Republic of the Philippines SANDIGANBAYAN

. Quezon City

SIXTH DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff, SB-15-CRM-0284 - 0285 For: Violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019

-versus- PRESENT:

CELESTINO A. MARTINEZ III, CRESENCIO P. VERDIDA, RHETT E. MINGUEZ, MARY LOU B. URSAL, and JULIO S. URSONAL, JR.,

Accused,

PONFERRADA, J., Chairperson MIRANDA, J, MUSNGI, J.,' HERRERA, JR, j2 &

JACINTO, J. 3

Promulgated:

AUG 2a ionp ,/

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

RESOLUTION

MIRANDA, J.:

This resolves: 1) accused Celestino A. Martinez III (Martinez III) and Rhett E. Minguez's (Minguez) Motion to Dismiss dated March 3, 2017; and 2) the Prosecution's Comment dated March 16, 2017, on the Motion to Dismiss of Accused Celestine Martinez III & Rhett Minguez.

Special Member in view of the vacancy in the Sixth Division, per Administrative Order No. 124-2017 dated April 4, 2017. 2 Designated as Special Member of a Special Division of Five Justices, per Administrative Order No. 12-C-2017 dated August 23, 2017. 3 Designated as Special Member of a Special Division of Five Justices, per Administrative Order No. 12-C-2017 dated August 23, 2017.

RESOLUTION 2 People. v. Celestino A. Martinez III, et al. SB-15-CRM-0284 - 0285

In their Motion to Dismiss, Martinez III and Minguez pray that the two (2) cases of Violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against them be dismissed on the ground of violation of their right to speedy trial. In support thereof, Martinez III and Minguez claim that it took the Ombudsman a total of five (5) years and seven (7) months from the time they filed their counter-affidavits on April 13, 2010 until the corresponding informations in these cases were filed before this Court on November 15, 2015. In particular, Martinez III and Minguez allege that: 1) since the filing of their counter-affidavits on April 13, 2010, they knew nothing about the status of their case until the Ombudsman rendered its Decision dated October 27, 2014 which they received on December 17, 2014; and 2) they filed their motion for reconsideration with prayer to suspend proceedings on December 19, 2014, which was resolved by the Ombudsman only on May 6, 2015.

In its comment on the motion to dismiss, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) alleges that: 1) Martinez III and Minguez cannot invoke the ruling of the Supreme Court in Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan for their failure to assert the right to speedy disposition of their cases; 2) from the time Martinez III and Minguez filed their respective counter-affidavits, they did nothing to assert their right; 3) the ruling in Coscolluela was decided by a division of the Supreme Court. On the other hand, the Supreme Court En Banc ruled in Barcelona v. Lim that the petitioner had waived his right to speedy trial after failing to assert it.

FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

On September 25, 2007, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas received a sworn letter dated September 24, 2007, from Antonio U. Balunan, Eliseo L. Tancawan, Jennifer T. Requiza, and Anastacio L. Celera, all residents and registered voters of Bogo City, requesting for an investigation on the issuance of a Land Bank check dated April 26, 2007, by Martinez III and Minguez, then Municipal Mayor and Municipal Treasurer, respectively, of Bogo City, Cebu, a few days before the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections. 4

On October 23, 2007, Virginia Palanca-Santiago (Palanca-Santiago), Director, Public Assistance and Corruption Prevention Office (PACPO) of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, released a letter dated

4 Letter dated September 24, 2007, Records, vol. 1, pp. 36-38

'1'

RESOLUTION 3 People v. Celestino A. Martinez III, et al. SB-15-CRM-0284 - 0285

October 18, 2007, requesting Atty. Nilo Pala (Pala), Officer-in-Charge, Cluster Director, Legal and Adjudication Office of the Commission on Audit (COA) Region 7 for a special audit examination on the alleged irregular disbursement of Twenty Million Pesos (Php 20,000,000.00) by Martinez III and Minguez to the Bogo Municipal Employees Multi-Purpose Cooperative. Director Palanca-Santiago also requested for a report, recommendation, and an affidavit of the auditor who conducted the special audit in case of an adverse finding.'

On November 7, 2007, Atty. Pala referred the case to the Audit Team Leader - Team 5, Province of Cebu, thru the Regional Cluster Director, Sub-Cluster II, Cluster IV - Visayas, Local Government Sector, Region VII for initial comments.6

On November 12, 2007, State Auditor V Helen S. Hilayo (Hilayo), Regional Cluster Director, COA Region VII indorsed the case to the Audit Team Leader, Team 5, Province of Cebu for appropriate action. 7

On October 6,

2008, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas received the letter dated October 2, 2008, of Atty. Pala recommending the prosecution of Martinez III and Minguez for violation of R.A. No. 3019, and R.A. No. 6713, or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. 8

On September 7, 2009, Graft Investigation Officer II Alejandro Borden (Borden) submitted his final evaluation report, approved by Assistant Ombudsman Palanca-Santiago, recommending the filing of charges against Martinez III, Minguez, Municipal Accountant Cresencio P. Verdida (Verdida), Municipal Budget Officer Mary. Lou B. Ursal (Ursal), Assistant Municipal Treasurer Julio S. Ursonal, Jr. (Ursonal, Jr.), Vice-Mayor Vicente P. Rodriguez (Rodriguez), and the members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, namely; Santiago M. Oliamot (Oliamot), Santiago A. Sevilla (Sevilla), Lyndon Hee C. Acusar (Acusar), Wilfredo L. Manubag (Manubag), Victor Elliot S. Lepiten III (Lepiten III), Teodoro Y. Pedroza (Pedroza), Ernesto Y. Faciol (Faciol), and Leo L. Villacrusis (Villacrusis). All of them were charged with violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), and Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019.

