attribute conflict in consumer decision

8/6/2019 Attribute Conflict in Consumer Decision

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Attribute Conflict in Consumer DecisionMaking: The Roie of Tasi< CompatibilityA NI SH N A G PA L

PA RT H A S A R AT H Y K R I S H N A M U RT H Y *

Past research holds that a de cision betwee n two unattractive a lternatives is nfdifficult than one between two attractive a lternatives. We argue that this conclumay rest on the the task of "choosing" adopted in the past research. A taskchoosing requires an attractiveness judgment that is compatible with attracalternatives but incompatible w ith unattractive alternatives. We test this thesireversing the compa tibility using a reject task that requires judgme nt of unattiveness. Two studies find that com patibility between alternative valence and

influences decision time, decision difficulty, attribute recall, and e ffort, unde rsthe role of the task in the study of attribute conflict.

P eople often find themselves having to decide betweentwo products that are similar in many regards butdifferentiated by their attractive featuresfor instance,deciding between a car with superior styling v ersus one withsuperior reliability. At other times, the products they facemay be differentiated by unattractive featuresfor instance,deciding between a car with poor resale value versus onewith poor gas mileage. How does this difference in thenature of the decision set influence the decision process?The attribute conflict literature addresses this question andsuggests that a decision involving unattractive alternativescreates greater conflict and is therefore more difficult andtakes longerto resolve than a decision involving two attractivealternatives (Chatterjee and Heath 1996; Dhar and Nowlis1999; Houston and Sherman 1995; Houston, Sherman, andBaker 1991).

The above relationship between the valence of thealternatives and decision difficulty is relevant not ju st forresearch in decision making but also for consumer research

*Anish Nagpal is lecturer. Department of Management and Marketing,University of Melbourne, Victoria 3010, Australia ([email protected]). Partha Krishnamurthy is associate professor of marketing andBauer Faculty Fellow at the C. T. Bauer College of Business Administra-tion, University of Houston, Houston, TX 77204 ([email protected]). Thisresearch is based on the first author's dissertation. Correspondence: AnishNagp al. The authors are grateful to Ed Blair for comments at various stagesof the writing of the article. The authors also thank Adwait Khare andparticipants at the University of Houston Doctoral Symposium for theircomments. The authors sincerely appreciate and thank the editor, associateeditor, and the four reviewers for their insightful guidance at every stageof the review process.

John Deighton served as editor and Mary F rances Luce served as associateeditor for this article.

Flectronically published August 17, 2007

because decision difficulty can affect whether or nota percontinues or terminates the consum ption p rocess; thethe decision difficulty, the greater the likelihood ofdoning/suspending the decision (Dhar and NowlisDhar and Sherman 1996; Huber and Pinnell 1994; Tand Shafir 1992; Zhang and M ittal 2005). If this is ththen a consumer facing unattractive options would b

likely to abandon the consumption process. There arconsumption situations in which such decision avoiddeferral would be harmful to the consumer. Imaconsumer facing a choice of insurance alternatives foand finding one option with a high deductible and awith poor coverage. In this example, if the choice bthe two unattractive options increases decision difficucauses the consumer to defer the decision, it may tuto be suboptimal because deferral effectively increasexposure and defeats the original goal of protectininvestment. Thus, to the extent that decision defeinfluenced by the valence of the alternatives, it is imto examine whether unattractive alternatives nece

induce greater decision difficulty or whether there mboundary conditions within the control of the consumarketer that alter perceived decision difficulty.

