australia strategy

8/3/2019 Australia Strategy

1/48

June 2011

STRATEGY

Forks in the riverAustralias strategic options in atransformational Asia


2/48

Cover image: Man navigating a river with a fork ahead Images.com/BrianJensen/Corbis

About ASPIASPIs aim is to promote Australias security by contributing fresh ideas to strategicdecisionmaking, and by helping to inform public discussion of strategic and defenceissues. ASPI was established, and is partially funded, by the Australian Government as anindependent, nonpartisan policy institute. It is incorporated as a company, and is governedby a Council with broad membership. ASPIs publicationsincluding this paperare notintended in any way to express or re ect the views of the Australian Government.

The opinions and recommendations in this paper are published by ASPI to promote publicdebate and understanding of strategic and defence issues. They re ect the personal viewsof the author(s) and should not be seen as representing the formal position of ASPI on anyparticular issue.

Important disclaimerThis publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in relation to thesubject matter covered. It is provided with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged inrendering any form of professional or other advice or services. No person should rely on the contentsof this publication without rst obtaining advice from a quali ed professional person.

Rod LyonDr Rod Lyon is the Program Director, Strategy and International, with ASPI.Rod was previously a Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the Universityof Queensland where he taught courses on con ict, international security,and civilmilitary relations. His research interests focus on a range of problemsassociated with global security, nuclear strategy and Australian security. Hehas authored a number of ASPI publications including the STRATEGY reports Alliance Unleashed: Australia and the US in a new strategic age , The eagle in aturbulent world: US and its global role , Global jigsaw: ASPIs strategic assessment 2008, Changing pace: ASPIs strategic assessment 2011 , SPECIAL REPORT Australiasstrategic fundamentals , and the STRATEGIC INSIGHTS,Obama in his own words:On leadership, force, and rebuilding US primacy and North Korea: Sliding towardsthe abyss.


3/48

Forks in the riverAustralias strategic options in atransformational Asia

Rod Lyon


4/48

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Limited 2011

This publication is subject to copyright. Except as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968, no part of it mayin any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, microcopying, photocopying, recording or otherwise) bereproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted without prior written permission. Enquiries should beaddressed to the publishers.

First published June 2011

Published in Australia by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute

ASPILevel 2, Arts House40 Macquarie StreetBarton ACT 2600Australia

Tel + 61 2 6270 5100Fax + 61 2 6273 9566Email [email protected] www.aspi.org.au

Lyon, Rod, 1951-

Forks in the river: Australias strategic options in a transformational Asia / Rod Lyon.

9781921302664 (pbk.)

Series: Strategy (Australian Strategic Policy Institute)

Includes bibliographical references.

Australia--Strategic aspects.Australia--Relations--Asia.Asia--Relations--Australia.

303.4829405


5/48

ASPI Strategy iii

Contents

Executive Directors introduction 1

Executive summary 2

Chapter 1

Regional transformation 4

Chapter 2Asia and Australian identity 12

Chapter 3Australia as an order builder in Asia 16

Chapter 4Australia as a power followerbandwagoning with anAsian great power 22

Chapter 5Australia as a power builderin a Southeast Asian power core 27

Chapter 6Australia as a power diffuser 31

Chapter 7Australia and Asia 34

References 38


6/48

Forks in the river: Australias strategic options in a transformational Asia


7/48

ASPI Strategy 1

There are few issues more important in Australian strategic policy thanour changing relationship with Asia. With our major alliance partnerentering a period of greater frugality, and our own defence-technologyedge over our neighbours slipping, we will be drawn towards a set of

new strategic choices as the years unfold. We Australians are currentlyenjoying an economic comfort zone, courtesy of Asias rise. But thevery conditions enabling that are simultaneously creating a strategicdilemma for usour strategies of alliance and self-reliance dont giveus suf cient engagement with the Asia now rising alongside us.

In this paper, Rod Lyon, director of ASPIs Strategy and InternationalProgram, tackles that critical third leg of our strategic tripod in anew way, focusing overtly on Australias options for a closer strategic

engagement with Asia. He uses an admittedly broad brush to sketchout four alternative paths for Australian policy. Each of the paths ismeant to supplementrather than supplantexisting policy lines,but each could also present its own implications for the alliance andour pursuit of self-reliance. Canberras policymakers dont face an easytask in balancing and harmonising three different, complementary,strategic approaches.

Australians are distracted on a daily basis by all manner of issues, mostshort term. But the big, long-term issues are only going to becomemore prominent, not less. This ASPI paper unpacks one such issue.And Im sure ASPI readers will nd the paper both provocative andstimulating. As usual, this paper has bene ted from external reviewand the close attention provided by our publication staff. I am gratefulto all those who had a hand in its production and presentation.

Peter Abigail Executive Director

Executive Directors introduction

Photo opposite: Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard with Indonesian President SusiloBambang Yudhoyono prior to their meeting at Merdeka Palace in Jakarta, Indonesia,2 November 2010 AP via AAP/Dita Alangkara.


8/48


2 ASPI Strategy

Australia looks out on an Asia where the pace of geopolitical changeis quickening: US power is in relative decline, and the era of weakAsian powers is ending. Australia cant stand back from this challenge.If we choose to rest solely on our current strategies of maintaining

the ANZUS alliance and nurturing a more competent and self-reliantAustralian Defence Force, well carry high opportunity costs into thefuture. Australia must think about its options for engaging a set of strategically maturing Asian countries with greater reach and in uence,and must do so in a way that strikes a balance both with its alliance tiesand with its policy of defence self-reliance.

One of the principal hurdles to Australias fuller Asian engagement liesnot in Asia but in ourselves. We seem likely to nd ourselves drawn

into a more intense debate about our own identity as we contemplateour regional role. Such debates have proven divisive before and maywell do so again. Indeed, the closer the ties between Australia and itspotential Asian partners, the greater the need for Australians to seetheir strategic future as irrevocably tied to the region. Only a broadbipartisan commitment towards Asian engagement will provide thesustained impetus that such a recrafting of Australian strategic policywould require.

This paper explores Australias options for greater Asian engagementunder four distinct categories: order building, power following,power building and power diffusing. In an order-building strategy,Australia would attempt to maximise a coherent, multilateral,Asian security order, seeking greater enmeshment across the region.In a power-following (or bandwagoning) strategy, Australia wouldendeavour to nd a great-power protector in Asia. In a power-buildingstrategy, Australia would seek to grow a Southeast Asian power core,at the heart of which would lie a much closer strategic partnership

between Australia and Indonesia. And in a power-diffusing strategy,

Executive summary


9/48

Executive summary

ASPI Strategy 3

Australia would try to exploit the inherent anticoagulant nature of Asian securityrelationships (which inhibits the formation of lasting strategic bonds), pursuing greaterAustralian security in the sheer multiplicity of independent power centres in the Asianstrategic environment.

Each of the options has its own costs and bene ts. Each requires particular attention tobalancing a new Asian strategy with our existing policies of alliance and self-reliance. Theorder-building strategy, long the centrepiece of Australias efforts in Asia, is nothing to sneezeat: if it works, it offers the most direct route to the sort of Asia that Australia most wants to

see arisea cooperative, prosperous Asia where Australia enjoys good relations with a widerange of regional countries. Among the three power-related strategies, the paper argues fora much closer focus on the power-building option, and suggests that it might be timely forthe Australian and Indonesian governments to sit down together for a thoughtful discussionabout how they see Asias future, and what they might do jointly to shape it.


