framework t:lutt will allow us to capture its present nature.
This Is not the place to examine different theories about
Imperialism. Let us say. to sum up, that the fundamental featurn
of imperialism, pointed out by the clu.aicall1uthon at the time
of the Fint World War, remain unchangrd In their esscntW.
given that imperiaU.sm is not an ancillary future of contemporary
capitalism or a policy implemented by some It'tes, but a new
stage in the development of this mode of production whose
fundamental tmlts have persisted to the p�sent day. This new
stage is characterized. now even more than In the past, by the
concentration of capital, the owrwhelmlng predominance or
monopolies, the incmasingiy important role p�d by financial
capital, the expo" of capital and the division of the world into
different 'spheres of InOuence', The acceleration of globalization
Ihat took place in the tlnal quarter of the hut century, inslt'ad of weakening or dissolving the imperialist structures of the world
ecoqomy, mapifled the ItnaC'tural asymmetries that define the
insenion of the different countries in it. While a handful of deftl·
oped capitalist n.tiom increased their capacity to control. at least
panially, the productive proc:eaes at a global level, the financial
iUlion of the international economy and the growing circulation
3
, a a " II
" of goods and services. the great majority of countries witnessed '"
i the growth of their external dependency and the widening of
a. the gap that separated them from the centre. Globalization, in
shon, consolidated the imperialist domination and deepened the
submission of peripheral capitalism" which became more and
more incapable of controlling their domestic economic proct'S5eS
even minimally. The continuity of the fundamental parameters
of imperialism, nOl so much of its phenomenology, is ignored
throughout Hardt and N�'s work, and this negation is what they
have called 'empire'. What I seek to demonstrate here is that. in
the same way that the walls of Jericho did not collapse because
of the sound of Joshua and the priests' trumpets, the reaJity of
empire does not fade awny when confronted by the fantasies of
philosophers.
The fact that Hardt and Negri's work appeared at a time when
the periphery's dependency and the imperialist domination have
grown to levels previously unknown in history is nolo minor
detail. This is why the need to h8� a renovated theoretical toolbox
with whieh to understand imperialism and fight against it is more
urgent than ever. It will be very bard to win this battle without
a clear understanding of the nature of the phenomenon . It is
precisely because of this need to know that Empin has had 5lK'h
an extraordinary impact on the large masses of young, and not
so young, people who from Seattle on have mobilized throughout
the world to put an end to the systematic genocide that imperial
ism is committing in the countries of the capitalist periphery, to
social regression, and to the disenfranchisement that is taking
place to a similar extent in both the most advanced and the most
backward socirties, to the criminal destruction of the environ
ment, to the degradation of demOC'ratic regimes rntrained by the
tyranny of markets and the militarism that, following the attacks
on the World Trade Center and the �ntagon, has permeated
the White House and other privil�d places in which decisions
affecting the lives of millions of people a� made. Despite the
4
nobll' intentions nnd intl'lIectual and political honesry of our
authors, about which I have no doubt, their book - regarded by
man}' as the 'Twenty-first Century's Communist Manifesto' or
a'i a revived 'Little Red Book' for (he slN,'alled 'globalphobics'
'" contains Sl'rious mistakes In terms of diagnosis and interprr
tation which, if accepted by groups and organizations uying to
defeat imperialism, could become the intellectual cau� of new
and long-lasting de frats, and not only in the theoretical arena.
This is why I have attempted to put forward my critiques and to
face the costs and risks entailed in criticizing a book which, for
several reasons, has become an important theoretical reference
for the movements critical of neoliberal globali7.ation. I believe
that a sincere debate about the theses developed in Empire can
be a powerful antidote to such worrying pMsibilities.
BIIl.'nl>sAirt's. March 2002
Prologue to the English-language edition
Thii book srcks to debate, bolh from a theoretical 5t4ndpoint
and in the light of the lessons provided by historical and con
temporary experience, the theses that Michael Hardt and Antonio
N� drvelop in Emp;rr(lOOO), While in previous editions I have
chosen not to examine some events that were both momentous
and spectacular, such as the atrocious 9/11 attacks in New York
and Washington - although tbf)' seriously challenged the core
of Hardt and Negri'S theoretical argument - at present such an
altitude is not only impossible but also undesirable. [ndt'ed,
the Iraq war has had the same effect on the analysis proposed
In Emplr� as the collapse of the Twin Towers had on American
self-confidence.
Much water has Howed under the bridge and much blood has
been shed as a consequence of the persistence of imperialist
policies since the original pUblication of Empirt QI.d Imptrialism
in Spanish in 1001. It hi necessary. therefore, to render an account
of these new realities, If, In writing it, my original idea had been
to creale a 'living text', to employ Antonio Gramsci's felicitous
expression, the book could hardly remain impervious to the vicis
situcks of. period like ours. charactcrized by InHnile horror and
terror dealt against defenceless populations - an inftnite war
or, as Gore Vidal suggested, I perpetual war waged allegedly in
pursuit of pe�tual peace - and b)' the unrestrained aggression
against human society and nature perpetrated in the name of
corporate profits and stock (!xchan� prices. These villainies are
called, with unparalleled cynklsm, 'humanitarian wars' fought
[0 build a more secure, peacerul and just worid by characters 8ll
notorious as the Bushes, Aznars, Blairs and Berlu5conis who today
command tM heights of the core capltall .. states. Through me
macabre manipulation of worcb and the systematic misinfonna
tion incessantly reproduced by the mass media, almost all of
which is under the steely control of capital, their technologicaUy
ultra-sophisdcated terrorism appears 15 regrettable but unavoid
able 'collateral damap' and their wars of pillalf and conquest
become noble cruadea in fllYOUr of fRedom and dem�racy.
The objeci or this Prologue, therefore, is to present some
theories rqarding the characterization of the current phase of
imperialism in the light of the lessons arising flOm the new epoch
inaugurated by the events of 9111 and, In partic:uJar, by the Iraq
war. Such a revision is essential not only to foil the propaganda
orchesltRted by Washington and projected worldwide In relation
to the us military occupadon of that country, but bei:ause, as we
shaU see in the foUowing pages, even within the ranks of the left
an unfortunate confusion prevails with reprd to imperialism and
the forms in which it currently manirest5 itselt A confusion that
is made WOIW by the malignant trend among a stuable majority
oC progressive intellectual. to be 'poUtie'eUy correct' Of, as the
Spanish playwright Alfonso Sanre said, to be �11 thinking', that
is, to abstain from challenging the dominant sUent premilSt's of
our age which, as Marx and Enpls diacowred in their early texts.
ore none other than the Ideas of the dominant class.
Given that without an accurate analysis of rulity there cannot
be a correct political line Cor combating the s.coulps or imperial
Ism, clearing up this matter turns into an issue of the greatest
importance. This Prologue seeks to add its humble contribution
to that undertaking.
Tht :harsh IYbuttals' oftht war in Iraq
Let us begin by paraphrasing an expression employed by
Norbeno Bobbio, 'the harsh rebuttals of history'. to refeT to the
refutation, according to his analyses, of the Marxist theory of the
state' owing to the changes ellperienced by democratic capital-
7
II isms during the twentieth century. The military occupation of �
r Iraq. declared by Washington with the suppon of its main client
l goftmment. the Uniled Kingdom. and of its luckily short·li�
Spanish lackey, Jose M . .unar, has in due course generated an
extremely harsh refutation of the ambitious theorizations of
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri thai are the object of this book.
The �nu that unfolded in the international arena after the
publication of Empire in 1000 have incontrovertibly refuted, with
the fottefulness of historical fact, the rash theories they propose
in their book. The latter not only proved itself incapable of ad
equately interpreting the history of imperialism and its current
structure, but also of accounting for the defining features of the
new phase begun after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the
end of the post-war world order.
An examination of some of the main 'theoretical vicdms' of
recent epoch-making events would include the following items.
1 Hardt lind Nevi's conception ofth� role ofth� United Nations
and international law. As pointed out in txtelUo in this book,
the authOR of Empir� grossly exaggerate the Importance of the
United Nations and International law. Lacking the theoretical
instruments necessary to allow them to perceive all the nuances
and complexities of the structure of the imperialist system
- since such instruments are not to be found in the 'toolbox' of
French postmodem philosophy, Italian politics and US economic
scienl.'t!. the authors' three acknowledged &Ources of inspiration
- they naively take for granted the 'democratic' appearance of
multilaterallsm and of the Unitc-d Natjoru system. They conse
quently confuse the empty formalities of the empire with its con
stitutive matter. thus mistaking fonn for substance. The contrast
between lhislma� and �aJity is evident even to beginneR in the
study of international �lation6. Blinded by the inadequacies of
their faulty theoretical framework, once again transformed into
a veritable prison for thought, Hardt and Negri an unable to
see what was evident to evnybody else: the invasion unilaterally
8
decreC!d by Pr�sident George W. Bush caused the contradiction
between their th�orization and reality to �come as glaring as it
was unsustainabl�. Violaling th� alleged ord�r �mbodied in the
United Nations and intemational law, the United States decickd
- as official policy rather than as a position paper circulating
surreptitiously in Washington, written by some paranoid hawk
in the Pentagon - to ignore any resolution to the contrary that
the Security Council might adopt, not to mention the General
Assembly, nnd invade Ira.q. Faithful to Lbat attitude, me White House did not hesitate to move to the defence or its supposedly
threatened national security. ignoring both the need to build
laborious political agreements as required by the United Nations
Chaner and the need to submit to the dictalC1i oC international
legislation that it had always considered to be a men: tribute
to demagogy and thai needed to be obeyed only in so rar as It
did not affcct Washington's inlerests. This position was adopted
�n despite its high political COlts, such as the ruptun: or the
North Atlanlic conRnsus, the crisis in NATO and the serious
altrrcation with France and Germany, the after-efTects or which
will M visible for a long lime. Afler the aggteuion apin. .. t Iraq
had been carried out. the Security Council unanimously adopted a
resolution in October 1003 calling for the democratic and shared
reconstruction of that country, but this wu merely a post MI
lum legi timization of imperialist aggrHSion that had destro)-ed
the tottering remnants of the post-war order. As Petty Anderson
poignantiy observed, this unanimoU8 vote to which the Security
Coun"U soLemnly welcomed the puppet government Htablished
by the White House in Iraq as the incarnation of Imqi sovereignty,
whUe calling on the patriotic resistance movements against the
invasion to cease their activities, �stowed the official blessing , of the united Natioru;' highesl auLhority on the American take-
over of Iraq (Anderson zOO4= 51-Z). This resolution, however, was
wrongiy interpreted by Antonio Negri in a recent interview IS
proof of Us capitulation to the United Nations, when it was exactly
9
J the opposite: the impotent resignation of the UN in the race of
the brutal outrage �mmiltcd by washington (Clrdoso 1003).
Yet, the absurdity of this interpretation - admittedly, always
difficult - of the current situation is 1150 repeated throughout
Empirr in its interpretation of the put. This dangerous tendency
to confuse rhetoric and reality led the authors, for example, to
cull the "gure or President Woodrow Wilson tn accordance
with the most conventional ideological elements of America's
establishment creed that present him as an 'idealist', an amialble
and tireless builder of peace and a man inspired by the noblest
Kantian idea oC universal community. In their own warda, Wilson
'adopted an internationalist ideology of peace as an expansion
of the con5titutioDal conception of network power' (p. 174). This
vision ignores, among other things, the acid remarks made by
John Maynard Keynes about the duplicity and bypocrisy that
Wilson exhibited at the Paris Peace Conference after the First
World War, which led the English economist to conclude that the
American president was 'the palest fraud on earth' (Pan itch and
GLndin 1004= 1:&). Or to disregard the fact, in no way trivial, that
it was during Wilson's pruidency that Ill8..rines OttUpied the Mex
ican port oCVeracruz and imaded Nicaragua and the Dominican
Republic, surely to help the locals gain a Ruer understanding of
Kant', hrpetual P�ace.
1 Th� connption of the sup�dly th'luntoriJJliutl and de
centrrd character of imp�rialism. Another of the victims of the
Iraq war has been the proposition that d��d the obsolrscenc:e
oC territorial - and to a pat extent material - issues in favour
of the virtual, symbolic: and immaterial. This volatilization of the
territorial elements of imperialism (and of capitalism) alkgedly
results in s�ral inevitable consequences: first, the irrever5iblr
displacement of ancient sove�igntles, based on archaic ter
ritorial nation-statt'S, by a 'smooth', supposedly supranational
space, a place where a new im�riaI sowmgnty would be �id
of any vestiges of links with national stales and. therefore, of
10
any territorial or geographical rderen�. Second, the gradual
disappearance of. territorially located centre lhat 'organizes'
the international structure of domination. Given the former,
the classic distinction between centte and periphery, North and
South, vanishes into thin air. Instead ofthis, what would aJlegedly
characterize the empire would be the primacy of a global logic
of domination overcoming traditional national interests whose
bellicose reaffirmation caused innumerable 'imperialist' wars in
the past. Thank God, this period is now ovtrl
If one thing was demonstrated by the aggression unleashed
against Inq, and before that in Afgh4nisran, it was the merely
illusory character of these conceptions so dear to the authors of
Empirr, which Bush refuted with the rude manners of a Texas
cowboy. One of the Orst readings that we caD make of the events
in Iraq is that (pace Hardt and Negri) the United States has ful1y
assumed its condition as the imperialist superpower, and not
only does not attempt to hide that condition, as happened in the
past, but even boasts of it. It intervened militarily in Iraq. as it
will surely do elsewhere, serving the grossest and pettiest defence
of the interests of the conglomerate of gigantic oligopolies that
form the dominont clus In the USA, iDternts which, thanks to the
alchemy of bourgeois h�mony, have been miraculously trans
Formed into the national Interests of the Untted Stateti. It would
be possible now to paraphrase the old motto of General Motors
by saying that, In the current imperialist phase, 'What Is good for
the US corporations is good too for the Unit� States'. The oilmen
who today fe�1 at home in the Oval OffIce pounded, with absurd
pretexts, a country to take pos..'iession of the enormous �aJth it
harbours in its subsoil. Plainly put, the military occupation of
Iraq-is essentially a lrnitorial conque5t for plunder carried out by the main actor or the imperialist structure of our time under the
pretext of preventing the deployment of yet unfound weapons of
mallis destruction and of �nging the eftn less Hkrly collabora
tion of the Saddam regime with the former US mercenary Osama
11
II Bin Laden. "0 conclude: there is nothing 'd�trrritorialized' or ::I
f immaterial there, Ills the old practice of conquHt and plunder
1 repeatrd for the umpteenth time by t.he same old actors wearing
new costumes and showing some technical innovations. Essen
tially, it is the samr tim�honoured imperialist 6tOI)'.
Nothing, therefore, can be more inaccurate than the image
evoked by Hardt and NrgrIln their book in which Washington
becomes militarily Im'Olved all over the world in response to II
universal clamour for the imposition of international justice and
legality. A plethora oHar-right publicists - especially Robert Kagan
and Charles Krauthammer - ha� eme� into public view to
juslify this reaffirmation of an imperialist unilateralism which
cares little or nothing for International justice and 1�lity, join
ing forces with other authors such as Samuel P. Huntington and
Zbigniew Bnezinski. who some �ars ago had already outlined tM
strategic imperatives of the 'lonely superpower' and the urgent
need to take up the challenges posed by its role as 1M focal point
of a vast territorial empire. One of those challenges, certainly
not the only one, is the right - actually the duly. by vinue of the
'manifest destiny' that turns the United States Into the all�dly
uni�rsal carrier of the freedom Dnd happiness of peoples - to
go to war as often as necessary to prevent the fragile and highly
unstable 'New World Order' proclaimed by Gf'Ol'g1! Bush Sr at the
end of the first Gulf War from collapsing like a house of cards.
And none of this can be done without considerably reinforcing
the state-based national sovereignty of the USA and its effective
organs orintemational operations, mainly its armed forces. This
is why the United States' militaJy expenditure has grown to almost
half the planet's entire milital)' outlay_ More�r. it should be
borne in mind that. as Noam Chomsky has rightfully o�rvtd,
the new American strategic doctrine announced by the Bush ad
ministration in September 1001 entails a plan to rule the world
by force dUll has nol btt'n heard since Adolf Hitler made similar
announcements in the mid-19.10s. certainly nol a minor detail
11
(Chomsky 1003a). In this way, the idyllic idea poRd by Hardt and
Negri - the United StaIn giving up the defence of its national
interesL'I and the exercise of imperialist power, and tran.sCecring
its sovereignty to a chimerical empire, for the sake of which the
White House magnanimously responds to international requests
for global justice and law - was buried under an avalanche of
'5man bombs' unleashed on Iraqi territory.
J A healthy imperialist detul body. Another of the lessons of
the Iraq war baa b�n the updating of some of the fealures that
characterized the 'old imperialism'. In the authors' version, the
emphasis placed on virtual elements established an unbruch
able frontier between the 'old imperialism' and the supposedly
new empire, the former being understood as that system of inter
nalional relations which fiued, approximately, within the canons
established in Lenin's analysis and which to a great extent was
shared by some classical authoni on the subject such as Bukbarin
or Rosa Luxemburg. One such feature was, precisely, the terri
torial occupation and the pillaging of the natural resowces of
the countries colonized or subjected to imperialist a�5Sjon.
From a reading of Empirt there emerges a theoretical conception
indifferent to the iuue of access to slIategic resources for the
world of production and the sustainabUity of capitalist civiliza
tion itself, explained by the strong emphasis the authors place
on the (nowadays undoubtedly important) immaterial aspects of
the process of creation of value and the transformations of the
modem capitalist corporation. Yet, the Iraq war, starting with
its tragi·comical groundwork, demonstrated how inaccurate
this conception was. We have only to recall President Geo� W.
Bush, whh his quirky pathetic smile barely disguised, exhorting
Iraqi, not to destroy their oil wells and to refrain from KIting
them on fire, to understand the crucial importance of access
to, and control of, strategit: natural h.'sources in the allegedly
current world imperialist structure. Oil constitutes, at this time,
the central nervous system of internalional capitalism. and its
13
"II a 0-ca c CD
! importance is even greater than that of the world of finance.
S' The latter cannot function without the former: the entire edi fice
! of what Susan Strange has correctly labe l led 'casino capitalism' A.
would collapse within minutes i f oi l d isappeared. And the latter,
we know, wi l l be exhausted in no more than two or three genera
t ions. It would constitute unforgivable naivery to suppose that
French dissidence in the face of US outrages in Iraq is fou nded
on the democratic and anti-colon ial ist convictions of Jacques
Chirac or on the unquenchable desi re of the French right to
ensure for the Iraq i people the full enjoyment of the del ights of
a democratic order. What prompted French intransigence was.
on the contrary, something far more prosaic: t he permanence
of that country's oil companies in a territory that conta ins the
world's second-largest oil reserves. Aga inst what Hardt and Negri
induce us to believe in their subl i mated - and hence complacent
- view of the e mpi re, one of the possible future scena rios of the
international systcm is that of a heightened inter-imperial ri valry
in which the sacking of strategic resources, such as oi l and water,
and the stmggle for a new carve-up of the world could wel l lead
to an outburst of new wars of pillaging, analogous in their logic
although different in their appearances to those which we have
known over the course of the twentieth century, in the days when
i m peria l ism enjoyed enviable health and was not dead, as they
want us to believe is the case today.
4 A nother victim: the view developed in Empire oj the en-one
ously labelled t.ransnational corporations. I ndeed, Hardt and Negri
endorse - unconsciously, I assume - the vision of the capi talist
world assiduously cult ivated by the main US and European busi
ness and manage ment schools and the theorists of neoliberal
'globalization'. As is wel l known, in the thinking of the right the
i rresistible rise of globalization is a natura l phenomenon as un
controllable as the movement of the stars , and one tha t gives rise
to a new world of i nterdependent economies, Economic agents
therefore operate on a level field free of the obstacles previously
14
set up by powerful nat ion-states. In this space, free competition
reigns, and the old asymmetries, with their hateful distinctions
between metropolis and colonies, are a th ing of the past. evoked
only by left ists nostalgic for a world that no longer exists.
According to this in terpretation, not only has there been a
decli ne in the 'national' economies, devoured by the farrago of
globalization, but large corporations have entirely sloughed off
the last vestiges of their national ascript ion . Now they are all
t ransnational and global , and what they require to operate effi
ciently is a worldwide spacc freed from the old 'national' hurd les
and restrictions that might h inder their movements. With i n a
supposedly a nti-capitalist reading this space would be the em
pire, precisely as i t is characterized in the work of Hardt a nd
Negri. As I shall demonstrate i n the following pages, the reality is
l ight-years away from this vision. There is an elementary distinc
tion (completely ignored in the work under review) between the
theatre of operations of the compan ies and tJle territorial space
in which thei r ownership and cont rol materialize. Even in the
case of modem corporate Leviathans - a smal l proportion of the
total number of companies existing i n the world - whose scale
of operations is clearly planetary, ownershi p and cont rol a lways
have a national base: compan ies are legal entities incorporated
in a specific country and not merely registered at the U nited
Nations in New York. They have headqua rters i n a given city,
obey a specific national legal framework that protects them from
potential expropriations, pay taxes on their income and profits in
[he country where their headquarters are loca ted, and so on.
The New York Times's conservative columnist Thomas Fried
man scorned the Sil icon valley execut ives who like to say:
We are nOt an American company . . . We arc IBM Canada, IBM
Australia, IBM China . . . Then, the next lime IBM China gets in
trouble in China, call Jiang Zemin for help. And the next t ime
Congress closes another military base in Asia, call Microsoft
1 5
" a I c •
11/ navy [0 secure [he sea l ines in the Pac ific. And the next t ime :::t
f Congress wants to close more consulates and embassies, call
e Amazon_com to order a new passport. (Friedman, 1999) IlL
I n case this argu ment does not look persuasive enough to dis
pel the myth of the 'transnational' nature of the modern capitalist
enterprise, the conduct o f the White House in Iraq and its brutal
insi stence, with the u ncultured manners of Texas ranchers, that
the beneficiaries of the war undertaken in the name of freedom
and democracy (a nd of the need to free the world from the threat
of a dangerous monster like Saddam) must be restricted to US
corporations (especially but not only Hall iburton) demonstrate
the mistakes made in the theses developed in Empire. Not only
that. It is no longer simply an issue of US corporations obtain
i ng the l ion's share of t he spoils of the I raq operation; the very
manner in which these privileges were d istributed among com
panies al l l inked to the governing US gang rcca l ls the methods
employed by the fami l ies of the New York Mafia to d ivide up
control over business in the ci ty. What relation is there between
this imperialist carve-up and the i dyllic theorizations found in
Empire? Absolu tely none.
S Social movements opposed to neoliberal globalization. Lastly,
a few paragraphs are needed to examine the role performed by
those movements opposed to neol iberal globalization that the
capital ist press, and this is no coincidence, cal ls 'non-global' or
'anti -globalization'_ The hardly innocent pu rpose of this semantic
choice is more than evident: to t ransform the critics of neoliberal
globalization into antediluvian monsters who seek to halt the
march of h istory and of technological progress. 'Non-global '
activists thus appea r before the eyes of world publ ic opinion
as a mult ifarious set o f melancholy seekers after Utopia in a
world that, as Francis Fukuyama and George SOlOS have said .
dances to the tune of the markets. Thrown together are soeial
ists, communists, ana rchists, ecologists, pacifists, human rights
1 6
militants, feminists, aborigi.nal organizations and al l sorts of sects
and tribes, who wilfully ignore the fact that for the first time in
h istory the world has been 'universalized' fol l owing an American
pattern, and for that reason the end has been decreed for a l l
k inds of mi llenarianis ms and particu larisms. Yel , contrary 10 this
biased opinion, the m ovements that resist the markets' tyranny
believe that another globalizat ion is possible (and u rgently neces
sary), that the current one is the product of the, u nti l recently,
u ncontested pred ominance of large corp orations_ Then, there
is nothi ng natura l about the current shape of gl obalizat i on; i t
i s the producl of the defeat suffered by popular, left-wing and
dem ocratic forces i n the 1 970S and 1980s. History, far from having
ended , is just at its begi nning, and the current situat ion can and
must be reversed.
The vigorous emergence of such movements contra d icts some
central planks in H ardt and Negri 's book. The 'n on-globals' have
earned the huge merit of having launched a large pacifist move-
ment even before t he beginning of operat i ons in Iraq. Wh ile,
as N oam Ch omsky reca lls, pacifism in relation to the Vietnam
War did n ot appear, and then t imidly, unt il more than five years
after the beginning of the mil i tary escalation in South Vielnam,
in the case of lhe recent war on I raq this m ovement managed
t o a rticulate massive protests of u nprecedented vigou r weeks
before the beginning of h ostilities. It is calculated that some 15
mil l ion people demonstrated for peace i n maj or cit ies through out
the world. In Britain and Spain , countries ruled by governments
complicit in US imperia list aggression, street dem onstrations
reached an unprecedented size. The governments of Blair and A:z.-
nar provided an exemplary less on on the l i mitations of capitalist
dem9cracy by ignori ng, with absolute cynicism, what the dem os,
the supp osed sovereign of an al legedly dem ocratic pol itical order,
demanded \vith its mobilizations and its answers to nu merous a public opin i on surveys. As 1 have argued elsewhere, i n demo- f cratic capitalisms what matters is the 'capi tal ism' component i
17
GI of the formula; the 'democrat ic' part is merely an accessory to :l
8' be respected as long as i t does not affect anything considered
1 fu ndamental (Boron 2002). This imperial pil laging was decided by
the 'rul ing ju nta' that cu rrently governs the United States. Let us
recal l , with Gore Vida l , t hat Bush is the first US president to reach
the White House through an institutional coup perpetrated by
that country's Supreme Court - there was no need to be bothered
by democratic 'formalit ies' (Vidal 2002: 158-9). The petty despots
did what (hey wan ted and continued with the plan drawn up by
White House hawks, despite i ts overwhelming repudiation by
the public. (n Spain, over 90 per cent of those interviewed were
agai nst going to war, despite which the government of the Popular
Party continued with its policy. The terrorist attack of 11 March
2004, and the shameful l i es of the Aznar government, prompted
his resound ing electoral defeat. Noam Chomsky is right when he
observes that, for Bush, Rumsfeld and their friends, 'Old Europe,
the bad Europe, were the countries where the governments lOok
the same posi tion as the overwhelming majority of their popula·
t ion. New Europe were t he countries where the governments over'
ruled a n even larger proportion o f their population. The criterion
was absolutely explicit - you could n't say more dramat ically ' )
hate and despise democracy' (Chomsky 2003b: 29).
All the above is to the point because, in Empire, the authors
celebrate as the real 'hero' of the struggle against the empire
the anonymous and uprooted migrant , who abandons his or
her homeland in the Third World to penetrate the belly of the
beast and , from there and along with others who l ike him or
her constitute the famous 'mull itude', fights the masters of the
universe. Without diminishing the importc1nce which these social
actors may have, the tru th is that what has been seen in recent
years - and especially in the demonstrations against the war in
early 2003 - is the vigour of a social movement that has solid
roots in the social structures of metropol i tan capitalism and
that attracts n umerous supporters, especia l ly a lthough not only
La
among t he young, from large social sectors that are su ffering an
accelerated process of decay by virtue of neol iberal global ization.
This is not (0 deny the participation of groups of immigrants in
such mobi l izations, but the fact is that the social com position of
these movements suggests that the presence of the latter is , more
than anything, marginal . In any case, because of its complexity
and radical nature, its original innovation as regards the strategic
organization of collective subjects, its discursive models, its style
of action and, lastly, i ts mil i tant ant i -capit.alism, the 'non-global'
movement represents one of the most serious challenges that
the empire has to face . This l ikewise const itutes a new aspect
that raises serious doubts abOllt the theses d rawn up by Hardt
and Negri regard ing the subjects of social confrontation and the
uncertain sociological physiognomy of t.he ' mult i tude'.
To recapitulate
We are living at a very special moment in the history of im
perialism: the transit ion from one phase ( let us call i t 'classical')
to another whose detai ls are only just beginning to be sketched out
but whose general ouu ine is a l ready clearly discernible. Nothing
could be more mistaken than to posit, as Hardt and Negri do
in their book, the existence of s uch an implausible entity as an
empire \vithout imperial ism - a paralysing pol it ical oxymoron.
Hence the need to argue against their theses, since, given the
cxceptional gravity of the current situation - a capita lism increas
ingly reactionary in the social, economic, political and cultural
spheres, one that criminalizes social protest and mi l i tarizcs inter·
nationa l pol i t ics - only an accurate d iagnosis of the structure
and operat ion of the international imperialist system wil l a l low
those social movements, political parties, labour unions and ,
popula r organizations of al l types that want to overthrow the cur-
rent s i tuation to face new journeys of struggle with any chance
of success. An accurate d iagnosis is also needed to identify the
empire's enemies. To consider, as Negri does, that Lula in Brazi l
1 9
a .r c CD
! and Kirchner in Argentina represent a species of resolute 'empire
f fighters'; or judging as 'absolutely positive' the first year and a hat(
1 of Lula's government i n Brazi l , turning a deaf ear to the deepening
of the neoliberal course of the economic policy implemented since
his accession to the presidency; or assuring his readers that the
Kirchner government has refused to pay the debt, an astonishing
discovery for the Argentinians who every day read in the press the
i nordinate amou nt of dollars be i ng punctual ly paid to foreign
creditors - these are certain ly not the best ways for intellectuals
to help defeat the empire (Duarte-PIon 2004: 1 ).
The i l lusion that we can u ndertake the st ruggle withou t a
precise knowledge of the terrain in which the major ballies of
hu manity will be fought can only lead to new and overwhelming
defeats. Dear Don Quixote is not a good example to be imitated
in poli t ics; confusing windmil ls with powenu l knights with lances
and armour was not the best path towards the real ization of his
dreams. Nor wil l St Francis of Assisi , another figure exalted in
Hard t and Negri 's text, serve as a model for inspira tion. I n fact,
no emancipatory struggle is possible withou t an adequate social
cartography to describe precisely the theatre of operations, and
the social natu re of the enemy and its mechanisms of domination
and explOi tation.
The d is tortions that result from a mista ken conception, such
as is maintained by Hardt and Negri, can be astoniShing. I t is
sufficient here to quote the latter when he states, among other
things, that 'the war in I raq was a coup d 'e tat by the Uni ted S tates
against the em pire' (ibid . ). I would l ike to conclude by quoting
extensively from a n interview granted by Negri to [he Argenti ne
newspaper Clarl'/I d ur i ng his visit to Buenos Aires, whose elo
quence is u nsurpassable. In it Negri avers that the current United
S tates occupation of Iraq does not constitute a case of
colonial adm i n istration , but rather a classical case of nat ion
building. And therefore it is a transformation in the direction
20
of democracy. This is the pretext of the United States. Ir is a
milita r)' occupation that toppled a regime, but afterwards the
problem is nation building, in other words an attempt at a
transition, not at colonization. I t would be l ike saying that the
fac t of turn i ng from dictatorship to democracy in Hungary or
Czechoslovakia is a colonization. There is no attitude of that
type in the Un ited States administration. These Americans want
to seem nastier than they are. (Cardoso 200))
It is convenient to ask ourselves, in the face of this incredible
confusion, i n which a war of pillage and territorial occupation
appears to have been sweetened into an altru istic operation of
nat ion-bu ilding and the expon of democracy: wil l i t be poss ible
to advance in the concrete st ruggle against the ' really existing'
imperial ism a rmed with such crude t heoretical instru m e n ts
as are proposed by these authors and that lead them to such
nonsensical conclusions? Ul t imately, to philosophize is to make
d ist inctions. A phi losophy incapable of differentiat ing between
a war of conquest and the process of nation-building is a bad
philosophy.