In this research, we argue that the conflict experby the decision makers does not result solely frovalence of the attributes; rather, it is the result of the vand a common feature of prior investigationsthe of the task. All the studies in the literature either imor explicitly employ the task of "choosing" for judgeffects of conflict (see table 1 for a list of some prominent exemplars in research on conflict). We argrather than being incidental to the investigation, the choosing may in fact be theoretically consequential

Prior research shows that the task of "choosing"

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TASK-ATTRIBUTE COMPATIBILITY 697

TABLE 1

AN ILLUSTRATIVE SET OF STUDIES ON ATTRIBUTE CONFLICT AND TASK EMPLOYED

Article Nature of study Dependent variable Task frame Findings

Arkoff (1957)

Barker (1942)

Chatterjee and Heath(1996)

Houston e t a l . (1991)

Dhar and Nowlis(1999)

Dhar and Sherman(1996)

Choice between superior andinferior personality traits

Choice between unpleasantand pleasant drinks

Attribute conflict is manipu-lated by referring to an un-available superior or inferioralternative

Choice between pairs of op-tions with unique good ver-sus bad attributes

Level of conflict, type ofconflict

Choice between pairs of op-tions with unique good at-tributes versus badattributes

Time to make decision; num-ber of conflicts of each typejudged to be easier toresolve

Time to make decision

Self-reported decisiondifficulty

Time to make decision

Explicit choose Decision between unattractivealternatives takes moretime and is less easy

Explicit choose Decision between unattractivealternatives takes moretime

Explicit choose Decision between unattractivealternatives is harder

Explicit choose

Choice or defer the decision Explicit choose

Choice or defer the decision Explicit choose

Decision between unattractivealternatives takes longer

Choice deferral is higher un-der high conflict and for un-attractive alternatives

Choice deferral greater forunattractive alternatives

the decision maker to look for reasons to choose, that is,advantages of selecting the option, thus requiring a relativeattractiveness judgm ent (Ganzach 1995; Shafir1993; Wedell1997). If both the alternatives are attractive, then bothprovide reasons to choo se and are therefore com patible withthe task of choosing . If both the alternatives are unattractive,neither one provides reasons to choose; therefore, they areincompatible with the task of choosing. We argue that it isthe incompatibility between the task and the valence of thealternatives that leads to greater experienced conflict,leading to greater decision difficulty and longer decisiontime. To assess support for this thesis, we reverse thecompatibility by shifting the task to one of "rejecting" oneof the two options, w hich orients the decision maker to lookfor reasons to reject, that is, what is unattractive about theoptions, thus requiring a judgment of relative unattractive-ness. Thus, a reject task is compatible with the unattractivealternatives but incom patible with the attractive alternatives.Hence, in a reject task, attractive alternatives should lead togreater conflict and increase decision difficulty and decisiontime. Reversing the compatibility allows us to test whetherdecision conflict arises due to the valence of the alternativesper se or to its combination with the task.

In two studies, we show that (a) decision difficulty anddecision time are affected by the combination of task and thevalence of the alternatives,{b) this effect is robust to differentoperationalizations of the alternatives, and (c) the combinedeffect of the valence of the alternatives and task hasimplications for decision effort and processing motivation.

Before we get into the specifics of the present research,it is worth situating our research in the broader literature.

There is a rich variety of approaches in the consumerbehavior and decision-making literatures on the topic of

conflict. For instance, early research in consumer behaviorexamined conflict among the goals of the stakeholders in agroup decision-making context (Davis 1976). Otherresearchers focused on the effect of within-alternativeconflict (attractive and unattractive features in the sameoption) on decision time and difficulty (Fischer, Luce, andJia 2000; Luce, Pay ne, and Bettman 1999). In a related vein,Shiv and Fedorikhin (1999) examined alternatives that varyon the type of conflict induced within the decision set, forexample, one that appeals to the emotions and another thatappeals to the reason. Our research focuses on conflictinstantiated by two attractive or unattractive decisionoptions, as was done in Chatterjee and Heath (1996) andDhar and Nowlis (1999), and aims to reveal a hiddencontingency.

The remainder of this article is structured as follows: wefirst review the literature on the relationship betweenattribute conflict and decision times and difficulty. We thenpresent our argumentation and hypotheses concerning theimpact of task and valence of the alternatives on previouslyexamined variables, such as time, difficulty, and variableshitherto not considered, such as decision effort and processingmotivation. We then present two studies that examine thesehypotheses.