10/48


4 ASPI Strategy

Regional tRansfoRmation

ASPIs recent2011 Strategic assessment canvassed the challenges that

Australia will confront in coming years from an accelerating pace of strategic changein particular, from quickening change in Asia (Lyonand Clegg 2011). The broad contours of a different Asian securityenvironment are increasingly visible. In coming decades, Australia willface one central question: as a new Asian security environment unfolds,how can Australia best achieve its core strategic interests?

In Asia, two interrelated trends are unfolding: US power is in relativedecline, and the era of weak Asian powers is ending. As a result of the

rst trend, Australian strategic analysts, like others around the region,are increasingly inclined to question the shape and textureratherthan simply the existence or durabilityof US primacy in the region.The second trend spurs talk of a more multipolar regional securityorder de ned not by a shared sense of regional identity, but bysudden empowerment, historical tensions, and prickly, introverted,nationalist sentiments.

In Asia, two interrelated trends are unfolding:US power is in relative decline, and the era of weak Asian powers is ending.

With only limited recent experience of multipolaritythe Cold Warwas bipolar and the post-Cold War years have been essentially

unipolaranalysts are naturally drawn to nd solutions for thestrategic challenges such an environment would pose, either inpower balancing or a concert of great powers. Power balancing isa classic solution to an anarchical security order with several greatpowers. It assumes that the order nds an uneasy stability point in

Chapter 1


11/48

ASPI Strategy 5

Regional transformation

ASPI Strategy 5

the tacit agreement of the great powers to predictable, tolerant equilibrium in preferenceto unpredictable, provocative, destabilising contests for pre-eminence. A concert takes thatunderstanding to a more formal levelits a form of indexation of an international order inwhich (typically war-weary) great powers agree not to challenge each others vital interests.

Its not obvious that either power balancing or concerting offers a direct solution to theemerging Asian security environment. The material available in Asia can make only for aweird power balance, or an even weirder concerttwo great powers (the US and China) indenial about their role as strategic balancers, one great power (Japan) still hesitant about its

role after World War II, another (India) partly trapped in the Indian Ocean, and yet another(Russia) more Eurasian than Asian in its focus. Moreover, multipolar orders take their sensefrom the history and context of their own emergence19th and 20th century Europeanmultipolarity arose in the context of the Napoleonic tradition of mass war, but no suchtradition backdrops Asian great-power relations in the 21st century.

Over the past sixty years, Asia hasnt been characterised by a single, overarching powerbalance; nor has it typically had a single front line. If anything, its been characterised byan interconnected set of subregional balances, but the different subregions have each,

in their own way, demonstrated the complexity of strategic relationships within them. Inthe Northeast Asian subregion, the Cold War saw the US and Japan balance off against theSoviet Union in what was essentially a maritime contest. On land, China balanced againstthe Soviet Union, and a similar, if quieter, relationship exists between China and Russia eventoday. But China was also engaged in a contest with Taiwanwhich was assisted by theUSto project power across the Taiwan Strait. The Korean peninsula possessed its owndynamic, with North and South Koreathe South again supported by the UStrapped ina time warp since the end of the Korean War.

Over the past sixty years, Asia hasnt been characterised by asingle, overarching power balance; nor has it typically had asingle front line.

In Southeast Asia, a broad balance existed between the initial members of the Association

of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Indochinese states, but that relationship wassideswiped by ChineseVietnamese tensions, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, anda degree of brittleness in the strategic relationships within ASEAN itself. Across SoutheastAsia, a set of developing nations concentrated on growing national and regional resilience,or, as the geopolitical thinker Saul Cohen would put it, transforming the Southeast Asianshatterbelt into a more cohesive structure (Cohen 1999).

Further west, the Indian subcontinent was de ned by its own balancesa broad balancebetween China and India and a taut, dangerous balance between India and Pakistan.

Both the broad balance and the narrower one have previously slipped into war. And thesecurity challenges felt by South Asian states have been the motor for subregional nuclearproliferation. Moreover, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 brought a whole new setof tensions to the region, drawing the US into a larger role in the subregion and generatingintra-subregional relationships whose effects are still felt today.


12/48


6 ASPI Strategy 6 ASPI Strategy

For some decades, then, strategic Asia has been not a simple seesaw, but a complex,interconnected mobile of the sort that can still be seen today hanging from the ceilingsof dentists surgeries, there to distract patients from the challenges of the moment. Thegrowth of Asian powers has added weight and importance to the movements of the mobile,but those movements are becoming increasingly lopsided and erratic because the mobilesappendages are growing, and doing so at different rates.

Similarly, the idea of a concert hasnt found clear expression in Asia either. Securityinstitutions have been slow to develop here. As one Australian scholar observed recently,

its relatively easy to nd two legs of Immanuel Kants peace tripod in Asia: the level of economic interconnectedness is high, and the level of democratisation is growing. But Asiahasnt nurtured forms of international organisation and law, despite the plethora of regionalsecurity architectures that have been reinvented on a regular basis (Goldsmith 2007).

Its entirely possible that Asias rst- and second-tier powers dont share a common vision of Asias strategic future, which would make a concert arrangement dif cult to organise andsustain. There would be some argument, though, for trying to build a G4 in Asiaa groupcomposed of the US, China, Japan and Indiaand providing it with a permanent home.

A G4 would represent not a commitment to concert but a commitment to dialogue betweenthe four great powersand that would still be of considerable value to the region. The valueof the G4 would lie not in its ability to mimic or anticipate a true concert, but in its abilityto substitute for the apparent unreformability of the UN Security Councils ve permanentmembers, a group much more Eurocentric in composition and worldview.

Its entirely possible that Asias first- and second-tier powers

dont share a common vision of Asias strategic future, whichwould make a concert arrangement difficult to organiseand sustain.

Overall, the notion that an emerging multipolar Asia is likely to move easily towards either apower balance or a concert deserves deeper consideration. The argument outlined by MichaelLEstrange in his Weary Dunlop lecture to Asialink in December 2009 sketches the limitations

of trying to pour Asia into Europes prede ned categories of international relations:

The transformative potential of this shifting balance does not lie in the revival of amodern variant of the old notion of a concert of powers, still less in an agreement on anequilibrium of powers, in Asia. It lies more in the evolution of a far less structured formof multipolarityone that entrenches neither current power relativities nor de factospheres of in uence, one that embraces elements of competition and cooperationamong the major powers (particularly the United States, China, Japan and India) acrossall the changing indices of hard, soft and smart power. (LEstrange 2009)

If LEstrange is correctand his assessment certainly portrays more vividly the complexitiesof modern Asia than more simplistic caricatures dowe should expect Asian strategicrelationships to be layered, often localised, frequently indirect, and coloured as much byelements of trade and shared interest as by tensions and enmity. Such relationships would


13/48

ASPI Strategy 7


ASPI Strategy 7

not be monochromatic. Indeed, its the sort of Asia where clear-cut strategic blocs wouldprobably be slow to emerge, and where military power would be only one variable amongmany shaping key strategic relationships.

Australian options

In some preliminary thoughts about how Australian strategy might meet that shiftingenvironment, ASPIs 2011 Strategic assessment observed that Australian policymakers wouldbe driven towards placing greater reliance on the underutilised Asian-engagement leg of our

own strategic tripod (Lyon and Clegg 2011). That tripod has Australias alliance with the US asone leg, a policy of defence self-reliance as the second, and strategic engagement with Asiancountries as the third. The ANZUS alliance has been a key leg in the tripod since 1951, and thepolicy of bandwagoning with the dominant Western maritime power of the day goes backto the era of white settlement. The policy of defence self-reliance essentially dates from the1970s and 1980s. But the Asian engagement leg has always been somewhat stunted.