To advocate carefully the features of a new society will be to
l i ttle avail without a realistic knowledge of the physiognomy of
the current soc iety that must be overcome. A post-eapi ta l ist and
post-imperialist world is possi ble. More than that: I would say i t is
essen tia l , because, if i t continues to operate under the predatory
logic of capital ism, mankind is head ing lOwards self-destruction.
But before bui lding this new society - more humane, just , free
and democratic than the preeedi ng one - it wil l be necessary to
employ all our energies to overcome the one that today oppresses,
explojts and dehumanizes us, and that condemn s almost half the
world's population to subsist miserably on less than two dollars
a day_ And this t rue emancipa tory epic has, as one of i ts most
imponant enabling conditions, the existenee of a real istic and
precise knowledge of the world we seek to transcend_ If instead of
'V a I c II
u this we are the prisoners of the i l lusions and mystifications that :I
f are so efficiently manufactured and spread by the ideological ap-
1 paratuses of the bou rgeoisie, our hopes of build ing a better world
will ineluetably sink. This book seeks to be a modest contribution
towards avoiding such a sad and cruel outcome.
Buenos A ires, September 2004
1 On perspectives, the limits of visibility and blind spots
Something that may surprise the reader of Hardt and Negri is the
seant a tten tion that Empire pays to the li terature abou t imperial
ism_ In contrast with Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg, who made a
careful review of the numerous works on the topie, our authors
have opted to ignore a great part of what has been written a bou t
the issue. The l i terature with which they deal is a eombination of
North American social science, especially international pol itical
economy and international re lations, mixed with a strong dose
of French philosophy. This theoretical synthesis is packaged in
a clearly post modern style and language, and the fi nal product
is a theoretica l mix that, despite the authors' in tentions, is
unl ikely to d isturb the serenity of the moneyed lords who year
after year gather in Davos. Due to th is, a lmost a l l the citations
are taken from books or a rticles pu blished within the l imits of
the French-American academic establishment. The considerable
l i terature concerning imperia lism and the functioning of the
imperial system produced in Lat in America, I ndia, Africa and
other parts of the Third World does not even merit a footnote.
Discussions within classical Marxism - Hilferding, Luxembu rg,
Len in, Bukharin and Kautsky - about the topic are al located a
brief chapter, while the con troversies of the post-war period oe
cupy a n even smaller space. Names such as Ernst Mandel, Pau l
Baran, Paul Sweezy, Harry Magdoff, James O'Con nor, Andrew
Shonfield, Ignacy Sachs, Paul Matlick, Elmar Altvater and Maurice ,
Dobb are conspicuous absences in a book that pretends to shed
new light on an entirely novel stage of the history of capital. It
is not surp rising, thus, that this enterprise offers a vision of the
empire viewed from above, from its dominant s trata . A partial
II and uni lateral vision, t herefore, unable to perceive the totality of c
o the system and to accou nt for its global manifestations beyond
what, presumably, occurs on the North Atlantic shores. Thus, the
resu h i ng vision is particula rly narrow, and the blind spots are
n umerous and important , as I wil l demonstrate throughout the
pages that follow. In short, Empire offers a vision that wants to be
a critical examinat ion going to the root of the problem, but given
the fact that it cannot ema ncipate itsel f from the privi leged place
from where it observes the social scene of its time - the opposite
of what occurred with Marx who, from London, knew how to
detach himsel f from that fate - i t is trapped in the ideological
nets of the dominant classes.
How can the n egation of the rol� played by two crucial in
st i tut ions that organize, monito r and su pervise the day-to-day
operation of the empire - the I n ternational Monetary Fund and
the World Bank - barely mentioned i n the almost five hundred
pages of the book, be u nderstood if not from t he limitations of
a North Atlantic perspective? Barely six pages a re reserved for
an analys is of transnational corporations, strategic players in
t h� world economy, only half of the amount devoted to issues,
presuma bly so crucial and urgent, such as the ' non-place of
power'. The eleven pages d evoted to Baruch Spinoza's contribu
t ions to political philosophy, or the s ixteen d�voted to exploring
the mea ndcri ng of Foucault 's thought and its relevance to u nder
standing the imperial order, can hardly be considered sensible
for those who see the world not from the imperial system's vertex
but (rom its base.
For th is and many other reasons, Empire is an in trigu ing
book that combines some i ncisive i l luminat ions a bout old and
new problems with monumental mistakes of a pprec iation and
interpret ation_ There is no doubt that the authors a re strongly
1 The page references are taken from Ihe original E nglish-language
cdil ion : F:lnpire (Cam bridge , MA: Ha rvard University Press . 100 1) .
24
comm i t ted to the construction of a good soc iety and, specifi
ca lly, a communist society. Th is com m i tment appears many times
throughout the book and d eserves enthusiastic s upport. Sur
prisi ngly, however, the a rgument of Empire has noth i ng to do
with the great trad ition of historical materialism. The audacity
exhi bited by the authors whe n , swi mming ag-ainst the t ide of
established prej ud ices and the neoli beral commonsense of our
l i mes, they d eclare their loyalty to commu nist ideals - 'No, we
are not a narchists bur com munists' (p. 350); ' the irrepressible
l ight ness and joy of being com m u ni st' (p. 413) - collapses like a
house of cards when they need to explain and analyse the i m perial
order of today.' At that pOi nt, theoretical and polit ical indecisive
ness take the place of decla matory concl usiveness. In th is sense,
i t is impossible to ignore the contrast with other works about the
same topic, such as Samir Am in's Accumulation on a World Scale
( 1974), Empire of Chaos (1992) and, the most recent, Capitalism
ill the Age of Globalization ( 1997); or Tile Long Twentieth Century
by Giovanni Arrigh i (1995); or Year SOl . The Conquest Continues
( 1 993) a nd world Orders, Old and New (1994) by Noam C homsky;
or Production, Power, and World Order by Robert Cox ( 1987); and
the works of Im manuel Wallerstein, The Modern world System
( 1 974-88) and After Liberalism (1995). And the results of such a
comparison a re extremely unfavoura ble for Hardt and Negri .
2 The constitution of the empire
Empire begi ns with a section devoted to 'the pol itica l constitution
o f the present' , which fol lows a Preface in wh ich the authors
introd uce the main thesis of the book: an empire has emerged
and imperialism has ended (pp. xi-xvii). I n the fi rst part of the
book, the analysis of the world order begins in a surprisingly
formalistic mode, at least for a Marxist, since the constit ution
of the empire i s laid out in narrowly jurid ical terms. Thus, the
world order, far from being conceived as the h ierarchical and
asym metrical organization of states, markets and nations under
the general d i rection of an i nternat ional domi nant bloc, is
misrepresen ted in Hardt and Negri's analysis as a proj ect ion of
the U n ited Nations' formal orga nizat ion. This surprise is then
i n tensified when the intrigued reader real izes that the conceptual
i nstru ments used by Hardt and Negri to examine the world order
problem are borrowed from such un prom ising toolboxes as the
ones used by a group of authors so foreign to hi storical material·
ism - and of such little use for a deep analysis of thi s type of issue
- such as Hans Kelsen, Niklas Luhmann, Joh n Rawls and Carl
Schmitt . Supponed by authorities such as these, it comes as no
surprise that the results of this init ial incursion into the subject
matter are far from satisfactory. For example, the U n ited Nations'
role i n the so-called worl d order is grossly over-esti mated: 'one
should also recognize that the notion of right defined by the
UN Charte r also points toward a new positive sou rce of j uridical
prod uction, effective on a global scale - a new center of normat ive
production tha t can play a sovereign j u rid ical role' (p. 4).
Hardt and Negri seem to ignore the fact that the U n ited
Nat ions is not what it appears to be. In fact, because of its bureau
cracy and elitism, the UN is an organ izat ion destined to support
the interests of the great imperia l is t powers, especially the United
States. The effect ive UN 'juridical production' has l i ttle substance
or impact when it concerns matters that contradict the interests
of the Uni ted States and its a l lies. The authors over-estimate
the very marginal role played by the United Nations General As
sembly, where the votes of Gabon and Sierra Leone are equal
to those of the United S tates and the United Kingdom_ Most of
the General Assembly's resolutions are reduced to dead letters
unless they are actively supponed by the hegemonic power and
its panners. The 'humanitarian war' in Kosovo, for example, was
carried out in the name of the United Nations but completely
bypassed the authority of the Security Counci l and the General
Assembly. Washington decided that a mi l i tary intervent ion was
necessary and that is what happened. Years later, George W. Bush
Junior invaded and devastated Iraq without the authorization of
the Security Counci l , not to mention the approval of the General
Assembly. Naturally, that bears no relationship to the production
of a universal law or, as Kelsen trusted, with the emergence of a
' transcendental schema of the val idity of right situated above the
nation·state' (p. 6). The imperia l istic nature of the ' really existing'
United Nations, not the one imagined by our authors, is sufficient
to prove the weakness of the fol lowing affi rmation: 'This is rea l ly
rhe point of depanure for our study of Empire: a new notion of
right, or rather, a new inscription of authority and a new design
of the production of norms and legal instruments of coercion
that guarantee contracts and resolve conflicts' (p. 9).
This fantastic and childish vision of a supposedly post-colon ial
and posl -imperialist international system reaches its clima.'I( when
they conclude that 'All interventions of the imperial armies are
solici'ld by one or more of the parties involved in an already
existing conflict' (p. 1 5); or when they hold that the 'first task of
Empire , then, i s to enlarge the realm of the consensuses that sup
port its own power' (p. 15); or when they assure a lready astonished
readers that the intervention of the empire is ' legitimated not by
27
o
� right bu t by consensus' in order to ' in tervene in the name of any
type of emergency and superior ethical pri nciples' such as 'the
appeal to the esse n tial values of j ustice' (p. 18). Is i t the ' hu man
itarian' intervention in the former Yugoslavia that our authors
have in m i nd ? Indeed, as wi ll soon become clear. This i ncred ible
nonsense allows them to conclude that, under the empire , 'the
right of the police is legit imated by universal values' (ibid.). I t is
telling that such a radical thesis i s supported by evidence provided
by two bibliogra phic references that all ude to the conventional
literature of international relations and whose right-wing bias is
eviden t to even the least- informed reader. The vol uminous Lat in
American bibl iography about i mperialistic intervention produced
by authors such as Pablo Gonzalez Casanova, Agustin Cueva, RUy
Mauro Mari n i , Gregorio Seiser, Gerard-Pierre Charles, Ed uardo
Galeano, Theoto n io dos Santos, Juan Bosch, Helio Jaguaribe,
Manuel Maldonado Denis, is ignored_!
The second chapter of Part 1 is devoted to biopolitica l prod uc
tion. It opens with a laudable statement of intent: to overcome the
l imitatio ns of the j urid ical fonnaJism with which they began t heir
i n tellectual course, descendi ng, i n t heir own words, to the mat
erial cond itions that susta in the legal a nd i nst i tutional framework
of t he empi re . Their obj ect ive is to 'discover t he means and forces
of the produ(·tion of social reality along with the subjectivities
that animate it' (p. 22). U n fo rtunately, such beautifu l intent ions
re main mere declamations, as thc i nvoked materialistic condi
t ions 'vanish into thin air', to use the wel l-known metaphor by
Marx and E ngel s in the Manifesto, and some venerable ideas
from the social sciences are prese nted as if they were the latest
I When Ihi5 work was practically fi n ished, a n exccllenl book by Saxe
Fernandl"'I:, Petras, Vcltmcyt'r and Nuilez \\':lli givcn 10 mc bUi I was able to
rake only margi nal advantage of i ls empirical and interpretalive ric h ness
(S3xe'Femandcz et al. 200 1 ). In any calie, the reader is reco m m ended to
consult t hat (ext in order 10 expand some of the analyses unden .. ken in this
book.
2 8
'discovery' by the Parisian rive gauche or New York's Greenwich
Village. Fou cault's theorization a bout the tra nsit jon to the sociecy
of control, for example, revolves round the supposedly new notion
t hat 'Biopower is a form of power that regulates social l ife from its
interior' , or that 'Life has now become [ . . . ] an object of power'
(pp. 23, 24)·
It wo uld not take long to find in the extended western po litical
tradition, that begins at least in t he fifth cen tury Be in G reece,
ideas surprisingly similar to what today, with the fanfare that
supposedly celebrates great scientific accomplishments, is called
the 'biopower'. A q uick look at the l iterature would show dozens
of citations from authors such as Plato, Rousseau, de Tocquevi lle
and Marx, to mention only a few of the most obvious, that refer
precisely to some of the 'great novelties' produced by the social
sciences at the end of the twentieth century, Plato's insistence
on the psychosocial aspects - summarized in the phrase 'the
individual's character' - that regulated the social and polit ical l ife
of the Athenian pol is is wel l known , as is t he young Marx's em·
phasis on the subject of the 'spiri tualization of the domination' of
the bourgeoisie by the exploited classes. I t was Rousseau who
stated the importance of the process by which the dominated
were induced to be lieve t hat obedience was a moral ducy. This
made d isobedie nce and rebel l ion a calise for serious conflict
within ind ivid ual consciences. In short, for Hardt and Negri,
who are dazzled by Foucault's (an author who deserves our res·
pect) t heoretical in novations, it could be highly educational to
read what \\las written a century and a half ago, for instance, by
Alexis d e Tocqueville: 'Formerly cyranny used the clumsy weapons
of chains and hangme n; nowadays even despotism, t hough i t
see"1ed to have noth ing more to learn , has been pe rfected by
civilization: And d e Tocquevi l le continues, saying ancient cyran
n ies 'to reach the soul, clumsily struck at the body, and the soul,
escaping from such blows, rose gloriously above it ' . Instead, mod
ern 'democratic' tyranny ' leaves t he body alone and goes straight
2 9
.. o ::I
�, ::1'. o ::I o -
o
l for the soul' (de Tocqueville 1969: 255). Th is step from chains and
hangmen to individual manipu lation and cont rol of ideology and
behaviour h as been christened by Foucault the t ransit ion from
the discipl inary society to the society of con trol. But, as we know,
to name something is completely diffe rent from d i scovering it .
I n this case, the creature had a lready bee n d iscovered and h ad a
name. What Foucault with his renowned abi l i ty d id was to give i t
a new, and very attractive, name, different from the one everybody
knew. Nevertheless, it cannot be said t hat we are in the presence
of a fu nda mental theoretical i n novation.
The first part of the book concl udes with a chapter devoted
to alternatives withi n the e m p i re . It begi ns with a statemen t as
perplexing as it is radical : 'The multitude called the Empire i nto
being' (p. 43). Contra ry to most common i nte rpretat ions within
the left, Hard t and Negri be lieve t hat the empire is not the crea
tion of a world capital ist coal ition under the A merican bourgeois
hegemony but the (defensive?) response of capital to the class
st ruggles against conte mporary forms of domination and oppres
sion nurtured by 'the mult i tude's desire for l iberation' (ibid .). At
th is point, H ard t and Negri enter a terra i n plagued with cont ra·
dictions. They i nsist that the e m pire is good si nce i t represents a
'step forward ' in overcom ing colonialism and i m perial ism. They
insist on this even a fter assu ring us, with the help of Hegel, that
the fact that the empi re 'is good in i tselr does not mean that it is
good 'for itselr ( p. 42). They continue: 'We claim that Empire is
better in the same way that Marx insists that capital ism is better
than the forms of society and modes of prod uction that came
be fore it' (p. 43). However. a few l ines earlier, the authors say that
the empire ' constructs its own relat ionsh ips of power based on
explo itation that are in many respects more b ru tal than those it
destroyed' ( ibid.). Despite this, the empire is ' better' because, they
assert, it enhances the potential for l iberation of the m u l ti tude, an
assu m ption that has not been confirmed by experience and that,
i n Hardt and Negri 's case, is surrounded by a dense m e taphysical
30
and, in certain ways, religious halo, as I shall show in the final
pages of this work. Where that bl issfu l l iberating poten tial is
and how such possibil ities could be realized is somet hing the
authors explain, in a s impl istic and u nsatisfactory way, i n the
last chapter of their book.
On the other hand, to say that the empire is 'better' means
that the real capi tal ist world order - and this is precisely the
empire - is something d i fferent from capital ism. Marx's argu
rnent referred to two d i ffe ren t modes of prod uction and com
pared the possibi l it ies and perspectives opened by capitalism to
the ones offered by the decay of feudalism. Are the au thors t ryi ng
to say that the empire means the overcoming of capitalism? Is
it that we have tra nscended i t without anybody not ic i ng such
a fabulous h i storical cha nge? Are we now in a new and better
society with renewed poss ibi l i t ies for l i bera t ing and emancipa
ting practices?
It seems that Hard t and Negri have bui l t a straw man, an ir
rational and im mutable leftist who, in the face of the challenges
posed by global ization, i nsists on opposing local res ista nce to
a process that is global by na ture . Local means, in most cases,
' na tional' , bu t t h is d istinction is irrelevant in their analys is. They
say that the strategy of local resistance ' misident i fies and thus
masks the enemy' (p. 45). Since Hardt and Negri wa nt to talk
pol i t ics seriou sly - and without this being a formal concession
to Schmit t but to Clausewitz, Leni n and Mao - who is the enemy
then? The answe r to this very concrete question could not be
more disappoi nting since we are told that 'The enemy is not a
subj ect but, rather, is a specific regime of global relat ions that
we call Empire ' (pp. 45-6) . N ational struggles conceal the view of
the r�al mechanisms of empire , of the existing altematives, and
of the l ibe rating potentials that agitate in its wom b. H ence, the
oppressed and exploi ted masses of the world are convened for a
final battle against a regime of global relat ions. The beloved Don
Quixote appears once again, afte r several centuries, to t i l t at new
� � II " o ::I III 2' • .. C .. ii" ::I
� ;. II ., 3
"
�.
wi ndmil ls while the sordid mi l lers, ignoring the multitude's rage ,
continue with business as usua l , rul ing their countries, exploiting
the masses and manipulating the culture.
Hardt and Negri view the empire as the historic overcoming of
modernity, a period for which they supply a somewhat distorted
vision. Indeed, modernity left a legacy of ' fratricidal wars, devas
tating "development, " cruel "civil ization," and previously u n im
agined violence' (p. 46). The scenario that modernity presents is
one of tragedy, signified by the presence of 'Concentration camps,
nuclear weapons, genocidal wars, slavery, apartheid' (ibid.) . And
from modernity, Hardt and Negri deduce a straight l ine that leads
to the nation-state without mediation. The nation-state is noth ing
but the ' ineluctable condition for imperialist domination and
innumerable wars' . And if now such an aberration 'is d isappear
ing from the world scene, then good riddance!' (ibid.).
There are several problems with this pecul iar interpretation of
modernity. I n the fi rst place, i t is a mistake to offer an extremely
uni latera l and biased reading of it. Hardt and Negri are right when
they enumerate some of the horrors produced by modernity (or
perhaps in modernity and not necessarily because of it), but whi le
doing so they forget some other results of modernity, such as the
nowering of individual l iberties; the relative equality establ ished
in the economic, pol itical and social terrains, at least in the de
veloped capital isms; u niversal suffrage and mass democracy; the
coming of socialism despite the frustration generated by some of
its concrete experiences, such as the Soviet Union; secularization
and the lay state that emancipated the masses from the tyranny of
tradi tion and religion; rationality and the scientific spirit; popular
education; economic progress; and many other accomplishments.
These too are part of modernity's inheritance,and many of these
accomplishments were achieved thanks to popular struggles and
in stren uous opposit ion to the bourgeoisie. Second, do Hardt
and Negri really believe that before modernity none of the social
evi l s and h uman aberrations that p lagued the modern world
32
was already there? Do they by any chance believe that the world
was inhabited by Rousseau's noble savages? Do they not situate
themselves in the same position as the critics of Niccoli:> Machi
avel l i who denounced the Florentine theoretician for being the
' inventor' of political crimes, treason and fraud? Have they not
heard about the Punic or Peloponnesian wars, the destruction of
Carthage, the sack of Rome and, more recently, the conquest and
occupation of the American continent? Do they bel ieve that before
modernity there were no genocides, apartheid or slavery? As Marx
did wel l to remind us, we are victims of both the development of
capital ism and its lack of development.
Once Hardt and Negri have asserted the substantive and
historical continu ity between modernity and the na tion-state,
they rush to reject the antiquated 'proletarian internationalism'
because i t presupposes an acknowledgement of the nation-state
and i ts crucial role as an agent of capital ist exploi tation. G iven
the ineluctable decadence of the nation-state's powers and the
global nature of capital ism, this type of internationalism is both
anachronistic and technica l ly reactionary. But thi s is not a":
together with t he 'proletarian internationalism', the idea of the
existence of an ' i nternational cycle of struggles' disappears. The
new battles, whose paradigmatic examples a re the Tiananmen
Square revolt, the Palestin ian Intifada, the 1992 race riots i n
Los Angeles a n d th e South Korean strikes of 1996, a.re specific
and motivated by ' immediate regional concerns in such a way
that they could in no respect be l inked together as a global ly
expanding chain of revolt. None of these events inspired a cycle
of struggles, because the desires and needs they expressed could
not be translated into d ifferent contexts' (p. 54).
F�om t h is categorica l assertion, for which i t would req u ire
considerable effort to provide supporting evidence, ou r authors
announce a new paradox: ' in our much celebrated age of com
munication, struggles have become all bu t incommunicable' (p. 54,
emphasis in original). The reasons for this incommunicabi l ity
33
remai n shadowy, but we should not lose hopc in the face of the
impossibil ity of horizontal communication among the rebels
because, in real ity, i t is a blessing. Under the logic of the empire,
Hardt and Negri tell their i mpat ient readers, the message of these
battles wi l l travel vertically on a global scale, auacking the imperial
constitution in its n ucleus - or, what they call with a mean ingful
slip, j umping vert ically 'to the virtual center of Empire ' (p. 58).
Here, new and more formidable problems besiege their argu
ment_ In the first place, those that derive from the very dangerous
confusion between axiomatic assu mptions and empi rical obser
vations. To say that the popul a r battles are incommunicable is
an extremely important assert.ion_ Unfortunately, Hardt and Negri
do not offer any evidence to demonstrate whether this is mere
supposition or the rcsu lt of a historical or empirical investigation.
Faced with th is s ilence, there are abundant reasons for suspecting
that this problemalique reflects the less than healthy influence
of Niklas Luh mann and Jtirgen Habermas over Hardt and Negri.
A quick exploration of the nebulous concepts put forward by
t hese German scholars is enough to con firm the scan t uti l i ty
that their constructions have when i t comes to anal)'sing popular
struggles. This, though, does not prevent either of t hem from be
ing extremely popular among the ranks of the disoriented Ital ian
left. In this sense, the Luhmannia n theses on social incommen
surabi l i ty and Habermas's proposals concerning communicative
action seem to have gready influenced Hardt and Negri , at l east
to a greater extent than they are wil l ing to recognize. But leaving
aside this b rief excursus towards the sociology of knowledge, if the
incommun icabil ity of the struggles prevents them from inflaming
the desires and needs of people from other countries, how can
we expla i n the speed with which the erroneously named 'anti ·
global ization ' movement spread all over the world? 00 Hard t and
Negri really bel ieve that the events i n Ch iapas, Paris and Seoul
were t ru ly i ncommunicable? How can they ignore the fact that
the Zapatistas, and especially sub-commander Marcos, became
34
international icons for the neoli beral globalization critics and for
the anti-capitalist battJes i n five continents, influencing i mpor
tant developments i n t hese con flicts waged at local and national
levels?
Second, Hardt and Negri mainta in that one of the main
obstacles preven ting the communicability of the battles is the
'absence of a recognition of a common enemy against which the
struggles are d i rected ' (p_ 56). We do not know whether or not
th is was the case among the French or South Korean strikers, but
we suspect that they had a clearer idea than our a uthors regard
ing the identity of their antagonists. Concerning the Zapat.istas'
experience, Hardt and Negri's thesis is completely wrong. From
the beginning of their battle, the Chiapanecos had no doubts
and knew perfectly well who their enemies were. Aware of this
real ity, they organized an extraordinary event in the depths of
the Lacandona jungle - an internatjonal conference against neo
l iberal globalization , attended by hundreds of panicipants from
around t he world who discussed some of today's most burning
problems. The abi l ity of the Zapatistas to convoke a conference
of this type refutes, in practice, another of Hardt and Negri's
theses - the one that bemoans the lack of a suitable com mon
and cosmopolitan language into which to t ranslate the languages
used in d iverse nat ional struggles (p. 57). The successive confer
ences that took p lace in the Lacandona jungle, togerher with the
demonstrations against neolibera l globalization and the world
social forums held in Porto Alegre , Brazi l , show that, contrary to
what is said in Empire, there is a common language and a com
mon understanding among the different social forces fighting
the d ictatorship of capita l .
If,the old battles are no longer relevant - Marx's o ld mole
has d ied, to be replaced by the ' infin ite u ndu lations' of the
modern snake, according to Hardt and Negri - the strategy of
the anti-capita l ist jou rneys has to change. National conf1icts a re
not communicated horizontally but jump d irectly to the vi rtual
35
� • ,. o :I
�, ::t. o :I o -
o
� centre of the empire, and the old 'weak l inks' of the impe rialist
chain have d isappeared. The articulations of the global power that
exh ibited a particular vulnerabil ity before the action of insurgen t
forces n o longer exist . The refore, 'To ach ieve sign i fi cance, every
struggle must attack at the heart of the Empire, at i ts strengt h '
( p . 58). Surprisingly, after having argued in the book's Preface
that the empire ' is a decentered and deterritorial izing apparatus
of rule' (p. xi i), the reader stumbles across the novelty that local
and nat ional battles must rise at the centre of the empire, though
our authors rush to explai n that they are not referring to a terri·
torial centre bu t to a (supposedly) virtual one. Given that the
empire includes all the components of the social orders, even
the deeper ones, and knowing that it has no l imits or front iers,
the notions of 'outside' and ' inside' have lost their mea ning. Now
everything is i nside the empire, and its n ucleus, its heart, can be
attacked from a nywhere. If we are to believe Hardt and N egri ,
the Zapat ista uprising in Chia pas, the i nvasion of land by the
La ndless Workers' Movement i n Brazil (MST) or the pot· banging
protesters and pickets in Argentina a re no differe nt from the 1 1
September attacks i n New York and Wash ington. I s i t i ndeed l ike
this? J udgi ng from the different types of reactions to all these
events, it would seem that this is nOl the perception held by those
at the 'Empire'S heart'. On the other hand , what mean i ng should
we assign to this expression? Are we talking of the capital ist
nucleus, the centre, t h e i mperialist coalit ion with i ts wide ning net
of concentric circles revolving round American capitalist power,
or what? Who are the concrete subjects at the 'Empire's heart'?
Where are t hey? What is thei r art iculation with the processes of
production and circulation of the i nternational capitalist econ·
omy? Which institutions normatively and ideologically crystallize
t hei r domination? Who are their polit ical represen tat ives? Or is
it just a set of im material rules and procedures? The book not
only does not offer any answers to t hese q uestions, but does not
even formu late t he q uest ions.
At this stage, Hard t and Negri's theorization makes its way to
a real disaster. By asserting that everything is i nside the empire,
thei r theory completely removes from our horizon of visibility
the fact that structural hierarchies a nd asym metries exist pre·
cisely there, and that such d i fferences do not disappear s imply
because someone h as decla red that everything is inside the
empire a nd noth i ng is left outside. Studies undertaken by La tin
American scholars and writers over decades do agree, beyond
the d i ffe re nces, on the fact that the categories of 'centre' and
'pe riphery' e njoy a cerlai n capacity, a t least a t fi rst , to produce
a mo re refined portrait of the inte rnational system. Everything
seems to indicate that such a disti nction is more useful than
ever i n the current circu mstances, because, among other thi ngs,
t he growing economic margi nal ization of the South has sharply
accentuated pre-existing asymmetries. In order to confirm this
assertion i t is enough to remind ourselves of what the United
Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) annual reports poin t
o u t with regard t o h u m a n development: if a t t h e begin n i ng of the
1960s the ratio between the rich est 20 per cent a nd the poorest
20 per cen t of t h e world population was 30 to 1, at the end of
the twen tieth ce ntury this ratio had grown to almost 75 to 1.
I t is true tha t Bangladesh and Hait i are i nside the empire, but
are they because of this i n a pOSi tion compa ra ble to that of the
United States, France, Germany or Japan? Hardt and Negri claim
t hat even though they arc not identica l from the production and
circulat ion point of view, between 'the United States a nd B razil,
Britain and I ndia [ ] are no d iffe rences of nature, only differ·
ences of degree' (p. 335).
This categorical conclusion cancels the last forty years of
debates and research t hat took place not only in Lat i n America
but also i n the rest of the Third World, and it brings us back to
the American theories in vogue in the 19 50S and at the begi n
ning of the 1960s, when authors such as Wa lter W. Rostow, Bert
Hosel itz and many ot hers elaborated their ahistorical models
37
� • " o ;:, III ::r. C ::r. g
of econom ic development_ Accord ing to these const ruc tions,
in both ni neteenth-century Europe and the U nited Sta tes and
in the historical processes that took place i n the middle of the
twentieth century in Latin America, Asia and Africa, economic
growth fol lowed a l i near and evolutionist path, begi n ning in
underdevelopment and concluding in development_ This type of
reasoning was based on two false assumptions: first, that societies
located at either extreme of the continuum share the same nature
and that they are essentially the same. Their d i fferences, when
existent, were only in tenns of degree, as Hardt and Negri would
later say, an assenion that was, and stil l is, completely false. The
second assumption: the organization of i nternational markets
has no st ructural asymmetries that could affect the chances of
deve lopment fo r nations in the periphery. For those au thors
mentioned above, tenns such as 'dependency' o r ' i mperialism'
were not useful when d escribing the real i t ies of the system and
they were more than anything else a t ribute to political - and
hence not scientific - approaches, with which an understa nding
of economic develop ment was sought. The so-called 'obstacles'
for development lacked structural foundations. Instead they were
the product of clumsy polit ical decis ions, u nfortunate and poorly
informed choices made by the ru le rs, or easily removable inertial
factors. In Hardt and Negri's terms, al l the cou nt ries were ' insidc'
the s}'stem.
In this imaginary return to the past, it i s i mponant to remem
ber the fol lowing: at the begi nning of the 1970s, the Lat in Amer
ican debate about dependency, i mperia lism and neo-colonialism
had reached its apogee, and its resonance deafened the Academy
and American political circles. Its impact was of such magni
tudc that Henry Kissinger, then chief of the National Seeurity
Cou ncil and on his way to becoming Seeretary of State under
R ichard N ixon, considered i t necessary to intervene on more
than one occasion in the discussions and debates caused by
the Latin Americans. Hardt and Negri ' s thesis about the non-
differemiation of the nations within the empire calls to mind the
cynical comments made by Kissinger about this topic. Expressing
his rej ection of the idea of Third World econom ic dependency
a n d question ing the extension and i m portance of the structural
asymmetries in the world economy, Kissinger observed: ' today
we a re a l l dependent. We live in an i n terdependent world . The
United States depend on the Honduran bananas as much as
Honduras depends on the American computers. ' 2 As can be easily
concluded, some of the sta tements expressed with such fi n al ity i n
Empire - for in stance, that there are no more diffe rences between
the centre and the periphery of the system, that there is no longer
an 'outs ide' , that the players merely differ in degree, etc. - are
far from new. These affi rmations began to circu latc through the
words of theoreticia ns clea rly affiliated to the right, who opposed
a theory of ' interdependence' and i m perialism, and who refused
to accept that the international economy was characterized by t he
radical asym metry that separated the nations in the centre of t he
system from those a t the peri phery.