CON FLICT AND TASK COMPATffiBLITY

In this section, we present arguments outlining why theeffects previously attributed to the valence ofthe alternativesshould be credited to the conflict arising from the compat-

ibility between the valence of the alternatives and the taskadopted by the decision makers.


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Prior Literature on the Effects of AttributeConflict on Decision Time and Difficulty

Research suggests that a decision involving attractive al-ternatives creates lower conflict and is thus faster and easier

to resolve than a d ecision between u nattractive alternatives.The explanation for this finding is that attractive alternativesrepresent an unstable equilibrium whereas unattractive al-ternatives induce a stable equilibrium (Houston et al. 1991;Hull 1938; Hunt 1944; Lewin 1931). According to this view,as one begins to process the information about an alternative,the desire to approach or avoid it increases depending onwhether the information is attractive or unattractive, re-spectively. When faced with attractive alternatives, as onebegins considering the attributes of one of the alternatives,its attractiveness increases, the tendency to approach it be-comes stronger, and an affirmative decision is made. Bycontrast, when faced with unattractive attributes, as one be-gins considering the attributes of one of the alternatives, theintensity of dislike for it increases and the tendency to moveaway from it gets stronger. Repelled by the first unattractivealtemative, the decision maker m oves to the second o ne andexperiences the same tendency to move away. Thus, unat-tractive alternatives induce greater conflict, leading to longerdecision times and greater perceived decision difficulty (An-derson 2003; Barker 1942; Chatterjee and H eath 1996; Dharand Nowlis 1999; Houston et al. 19 91; Hovland and Sears1938; Sears and Hovland 1941).

Attribute Conflict and the Role of the Task

We noted earlier that previous investigations on attributeconflict have employed the task of choosing, either explicitlythrough instruction ("which option will you choose") orimplicitly through the framing of the response scale ("whichoption do you favor"; e.g., Arkoff 1957; Chatterjee andHeath 1996; Houston and Sherman 1995). Research sug-gests that when people are given two alternatives and askedto choose between them, they tend to look for reasons tochoose; consequently, they focus on attractive features ofthe alternatives (Shafir 1993). If both alternatives are at-tractive, each of them readily provides reasons to generatesuch an attractiveness judgm ent. T hus, attractive options arecompatible with the task of choosing. Following a similar

reasoning, if both alternatives are unattractive, neither onegives the decision maker reasons to generate an attractive-ness judgm ent. H ence, unattractive options are incompatiblewith the task of choosing.

Findings from the behavior decision research literature(Shafir 1993; Simonson 1989) suggest that the availabilityof reasons facilitates decision making and the lack thereofimpedes it. Separately, cognitive consistency theories suchas balance theory (Heider 1946, 1958), incongruity theory(Osgood and Tannenbaum 1955), and cognitive dissonancetheory (Festinger 1957) also suggest that, when people en-counter aspects of their decision environment that are in-compatible with each other, they attempt to try to reducethe inconsistency that is likely to be more time consuming

and perceived as more difficult, as compared with situain which there is no such inconsistency in the first pThus, there are reasons to expect that compatibility arfrom the ready availability of task-consistent informshould influence decision time and difficulty.

Hypotheses: Task Compatibility Effects onDecision Time, Difficulty, and Effort

If compatibility between task and valence of attributhe underlying reason for decision time and difficulty ethen reversing the compatibility should modify the tionally observed effects credited to attribute valenceway to vary compatibility is to instruct the decision mto "reject" one of the alternatives because, in a reject decision makers will look for reasons to reject (Gan1995; Shafir 1993; Wedell 1997). Each of the unattra

alternatives readily provides information to generate aattractiveness judgmen t implied in a reject task. By conneither altemative in the attractive decision set facilitatunattractiveness judgment.

Incompatibility should not just increase decision timdifficulty; it should also influence the amount of effortple put into processing the attributes. Since the task of cing requires a judgm ent of relative attractiveness, genersuch a judgm ent should be more effortful if the optiondifferentiated by what is unattractive about them. Th e apredictions concerning decision time, difficulty, and are described in hypotheses 1-3 below.