Its important to remember that a tripods three legs are designed to work synergistically.Each is angled to exploit the support provided by the other two, and the entire contraption

is manufactured to ensure such an outcome. Treating a tripod as three separate monopodswould be conceptually awed. The same ought to be true of Australian strategy. Overthe years, weve become more adept at making our alliance relationship and our policy of defence self-reliance t harmoniously. Making both t with a new level of Asian engagementwill be an important new challenge in Australian strategic policy. Both the ANZUS allianceand our policy of defence self-reliance would have distinct application in terms of our Asianengagement options, but placing greater strategic weight on an Asian engagement strategywould also imply a less perpendicular reliance on the other two legs of the tripod. So at acertain point this paper will try to knit together both a clear set of Asian engagement options

and our existing commitments.

Australias Asian engagement has been strong in a commercial and economic sense,but weve been slower to develop practical security and defence cooperation with Asianpartners. Its entirely possible, of course, that neither Australia nor the region would havebene ted much in earlier years from a more intense focus on regional strategic and defencecooperation in Australian policy settings. In a region where all emerging powers rose thesame wayby enmeshing themselves more closely into an existing system of trade andpolitical dialogue, rather than by challenging that systemAustralias strategic interest

lay primarily in reinforcing such behavioural patterns across the region, rather than inupsetting them.

Still, as the Asian century unfolds, it seems inevitable that Australia will look to address moreof the rising challenges of the regional security environment by increasing its engagementwithin the region. Thats easier said than done. Asian engagement raises at its core thevexed issue of Australian cultural identityand it would be fatuous to pretend that thischallenge didnt exist. An Asian engagement strategy would require Australia to identifyand pursue real strategies of engagement, rather than merely to talk about its commitment

to engagement. Furthermore, it would require a degree of bipartisan commitment to thosestrategies in order to allow Australian foreign and defence planning to be sustainable overtimea factor that would be important to our Asian partners as well as us.


14/48



A rising clamourOver the past year or two, the topic of Australias position in a shifting Asia has moved to theforefront of both of cial and academic thinking. Some of the Wikileaks cables, for example,show an Australian Government intensely interested in how it might live in a region witha stronger China. Thats probably been a natural outcome of exchanges between Australiaand China in recent years across a range of issuesover the proposed Chinalco investmentin Rio Tinto; over the visit by Uygur activist, Ms Rebiya Kadeer, to Australia; over the2009 Australian Defence White Paper; and over Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea

in 2010. But its also the product of a growing acceptance among Australian policymakersthat the Asian security environment is shifting, driven in particular by the growth of strategicweight in Asia. A burgeoning set of security dialogues and heightened practical securitycooperation between Canberra and a range of regional capitals have also highlighted theincreasing importance of Asian factors in Australias strategic calculus.

A burgeoning set of security dialogues and heightened

practical security cooperation between Canberra and a rangeof regional capitals have also highlighted the increasingimportance of Asian factors in Australias strategic calculus.

The growth of policy interest has been complemented by a wider public debate about thetopic. Professor Hugh Whites Quarterly Essay , Power shift (White 2010a), which arguedthat Australia would increasingly have to nd a new strategic saddlepoint between Beijingand Washington, was the focal point for an intensesometimes heateddiscussionof Australias future strategic options (see, for example, White 2010b, Sheridan 2010,Sheridan 2011a, Bisley 2011, Phillips 2011). And a Kokoda Foundation paper authored byProfessor Ross Babbage, which argued that Australia needed to be more conscious of thescale, pattern and speed of Chinese military modernisation, helped ignite a second roundof exchanges on the topic (see Babbage 2011:iii, Sheridan 2011b, Dibb and Barker 2011).

In some senses, the debate has been a strangely constricted one, with the principalcontributors generally unwilling to unpack a broad spectrum of Australian strategic options.True, White offers us a set of options, including sticking with the old alliance, nding a newgreat and powerful friend in Asia, armed neutrality, a middle-power regional alliance, andgoing down the New Zealand path, but those options are all discussed relatively brie yin Whites nal chapter (White 2010a:6067). His preferred outcomethat we remain aself-reliant middle power in the Asian centuryis something of an anticlimax. Babbagespaper focuses on two main approaches: contributing to a combined USAustralia theatrestrategy, or developing a more self-reliant Australian defence strategy. He unpacks thosetwo approaches as four options: two that depict either an evolutionary or more robust

development of the Australian Defence Force (ADF), one that involves a much closerpartnership with the US, and one that involves a degree of closer regional cooperationin cyber- and undersea-warfare (Babbage 2011:viiix). Where Whites preferred option isself-reliance, Babbages is a combined USAustralia defence strategy.


15/48

ASPI Strategy 9


ASPI Strategy 9

Both the White and Babbage papers stress the role of military power in shaping futureAsian strategic relationships. In that regard, both seem written with a purpose: to rebuildthe apparent consensus about Australias defence future that existed about the time of the2009 Defence White Paper. That consensus was founded upon a planned consistent realgrowth in defence force funding out to 2030 and substantial growth in Australian maritimecapabilities. Those objectives have remained central to Australian defence planning in thetwo years since the White Papers release, but theres an increasing fragility in the intensityand level of the consensus. Spending has been pushed into the outyears as the governmentstrives to deliver a budget surplus by 201213, and arguments have broken out in public aboutthe make-up and the size of the force structure that Australia should pursue.

When push comes to shove, the WhiteBabbage argument, insofar as there is one, seemsto focus on whether Australia should plan to ght China in the seaair gap to our north,orhopefully in concert with our US allyby actually attacking leadership targets in China.That argument isnt one that provides much sense of the breadth of strategic options thatCanberra will confront in 21st-century Asia. But the tone and content of the argumentindeed, of the whole recent debateprobably does help to reinforce a fundamental point:that Australians arent close to forging a broad, bipartisan understanding of how Australia

should engage with a rapidly changing Asia.

Four possible roles

This paper focuses on how Australia might strengthen the Asian engagement leg of thetripod and provides a fuller unfolding of its potential strategic options. It takes for grantedthat Australia will want to retain its alliance with the US and to do what it can to enhance itsnational capacities for defence self-reliance. In short, nothing that follows should be read asa call for Australia to abandon ANZUS or forswear its own national defence options.

...nothing that follows should be read as a call for Australia toabandon ANZUS or forswear its own national defence options.

In Chapter 2, the paper explores the identity challenges that have traditionally plaguedAustralias relations with the region. Frankly, it will take a conscious effort of will for Australiato overcome those hurdles in the next decade or twothe period in which any Asianengagement approach would have to be developed. Australians havent entirely convincedthemselves that they should seek security with Asia rather than security from Asia. Of course,one way to entice ourselves across the hurdles is to see more clearly the greener pasturesstrategically speakingthat might lie on the other side. The chapter concludes by identifyingfour distinct strategic roles that Australia might play in Asiaorder builder, power follower(bandwagoner), power builder or power diffuser.

In Chapter 3, the paper examines the rst of those roles: building a more cooperativestrategic order in Asia. That might sound a somewhat uncontroversial place to start,since this approach has formed the core of Australian strategic policy towards Asia forsome decades, but Asia remains promising material for some level of cooperation.Without necessarily assuming that the region will move speci cally towards a concert


16/48


10 ASPI Strategy

of powers, its clear that regional countries are already bound together by high levels of interactionin particular by economic connections. Those connections militate againstthe formation of distinct strategic blocs. Moreover, the region is growing something of anarchitectural framework for consultation and dialogue, even though examples of practicalstrategic cooperation tend to trail considerably behind. Reinforcing those trends isnt justgood economics or good diplomacyits good strategy. It would be an important part of an Australian strategy of order building in Asia.