H a rd t and Negri conclude this section of the book by intro
ducing the two-headed eagle , the emblem of the old Austro
H u ngarian Empire, as a convenient sym bol for the curren t
empire. However, i t i s necessary t o i ntroduce a litt le reworking
of this image si nce the two head s would have to look i nwards,
as if they were abou t to a ttack each other. The first head of t.he
i m perial eagle represents the jurid ical structure - not the eco
nomic foundations - of the empire. As we have said, there is very
little pol it ical economy in this book and the absence of the most
elementary men tion of the economic structure of the empire i n
what i s outli ned a s its emblematic i mage reveals the strange paths
through which ou r authors have ventured and on which they have
2. Henry Kissinger is considered by the nove-list and playwright Gore
Vidal to be 'the most conspicuous criminal orwar loose around the- world'
(c(, Saxe·Femandt"l et 31 . 200 1 : 25).
39
o completely lost their way. That is why the eagle's second head,
� sta ri ng at the one that represe nts the empire's juridical order,
symbolizes 'the plural mult itude of p roductive, creative subjectiv
i t ies of global ization' (p. 60). This m ultitude is the true
absol utely posit ive force that pushes the dom inating power
toward an abstract and empty unification, to which it appears as
the d istinct alte rnarive. From this perspective, when the const i ·
tuted power o f Empire appears merely a s privation of being and
production, as a si m ple abstract and empty t race of the constitu
ent power of the multitude, then we will be able 10 recognize the
real stand point of our analysis. (pp. 62-3)
In short: those interested i n exploring the alternatives to the
empire will find very l ittle help in t his section of the book. What
they will find is a death certificate for the archaic 'proletarian
international ism ' (without a ny mention of the new in ternational
ism that e ru p ted strongly from Seattle);J a petj tion of p rinci ples
in the sense that the popular st.ruggles are i ncommunicable and
laek a eom mon language; an embarrassing silence regard i ng the
rela tionship with a concrete enemy whom the omnipotent mul
titude faces or, in the best case, an immobilizing vagueness ('a
regi me of global relationsh ips'); the d isappearance of the 'weaker
l inks' and the d isti nction between centre and periphery; and
that the old dist inction between s trategy and tactics has disap
peared because now there is only one way of ba uling against the
empire and it is strategic and tactical at the same time. This way
is the rising of a constituent coun ter·power that emerges from
i ts womb, something hard to u nderstand in light of Hardt and
Negri's rejection of dialectics. The only lesson that can be learn t is
3. For more on this, I suggesl looking at thc compilation prepared by the
Observatorio Social de I\meric-a Lalina of CLACSO in an issue devoted 10 ule
'new intern:llionalism' with lexts by Noam Chomsky. Ana F.st11er Ceceiia, Christophe Aguilon, Rafael Freire, Walde n Be l lo, Jaime ElOlay and Francisco
Pi n eda (OSAL, 6, January 2002).
that we must trust that the multitude wi ll fi nally assume t he tasks
assigned them by Hardt and Negri. How and when this will occur
cannot be found in the book's contents. There is no d i scussion
about the ways of fighting; the organizational models (assuming,
as the authors do, that the parties and labour u nions are illustri
ous corpses)j the mobil ization strategies and the confro ntational
tacticsj the a rticulation among the economic, pol itica l a nd ideo-
10gicaJ confl icts and oppositionsj the long-te rm objectives and
revolutionary agendaj the political instruments used to put an
end to the iniquities of global capital ism; i nternational a ll iances;
the mi l itary aspects of subversion promoted by the multitudc;
and many other topics of similar t ranscendence. Neither is there
any attempt to relate the current postmodern d iscuss ion about
the subversive impulse of the mult itudes to previous debates
about the labour movement and a nti-capitalist forces in general,
as if the pbase in which we are now had not e merged from the
unfolding of past social struggles but had erupted, instead. from
the phi losophers' heads.
What we do find in this part of the book is a vague exhortation
to trust in the transformational potential of the multi tude. who.
in a myste rious and unpredictable way, wil l some day overcome
all resistance and blocks, and subdue its enemies to To do
what? To build what type of society? Its i ntellectual mentors stil l
do not say.
41
3 Markets, transnational corporations and national economies
A Recurrent Confusion
Hard and Negri's naive acceptance of a crucial aspect of world
market ideology clearly i l lustrates the consequences of their rad
ical i ncomprehension of contemporary capitalism_ I nexpl icably
stubborn in maintain ing the not very in nocent myth that nation
states are c lose to d isappearing completely, the authors make
their own, as if it were a t ruth revealed by a prophet, the opinion
of the fo rmer US Secretary of Labor, Robert Reich, who wrote:
as almost every fa('tor of production - money, technOlogy,
factories, and equipme nt - moves effortlessly across borders,
the very idea of a [national) economy is becoming meaningless,
In the fut ure ' there wi l l be no national products or technologies,
no nat ional corporations, no national industries, The re will
no longer be nat ional economies, at least as we have come to
un derstand that concept.' (p, 1 5 1)
It is hard to bel ieve [hat an i nte l lectual of Toni N egri 's cal
i bre, who i n the past has shown a strong in terest in the study of
econom ics, cou ld cite an opinion such as the one above, First of
al l , Reich shrewdly speaks of 'almost every factor of production',
a n e lega nt way of avoiding the emba rrassing fact that there is
a nother crucial factor of production, the labour force, which does
not 'move effortlessly across borders' _ This belief in the free mo
b i l i ty of productive fac tors is to be fou nd at the hean of corporate
American ideOlOgy, determi ned as it is to e m bel l ish the assumed
virtues of the free market at the same time as i t condemns a ny
type of state i nterve n t ion that does not favou r monopolies or
ol igopol ies or that int roduces at least a m i n i m u m level of popular
or democratic control over economic processes. From their s trat
ospheric platfonn, Hardt and Negri seem to ignore the fact that
Reich was the Secretary of Labor in a government that presided
over one of the most dramatic periods of wealth and income
concentration in the history of the United States, It was a time
when waged labou r saw some of the most important pieces of
labour legislation dismantled and when precarious ness reached
unprecedented levels not only in the rural districts of Alabama
and California but also in the Upper West Side of Manhattan ,
where hundreds of elegant stores recrui ted i I Ieg-dl immigrants
to assist their clients, paying them salaries well below the legal
minimum. Perhaps the authors refused to acknowledge that none
of these workers would have crossed American borders without
cons iderable effort. The h istory of these m igrants is one of vio
lence and death, pain and m isery, su ffering and humil iation, And
it is a history in which the crucial player is the nation-state that
Hardt and Negri describe as 'decl in ing', Before writ ing about
such issues, it would have been appropriate had the authors inter
viewed a n undocumented worker from Mexico, EI Salvador or
Haiti to ask him what the expression ' [a migra' means, a term used
to refer to the U nited States' immigration police, the very mention
of which terrifies the immigrants. Or maybe the authors could
have asked how much the worker had to pay to enter the U nited
States i llegally, how many of his friends died in the a ttempt and
what the word 'coyote' means on the Cal i fornian border. Have
they not heard about the unsuccessful m igrants who died in the
desert under a baking sun (bu t comfo rted by Reic'h's words)?
Can they ignore the fact that every year the Mexican-American
fron tier takes more human l ives than the infamous Berl in Wal l
throughout its entire existence? I t would also be appropriate to
ask similar questions of il legal immigrants in France and the
rest of Europe. A quick look at UNOP or the International Labor
Organ ization (ILO) repons would have saved them from making
major mistakes such as as the one mentioned above.
43
f i-& a i :::I a ::r. o :::I a
It o :::I o :i i· '"
It is not thei r only m istake. Our authors seem to believe that
money, technology, factories and equipment a re a lso subject
to unl imited mobi l ity. Money is, no doubt, the most mobile of
the four, but even so i t i s t ied to certain restrictions, albeit not
extremely strict ones. But what about technology and the rest ?
D o they real ly bel ieve that technology and t h e other factors of
production ci rculate as freely across borders as Reich proclaims?
Which technology anyway? Do they mean last generation techno
logy? This is something that even a primary school child al ready
knows. Obviously, technology and i ts p roducts circulate, but the
ones thaI move more freely are su rely not the latest or the best.
Th i rd World countries know that they can have access without
problems to obsolete or semi-obsoletc technologies, relics already
abandoned by the nations at the forefron t of the planet's techno
logical development. I f the best technologies c irculate freely as
corporate-speak assures us, why is it that we wi tness so many
cases of industrial espi onage in al l the developed countries? How
can we explai n i ndustrial p iracy, i l legal copying and im itations
of al l types of tech nologi<.'s and products·?
That Hardt and Negri accept some of the central assumptions
of the ideologues of globa l ization i s a matter of extreme concern.
Their belief in the disappearance of nat ional products, com panies
and industries is absolu tely indefensi ble in the l ight of dai ly evi
dence that shows the vital ity, especially in developed cou ntries, of
customs taxes, non-tariff barriers and spccial su bsidies through
which governments seek to favour their national products, com
panies and economic act ivi ties. The au thors l ive in countries
where protect ionism has an extraordinary strength and can be
ignored only by those who insist on denying its existence s i mply
because it has no place in their theory. The American govern
ment protects its i nhabita n ts from foreign competit ion from
Mexican strawberries, Brazi l ian cars, Argentine seam less steel
pipes, Salvadorian texti les, Chi lean grapes and Uruguayan meat ,
while on t h e other side o f the Atlantic, t h e European citizens are
44
safely prolected by 'Fortress Europe' which, while hypocritical ly
proclaiming the virtues of free trade, seals i ts doors against the
' Ih real' posed by the vibrant economies of Africa, Lat in America
and Asia.
Regardi ng the declared d isappearance of national companies,
a simple test would be enough to demonstrate this mislake. For
ex.ample, Hardt and Negri should tl)' to convince a friendly gov
ernmenl 10 expropriale a local branch of a 'global' finn (and,
therefore, supposedly unatlached to any national base) such as
Microsoft, McDonald's or Ford; or, i f they prefer, I hey could tl)'
to do Ihis wi lh Deulsche Bank, Siemens, Shell or Uni lever. Then
we would have only to wait and see who would step forward to
demand that the decision be revoked . If the companies were
truly global , it would be the job of Kofi Annan, or of the general
d irector of the World Trade Organization (WfO), to appear i n
front of the government involved i n order 10 put pressure o n it
in the name of global markets a nd the world economy. However,
it is more l ikely that, instead of those characters, an am bassador
from the United States, Germany or the U ni led Kingdom would
lum up to demand, wi lh their usual rudeness and i nsolence, the
immediale reversal of the decision under the threal of punishing
the country wil h al l types of sanctions and penal ties. If this hypo·
thetical example seems too compl icated , Hardt and Negri should
ask themselves, for example, who was Ihe Boeing representative
in t he tough negotiations with European Un ion officials for the
commercial competition with Airbus. Do they bel ieve that the
interests of the former were defended by a CEO from Bangladesh
who had received his M BA from the Universi ty of Chicago or
instead by top American government officials with the help of
Iheir a� bassador in Brussels and aCling logelher with the While
House? In Ihe real world, and not i n the nebulous republic i m·
agined by philosophers, the latter is what really occurs. This i s
someth ing Ihat any student of economics learns only two weeks
into classes.
4S
� D .. Jr"
! D :::I G. :::I 3, o
! It o :::I o 3 ii' '"
I Can Hardt and Negri ignore the fact that the 200 mega-corpora-
l: l ions that prevai l in the world markets register a combined total �
of sales that is greater than the GNP of a l l the countries i n the
world combined except for the nine largest? Their total annual
income reaches the $7, 1 00 tril l ion threshold and they are as big
as the combi ned wealth of 80 per cent of the world population,
whose income barely reaches S3,900 tril l ion. Despite this, these
Leviathans of the world economy employ less than one-third of
1 per cent of the world population (Barlow 1 998). The neolib
eral global ization ideologists' rhetoric is not enough to disguise
the fact that 96 per cen t of those 200 global and transnational
companies have their headqua rters in only eight countries, are
legally registered as incorporated companies of eight countries;
and their board of directors s i t in eight cou ntries of metropol
iran capitalism. Less than 2 per cent of their board of directors'
members are non-nationals, while more than 85 per cent of al l
their technological developments have originated with i n their
'nat ional frontiers'. Their reach is global , but their property and
their owners have a clear national base_ Their earnings now from
al l over the world to their headquarters and the loans necessary
to finance their operations are conveniently obtained by their
headquarters in the national banks at interest rates i mpossible
to find in peripheral capita l isms, thanks to which they can easily
displace their competi tors (Boron et al 1 999: 233; Boron 20oob:
1 1 7-23).
Noam Chomsky, for instance, c ites a study by Winfried Ruig·
rock and Rob Van Tulder on the top 100 corporat ions of the
1993 Fortune l i st according to which 'virtually all of the world 's
largest corporations have experienced a decisive support from
govern ment policies and trade barriers to make t hem viable. '
In addition, these authors also noted that at least 20 companies
would not have survived by themselves have their governments
not ' intervened by e ither socia l ising losses or by simple takeovers
when the companies were in trou ble' (Chomsky 1 998, Kapste in
1991/92, Ru igrock and Van Tulder 1995). I n short, despi te what
the a u thors of Empire assert, nation-states still are crucial players
in the world economy, and national economies sti l l exist.
The postmodern logic of global capital
In l i ne with the argument developed in the previous section,
Hardt and Negri state that a profound change in the logic with
which global capital operates has taken place with the constitu
tion of the empi re . The predom i nant logic these days is that of
post modernism, with its e mphasis on exalt ing the instantaneous,
the always cha nging profiles o f desires, the cult of individual
e lection , the ' pe rpetual shopping and the consu mption of com
m odities and commodi fied i mages [ . . _ ] difference and m u lti plic
ity [ ] fet ishism and simulacra, i ts contjnued fascinat ion with
the new and with fashion' (p. 1 52). Al l t hese lead ou r aut hors to
conclude that market i ng strategies fol low a postmodem logic,
s ince marketing is a corporate p ractice i ntended to maxi mize
sales from the com mercial recogni tion and exploitation of d i ffe r
ences. As populations become increasi ngly hybrid, the possibility
for creating new ' target markets' is e n hanced. The consequ ence
is that m arketing u n folds an endless array of commercial strat
egies: 'one for gay Latino males between the ages of eighteen and
twenty-two, another for Chinese-American teenage girls, and so
forth ' (po 152).
Aware that, by pre tending to i nfer the global logic of capital
from marketing strategies, they are on a sl ip pery slope, Hardt and
Negri take a step forwards to assure us that the same post modern
logic also prevails at the heart of t he capital i st economy: t h e
sphere of p rod uction. For th is, they recal l some recent develop
ments in the management field, where it is stated t hat corpora-l
tions must be ' mobile, flexible, and able to deal wit h difference'
(p. 1 53). As could have been foreseen, the naive acceptance of
these assu med advances of 'managemen t science' - in truth,
stra tegies to strengthen the extraction of surplus value - led Hardt
47
and Negri to a completely ideal ized vision of contemporary global
corporations. These appear as 'much more diverse and fluid cui'
tural ly than the parochial modern corpora t ions of previous years' .
A con sequence of th is greater diversi ty and fluidity is eviden t in
the fact that, according to the authors, 'the old modernist forml>
of racist and sexist theory are the expl icit enemies of this new
corporate cul tu re' (p. 1 53). Because of this, global companies are
anxious to include:
diffe rence within their realm and thus aim to maximize crea·
tivi[)" free play, and d iversity in the corporate workplace. People
of all d ifferent races, sexes, and sexual orientat ions should
potentially be inclu ded in the corpora t ion; the daily routine of
the work place should be rejuve na t cd with uncxpe("led changes
and an atmosphere of fu n. Break down the old boundaries and
let one hund red f)owers bloom! (p. 1 53)
After rcading these l ines, we cannot avoid asking to what extent
corporations a re home 10 the relat ionships of prod uction; are the
salaried exploited or, i n contrast, are they real earthly paradises?
I t does not seem to req uire a management expen to conclude that
the rosy description given by the aut hors bears l i ttle relationship
to reality, si nce sexism, racism and homophobia are practices that
still enjoy enviable health in the postmodern global corporation.
Maybe this i m proved corporate atmosphere has someth ing to do
with the fact tha t, as reported in the New England}oumal of Medi·
cine, d u ring the apogee of America n prosperity, 'African·American
men in Harlem had less probabil i ties of reaching t he age of 65
than men i n Bangladesh' (Chomsky 1 993: 278). Hardt and Negri
consta n tly fal l against the subtle ropes of corporate l iterat ure and
the free market ideologists. If we were to accept their points of
view - actually the points of view o f the busi ness school gurus
- the whole debate arou nd the despotism of capital within the cor·
poration loses its meani ng, as it does every time more demands
in favour of the democratization of fi rms are made by theoreti·
cians of Robert A. Dah l 's stature ( Dahl 1995: 134-5). Apparently,
t he structural tyran ny of capital va nishes when wage-labourers
go to work not to earn a living but to entertain themselves in
an agreea ble c l ima te t hat a llows them to express their desires
without restriction. Th i s portra i t hardly squares wit h the stories
reponed even by the most capi tal-involved sectors of t he press
about the extension of the work day in the global corpora tion, the
devastating i mpact of labour flexi bi l ity, the degradation of work
and of thc workplace, the growing frequency with which people
are laid off, the precariousness of employmem, the trend toward s
an aggressive concemration of salaries wi thin the com pany, not
to mention horror stories such as the exploitation of chi ldren by
many global corporations.
It seems u nnecessary to insist, before t hese two authors who
idemify themselves as communists and scholars of Marx, on the
fact that the logic of capita l , be it global or national, has l itt le
to do with the i mage projectcd by busi ness school theoret icians
or eclectic postmodern philosophers. Capital moves through
an i ncxorable logic of profit-generation, whatcver the social or
environmental costs may be. In order to maxim ize profits and
i ncrease security in the long tenn, capital travels al l ovc r the world
and is capable of establishing i tself anywhere. The pOlitical condi
t ions are a matter of maj or importa nce, especially if there is a
need to maintain an obedient and well-behaved labour force. Cor
porate blac kmail is also e�t remely releva nt, given that the global
firms, with ' their' government's su pport, seek to ga in benefits
from the ext raord inary concessions made by the h ungry states
of the impoverished periphery. These concess ions range from
generous tax exemptions of all kinds to the implementa tion of
labou� legislation comrary to workers' imerests, or of the type that
d iscourages or weakens the activism of labou r u n ions capa ble of
disturbing the nomlal atmosphere of business. I n the developed
world , i nstead, i t is more d ifficult to d ismantle workers' advances
and ach ievements, and the pro-labou r legiSlation sanctioned i n
49
the gol den period of the Keynesian stllte, but this is compensated
for by the greater size of the markets in societies where social
progress has created a pattern of mass consumption not usual ly
available i n the peripheral cou ntries.
Transnational corporations and the nation-stale
Chapter 3.5 of Hardt and Negri's book is devoted to the mixed
constitution of the empire. It opens, however, with a surprising
epigraph that demonstrates the unusual penetration of bourgeois
prejudices even i n to the m inds of two intellectuals as lucid and
cultured as Hardt and Negri. The epigraph is a statement made
not by a great philosopher or a distinguished economist, nor by
a renowned statesman or a popular leader. I t is, i nstead, a few
words pronounced by Bi l l Gates: 'One of the wonderfu l th ings
about the information highway is that virtual equity is far easier
to achieve than real-world equity We are all created equal in
the vi rtual world' lp. 304).
Two brief comments. Fi rst , it is hard to u nderstand the reason
why a chapter devoted to examining the problems of the mixed
constitution of the empire begins with a banal quote from Bi l l
Gates about the supposed eq uity of the information h ighway.
Maybe it is because quoting Gates has become fashionable among
some European and American progressive i ntel lectuals. The
reader, even one who is well d isposed, cannot but feel irritation
before this t ribute paid to the richest man in the world, someone
who is the most gen uine personification of a world order that,
supposedly, Hardt and Negri fen'ent ly desi re to change.
Second, and even more imponant, Ga tes is wrong, deeply
wrong. Not a l l of us have been created equal in the information
world a nd the fa ntastic virtual universe. Surely, Gates has never
been in con tact with even one of the three bill ion people in the
world who have never made or received a phone call. Gates and
Hardt and Negri should remember that i n very poor countries,
such as Afghanistan for instance, only five ou t of a thousand
50
people have access to a te lephone. This horrifying figu re is far
from being exclusive to Afghanistan . I n many areas i n southern
Asia, in sub-Saharan Africa, and i n some underdeveloped coun
tries in Latin America and the Caribbean, the figures are not
much better (Wresch 1996). For most of the worl d's population,
Gates's comments are a joke, i f not �n insult to rheir miserable
and inhumane l ivi ng conditions.
Leaving aside this unfortunate beginning, the chapter intro
duces a d ivision of capitalist development into three stages. The
first extends throughout the eighteenth and n ineteenth centuries.
It is a period of competitive capital ism, characterized according
to Hardt and Negri by ' re latively l i t tle need of state intervention
at home and abroad' (p. 305). for the authors, the protection
ist policies of the UK, the USA, France, Belgium, Holland and
Germany, and the pol icies of colonial expansion promoted and
implemented by the respective national governments, do not
qualify as 'state intervention' . In the same manner, the legisla
tion passed, with differen t degrees of thoroughness in al l these
countries over a long period and destined to repress the workers,
would also nOt qualify as examples of state intervention in eco
nomic and social l ife. It should be taken i nto consideration that
such legislation incl udes the Anti-Combination Acts of Engla nd,
the Le Chappellier law i n France, the a nti·socia l ist legislation of
Chancellor Bismarck in Germany, who condemned thousands
of workers to exile, and the legal norms that made possible the
brutal repression of workers in the United States, symbolized
by the massacre of Haymarket Square, Chicago, on 1 May 1886.
Gramsci formulated some very precise observations about the
'Southern Question' in which he demonstrated that the complex
system of a l l iances that made Italian uni ficatjon possible overlay ,
a set of soph isticated econom ic pol icies that in fact supported
the dominant coa lition. It was G ramsci who pointed out the
'theoretical mistake' of the l ibera l doctrines that celebrated the
supposed Iy hands-off an itude, the passivity of the state in relation
5 1
� a .. 1r'
! a :::s a. :::s a �o o :::s !. It o :::s o 3 iO VI
to the capitalist acc umulation process. I n his Quadern;, Gramsci
wrote: 'The iaisse'ljaire is also a mode of state regu lation, intro
duced a nd maintained by legislative and constra i n i ng means. I t
is a del iberate pol icy, aware of i ts own obj ect ives, and not t h e
spon taneous and automatic expressio n of the econo mic events.
Consequently, the laissezjaire l iberalism is a polit ical progra m '
(Gramsci 1 9 7 1 : 160).
The reason for t h is gross error must be found in the inability
of l iberal writers to recognize the fact that the distinction between
the polit ical society and the civil society, between economics a n d
pOli tics, ' i s made and presented a s if it we re an organ ic dist inc
tion , when it is me rely a methodological distinct ion' (ibid.). The
'passivity' of the state when the fox en ters the henhouse cannot
be conceived as the inaction proper to a neutral player. This be
haviou r is called compl icity or, in some cases, conspiracy. These
brief exa mples are enough to prove that conve n tional knowledge
is not capable of providing adequate guidelines to explain some
of the central features of t he fi rst period iden tified by Hard t a n d
Negri. Certainly, t he passivity of the state was not one o f them.
I t is t rue �hat , i n comparison with what happened in the period
following the great depression, the levels of state i ntervention
were lower. But this does not mean that there was no in tervention,
or that the need for i t was weaker. On the contrary, there was
a great need for state in tervention and the different bou rgeois
govern ments responded adequ ately to th is need. Naturally, after
the F i rst World War and the 1929 crisis, t hese needs increased
to an extraordinary degree, but that should not lead us to bel ieve
that before these dates the state did not play a primary role in
the process of capitalist accu mulat ion .
The most serious problem with Hard t and Negri's interpreta
tion emerges when they get to the ' th ird stage' in the history of
the marriage berween t he state and capital. In their own word s:
'Today a third phase of this relationship has ful ly matured, in
which large tran snational corporations have effectively surpassed
52
the j u risdiction and authority of nation-states. It would seem,
then, that this centuries-long dia lectic has come to an end: the
state has been defeated and corporations now rule the earth!'
(p. 306, emphasis i n original) .
This statement is not only wrong but also exposes the authors
to new rebu ffs. Worried about having gone too far with their
anti -state en thusiasm, they warn u s that i t i s necessary ' to take
a much more nuanced look at how the rela t ionsh ip between
state and capital has changed' (p. 307). It is at the very least
perplexing that, after having written this sentence, the authors
d id not proceed with the same conviction to erase the previous
sentence. This confinns the suspicion that the fi rst one represents
adequately enough what they think about the subject. For them,
one of the crucial features of the c urrent period is the displace
ment of state functions and pol i tical tasks into other social l i fe
levels and domains. Reversing the historical process by wh ich the
nation-state 'expropriated' the pol i t ical and administrative fu nc
tions retained unti l then by the aristocracy and local magnates,
such tasks and fu nctions have been re-appropriated by somebody
else in this th ird stage in the history of capital. But by whom'? We
do not know, because i n Hardt and Negri's a rgument there is a
meaningful si lence at this poi nt. Hardt and Negri begin assuring
us i n an a'\iomatic way that the concept of national sovereignty is
losing i ts effectiveness, withou t bothering to provide some type
of empiri cal reference to support this thesis. The same happens
with the famous thesis about 'the autonomy of the pol it ical ' . If
evidence for the first thesis is completely absent, all that can be
said is that i t is a commonplace of con temporary bou rgeois ideol
ogy; concerning the second thesis, Ha rd t and Negri are completely
wrong. To support their interpretation , they mainta in : 'Today a
notion of pol i t ics as an independent sphere of the detennina
tion of consensus and a sphere of mediation among con fl icting
social forces has vcry little room to exist' (p. 307). Question : when
and where was pol i t ics rhal ' i ndepe ndent sphere' or that s imple
53
� a ;. CD � 1/1 a � � :I a :t. o � e.. � o & 3 ii' 1/1
e 'sphere of mediation'? To this i t could be answered that what is in
� crisis is not so much politics - which might well be in crisis, bUI t-
for other reasons - but a Schmittian conception of pol itics, which
progressive European a nd American intel lectuals cul tivated wi th
an obsessive passion for many years. As a resu lt of that addiction,
the confusing doctrinal constructions of Nazi theore tician Carl
Sch mitt - not only an academic bUI also a lead ing judge in the
Third Reich - were interpreted as a great contribution to poli tical
theory capable of prOviding an escape rou te for the oft-proclaimed
'crisis of Marxism'. But, conU'ary to Schmitt's teachings, poli tics in
capi taJ ist societies was never an autonomous sphere. This d iscus
sion is so wel l known, generat ing rivers of ink in the 1960s and
1980s, that there is no need to summarize i t now. For the purpose
of this book, a brief reference to a couple of works that approach
this problem in a direct manner (Meiski ns Wood 1 995: 19-48;
Boron 1997: 95-137) will suffice. In any case, our authors are
closer to the truth when they write, a few lines later: 'Pol i t ics does
not disappear; what d isappears is any notion of the autonomy of
the pol it ical ' (p. 307). Once again, the problem here is less with
politics - which has undoubtedly changed - than with the absurd
notion of the autonomy of polit ics and of the pol itical, nu rtured
for decades by angry ant i-M arxist academ ics and intel lectuals,
who desire to maintain, against al l the evidence, a fragmentary
vision of the social , typical of what Gyorg Lukacs characterized
as bou rgeois thought (Lukacs 1971).
In Hardt and Negri 's interpretat ion, t he decl ine experienced
by the autonomy of pol itics gave place to an ultra-economicist
conception of the consensus, 'determined more sign ificant ly by
economic factors, such as the equi l ibria of thc trade balances and
specu lation on the value of cu rrencies' (p . :107). In this way, the
Gramscian theorization that saw the consensus as the capacity
of the dominant al l iance to guarantce an intel lectual and moral
d ireetion that would establish it as the avant-garde of the devel
opment of nat ional energies, is entirely left out of the aut hors'
54
analysis of the state i n its current stage. I nstead, the consensus
appears as the mecha n ieal reflection of the economic news,
a set of mercantile calculation with no room left fo r political
med iations lost i n the darkness o f t ime. Its reductionism a n d
econom icism com pletely distort the com plexity o f the consensus
cons truction p rocess i n con temporary capitalism, and, i n addi
t ion, they do not fail to pass the test that demonstra tes how on
innumerable occasions sign i ficant pol itical turbulence occurred
at moments i n which the economic variables were moving i n
the ' right d i rection', as European a n d America n history o f the
1 960s demonstrates. Besides, times of deep economic crisis d i d
no t necessarily t ranslate i nto t h e swift collapse of pre-exist i n g
pol itical consensuses. Popu lar passivity and acquiescence we re
noticea ble, for example, in the omi nous decade of t h e 19 30S
in France and Britain, something very differe nt from what was
oecurri ng in neighbouring Germa ny. In consequence, it is u n
d en iable that, given that politics is not a sphere autonomous from
social l i fe, therc is a n int.i mate con nection berwee n econom ic
factors a nd political, social, cultural and i nternational factors
that, at a certa i n moment, crysta ll izes in the construction of a
long-lasting pol i t ical consensus. That is why a ny reduction i st
conceptual scheme, either economicist or politicist, is i ncapable
of explaining real ity.
The co nclusion of the authors' analysis is extraord inarily im
portant and can be su mmarized in this way: the decline of the
political as an au tonomous sphere 'signals the decline, too, of a ny
independent space where revolution cou ld emerge in t he national
pOl it ical regime, or where social space cou ld be transformed
u sing the instruments of the state' (pp. 307-8). The traditional
ideas o f bui ld ing a counter-power or of opposing a national resist-I
a nce aga inst the state have been losing more and more releva nce
i n the current c ircumstances. The main fu nctions of the state
have m igra ted to other sphe res and domains of the social l ife,
especially towards the 'mechanisms of command on the global
55
level of the transnational corporations' (p. 308). The resu l t of
this process was something l ike the destruction or suicide of
the national democratic capitaJist state, whose sovereignty frag
mented and dispersed among a vast collection of new agencies,
groups and organizations such as 'banks, i nternational organisms
of planning, and so forth [ ] which all increasingly refer for
legitimacy to the transnational l evel of power' (p. 308). [n relation
to the possibil i ties opened before th is nansfo rmation, the verdict
of ou r aut hors is rad ical and unappeal ing: 'the decl ine of the
nat ion-state is not simply the resu l t of an ideological posi t ion
that m ight be reversed by a n act of polit ical wil l : i t is a structu ra l
and i rreversible process' (p. 336). The d ispersed fragments of
the state's old sovereignty and its inherent capacity lO inspire
obedience to i ts mandates, have been recovered and reconverted
'by a whole series of global jurid ico-economic bodies, such as
GATT, the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, and thc
I MF' (ibid.). G iven that the global ization of the production and
circulation of goods caused a progressive loss of efficacy and
effectiveness in national pol i t ical and juridical structu res which
were powerless to control players, processes and mechanisms
that greatly exceeded their possi bi l i ties and that d isplayed their
games on a foreign board, there is no sense in trying to resurrect
rhe dead nation-state. Aijaz Ah mad ( 2004: 5 1 ) provided a timely
reminder that it was none other than Madeleine Albright who, as
Secretary of State during the Clinton administration, expou nded
s imilar theses by sayi ng that both 'nat ionality' and 'sovereignty'
belonged to an 'outdated repenoire of polit ical theory' unable
to accou nt for the ' new structu res of globalization and impera
tives of " h umanitarian i n terven tion· . . . The authors assure us
that noth ing cou ld be more negative for future emancipalOT}'
struggles than to fal l victim to nostalgia for an old golden era.