H I : Under a task of choosing, decisions involattractive alternatives will lead to shorter sion times than will decisions involving utractive alternatives (Hla) . In a reject task, reverse will be tme (Hlb) .

H2: Under a task of choosing, decisions involattractive altematives will be rated as lessficult than decisions involving unattractivtematives (H2a). In a reject task, the reverse be tme (H2b).

H3: Under a task of choosing, decisions involattractive altematives will be associated lower decision effort than will decisions ining unattractive altematives (H3a). In a rejtask, the reverse will be tme(H3b).

EMPIRICAL APPROACH

Study 1 examines hypo theses 1-3 , which describeffects of compatibility between the task and valence oaltematives on decision times, decision difficulty, and eStudy 2 employs a different operationalization of thcision altematives by using p ositive versus negative attframing of the same set of attributes to create conflict rthan using different attributes, as is commonly done i


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iterature. In addition, study 2 examines the effect of com-patibility on processing mo tivation and eliminates a possibleactor in the stimulus that might contaminate the behav ioral

measure of effort. We also measured memory for the optionattributes as an exploratory indicator of elaboration andeffort.

STUDY 1: EFFECTS OF COMPATIBILITYBETWEEN TASK AND VALENCE OF THE

ALTERNATIVES

Participants, Design, and Procedure

One hundred and forty-four undergraduate college stu-dents participated in study 1 in exchange for partial coursecredit. The design was a 2 (task: choose/reject) x 2 (al-ernative valence: attractive/unattractive) x 2 (order: au-

omobile A and then automobile B/automobile B and thenautomobile A) between-subjects d esign. This study was con-ducted on line. Participants logged onto the Web site at theirown convenience and were assigned to one of the eightconditions based on their arrival sequence. The first pagedescribed the nature of the study. They were told tbat theywould be given descriptions of products and then askedabout their responses. The second page asked for their con-sent to participate in tbe study.

After the consent page, the participants proceeded to afour-page sequence in which the manipulations were in-stantiated and critical dependent measures were collected.n the first of the three pages, they were informed that they

will be seeing descriptions of two automo biles and that theywill be asked to choose or reject one of them. The secondpage described the first option, and the third page describedhe second option. The response of choosing/rejecting was

elicited on the fourth page. The participants were allowedo go back and forth between pages containing the descrip-ion of the altematives prior to making the decision.

Independent Variables

Task. The decision task was manipulated between sub-ects. All participants were informed thatthey would be shownwo altematives; in the choose condition, they were instructedo choose one of the options, and in the reject condition, they

were instructed to reject one. Furthermore, the response scalewas framed as "I will choose option: A/B" or "I will rejectoption: A/B."

Altemative Valence. Valence was manipulated be-ween subjects; participants were exposed to either two at-ractive or two unattractive altematives by using options

differentiated by attractive versus unattractive attributes. Thestimuli were patterned after Houston et al. (1991) with onedifference. We had six attributes (three unique and threecommon) for each altemative compared to the 8-10 attrib-utes per alternative in Houston et al. (1991). Please see theabulations in the appendix for a sample of the stimuli.

Order. The description ofthe two automob iles was pro-vided on separate pages, one on each page. Half the par-ticipants first read the description of automobile A followedby automobile B. This order was reversed for the other halfof the participants.

Dependent Variables

Time. The time spent on pages containing the optionattributes was recorded. This included time spent on repeatviews of the page since the Web site allowed the participantsto go back and forth between the pages.

Decision Difficulty. The participants responded to twoseven-point rating scales (anchored by not at all difficult/very difficult and not at all simple/very simple) relating tohow easy or difficult they found the task of choosing orrejecting (Chatterjee and Heath 1996). The simplicity item

was reverse coded. The correlation between the two itemswas significant (0.55, p < .0001). These two items were av-eraged to yield an index of decision difficulty (higher num-bers indicate greater difficulty).