This option turns centrally upon the notion that Asian strategic relationships arent merely

a function of military capabilities. Yes, many countries have modernisation programs for theirmilitaries, but such programs, by themselves, arent a sound guide to strategic intent: evena liberal, democratic China would probably be modernising its military forces. The strategicpositioning of states has much more to do with in uence patterns and with regionalperceptions of a particular states role and power. And in uence and perceptions usuallyturn upon broader understandings of a countrys capacities and probable future than upona narrow assessment of its military potential. Development, not military power, has beenthe key to Asias rise. This strategy would piggyback upon that history, it would be stronglysupported by the Australian public, and it would allow Australia to position itself as the

partner of many Asian states.

Chapter 4 examines Australias potential role as a power follower in Asia: what it wouldmean for Australia to build a more exclusive partnership with an Asian great power, inaddition to ANZUS. That rolebandwagoning with a great poweris a classic one in thestrategic history of modern Australia. The chapter identi es the principal attributes of our previous (and current) strategic partnerships with great powers and uses them as atemplate for thinking about what Asian partnerships might look like. This option plays toan obvious feature in our regional security environment: if the age of weak Asian powers

is ending, it will increasingly be possible for Australia to nd able-bodied security partnersaround its region. But this option has its downsides. It would push Australia into both explicitand implicit positioning in relation to existing and emerging great-power friction pointsin Asia. Many Australians would probably nd that positioning uncomfortable. Moreover,any such partnership would be shaped heavily by the strategic cultures of the two players,and Asian great powersunlike Western ones arent usually endowed with extrovertedstrategic cultures.

In Chapter 5, the paper explores the idea of Australia as a power builder in Asia, using the

most likely case of a much closer AustralianIndonesian strategic relationship to grow a newpower core in Southeast Asia. Whereas Australia might partner with an existing power corein a bandwagoning role, it might also consciously choose to place its efforts behind growinga distinctly new power core in a builder role. Power bubbles are growing elsewhere inAsia, expanding as the large countries become economically bigger and militarily morecompetent, so an Australian contribution towards growing one more power bubble wouldberegionally speakingunremarkable.

Power bubbles tend to expand outwards from a particular geographical location. Southeast

Asia is the obvious place for Australia to implement such a strategy, and the paper identi esa number of steps that Canberra might take to intensify its relationship with Indonesia. Thestrategy would face one important challenge: Southeast Asian countries have not typicallythought of their regional strategic role in power terms. Moreover, some Australians willsay that we already have such a strategy, through our emphasis on enhancing Australias


17/48

ASPI Strategy 11


ASPI Strategy 11

own strategic weight. The option advanced here is intended to be a supplement to thatapproacha complement to a Defence of Australia strategy, building outwards to theconcentric circle immediately beyond the seaair gap to our north. Indeed, one of the greatattractions of nurturing a much stronger relationship with Indonesia would be that it wouldsimplify the anticipated challenges that might increasingly emerge closer to Australias shores.

In Chapter 6, the paper turns to the issue of Australias role in an Asia where it can neitherbuild a sound regional order, nor nd good partnerships, nor grow a distinct power core inits own subregion. In that Asiawhere anticoagulation forces remained strongwed be

more on our own, but most other regional countries would probably be, too. And even inthat environment, wed still have a distinct interest in shaping the emerging Asian securityenvironment. Wed prefer to be a lonely engager rather than a disengaged loner, so to speak.A smaller fraction of our engagement would be tied to speci c ends, whether in supportinganother great power or in forging a speci c outcome in Southeast Asia. Indeed, our principalinterest might well be to encourage the growth of multiple independent power centresacross the region so that the relative in uence of any one centre is diluted.

This wouldnt be an easy policy to follow, not least because Australia doesnt have many

favours to bestow upon others as encouragement. And it presupposes that Australia isindifferent to most issues other than balancing onesjust as content to strengthen a weakChina against Japan or India, for example, as to do the reverse. In the grand passage of time,this strategy would be one of neutrality in most Asian disputes, but in the shorter term itwould require a set of actions that would leave us looking neither neutral nor disinterested.Indeed, it might risk Australias good relations with many powers, because nurturing agreater number of independent power centres doesnt just mean bestowing favours onsome but also implies withholding favours from others. Our partiality would be evident inour differential treatment of others. So far, Australia has managedmostlyto avoid issues

of inter-Asian partiality because of its link to Washington.

Chapter 7 summarises some policy recommendations for Australian engagement in Asia.Essentially, those recommendations turn upon choices that Australia has yet to make aboutthe role that it wishes to play in regional security. In a deeper sense, the choices are aboutAustralian identity, and that identity isnt shaped merely by how we interact with Asia.Its shaped by how we see ourselves on a broader canvas, and the role that we play in Asiahas to t that broader identity.

Frankly, Australia avoids many of the hardest choices by continuing to push an order-buildingstrategy in Asia. Wed face deep challenges in identifying a new great and powerful friend inAsia, and only dire circumstance would drive us down that pathjust as dire circumstanceswere the basis for our shifting our preference for a great and powerful friend from the UnitedKingdom to the US. The attractions of building a Southeast Asian power core with Indonesiaare more enticing: indeed, nothing could match this option for its ability both to empowerAustralia and to transform our classic defence dilemma about securing our continent. Life inan anticoagulant Asia wouldnt be especially attractive, but that Asias already relativelyfamiliar to us and shows distinct possibilities of enduring. In this scenario, wed still have

an Asian engagement strategy, but it would be a thin and unsatisfying gruel. In that Asia,we might well be advised simply to go back to the rst option and attempt to grow asounder regional order. That would be a long-term strategy for increasing the forces forstrategic coagulationand that, in turn, would bring other options back into play.


18/48


12 ASPI Strategy

asia and austRalian identity

Australias broader identity is still largely Western in its civilisational

content. In the 1990s, Samuel Huntington believed that Australia (likeTurkey, Mexico and Russia) was a torn countrytorn between itscultural attachment to the West and its increasing economic ties tothe Confucian world (Huntington 1997:151154). Huntington arguedthat Australia was trying to swim away from its Western civilisationand nd a new identity in Asia, but accepted that such a transitionwould be protracted and dif cult. In the years since Huntington madethat judgment, both trade and migration patterns have continuedto strengthen Australias Asian ties, but Australias sense of identity

is changing only slowly. For the next two decadesabout as farforward as this paper lookswe expect an Australia whose identity isstill profoundly shaped by its Western culture, and which must workactively to build and nurture linkages beyond that constraint.

What effect will our Western identity have on strategic interactionswith Asia? Will it mean that we bond preferentially with Asiancountries at the Westernised end of the spectrum (Japan, SouthKorea and Singapore, for example) or those with growing ties to

Washington (such as India, Vietnam and Indonesia)? Will it constitutea fundamental hurdle to the growth of closer forms of strategicinteraction with China? Much would depend on how far we see ourstrategic engagement as merely functional, as opposed to being anaf rmation of our cultural identity. Australiansor at least Australianpolicymakersmight have to put to one side a well-entrenched belief that nations only truly partner with countries that are culturally muchlike them. Playing our part in the future Asian security environmentwill probably require us to be overtly direct, functional and calculatingin our approach. Soft-power issues of cultural attraction will probablyform some small part of our strategic approach to Asia, but bythemselvesas Joseph Nye once observed about soft powerwouldnt support a very venturesome foreign policy or strategy.