Letter dated October 18, 2007, Records, vol. 1, p. 39. 6 31d Indorsement dated November 7, 2007, Records, vol. 1, p. 43. 7 411 Indorsement dated November 12, 2007, Records, vol. 1, p. 42. 8 Leuer dated October 2, 2008, Records, pp. 40-41. 9 Resolution dated October 27, 201.4, Records, pp. 8-25, 9.

RESOLUTION 4 People v. Celestino A. Martinez III, et dl. SB-15-CRM-0284 - 0285

In its Order dated December 22, 2009, the Office of the Ombudsman directed Martinez III, Minguez, Verdida, Ursonal, Jr., Ursa!, Rodriguez, Sevilla, Oliamot, Acusar, Manubag, Lepiten III, Pedroza, Faciol, and Villacrusis to file their respective counter-affidavits. 10

On March 24, 2010, Rodriguez filed his counter-affidavit. 1 '

On March 25, 2010, Sevilla, Oliamot, Acusar, Manubag, Lepiten III, Pedroza, Faciol, and Villacrusis filed a joint counter-affidavit. 12

On April 13, 2010, the Office of the Ombudsman received the respective counter-affidavits of Martinez 111,13 Minguez and Verdida,' 4 and Ursonal, Jr. 15

Ursal did not file her counter-affidavit.' 6

On October 27, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman drafted a resolution finding probable cause for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 against Martinez III, Minguez, Verdida, Ursa!, and Ursonal, Jr., and for violation of Section 3 (g) of R.A. No. 3019 against Martinez III and Ursonal, Jr. Said resolution was reviewed by Assistant Ombudsman Jennifer Jardin-Manalili (Jardin-Manalili) and approved by Ombudsman Carpio-Morales on November 21 5 2014. The Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the charges. against Rodriguez, Sevilla, Oliamot, Acusar, Manubag, Lepiten III, Pedroza, Faciol, and Villacrusis. However, the Office of the Ombudsman recommended the issue of Php500,000.00 financial assistance to the Bogo Municipal Employees Multi-Purpose Cooperative for further fact-finding investigation against all of them. 17

On December 19, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman received the motion for reconsideration with prayer to suspend proceedings filed by Martinez III, Minguez, and Ursonal, Jr. 'I

'° Resolution dated October 27, 2014, Records, vol. 1, pp. 8-25, 12. "Resolution dated October 27, 2014, Records, vol. 1, pp. 8-25, 13. ' 2 Resolution dated October 27, 2014, Records, vol. 1, pp. 8-25, 12. 13 Counter-Affidavit dated March 26, 2010, Records, vol. 1, pp. 48-49. 14 Undated Counter-Affidavit, Records, vol. 1, pp. 52-53. Is Counter-Affidavit dated March 26, 2010, Records, vol. 1, pp. 48-49. 16 Resolution dated October 27, 2014, Records, vol. 1, pp. 8-25, 14.

Resolution dated October 27, 2014, Records, vol. 1, pp. 8-25. 18 Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer to Suspend Proceedings dated December 19, 2014, Records, vol. 1, pp. 491-494.

RESOLUTION 5 People v. Celestino A. Martinez III, et al. SB-15-CRM-0284 - 0285

On January 14, 2015, the Office of the Ombudsman also received a separate motion for reconsideration from Verdida. On January 23, 2015, Martinez III, Minguez, and Ursonal, Jr. filed a subsequent motion to suspend proceedings due to a prejudicial question pending the resolution of their petition for declaratory relief before the Regional Trial Court of Bogo City, Branch 61. 19

On January 30, 2015, the Office of the Ombudsman drafted an order denying the motions for reconsideration of Martinez III, Minguez, Ursonal Jr., and Verdida, and the motion to suspend proceedings due to a prejudicial question of Martinez III, Minguez and Ursonal Jr. Said order was reviewed by Assistant Ombudsman Jardin-Manalili and approved by Ombudsman Carpio-Morales on April 8, 2015 .20

On May 6, 2015, the OSP drafted an information for Violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 against Martinez HI, Minguez, Verdida, Ursal, and Ursonal, Jr., and another information for violation of Section 3 (g) of R.A. No. 3019 against Martinez III and Ursonal, Jr. Ombudsman Carpiø-Morales approved the said informations on May 14, 2015. The OSP filed the two (2) informations on November 2, 2015. 21

On November 24, 2015, Ursonal, Jr. was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the charges. 22

On January 8, 2016, the Fifth Division of this Court received Martinez III and Minguez's Omnibus Motion for the Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and/or Motion to Quash Information. They sought the re-determination of probable cause of their cases and/or quashal of the information as the narration of facts do not constitute an offense. 23

On February 11, 2016, the Fifth Division of this Court received Verdida's Entry of Appearance with Motion to Quash dated January 19, 2016.24

On March 21, 2016, the Fifth Division of this Court denied Martinez III and Minguez's omnibus motion for the judicial determination of probable

19 Order dated January 30, 2015, Records, vol. 1, PP. 26-33, 27. 20 Order dated January 30, 2015, Records, vol. 1, pp. 26-33. 21 Informations, both dated May 6, 2015, Records, vol. 1, pp. 1-3, and a separate folder, pp. 1-3. 22 Certificate of Arraignment dated November 24, 2015, Records, vol. 1, p. 85. 23 Omnibus Motion for the Judicial Re-determination of Probable Cause and/or Motion to Quash Information dated January 7, 2016, Records, vol. 1, pp. 109-114. 24 Entry of Appearance with Motion to Quash Information dated January 19, 2016, Records, vol. 1, pp. 222-242.