Sti l l , if it were possible to resurrect the nation-state, there i s
a n even more important reason t o give up this enterprise: th is
institu tion 'carries wi th i t a whole series of repressive structures
and ideologies [ ] and any strategy that relies on it should be
rejected on that basis' (p. 336). Let us suppose for a moment that
we consider this argumenl val id . In that case we should resign
ourselves to contemplat ing not only the ineluctable decadence
of the nation-stale but a lso the fall of the democrat ic order, a
result of centu ries of popular struggles that inevitably rest on
the state s tructure. Hard t and Negri do not delve very deeply in to
this subject of vital importance. M aybe they do not do so because
they assume, m istakenly, that i t i s possible to ' democratize' the
markets or a civil society structu ra l ly divided into classes. This
is not possible, as I have explained careful ly elsewhere (Boron
20oob: 73-132). Therefore, which is the way Out?
57
4 Alternative visions of the empire
The ethical empire. or the postmodem mystification of the
'really existing' empire
At this stage of their journey, Hardt and Negri have clearly
gone beyond (he point of no ret urn, a nd their analysis o f (he
'rea l ly ex.isti ng' empi re has given place to a poetic and meta
p hysical construction that, on the one hand, maintains a distan t
similari ty to reality, a n d , on the other h a n d , given precisely those
characteristics, offers sca nt help to the social forces i n terested in
transform ing t he national and international structures of world
capital ism. As Charles Ti l ly (2003: 26) put it rather bluntly, t he
authors 'orbit so far fro m the concrete rea l i ties of conte mporary
cha nge that their readers see l ittle but clouds. hazy seas and
nothingness beyond'. The general d iagnosis i s wrong due to
fatal problems of analysis and intcrpretation tha t plague their
t heoretical scheme. To this I cou ld add a series of extremely
unfonunate observations a nd comment aries that a patient reader
could find without grea t effort. But if t he reader were to refute
them, he would be obl iged to write a work of extraordinary mag
nitude. Since t hat is not my inten tion, I wi ll continue with my
anaJysis centred o n the weaknesses of the general interpretative
t heoretical scheme.
To begi n, allow me to reaffirm a ve ry elementary but extremely
important poi n t of depa rture: it is impossible to do good political
a nd social philosophy without a solid economic analysis. As I have
shown elsewhere, that was exactly the path chosen by the young
Marx as a pol i tical philosoph er, once he precociously understood
the l imits of a social and pOlitical re(Jection that was not firmly
anchored in a rigorous knowledge of civil society (Boron 2000a).
The science thal unveiled the anatomy of civil society and the
most i ntimate secrets of the new economic orga nization created
by capitalism was politicaJ economy. This was the reason why
the foun de r of historical materialism devoted his e nergies to the
new discipline, not to go from one to t he other but to anchor
his reOections on crit iques of the existing social orde r and his
anticipation of a fu ture society i n the bedrock of a deep economic
a nalysis. Tbis anchorage in a good political economy, a 'regal way'
to reach a thorough knowledge of capit alist society, is precisely
what is m issing in Empire. [n fact, the book has very little of
economics, and what it has is, in most cases, the convenlional
version of the economic a na lysis taught in American or Europea n
busi ness schools or the one boosted by the publicists of neo
l i bera l globalization, com bined with some isolated fragments
of Marxist political economy. In shon: bad economics i s used
to analyse a topiC such as the imperiaJist system that requires a
rigorous t reatment of the matter appealing to the best of what
pol itical economy could offer. As M ichael Rustin persuas ively
argues, Hardt and Negri'S 'description of the major t rends of de
velopment of both the capi ta l ist economy, and of its major fonn s
of governance, is plainly in accord with much curre n t anaJysis of
gla blization' (Rustin 2003: 8).
Conseq uen tly, readers will find themselves with a book that at
tempts to analyse the i nternational order, supposedly an empire ,
a n d in which only a couple o f times will they stumble across
institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO a nd o ther
agencies of the current world order, call it empire or imperia lism.
For example, the word 'neoliberalism', wh ich refers precisely to
[he ideology and the econom ic-political form ula prevailing dur
ing the last q uarter of the twentieth ce ntury whe n the curren t
econoPlic order was rebuilt fro m head t o we, merely appears
throughout the book, in the sa me way as the Multilatera l Agree
ment on I nvestments (MAl) and the Washi ngton Consensus. The
impression that the reader gets as he co ntinues to read the book
is of fi n di ng h i mself before two acade mics who a re very well
59
� i ntentioned but who are completely removed from the mud and
: blood that constitute the daily l i fe or capital ist societies, especi
ally i n the periphery, and who have launched themselves to sail
across the oceans of the empire anned with defective maps and
inferior instru ments of navigation_ Thus, bewildered as Quixote,
they take appearances as real i t ies. Therefore, when they describe
the pyramid or the empire's global const itution, Hardt and Negri
assure us that: 'At the narrow pinnacle of the pyramid there is
one superpower, the United States, that holds hegemony over the
global use of force - a superpower that can act alone but prefers
to act in col laborat ion with others under the umbrella or the
United Nations' (p. 309).
It is very hard to understand such a naive comment, in which
the sophistication expected or scientific analysis is completely
lacking. To begin with, the reduction of the concept of hegemony
to the use o r rorce is inadmissible. Hegemony is much more
than that. Regardi ng the themes of empire and imperialism,
Robert Cox once wrote that hegemony could be represented as
'an adjustment among the material power, the ideology and the
i nstitutions' (Cox 1986: 225). To reduce the issue of hegemony
to its mil itary aspects only, whose i mportance goes beyond al l
doubt, is a major m istake. American hegemony is m uch more
complex than that. On the other hand, we are told that the United
States ' prerers' - surely because of its good will, i ts acknowledged
generosity on international matters and its strict adherence to the
principles of the J udeO-C h ristian tradition - to act in collabora
tion with others. One cannot hel p but wonder i r the twen ty-some
thing pages that Empire devotes to a reflection upon Machiavel li 's
thoughts were written by the same authors that then present
an interpretation of the United States' international behaviou r
so antithetical t o the teach ings o f the Flore ntine theorist a s the
one J have q uoted . The 'prererence' of the U nited States - of
course I am talking ofthe American government and its dominant
classes, and not about the nation or the people or that country
60
- for collaborative action is merely a mask behind which the
imperialist policies are adequately disguised so that they can be
sold to i nnocent spirits. Through this operation, whose efficacy is
demonstrated once again in their book, the policies of imperial
expansion and domi nation appear as if they were real sacrifices
in the name of humanity's common good. It is reasonable to
suppose that the American government's top officials and their
numerous ideologists and publicists could say something like
this, something that nol even the most submissive and servile
allies of Washi ngton would take seriously. It is entirely u n rea
sonable for two radical critics of the system to believe these
deceits.
This is not the first time that such a serious mistake appears
in the book. Already in Chapter 2.5 they had written:
I n the wan i ng years and wake of the cold war, the responsibil ity
of exercising an international police power 'fel l ' squarely on
the shoulders of the United States. The Gulf War was the first
t ime the United States could exercise this power in its full form.
Really, the war was an operation of repression ohery l iule
interest from the point of view of the objectives, the regional in
teresls, and the political ideologies involved. We have seen many
such wars conducted directly by the United States and i ts allies.
I raq was accused of having broken i nternat ional law, and it thus
had to be judged and pun ished . The i mportance of the Gulf War
derives rather from the fact that it presented the United States
as t he only power able to manage international justice, not as a function of its own national motives but ill lhe /lame of global right. (p. 1 80, emphasis i n original)
In. conclusion, and contrary to what the a ncestra.1 prejudices
nurtured by the incessant anti-American preaching of the left
i ndicate, what we learn after reading Empire is that poor Uncle
Sam had to assume, despite his reluctance and agai nst h is wil l ,
t h e responsib i l ity of exercising t h e role o f world policeman after
61
.. decades of unfru itful negotiations trying to be exem pted from :::I .f such a distressing obligation. Therefore, the power ' fel l into' his
hands while all the diplomacy of the State Depanment was busy in
the reconstruction , on gen uine democratic grounds, of the United
Nations system. Meanwh ile, top waShington officials travelled
around the world trying to l aunch another round of North-Sou th
negotiations focused on reducing t he irritating inequal it ies of
the international dis tribution of wealth and to strengthen the
languish ing governme nts of the periphery by teaching t hem how
to resist the exactions by which t hey are subdued by the gigantic
tra nsnational corporat ions. Those two radical scholars, lost i n the
darkness of theoretical confusion, find someone to give [hem a
hand who, in the light of the day, t hey discover is Thomas Fried
man, the very conservat ive edi torial writer of the New York Times
and spokesman for the opinions of the American establishment.
According to Friedman, the interve ntion of the United Sta tes
in Kosovo was legitimate (as was the one in the Gul f for other
reasons) because it put an end to the ethnic cleansi ng practised
in that region and, therefore, it was 'made in the name of global
righ ts', to u�e an expression dear to Hardt and Negri. The tru th is
that, as Noam Chomsky has demonstrated, t he ethnic cleansing
of the sin ister regi me of Milosevic was not the cause but the
consequence of the America n bom bings (Cbomsky :2001 : 81).
Let us return to the Gulf War, deplorably c haracterized by t he
authors as a 'repressive operation of scarce interest' a nd l i ttle
importance. first of a l l , i t is convenient to remember that this
operation was not precisely a wa r but, as Chomsky i nforms us,
a slaughter: 'the term "wa r" hardly applies to a confronta tion
in which one pa rt ma ssacres the other from an u n reachable
distance, while the civi l society i s destroyed' (Chomsky 1 994 : 8).
The authors a re not worried abou t this type of disquiSition. Tbeir
vision of the coming of the em pire with its plethora of l iberat ing
and ema ncipating possi bil i ties ma kes their eyes look u p so, for
that reason, t hey are unaware of the horrors a nd miseries that cu r-
62
ren t imperialist pol icics produce in history's mud. If the C hrist ian
theologians of the M iddle Ages had their eyes completely t urned
to the con templation of God and for that reason did not real ize
that hell was surrounding them, the authors are so dazzled by the
luminous perspectives t hat open with the coming of the empire
that the butchery inaugurated by this new historical era does
not move them to write a single l ine of lamentation or compas
sion. Masters of the art of 'deconstruct ion ', they are shown to be
completely incapablc of applying this resource to the analysis of a
war that was i n real ity a massacre. They also fa i l to recognize, let
us not say denou nce, the enormous nu mber of civil ian victims of
the bombi ng, the 'collateral damage' and the criminal embargo
that followed the war. Only cou nting the children, the n umber
surpasses 1 50,000 victi ms. They also remain silent about t he fact
thaI, despite his defeat, Saddam remained in power, but with the
consent of the world's boss to repress a t will the popu lar upri si ngs
of the Kurds and the Shia m i nority (ibid.).
Finally, how realistic can an analysis be t hat considers the Gulf
War, located in a zone containing the world's most important oil
reserves, a matter of marginal i m portance for the United States?
Should we think then that washi ngton launched its mil i tary
operations moved by the imperious necessity to ensure the pre
dominance of 'global righ ts' and not with the goal of reaffirming
its ind ispu ta ble primacy in a strategic region of the globe? Was
President Bush's decision to raze Afghanistan while trying in vain
to discover the whereabouts of one of its old partners, Osama Hin
Laden, motivated by the need to make poss i ble this demand for
universal jus tice? How to describe such foolish ness?
This vis ion of the empire's concrete functioning, a nd of some
unple",sa nt events such as the Gulf War, is in l ine with other
extremely pole mic definit ions made by the authors. For example,
that 'the world police forces of the United States act not with an
i m perialistic bu t a n imperial interest'. The grou nding for this
affi rmation is pretty simple and refers to other passages of the
� book: given that imperia lism has disappeared, swallowed by the
:. commotion that destroyed the old nation-states, an intervent ion
by the ' hegemon' makes sense only as a contribution to the stabil
ity of the empire. The pillage characteristic of the imperialistic era
has been replaced by global rights and international justice.
Another issue outlined by Hardt and Negri renects with greater
clari ty the serious problems that a ffect their vision of the really
existing international system which before their eyes becomes
a type of ethical empire. Thus, referring to the ascendancy that
the United States achieved in the post-war world , the authors
maintain that:
With the end of the cold war, the United States was called to
serve t he role of guaranteeing and adding juridical efficacy to
this eomplex process of the formation of a new supranational
right. Just as in the first century of the Christian era the Roman
senators asked Augustus to assume i mperial powers of the ad·
ministration for the public good , so too today the internat ional
monetary organizat ions ( the United Nations, the international
organizations, and even the humanitarian organizations) ask the
United States to assume the central role in a new world order.
(p. 1 8 J )
The equivocal contents o f this passage o f Hardt a n d Negri's
work are vel)' serious. First, they consider analogous two situa·
tions that a re completely differ�nt: the one of the Roman Empire
in t h e first centul)' and the current one, when the world has
changed a l i ttle if not as much as we would l ike. And the old
order that prevailed around the Mediterranean basin based on
slaveI)' does not seem to have many affinities with the current
imperial ist system that today covers the entire planet and which
includes formally free populations. Second, however, is the fact
that Roman senators demanding that Augustus assume i mperial
powers is one thing and the people subdued by the Roman yoke
asking lor this is another, very different, thing. Cenainly, there
is a considerable majority of American senators who repeatedly
lobby the White House on the need for acting as an articu lating
and organizing axis for the benefit of the companies and national
interests of the United States, as we will see in the following
chapters. Another, very different thi ng is that people, nations and
states subjected to US imperialism wou ld demand such a thing.
At this point , Hard t and Negri 's analysis becomes muddled with
American esta blishment thought because it refers to questions
supposedly asked of Wash ington by the United Nations. When
did the General Assembly request such a thing? , because this is
not a matter that can be solved by an organ as little representa
tive and a nti-democratic as the Security Council; and even less
by the ' international monetary org-aniUltions'. In this case, are
they referring to the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO or the IDB
as 'representatives' of the people's rights? What are they talking
abou t? In any case, and even when they had reclaimed it, we k now
very well that such institutions are, in fact, ' informal depa nments'
of the American government and completely lack any universal
legitimacy to take up an initiative such as the one men tioned. And
what can be said about the humanitarian organizations? As far as
I know, neither Amnesty or the Red Cross, neither Greenpeace or
the Service of Peace and Justice, or indeed any other known organ
ization has ever formulated the petition stated in the book.
Maybe Hardt and Negri are thinking about the main role ta ken
by the United States in the promotjon of a new supranational
juridical framework, which, for reasons that will soon be u nder
stood, has been conducted in secrecy by the governments involved
in this enterprise. Indeed, for many years, Washington has been
systematically working on the establishment of the Multi lateral
Agrerment on Investments (MAl) and has it as a priority on its
political agenda. To move forwards with this proposal, the White
House counts on the a lways uncond itional collaboration of i ts
favourite client-state, the United Kingdom, and that of the over
whelming majority of the governments in the OECD. Among
5 the rules that the USA has been t rying to impose to consolidate
.2 un iversal justice and rights - surely inspired by the same l i ter·
ature as the au thors - are two epoch·making contri butions to
legal science. The first is a doctrinarian in novation, thanks to
which for the first time in history compa n ies and states become
j uridical ' persons' enjo}'i ng exactly the same legal status. States
are no l onger representatives of the popular sovereignty and the
nation and have become simple economic agents without a ny
type of prerogative in the courts. It is not necessary to be a great
legal scholar to be able to qualify this 'j u ridical advancement',
zealously sought by Wash ington, as a phenomenal retrogression
that neglects the progress made by modern law over the last t h ree
hundred years.
The second contribution: having taken into account the
extraordinary concern of the American govern ment fo r universal
law, t he MAl p roposes the abolit ion of the reciprocity principle
between the two parties sign i ng a contract. If the MAl were
approved, something that so far has not been possible thanks
to tenacious opposition from humanitarian organ izations and
diverse soc ial movements, one of the parties to t he cont ract
would have rights and the other one only obl igations. Given the
characteristics of the 'really ex.i sting' empire, it is not hard to
find out who would have what: co mpanies would have the right
to take states to th e courts of j ustice, but the states would be
debarred from doing so with investors that d id not comply with
their obligat ions. Of course, given the well·known concern of
the American gove rnment to guarantee un iversal democracy, it
is permitted for a state to file a law suit against a nother state,
with which things become more even. Thus, i f the governments
of Guatemala or Ecuador had a problem with Un ited Fruit or
Chiquita Banana, they would not be a ble to file a suit against
those companies, but they would be free and would have a ll the
guarantees in the world to do i t against the government of the
Un ited States, given that, despite what Hardt and Negri thi nk,
66
those companies are American and are registered in that country.
Now we can understand the reasons why t he negotiations that
ended in a d raft MAl were conducted in absolute secrecy and
beyond any rype of democratic and popular control (Boron 2OO1a:
3 1 -62j Chomsky 2oooa: 259-60; Lander 1 998).
Given such a huge distortion of the empire's realities, it is not
surp ris ing that the authors conclude:
In all the regional conflicts of the late twent ieth century, from
Haiti to t he Persian Gulf and Somalia 10 Bosnia, the United
States is called to intervene militarily - and these calls are real
and substantial, not merely publicity stunts to quell U.S. public
dissent. Even if i t were reluctant, the U.S. mi l i tary would have to
answer the call in the name of peace and order. (p. 1 8 1 )
N o comment.
The empire as it is, portrayed by its organic intellectuals
Hence, it seems to be sufficiently proved that Hardt and Negri's
analysis of the contemporary world order is wrong. based on a
seriously distorted read ing of the current transformations that
are taking place in state formations and in the world markets of
contemporary capitalism. This i s not to deny that, occaSionally,
here and there, the reader can find a few sharp reflections and
observations related to some timely issues, but t he general picture
that flows from their a nalysis is t heoretically wrong and politically
self·defeating.
A good exercise that could help Hardt and Negri to descend
from the structuralist nebula in which they seem to have sus
pended their reasoning - 'a new global form of sovereignty' (p. xii),
'a sp�cific regime of global relat ions' (pp. 45-6) - would be to read
the work of some of the main organic i ntellectuals of the empire.
Leo Pan i tch has ca l led attention to a meaningful paradox: while
the term ' imperial ism' has fallen into d isuse, the realities of im
perialism are more vivid and impressive than ever. This paradox is
• i 3 a �. � < iii·
i' WI
l f It 3
'V
�.
.. much more accule in Lat in America, where not only the tern, :J .f ' imperia lism' but also the word 'dependency' have been ell.-pelled
from academic language and public discourse, precisely at a time
when the subjection of Latin American countries to transnational
economic forces has reached unprecedented levels. The reasons
for this are many: among them the ideological and political defeat
of the left and its consequences stand out. The adoption of the
language of the victors and the inabil ity to resist their blackmail,
especial ly among those obsessed with preserving their careers
and gaining 'public acknowledgement' , reinforces this subjec·
tion. This phenomenon can be verified not only in L-atin America
but also in Europe and the United States. In Europe, it is mainly
evident in those countries in which communist parties were very
strong and the presence of the polit ical left vigorous, such as in
Italy, France and Spain. This is why Panitch suggests that if the left
wants to face real ity, maybe 'it should look to the right to obtain
a clear vision of the d irection in which it should march' (Panitch
2000: 18-20). Why? Because while many on the left are incl ined
to forget the existence of class struggles and imperialism (fearful
of being denounced by the prevail ing neoliberal and post modern
consensus as self· indulgent and absurd dinosaurs escaped from
the Jurassic Park of socialism), the mandarins of the empire , busy
as they are giving advice to the dominant classes who are faced
dai ly by class antagonists and emancipatory struggles, have no
time to waste on fantasies or poetry. The pract.ical necessities of
imperial administration do not a l low them to become distracted
by metaphysical lueubrations. This is one of the reasons why
Zbigniew Brzez inski is so clear i n his diagnosis, and instead of
talking about a phantasmagorie empire , such as the one depicted
by Hardt and Negri, he goes directJy to the point and celehrates
withom shame the irresist ible ascension, in his own judgement,
of the United States to the condition of 'only global superpower'.
Focused on assuring the long·term stabil ity of the imperial ist
phase opened after the fal l of the Soviet Union, Bn.ezinski identi-
68
fies three main guiding principles of the American geopol itical
strategy: first, to impede the collusion among, and to preserve the
dependence of, the most powerful vassals on issues of security
(Western Europe and Japan); second, to maintain the submission
and obedience of the tributary nations, such as Latin America and
the Third World in general ; and third, to prevent the unification,
the overflow and eventual attack of the 'barbarians', a denomina
tion that embraces countries from China to Russia, including the
Islamic nations of Central Asia and the Middle East (Brzezinski
1998: 40). Crystal clear.
The former US National Security Council chairman·s observa
tions offer a c lear vision without beating about the bush, distant
from the vague rhetoric employed by Hardt and Negri and, pre
cisely because of this, extremely instructive of what these authors
call empire and Panitch calls 'new imperialism'. In 1989, long
before Brzezinski expressed these ideas, Susan Strange, not ex
actly a Marxist scholar, wrote an article. Had it been read by our
authors, it would have saved them time and prevented them from
making extremely serious mistakes. Strange said:
What is emerging is, therefore, a non-territorial empire with its
imperial capital in Washington DC. If the imperial capitals used
to anract courtesanS of foreign provinces, Washington instead
attracts 'lobbies' and agents of the international companies,
representat ives of minority groups dispersed throughout the
empire and pressure groups organized at a global scale. [ ... J
As in Rome, citizenship is not l imited to a superior ra,·e and
the empire contains a mix of citizens with the same legal and
polit ical rights, semi·citizens and non-citizens, such as the slave
population in Rome. [ . . . ] The semi-citizens of the empire are ,
many and they a re spread out. [ . . . ] They include many people
employed by big transnational finns that operate in the trans
national stmcture of production that assists, as they all well
know, the global market. This includes the people employed
69
• i .. :2 D i' " < iii' 0' :2 III o -
:J-et CD 3
'U
:i"
.. in transnational banking and, very often, the members of the :t .e 'national' armed forces, especial ly those that are trained, armed
by, and dependent on the United States a rmed forces. It also in
cludes many scholars in medicine, the natural sciences and the
social sciences, as in business management and economy, who
view the American professional associations and universities as
those peers before whose eyes they want to shine and excel . It
also includes the people in the press and the mass media, for
whom the American technology and the examples offered by
the United States have shown the way, changing the established
institution s and organizations. (Strange 1989: 167)
I t is u nquestionable that , despite her rejection of Marx
ism, Strange's d iagnosis of the inrerna tional st.ructure and the
organ ization of the empire has more i n common with historical
materialism than the One that arises from Hardt and Negri's work.
This is not the fi rs t li me that a rigorous and objective liberal,
thanks to the realism that informs her analysis, provides a vision
that is closer to Marxist analysis than that p rovided by aut hors
tacitly or outspoken ly identified with tha t theoretical tradition.
I n addition to the vibrant perspective that Brzezinski and Strange
have offered us, we have a crude diagnosis made by one of the
most distinguished t h eoreticians of American neo-conservatism,
Sa muel P. Huntington; h e also h as n o doubts about the imperial·
ist ch aracter of the curren t world order. Hun tington'S concern is
with the weakness and vul nerability of the USA and its cond ition
as the 'lonely sheri ff' . This condition has obliged Washi ngton
to exen a vicious international power, one of the consequences
of wh ich could be the formation of a very broad anti-American
coalit ion including not only Russia and China but also, though
in d i ffering degrees, the Eu ropean states, which could put the
current world order in crisis . To refute the scepticS and refresh
the memory of those who have forgotten what the imperial ist
relationships a re , i t is convenient to reproduce in extenso the long
70
string of i nitiatives that, according 10 H u ntingto n , were d riven by
Washington in recent years:
To press other countries to adopt American values and practices
on issues such as human rights and democ racy; to prevent
that third countries acqu i re mil i tary capacities susceptible of
i nterfering with the American military superiority; to have the
American legislation applied in other societies; to qualify third
coun tries with regards to their adhesion to American standards
on human rights, drugs, terrorism, nuclear and missile prolifera
tion and, now, religious freedom; to apply sanctions against
the countries that do not conform to the American sta ndards
on these issues; to promote the corporate American interests
under the slogans of free t rade and open markets and to shape
the politics of the I M F and the World Bank to serve those same
i nterests; [ . . . ] to force other countries to adopt social and
economic policies that bene fi t the American economic in terests,
to promote the sale of American weapons and preven t t hat other
countries do the same [ . . . ] to categorize certain cou ntries as
'pariah states' or criminal Slates and exclude them from the
global institutions because they refuse to prostrate themselves
before the American wishes. (Huntington 1 999: 48)
Let us be clear, this is not i n ce ndiary criticism by an e nemy
of A merican imperial ism, rather it is a sober acco u n t written by
one of its most lucid organic intel lectuals, concerned about the
self-destructive trends that have a risen fro m America's exercise
of its hegemony i n a u n i polar world. Given the images that a rise
from the work of the t h ree authors whose ideas we have p res
ented, the someti mes poetic and at other times m etaphysical d is
cour.;e of Hardt and Negri vanishes because of its own l ightness
and its radical discon nection with what Hunti ngton appropriately
cal ls the respons ibi l i l.ies of the ' lonely superpower', What emerges
from Hardt a n d N egri's a nalysis is that the assumed ' n ew form of
global sovereignty' exercised by the world 'Empire', which woul d
7 1
!i impose a new global logic of domination, is not a world empire
.e but 'American logic of domination'. There is no doubt that there
are supranat ional and transnational organizations,just as there is
no doubt that behind them lies the American national interest.
It is obvious that the American national interest does not exist in
the abstract, nor is it in the interests of the American people or the
nation . It is in t he interests of the big corporate conglomerates
which control as they please the government of the U nited States,
Congress, the judicial powers, the mass media, the major univer·
sities and centres of study and the framework that allows them to
retain a formidable hegemony over civil society. Inst i tu tions t hat
are supposedly ' intergovernmental' or i nternational, such as the
IMF, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization , are at
t he service of corporate American i nterests. The intervent ions of
t he USA in other regions of the world have different motivations,
but did they take place. as Hardt and Negri cla im. to establ ish
international law? In this sense, Brzezinski could not have been
more categorical when he said t.hat the so-called supranational
institut ions are, in fact , part of the imperial system, something
that is particularly t rue in the case of the international fina ncial
insti tut ions (Brzezinski 1998: 28-9).
5 The nation-state and the issue of sovereignty
As we have seen in previous chapters, according to Hardt and
Negri, the const itution of the empire overlays the decadence and
final, supposedly inexorable, collapse of the nation-state_ Accord
ing to our authors, the sovereignty t hat nation-states retained in
the past has been transferred to a new global st ruct ure of domi
nation i n which decadent state formations play an i ncreasingly
marginal role. There are, we a re assured, no imperialist players
or a territorial centre of powerj nor do there exist established
barriers or limits or fixed identities or crystallized hierarchies.
The transition from the age of imperialism, based on a collect ion
of bell icose states i n permanent conflict among t hemselves, to
the age of the empire, is signalled by the irreve rsible decl ine
of the institu tional and legal foun dations of the old order, the
nation-state. It is because of this that Hard t and Negri plainly
reject the idea that the United States is 'the ultimate authority
that rules over the processes of globalization and the new world
order' (p_ xiii). Both those who see the United State9 as a lonely
and om nipotent superpower, a fervent defender of freedom, and
those who denou nce that country as an imperialist oppressor, are
wrong, Hardt and Negri say, because both parties assume that the
old nation-state's sovereignty is still in force and do not reali:te
that i t is a rel ic of the past. Unaware of th is mutation they also
fail to understand that i mperialism is over (ibid .)_
LFt us examine some of the problems that this in terpreta t ion
poses_ In the first place, let us say that to assu me that t here can
exist something l ike an authori ty able to govern 'all the processes
of globalization and the new world order' is not an i nnocent mis
take. Why? Because given such a requirement the only sensible
., answer is to deny the existence of such an authority. To say that .� ... a certain structure of power can control all thc processes that
occur in its jurisdiction is absurd. Not even the most elementary
forms of organization of social power, such as the ones reported
by anthropologists studying 'primit ive hordes' , were capable of
fulfi l l ing such a requirement . Fortunately, the omnipotence of
the powerfu l does not exist. There are always loopholes and,
invariably, there wil l be things that the power cannot control .
Even in the most extreme cases of despotic concentrations of
power - Nazi Germany or some of the most oppressive and feroci
ous Latin American dictatorships such as Videla's in Argentina,
Pinochet's in Chile, Truji l lo's in the Dominican Republic and
Somoza's in Nicaragua - the authori ties at the time demonstrated
an incapacity to control 'a l l the processes' unfolding in their
countries. To say that there is no imperialism because there is
no one who can take control at a world level a world whose
complexity transcends the limits of our imagination - constitutes
a dismissive statement. It is a question of finding out i f in the new
world order, so celebrated by George Bush Senior after the Gulf
War, there are some players who hold an extraordinarily elevated
share of power and whose interests prevail systematical ly. It is
a question of examining whether the design of this new world
reflects, somehow, the asymmetric d ist ribution of power that
existed in the old world, and how i t works. Of course, to talk about
an 'extraordinarily elevated' share of power is to admit that there
are others who have some power, and i f we speak of systematiC
predominance it is also accepted that there may be some devia
t ions that, from time to time, wil l produce unexpected resu lts.
Th is being said, let us continue with a second problem. Hardt
and Negri'S analysis ofthe issue of sovereignty is wrong. as is their
interpretation of the changes experienced by social structures in
recent tjmes. Regarding the issue of sovereignty, they seem not to
have noticed that in the imperia l ist structure there is a yardstick
of evaluation, or, as Jeane Kirkpatrick, the US Ambassador to the
74
United Nat ions during Ronald Reagan's first term, said , there is
a double standard with which Washington judges foreign govern
ments and their actions. One standard is used to evaluate the
sovereignty of the friends and al l ies of the U nited States; another,
very different, is used to judge the sovereignty of neutral cou ntries
and its enemies. The national sovereignty of the former m ust be
p reserved and strengthened, the laner's should be weakened and
violated without scruples or false regrets. Prisoners of their own
speculations, Hardt a nd Negri cannot perceive this d isturbing
duality, believing thus that there is a 'global logic' beyond and
above the national i nterest of t he superpower and u ndeniable
'centre' of the empire, the United States. For authors so interested
in constitutional and j u ri dical matters, as is the case of Hardt
and Negri, the deplorable performance of Washington regarding
the acknowledgement of i n ternational treaties a nd agreements
provides a timely douche of sobriety. As is well known, the United
States has repudiated any i nternational jurid ical i nstrument that
implies even a minimal reduction of i ts sovereignty. Recently,
Washington has deliberately delayed agreeing to the constitu tion
of an International Criminal Court sited in Rome - with special
competence to judge war crimes, c ri mes against humanity and
genocide - because this would mean a t ransference of sovereignty
to an international organ whose control could escape from their
hands. The United States actively panicipated i n all the previous
delibera tions about setting u p the court, it discussed criteria, i t
vetoed norms and co-authored various drafts of the const itution.