Chapter 2


19/48

ASPI Strategy 13

Asia and Australian identity

ASPI Strategy 13

Its true, of course, that one of Australias national interests is to grow a future Asian securityorder that re ects Western ideals of stability, prosperity, tolerance and individual rights.Thats the sort of objective that weve grown up with through US primacy in Asia overrecent decades. But US in uence is in relative decline in Asia: so that perfect AsiatheWesternised onemight no longer be available as a possible policy outcome. That doesntmean a good Asia is unachievable, of course, and one of our main instruments for achievingit is to encourage the US to remain a powerful player here even when it isnt a pre-eminentone, but the principal task will be to identify what else we can do to buttress the good Asia.Beyond that, a range of strategic commentators are saying that its timely to consider evenharder questions, including the more depressing question: how would Australia prosper in anAsia that looked considerably darker than its preferred alternatives?

Playing our part in the future Asian security environmentwill probably require us to be overtly direct, functional andcalculating in our approach.

A description of Australia once offered by the noted Australian historian, WJ Hudson, brutallylaid bare the bizarre foundations of modern Australia:

If today Japan were to establish a colony of settlement in sub-Saharan Africa, and if the colony developed into a tolerably prosperous state in its own right while remainingdistinctively and deliberately Japanese in ethnic composition and tradition, and whileretaining the Japanese emperor as its head of state, we would be agog Yet this is the

nature of modern Australias origins British colonists in Australia developed attitudeswhich included marked geographical alienation, of never feeling quite at home, a touch almost of permanent exile. (Hudson 1988:4)

True, that picture of Australias now a dated one, but we can still hear its resonancestodayeven among commentators who label Australia as the odd man out in Asia or,indeed, as the odd man in in Asia. The references to our oddness show that Australia in the21st century still experiences some echoes of discom ture in thinking of itself as an Asianstate. Its much less in denial about its geography than it once was, and the trends towards

an Australia more immersed in its Asian region, but the resonances endure.It was interesting to see just how quickly the debate inspired by Hugh Whites Quarterly Essay became a debate about Australian culture rather than a debate about strategy. A rangeof contributors to the Lowy Interpreter blog emphasised the centrality of the cultural theme.Graeme Dobell, for example, rehearsed Samuel Huntingtons concept of Australia as acountry torn between competing civilisations and suggested that Australians might indulgein a parlour game of spot-the-tear as Chinas power and in uence grow in Asia (Dobell2010). The Lowy Institutes Malcolm Cook observed that he was left with an intellectualitch that Hughs Australia (and its place in Asias strategic order) is not the one I think I live inafter hed nished reading Whites essay (Cook 2010). Whites response to those commentssuggested that this was uncomfortable ground for his argument, a debate for another time(White 2010b), but its hard to see how Australia can contemplate its future role in Asiawithout simultaneously re ecting upon its own identity.


20/48


14 ASPI Strategy

In The Australian on 15 December, journalist Paul Kelly rehearsed a question that hesrevisited a number of times during his career: what sort of country does Australia want tobe? He asked the questionin partby contrasting a complacent Australia with its moredynamic regional neighbours:

Treasurer Wayne Swan rightly says Australia is perfectly placed to enjoy the transfer of global economic power from the West to Asia. Sounds great. But ask another question:is Australia in its values more at home with declining Europe or with rising Asia? In Asiathe values are personal improvement, economic competition, educational excellence,national pride, strong family ties, cultural traditionalism and rising religious faith.Are these Australias values? The GFC has delivered a shattering intellectual and moralmessage to the world: while the US is wounded, the European model is crippled. Europessystem of government debt, entrenched welfare, extensive regulation and mushytolerance towards all as its unifying value is broken. (Kelly 2010)

Kellys long been interested in the issue of Australian identity. His latest salvo is anotherforay into this dif cult area. In truth, Australians dont share a common vision of Asia, orof its future, or of the level and type of engagement that Australia ought to pursue, oreven of Australias own identity. Academic David Goldsworthy once observed that whileengagement has been the major currency of almost all Australian discourse on relationswith Asia the term has a spectrum of different meanings, which might be thought of asrunning from the commercial and functional at one end to an embrace of the notion of Australia as an Asian country at the other (Goldsworthy 2001:25). He also pointed to an Asiathat was not homogeneous: Australians, he argued, needed to think less about engaging Asiaand more about engaging with a range of different Asian countries.

Commercial and functional ties with Asia enjoy wide supportin Australia, but the issue of whether Australia should seeitself as an Asian nation has been much more controversial.

Commercial and functional ties with Asia enjoy wide support in Australia, but the issue of whether Australia should see itself as an Asian nation has been much more controversial.

Stephen Fitzgerald has probably been the best known academic advocating such a shift inAustralian identity. The Keating government began to hint at that prospect, especially whenGareth Evans was canvassing the notion of cultural convergence between West and East.The clearest expression of that ideaalbeit in abstract form was probably contained inthe opening paragraphs of Evans lecture to the AsiaAustralia Institute in 1995:

In the Eyes on ASEAN photographic exhibition brought to Australia recently by MarinaMahathir, there is one particular picture that haunts my memory. It is of a Chinese operasinger making up her face, looking directly into a hand-held mirror. What she sees wouldbe her own re ectionstarkly de ned; heavily painted features; white against purplepink against black. What the viewer sees is the back of the mirror, on which LeonardosMona Lisa is reproducedthe features quiet; re ned; bathed in golds and browns,and muted greens.


21/48

ASPI Strategy 15

Asia and Australian identity

ASPI Strategy 15

At rst glance the contrast is obvious, stark; two emblematic clichs; the clash of civilisations brought to life, captured in one press of a camera button. But then look moreclosely: at the eyebrows, the bridge of the nose, the soft contours of each faceeachvery feminine face. Look through the looking glass that separates them, and the imageslook less and less radically different; more and more they replicate each other, converge.(Evans 1995)

Evans outlined a case for Australia to think of itself as an East Asian Hemisphere nation,but the 1996 election in Australia brought to power a government that wanted to revitalise

Australias traditional relationships, and which used the metaphor of the mirror in quitea different sense. John Howard, for example, drew upon that metaphor in his Federationaddress of 2000: Along with other regional countries, we have sensibly taken the view thatwe do not need to be cultural and political mirror images of each other to work closely andeffectively together (Howard 2000). Indeed, the Coalition government was keen to quellthe identity debates of the 1990s, not least because experience seemed to suggest thatthere were two distinctly different Australias: one an urbanised, younger, tertiary-educatedAustralia that saw a future in Australias Asian links; the other a non-urban, older, lesstertiary-educated Australiathe Australia of bush and regional townthat was less inclined

to support such a conclusion (Jones 1998).

Foreign Minister Downer, opening a conference in Beijing in April 2000, suggested thatdelegates might like to discuss the extent to which Asia and Australia shared a sense of cultural regionalism, although, he noted, they certainly bene ted from practical regionalcooperation (Downer 2000).

Much of whats discussed in the following chapters presupposes a more (rather than less)intense form of Asian engagement: in particular, it presupposes a strategic engagementby Australia of a region in which it has typically played an economic and diplomatic hand.Its possible that Australians will come to regard closer strategic cooperation with Asiancountries as merely one more form of practical regional cooperationand the closercounter-terrorism relations that Australia now enjoys with a range of Asian partners suggestthat such a perception might not be totally fancifulbut academic research suggests thatprevious patterns of strategic cooperation between different cultures havent always beenplain sailing (Luft 2009).

The chapters that follow explore four options for Australian strategic engagement with Asia:Australia as an order builder, a power follower, a power builder and a power diffuser. Theoptions arent mutually exclusiveit would be possible for Australia to be an order builderand a power builder, for example where the power-building option was a hedging strategyagainst slippage in a broader, softer, shaping strategy. But each of the options essentiallydepicts a different sort of Australia, and over coming decades Australians will probably bepulled into a more intense debate about what sort of people they really are. It might wellbe that the principal barrier to Australias embrace of its Asian partners lies not in Asia,but in ourselves.