RESOLUTION People v. Celestino A. Martinez III, et al. SB-15-CRM-0284 - 0285

6

cause and/or motion to quash information, Verdida's motion to quash information, and Ursonal's motion to defer proceedings for lack of merit. 25

On January 17, 2017, after the Fifth Division of this Court had resolved all pending motions and after an inventory of the cases, the Sixth Division of this Court set the arraignment of Martinez III and Minguez, and issued an alias warrant of arrest against Ursal who was still at large. 26

On March 6, 2017, Martinez III and Minguez filed a Motion to Dismiss dated March 3, 2017, on the ground that the Office of the Ombudsman violated their right to speedy trial. 27

On March 17, 2017, the OSP filed its Comment on the Motion to Dismiss of Accused Celestino Martinez III & Rhett Minguez dated March 16, 2017.28

The above-stated incidents can be summarized in a table as follows:

Incidents Date The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas September 25, received a sworn letter requesting for an investigation 2007 against Martinez III and Minguez on the alleged irregular disbursement of Php 20,000,000.00 to the Bogo Municipal Employees Multi-Purpose Cooperative. PACPO Director Palanca-Santiago requested Atty. October 23, 2007 Pala of LAO COA Region 7 for a special audit examination of the alleged irregular disbursement of public funds. Atty. Pala referred the case to the Audit Team Leader November 7, 2007 - Team 5, Province of Cebu, thru the Regional Cluster Director, Sub-Cluster II, Cluster IV - Visayas, Local Government Sector, Region VII for initial comments. State Auditor V Hilayo indorsed the case to the Audit November 12, 2007 Team Leader, Team 5, Province of Cebu for appropriate action.

25 Resolution dated March 21, 2016, Records, vol. 1, PP. 268-281. 26 Resolution dated January 17, 2017, Records, vol. 1, p. 454. 27 Motion to Dismiss dated March 3, 2017, Records, vol. 1, pp. 478-497.

Comment on the Motion to Dismiss of Accused Celestino Martinez III & Rhett Minguez dated March 16, 2017, Records, vol. 1, pp. 513-516.

RESOLUTION People v. Celestino A. Martinez III, et al. SB-15-CRM-0284 - 0285

Incidents Date The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas October 6, 2008 received the letter of Atty. Pala recommending the prosecution of Martinez III and Minguez for violation of R.A. No. 3019 and R.A. No. 6713. GIO II Borden submitted his final evaluation report September 7, 2009 recommending the filing of charges against Martinez III, Minguez, Rodriguez, Verdida, Ursonal, Jr., Ursal, Sevilla, Oliamot, Acusar, Manubag, Lepiten III, Pedroza, Faciol, and Villacrusis. The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas December 22, 2009 directed Martinez III, Minguez, Rodriguez, Verdida, Ursonal, Jr., Ursal, Sevilla, Oliamot, Acusar, Manubag, Lepiten III, Pedroza, Faciol, and Villacrusis to file their counter-affidavits. Rodriguez filed his counter-affidavit. March 24, 2010 Sevilla, Oliamot, Acusar, Manubag, Lepiten III, March 25, 2010 Pedroza, Faciol, and Villacrusis filed a joint counter- affidavit. The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas April 13, 2010 received the counter-affidavits of Martinez III, Minguez and Verdida, and Ursonal, Jr. The Office of the Ombudsman drafted a resolution October 27, 2014 finding probable cause for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 against Martinez III, Minguez, Verdida, Ursal, and Ursonal, Jr., and for violation of Section 3 (g) of R.A. No. 3019 against Martinez III and Ursonal, Jr. Assistant Ombudsman Jardin-Manalili reviewed the said resolution. Ombudsman Carpio-Morales approved the resolution. November 21, 2014 Martinez III, Minguez, and Ursonal, Jr. sought a December 19, 2014 reconsideration of the resolution with prayer to suspend the proceedings. The Office of the Ombudsman received the motion for January 14, 2015 reconsideration of Verdida. Martinez III, Minguez, and Ursonal, Jr. sought a January 23, 2015 subsequent suspension of the proceedings on the ground of a prejudicial question. The Office of the Ombudsman drafted an order January 30 5 2015 denying the motions for reconsideration and suspension of proceedings. Assistant Ombudsman Jardin-Manalili reviewed the said order. Ombudsman Carpio-Morales approved the said order. April 8, 2015

RESOLUTION People v. Celestino A. Martinez III, et al. SB-15-CRM-0284 - 0285

Incidents Date The OSP drafted two informations for violation of May 6, 2015 Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019 against Martinez III, Minguez, Ursonal, Jr., Verdida, and Ursal. Ombudsman Carpio-Morales approved the said May 14, 2015 informations. The OSP filed the two informations with the November 2, 2015 Sandiganbayan. Ursonal, Jr. was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. November 24, 2015 Martinez III and Minguez sought a judicial January 8, 2016 determination of probable cause of their cases and/or guashal of the informations. Verdida sought the quashal of the information against February 11, 2016 him. The Fifth Division of this Court denied the motions for March 21, 2016 the judicial determination of probable cause, quashal of the information, and deferment of the proceedings. The Sixth Division of this Court set the arraignment of January 17, 2017 Martinez III and Minguez. Martinez III and Minguez sought the dismissal of the March 6, 2017 cases against them on the ground of violation of their right to speedy trial. The OSP filed its comment on the motion to dismiss. March 17, 2017

DISCUSSION AND RULING

Each case must be decided upon the facts peculiar to it?9 A mere mathematical reckoning of time involved would not be sufficient. 3°

The Court, after a thorough review of the case, holds that the time it took the Office of the Ombudsman to investigate the complaint against Martinez III and Minguez and file the necessary informations against them was with valid reasons. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss should be denied.

Article III, Section 16 of the Constitution provides that, all persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before alijudicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but

29 Benes v. Lim, G.R. No. 173421, December 14, 2006. '°Bernat v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 158018, May 20, 2004.

RESOLUTION 9 People v. Celestino A. Martinez III, et al. SB-15-CRM-0284- 0285

extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. Hence, under the Constitution, any party to a case may demand expeditious action from all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice. 3 '

Due regard must be given to the facts and circumstances surrounding each case. The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated Only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive, a long time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. Just like the constitutional guarantee of speedy trial, speedy disposition of cases is a flexible concept. It is consistent with delays and depends upon the circumstances. What the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays which render rights nugatory. 32

The conduct of both the prosecution and the defense, the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay are the factors to consider and balance.

Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether that right has been violated, the following factors may be considered and balanced: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay. 34

The fact-finding investigation which lasted from September 25, 2007 to September 7, 2009, or one (1) year, eleven (11) months, and thirteen (13) days, should not be entirely attributed to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas. -

The period from September 25, 2007 to October 23, 2007, or twenty-eight (28) days, is attributable to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas because this is the time spent in referring the sworn letter to the COA for a special audit investigation.

The period from October 23, 2007 to October 6, 2008, or eleven (11) months, and thirteen (13) days, should be excluded from the period of the fact-finding investigation that is attributable to the Office of the Deputy

31 The Ombudsman v. Jurado, G.R. No. 154155, August 6, 2008. 11 The Ombudsman v. Jurado, G.R. No. 154155, August 6, 2008.

Ty-Dazo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 143885-86, January 21, 2002. 34 Roquero v. Chancellor of UP Manila, etal., G.R. No. 181851, March 9, 2010.

S.

, . .

RESOLUTION10 People v. Celestino A. Martinez Ill, et al.

SB-15-CRM-0284 - 0285

Ombudsman for the Visayas. This period was spent by the COA for its special audit examination of the alleged irregular disbursement of public funds against Martinez III and Minguez. This is beyond the control of both the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, and Martinez III and Minguez.

The period from October 6, 2008 to September 7, 2009, or eleven (11) months, and one (1) day, is attributed to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas. This period is reasonable because the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas needed time to study the facts and evidence, evaluate the individual participation of the fourteen (14) persons involved, and draft the final evaluation report.

The preliminary investigation which lasted from September 7, 2009 to November 21, 2014, or five (5) years, two (2) months, and fourteen (14) days, is also not entirely attributed to the Office of the Ombudsman.

The period from September 7, 2009 to December 22, 2009, or three (3) months, and fifteen (15) days, is attributable to the Office of the Ombudsman because this was the time spent in requiring Martinez III, Minguez, Rodriguez, Verdida, Ursonal, Jr., Ursal, Sevilla, Oliamot, Acusar, Manubag, Lepiten III, Pedroza, Faciol, and Villacrusis to file their respective counter-affidavits.

The period from December 22, 2009 to April 13, 2010, or three (3) months, and twenty-two (22) days, is attributed to Martinez III, Minguez, Rodriguez, Verdida, Ursonal, Jr., Sevilla, Oliamot, Acusar, Manubag, Lepiten III, Pedroza, Faciol, and Villacrusis because this was the time spent by them to file their respective counter-affidavits.

The period from April 13, 2010 to November 21, 2014, or four (4) years, seven (7) months, and eight (8) days, is attributed to the Office of the Ombudsman. This period, however, is justified because the Office of the Ombudsman evaluated the records to check whether there was indeed probable cause to charge Martinez III, Minguez, Verdida, Ursonal, Jr., and Ursa! in Court. This is in addition to the separate evaluation of the participation of Rodriguez and the members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, namely: Sevilla, Oliamot, Acusar, Manubag, Lepiten III, Pedroza, Faciol, -and Villacrusis. Considering the number of persons involved, the evaluation of the case would take time. Moreover, the Office of the Ombudsman wanted to resolve the case on the merits. It waited for Ursal's counter-affidavit to get the complete facts of the case. The Office of the Ombudsman's actions were put on hold pending the compliance of Ursal with the order directing her to file her counter-affidavit. Thus, this

RESOLUTION

11 People v. Celestino A. Martinez III, et al. SB-15-CRM-0284 - 0285

undetermined time can be excluded from this period because of the failure of Ursal to file her counter-affidavit. This Court, however, ascribed it to the Office of the Ombudsman because the said undetermined time cannot be measured with the qualification that the same was reasonable.

It is understandable for Ombudsman Carpio-Morales to approve the resolution after twenty -five (25) days on November 21, 2014. This is because the final evaluation report of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas charged fourteen (14) persons with violation of Article 220 of the RPC, and Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019. On the other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman found probable cause for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 against Martinez III, Minguez, Verdida, Ursal, and Ursonal, Jr., and for violation of Section 3 (g) of R.A. No. 3019 against Martinez III and Ursonal, Jr., and dismissed the charges against Rodriguez and the eight (8) members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod.

The periods spent by Assistant Ombudsman Jardin-Manalili to review the draft resolution, and for Ombudsman Carpio-Morales to approve the resolution are' needed to ensure that the proper, correct, and strong cases are filed against Martinez III, Minguez, Verdida, Ursa!, and Ursonal, Jr. The verification and further evaluation of the cases take time considering the disparity of the charges and the number of persons subsequently charged in Court between the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas' final evaluation report and the Office of the Ombudsman's resolution.

The period from November 21, 2014 to January 23, 2015, or two (2) months and two (2) days, is attributed to Martinez III, Minguez, Ursonal, Jr., and Verdida because of the exercise of their right to procedural due process. This was the time when they sought a reconsideration of the resolution finding probable cause against them and a suspension of the proceedings on the ground of a prejudicial question.

The periods from the filing of the motions for reconsideration and suspension to the approval of the order denying the said motions on April 8, 2015, or two (2) months and sixteen (16) days, and from the approval of the order denying the said motions to the filing of the informations in this Court on November 2, 2015, or six (6) months, and twenty -five (25) days, are attributed to the Office of the Ombudsman. The first period is justified because the motions for reconsideration and suspension were resolved with dispatch, the order denying the motions was immediately drafted, and approved promptly by Ombudsman Carpio-Morales. The second period is also justified because the OSP reviewed the cases again and made sure that only those cases that could stand the rigors of trial would be filed.