Bu t when the time came to approve the constitu tion of the cou n
i n Rome, it decided to wa lk away.
This should come as no surprise to students of imperialism,
thoug-h i t seems to have con fused the authors of Empire. Appar
ently, they have ignored the fact that the Uni ted States has one of
the worst world records regarding the rat ification of international
conventions and agreements, precisely because WaShington con
siders that these would be detrimental to American national
75
� sovereignty and its interests as a superpower. Recently, the USA
ii: refused to sign the Kyoto Agreement to preserve the environment,
using the argument that i t would hann the profits of American
companies. In the case of the Incernational Convention on the
Rights of the Child, only two countries in the whole world re
fused to sign the protocol: Somalia and the United States_ But as
pointed out by Noam Chomsky, actually the United States 'have
not ratified a single convention, because even in the very few
cases in which they did so, the American government managed to
introduce a reserve clause that says the fol lowing: "not appl icable
to the United States without the consensus of the United States"'
(Chomsky 2001: 63).
In the neo-consel"Jative zenith of the 1 960s, the United States
refused (and in some cases is sti l l refusing) to pay i ts fees to
some of the main agencies of the U nited Nations, accusing them
of having defied American sovereignty. Why pay membership
fees to an institution that Washington cannot control at wil l? A
simi lar attitude is obsel"Jed in relation to another US creation,
the wro, and its preceding agreement, the GATT. The European
U nion aCCllsed the American government of damaging European
companies because the embargo against Cuba violated the com
mercial ru les previollsly agt"eed. Besides, the European Union
said, the embargo was immoral , i t had been unanimously con
demned and children and the elderly were i ts main victims_ The
embargo's unfavourable impact on heal th and nutrition policies
as wel l as other similar considerations were also highl ighted. The
response from Washington was that these were not commercial
or humanitarian issues but, i nstead, they were matters related
to American national security and, therefore, they wou ld not
be transferred to any other international agency or institution
but would be exclusively managed by the d i fferent branches of
the American government without allowing any, even minimal,
foreign imel"Jention (ibid.: 64-6).
A final example will be useful to conclude this d iscu ssion.
76
During the offensive of the N icaraguan Contras - i l legal ly armed,
t rained. financed and organized by t he United States - the govern·
ment of Managua fi led a demand in 1985 to the I n ternational
Court of J ustice accusing the A merican government of war crimes
against the Nicaraguan civil population. The response from Wash
i ngton was to d isregard the court's jurisd iction. The process
continued anyway, and the final sentence of the court ordered
Washington to stop i ts mil i tary operations, retire the mercenary
forces stationed in N icaragua and pay substantial reparations
[0 compensate for the damage inflicted on the civil society. The
government of the Uni ted States simply disrega rded the sentence,
continued the war, whose results are well known, and not even
when it managed to i nstal a new 'friendly' government in Nicar·
agua d id it dare to sit down to talk about the reparations of war,
let alone paying them. The same occurred with Vietnam. These
are good examples of what Hardt and Negri unde rstand as the
i mperial creation of 'global rights' and t he empire of universal
justice (ibid. : 69-70).
It seems clear that the authors have not ma naged to appreciate
the continuous relevance of national sovereignty, the national
i nterest and national power in al l its magni tude, all of which
i ncurably weakens the central hypothesis of their argument that
i nsists t here is a global and a bstract logic that presides over the
functioning of the empire . Rega rding what occurred with the
capitalist state in its cu rrent phase, i t seems that the mistakes
cited before become even more serious. First of all, there is an
important in itial problem that is not margi nal at all, with res·
pect to the proclaimed final and irreversible decadence of the
state: all the avai lable quantitative information with regard to
publjc expenditure and the size of the state apparatus moves i n
t he opposite direction of t h e o n e imagi ned by Hardt a n d Negri.
If something has occurred in metropolitan capitalisms in the
last twen ty years, i t has been precisely the noticeable increase
of the sizc of the state, measured as the proportion of public
77
expenditu res to GOP. The informat ion p rovidcd by al l types of
sou rces, from national governments to the United Nations De
ve lopment.Program me (UNOP). and from the World Ban k to the
I M F and the OECO, speak with a single voice: all the states of the
metropolitan capital isms were strengthened in the last twenty
years, despite the fact that many of the governments in those
states have been veritable champions of the anti-state rhetoric
t hat was lau nched with fury at the begi nning of the 1980s. What
happened after the crisis of Keynesian capitalism in the middle
of the 1970S was a relative decrease in the growth rate of public
expenditu re. Fiscal budgets continued to grow uninterruptedly.
although at more modest levels than before. That is why a special
report on this topic in the con servative British magazine The
Economist ( 1 997) is entitled ' Big Government is Still in Charge'.
The writer of this article cannot hide his disappointment at the
slates' tenacious resistance to becoming smaHer as mandated
by the neoliberal catechism. (Hardt and Negri seem not to have
examined this work because the last section of Chapter 3-6 i n
their book i s ent itled 'Big Governmen t is Over!', a heading that
clearly reflects the extent of their misunderstanding of a theme so
crucial to their theoretical argument.) In any case, after a careful
analysi s of recent data on public expenditure in fourteen indus
trialized cou ntries of the OECO, The Economist concludes that,
despite the neoliberal reforms initiated after the proclaimed new
goals of fiscal austerity and public expenditure reduction between
1980 and 1 996, public expenditure in the selected cou ntries grew
from 43-3 per cent of the GOP to 47.1 per cen t, while in cou n tries
such as Sweden this figure passes the 50 per cent threshold:
'in the last forty years the growth of public expenditure in the
developed economies has been persistent, universal and counter
productive ', and the objective so strongly proclai med of becoming
a 'small govern ment' apparently has been more a weapon of
electoral rheroric than a true objective of economic policy. Not
even the strongest defenders of the famous 'state reform' and
the shrinking of public expenditure, such as Ronald Reagan and
Margaret Thatcher, managed to achieve any significant progress
in this terrain.
Thus, if th is strengthening of state organizations is verified in
the hea rt of developed capitalisms, the h istory of the periphery
is com pletely different . In the i n ternational reorganization of
the imperialist system under the ideological shield of neol iberal
ism, states were radically weakened and the economies of (he
periphery were subdued to become more and more open, and
almost withou t any state med iation, (0 the influx of the great
transnational companies and to the policies of the developed
coun tries, mai nly the United States. This process was in no way
a natu ral one, but ins tead was the result of initiatives adopted at
the centre of the empire : the government of the United States,
in its role as ruler, accompanied by its loyal guard dogs (the
IMF, the World Bank, the wro, etc.) and supported by the active
compl icity of the countries of the G-7. This coalition forced ( in
many cases bru tal ly) the indebted cou ntries of the Third World to
apply the policies known as the 'Washi ngton Consensus' and to
transform their economies in accordance with the interests of the
dominant coalition and, especia l ly, of the primus inter pares, the
U nited States. These pol icies favou red the practically unl imited
penetration of American and European corporate interests into
the domestic markets of the southern nations. For that to take
place, it was necessary to d ismantle the public sector in those
cou ntries, produce a real deconstruction of the state and, with
the a im of generating surplus for the payment of these countries'
foreign debt, to reduce public expenditure to the mi nimum, sacri
ficing in this way vital and impossible-to-postpone expenditure
on h�alth , housing and educat ion . State-owned companies were
first financially drained and then sold at ridiculous prices to the
big corporations of the central countries, thereby creating a space
for the maximum exercise of 'private in itiative' . (Despite that, in
many cases, the buyers were state-owned companies from the
79
004 '7 CD :::s a ::r. o :::s . III a if a :::I a. III o � ;; ca-:::I -<
� industria lized cou ntries.) Another policy imposed on these coun-
� tries was the u n ilateral opening up of the economy, faci l i tating
an i nvasion of imported goods produced in other countries wh i le
the u nemployment rates increased exponentially. It is pertinent
to state that while the periphery was forced to open up commer
cially, protectionism in the North became more sophisticated.
The deregulation of markets, especially the fi nancial one, was
another of the objectives of the 'capita list revolut ion' in the 1 980s.
Al l together, t hese policies had the result of d ramatically weaken
ing the states of the peri phery, while fu I fil ling the capitalist dream
of having markets operating without state regulation, as a result
of which the strongest corporate conglomerates actually took
charge of 'regulating' the market, obviously in their own i nterests.
As I said before, these policies were not fortuitous or accidental,
given that the d ismantl ing of t.he states increased s ignificantly
the abi l i ty of i mperialism and foreign companies and nations
to control not only the economic l ife but a lso the pol i t ical l ife
of the cou ntries of the periphery. Of course, we find nothing of
this in Empire. What we do find, instead, are reiterative passages
claiming that imperialist relat.ionships have ended, despite the
fact that the visi bil ity they have acquired in recent decades is so
striking that even the least rad ical sectors of our societies have
no trouble in recognizing them.
A concrete example of the conseque nces of this acute weaken
i ng of the state in the capitalisms of the periphery has been
stressed by Hondu ran h istorian Ramon Oqueli. Referring to his
country in the m id-1 980s, wit.h its well-established democrat ic
regime, OqueJi observed:
The importance of the president ial elections, with or without
fraud, is relative. The decisions that affect Honduras are first
made in Washington; then in t.he American mil itary com-
mand in Panama ( the Southern Command); afterwards in the
American base command of Palmerola, Honduras; immediately
80
after in the American Embassy in Tegucigalpa; in the fifth place
comes the commander-in-chief of the Honduran armed forces;
and the president of the Republic only appears in sixth place.
We vote, then, for a Sixth-category official in tenns of decision
capacity. The president's functions are limited to managing
m isery and obtaining American loans_ (Cueva 1 986: 50)
Replace Honduras with almost any other Latin American coun
t l)' and a similar picture wi l l emerge. Obviously, the predominant
mil i tary situation i n those years assigned the a rmed forces a very
special role_ For the coun tries that do not face a serious military
crisis, that central role today fa lls i nto the hands of the Treasury
and the I M F, and the president can, in such a case, move up
the decision ladder to the th ird or fourt h rung, but no further
than that. Regarding the president's main functions - managi ng
misery and obtaining American loans - th ings have not changed.
The Argenti ne case is a shining example of a l l th is .
Continu ing with the probJemalique of the state, our authors
do not seem able to d istinguish between s tate forms and func
tions and the tasks of states. There is no doubt that the form
of the capitalist state has changed in the last quarter of a cen
tury. Since the state is not a metaphysical entity bu t a historical
c reature, continually formed a nd reformed by class struggles,
its forms can hardly be i nterpreted as immanent essences float
ing above the h istorical process. Consequently, the forms of
the democratic state in the developed capitalist countries have
changed. How? There has been real democratic degeneration:
a progressive loss of power formerly i n the hands of congresses
a nd parliaments; the growing u naccountability of governments,
whicl;l goes hand-in-hand with the i ncreasing concentra tion of
power i n t he hands of executives; the proliferation of secret areas
of decision-making (see, for example, the aborted negotiations
of the MAl , the accelerated approval of the NAITA, the current
negotiations behind closed doors to create the Free Trade Area of
8 t
� the Americas); decl i ning levels of governmental response to rhe
i&: claims and demands of civil society; a drastic reduction of com
petit ion among pOlit ical parties because of increasing simi larities
between the majori[)' pol it ical parties, fol lowing the bipart isan
American model; the tyranny of the markets - in fact, of the
ol igopol ies that control them - that vote every day and capture the
permanent artention of the governments whi le the public votes
every two or three years; related to the aforemcntioned, logical
t rends towards pOl i t ical apathy and individual ist ret raction; the
growing predominance of the big oligopol ies in the mass media
and the cul tural industry; and, lastly, an increasing transference
of the right to make decisions from popular sovereign[), to the
admin istrative and polit ical agencies of the empire, a process that
exists both in the empire's 'exterior provinces' and in its centre.
In the Lat in American case this means that popular sovereign[)'
has been deprived of almost a l l its attributes, and that no strat
egic decision on economic or social mat ters is adopted in these
countries without previous consultation with, and the approval of,
the relevant agency in Washington. As we can sec, a si tuation l ike
this cannot but contradict the essence of the democratic order,
and popular sovereign[)' is reduced to a mere dead let ter.
Boaventura de Sousa Santos has examined the changes experi
enced by states under neoliberal globalization and his analysis
confirms that ' there is by no means an overal l crisis of the state,
let alone a terminal crisis of the state, such as suggested by the
mOSI extreme theses of globalizatjon scholars' (de Sousa Santos
1999: 64). The Hobbesian repressive fu nctions of the slate enjoy
thei r vigour both in the periphery and in the centre of the sysrem.
In the former, because the implementation of strongly repressive
pol icies has become necessary to prop up an increaSingly unjust
and unequal capitalist organization, where the numbers of the
exploited and the excluded increase incessantly. In the centre,
on the other hand, because th is occurs especially in the United
States, a Significant proportion of their social problems is dealt
82
with by channell ing people towards the prison syste m, though
this situation also occurs, but less acutely, in other countries. I t
is estimated that today the total number of p ri soners in A merica
a mounts to a figure only surpassed by the populations of the
three major cities of that country, New York, Chicago and Los
A ngeles, and that the overwhelming majority of the convicts
are black or Latino_ As de Sousa Sa ntos correctly notes, in the
social apartheid of contem porary capitalism the state conti nues
to pe rform a crucial role: it is the Hobbesian Leviathan in the
gheuos and the margi nal neigh bourhoods while it guarantees
t he benefits of the social Lockean contract for those who inhabit
the opulent suburbs. Consequently, this state supposedly on the
way to becoming extinct, according to the obfuscated vision of
Hardt and Negri, continues on its way as a divided s tate, almost
schizophre nic: for the poor and the excluded, a fascist state; fo r
the rich, a democratic state. But the vitality of the nation-state is
not measured only in t hese temls; it can also be proved by the role
it plays i n several other fields, such as supranational un ification,
the l iberalization of t he economy, the commercial open ing u p,
the deregulation of the fi nancial system and the elaboration of
an institutional-jurid ical fra mework adequate for the protection
of private companies and the new economic model inspired by
the 'Washi ngton Consensus' . 'What is in c risis is the function of
pro moting non-merca ntile exchanges among citizens,' concludes
de Sousa San tos (ibid_: 64).
As Ellen Meiskins Wood (2000: 1 1 6) demonstrates, the nation
state con t inues to be the main agent of globa lization. In the
global markets, the need that capital has for the state is even
more pronounced than before. A recent analysis shows that in
the processes of economic restructuri ng, the national states of
metropOl i tan capitalisms, fa r from being the 'victims' of global
ization, were its main promoters. The international expansion
of the fina ncial, industrial and commercial capital of the United
States, the European countries, Ja pan , South Korea, Si ngapore
� and Taiwan 'was not a macroeconomic phenomenon born inside
� the companies' but, instead, was the product of a political strategy
directed at improving the relative position of those cou ntries
in the changing international economic scene. In this strategy,
actors such as the US Treasu ry, the MITI of Japan, the European
Commission and a group of national state agencies played a
central role (Weiss 1997: 23). This is why Peter Drucker, one of
the most prestigious US gurus, calls our attention to the amaz·
ing persistence of states despite the great changes t hat occurred
i n the world economy and he concludes that they wil l , for sure,
survive the globalization of the economy and the information
technology revolution (Drucker 1997: 1 60).
It seems appropriate to quote what one of the major advocates
of US imperialism has written on these issues, ratifying the key
role played by the capitalist states, and very especially the Ameri
can state, in globaJization. 'As the country that benefits most from
global economic integration, we have the responsibility of making
sure that this new system is sustainable [ . . . ] Sustaining globaliza·
t ion is our overarching national interest,' says Thomas Friedman.
And the implications of the fact that 'global ization·is·US' the New
York Times columnist does not fa il to notice that 'because we
are the biggest beneficiaries and drivers of global ization, we are
unwittingly putting enormous pressure on the rest of the world'
( Fried man 1 999).
To sum up: the global markets strengthen competi tion be·
tween the giant corporations that dominate the global economy.
Since these companies are transnational in t heir reach and the
range of their operations while still possessing a national base,
in order to succeed in this relentless battle they require the sup·
port of 'their governments' to keep their commercial rivals in
l ine. Aware of this , the national states offer ' their companies' a
menu of alternatives which i nclude the following: the concession
of direct subsidies for national companies; the gigantic rescue
operat ions of banks and com panies, paid in many cases through
taxes applied to workers and consumers; the imposition of fiscal
austerity policies and structural adjustment programmes directed
towards guaranteeing greater profit rates for the companies; the
devaluation or appreciation of the local cu rrency, in order to
favour some fractions of capital while placing the bu rden of the
crisis on other sectors and soc ial groups; the deregulation of
markets; the i mplementation of ' labour reforms' i ntended to
accentuate the submission of workers, weakening both their
capacity to negot iate their wages and their labour unions; the
enforcement of the international immobil ity of workers while
faci l i tating the i nternational mobility of capital; the guarantee
of ' law and order' in societies that experience regressive social
processes of wealth and income re-concentration and mass ive
processes of pauperization; the creat ion ofa legal framework cap
able of ratifying favou rable terms and opportunities that compa
nies have enjoyed in the current phase; and the establishment of
a legislation that ' legalizes', in the cou ntries of the periphery, the
imperialist suction of surplus-value and that al lows for the great
profits of the transnational companies to be freely remitted to
their headquarters. These are some of the tasks that the national
states perform and that the 'global logic of the Empire', so exalted
in Hardt and Negri'S analysis, can guarantee only through the
sti l l indispensable mediation of the nation-state (Meiskins Wood
2000: 116-17). That the most prominent and i nfluential members
of the capitaJist class are actively working to destroy such a useful
and formidable instrument as the nation-state can be understood
only by assuming that the capi talist class is made up of id iots
(I must state right away, to clear up possible doubts, that the
capitalist state is not only an instrument of the bourgeoisie but
also m�ny other things, which do not prevent i t from also being
an i ndispensable instrument in the process of capital accumula
tion).· In l ight of this, Ellen Meiskins Wood concludes:
1 I have examined [ his issue i n detail i n Boron ( 1995).
85
• Of course, it is possible for the state to change its form, and .� � for the traditional nation-state to give room, on the one hand,
to most strictly local states and, on the other hand, to wider
regional political authorities. But regardless of its shape, the
state will still be crucial, and it is likely that for a long time even
the old nation-state will continue to play its dominant role.
( Meiskins wood 2000: 1 17)
6 The unsolved mystery of the multitude
Obsessive denial of the realit ies of the nation-state leads Hardt
and Negri to a political dead-end. Let uS review, therefore, a pas
sage from Empire that ' analysed from another perspective in
Chapter 5. In that chapter I said that, together with the terminal
crisis of the state, Hardt and Negri a lso observed 'the decline
] of any i ndependent space where revolut ion could emerge
i n the national poli t ical regime, or where social space could be
transformed using the instruments of t he s tate' (pp. 307-8).
Consequently, withou t the oxygen provided by that space, the
name of revolution is extinguished. I f th is is true, how can one
break t he iro n cage of the empire? The answer offered by the
authors is s i lence. The word ' revolution' is mentioned only five
or six t imes in the thick volume u nder analysis, and the subject
occu pies a lot less space than the ten pages assigned to the study
of population mobility or the eleven pages devoted to a discussion
of republ icanism. How can such noisy silence be u nderstood?
The vague references to 'the mult i tude' in the final chapter
of Empire do not offer any clues as to how th is oppressive world
order - much more oppressive than the preceding one, it should
be remembered - may some day be transcended. The problem is
not only that the references to the mult i tude are vague. M ichael
Hardt acknowledged in a recent i nterview that, ' in our book the
concept of mult i tude works as a poetic concept rather tha n as a
factual one' (Cangi 2002: 3). Hard t is right about that , because ,
such a notion i s, sociologically speaking, empty, t hough it is
necessary to recognize that i t has a considerable poetic force
which makes it extremely attractive. We are told that the mult i
tude is the totality of the creative and productive subject ivities
that 'express, nourish, and develop positively t heir own constitu
ent projects' and that they 'work toward the l iberation of l iving
labor, creating constel lations of powerful singularities' (p. 61).
Thus, with a stroke of the pen, social classes disappear from
the scene a nd the distinction between exp loiters and exploited
and between the weak and the powerful evaporates. What is left
after this shadowy operation is an amorp hous mass of h ighly
creative singularities that, if existent, would put t he t hesis of
the alienat ing character of labour and da i ly l i fe in capitalist
societies i n serious trouble. If we appl ied Hardt and Negri's
work to the prosaic rea lity of contem porary Lat in America, we
should ask ourselves if the para mil ita ries and death squads that
razed C h iapas and a good part of Centra l America , sowing ter
ror and death, are i ncluded in the multitude; or the landowners
who organize and finance a great pa rt of the private repreSSion
exened in those countries against peasa n ts and aborigi nal com
mu nities; or the financial speculators and t he bou rgeoisie who
supponed mil itary regimes in the past and who today undermine
the languishing democracies. Does t h is category include those
who, in the name of capital, control the cul tural ind ustry of Latin
America at their pleasure? Do h umil iated and exploited peasan ts,
blacks, I ndians, cholos and mestizos form pa n of the m u l t itude
too? And what a bout the urban 'proletaria t ' sunk i n excl usion
a nd misery, the workers and the u ne mployed, the single mothers
and overexploi ted women, the sexual minorities, the ch ildren
of the streets, the paupe rized elde rly, public employees and the
impoverished middle classes? If t hey are not in t h is ca tegory,
where can this vast conglomerate be placed socially? And if they
indeed share their place in the mult itude with the social agents
of exploita tion and repression, wh at sense is there in using such
a category? What is i t t hat i t describes, to say nothing of what
i t could explain? Empire does not offer any such expla nations.
I t is, as Hard t said i n the interview mentioned above, a poetic
concept. But poetry is not always useful for explain ing reality, or
88
for cha nging i t . Sometimes, good poetry makes bad sociology,
and this seems to be the case here.
Leaving aside these disagreeable observations, the progra mme
proposed for the multi tude is explai ned in the fi na l chapter of the
book. The combi nation of the basic precepts o f the neoliberal
theory of globa lization and a sociologically amorphous concept
such as that o f the 'm uhitude' results in a cautiously reform·
ist poli t ical programme and, to make things worse, not a very
realistic one. An 'abstract internationalism' permeates it and th is
resul ts i n what t he a uthors cal l thc 'first element of a poli t ica l
program for the global mult i tude, a first political demand: global
citizenship' (p. 400, emphasis in original). I ca n not d isagree with
this claim, an old aspi rat ion a l ready proposed by Kant and that
Marx a nd Engels recovered a nd redefined within the framework
of the i nternationalism proclaimed with so m uch vigour in the
Manifesto. But Cit izenship has a lways i nvolved a set of rights and
prerogatives as well as req u iring the creation of adequate chan·
nels of polit ical participation that, to be effect ive and not i l lusory,
must be realized wit h i n a legal and i nstitutional framework such
as, in recent h istory, was provided by the nation·state. Whoever
speaks of citizenship, speaks of power, relationshi ps of force, a nd
the state as the basic framework within which a j u ridical order i s
elaborated a n d su pponed. S i nce, accordi ng to Hard t a n d Negri,
t he state faces an irreversible decl ine, with i n what fra mework is
the emancipating and panicipative poten tial of the cit izenship to
be realized? 'Abstract internationalism' believes that the solution
for most of our problems l ies i n the empowerment of civil society
and the construction of a global and cosmopol itan ci tizenship.
The problem is that , in its arroga nt a bstraction, this i nterna·
tionalism rel ies on 'an abstract and l itt le real istic notion of an ,
i nternational civil society or global citizenship' and on the i l lusion
that the world can be cha nged if t he representation of the left a nd
the popular movements - let us say for a moment, the mult i tude
- are strengthened within the la rge transnational organ izations
89
such as the I M F (Meiskins wood 2000: u8). Though the argu·
ment developed in Empire is not very c lear about this, it seems,
however, to be in l ine with a certain type of reason ing that in
recent years has aequired great popularity thanks to the efforts of
a wide range of intellectuals and ·experts' connected to the World
Ban k and other international financial i nstilutions. The proposals
out l ine, especial ly in the framework of national societies, t he
begi n n i ng of a process of 'devolution' to civi l soeiety functions
that had been improperly appropriated by the state. Obviously.
these pol icies are · the other side of the coin' of the privatizations
a nd the dismantl ing of the public sector that the interna tional
financial institut ions have promoted over the last twenty years.
Such changes seek to provide a solution to the crisis triggered
by the state's desertion of its responsibil it ies in the provision of
public welfare - providing social assistance, ed ucation, heal thcare
and so on - transferring to civil society the task of deal ing with
these issues whiJe incidental ly preserving a balanced fiscal budget
and, eventually, guaranteeing the existence of a surplus in the
fiscal aceounts in order to fund the foreign debt. If this pol icy of
empowerment of civil society is u nreal istic at the national level ,
i ts transference to the international level deepens the cracks ap
parent in its own foundations. The so-cal led global civil society,
far from bei ng liberated from class l i mitations that make impos
si ble the fu l l expansion of ci tizens' rights in national societ ies,
suffers from these same l imitations even more acutely, riddled
as it is by abysmal economic and soc ial inequalities and by the
oppressivc features inscribed in its structures, norms and ru les of
operation. If democracy and citizenship have proved to be such
elusive and praetical ly ungraspable objectives in the capitalisms
of the periphery, why should we expect them to be obtainable in
the even less unfavou rable terrain of the internat ional system?
The price that Hardt and Negri pay for ignoring this i s the
extreme naivety of their proposal , c loser to a religious exhor
tation than to a rea l istic socia l-democra tic demand . According
90
[0 i t , capi talists should acknowledge that capital is created by
rhe workers and, therefore, accept 'in postmodernity [ ] the
fu ndamental modem const itutional principle that links right and
labor, and thus rewards with citizenship the worker who creates
capital' (p. 400). The mult itude's emaneiparion, conseq uently,
seems to ru n along t he following course: ' If in a first moment
the mult itude demands thaI each state recogn ize juridieally the
migrations that a re necessary to capital , in a second moment i t
must demand control over the movements themselves' (p. 400).
Conseq uently, our a uthors conclude: 'The general right to control
its own movement is tile multitude 's ultimate demand for global
citizenship' (p. 400, emphasis in original). It is of no use to search
the book for a discussion of the reasons why large n umbers o f our
people have to emigrate, desperately seeking to be exploited in the
metropolitan capitalisms, since the destru ction - sometimes the
silent genocide - practised in the periphery a nd the deterioration
of every form of civil ized life under the rise of neoliberalism a re
completely a bsent from the pages of Empire. Sim ila rly useless
would be the search for a serious d iscussion about the reach and
l i mitations that migntion and a nomad ic way of l ife would have
in a (revolut ionary?) project that wou ld al low the mult itudes to
take control of their lives; putting an end to the slave ry of waged
labour and of nom i mally 'free' subjects throughout the world.
Because of th is, the equation between migrat ion/nomadism and
li berat ion/revolution acquires i l lusory characteristics.
The second component of the supposedly emancipating pro
gra mme of the multitude in its effon to defeat the empire is t he
right to a soc ial wage and a guara nteed minimum income for
everybody. This demand goes one step beyond the fa mily wage,
puttipg an end to the unpaid labour of workers' wives a nd fam i ly
m em bers. The distinct ion betwecn productive and reprod uctive
la bour fades in t he biopolit ical context of the empire, si nce it is
the mul titude in i ts totaliry that produces and reproduces the
social l ife. Th us, 'The demand for a social wage extends to the
9 1
entire population the demand that al l activity necessary for the
prod uction of capital be recognized with an equal compensation
such that a social wage is real ly a guaranteed income' (p. 403).
Once again, fine intentions with which everybody can agree. But it
i s pertinent to formulate some questions: fi rst, is not t h is second
component of the emanCipating programme extremely similar
to the 'citizens' wage' that, with some restrictions i t is true, has
been conceded in some of the most advanced industria l ized
democracies of the North? Is i t so different from the moderate
social-democrat reformism in place in some of the Scandinavian
countries, especially Sweden? It does not seem so. Instead, i t
appears that th is would be the deepening of a trend going back
almost half a century wi thout, at least as seen fTom here, having
checkmated the capitalists or neutral ized the exploitative charac
ter of the bourgeois relationShips of production. Authors such as
Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, for example, thoroughly ex
a m ined different intemational experiences with what they called
'the citizens' wage' without being able to infer from their analysis
a conclusion that al lows us to support the thesis that in states in
which such a wage has been establ ished - with greater or lesser
rad ical ism - the multitude has been emancipated (Bowles and
Gintis 1982, 1986). Second: how would the capitalist class respond
to the implementat ion of a measure sllch as the aforementioned,
which, despite its l imi tat ions, has an enormous distributive cost?
Would they accept it without ferocious resistance? This leads,
obviously, to a discussion that postmodern thinkers abhor but
which imposes itself with the same u navoidable power as the
universal law ofgravity. We are talking, with Machiavel l i , about the
problematic of power and how i t i s obta ined, exerted a nd lost.
The third political demand of the mult i tude is the right to
reappropriation. I t i s a right that conta ins diverse d imensions,
from language, communication and knowledge to machines,
and from biopolitics to the conscience. This last component is
partieu larly problematic because i t 'dea ls d i rectly with the con-
92
stituent power of the multi tude - or really with the prod uct of
the creative imagination of the multitude that configures i ts own
constitution' (p. 406). On this point, which covers as we know a
crucial topic i n Negri 's thought, such as the constituent power,
the authors i ncessantly t ravel between the constitution of (he
mult i tude as a social actor - and here a wide space opens in which
to discuss to what extent this process can be i nterpreted as the
only resul t of its 'creative imagination' - and the consti tution of
the U nited States as it appears, in a particu larly ideal ized fash
ion and, for a moment, naively interp reted , by the authors. This
becomes evident when, for example, they say: 'the postmodern
multitude takes away from the US Constitution what allowed it
to become, above and against a l l other constitutions, an i mperial
const itution : its notion of a boundless frontier of freedom a nd
its defini tion of a n open spatiality and temporality celebrated i n
a constituent power' (p. 406).
There are a few l i ttle problems with this interpretation. First,
the belief that the so-ca lled postmodern mu ltitude knows the
American constitution or somethi ng l ike it, its debates and its
lessons; in the best of all possible worlds th is is sti l l a remote pos
sibility. If u nder the label of 'multitude' Ha rdt and Negri i nclude
the more than two bil l ion people who barely survive on one or
two dollars a day and without access to potable water, sewerage
systems, electricity and telephones, without food or housing, i t
is somewhat hard to understand how they manage to imbibe the
marvellous emancipating teachings of the US constitution . If, on
the cont ra ry, the authors are referring to the graduate students
of Duke or Paris, then the chances improve, though not greatly.