22/48


16 ASPI Strategy

austRalia as an oRdeR buildeRin asia

Over recent decades, Australia has held to a single strategic approachin Asia that might be described as developmental in its thinking.Canberras been interested in seeing an Asia driven by growth (Morley1999), believing that stronger regional economies mean improvedregional stability. Similarly, its seen improved political and sociallinkages across the region as an important contributor to the growthof regional norms on key strategic issues. Australian policymakers havetypically believed that Australias key strategic concernsa revisionistgreat power or a major second-tier power gone badcould be easedby the creation of a regional order nourished and sustained by thecommitment of regional players.

This order-building approach has seen Australia pursue threedistinct policies:

as a civil commercial power in Asiawhile not exactly theSwitzerland of Asia, Australias already a country with ties to manyAsian economic partners, including all of the three great powers

and the ASEAN countries as a rule builder, attempting to nurture a degree of strategic order

across a vast strategic theatre by using rules and institutions toconstrain power

as a community builder, aiming to strengthen a sharedregional identity and a joint sense of ownership of the Asianstrategic environment.

At its core, this option sounds less strategically exciting than the

other options. It is, but good strategies arent de ned by the levelof excitement they generatetheyre de ned by whether they candeliver the desired outcomes. Indeed, strengthening integrativeforces within the region might be the most direct and effectiveroute towards the sort of Asia that Australia most wants to see

Chapter 3


23/48

ASPI Strategy 17

Australia as an order builder in Asia

ASPI Strategy 17

emerge: an interconnected, rule-shaped Asia, where nationalist rivalries are contained andchannelled and the advantages of trade and exchange are available across a wide range of regional countries. Those system-building approaches may never succeed in addressing allchallenges, and might never be inclusive enough to embrace all regional countries. Theremight long be a North Korea or Burma in Asia that challenges norms and inclusiveness. Butthat doesnt negate the importance of a broad set of arrangements that enhance a sharedregional identity, provide a framework for greater strategic cooperation, and reinforce thecurrent trends towards closer economic integration.

...strengthening integrative forces within the region might bethe most direct and effective route towards the sort of Asiathat Australia most wants to see emerge...

The strategy also allows for the possibility that we might be judging the long-term prospects

of Asian great powers prematurely. Some say, of course, that the Asian great powers areprobably not all great: indeed, there are arguments about the future trajectory of justabout all the main players (see, for example, Edelman 2010). Part of the problem mightbe merely one of terminology. In international relations, great powers are not clearlydemarcated by the attainment of speci c power thresholds. So some scholars use differentexpressionsBarry Posen, for example, tends to talk of a set of consequential powers thatinhabit both ends of the Eurasian landmass (Posen 2008:87). But while the emerging Asiangreat powers might stumble (and all powers do once in a while) it seems unlikely that theyllbe permanently de ected from their current growth trajectories. Whatever terminologywe use, the core of the strategic problem remains the same: Asias security environment isexperiencing a fundamental geopolitical transformation. Australian strategic thinking mustaddress that fact.

This sort of role for Australia would place a high premium on order building and a relativelylower one on hedging. In its basic shape, its remarkably similar to the strategy that FareedZakaria recommends the US pursue towards China: a judicious amount of hedging butwith a long bias in favour of engagement, for the simple reason that engagement isboth preferable and less costly (Zakaria 2010). And its the sort of engagement strategythat weve been pursuing in Asia for many years now, with the growth of our own tradingpro le, our support for a more inclusive regional architecture, and our encouragement of the negotiated settlement of regional ashpoints. Those efforts do more than encourageregional stabilitythey let Australia position itself broadly as a country with a range of friends across the region and a commitment to the pursuit of shared interests. That pursuitallows Canberra to seek its strategic objectives under a regional rather than a merely nationalumbrella, because it builds upon the notion that our objectives arent exclusive and covertbut shared and overt.

Moreover, this approach enjoys bipartisan political support in Australia and broad supportacross the region. True, some debate frequently occurs in Australia about how best to giveeffect to an approach that aims at strengthening ties between Asian states and de ningbetter the rules of the road for Asian international behaviour. But our objectives here arerelatively easy to pursue, and not just because other players in the region broadly want the


24/48



same things that we do. The objectives are easy to pursue because theyre ones that reinforceaccepted modes of state interaction, rejecting the early use of force in crises and favouringdialogue and commerce as the broad ties of regional endeavour. Its those attractionsthat have also made an order-building approach widely supported across the region(Alagappa 2003, Tan and Acharya 2004, Goh 200708).

Economic connectivity

Continuing down the order-building route also plays strongly to Australias economic

interests. A quick look at our current trade patterns shows just how strongly weve tiedour own economic engine to Asian growth (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: Australias top ten trading partners, 200910

0 5 10Percent

15 20

0 5 10

Percent

15 2520

China

Japan

United States of America

Korea. Republic of

India

Singapore

United Kingdom

New Zealand

Thailand

Taiwan

TOTAL VALUE OF TWO-WAY TRADE, By major countries200910, percentage share

EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES, By major countries200910

% total exports value

% total imports value

China

Japan

United States of America

Korea. Republic of

India

Singapore

United Kingdom

New Zealand

Thailand

Taiwan

Source: ABS (2010).


25/48

ASPI Strategy 19


ASPI Strategy 19

Analysis of the graphs shows that were already strongly connected to Asian economicpartners. Seven of our top ten trade partners are Asian: China, Japan, South Korea, India,Singapore, Thailand and Taiwan. Two of the remaining three are our ANZUS allies, the USand New Zealand. The United Kingdom completes the list.

Our connection to India is the weakest of our economic connections to the three regionalgreat powers by a considerable margin. Its weakened in particular by an import gure thatslow even in comparison to our typical trade pattern with China and Japan, in which ourexports considerably overshadow our imports (the reverse of our trade pattern with the US).

But the broad message from the graphs is that Asian peace and growth have been importantstrategic assets for Australia. We should be doing what we can to cement those assets intoplace. If that conclusions true, we need to be careful in deciding to supplement our currentapproach to Asia by adding further options that might potentially undermine this rstapproach. As it is, we occasionally put lead in our own order-builder saddlebags merely bylack of proper consultation, for example. But trying to t alongside order building anotheroption that would deliberately require us to have a more exclusive charter of friends in Asiawould probably sit uncomfortably with our current role of being a partner to all and an

enemy of none.Still, theres a problem with the order-building route: it mightnt work. Building reliablesecurity communities is hard work, even within regions where the forces in favour of it are considerable (Adler and Barnett 1998, Murray 2010). The patchy record of Asianinstitutionalism is evidence of just how hard it will be to grow a genuine sense of communityin Asia. Moreover, this is an Asia typi ed by a sense of sudden empowerment after some years of rapid economic growth and the faltering of the US position after the global nancialcrisis, and characterised by prickly, introverted, nationalistic great powers. At a minimum,we need to be cautious about an Asia where therell be competitive pressures as well ascooperative ones.

...theres a problem with the order-building route:it mightnt work.

It pays to remember that the recent debate about Australias future role has developedwithin the current policy framework of order building and cooperation. That suggeststhat this approach, by itself, doesnt give us suf cient leverage for the age of geopoliticaltransformation thats now upon us. Some sense that the order-building approach hasplateaued in its ability to deliver stable security outcomes. Others worry that power assetsin Asia are growing more strongly than regional security cooperation. Thats meant that theorder-building option has been unable to allay growing fears in Australia about the sheerpace of geopolitical transformation.