~k

RESOLUTION 12 People v. Celestino A. Martinez III, et al. SB-15-CRM-0284 - 0285

In sum, the total period of five (5) months, and twenty-four (24) days is attributed to Martinez III, Minguez, Rodriguez, Verdida, Ursonal, Jr., Ursal, Sevilla, Oliamot, Acusar, Manubag, Lepiten III, Pedroza, Faciol, and Villacrusis which should be excluded from the time spent by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas and Office of the Ombudsman to terminate the fact-finding investigation and preliminary investigation, respectively, and for the OSP to file the corresponding informations in this Court. Again, this is because of the exercise of their rights to file their respective counter-affidavits and procedural due process.

The total period of eleven (11) months, and thirteen (13) days should also be excluded from the computation of the period attributed to the Office of the Ombudsman. During this period, the COA conducted its special audit investigation on the alleged irregular disbursement of public funds by Martinez III and Minguez after the case was referred to it by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas.

Subtracting the periods attributable to Martinez III, Minguez, Rodriguez, Verdida, Ursonal, Jr., Ursal, Sevilla, Oliamot, Acusar, Manubag, Lepiten III, Pedroza, Faciol, and Villacrusis and those beyond the control of the Office of the Ombudsman, the total period it took the Office of the Ombudsman to finish its fact-finding investigation and preliminary investigation, and for the OSP to file the corresponding informations is six (6) years, eight (8) months, and three (3) days. Under the circumstances and as previously discussed, said period is justified, acceptable, and not capricious, oppressive and vexatious. Again, this includes an undetermined period caused by the failure of Ursal to file her counter-affidavit. Since this period to be excluded cannot be determined, this Court attributed it to the Office of the Ombudsman with the qualification that the same was justified.

Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the following interests of Martinez III and Minguez which the speedy trial was designed to protect: a) to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration; b) to minimize anxiety and concerns of the accused to trial; and c) to limit the posibility that his defense will be impaired. The last interest is the most serious because the inability of an accused to adequately prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system. There is also prejudice if the defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately the events of the distant past. Even if the accused is not imprisoned prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion and often, hostility. His financial resources may be drained, his association is curtailed, and he is subjected to public obloquy. 35

G.R. No. 162214, November 11, 2004.

V1

RESOLUTION 13 People v. Celestino A. Martinez III, et al. SB-15-CRM-0284 - 0285

In these cases, Martinez III and Minguez cannot claim to be prejudiced by the fact-fmding investigation and preliminary investigation of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas and the Office of the Ombudsman, respectively, because they were given all the opportunity to present their defenses during the preliminary investigation.

Deprivation of liberty for any duration of time is quite oppressive. Any delay in trying a case would cause an accused great prejudice. 36 Here, Martinez III and Minguez cannot claim to be prejudiced because they were not confined in jail from the time the fact-finding investigation started until the informations were filed with the Court.

Anxiety typically accompanies a criminal charge. But not every claim of anxiety affords the accused a ground to decry a violation of the rights to speedy disposition of cases and to speedy trial. The anxiety must be of such nature and degree that it becomes oppressive, unnecessary and notoriously disproportionate to the nature of the criminal charge. 37 Martinez III and Minguez, however, did not claim to have experienced these things or provide details thereof. For this reason, they cannot be said to be living under the cloud of anxiety, suspicion, hostility, public obloquy, depleted financial resources, and restricted association, or their defenses impaired. This Court cannot assume these matters.

In fact, Martinez III and Minguez benefited from the actions of the Office of the Ombudsman. The Office of the Ombudsman found probable cause for violations of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019 against Martinez III, and violation of Section 3 (e) only against Minguez, and dismissed the charge of violation of Article 220 of the RPC recommended by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas.

In Barcelona v. Lim, 38 the Supreme Court held that petitioner therein is considered to have waived his right to the speedy disposition of his case because of his failure to assert it. The right to speedy trial, as well as other rights conferred by the Constitution or statute, may be waived except when otherwise expressly provided by law.

In Tilendo v. Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan, 39 the Supreme Court held that the right of the petitioner therein to speedy disposition of his cases was not violated because he slept on his right and did not take any step whatsoever to accelerate the disposition of his cases. The inaction of the petitioner therein gave an impression that he did not object to the

36 Mari and People v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 187728, September 12, 2011. See Separate Concurring Opinion of Justice Bellosillo in People v. Lacson. G.R. No. 149453, April 1, 2003.

38 G.R. No. 189171, June 3, 2014. 39 G.R. No. 165975, September 13, 2007. Y,

RESOLUTION 14 People v. Celestino A. Martinez III, et al. SB-15-CRM-0284 - 0285

supervening delay, hence, it was impliedly with his acquiescence. He did not make any overt act, like filing a motion for early resolution.

In Bernat v. Sandiganbayan and People,` the petitioner therein raised the violation of his right to speedy disposition only when the trial court judge reset the case for rehearing. The Supreme Court held that it is fair to assume that the petitioner therein would have just continued to sleep on his right, a situation amounting to laches had the trial court judge not taken the initiative of determining the non-completion of the records and ordering the remedy precisely so he could dispose of the case. The matter could have taken a different dimension if during all those ten years between 1979 when accused filed his memorandum and 1989 when the case was re-raffled,- the petitioner therein showed signs of asserting his right which was granted him in 1987 when the new Constitution took effect, or at least made some overt act (like a motion for early disposition or a motion to compel the stenographer to transcribe stenographic notes) that he was not waiving it. As it is, his silence would have to be interpreted as a waiver of such right.

In the cases before this Court, Martinez III and Minguez failed to seasonably assert their right to speedy disposition of their cases. They neither filed any motion for early resolution with the Office of the Ombudsman nor made any overt acts of questioning the alleged inordinate delay. Their inaction shows acquiescence and waiver to question any violation of their right to speedy trial.