Effort. We measured the nu mber of times peop le visitedeach of the pages describing the two alternatives as a be-havioral measure of effort. We also measured memory forattributes as an exploratory indicator of both level of effortand distribution of effort across the two options in the choiceset (see table 2).

ResultsThe continuous variables of time, difficulty, and effort

were analyzed via a two-way ANOVA with two levels oftask and two levels of valence. Since there were nosignif-icant order effects, the data were collapsed across the twoorders. Tests of mean differences were based on two-tailtests using the error terms from the respective overallANOVAs.

Time of Processing (Hypothesis 1). We observed asignificant task x altem ative valence interaction on time ofprocessing {F{l,l40) = 12.49, p < .0001). In the task ofchoosing, decisions were quicker for attractive altematives

{M 49.41 seconds) than for unattractive altematives{M

63.60 seconds; F (l , 140) = 7.64,p < .01). The reverse wastrue in the reject task; decisions were quicker for unattractivealternatives (M = 50.37 seconds) than for attractive alter-natives (M = 61.32 seconds; F( l, 140) = 4 .95, p< .0 5 ).No other effects were significant. Thus hypotheses la andIb received support.

Decision Difficulty (Hypothesis 2). We observed a sig-nificant task X altemative valence interaction on decisiondifficulty (F (l, 14 0) = 12.17,p < .0001). In the task ofchoosing, decisions were easier for attractive altematives(M 3.41) than for unattractive altematives{M = 4.10;F{1,140) = 4.14, p < .05). The reverse w as true in the rejecttask; decisions involving unattractive altematives were easier


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TABLE 2

CELL MEANS FOR STUDIES 1 AND 2

Choose Reject .

Study 1:Decision time (seconds)

Decision difficulty

Recall (common)

Visits

Recall (unique)

Study 2:Time taken

Decision difficulty

Visits

Motivation

Effort

Attractive

49.41(16.90)

3.41(1.32)3.11

(2.08)3.47

(1.79)2.65

(1.80)

70.09(26.44)

3.17(1.37)3.22

(1.54)4.24

(1.22)4.02

(1.52)

Unattractive

63 .60"(23.97)

4.10*(1.47)2.45

(2.03)4.17

(2.02)3.71*

(1.65)

86.93*(34.13)

4.07*(1.54)4.00*

(1.85)5.24*

(1.80)5.14**

(1.48)

Attractive

61.32*(24.35)

4.46*(1.54)2.46

(2.11)3.41

(1.99)3.32*

(2.16)

88.57*(30.77)

4.33*(1.38)4.05*

(1.56)4.93*

(1.37)5.05*

(1.29)

Unattractiv

50.37(18.97)

3.51(1.26)2.58

(1.90)3.37

(1.74)2.37

(1.86)

69.50(26.01)

3.56(1.50)3.13

(1.94)4.23

(1.94)4.40

(1.85)NOTE.Standard deviations are in parentheses.*p< .1 (two-tailed test).*p< .05 (two-tailed test).**p< .01 (two-tailed test).

(M = 3.51) than those involving attractive altematives(M = 4.46; F(l, ]4 0) = 8.51,p < .01). No other effectswere significant. Thus hyp otheses 2a and 2b received support.

Effort (Hypothesis 3). We measured effort by countingthe number of times participants visited the two pages con-taining the description abou t the two au tomobiles. In a taskof choosing, the number of page visits was directionallygreater for decisions involving unattractive altematives{M 4.17) than those involving attractive alternatives(M = 3.47; F(l, 140) ^ 2.31, p < .12). In the reject task,there was no difference in the number of page visits betweendecision involving unattractive (M = 3.37) versus attractivealtematives (M = 3.41; F(l,140)< 1, NS). Hypothesis 3was not supported.

Discussion

In study 1, we investigated how compatibility betweenthe task and valence of the altematives instantiates conflictthat affects decision time, decision difficulty, and effort. Wefound that decision conflict is a function of both valence ofthe altematives and task, such that incompatibility betweenthe two increases decision time and decision difficulty ashypothesized.