So, over the past few years Australian analysts have begun to revisit the whole area of Asias strategic future. The publics been treated to a variety of analyses and assessmentsof that future and of Australias potential role in it. The 2009 Defence White Paper sketchedseveral plausible Asian futuressome in which the security environment would becharacterised by cooperation, but also others of a darker complexion. The Lowy Institute


26/48



released a publication canvassing four future scenarios: continuing US primacy, an emergingbalance of power, Chinese primacy, or a concert of powers (Cook et al. 2010). And theWhite and Babbage papers sit against that broader backdrop of declaratory policy andscenario-based speculation.

...over the past few years Australian analysts have begun torevisit the whole area of Asias strategic future.

Whites paper in particular spawned something of a debate among journalists andacademics. Greg Sheridan has been perhaps the most vociferous of Whites critics, arguing infavour of the durability of US power and in uence and in support of a broader understandingof the emerging regional security environment. In a piece for the Australian Literary Review ,Sheridan (2011a) observed that three generic factors would apply in all future scenarios:

the rise of China would be accompanied by the rise of several other great Asian powers,

and a range of lesser powers the US alliance system would easily outweigh Chinas small ring of friends the US wouldnt disappear from history even if Chinese economic growth, down the

track, were to generate a Chinese economy that matched the US one.

Some of the debate has been more abstract and academic. Andrew Phillips, for example, hasargued in favour of a different framing of power growth in shaping Asias future, pointingout that in recent centuries Asian countries weakness has been an important source of regional con icts, and that their return to strength is an indicator of likely future stability andconvergence (Phillips 2011). Michael Wesley, the Lowy Institute director, has pointed similarlyto a world marked by great convergence (Wesley 2011a). Nick Bisley has argued that Whitescalculus is both too stark and turns too much upon the single variable of military power(Bisley 2011).

With their different views of Asias prospective strategic futures, Australians are probablynot too different from citizens of other regional countries, or indeed of the US itself. Thedifferences are much less evident in the realm of Australian strategic interests, whichseem largely to be taken for granted by commentators. Whats interesting is just how

much differences in recommended strategies derive from shifting judgments aboutthe environment.

Essentially, the debates about how much a transformational external environment shoulddrive a reformation in Australian strategic thinking. Some say the transformations overstatedand more apparent than real (Sheridan). Others say the transformations real, worrying forAustralia, and will wreak a reformation in our strategic thinking (White). Still others say thetransformations real but reassuring, and likely to serve as the basis for a more stable, positiveregional order (Phillips). True, we cant be sure of the scale of transformation, and so must be

prepared to move in different directions as the future unfolds, but we need to begin thinkingnow about how Australia lives in an Asia thats perhaps more power-de ned than wedlike and less order-de ned than wed hope. Important parameters of that new Asia arent


27/48

ASPI Strategy 21


ASPI Strategy 21

yet xed. For example, we dont know how easily Asian power will translate into regionalleadership; how the elements of competition and cooperation will interact on speci c issues(North Korea, for example); how much potential partners will share our own assessmentsabout Asias future and be willing to embrace new approaches.

Likely and unlikely Asias

While we should prepare to live in the most likely Asia, we must also have available strategiesto live in the less likely Asias. A situation in which Asian great powers are happy with

the status quo doesnt require us to do much, but down the other end of the spectrum(a diminishing US role, or heated Asian great power strategic competition, or both) thereexists the potential for a much bleaker future. In those futures (there are probably more thanone), Australia has more serious choices to make. What part does it want to play in Asiansecurity balances? Does it want to be more of a loner?

Sooner or later, if Australia intends to play a larger role in Asian security, it must attempt toanswer the question that we often pose to others: do we have a narrative for how Australianpower bene ts Asias strategic future?


28/48


22 ASPI Strategy

austRalia as a poweRfolloweRbandwagoningwith an asian gReat poweR

One way for Australia to think about its future in a changing Asiawould be to try for a new wine in old bottles approach. We coulduse a strategy that were familiar withbandwagoning with a greatand powerful friendbut adapt it to embrace an Asian great powerpartner. Bandwagoning is a natural role for Australia: weve done it sincewhite settlement. We typically address our principal strategic orderingchallenge by partnering with a strong player at the global level.

Over our history, our partnerships with both Britain and the US havebeen pillars of our strategic policy. Those pillars were built upon ashared assumption: that enhancing a stable, bene cial global order isthe key mechanism for ensuring Australias security closer to home.In short, if there were a stable global order, Australias regional strategicneeds would fall into place. The rise of the self-reliance school of strategic thinking since the 1970s and 1980s has tended to dilute theprominence of this assumption in public discourse. Instead, Australians

have increasingly been encouraged to believe the reversethat if weconcentrate more on managing our strategic needs closer to home wecan become less dependent on great-power partnerships further a eld.As the self-reliance school has waxed, so the concept of followershiphas waned.

Past performance

What does our history tell us about Australias predilection for

bandwagoning? Five points merit special mention: Australias traditional great-power partnerships have both been

with Western powersan important point to underline, sinceneither of them constituted much of a challenge to Australiascultural identity.

Chapter 4


29/48

ASPI Strategy 23

Australia as a power followerbandwagoning with an Asian great power

ASPI Strategy 23

Australias partnerships have both been with the dominant maritime power of the day.We have no experience of partnering with land-based great powers. Our strategic relationships with our great-power partners tend to be long-lived. ANZUS

will be celebrating its 60th anniversary in September this year, and the British connection,dating back to settlement and tied by the strings of kinship and empire, lasted evenlonger than that. Strategically, we like durability in our partnerships.

Both of our traditional partnerships were strengthened by military engagements:Australians fought and died on the same battlefields as their partners.

Australians tend not to swap their great and powerful friends easily. Indeed, we haveswapped only once in our historyand that in the dire circumstances of a world war andthe imminent prospect of an invasion of the Australian continent.

How much of this history could we transfer to a geopolitically transformed Asia? Well, werenot looking to substitute a closer tie to an Asian partner for our alliance with the US, so not allof the same logic would apply. Were looking to complement our US relationship, not replaceit, so perhaps the inhibition on swapping wouldnt apply. And perhaps we arent looking fora formal treaty detailing speci c military commitments in speci ed instances. Still, important

parts of the traditional logic would apply. Wed probably be looking to partner with a greatpower that didnt challenge our cultural identity, that had some strengths in the maritime

eld, that seemed likely to be a durable partner, and that had both the military competenceand the political will to ght alongside Australia on future battle elds.

When we turn to the likely Asian great powers of the coming decadesChina, Japan andIndiathe dif culty of turning those requirements into a practical strategic partnershipbecome more apparent. Of course, we already have formalised partnerships with Japan andIndia, so wed need to identify what it is we want the new Asian partner to deliver. Under the

existing partnerships, we have outlined our shared agreements about the nature of regionalpublic goods and our commitment to them. So, if were to move beyond those agreements,we need to be clear about where were headed and how fast we want to get there. Basically,closer partnerships would probably be about several things: con rming our place in Asia (anidentity outcome); nding a seat at the table in Asian strategic councils (an access outcome);enhancing Asian strategic stability during a period of geopolitical transformation (a positivestrategic outcome); enhancing Australias core strategic interests (a defence outcome); and,to a limited extent, obtaining security guarantees for Australian strategic interests (limitedbecause wed still have ANZUS and self-reliance as two key strategies, and this engagementwould really be about us being a shaper in Asia).

When we turn to the likely Asian great powers of the comingdecadesChina, Japan and Indiathe difficulty of turningthose requirements into a practical strategic partnershipbecome more apparent.

Thinking through that list of objectives helps to clarify the objectives of our bandwagoningin Asia. The list might plausibly form the basis of a more coherent strategic narrative thatthe Australian Government could retail to the Australian public and to friends and allies


30/48



overseas, but it would also help guide us in devising possible outcomes of such partnerships:reassurance, access, enhanced regional stability, protection of our core interests, andsupplementation of Australias current defence capabilities.