To make matters worse, Martinez III and Minguez failed to assert the same right at the first instance in this Court. To recall, the informations were filed on November 2, 2015. Instead of filing a motion to dismiss on the ground of violation of their right to a speedy trial, they filed a motion seeking the judicial determination of probable cause of their cases and/or quashal of information. They filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of violation of their right to speedy trial only on March 6, 2017, or one (1) year, four (4) months, and four (4) days after the informations were sled. This was also after the Fifth Division of this Court denied their motion for judicial determination of probable cause and quashal of information. This Court will not tolerate piece-meal reliefs or the filing of motions one after the other should their initial motion be denied.

Notably, under the Revised Guidelines for Continuous Trial of Criminal Cases, which shall take effect on September 1, 2017, a motion for judicial determination of probable cause will now be a prohibited motion. The said prohibited motion shall be denied outright before the scheduled

40 G.R. No. 158018, May 20, 2004.

RESOLUTION 15 People v. Celestino A. Martinez III, et al. SB-15-CRM-0284 - 0285

arraignment without need of comment and/or opposition. This will expedite trial and the resolution of cases.

Considering the number of times that the case had to be reviewed, the levels of review that the cases had to undergo, the attendant circumstances of the cases, the waiver of the right to a speedy disposition of the cases, and the lack of prejudice to Martinez III and Minguez, the period that lapsed could not be considered vexatious, capricious and oppressive. Under the circumstances, this cannot be considered inordinate delay. Martinez III and Minguez cannot now seek the protection of the law to benefit from the adverse effects of their own conduct in these cases. Martinez III and Minguez's assertion that their right to a speedy disposition of cases against them has been violated must necessarily fail.

The case on inordinate delay cited by Martinez III and Minguez in their motion to dismiss is not applicable in the cases against them now pending before this. Court.

In Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan and People,41 the Supreme Court found the presence of inordinate delay because it took the Ombudsman eight (8) years to complete the preliminary investigation. Petitioners therein could not be faulted for failing to assert their right to speedy disposition of their cases because they were not aware that the preliminary investigation was still on-going. They were merely asked to comment and not to file any counter-affidavits. Thereafter, the Resolution finding probable cause and the Information were issued and filed, respectively, only after six (6) years. They could have reasonably assumed that the proceedings were already terminated.

Martinez III and Minguez's Motion to Dismiss on the ground of inordinate delay must be resolved on the basis of the particular facts of the case which are different from the case cited' by Martinez III and Minguez. The circumstances of inordinate delay in the foregoing case is not present in the cases now before this Court. Martinez III and Minguez were aware that a preliminary investigation was being conducted against them. They were served copies of the final evaluation report and given the opportunity to file their counter-affidavits. The Prosecution gave sufficient justification for the alleged delay in the fact-finding investigation, preliminary investigation, and the filing of the informations in this Court.

The protection under the right to a speedy disposition of a case should not operate to deprive the government of its inherent prerogative in

41 G.R. No. 191411, July 15, 2013.

\1A

RESOLUTION 16 People v. Celestino A. Martinez Ill, et al. SB-15-CRM-0284 - 0285

prosecuting criminal cases or in generally seeing to it that all who approach the bar of justice be afforded a fair opportunity to present their side. 42

This Court is not unmindful of the duty of the Ombudsman under the Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 to act promptly on complaints brought before it. Such duty, however, should not be mistaken with a hasty resolution of cases at the expense of thoroughness and correctness. 43 Judicial notice should be taken of the fact that the nature of the Office of the Ombudsman encourages individuals who clamor for efficient government service to freely lodge their Complaints against wrongdoings of government personnel. A steady stream of cases reaching the Ombudsman inevitably results. Naturally, disposition of those cases would take some time. 44

To our mind, the time it took the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, Office of the Ombudsman, and the OSP to complete the fact-finding investigation, preliminary investigation, and filing of informations against Martinez III and Minguez can hardly be considered an unreasonable and arbitrary delay as to deprive them of their constitutional right to the speedy disposition of their cases.

WHEREFORE, the Motion to Dismiss dated March 3, 2017, of accused Celestino A. Martinez III and Rhett E. Minguez is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

ZMANDA Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RODOLFWA.0NFERRADA Associate Justice

OiS'SEPT.4

MICHAEL FRI IJWL MUSNGI

Associate Justicel 4

JR. BAYArteJustice

INTO Ass

42 Dansal v. Fernandez G.R. No. 126814, March 2, 2000. 43 Dansal v. Fernandez G.R. No. 126814, March 2, 2000.

Mendoza-Ong v. Sandiganbayan and People, G.R. No. 146368-69, October 23, 2003.

DISSENTING OPINION

MUSNGI, J.:

Respectfully, I dissent.

A careful perusal of the instant motion, the prosecutions comment on the Motion to Dismiss of Accused Celestino Martinez Ill & Rhett (sic) Minguez dated 16 March 2017 ("Comment"), and the' records of this case shows that the right to the speedy disposition of cases of, accused. 'Celestino . Martinez Ill ('Martinez III") and accused Rhette E. Minguez ("Minguez") has been violated.

The Office of the. Ombudsman ( 101Y1113") took a: total period of eight (8) years one (1.) month, and seven (7) days to conclude its fact-finding and- preliminary, investigation' starting from the: - receipt of the' "Complaint. on 25 September) 2007 until o the filing of the Informations before this Court on 02 November 2015:

In its Comment, the prosecution anchors its opposition mainly on the alleged failure of accused Martinez Ill and Minguez to timely assert their constitutional right tO the speedy disposition of the cases against them. 'It avers that both accused have been aware of the. on-going preliminary investigation being conducted against them upon' the filing of their COunter-Affidavit on 13 April 2010, and yet they "simply sat back and did nothing to assert their" right.". According' to the prosecution, said: inaction is tantamount ,to an 'acquiescence to the delay in the preliminary investigation. Citing the case of Barcelona v.

'Lim 1 the prosecution argues that both accused should have asserted such right because failure to do so is, considered to be a waiver thereof.