But these are minor details. The serious issue is their idealization
of the America n const itution . Noam Chomsky has a rgued repeat· I
edly that this document, so admired by the authors of Empire,
was conceived 'to keep the ra bble in l ine ' a nd to prevent them
from, even by accident or by mistake, having the idea (let a lone
the practical possibi l ity) that they m ight want to rule the destiny
93
of the United States or even govern themselves. The American
const itution is decisively and consciously a nt i·democratic and
anti-popular, in accordance with what i ts most important original
architects repeatedly declared. For James Madison, the main task
of the constitution was that of 'assuring the supremacy of the
permanent in terests of the country, that are no others than the
property rights' . This opinion from one of its wri ters probably
went un noticed by Hardt and Negri, but i ts force obl iges us seri
ously to redefine the role that they assign to the US constitu
t ion, especially when we consider that Madison's words were
pronounced in a country that at the time had a great part of its
territory organ ized as a slave economy, a nd tha t the idea of the
incipient constitution becoming a beacon for the emancipation of
the multitude of the day, mainly slaves, apparently d id not enter
his thoughts_ M oreover, to avoid attacks on the righ ts of property,
Madison shrewdly designed a pol i t ical system that d iscouraged
popular participation (something that persists today, with a very
low t um-out for e lections which, on top of evel)1hing else, are
held on working days), and fragmented the process of decision
making, while he reaffirmed the i nstitutional balances tha t would
guarantee that power would remain fi rmly i n the hands of those
who controlled the wealth of the cou ntry. As Chomsky obsclVes,
these opinions of Madison in the constitut ional debate of Phila·
delphia are less well known than those expressed in the famous
Federalist Papers, but they may be more revealing of the true
spiri t of the constitution than the formal declarat ions voiced to
the general public. It is no coincidence that, as the bri l l iant M IT
l inguist remarks, i n a country where the publish ing i ndustry is
so dynamic, the most recent edi tion of those debates dates from
1 838. The American people was not supposed to know about
the ideas t hese gen tlemen discussed in the convention (Boron
20oob: 2 28). In short, the constitu tion of the United States cou ld
hardly be an i nvitation 10 travel through ' the infinite front iers
of freedom', as the authors nai\'eiy proclaim, since sti l l today,
94
and despite successive reforms (one of which prohi bi ted the con
sum ption of a lcoholic beverages), it prevents t.he American multi
tude from directly electing their president. Thanks to the norms
and procedures established in this much-adm i red constitut ion ,
during t h e last presidential elect ion t he candidate who came sec
ond in terms of the number of votes cast by the citizenship could
legal ly become president. Apparently, the authors had not noticed
the dangers lurking within the constitutional text . Malcolm Bull
(2003: 85) is surely right when he assens that : 'Although hai led by
Slavoj Zizck as "the Communist Manifesto for our t ime", Empire
is more Jeffersonian than MaIXist. ' I would add that the book is
much more Jeffersonian than Marxist.
Another serious problem emerging from the issue of the rights
of appropriat ion is the fol lowing: Hardt and Negri stand on solid
ground when they write: 'The right to reappropriation is first of
al l the right to the reappropriation of the means of production'
(p. 406). The old social ists and communists, they say, demanded
that the proletariat should have free access to the machines and
materials needed in the production process. But s ince one of
the d ist inctive signs of post moderni ty i s the coming of what
Hardt and Negri ca l l 'the immaterial and biopolit ical produc
tion', the concrete contents of the old left and the labour unions'
demands have been transformed . Now the m u l ti tude not only
uses machines for production but, according to the authors, i t
'also becomes increasingly machinic itself, as the means of pro
duction are increasingly inregrated into the m inds and bodies of
the multitude' (p. 406). The consequence of this mutat ion is that
a genuine reappropriation requires free access and control over
not only machines and equ ipment but also over ' knowledge, in
forrQation, communications, and affects - because these are some
of the primary means of biopol i t ical product ion' (p- 407). Now,
let us analyse two not very trivial inconveniencies that emerge
from the precedi ng argument. Fi rst, how do the knowledge, the
information, the commun ication and the affects relate to the
95
.!! VI
'classic' material means of product ion and the materials that are
still required to produce most of the goods necessary to sustain
l ife on this planet? Or are we in the presence of autonomized
segments of the postmodem biopol it ical production? Are those
segments or instruments avai lable for anyone? Are the know
ledge, the information and the communication capable of circu
lating freely through all classes, social strata and groups of the
em pire'? How can the growing monopolistic features acquired by
the informat ion and mass commu nication industries all over the
world be explained? And regard ing knowledge, what can be said
about patents and the crucial issue of intel lectual property rights,
a new method of pi l lage in the hands of the main transnational
companies of the industrialized countries that are looting entire
continents with the active support of their governments?
Second, do we have to assume that the owners and/or those
who control these new and very complex and expensive means
of production will peaceful ly and gently yield their property and
i ts control , t hrowing overboard the basis of their wealth and
poli tical domination itself? Why would they act in such a way,
unprecedented in the mil lenary history of class struggles? Wou ld
they be led to do th is because their hearts woul d become ten
der before the shining vision of the self-constitu ted multitude
marching jubilantly towards i ts l iberation? I f this is not the case,
which recommendation would our authors make regarding the
unavoidable intensificat ion of class st ruggles and the poli t ical
repression that wou ld surely fol low as a response to the emanci
pating in i tiatives of the multi tude?
The fourth di mension of the political programme of the multi
tude is the organization of the mult i tude as a pol i tical subject, as
posse. The au thors i ntroduce here the Latin word posse to refer to
power as a verb, an activity. Thus, posse 'is what a body and what
a mind can do' (p. 408). In the postmodern society, the constitu
ent power of labour can be expressed as the egal itarian right of
citizensh ip in the world or as the righ t to communicate, construct
96
languages and con trol the communication networks; and also as a
political power, which is to say, 'as the constitution of a society in
which the basis of power is defined by the expression of the needs
of al l ' (p. 4 10). Due to the latter, Hardt and Negri conclude with
a surp risi ngly triumphant tone, 'The capacity to constru ct places,
temporalit ies, migra tions, and new bodies already affirms its
hegemony through the actions of the multitude against Empire'
(p. 4 1 1). They wa rn, though, that a small difficu lty still persists:
'The only event that we are sti l l awaiting is the construction, or
rather the insu rgence, of a powerful organization' (p. 41 1). Sens
ibly t hey recognize that they have no model to offer regarding this
organiza tion, but they are confident that ' the multitude through
i ts practical experimentation wi ll offer th e models and determi ne
when and how the possible becomes real ' (p. 411). Some clues,
however, were provided in an earlier chapter where we read that
'The real heroes of the l iberation of the Third world today may
really have been the em igrants and the flows of population that
have dest royed old and new bou ndaries. Indeed, the postcolonial
hero is the one who con tinually t ransgresses territorial and racial
bou ndaries, who destroys part icu lari sms and points toward a
common civil ization' (pp. 362-3). Th is is an enigmatic statement
because it obl iquely i nd uces us to t hink, first, that the Third
World has already ach ieved its l iberation; second, that the mul·
titudes of the Third world have also succeeded in their attempt
to l iberate themselves (an amazing revelation for four-fifths of
the world popu lation); th ird, tha t the hero of such a great deed
is the migra nt who abandons his native land to enter Europe or
the Uni ted S tates, in most cases i l legally, in search of a better l ife .
The a lchemy of theory h a s converted emigra t ion t o revol ution.
97
7 Notes for a sociology of revolutionary thinking in times of defeat
Empire concludes with a political programme for the multitude,
whose most i m portant features h ave bee n outlined i n the previ
ous chapter. Once again, the fragi l ity of the a nalysis m anages to
debunk both their very good inten tions and their noble goals. The
appendix at the end of the last chapter is extraordi narily eloquent,
since it d iscusses the issue of political act.ivism and fin ishes with
a hal luci nat ory reference to St Francis.
This brief eXClirsus begi ns very nicely, wi t h the a ssertion that
today's pol itical act ivist is in no way similar to the 'sad, ascetic
agcnt of the Third International whose soul was deeply penneated
by Soviet state reason' (p. 4 1 1 ). On the contrary, today's activi st is
inspired by the imagc of the 'com munist and l i bera tory co m bat
ants of the twentie th-century revol utions' (p. 4 1 2), a mong whom
we must include those inteUectuals who were persecuted a nd
exiled during the fascist era, the republ icans of the Spanish civil
war, the mem bers of the anti-fascist res istance, a nd those who
fough t for freedom i n the anti-colo n ia l ist and anti- i mperia l ist
wars. The mission of the poli tical activist has always been, and
today more than ever, to orga nize and act, and n ot to represent . I t
is precisely t h e i r co nstitu tive act ivity a n d n o t their represen tat ive
act ivity that characte rizes t hem. ' M i l i tancy today is a positive,
constmctive, and i n novative a(;livi�' ( ] M i l itants re sist imp erial
command in a creative way' (p. 4 1 3). The culm ination of this
l ine of reasoni ng, nevertheless, d oes not lead the reader to Che
Guevara o r Fidel Cast ro, nor to Nelson Ma ndela . Ho Chi M i n h ,
M a o Zedong o r Den Bel la, b u t t o S [ Fra ncis o f Assisi . Accord i ng
to H ardt and Negri , St Fra ncis denounced the poverty that was
strik ing the multitude of his t imc, and he adopted it as one of the
rules of the begging o rder thai he would later fou nd , d i scovering
in poverty
the ontological power of a nt.'w society. The communist militant
does the same, ident ifying in the common cond ition of the
muitilllde its enormous wealth. Francis in opposition to nascent
capitalism refused evet}' type of instru mental discipline. and i n
opposition t o the mortification of t h e flesh ( in poverty a n d in the
constituted o rder) he posed a joyous l i fe, includ ing all of being
and nature, the animals. sister moon, brother sun, the birds of
the field, the poor and exploited humans. together aga inst the
will of power and corruption . (p. 41 3)
I n t he post modern world . H ardt and Negri co ntin ue. 'we find
ourselves i n Fra ncis's s i tuat ion, p os i ng aga i n st t he misery o f
power t h e joy of bei ng' (ibid.) . T h e outcome of t h i s m isplaced,
and dangerous, analogy can only be a very pecu l iar u ndersta nding
of t he meaning o f revolution in our t ime, 'a revolution t hat no
power will conrrol - because biopower and communism, coopera
tion and revolution remai n together, in love, simplicity, a nd a lso
i nnocence. This is the i rrepressible l igh tness and joy of being
commun ist' ( ibid.) .
So wha t is i t that H ardt and Negri suggest? That the multitude
within the e m pi re, i nsp i red by the example set by 5t Francis,
should play gentle melodies on the i r viol ins to pacify the Levia·
t h a n s of neoli bera l globa lization, just as St fra ncis d id with the
wild anim als i n t he woods? Or that the i n noce n t songs to l i fe
sung by the p roduct ive m u lt itude will convi n ce the masters of
t he world of their u nworthiness and gu ilt, and henee they will
give up their p rerogat ives, wealth a n d p rivilege? For the sake of
h u m.a n i ty, we can only hope that these new postmodern com
muni st activists will be somewha t more successful i n defea ting
capitalism than the fra nciscan order, and that t he outcome of
their activism will be more productive both in terms of the eradi
cation of pove rty and of the ema ncipation of mankind than that
99
c obtained long ago by the prayers and sacrifices of 5t Francis.
j A carefu l reading of Empire allows us to conclude that the
authors' goal of displaying a sophist icated analysis of the world
order ends in fai l u re. How can we explain the b l ind ness of
these [\Yo communist academics to the inherently i mperialist
nature of the intemationaJ system? Throughout th is book, I have
mentioned some factors that I feel need to be taken i nto account
in order to explain the authors' fa il ure to achieve their goal: the
extremely formalist and legalistic point of departure; the weak·
ness of the instru ments used to analyse polit ical economy; the
lack of very basic economic data; the naive acceptance of several
neoliberal and postmodern axioms; the con fusing heritage of
structuralism and its visceral rejection of the subject; and, last
but not least, the unsett l ing effects o f a radically mistake n theory
of the state.
Given the formidable intellectual calibre of Hardt and Negri,
especial ly in the case of the Italian academic wi th his strong
experience in the fields of Marxist social and political philosophy,
how can we explain such d isappointing results? In an outstanding
piece of work, Terry Eagleton provides some hints that might
help us solve the puzzle. In order to faci l i tate comprehension of
his argument. Eagleton invites us to i magine the impact that an
overwhelming defeat would have on a radical d issident move'
ment. assuming that this defeat seems to erase from the public
agenda the topics and proposals of the movement not only for
the l i fetime of i ts members but probably for ever. As time goes
by, the movement's central theses become more characterized
by their i rrelevance than by their falseness. The movement's op'
ponents no longer bother to debate or refute them, but i nstead
they contemplate these theses with a strange combination of
indifferent curiosity, 'of the same type that one can have towards
the cosmology of Ptolemy or the scholastics of Thomas Aquinas'
(Eagleton 1997: 17)·
What are the pract ica l alternatives that these antagonists face,
100
given the aforemen tioned political and ideological catastrophe,
i n which a world of seemi ngly u nmoving and obj ective certain
ties, of determ inant structures, o f 'laws of motion' and efficient
causes, has suddenly van ished l i ke morn i ng fog, giving place to
a colourful galaxy of social fragments, hazardous contingencies
and brief circumsta nces whose endless com bi nations have led
to t he bankru ptcy not only of Marxism but also of the whole
theoretical heritage of the Enlightenment? Eagleton asserts t hat,
for a 'post modern sensibility', the central Marxist ideas are more
often ignored than fough t agai nst: it is no longer about their
wro ngness, but i nstead, i t is a bout t heir i rreleva nce. The Berl i n
Wall has already fallen; the Soviet Union has su ffe red a gigantic
implosion, and for many today it is a blu rred memory; capital ism,
markets and liberal democracy seem to wi n everywhere, accord i ng
to Francis Fukuyamaj the old work i ng class has been atomized by
post-fordism ; t he nation-states seem to be undergoing a messy
withd rawal, kneeling l ike serfs i n front of the strength of global
markets; the Warsaw Pact has been d issolved in embarrassm entj
social democracies shamelessly embrace neoliberalism; China
opens up to fo reign capital a n d becomes part of the wro; and
the former 'socia list camp' disappears from the i nternational
arena. What should we do?
Eagleton proposes some i n teresting alternatives that i l lumi·
nate not only the rou tes probably walked by the au thors, but
also the i t ineraries covered by many o f those who, in the La tin
American context of the 1960s and 1970s, extolled the im mine nce
of the revolution and awaited wi th their arms ready the arrival
of t he 'decisive day'. We can find, on the one hand, t hose who
either cynica l ly or sincerely moved to the right. On the other
hand there a re those who stayed o n t he left, but who did so wi th
resignation a nd nostalgia , given the i nexorable d issolution of
their identity. There are stil l others who have closed their eyes
i n delusional triumphalism, recognizing in the weakest traces
of a street demonstration or a strike clear signs of the imminent
101
,. .. o " o·
{ o -
� o C �. o :::I D � ;. 5· lIr" !i"
ca
c outbreak of revolution. Final ly, there are those who keep their
j radical impu lse al ive, but who have had to redirect it to regions
other than the pol it ical arena ( ibid.).
Hard t and N egri lind themselves, we could argue, within the
complex field that defines th is fourth a lternative. They have not
moved to the right, as Regis Debray or ( in Latin America) M ario
Vargas L10sa have done. Nor have they remained in the deep and
pai n fu l perception of the defeat of a set of ideas in wh ich they
st i l l be l ieve, nor have they bl indfolded themselves by pretending
that nothing has occu rred and search the planet for signs that
forecast the return of the revolution. Their a ttitude has been
healthier: open ing, search ing, reconstruction . Needless to say, a
process of t his type carries with it the inevitable risk of involuntar·
i1y accepting a premise that , in the long run, can frustrate the
renovating project: the idea 'that the system is, at least for the time
being, unbeatable' (ibid .). From here, a series of theoretical and
practical conseq uenccs emerge that, as r will explain below, are
neatly reflected in the postmodem agenda. On the one hand , an
almost obsessive in rerest i n the exami nation of the social forms
that grow in the margins or in the interst ices of the system; on
the other hand, the search for those social forces that at least for
now could commit some sort of t ransgression against the system,
or could promote some type of l imited and ephemeral subversion
against it. The celebration of the marginal and the ephemeral , the
prejud ice that 'minori ty' is a synonym for l iberation (bl urring the
role played by a vel)' special minority, namely the bourgeoisie),
wh i le the mass ive and central , the non-marginal , i s demonized,
has become pa rt of th is new poli t ical and cultural ethos. I f the
system appears to be not only inexpugnible but a lso oppressive,
the abandonment of a 'modern' t heorization such as the Ma rxist
one leaves no escape other than its purely imaginary neg-a tion.
In this way ' the other' , the different, arises as the supposed an·
tagon ist of the existing order, And it is precisely its 'otherness'
that guarantees the radical ism of i ts antagon ism, when it lurn�
102
it into someth ing i m possible to assimilate and therefore i n to t.he
only ( i l lusory) al te rn ative to the system.
The ou tcome of a product ion that is consistent with its poi nt
of departure, the i nvinci b i l ity of the system, is what Eagleton
ca lls ' l ibertarian pessimism' ( ibid. : 19). Pessim ism, because the
system prese nts itself as omn ipotent and ove rbeari ng; l i bertarian,
because i t al lows u S to dream about mult iple subversions a nd the
overcom i ng of the system, withou t im plying the ident i fication
of flesh and blood agents ca pable of turning those dreams into
reality. The system is everywhere a n d it cancels the distinction
between 'inside' and ·outside': wha tever is i n side is part of its
machinery and is therefo re an accom plice; whatever is outside
is un able to defeat it . This is the main source of the rad ical
pessimism that permeates this line of thought, regard less of i ts
proclaimed revolutionary i ntentjons.
Eagleton 's work is extraord inarily suggestive and - written at
the same ti me that Hardt and Negri were working on the writing
of Empire - i t a n t ic ipates with outstand ing sharpness some of the
general fea tures prese n t i n that theorization. Like the system, the
empire is omni present, and although the authors by no means as
sert that the empire is invincible, the tonc used in their argu ment
culm i nates with a pessim istic re mark that st.rongly resem b les
capi tu la t io n . Throughout the book , t.he conserva tive forces of
order are i n fi n itely m ore powerful and e ffective than t hose al
legedly called upon to destroy the empire. Aga i nst the powers
of the bom b , t he money, language a n d i mages, there a rises a
Th ird World 'hero' wh o i nstead of em bracing rcvolution selects
em igrat ion . Moreover, l he empire recognizes no 'outside' and
' inside'; we are al l ' inside' and, even though t h is is not expl icitly
menSioned, we are a l l subjected to its arbitrary modes and its
oppression. The one thing that can brea k i t down is the unforesee
able act jon of the ideal ized 'other', the m ult i tude, marked as it
is by an in finite com bination of inexha ustible singu l a ri ties. The
classes and the people, categories of i nclusion at a time when
1 03
c there were stil l 'national' capital ism and nation-states, become
j volatile in the work of Hard t and Negri and they leave space for the
hopeful negativity of the multitude. And some features that the
authors identify as carrying a radical answer to the system - 'dif·
ference', 'hybridation', heterogeneity a nd inexhausti ble mobility
- are, as specified once again by Eagleton, 'native to the capitalist
mode of production and therefore t hey are i n no way inherently
rad ical phenomena' (ibid.: 21 ).
In a ny case, this syndrome is far from being unique i n the
history of Marxism and revolutionaty thought. Perry Anderson
detected this with his habitual shrewdness in a relevant piece
of scholarship published at a very special point in t ime, 1 976,
when Keynesian capitalism and the social-democratic strategy
(fol lowed by both socialist and communist parties, especia l ly
in Italy, France and Spain) were decl in ing and when the first
s igns of the neolibera.l coun ter-revolu tion were starting to show.
I am referring, of course, to Considerations on Western Marxism, a
book that was conceived to examine a different h istorical process,
that of the 1920S and early 1 930s, a period that was a lso deeply
characterized by defeat. However, it is not my purpose here to
try to reconstruct an imaginary dia logne between Eagleton and
Anderson, though I bel ieve i t would be very enlightening. given
the chal lenge that u nderstanding the theoretical mess presemed
in Empire entai ls .
Defeat duri ng the 1920S, defeat once again during the 1980s;
a l ine of thought characteristic of that which Hannah Arendt
would portray with extraordinary subtlety in her revision of the
hard times undergone by the brigh t men and women who lived
during the t imes that Bertolt Brecht called t he 'dark ages'. A
look at the l ives of Rosa Luxemburg, Walter Benjamin or Bertoli
Brecht h imself, just to mention some of those who dedicated
their l ives to socialist ideals, reveals some extremely i nteresting
teachings_ For exa mple, the fact that unt i l the moment at which
the catastrophe took place, the truth was h idden behind a thick
104
fog of d iscourses, double d iscourses and various mechanisms
that effectively concealed the ugly facts and d issipated the most
reasonable doubts. Such concealment was possible thanks to
the work of both public servants and good·hearted intellectuals.
Then , all of a sudden, tragedy emerged (Arendt 1 968: viiil. Isn't
it possible, then, that Hard t and Negri have become victims of
[he way in which i ntellectual product ion is undertaken by those
who live during dark ages? There is no way for us to know. [n any
event , Eagleton has pro\'ided us with some clues that wil l help u s
understand t h e difficulties faced by left·wing intellectuals t rying
to explain the most abominable aspects of our t ime. Anderson
adds some other clues that mesh very smoothly with those sug·
gested by Eagleton. This Marxism of defeat 'has paradoxically
reversed the trajectory of Marx's own intellectual development'
(Anderson 1 976: 52). If the founder of historical materialism
turned from philosophy to politics and from poli t ics to pol itical
economy, the 'Western Marxist' t radition reversed this path and
quickly searched for a place to h ide - both from revolutionary
defeat at the hands of fascism and from the frustration ariSing
from i ts 'triumph' and consolidation i n the USSR - i n the most
abstruse areas of philosophy. The path of the young Marx from
philosophy to pol i t ics was based on the conviction that 'the
radical character of social criticism requires for us to go to a
deeper level of analysis than tha t of the abstract man, and that
in order to u nderstand the man i n context we need to delve into
the anatomy of the civil society' (Boron 2oooa: 302). In walking
backwards in Marx's steps i nstead of goi ng forwards, phi losophi'
cal and epistemological thought have once agai n been put at the
centre of the scene, overshadowing the pol it ical, economic and
historical worries of the founder. This reorientation towards the ,
philosoph ical and the metaphysical, clearly reflected i n Empire,
goes hand·in·hand wilh a second feature recognized by Anderson
as one of the d istinctive marks of West em Marxism in the period
between the two world wars (Anderson 1976: 5). As he explains,
105
c this brand of Marxism was characteri2ed by its esoteric language � JI and its inaccessibil i ty to anyone not already immersed i n the
field: 'The excess above and beyond the necessary verbal com
plexity was a sign of its d ivorce from any popular pract ice: This
conceptual prol iferat ion becomes manifest i n some symptoms
that are also apparent in Hardt and Negri 's work: the language
is unnecessarily d ifficult; the syn tax is, at times, impenetrable,
and there is a needless lise of neologisms that only contributes
to a more hermetic work. Finally, there is one last element t.hat
chara(·teri2es this theoretical regress ion : 'Due to the lack of mag
netism that the existence of a class-based social movement can
provide, t he Marxist tradition has leaned more and more towards
the contemporary bourgeois culture: And, Anderson suggests,
'the original relat ionship berween M arxist theory and proletari an
practice was swiftly but fi rmly substi tuted by a new relationship
between Marxist theory and bourgeois theory' (ibid_ : 55). The
truthfulness of this assertion can be confirmed rather easi ly, j ust
by ta ki ng a look at the list of aut hors discussed by Hardt and
Negri. very few of whom have had a ny sort of participat ion in
a ny of the big fights led by the classes a nd the popular sectors
of society in t he last twenty years.
In an i nterview that took place recently, M ichael H ardt offered
some interesting clues rega rding the reasons for the astonishing
theoretieal involution that beeomes apparent throughout Empire.
During the interview, he observed that, in Marx's t ime, revolution
ary thought recognized three main sources of inspiration: Ger
man phi losophy, British political economy and French pol itics:
' Nowadays [ . . . ) the orientations have changed and revolutionary
thought is guided by French phi losophy, North Ameriean eco
nom ic science, and I tal ian polities' (Hard t 2001)_ Hardt is right,
as long as he is referring to the orientation that guided h is own
work and not to the sources that inspire revolutionary t hought.
I n fact. both French philosophy and the economie theories that
are t aught in most business schools t.hroughout the United States
106
play a predomi nant role i n Empire. Of course, nothing al lows us
to assume that these new theoretical avenues wil l either represent
a step forwards in terms of i mproving and developing a theory of
capital ism's i m perial ist stage, or, even less, that they wi ll cont ri
bute to the elaboration of a 'guide for action' that wil l i l luminate
for us the path that the social forces of transformation and change
should fol low. ConlTiuy to Hegelian dialectics, with its empha·
s is on the h istoric and transi tory character of all institutions
and socia l practices, and the contradictory cha racter of social
existence, contemporary protest seeks to update i ts theoretical
arsenal in such u n reliable sources as structural ism and post·
structu ral ism, semiology. lacanian psychoanalysis, and a whole
series of philosophical currents characterized by their adherence
to post modernism. O n the other hand, it is i m possible to view
the crowding·out of political economy and i ts replacement by
North American economic science - whose narrowness, pseudo·
mathematic formalism and superficial ity are today universally
recognized - as a step forwards towards a better understanding of
the econom ic real i t ies of our t ime. To suggest that the d isplace
ment of figures of the stature of Adam Smith or David Ricardo
by pygmies such as Mi lton Fried man or Rudiger Dornbusch can
be an encouraging sign in the consrruetion of a leftist l ine of
thought is , to say the least, a monumental mistake. Lastly, to say
that the Ital ian pol itical system, onee home to the largest com
munist party in the western hemisphere a nd nowadays governed
by a repulsive creature, Silvio Berl usconi, is a renewed source of
inspiration that can be compared to n ineteenth-century France,
"",ith its great popular uprisings and the wonderful experience of
the Paris Commune, the fi rst government of the working class i n
world history, demonstrates dearly the extent o f t his mistake, that
could have d isast rous consequences for both praetieal pol i t ics as
well as in the domain of theory.
Stil l taking into account the aforementioned considerat ions,
] cannot refrain from asking how i t was possible for Antonio
107
Negri , who has written some of the most imponant books and
ankles within the Marxist tradit ion over the last quarter of a
centu ry, to write a book i n which it appears as if he has forgotten
everyth i ng that he had previously though t. There is no doubt that
Negri has been one of the most important Marxist theorists. I Born
in Padua, ltaly, in 1933, he graduated in Phi losophy from his natal
city's u niversity, and in the 1 960s was appoi nted Professor of
Theory of the State in the Polit ical Science department in Padua.
At the same time, his practical i nvolvement in I tal ian pol i t ical l ife
tu rned him i nto one of the leaders of the Potere Opcraio and one
of the most outstandi ng figures of the Italian left, very critical of
the poli tical and theoretical line fostered by the Italian Commu
nist Party, PCI. In 1979 Negri was arrested and sent to prison after
a faulty legal process. He was accused of being the intellectual
mentor of the terrorist anions of the Red Brigades, i ncluding
the assassination of Italian Prime Min ister Aldo Moro. In 1983
the Italian Rad ical Party, a moderate combination of l ibe ral ism
and social democracy, sponsored h is candidacy to parliament, in
order to pressu re the Ital ian government into reviSing t he legal
sentence. After being elected member of parliament by popular
vote, parliamentary immunity allowed him to get out of prison.
Shortly after, the ml ing pany with a majority in parliament - with
the infa mous complicity of PCI MPs, i n a scandalous pol i t ical
act - revoked his immunity, and, as many other anti-fascists
had done before, Negri departed for exile in France. The a lready
entirely corrupt Italian judicial system declared Negri a rebel and
he was condemned to thirty years in prison, accused of 'armed
insurrection against the state' with an additional sentence of four
a nd a half years because of h is 'moral responsibi l ity' for violent
confrontations between the police, students and workers that
took place in Milan between 1973 and 1 977.
I A 5ublle analysis or Negri·s intelleclual and political l rajeelOl)' is to be ruund in Callin icos (ZOO)).
108
Imprisonment d id not prevent Negri from writing; among texts
written in prison, La Anomalia Sa/vaje, published in 1981 , is worth
mentioning. By this time he had a lready published some of his
main contributions to Marxist theory: Opera; e Stato. Fra Rivolu·
zione d'ollobre e New Deal ( 1 972), Crisi dello stato'piallo (1974),
Proletari e Stato (1976),LaForma Stato. Per la Critica deU'Economia
Politica della Constituzione ( 1977), Marx oltre Marx ( 1 979), and a
seminal article abou t capitalist restructuring after the great de·
pression, 'Keynes and t he Capital ist theory of the State', origi nally
published in Italy and later transla ted into several languages and
reprinted in Labor of Dionysus, a book that Negri wrote years later
wi th M ichael Hardt. Negri remained in France for fou rteen years,
between 1983 and 1 997. Fran�ois Mi t terrand's government's
protection was decisive i n terms of dissuad ing the I tal ian secret
service from its original intention of kidnapping Negri. During
his years in France, Negri taught at the famous Ecole Normale
Superieure and at the University of Paris VIII and, together with
other distinguished 1-'Tench colleagues, he founded a new theoret·
ical magazine: FI/Cur Anterieur. It is obvious that during h is stay
in France Negri shelved his i nterest in Germ a n philosophy a nd
acquired a great familiarity with French philosoph ical debates
marked by the presence of intel lectuals such as Louis Althusser,
Alain Badiou, Et ienne Bal ibar, jean lIaudri llard , Gil les Deleuze,
j acques Derrida, M ichel Foucault, Felix Guauari, jacques Lacan ,
jean'Fran�oise Lyotard , jacques Ranciere and many others. His
stay in France was a period of intense theoret ical production and
profound intellectual, a nd to some extent polit ica l , reorientation.
Among rhe most imponant books published during that period
it is won h mentioni ng Les nouveaux espaces de liberlfi, in col·
labo�ation with Fel ix Guattari ( 1<)8s); Fabbriche del soggetto ( 1 987);
1 'he Politics of Subversion ( 1 989); II potere constituente ( 1 992); a nd
Labor of Dionysus: A Critique of the Statclonn, co·authored with
M ichael Hardt ( 1994). In 1997, after the scandalous collapse of
the Italian slate institutions and the crises of Christian Democracy
109
c and the I talian Social ist Party, Negri returned to I ta ly where his � � previous sentence had been revoked. He spent a short period in
the Rebibbia prison and. afterwards, was permitted to serve a new,
shorter a nd more benign sentence that entails living at home in
Trastevere during the d ay and spending the nights in prison. I t
is in th is context that Negri co-au thored Empire. with Michael
Hardt
8 The persistence of imperialism
'The United States seem to bc destined by Providence to plague
the Americas with misery in the name of freedom' Simon Bolivar
The radical goa l repeatedly deela red th roughou t Empire - to con
t ribute to the c reation of a 'general theoretical structure and for
that structure to constitute a set of conceptual tools al lowing us
to theorize and act i n the E m pire and against i t' - falls to eart h as
a result of the i ncurable weakness of the analysis. U n fortun ately,
the tool box is l acking some of the most basic i n struments for
theorizi ng abo u t the empire a n d , more seriously, for fight ing
against i t . Th is final critique could be su m marized by saying
tha t t he book's most crucial fau l t is its serious d iagnostic m is
takes. There is no con nection between a t heoretical backgrou nd
that is u narguably conservative i n nature - o r whose nature is a t
best confusing - and which derives mainly from eonven tional
neol i beral knowledge that extols globalization and 'natu ra lizes'
capitalism on one hand, and the blurry vision of a new society
and a new in ternational order to be built over radica lly d i fferen t
premisses o n the other. I f t he d iagnosis is i naccu ra te, t h e new
social a n d political construction is doomed to failure. The fragil ity
of the ana lysis is appa rent as ea rly as the Preface of the book. The
authority cited in order to define the fundamenta l concept that
gives the book its name is not Len i n or Bukha ri n or Luxemburg
or, more recently, Sa m i r Amin, And re Gunder Frank, Immanuel
Wa llerstein, Eric Hobsbawm, Samuel Eisenstadt, Pa blo Gonzalez
Casa nova, Agu st i n C ueva, Alonso Agui la r, Helio Jagua ribe, John
Saxe-Ferna ndez, James Petras or a ny of the many other scholars
who have contribute d to our u ndersta n d i ng of the topic. No.