In regard to decision effort, measured by the number ofvisits to the pages containing the descriptions of the produ ctoptions, we observed only a directional effect of compati-bility. We believe that the lack of statistical significance is

in part due to the options containing both commonunique attributes. While we included both commonunique attributes to keep the stimuli consistent w ith thvious literature, part of the processing effort has to bpended for discerning which is which. Thus, the pagenumber reflects two types of processing: (a) an effodetermine the common versus unique attributes, whiunrelated to the hypotheses, and{b) an effort to processinformation as dictated by the compatibility betweetask and valence. Thus, the number of page visits in 1 is a somewhat limited indicator of processing efforaltemate indicator of effort is recall. As noted earliehad asked respondents to indicate their recall of the oattributes as an exploratory indicator of decision effor

elaboration. We discuss some of the patterns that emein the recall data below.Prior to analyzing the recall data, we created two sep

indices: one for the recall of unique attributes and anfor the recall of common attributes. We observed asignicant task X alternative valence interaction on uniqutributes recalled {F{1,140) = 10.42,p < .01). In a taskchoosing, the number of unique attributes recalledgreater for decisions involving unattractive altern(M 3.71) than for those involving attractive altema(M = 2.65; F(l,1 40 ) = 5.57,p < .05). The reverse true in the reject task; the number of unique attributcalled was greater for attractive{M 3.32) than for

attractive alternatives (M = 2.37; F (l, 14 0) = 4.86


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05). For the common attributes recalled, we did not observeany significant effects of task, alternative valence, or theirinteraction. Thus, incompatibility appears to enhance recallof the unique, but not the common, attributes, indicatingthat higher conflict induces a focus on unique rather thancommon attributes. This pattem is consistent with the can-cel-and-focus hypothesis (Houston and Sherman 1995),which notes that common attributes of decision o ptions can-cel out and are not processed nearly as much as uniqueattributes. It is also consistent with the broader view thatincompatibility enhances elaboration. For instance, incon-gruity between the stimulus and response, a type of incom-patibility, has been thought to increase elaboration and recall(Meyers-Levy and Tybout 1989). Likewise, Houston, Chil-ders, and Heckler (1987) report that picture-copy incongm-ence in advertisements increases elaboration and recall ofelements of the advertisement. Sujan, Bettman, and Sujan(1986) report that incompatibility between ex pectations andwhat is encountered increases recall. Although the aboveresearch does not specify what aspect of the informationenvironment will receive elaboration, it does take a specificposition that incongruity induces elaboration.

The absence of differences in recall of common attributesdoes not necessarily mean that they play no role in thedecision. In fact, there is at least one theoretical perspectivethat suggests that common attributes receive focus. Thestructure mapping literature suggests that when makingcomparisons across options, people first focus on commonattributes, then on alignable differences, and last on non-alignable differences (Markman and Gentner 1997). On first

glance, the structure mapping principle and the cancel-and-focus principle seem to be at odds with each other. However,f we take into account the progressive shift in focus from

common to unique as the decision process becomes moredeliberative, the predictions under structure mapping and can-cel-and-focus hypothesis can, in fact, be reconciled. If thereis a shift from common to unique attributes as elaborationncreases, then, under lower elaboration, thatis, lower conflict

arising from high task-valence compatibility, there should begreater focus on the common attributes. The reverse shouldbe true under higher elaboration, thatis, higher conflict arisingfrom low task-valence compatibility. In other words, com-patibility between valence and task may modify the relative

recall of unique versus common attributes.We explored the viability of this reconciled view by taking

the difference between common and unique attributes re-called and predicting it using compatibility. If there is a shiftin focus from common to unique attributes as elaborationincreases, then we should see a shift in the recall of commonversus unique attributes as a function of compatibility. Spe-cifically, more common attributes must be recalled undercompatibility, shifting to a greater recall of unique attributesunder incompatibility. The difference in the recall of com-mon versus unique attributes was significantly influencedby compatibility (F (l, 141) = 11.12, />< .01). In the com-patibility conditions (reject-unattractive and choose-attrac-tive), consistent w ith the structure m apping predictions, 0.44

more common attributes than unique attributes were re-called. However, under incompatibility (reject-attractive andchoose-unattractive), the opposite was true; 1.08 moreunique attributes than common attributes were recalled.Thus, our preliminary exploration of the patterns in recallsuggest that both the cancel-and-focus mechanism and thestructure mapping mechanism may be in operation, de-pending on the level of compatibility between the attributevalence and the task.