Theprosecution also cited the case of Co v. New Prosperity., Plastic Products2 in support of its assertion "that delay in the disposition of the case shoUld be considered in. view of the entirety of the proceedings and that the factors to be balanced in considering such 'issue include the assertion 'of the right to speedy trial or failure to assert

Lastly, the prosecution challenges accused Martinez JU and Minguez's reliance onthe case Of CosOolluela vs. San cliganbayan 3 by claiming that the ruling therein* was made merely by a division of the Supreme Court and not the Supreme Court En Banc. Hence, the doctrine laid down by the HighCourt in the case of Barcelona v Lim regarding the, assertion of the subject right still stands because the' 1987 Philippine Constitution clearly provides that "no doctrine or principle of law laiddown by,the court in a decision rendered en banc

O.R. No. 189171 03 June 2014. 2 GR No'. 183994, 30 June 2014. 3 G'.R. No. 191411, July 15, 2013. ' .

Criminal Case No. SB -17-CRM-0284 to 0285. . People vs. Martinez, et al. .. DISSENTING OPINION Page 2 of ' •. . .

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• or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc." '

The constitutional right to speedy, disposition' of, cases:: is enshrined, in Zection 1.6, Article Ill of the 1987' Philippine ConstitUtion which provides; thus: . .' , • . ,

• . .- . "Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their oases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or adininiStrative bodies."

The Supreme Court 'discussed this right of the accused and the correlative obligation of the Court to protect such right in the case of Corpuz vs. Sandi .ganbayan, 4 to wit

"The right of the accused to a speedy trial. and. to a speedy disposition of, the case against him was designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution Suspended over him for an indefinite time, and.. to 'prevent delays in the' administration of justice by mandating the courts to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of 'criminal cases. Such right to a speedy tnal and a speedy disposition of a cases violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and, oppressive delays The inquiry as to whether or not an accused has been denied such right, is not susceptible by precise qualification The concept of a speedy disposition is a relétive term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.'

While justice is administered with dispatch, the 'essential ingredient is orderly, expeditious and not mere speed. It cannot be definitely said how long is' too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift, but deliberate. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. lt'secüres rights to the accused, but it does not preclude the rights of public justice.Also,it mustbe borne in mind that the rights given to the accused by the" Constitution and ' the Rules of Court' are shields, 'not weapons; hence,,.courts are to give meaning to .that intent.'

'A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accUsed 'necessarily compels the court to approach speedy, 'trial cases on an ad hoc basis.'

'In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his 'right to a speedy disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: '(a) length of delay; (b) the reason ' for the delay; (c) the defendant's asáertion of his right-, and Id)

AA 4 GR No 162214, 11 November 2004.

• . Criminal case No. SB -17-CRM-0284 to 0285 People vs. Martinez, et al.

• DISSENTING OPINION Page'3of7 x- --- -- -- ------- - ----x

reiudice to the defendant Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of the defendant that the speedy trial was • designed to protect,' rotect namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration; to minimize anxiety and concerns of the accused to I trial; and to 'limit the possibility that his defense will be impaired. Of these, the most Serious is the last, because the inability of a • defeAdant adequately to . prepare his case skews the , fairness of the

• entire system. There is also pçejudice if the defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately the events of the distant past. Even ifthe

• accused is not imprisoned prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged by • restraints on his liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety,

suspiciOn and often, hostility. His financial resources may be drained, his association is curtailed, and he is subjected to public obloquy.'

'Delay isa two-edge sword. It is the government that bears the burden of proving its case beyond reasonable doubt. The passage of time may make 'it difficult or impossible 'for, the government to carry its burden. The Constitution and the Rules do not require impossibilities or extraordinary efforts, diligence or exertion from courts or the' prosecutor, nor, contemplate that such

• ' . right shall deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly 'prosecuting criminals. As held in' Williams v. United States, for 'the government to sustain its right to try the accused despite a delay, it must show two 'things:. (a) that the accused suffered no serious

• ' prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and inevitable delay; and (b) that there was no more delay than is reasonably attributable to the ordinary processes of justice.'

'Closely related to the length of delay, is' the reason or • ' ' ' . justification of the State for such delay. Different weights should be

' assigned to different reasons :or justifications- invoked by the State, For instance, a'deliberate attempt to 'delay the trial in order to hamper or prejudice the defense should : be weighted heavily against the State.' Also, it is improper for the prosecutor to intentionally delay to gain some tactical advantage over the defendant or to harass or prejudice him. On the other hand, the heavy case load of the prosecution or a missing witness should be weighted less heavily against the State. Corollarily, Section 4, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure enumerates the factors for granting a continuance."5 (Emphasis supplied and citations omitted)

Hence, the following factors Should. 'be taken into account in determining whether the defendant has been denied his right to speedy. disposition of cases: (1) length of delay; (2) the reason for 'the delay;,, (3) the defendant's assertion of his right; and (4) prejudióe to the

• ' ' defendant. .' . • ' ' ' " ' ' . . •

' G.R. No. L-37007, 20 July 1987.: • ' ' '

Criminal Case No. SB 47-CRM-0284 to 0285 • People vs. Martinez, at al.

bIsSENTING OPINION Page 4of7 x-------------------------------- - - ---x

To reiterate, it took the OMB a total period of, eight (8) years, one (1) month, and seven (7) days to conclude its fact-finding and preliminary , investigation starting from the receipt of the Complaint on 25 September 2007 until the filing of the Informtions before the Court on 02 November2015. Assuming for the sake of argument that the delay attributable to accused Martinez Ill and Minguez, Vicente P.