I n stead, the au thors mention Mau rice Duverger, a French poli-
.l: t ical scient ist comfortably installed in the most conventional at
iii currents within the discipline and an academic who has never
been associated with any of the critical schools of thought. These
l imitations are even more conspicuous when it becomes clear
how easily the au thors prese n t as their own the conventional
definitions used hy business school professors who conceive
globalization as an ' i rresistible and i rreversi ble' process before
which the democratic states should kneel. We can recogn ize i n
this formulation t he old trap o f t h e bourgeOis ideologists for
whom capital ism is nothing but the ' natural ' manifestation of
our human acquisi t ive and egoistic impu lses, and every system
other than capitalism is viewed as 'artificial ' or as the imprudent
product of polit ical will. Hardt and Negri appear to have paid no
attent ion to the sensible comments made by a genuine American
li beral not too long ago: John K. Galbraith, who sharply argued
that 'global ization is not a serious concept. Us, Americans, have
invented it in order to h ide our pol icies of economic penetration
in the rest of t.he world ' (Galbraith 1997: 2). This argument comes
very close to admitt i ng that capita lism's i rresisti bil ity and irrevers'
ibil ity leave no alternative options, an argument deeply engrai ned
in the heart of neoliberal thought . El len Meiskins Wood (2003:
63) is right when she observes that if ' there is no material point
at which the power of capital can be challenged , and wi th al l
forms of pol i tical action effectively disabled, the ru le of capital
is complete a nd eternal ' .
The clamorous i nconsistency between the au t hors' analysis
and their pol it ical goals is also revealed when the reader asks
to what extent the system's 'global logic' is overlaid by contra'
dictions that could eventually lead to its col lapse and to the
preparation of the material and cultural bases needed to build
an alternative system. This is partinllarly serious when we realize
that the authors seem not to be aware of the fundamental con
ti nuity that exists between the supposedly 'new' emp i re's global
logic, its fu ndamental actors, its institutions, norms, rules and
1 1 2
procedures, and the logic that exis ted i n thc al legedly dead phase
of i mperialism. Hardt and Negri seem not to have realized that the
strategic actors are the same, the large transnational companies
but with a national base, on one hand, and the governm ents of
industrial ized cou ntries, on the other hand; that the decisive insti·
tutions are still those that characterized the imperialist phase they
cla im is now fi nished, such as the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO,
and other simila r organizations; and that the rules of the game of
the internat ional system are still the ones dictated mainly by the
United States and global neoliberalism , and that were imposed
by force during the climax of the neolibe ral cou nter-revolution
through the 1980s and the begi nn ing of the 1990S. Given their de·
sign , purpose and fu nctions, these rules do nothing hut continuo
ously reproduce and perpetuate the old i mperial ist structu re in a
new guise. We would be much closer to the truth if, paraphrasing
Lenin, we say that the empire is the 'superior stage' of imperial
ism and nothi ng else. Its functioning logic is the same, and so
are the ideology that justifies its existence, the actors that make
its dynamics, and the unfair results that reveal the persistence of
relations of oppression and exploitation. I n Marx's analyses, the
contradictions in the development of bou rgeois society would
lead it to its own destruction. The logic of social development was
presided over by class struggles and contradict ions between the
forces of production and the social relations of production, The
problem with Hardt and Negri's analyses is that the new global
logic of rule that al legedly prevails in the empire as imagi ned by
the authors lacks any structural or inherent cont radictions.'
The only cont radiction that is p resent is that of the potential
threat posed by the multitude if i t ever abandoned the lethargy
I For a penetrating analysis of the shoncomings of the '('(assie thcorics of imperial i:;m' and the new challenges posed by today's new facets of
i mperial ism, see Panitch and Gindin (2004) and, in general , the ;\nic1es
i ncluded in Socialist Register 2004 (Panitch and Lcys 1004), See also John
Bellamy Foster (2002),
1 1 3
� It
" CI ... III
j. :::I 1'1 CI
!1. �" 1 �" 2-iii" 3
� in which it is kept by the mass media and the bourgeois cultural Q)
iii industry. Even if th is happened, though, there is noth ing in the
book to convince the reader of the existence of structural - and
hence impossible to overcome - contradict ions between the
empi re and the mul t i tude. On the contra ry, it would be possible
to extend the a uthors' argument (0 say that i f the rulers behave
wisely, they are in a very good posit ion to absorb the demands
of the mu ltitude by means of relaxing migratory norms or pro·
gressively establ ish i ng a guarantced minimum i ncome. Episodcs
d ur i ng which the dominant classes have been forced to adopt
progressive policies so as to hold back popular t ides or in order
to co-opt potential adversaries have not been infrequent in the
political history of the twentieth century, and the two measu res
mentioned above are in no way i ncompatible with the su rvival of
the capital ist relations of prod uction nor are thcy i ncompatible
\\oith the con tinu ity of imperial ism.
During the 1980s, neol iberal ism won a strategic batt le for
the meanings of words used in everyday speech, pan ic'ularly i n
t h e public sphere, Throughout the globe t h e word 'reform' was
successful ly used to refer to events that a somewhat rigorous
analysis would have undoubtedly classified as 'counter·reform ',
The aforementioned 'reforms' were material ized i n not too reo
formist policies such as the dismantl ing of social securi ty, the
reduction of social provisions, the cuts in public spending
on ed ucation, health and hous ing, and the legalization of the
ol igopol istic control of the economy. The word 'deregulat ion'
was actively promoted by the neol iberal and managcrial ideo·
logists c i ted throughou t Empire to refer to a process through
which governmental i n tervention in economic matters was
suppressed in order to restore the ' natural sel f-regulation' of
e('onomic processes. In fact, what 'deregulation' means is that
the previous regulations establ ished by democrat ic' governments
- and which led, i n some way, to a certa i n degree of popular
sovereignty - were banished, and after this happened the capacity
1 1 4
to regulate the functioning of markets was left in the hands of
the most powerfu l actors, the oligopol ies. Governmental capacity
to regulate was privatized and transferred to large companies. As
Samir Amin wrote, 'al l the markets are regulated, and they only
function u nder that condition . The essential thing is to know
who regulates them and how' (Amin ZOO l : z6). To conclude: the
commonsense of the last two decades of the previous century has
been satura ted by the contents of neoliberal ideology. Further
proof of this fact is the ready acceptance of the dogma claiming
that state-owned companies were by definition i nefficient and
produced low-q uality goods and services; that the state was a
bad administrator: that private companies sat isfy the demands
and requirements of consumerSj that ol igopolies promote social
progress through unrestricted market freedomj and, finally, that,
as argued i n the ' t rickle-down' theory, i f the rich get richer, the
wealth concentrated at the top of the social pyramid soons spills
over to reach the least advantaged sectors of the population.
Nowadays, al l those stories face a terminal crisis of cred i bi l i ty.
For a long time, the hegemony of neoliberalism was nOI only
economic and ideologieal but also pol i tica l . I n that field too we
observe a backwards movement . Economies do not respond as
predicted and, after more than twenty years of painful experi
ments, the results are dire. Argentina isjust the most recent case,
but in no way the only one, that demonstrates once more the final
result of the policies promoted by the Washi ngton Consensus.
The pol i tica l formulas of a successful neoliberal ism, whose arche
types are st i l l the sinister figures of Carlos S. Menem in Argentina,
Carlos Salinas de Gortari in Mexico and Al berto Fujimori i n Peru,
have demonstrated their inabil i ty to remain in power and their
inabil ity to establish a new structure of domination in accordance ,
with the needs of the empire's dominant classes. The ideologi-
cal hegemony of neoli beral ismj its capacity to ascribe new and
contradictory meanings to old words, is be ing rapid ly eroded.
Empire could perfectly be thought of as a late chapter of that
1 1 5
.... � II
1 ... '" ;' if � " • o -
3' 1 :2, e. iii' :I
� history. The book was published in 2000 and its real function
-r - I concede this was not the intention of the au thors - seems
to have been to make a l i t tle bit more palatable the increas
i ngly atrocious and despicable features of the imperial ism of
the end of the century. Probably nothing could haye been more
convenient for the imperialist powers, gu ided not without friction
and contradictions by the Uni ted States, than this representation
of the imperialist order metamorphosed i n to a phantasmagoric
system, without identifiable dominators and beneficiaries, and,
above all , inspired by the most elevated legal not ions of Kantian
l ineage that only the enemies of freedom and justice would dare
to criticize. While the authors were giving the last touch to their
metaphysical empire, the i mperial ists were eager to launch the
Colombia Plan with its declared goa l of stabilizing the polit ical
and mi l i tary situation in that country and of control l ing d rug
traffic in the area, whose funds are careful ly lau ndered in fiscal
havens th roughou t the region that survive thanks to Washington's
i ndulgence. Another of the aforementioned project's objectives is
the establishment of a strategic base in the heart of South America
as a means to monitor the advances of the popular movement in
Brazil, a country which , by chance, is the home of two of the most
important popular organizations of the western world, the PT and
the MST. Another important imperial ist in i t iat ive is the Pueblal
Panama Plan i ntended to 'solve· the (apparently iccommunicable,
accord ing to Hardt and Negri) conflict in Chiapas and, in addi
tion, to set u p an establishment in the largest Mexican reservoir of
fresh water in order to provide Southern California with that vital
l iqu id . Moreover, it was imperialism that launched a 'humanitar
ian intervention' in the former Yugoslavia; it constantly sabotages
the construction of Mercosur so as to faci l itate the rapid formal
' integration' of the Lat in American economies into American
hegemony through the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA);
and it works without ceasi ng to ensure the collaboration of some
regional governments, such as those of Argentina, Costa Rica
1 1 6
and Uruguay, in imposing sanctions on Cuba for alleged human
rights violations and to make i t pay an exorbitant price for its lack
of docility towards American imperialism. In other latitudes, its
activism leads i t to support i ts al l ies in Tu rkey when they commit
genocide against the Kurdish minori ty without fear, and to sup
port similar actions by Indonesia against East Timor, and by the
fascist Israeli government of Ariel Sharon against the PaJestinians.
A few years earlier, the empire, al legedly in the name of universa l
law, invaded Panama, kill ing thousands of innocent civil ians with
the goa l of capturing President Noriega, a former collabora tor of
the CIA and the DEA, and put in power by Washington; i t caused
more than )0,000 deaths in its offensive against the Sand inista
government in Nicaragua; and it started the Gulf War. In the
economic terrain, im perial ism was again active, promoting the
approval of thc Multi latera l Agreement on I nvestments, i n order
to legalize the tyranny of markets, especially in the Third World ,
and it made strong efforts to ensure that the I M F and the World
Bank would not lend a n ickel to those cou ntries that d id not ac
cept the 'conditional ities' imposed by the market's international
financial institutions. In this way, a recent loan to Ecuador in
cluded arou nd a hundred and forty requirements of this type
- among them, massive dismissals of public servants, cuts in
public social spending, an end to su bsid ies - and more than
two hundred 'conditionali ties ' were reported in several loans to
su b-Saharan Africa, a l l of which were oriented to consol idate the
presence of 'market forces' in the economy. On the other hand,
imperialism has been constantly imposing economic pol icies
that severely u ndermine the economic sovereignty of cou ntries
in the periphery and dimi nish their l ikel ihood of being able to
devel9P their economies, consol idate their democracies, a nd
respond posit ively to their popu lations' expectations of material
and spiritual progress (Stigl itz 2000)_ Leo Panitch claims, with
regard to th is issue, that a report by the World Bank demonstrates
that on the same year in wh ich the M lA was aborted 'there were
\ 1 7
� at least as many as 1 5 1 changes in the regulations that govern
: direct foreign investments in 76 cou ntries, and 89% of them
were favorable to fore ign capital ' (Panitch 2000: 1 6)_ Meanwh ile,
Pablo Gonzalez Casanova has developed a methodology for the
study of the surplus l Tansferences from the Th ird World towa rds
metropoli tan capita lism. In the twenty-three years from 1972 to
1995, the vol u me of those transfers hoovered u p by the empire's
dom inant classes reached the astonishi ng amount of$4.5 tri l l ion;
the calc ulatio ns made using this same methodology excl usiYely
for La tin America by Saxe-Fern andez and N unes show that the
figure 'surpasses the 2 t ri l l ion dol lar threshold paid in two dec
ades of globalizing neo-I iberalism, a magn i tude that is eq ual to
the combined GDPs of all the countries in Latin America and the
Caribbean i n 1997' (Gonzalez Casanova 1998; Saxe Fernandez et
al . 2001: 105, 1 1 1).
I n a word, imperialist oppression contin ues to exist wh ile a lost
patrol of radical scholars proclai m� that the age of i m perialism
has concluded and exalts the figure ofSt Francis as the pa rad igm
of the renovated mil i tancy against the spectre of an empi re that
is impossible to seize, define or fi nd , and hence impossible to
beat . That which is openly recogn ized by scholars of im perial
ism such as nrlezinski and Huntington, magically disappears
from the ' radical critical ' vision of rhe e m pire. Meanwhile, ap
proximately 100,000 people die each day in the periphery d ue
to h u nger, ma lnutrit ion and curable d iseases, because of the
unin terrupted continuity of the exactions of this 'smooth space
across which subject ivi ties gl ide', which the authors call empire,
a non-i m perialist regi me that day a fter day prod uces a s i lent
bloodbath that the bourgeois media take pains to concea\. These
people d ie without receiving the most elementary medical care.
Each year a country of the size of Spain, Argentina or Colombia
is wi ped off the face o f the ea rth i n the name of the despicable
'new i nternational economic order', an order that, i f we are to
believe in Hard t and Negri , has ceased to be i mperial ist .
1 1 8
Ha rdt and Negri 's stubborn ness in defending their m istaken
concept ions has become st ronger since the fi rst publication of
their book, In an inte rview with Le Monde Diplomatique, Negri
insisted on his view that the em pire lacks any national base and
that i t is the expression of the i n ternational order created by
'collective capi tal ' once it emerged victorious from the long civil
war waged against the workers throughout the twentieth centul)',
'Contrar), to what the last supporters of national ism susta in, the
em pire is not NortJ, American; in add ition, th roughout the histol)'
of the U nited States they have been much less i mperialist than
the British, the French, the Russians, or t he Dutch' (Negri 2001 :
13 ) , According t o N egri, the empi re's beneficiaries a r e cenainly
American capitalists, but also their European counterpans, those
magnates who bui l t their fonu nes with i n the Russian Mafia and
all the wealthy in the Arab world , Asia, Africa or Latin America,
who send their chi ldren to Harvard and thei r money to Wal l
St reet. Clearly, in this pseudo-totality of t h e empire a n d in i ts
u n bearable emptiness, not only is there no theoret ical space in
which to dist inguish between exploiters and explOi ted but also
there is no room to conceive the dominant coal i t ion as anyt h i ng
d i fferent fro m an undifferen tia ted gang of capitalists, In this
way, and d eparti ng from this anal}'lical ster i l ity, 'collect ive cap
ital ' prod uces the miracle of control l ing the world economy (the
reader should be reminded that only 200 t ransnational mega
corpo rations, 96 per cent of which have their headquaners i n
j ust eigh t count ries, have a combi ned volume of sales that i s
higher than the G D P of a l l t h e countries i n the globe except the
nine largest ones) without st ructu res, organizations, instit utions,
h ie ra rchies, agents, rules or norms,l I n addition, if a ny con niet
, 2 We add: the annual i ncome of Exxon is al most equal to Australia'S
GOP; thaI of Ford is simil:lr to Denma rk's GOP; that oftne British' Dutch oil
company Shell is almos! double thc G OP of one of the largest oil producers in
the world. Venezuela. General MOlors has an annual in come thai cxcceds the combined GOP of Ireland, New Zealand and Hungary (Res!ivo 2002: 24-5).
� lOok place with in it , such a conflict would be merely accidental
-! or circumstantial , and i t would be easily solved by appealing to
the good-will of the parties concerned. All of a sudden the world
order created by North American hegemony d uring the post-war
era disappears in front of our eyes, and the magnates of the
Russian Mafia seem to have the same weight and relevance as
their North American counterparts. The main institutions which
model the international i mperialist order - the IMf, the World
Bank, the WTO, NATO, the OECD and ot her similar institut ions
- seem to bear no more relation to Washington than they do to
Osama Bin Laden's family or to any other Arab magnate, a l though
the organic i ntellectuals of the empire i nsist on characteriz ing
them as an informal part of the Nort h American government . In
this phantasmagoric view of the e mpire, the 'conditionalit ies' of
the international financial institutions would be dictated by an
Arab mil l ionaire, a Portuguese banker, a Japanese whaler, a Latin
American oligarch and, of course, a n American busi nessman. In
the same way, the errat ic movements of the United Nations are
the result of a fight between the aforementioned subjeets. It is not
necessary to be an international relations expert to demonstrate
t he falsehood of th is argument. Recent events in Venezuela (the
fai led coup d 'etat agai nst Hugo Chavez in April 2002) d issipate
any doubt regardi ng the persistent oppressive presence of im
perialism. A coup that the CIA had been preparing for more than a
year, and which was blessed , in a sign of arrogance close to sheer
stupidity, hours after i ts occurrence by thE' presidential spokes
man at the White House (violating thc Organizat ion of American
States' resolut ions that Washington had promoted when it had
been convenient for it to do so), and which immediately had the
'disinterested' collaboration of the I M F that, surprisingly and
without anybody having to ask for i t , offered its help to the new
government at a t ime when it had been recognized only by the
United States and its European footman , Jose M. A2:nar, the situ
ation still not having been resolvE'd. This behaviour by the IMF
120
proves once again that thi s 'multilateml organization' is, in reality,
a minor department inside the Whi te House.
This record completely invalidates Negri's statement made
d u ring a recent i nterview in which he expanded on the issues
developed in Empire: 'We think that there is no centralization
place within the empire. and that it is necessary to speak of a
non-place. We are nOI claiming that Washington is nol impor
tant: Washington has the bomb. New York has the dollar. Los
Angeles has the language and the means of commu nication'
(A1biac 2002: 2).
No further comment.
1 2 1
... 7 It
1 .. �, '" , :::I " •
So �' 1 �, !. iii' 3
Epilogue
Fame and celebrity have rarely gone hand-in -ha nd with critical
thinking. The history of political philosophy teaches us that
adversarial spirits have usually been persecuted and silenced by
the dominant classes. In most cases, this has been ach ieved by
means of more or l ess brutal coercion. Antonio Negri has been,
for almost thirty years, a victim of this methodology: his m ilitancy
in Italian social struggles, as well as his signi ficant contributions
to both political theory and political philosophy - two fields also
marked by the ups and downs of class struggles - brought down
on him the fury of the Italian bourgeoisie and its political rep
resentatives, and it also brought persecution, incarceration and
exile. On other, less frequent, occasions, those who contest the
existing social order are faced only with the i ndifference of the
powerful. This occurs when the dominant groups find themselves
in such a safe position a nd are so confident of the stability of
their own supremacy that they allow the mselves the luxury of
practising the an of tolerance. Needless to say, this exercise is
practised only on condition that the dissident voices can be heard
only by a small circle of harmless followers who lack any organic
l ink with civil sociery, and who, for that reason, are incapable of
becoming a serious threat to the dominant classes. Given this,
how can we explain the 'unlimited pra ise' that, according 10
John Bellamy Foster, was heaped on two leftist scholars - namely
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri - in some of the most select
intellectual bastions of the bou rgeoisie, such as the New York
Times, Time magazine and the Observer or London, to which I
could add a newspaper l inked to the most reactionary fat·tions of
Argentine capitalism, La Nacion (Bellamy Foster 2001).
I n co ncluding this examination the answer seems to be clear:
the favourable reception give n by the esta blishment's mandarins
to Empire shows that they read the book carefully, that they cor
rectly understood its most profound message, and that they ac
cu rately concluded that there was nothing within the book that
could be considered incompatible with the dominant ideology or
with the self-image that the powerful like to exhibit. Although the
metaphysical rad icalism of its narrative and its abstruse allusions
to the contrad ictions of capitalism did not cease to i rritate the
most intolerant and na rrow-minded intellectuaJs of the empire,
the main argu m ent shows a surprising and welcome similarity to
the main thesis that the ideologists of 'globalization ' have been
promoting around the world since the 1 980s, namely: that the
nation-state is practically dead, that a global logic rules the world,
a nd that defyi ng this abominable structure, whose concrete
bene ficiaries as well as its victims and oppressed are lost in the
shadows, there is a new and amorphous entity, the ' multitude',
no longer the people, let alone the workers or the proletariat. Re
gardless of the repeated invocations to co mmunism and the good
society that make the imperial energumens shiver, Empire leaves
the reader without answers as to why the men and women of the
empire should rebel, agai nst whom, and how to create a new type
of society. Although Empire formally criticizes capital ism as an
inhuman, oppressive, exploitative and unfair mode of production,
it vanishes in the translucent air of postmodernity. It becomes, in
a manner of speaki ng, invisible, just l ike American imperialism,
and in this way both are ' naturalized '. Hunger, poveny, death,
wars, diseases and the whole catalogue of hu man miseries that
were observed throughout the twentieth century are rhetorically
transformed in dull and almost impenetrable phraseolOgy that,
in spite of the manifest intentions of its creators, hides the most ,
despicable features of neoliberal globalization and or contem-
porary capitalism.
For the reasons displayed throughout my book, I find it highly
unl ikely that the anti-imperialist fighters of the world will find
1 23
III 'E. I !i
• in Empire any realistic and persuasive argument to illu minate :t
J their path or to help them understand what is happening in the
1- world. More l ikely, a 'counsel of surrender would be the message
of a manifesto on behalf of global capital. Jt is also, l ike it or
not, the message of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri's Empire'
(Meiskins Wood 2003: 63). Given its mista kes and confusions,
it is easy to u nderstand why the book was acclaimed as a true
revelation by some of the world 's most i mponant mass media
tightly associated with the imperialist structure that overwhelms
us. In any case, it is good to know that, as Hannah Arendt re
minded us, 'even in the da rkest n ight we still have the right to
wait for some illumination', and that this will probably come not
from a colou rful conceptual and theoretical apparatus but from
the smaJl lights that will ema nate from the initiatives that men
and women adopt in order to put an end to, in Marx's words,
this pai nful and barbarian 'pre-history' of humanity finally to
enter a superior stage of civilization (Arendt 1968: ix). I want to
believe, going back to Hardt and Negri's work, that (he mistakes
that we have ide ntified in Empire will be rectified in a new study
u ndenaken by these authors. I n N egri's case I am inclined to
think that the mistakes detected in this book could be due to
distortions produced by a long exile, even if it is i n Paris; to the
lack of ability to travel around the world and to confirm, with his
own eyes, the sinister realities of imperialism; and finally, to the
rarefied intellectual Parisian atmosphere, whose provincialism
and splendid self-reference were repeatedly underlined by notable
French intellectuals such as J ean-Paul Sartre, or others residing
in France l ike Nicos Poulantzas. Negri's contributions to the de
velopment of social and political Marxist theory do not deserve
such a disappointing ending. I hope with all my heart to have,
in the short term, the satisfaction of commenting, in completely
differe nt terms, on a new book in which Negri's extraordinary
talent meets again with his own history.
12.4
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1 19
Index of proper names
Accumulation on a World Scale; 15 AfghaniSlan; 1 1 , So, 51 , 63 Afriea; lJ, J8, 45, 1 19 After Liberalism; 15 Aguilar, Alonso; 1 1 1 Ahmad, Aijaz; 56 Alabama; 4J Albright, Madeleine; 56 A1thusser, Louis; 1 09 Altvater, Elmar; 13 Amin, Samir; 15, 1 1 1, 1 1 5 Amnesty; 65 Anderson, Peny; 9, 104, 105, 106 Annan, Kofi; 45 Aquinas, Thomas; 100 Arendt, Hannah; 104, 1 05, 1 24 Argenlina; 20, J6, 74, l l 5, 1 1 6, I 1 R Arrighi, Giovanni; 25 Asia; 1 5, 38, 45, 5 1 , 69, 1 1 9 Australia; I S, l l9 Austro-Hungarian Empire; J9 Aznar,jose Maria; 8, 1 7, 1 8 , 1 20
Badiou, Alain; 109 Balibar, Etienne; 109 Bangladesh; 37, 45, 48 Baran, Paul: 2J Baudrillard, jean; 109 Uclgium; 5 1 Ilen Bella , Ahmed; 98 Benjamin, Waller; 104 nerlin Wall; 4J, 1 0 1 Berluseon i , Si lvio; 107 'Big Government is St ill in Charge';
78 Bin Laden, Osama; I I , 6J, 1 20 Bismarck. Olto von; 5.1 Bobbio, Norbeno; 7 Boeing Corporalion; 45 Iloiivar, Sim6n; I I I
Boron, Atllio A. ; 18 , 46. 54. 57, 58. 67, 85, 94, 105
Bosch. juan; 28 Bosnia; 67 Bowles, Samuel; 92 Brazil: 1 9. 20, J5, 36. 37, 1 16 Brechl. Benoll; 104 Brilain: 1 7. J7. 55 B russels; 45 Bn.ezinski, Zbigniew; 1 1 . 68, 69. 70,
72. 1 1 8 Bukharin, Nikolai; 2 , 13. 23, 1 1 1 Bull, Malcolm; 95 Bush, George Sr.; 1 1. 74 Bush, George W.; 9, 1 1 . 1 2 , I J, 1 8 ,
17. 6J
California; 43, 1 1 6 Capitalism in the Age of
Globaliwtion; 25 Cardoso, Oscar Raul; 10, 1 1 Caribbean; 5 1 . l l 8 Carthage; 33 Castro, fidel: 98 Central Intelligence Agency (elA);
1 1 7 , 1 10 Charles. Gerard·Pierre; 28 Chavt'"Z, Hugo; 120 Chiapas; 34, ]6, 8R, 1 16 Chicago; 5 1 , 8J Chile; 74 China; 1 5 , 69, 70, 1 0 1 Chiquita Banana; 66 Chirac, jacques; 1 4 Chomsky, Noam: 1 1 , I J , 1 7, 18. 25,
40, 46, 49, 62, 67. 76, 93, 94 Christian Democracy Pany (CUP);
109 Clan"n; 20 Clausewitz. Carl von; J I
Climon. Bill; 56
Colombia; 1 18
Colombia Plan; 1 1 6
Common Market or the South
lMERCOSUR)j 1 1 6 Comnlllnisl Manifesto; 2 , 5 , 28. 89, 95 Considerations on Western Marrism;
104
Copernican; 2
Costa Rica; 1 16
COlt. Roben; 25, 60 Crisi dello slato-pinno; 109
Cuba: 76, 1 1 7
Cueva, Agustin; 28, 8 1 , 1 1 1
Czechoslovakia: 2 1
Dahl, Robert A.; 48
Davos; 23 Debray, Regis; 102
DeleuU", Gilles: 109
Denmark; 1 1 9
Derrida. Jaeques: 109 Deutsche Bank; 45
oabb, Maurice; 23
Dominican Republic; 1 0. 74 Don QULrOle: 20. 3 I Dornbusch, Rudiger; 1 07 Dos Santos, Theolonio; 28
Drucker. Peter; 84 Drug Enforcement Administration
(OEA); 1 1 7
Duke University; 93
Duverger, Maurice: 1 1 1
Eagleton, Terry; 100, 101, 103. 104, 105
East Timor; 1 1 7 Economist. The: 78
Ecuador; 66. 1 1 7 Eisenstadt, Samuel: I I I EI SaiYador; 43 Empire o/Chaos; 25
Empire: 1 . 4, 5, 6. 8, 1 0, 1 1 . 13. 14.
16, 1 8. 2J. 24. 25. 26. 35. 39, 47, 59. 60. 6 1 , 75. 80, 87, 88, 90, 9 1 • 93. 95. 98, 100. 103. 1 04, 105.
106. 1 07, 1 10, I l l . 1 14, l l5. 121 , 1 23, 1 24
Engtls, Friedrich: 2. 7. 28, 89
European Union: 45. 76 Europe: 18, 38, 43. 45, 68, 69, 97
ElU(on; 1 19
Fabbriche del soggetto; 109
Federalist papers; 94
Feuerbach, Ludwig; 2
First World War: 3, 10, 52
Ford; 45, 1 19
Fortunej 46
Foucault, Michael; 24, 29. 30, 1 09
France; 9, 37, 43, 51 , 55, 68, 104, 1 07. 108, 109, 1 24
Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA): 8 1 . 1 1 6
Friedman, Millon; 1 07
F riedman, Thomas: 15, 1 6, 62. 84
Fujimori. Albeno: 1 1 5 Fukuyama. Francis: 16, 101
FulUr AlIlerieur; 109
Gabon: 27 Galbraith.John K . ; 1 1 2
Galeano, Eduardo; 28 Gates, Bill; 50, 51
General Agreemem on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT): 56, 76 General Motors: 1 1 , 1 1 9 Gennan)'; 9, 37, 45. 5 1 , 55
Gindin, Sam: 10, I I 3
Gi ntis. Herbert; 92 Gonzalez Casanova, Pablo; 28, I l l .