In study 2, we add ress a couple of limitations from study1. We noted earlier that the number of page visits may notbe a clean indicator of compatibility-induced effort if theoptions contain both common and unique attributes. To ad-dress this limitation, in study 2, we employ only uniqueattributes.

Another limitation of study 1 is that the attractive alter-natives are described using attributes that are different from

those used to describe the unattractive set. Consider thestimuli used to create the attractive set. Option A has uniqueattractive attributes, such as "powerful engine," "very re-liable," and so on, and option B has unique attractive at-tributes such as "good financing available," "air-condition-ing included," and so on. Now consider the stimuli for theunattractive set. Option A has unique unattractive attributessuch as "hard to find service outlets," "poor warranty," andso on, whereas Option B has unique unattractive attributes,such as "high insurance costs," "has had a lot of factoryrecalls," and so on. Thus, the attributes describing each setare different. Although counterbalancing the order of pre-sentation removes option-specific effects within each type

of decision set, it does not remove the possibility of option-specific effects across the two types of decision sets. Toaddress this, in study 2, we employed positive versus neg-ative attribute framing of the same attributes to describe thealtematives in both the attractive and unattractive decisionsets. In addition, we assessed self-reported processing effort.

In study 2, we also include a self-reported measure ofprocessing motivation. Cognitive consistency theories suchas balance theory (Heider 1946, 1958), incongruity theory(Osgood and Tannenbaum 1955), and cognitive dissonancetheory (Festinger 1957) suggest that when people encounteraspects of their decision environment that are incompatiblewith each other, they are motivated to restore consistencyby transforming some of the incompatible elements. Thus,incompatibility between the task and valence of the alter-natives should lead to greater processing motivation thanwhen there is compatibility. Hypothesis 4 below representsthis idea.

H 4: In a task of choosing, processing motivation willbe higher for decisions involving unattractive al-ternatives than for those involving attractive al-tematives (H4a). In a reject task, processing mo -tivation will be higher for decisions involving

attractive altematives than for those involving un-attractive alternatives (H4b).


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STUDY 2: ATTRIBUTE-INDEPENDENTDESCRIPTION OF THE ALTERNATIVES

The purpose of study 2 is twofold. The first is to testhypotheses 1-4 using an attribute-independent operation-alization of the altematives. The second purpose was tocollect self-reported measures of effort (hypothesis 3) andprocessing motivation (hypothesis 4).

Participants, Design, and Procedure

One hundred and forty-two undergraduate college stu-dents participated in study 2 in exchange for partial coursecredit. The design, procedure, and m easures for study 2 w eresimilar to study 1. There were, however, a few differences.First, we assessed motivation and effort through self-reportmeasures. Second, the altematives were described by fram-ing the same attributes positively versus negatively. Third,the manipulation of the valence was "p ure" in the sense thatthere were only unique attractive (unattractive) attributes foreach option; there were no common attributes of the op-posing v alence, unlike study 1. These changes are describedbelow. The independent variables, task and order, remainedthe same as in study 1 and are not described below.