• Rodriguez; Cresencio P. Verdidä, Julio S. Ursonal, Jr.,, Mary Lou B. Ursal, Santiago A. ,Sevilla, Santiago M. Oliamot, Lyndon Heé C. Acusar, Wilfredo L. Manubag, Victor Elliot 'S. Lepiten Ill, Teodoro V. Pedroza, Ernesto Y. Faciol, and Leo L. Villacrusisaré r subtracted from the said total period, it Still took the 'OMB a long period of six (6) years, eight (8) months, and three (3) days to conclude its fact-finding and preliminary investigation. • ,•

it is worthy to note that the period spent by the 0MB, on the preliminary investigation upon receiving the Counter-Affidavit accuse

' of • d Martinez Ill and Mlnguez on 13 April 2010 up to the issuance on 27 October 2014 ,of'a resolution'finding probable cause for violation Of Sections 3(e) and (g), Republic Act No. 3019 ("R.A. No. 3019")' alone already constituted a period of four 4)years, six (6) months, 'and 'fourteen (14) days delay.

Instead' of providing. the-Court with a reasonable explanation to justify its delay in the fact-finding and preliminary investigation of the subject cases, the prosecution 'merely 'aSserted in its Comment the alleged failure of both accused to timely assert their right to speedy diSpositioh of cases.

In the case of Coscollueia. vs. Sandiganbayan, 6 the Supreme CoUrt emphasized that it is the duty of the Ombudsman to act 'with reasonable dispatch on the cases entrusted to it, thus:

"Verily, the, Office of the Ombudsman was created under the mantle of the Constitution, mandated to be the 'protector of the people' and as such, required to 'act promptly on complaints filed in

• ' any form or manner against officers. and employees of the , GovernmSnt or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, in order to promote efficient service. This great responsibility cannot be simply brushed aside by' ineptitude. Precisely, the Office of the Ombudsman has the inherent duty not only to carefully go through the particulars of case but also to resolve the same within the proper length of time. Its dUtiful performance should not' only be gauged by •

' the quality of the assessment but also by the reasonable promptness

of its dispensation.'

• °GA. No. 191411, July 15, 2013. • .

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Criminal 'Case No. SB -1 7-CRM-0284..to 0285 People vs. Martinez, at al. DISSENTING OPINION Page 5of7 x------------- — -------- -- -------- --- --- -------- ----x '

xxx

'Lest it be misunderstood, the right to speedy' disposition of cases is not merely hinged towards the objective of spurring dispatch in the administration of justice butalso to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding a criminal prosecution - suspended over him for an indefinite time Akin to the right to speedy trial, its "salutary objective" isto assure that-an innocent person may be free from the 'anxiety and expense of litigation or, if otherwise, Of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever legitimate, defense he.,

• may interpose. This looming unrest as well as the tactical disadvantages carried by the passage of time should be weighed' against the State and in favor of the individual."

Hence, the '0MB should not have just sat idly while waiting for, Ursal, the only remaining respondent then who. had yet to Submit her Counter-Affidavit, to file the same Such justification for the period of more than four' (4)"years that it took the OMB to conduct the preliminary investigation after already having received both accused's 'Counter-Affidavit is unreasonable It is as if the progress

I

of the investigation and the 'right' of' the other' accused are left at the mercy . of a single respondent. The OMB'S vigilance, toward its mandate as protector Of' the people, : including the accused, should not' be constrained by unreasonable factors such as this. '

The accused were then 'being. investigated for violation , of R.A. No; 3019 and R.A. No. '6713. The issues presented weref not complicated, there were only fourteen (14) respondents, and no voluminous records needed review 'because it only involves the loan applications of said respondents which: were 'granted 'by Bogo City's Multi-Purpose Cooperative.

The prosecution's claim that both accused failed to timely assert their right to .speedy disposition ,of cases fails to convince. Undoubtedly, theaccused's asSertion 'of such' right is among they

'factors that heed to' be balanced with' the circumstances surrounding the attendant delay in the proôeedings. However, such factor is not the only factor. To reiterate, 'a balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused: nessarily , compels the court to

: 'approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.!7 '

7Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. L- 137007,20 July 1987. • ' . 2

• - , Criminal Case No. SB -17-CRM-0284 to 0285 People vs. 'Martinez, et al. DISSENTING OPINION Page 6of7

• x----------------------------------- -x

As regards both accused's. awareness of the preliminary. investigation being conducted against them, suffice it to say that it has already been established that an accused has no obligation to follow up on the status of his prosecution., Thus, citing the case of Barker v. Wing08 in Coscoiluela vs. Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court held that:

"Being the respondents in the preliminary investigation proceedings, it was not the petitioners' duty to follow upon the prosecution of their. case. Conversely, it was the Office of the Ombudsman's responsibility to expedite the same within the boundsof reasonable timeliness in view of its mandate to promptly act on all complaints lodged before it. As pronounced, in the case of Barker v. Wingo:'

A defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial; the State has that duty as well as the 'duty of insuring that the' trial is consistent with due process." (citation Omitted)..

Moreover, contrary to what is being implied by the prosecution,' the case of Coscolluela vs. ,Sandiganbayan did not overturn the Decision of the Supreme Court En Banc in the case Of Barcelona v. Lim. A thorough 'reading' of the same reveals that it adheres to the High

• ., Court's pronouncement in the latter case.. In fact, the said" case cited

Roquero v. "The Ghancellor of UP-Manila, et al. 9 in enumerating the four (4) factors to be considered in determining whether or not the right

• ' of the accused to speedy disposition of cases has been violated and it • includes the timely assertion thereof.

Finally, the most serious interest of the accused which is protected by the right to' speedy disposition% of cases is the limitation on the possibility of impairing his/her, defense Apending and prolonged

•

'dispOsition • of a case against the accused causes anxiety, hostility, additional expenses, and restriction on his person and well-being The passage of time in the conduct of the investigations weakens the defense of the accused. In this case, inordinate delay has already • caused tactical disadvantage in the preparation of the accused's

• defense. '• • ' .• •' • •'

• • • Again, the case of Corpuz vs. Sandiganbayan,'° is, instructive, thus: , • ' • ' ' ,' ' •

8407 U.S. 514(1972). • • •

9 0.R.. No. 181851, 09 March 2010. • • 10 G.R, No. 162214, 11 November 2004.