1 1 8 Gortari, Carlos Salinas de; 1 1 5 Gramsci, Amonioj 6. 5 1 , 52 Greece; 29
Greenpeaee; 65 G reenwich Village; 29 Group of Seven (G-7); 79 Guatemala: 66 Guattari, Felilt: 109 Guevara. Emesto 'Che': 98 Gulf War; 1 2, 6 1 . 62, 63. 74, 1 1 7
131
Habermas, Ji.lrgen; 34
Haiti; 37, 43, 67
Hardt, Michael and Antonio Negri;
1 , 2, 4, 6, 8, 1 1 , 1 2, 1 3, 14, 1 5, 1 7,
19, 20, 23, 25, 26, 29, 30, 3 1 , 32,
33 , 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 4 1 ,
42 , 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 50, 5 1,
52, 53 , 54, 57, 58, 59, 60, 62, 64,
65, 66, 67, 68, 6g, 70, 7 1 , 72, 73,
74, 75, 77, 78, 83, 85, 87, 88, 89,
90, 93, 94, 95, 97, 98, 99, 100,
101, 103, 104, 105, 106, 1 10, I l l,
1 13, 1 16, 1 18, 1 1 9, 1 22, 124
Hardt, M ichael; 87, 88, 106. log, 1 10
Harlem; 48
Hegel. Georg Wilhelm Fried rich; 30
Hilferding. Rudolf; 2, 23
Ho Chi Minh; 98
Hobbesian; 82, 83
Hobsbawm, Eric; 1 1 1
Holland; 5 1
Honduras; 39, So, 8 1
Hoselitz, Bert; 3 7
Hungal)'; 2 1 . 1 19
Hunlington. Samuel P.; 1 2, 70, 7 1 ,
1 18
Hussein, Saddam; 1 1 , 16, 63
11 potere consliluente; log India; 23 , 37
International Convention on the Rights of the Child; 76
I nternational Coun of justice; 77
International Criminal coun; 7 5
International Labor Organization (JLO); 43
International MonetaI)' Fund ( J M F); 2, 24, 56. 59, 65, 7 1 , 72, 78, 79, 8 1 ,
go, 1 1 3. 1 17. 1 20
Iraq; 6, 7, 8, 9. 10, 1 1 , 13, 14, 1 6, 1 7 ,
20, 17, 6 1
Italian Communist Party (PC)); 108
Ita l ian Radical Party; 108
Italian Socialist Party; 1 10
Italy; 68, 104, 108, log, 1 1 0
Jaguaribe, Hclio; 28, I I I japan; 37, 69. 83, 84
jericho; 4
Kagan, Robert; 12
Kant. Im manuel; 10, 89
Kapstein, Ethan; 46
Kaulsky, Karl; 23
Kelsen, Hans; 26, 27
Keynes, john Maynard; 10, 109
Kirkpatrick,jeane; 74
Kissinger, Henry; 38, 39
Kosovo; 27, 62
Krauthammer, C harles; 1 2
Kyoto Agreemenlj 76
La Anomalia Saillaje; log La Forma Stalo. Per la Critica
dell 'Economia Polilico della
ConslilUzionej log La Nacion; 1 22
Labor of Dionysus. A Critique of Ihe
Slole-form; 109
Lacan,jacques; log Lacandonajungle; 35 Landless Workers' Movement, Brazil
(MST); 36, 1 16
Latin America; 23. 37, 38, 45, 5 1 , 68,
69, 88, 102, 1 18, 1 19
Lenin, Vladimir Jl ich; 2, 13, 23, 3 1 ,
1 1 1 , 1 1 3
Les noulleoux espaces de liberte; 109
Lockean; 83
Lang Twentiet/l Century, The; 25 Los Angeles; 33, 83, 1 2 1
Luhmann, Niklas; 26. 34 Lukacs, Gyorg; 54 Luxemburg, Rosa; 1, 13, 23, 104, 1 1 1
Lyotard, Jean·Fran'iOise; 109
Machiavelli, Niccolo; 33, 60, 92
Madison, james; 94 Magdoff, Hany; 23
Maldonado Denis, Manuel; 28
Managua; 77
Mandel, Ernst; 23
132
Mandela, Nclson; 98
Mao Zedong; 3 1 . 98
Marini, Ruy Mauro; 28
Marx olrre Marx; 109
Marx, Karl; 2. 7. 24. 28. 29. 30, 3 1 . 33.
35. 49, 58, 89. 105. 106. 1 13, 1 24
Marxism; 23. 54. 70. 10 1 . 104. lOS, 106
Massachusetts Institute or
Technology (MIT); 94
Matlick, Paul; 23
May 1 , 1886 Haymarket Square.
Chkago; 5 1
McDonald's; 45
Medherranean; 64
Meiskins Wood. Ellen; 54. 83. 85, 86.
90. 1 12. 1 24
Menem. Carlos Saul; 1 1 5 Mexico; 43. 1 1 5
Microsoft; 15. 45
Middle East; 69 Milan; 108 Minisuy of Intcrnational Trade and
IndusUY. Japan (Min); 84
Modem World System, The; 25 Monde Diplomat;que, Le; 1 19
Moro, Aldo; 108
Multilateral Agreement on
Investments (MAl): 59, 65, 66. 67,
8 1 , 1 1 7
National se-c:urity Council; 38, 69
Negri, Antonio; 9. 19, 20. 42. 93. 108,
log, t lO. 1 1 9. 1 2 1 , 1 22. 1 24 New Ellgland Journal of Medicine; 48
NfilJ Left Revir.w; I
New York Times; 15. 62. 84. 1 2 2 New York; 6, 1 5 . 16. 29, 3 6 , 8 3 , 1 2 1
New Zealand; 1 19 Nicaragua; 10. 74. 77, 1 1 7
Nicaraguan Contras; 7 7 Nixon, Richard; 3 8 Noriega. Manuel Antonio; 1 1 7 Nonh America; 1 19
North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA); 8 1
North Atlantic Treaty Organi2:3tion
(NATO); 9. 1 20
North Atlantic; 9. 24
Nuftez. Omar; 28
O'Connor, James; 23
Obsenler; 122
Opera; e Stalo. Fra Rilloluzione
d'ottobre e New Deal; 109
Oqueli. Ramon; 80
O rganization ror Economk Co
operation and Development
(OECD); 65, 78, 1 20
Organization or American States
(OAS); 120
Palestinian Intifada; 33
Palmerola; 80 Panama; 80. 1 1 7
Panitch. Leo; 10. 67, 68. 69. 1 1 3. 1 1 7.
1 18
Paris Commune; 107
Paris Peace Confe�nce; 10
Paris; 34. 93, 124 Peloponnesian war; 33
Pentagon; 4. 9
Persian Gulf; 67
Peru; l i S Petras.James; 28, 1 1 1 Philadelphia; 94 Pinochet, Augusto; 74
Plato; 29 Polirics ofSubllersiOIl. The; 109
Popular Parry, Spain (PP); 1 1 8
Pono Alegre; 35 Poulant7.as, Nicos; 1 24 Production. POUler, and World Order;
25 Proletar; e Scato; 109 Ptolemy; 1 00
PueblaJPanama Plan; 1 16 Punic war; 33
Quademi del carcere; 52
Ranciere. Jacques; log
1 33
Rawls,john; 26
Reagan, Ronald; 75. 79
Red Brigades; l oB Red Cross; 65
Reich. Roben; 42, 43. 44
Restivo, Nestor; 1 1 9
Ricardo, David; 107
Rome; ]3, 69. 75
Rosto\\,. Walte r W.; 37
Rousseau, jean jacques; 29, 33
Russia; 6<), 70
Sachs, [gnney; 23
Sandinista; 1 1 7
Sastre, A l fonso; 7
Saxe· Fernandez, joh n; 2B. 39, 1 1 1 ,
l i B
Schmin, Carl; 26, 3 1 . 54
Seattlr; 4, 40
Seiser, Gregorio; 2B
Seoul; 34
September 1 1 ; 6, 7, 36
Service of Peace and justice; 65
Sharon, Ariel; 1 1 7
Shell; 45, 1 1 9
Shonfie[d, Andrew; 2J Siemens; 45
Sierra Leone; 27
Singapore; 83
Smith, Adam; 107
Socialist Register 2004; 1 13
Somalia; 67, 76
Som01.a, Anastasio; 74
Soros, George; 1 6
Sousa Samos. Boaventu ra de; 82. 8 3
South America; 1 16
South Korea; 33, 35, B3
Soulhern Command; Bo Soviet Union; B, 32, 68, 101, 105
Spain; 17, 68. 18, 104, l I B
Spi noza. Baruch; 24
St Francis of As�isi; 20, 9B. 99, 1 00,
l l8
Stiglitz, Joseph; 1 17
Strange, Susan; 14, 69, 70
Sub-commander Marcos; 34
Sub-saharan Africa; 5 1 , 1 1 7
Sweden; 78, 92
Sweezy, Paul; 23
Tajwan; 84
Teguciga lpa; 8 1
Thatcher, Ma rgaret; 79
Third International; 98
Third Reich; 54
Third World; 18, 23, 37, 39, 44, 69,
79. 97, 103, 1 1 7, 1 18
Tinnanmen Square; 33
Time Magazine; 1 22
Tocqueville, Ale)[is de; 29, 30
Trujillo, Rafael Leonidas; 74
Tu rkey; 1 1 7
Twin Towers; 6
Uililever; 45
United Fruit; 66
United Ki ngdom; 8. 27, 45, 5 1 , 65
United Nations (UN); 8, 9. 1 5. 26, 27,
60, 62, 64, 65, 75. 76, 1 20
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); 37, 43, 78
United State Treasury; 8 1 , 84
Un.ited States; 9. 1 1 , 1 2 , lJ, 18, 20,
2 1 , 27, 37, 38, 39, 43, 45, 5 1, 60, 6 1 , 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 70,
71, 73, 75, 76, 77. 79, 82, 83, 84, 93, 94, 97, 1 06, 1 1 1. 1 1 3, 1 1 6, 1 19. 1 20
University of Paris VIII; 109
Upper West Side; 43
Uruguay; 1 17
Vargas Llosa, Mario; 102
Veltmeyer, Henry; 28
Venezuela; 1 19, 1 20
Veracruz; 10
Vida.!, Gorc; 6, I B, 39
vidrla, jorge Rafael ; 74
Vietnam War; 1 7, 77
Wallerstein, Imma nuel; 25, 1 1 1
WarSaw Pact; 101
1 3 4
Washington Consensus; 59, 79. 83,
1 1 5 Wash ington; 6, 7, 8, 9. 10, 1 1. 2 7.
36. 61 . 62, 63 , 65, 66, 69, 70, 71 ,
75, 76, 77, 80, 82, 1 16, 1 1 7. 1 20, I I I
While House; 4. 9, 1 3, 1 6, 18, 45. 65,
1 20. 1 2 1
Wilson, Woodrow; 10
Workers' Pany, Bra2il (Pl1; 1 1 6 World Bank (WB); 2, 24. 56, 59, 65,
7 1 , 72, 78, 79, 9°, 1 13. 1 17, 120
World Ordtr$, Old and New; "15
World Trade Center; 4 World Trade Organization (W1'O);
45, 56, 59. 65, 72, 76. 79, 101 , 1 1 3. 1 10
WreSl'h, William; 5 1
Year 501. The Conquest Continues; 15
Yugoslavia; 28. 1 1 6
Zapatislas; 34. 35, 36 Zi2l'k, Slavoj ; 95
135
General index
aboriginal communities; 88
aboriginal organizations; 17
accumulation; 3. 85
actOr\S); 1 1 . 12. 18, 84, 93 . 1 12 , 1 1 3,
1 1 5
alliancelsl; 41 • 5 1 . 54 anarchisl(s); 16. 25
anti- socialist; 5 1
anti-capitalism(s): 19
ami-capitalist(s); 15 . 35. 4 1
anti-colonialist(s); 14, 98
anti-democratic; 65. 94
ami-fascist resistance; 9B
anti-globalization; 1 6. 34
anti-imperialist; 98. 1 2]
anti-popular; 94
ant i-socialist; 5 1
anti-Slate; 53. 78
apartheid; 32, ]3. 83
aristocracy; 53
anned forces; 1 2. 70, 8 1
authority; 9. 26, 27, 5]. 73, 74. 86, 1 1 1
autonomy; 53. 54
banks; 46, 56, 84
biopolitic; 92
biopolitical; 28, 91 , 95, 96
biopolitics; 92
biopower; 29, 99 black; 8J bourgeois (bourgeoisie); 1 1 , 22. 29,
]0, 3 2. 50, 52. 5]. 54, 85, 88. 92•
101. 106, 1 1 1, I I J. 1 14. 1 1 8. 122
business; 14. 1 6, ]2. 48. 49. 59, 70.
106. 1 1 2
capilal; 3, 7. 13, 30, 35. 47. 48. 49. 52. 53, 69, 83. 85, 88, 9 1 . 92, 101 . 1 1 2. 1 1 8. 1 19
capilalism(s); 1 . 2 . 3. 4, 1 0, 1 3, 14, 1 7,
18, 19. 2 1 • 25. ]0. J l, J2. 3 3. 4 1 ,
42. 46. 5 1 . 55. 58, 59. 67. 77. 78,
79. 80. 83. 90, 9 1 , 99. 101 . 1 04,
1 07, 1 1 1 . 1 12 . 1 1 8, 1 22. 12J
capilalist accumulation; 51
capilalist class; 85, 92
capitalist e)(ploit�tion; 33
capitalist relations of production;
1 14
capitalist revolution; 80
capitalist society (ies); J, 54. 59. 60. 88
capitalist stare(s); 7, 56. 77. 8 1 . 84. 85
capitalist(s); 3 , 4. 7 , 1 ]. 14. 16. 1 7. 30,
31 , 33. 36. 47, 5 1 . 52. 54. 56. 59.
60. 8 1, 82. 9 1 , 92. 104, 109. 1 1 9
casino capitalism; 1 4
centre; 4, 1 1 . 36. 37. J9, 40, 73, 75.
79. 82, 105 cholos; 88
citizen(s); 44. 69. 83. 90
dt izens rights; 90 citi:.:ens wage; 92
citizenship; 69. 89. 90. 9 1 , 95. 96 civil society; 52. 57. 58, 62, 72, 77. 82,
89, 90• 122
civilizalion; 1 3. 29. ]2. 97. 1 24
class st ruggles; 30, 68, 8 1 , 96, 1 13 . 122
class(es); 19. 45. 57. 60. 68. 90, 96. 10J. 106
coaJition; 30, 36. 51, 70. 79, 1 19
roerciOOj 27. 122
collect.ive subjects; 19
colonialism; 30 colonies; 15
coloni7-3tlon; 2 1
communication(s); 33, 34, 92, 95. 96,
97. 1 2 1 communist society: 25
communiSI(s); 1 6, 15, 49. 68, 95. 98. 99. 1 00. 104. 107
company(ies); 14. 1 5. 16. 44. 45. 46.
48. 49. 65. 66, 67. 69. 76. 79. 80.
84, 85, 1 13, 1 1 5, 1 19
complcxity(ies); 8, 19. 55. 74. 106
concentration camps; 32
conflict(s); 27. 29. 35. 41 , 67. 73. 1 1 6• 1 19. 1 20
confrontation; 19. 62
conquest; 7, 1 1 . 1 2 . 2 1 . 33
consensuS; 9, 28. 53, 54. 55. 68 . 76
conservative; 1 5. 62, 78, 103, 1 1 1
constituent power; 40• 93, 96
consume r(s); 85, 1 1 5
contract(s); 27. 66. 83
corporation(s); 1 1 . 13. 14. IS, 16, 1 7. 24, 4'1, 46. 47. 48, 49. 50. 51 . 53. 56. 62. 79, 84
counter-power; 40. 55
counter-revolution; 1 04. 1 1 3
countries colonized; 1 3
coup d'�tat; 10. 120
coyote; 43
cuhural; 19. 55. 82. 88. 101, 1 1 2. 1 14
debate(s); 5. 6, 37. 38, 4 1 . 48. 93. 94,
100, 109 decentred; 1 0
democracy; 7. 1 6 . 1 7. 1 8, 2 1 . 32. 66.
7 1 . 88. 90. 92. 101 . 1 1 7
democralic order; 14, 82
democratic slate; 81 . 83
democraLic; 4. 7. 8. 9. 1 4. 1 7. 18, 2 1 .
80. 8 1
demonSl'ralion(sl; 1 7. 18, 35, 101
dcpendenCY; 4, 38. 39, 68
deregulation of market(s); 80. 85
despotism; 29. 48
delerrilorialized; 10
developlllcnt; 3 , 32, 33, 35. 37, 38.
44. 46. 47. 5 1 . 54. 59. 1 05, 1 1 3.
1 14 dialectic; 40, 53. 107
dictatorship; 2 1 . 35
d isciplinary sociery; ;1o
doclrine(s); 12, 5 1
dominant class(es); 7. 1 1 . 14. 68.
1 14, 1 1 5, 1 1 8, 1 22
domination; 4, 1 1 , 20. 29. 30, 31, 36.
6 1 . 72. 73. 96. 1 1 5
drug(s); 7 1 . 1 16
ecologists; 1 6
economy(ies); 3 . 1 4 . 15. 23. 24. 36.
39. 42. 45. 46, 47. 59, 70, 78. 79.
80, 83 , 84, 94, 100, 105. 106, 1 07,
1 1 4, l i S, 1 16. 1 17, 1 19
education; 32, 79. 90. 1 14
emanCipation; 9 1 • 94. 99 emancipatory; 20, 2 1 . 56, 68
empire; 1 , 4. 8, 1 1 , 12 , 13 . 15. 16. 18.
1 9. 20, 23. 26. 27, 28. 30. 3 1, 31, 34. 36. 37. 39. 40, 47. 50 .58. 59.
60 .6 1 . 62. 63, 64. 66• 67. 68. 69,
70 . 7 1 , 73. 75, 77. 79. 82, 87. 91 • 96. 97, 99. 103. I l l ! 1 1 3. 1 14.
1 1 6, 1 1 7, 1 1 8. 1 1 9, 1 20, 1 2 1. 1 23
empowerment; 89. 90
enem)iies); 19. 20. 3 1 , 35. 40. 4 1 , 48.
7 1 . 75. 1 1 6 equal ity; 32
cstabl ishment; 10, 24. 62, 65. 85. 1 1 6
exploitalion; 20, 30, 47. 49. 88. 1 1 3
exploited; 29. 3 1 , 48. 82. 88. 9 1 , 99. 1 19
feminists; 1 7 feudalism; 3 1
finance; 14, 46. 88
financial; 3 . 72. 80. 8], 88. 90, 1 1 7.
1 20
financ:ialization: 3
forces of production; 1 1 3
forces; 1 2. 1 7, 28. 36. 4 1 , 6]. 68 , 77,
103. 107, 1 1 7 rree markets. 42. 48
freedom; 7. 1 2, 16, 7 1 . 73, 93. 94.
98, 1 1 1
ghettos; 83 global market(s); 45, 69, 83. 84. 101
1 3 7
: .,. oS
global; 3. I I . 13 . 1 5. 24. 26. 3°. 3 1 .
13 , 34. 36. 4°. 4 1 . 45. 46. 47. 48 • 49, 55, 56. 60. 6 1 . 62. 63. 64. 67. 68, 69, 7 1 . 72. 73. 75. 77 . 84. 85.
89. 90. 91 , 1 1 2. 1 13 . 1 23. 1 24 global ization ; 1 . 2 . 3. 4. 5. 14. 1 5. 16.
1 7. 1 9. 31 . 35. 4°. 44. 46. 56. 59. 73. 82. 83. 84 . 89. 99. I I I . 1 12 . 1 23
'globalphobics'; 5 goods and services; 4. 1 1 5
health; 14. 48. 76. 79. 1 14
hegemon; 64 hegemony; 1 1 . 3°. 60. 7 1 . 72. 97. 1 15.
1 16. 1 20 historical materialism; 25. 26. 59.
70, 105
hisLOry; 1 . 4, 7. 8. 16. 17 . 19. 23. 43,
52. 53, 55. 63. 66. 79, 89. 96. 104.
107. 1 14. 1 16. 1 19. 1 22 . 1 24
housing; 79. 93. 1 1 4 human rights; 16. 7 1 , 1 1 7
humanitarian; 6, 27 . 28. 56. 64, 65.
66. 76, 1 1 6 humanity; 20. 75. 99. 1 24
identity; 3. 35. 73. 10 I
ideologist(s); 46. 48. 6 1 . I 1 2. I 14. 1 23
ideology; 30. 43. 53. 59. 60. 1 10. 1 1 3 , 1 1 5. 123
immigrants; 19. 43
imperialism: 2 . 3. 40. 5. 7. 10. 1 3. 14.
19. 2 1 . 24. 23. 26. 3°. 38. 39. 59.
60 .64. 65. 67, 68. 69. 7 1 . 73. 75.
80. 84. 1 1 2. 1 1 3. 1 14. 1 1 6. 1 1 7. J J8. 1 20. 1 23. 1 24
imperia.list(s); I . 3. 4. 6, 8. 9. 1 1 . 1 2 .
1 3. 1 6. 17. 1 9. 27. 32. 36. 59, 6 1 .
63. 64. 68. 7°. 73. 74. 79. 80. 85. 100. 107. 1 13. J l 6. 1 18. 1 19. 1 20. 1 24
i mperialistic; 27. 28. 63. 64
income; 1 5. 43. 46. 85. 9 1 . 92. 1 1 4. 1 1 9
Indians; 88 individual consciences; 29
individual libenies; 3 2
individualist; 8 2
industrialized countries; 78. 80. 96.
1 1 3 information; 50. 77. 78. 84, 95, 96
insurgence; 97
insurgent forces; 36
i ntellectuals; 7, 20, 50, 54. 67. 7 1 , 90,
98. 105, 1 09, 1 20, 1 23, 1 24 imer-imperial rivalry; 14
international; 3, 8. 9. 1 1 • 1 2• 13, 14,
1 9. 23, 26. 27, 28. 33. 35. 36. 37.
38. 39. 4 1 . 55, 56. 58. 59, 60. 6 1 ,
62, 64. 65, 69. 70, 72, 75, 76. 79. 83, 84. 89, 90. 925. LOO. 101. 1 1 1 , 1 1 3, 1 1 7, 1 1 8, J l9. 1 20
internationalism; 33, 40. 89
internationalist ideology; 10
justice; 1 2, 1 3. 28, 6 1 , 63. 64, 65. 66,
77. 1 16
labour foree; 4J. 49
labour legislation; 43, 49 labour reforms; 85
labour unions; 19, 4 1 . 49. 85, 95
labour; 4 1 . 49, 88. 9 1 . 96
laiss�-faire; 52 landowners; 88
latina; 47. 83 legality; J 2
Leviathans; 15. 46. 83, 99 l iberal(s}; 5 1 , 52. 70. 1 0 1 , 1 1 1 l iberalism; 52, 108
l ibenarian pessimism; 103
mafia; 16. 1 1 9. 1 20 mandarins; 68, 123
market freedom; 1 1 5 market(s); 16, 26. 38. 42. 45, 46, 47,
50, 57, 67. 69. 7 1 . 79. 80, 82. 83. 84, 85. 101 . J l 5. J l7
markets' tyranny; 4. 17 , 82. 1 17 Marxist tradition; 1 05, 106. 108
138
mass m�dia; 7, 70. 72. 82. 1 14. 1 24
material conditions; 28
means of production; 95. 96
mestizos; 88
metropolis; 1 5 metropolitan capitalism; 18, 46. 77,
78, 8], 9 1 , 1 1 8
middle classes; 88
migrants; 18, 43, 97
mil itant(s)j 17. 19, 98, 99
military occupation: 7, 8, 1 1 , 21
m ilitary; 1 2 , 1 5. 1 7, 27, 4 1 , 60, 63, 67,
7 1 , 77, 80, 8 1 . 88, 1 16
mobilization: 1 7 . 19. 4 1
mode ofproducrion: 3. 1 04. 1 23
modern; 13, 15 , 16, 29. 32. 35. 48. 66.
9 1 • 102
modernist; 48
moderniry; 32. 33
multilatenllism; 8
multitude(s); 1 8, 1 9. 30. 32. 40. 4 1 , 87. 88. 89. 9 1 . 92. 93. 94. 95. 96• 97. 98. 99, 10]. 104, 1 1 3. 1 14, 1 23
nation (s); 3. 26, 38. 39. 44. 60. 62,
65. 66, 69, 72, 79. 80
nation building; 20. 2 1
national; 9. 10, I I . 12 , 1 3. 1 4, 1 5, 3 1 ,
35, 36. 42, 44, 45, 46. 47, 49, 5 1 ,
53 . 54, 55. 56, 58, 6 1 , 65, 70. 72•
75. 76, 77, 78, 83, 84, 87. 90, 104, 1 1 3, 1 19
nationalism; 1 1 9
natjonalirYi 56 nation-slatej 10, 1 5, 27, 32. 33, 42,
43, 47, 50. 53. 56, 57. 64, 73. 8]. 84, 85. 86. 87, 89. 1 0 1 , 104, 123
natural resources: 13
nco-colonialism; 38
neo-conservative: 76
neo-liberal: 1 . 2 , 3. 5. 14. 1 6, 19. 20,
25. 35 , 46, 59, 68. 78, 82, 89, 99, 100, 104, 1 1 1 , 1 1 2 , 1 1 3. 1 14. 1 1 5,
1 18. 1 23
neo-liberalism: 59. 79, 9 1 . 10 1 , 1 13,
1 1 4. 1 1 5, 1 1 8
non-cit izens; 69 non-global(s); 16, 1 7. 19
non-imperialist; 1 18
non-national; 46
non-place: 24, 1 2 1
non-territorial; 69
nuch:ar weapons; 32
oil : 13, 14, 63. 1 19
oligopolist ic; 1 1 4
ownership; 1 5
pacifism; 1 7
pacifisls; 1 6. 1 7
para militaries; 88
peace: 6, 10. 1 7, 65. 67
peasants; 88
periphery; 4, 1 1 , 37. 38. 39, 40, 49, 60,
62, 79, 80, 82, 85, 90. 9 1 , 1 1 7. 1 18 pickets: 36
planet: 64. 96, 102
policy(ies); 3,6. 9, 1 8, 20, 46, 5 1 . 52,
6 1 . 63. 7 1 . 76. 78, 79. 80, 82, 85, 90. 1 1 2. 1 1 4. 1 1 5. 1 1 7
polilical: 1 , 2, 5. 9. 1 7, 1 9. 23, 24. 25,
26. 29. 32. 33. 36, 38. 39, 4 1 , 49,
52, 53. 54. 55, 56, 58, 59. 6 1 , 65 , 68. 69, 80. 82, 84, 86, 87, 89, 92•
94, 96, 97. 98. 100, 10 1 , 102, 105.
106, 107, 108, 1 1 2. 1 1 4. 1 15, 1 1 6.
1 22, 1 24
politics; 8, 19. 20, 3 1 , 52. 53. 54, 55.
7 1 , 1 05. 106, 107
population(s)j 6. 18. 2 1 , 37. 46. 47.
5 1 , 64. 69, 7 7, 83, 8 7. 92. 97. 1 1 5.
1 1 7 post-capitalisl; 21 post-colonial: 27, 97 posl-ford ism: 1 0 1
posl-imperiaJisl; 2 1 , 2 7
post-modern society; 96
posl-modernity; 9 1 . 95, 123 post-structuralism: 107
post-war: 23. 64, 89, 1 20
pOI-banging protesters: 36
poverty; 98, 99, 1 23
1 39
power; 13. 24. 27. 19. 30. 33. 36. 40.
56, 60. 6 1 . 62. 63. 64. 70. 72. 73.
74. 77. 8 1 . 89. 92. 93. 94. 96. 97.
99. 103. 1 1 2. 1 15. 116. 117
privatc companies; 83. 1 1 5
profits; 6. 15. 49. 76. 8 5
progress: 16. 32. 50. 66. 79. 1 1 5. 1 1 7
progressive policies; 1 1 4
proletariat; 88. 95. 1 23
propeny; 46. 94. 96
public agenda; 100
public employees; 88
public expenditure: 77. 78. 79. 1 14.
1 1 7
public opinion: 16. 1 7
public sector; 79. 90 public sphere; 1 14
racism: 48
reaclionary; 19. 33. 123
reappropriation; 92. 95
reform(s); 78. 85. 95. 1 14
regime; 4. 1 1 . 21. 31 . 40. 55. 62. 67. 80. 87. 88. 1 1 8
regulation(s); 51. 80. 1 1 4. 1 1 8
relationships of force; 89
repression: 5 1 . 6 1 . 88. 96
republicanism: 87
republicans; 98
resistance movemenls; 9
revolution; 1. 55. 80. 84, 87. 9 1 • 97.
98. 99. 101. 101. 10]
revolutionary: 4 1 . 91 . 98. 103. 104.
105. 106
secularization: 32 semi·cilizens: 69
sexism: 48
sexual minorities: 88
slavery: 32. 33. 64, 91
social classes: 88 social democracy; 90. 1 08
social forces; 35. 53, 58. 102. 1 07
social movement(s): 16, 18. 19. 66.
106 social ordeJ{s): 36. 59. 1 23
social relotions of production: 1 1 3
social science: 13. 28. 29. 7 0
social struggles: 4 1 . 12 2
social wage: 9 1 . 91
socialism; 32. 68
socialist(s); 1 6. 95. 1 0 1 . 104
sociery of comrol: 29. 30
sociery: 6. 21 . 15. 30. 31. 4 1 , 52. 59.
97. 99. 106. 1 1 1 . 1 13. 1 23
sovereignry (sovereignties): 9. 10. 12 ,
13. 53. 56• 66. 67. 71, 73. 74. 75, 76. 77. 82. 1 1 4, 1 1 7
state: 3. 7, 10. 26, 42, 49. 50, 5 1 . 52• 53. 55, 56. 5;. 60. 65. 66, 67. 70•
7 1 . 73. 77. 78. 79, 80, 81 . 82. 83,
84. 85. 86, 87, 89, 90. 91 . 92, 98. 100. 109. 1 1 2• 1 1 5. 1 20
state·owned companies: 79. 1 1 5
strike(si: 33. 1 0 I
structuralism: 100
structure; 2, 3. 8. 1 1. 13. lB. 19. 39.
56. 57. 58. 69. 70. 73, 74. 90. 1 0 1 .
1 1 1 . 1 1 3. 1 15. 1 19, 1 13. 1 24
subsidies; 44. 84. 1 I 7
subversive: 4 1
superpower: I I , 12, 60. 68. 7 1 . 73.
75. 76
supranational: 10. 64. 65. 72. 83
surplus-value; 47, 85
system(s): 1 , 2. 8. 13. 1 4, 19, 23, 24,
27. 37. 38. 39, 59. 61 . 64, 72, 79.
82. 83. 84. 90. 94. 100. 102. 103.
104, 107. 108. 1 12, 113, 1 16
taxes; 15. 44, 85
technology: 42. 44. 70, 84
territorial occupation: 1 3, 2 1
territorial; 10, 1 1 , 12, 1 5, 36, 69, 73.
97
territory; 14, 94 terrorism; 7. 71
Texas ranchers; 16
theory: 2. 7. 37. 39. 44, 48. 54. 56.
89. 97. 100, 1 06, 107. 109. 1 1 5.
1 22. 1 Z4
tradition: 25. 29. 32, 60. 70
tribes; 1 7
trickle-down theory; 1 15
unaccountabilil)'; 8 1
unemployment; 80
unification; 40. 5 1 . 69. 83
unilateralism; 1 2
universal community; 10
unsustainable; 9
value; 1 3. 54
victim(s); 8. 10. 33. 56. 63. 76. 8 3. 105. 122. 1 23
waged labour; 43. 9 1
wllr crimes; 75. 77
walis); 6. 7, 10. I I . u. 1 3, 14. 16. 17.
1 8. 20. 21, 2 7. 32. 39. 6 1 , 62, 6],
64. 98, 1 05, 1 1 9, 1 23 w8telis); 2 . 6, 14. 93, 1 16
wealth; 1 1, 43, 46, 62, 85. 94, 96, 99.
1 1 5 women; 88, 104 . 123, 1 24
workelis); 43. 49, 5 1 , 85. 88, 9 1 , J08,
J 1 9, 1 23
working class; 1 0 1 , 107
world economy; 3, 24, 39, 45. 46, 47,
84, 1 19 world order; 8, 1 2, 26, 3 1 , So, 59. 64,
67, 70. 73. 74, 87. JOO. 1 20 world population; 21 , 37. 46, 5 1 , 97
world records; 7 5