Independent Variables

Altemative Valence. Valence was manipulated be-tween subjects; participants were exposed to either attractiveor unattractive alternatives using positive versus negative

attribute framing. The literature in attribute framing findsthat an object is evaluated more favorably when its attributesare framed positively than when they are framed negatively(Levin, Schneider, and Gaeth 1998, 2002). Levin, Schneider,and Gaeth (1998, 164) suggest that "positive labeling of anattribute leads to an encoding of the information that tendsto evoke favorable associations in memory, whereas thenegative labeling of the same attribute is likely to cause anencoding that evokes unfavorable associations." Hence, weused positive versus negative attribute framing to manipulatevalence. For instance, the reliability of the car was framedas follows in the attractive valence condition: "The car hasa 90% chance of not needing repairs in the first 100,000

miles." In the unattractive valence condition, the same at-tribute was framed negatively as follows, "The car has a10% chance of needing repairs in the first 100,000 miles."Please refer to the tabulations in the appendix for a sampleof the stimuli.

Additional Dependent Variable

Motivation and Effort. Two measures, one each formotivation and effort, were adapted from Pham (1996); theywere "I was very motivated to reach an accurate evaluationof the automobiles" and "I did not put much effort into theevaluation of the automobiles," respectively (the latter wasreverse coded).

Results

Time of Processing (Hypothesis 1). We observsignificant task x altemative valence interaction on tprocessing (F (l , 138) = 12.88,p


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tives (A/ = 4.23; F(l, 138) = 4.96,p < .10). No other ef-fects were significant. Thus, hypothesis 4 received support.

Discussion

Study 2 aimed to provide a stronger test for hypotheses1-4 by (a) using the same rather than different attributes todescribe the altematives,{b ) employing only unique attrib-utes, and (c) measuring processing motivation and effortthrough self-rated items. Study 2 replicates the finding s fromstudy 1 and finds that the effects of task-valence compati-bility on decision times and decision difficulty are observedeven if we use the same attributes for describing the alter-natives. More imp ortant, study 2 shows that incompatibilityincreases motivation and effort to process information.Study 2 also suggests that it is the perception of the valencethat creates attractive or unattractive altematives. In addi-tion, the framing of the same attributes can shift the per-ception of valence by emphasizing the presence versus ab-sence of positive/negative attributes. We conducted apost-test of the stimuli used in this study, which indicatedthat the positively framed options were perceived as beingmore attractive, likable, and appealing{a = 0.78) comparedto negatively framed options (5.65 versus 3.62; f(75) =3.96, /?


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UNATTR ACTIVE ALTERNATIVESSTUDY 1

Automobile A Automobile B

Doesn't need repairs oftenStereo includedPrestigious modelHard to find service outletsPoor warrantyBad ratings from a consumer guide

Doesn't need repairs oftenStereo includedPrestigious modelHigh insurance costsAir conditioning not includedHas had a lot of factory recalls

ATTRACTIVE ALTERNATIVESSTUDY 2

Automobile A AutomobileB

Repairs: It has a 90% chance of not needing major repairsduring the first 100,000 miles

Tinted Windows: The tint successfully blocks 80% of harmfulrays from the sun

Braking System: The ABS/Traction Control System success-fully prevents skidding 80% of the time

Anti-theft System : It has a 95% success rate in tracing stolencars within 2 hours

Warranty: This warranty covers 90% of the parts in case offailure or accidents

Side Air Bags: These air bags are effective in saving lives 85out of 100 times during accidents

Recommendation: Nine out of 10 people who bought this carrecommend it

Factory Recaiis: 97% of the cars rolling out of the manufactur-ing plant are defect free

UNATTRACTIVE ALTERNATIVESSTUDY 2

Automobile A AutomobileB

Repairs: It has a 10% chance of needing major repairs duringthe first 100,000 miles

Tinted Windows: The tint fails to block 20% of harmful raysfrom the sun

Braking System: The ABS/Traction Control System fails toprevent skidding 20 % of the time

Anti-theft System: It has a 5% failure rate in tracing stolencars within 2 hours

Warranty: This warranty does not cover 10% of the parts incase of failure or accidents

Side Air Bags: These air bags are not effective in saving lives15 out of 100 times during accidents

Recommendation: One out of 10 people who bought this cardo not recommend it

Factory Recaiis: 3% of the cars rolling out of the manufactur-ing plant are defective

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