A key problem with going down this route is that bandwagoning with an Asian great power(regardless of which) would entangle Australia directly in great-power tensions in theAsiaPaci c. (Indeed, some of that concern seems already to colour debate about Australiascontinuing alliance with the US.) So far, those tensions are relatively well managed, but theyturn upon deep-seated historical friction pointsincluding previous wars in both the

ChinaJapan and the ChinaIndia bilateral relationships. So there could easily be a potentialcost to Australia of a direct, close great-power linkage to an Asian partner. We need tobeware of pre-limiting our strategic options as Asias future unfolds. Prematurely paintingonly one Asian great power as our partner (Japan, for example) or, just as bad, prematurelypainting one great power as our likely adversary (China, for example) is unhelpful. Weneed to be cautious about depicting China as an adversary. It isnt. Well be living witha China in transition for many years yet and, as noted above, our relationship with Chinaisnt monochromatic. In practical terms, Australia is most able to nurture partnershiparrangements with Asian countries precisely in those circumstances in which the Asian

security environment is relatively convivial.

Prematurely painting only one Asian great power as ourpartner (Japan, for example) or, just as bad, prematurelypainting one great power as our likely adversary (China,for example) is unhelpful.

This option would also be domestically contentious. Even among conservative Australiangovernments theres been a tendency to frame Australian strategic engagement with Asia inbroad, cooperative terms. Alexander Downer, for example, once noted that Australia simplywasnt interested in pursuing hegemonic designs in Asia:

By regional power I dont mean that we dominate others in our region. We dont aspire tohegemony. Thats not our style. We work cooperatively, within international norms and

towards the common good. (Downer 2006)

Our positioning of ourselves alongside one of the principal Asian power brokers for thedecades to come would take us directly into a more strategically competitive role.

True, weve been a solid supporter of US primacy in Asia, but thats because weve beeninclined to see that role in softer terms. Weve seen the US as the builder of an open, liberalregional system. Indeed, the notion that every Asian great power has risen precisely the samewaythrough that system of open trade and closer integrationis proof that the systemhasnt been designed to exclude others but to engage them. As both a bene ciary of thesystem and a believer in its continuing relevance for Asias future, Australia will naturally bedrawn to Asian great powers that favour a similar position.


31/48

ASPI Strategy 25

Australia as a power followerbandwagoning with an Asian great power

ASPI Strategy 25

Australian political bipartisanshipA second domestic issue should also be noted. At least in recent decades, the Labor Partyhas been deliberately trying to put some distance between itself and Australias traditionalrole of partnering with great and powerful friends. When Paul Keating was delivering theJohn Curtin Prime Ministerial Library Anniversary Lecture, for example, he went out of hisway to detail two forms of Australian engagement:

a conservative predilection for great and powerful friends a Labor inclination to work more as an activist middle power, building coalitions of

support in relation to particular issues. (Keating 2002)

Its far from clear that the Labor Party would be drawn into a policy of seeking a greatand powerful friend from among the ranks of Asian great powers, althoughafter PrimeMinister Gillards speech to the US Congress in Marchneither is it in any hurry to abandonthe great and powerful friend it has now. Our relationship with the US means that we alreadyhave an important relationship with an AsiaPaci c great power; its just a great powerthats more Paci c than Asian.

In short, for Australia to choose to shelter under the protective wing of an Asian great powerwould probably require some decisive historical event that made that option seem moreattractive and simultaneously deprived us of the shelter to which weve become accustomed.In other words, the attractions of a tight bond to one of the Asian great powers could wellincrease if the Asian strategic environment grew noticeably darker and the US were lessreadily available as a partner. The second condition seems unlikely to be ful lled: US primacyin Asia looks likely to become more geographically and temporally patchy, but the US isntabout to disappear as an important player in Asian security.

US primacy in Asia looks likely to become more geographicallyand temporally patchy, but the US isnt about to disappear asan important player in Asian security.

Its possible, of course, that our current great-power protector mightnt be immediately

available during crises. That was the experience we had with the fall of Singaporein World War II, when Britain was distracted by events elsewhere in the world andcomparatively poorly placed to leap to Australias defence. The US could nd itself similarlydistracted by future eventsafter all, its carrying the water in a lot of theatresbut thisproblem is generic in all bandwagoning relationships. We wouldnt solve it merely by tyingourselves to an Asian great power instead of a Western one.

Besides, if Australia did suddenly nd itself in urgent need of a great and powerful friendin Asia, could Australians even agree on which Asian great power would have most appeal?

Relations with India have been tful (Mayer and Jain 2010), partly because of Australiastendency to neglect its western frontier. Relations with Japan have been commercial, andeven a closer strategic partnership in recent years has been tempered by Japans continuingreluctance to embrace a larger strategic role in Asia. Relations with China have been colouredby high levels of economic interaction but comparatively low levels of strategic trust.


32/48



Maintaining the US allianceWhen those questions are considered at face value, it becomes apparent why Australiawill be extremely reluctant to grow a new great-power bandwagoning relationship in Asia.In essence, of course, we already have one. The ANZUS alliance relates directly to events inthe Paci c area. Our relationship with the US is broad enough that it directly encompassesour support for a large and continuing US presence in the AsiaPaci c. If Australias goingto put further effort into bandwagoning, then it might do that most effectively by buildingbetter supportive structures for an ongoing US role in Asia during a period of relative US

decline. In particular, as the strategic signi cance of Southeast Asia increases, Australia canbe of direct assistance to Washington, as it already seems to be, by providing access andmilitary cooperation to the subregion.

This shouldnt be seen as our attempt to create a separate subregional competitionfor Washingtons attention. Canberra wouldnt be interested in pulling US attentionsouthwards at the expense of US commitment to Northeast Asiaone of the geopoliticalfulcrums of the current global order. And the US would certainly not want its own greaterfocus on Southeast Asia to be perceived as ducking the increasing risks associated with its

commitments in Northeast Asia. Such perceptions would only complicate the US role in theregion and increase nervousness among US allies and partners.

Accepting the fact that we already have a bandwagon partner in Asia, even if not an Asianone, it will be hard for us to grow another bandwagoning relationship within the region.It would be especially hard for us to grow one with an Asian great power whose strategicworldview wasnt relatively closely aligned with Washingtons. A free choice of bandwagoningpartners in Asia would require us essentially to have lost the Western bandwagoning partnerthat we have now, and that condition doesnt seem close. However, even in that (remote)

free choice environment, Australian culture would continue to lay down some constraints.For example, weve never had a bandwagoning relationship with an authoritarian greatpower. Its hard to imagine that Australia would see its strategic interests best served inthe 21st century by building such a relationship. A free choice might only truly exist if weencounter a range of Asian great powers all blessed with some variant of liberal democracy.

Finally, theres a problem of effectiveness. Asian great powers are typically insular, and insularpowers dont make good leaders. They dont usually have compelling narratives at hand thattell of their own importance as regional leaders. So, as Ronald Brownstein once wrote, In aworld where the dominant power is hobbled and the rising power is insular, disorder may bethe new default (Brownstein 2010). One of the challenges wed encounter in partnering witha new great and powerful friend in Asia is that wed be tying ourselves to an insular powerunwilling to deliver the regional security structure that might maximise Australian security.

The cultural inhibitions to a closer partnership in Asia might well prove problematic: thehistory of close partnerships between Western and non-Western cultures is mixed, at best(Luft 2010). Cultural issues complicate partnerships, but they rarely, by themselves, stoppartnerships altogether. Warriors of different cultures have fought together for the samecauses since antiquity. The broad trajectory of the future is one in which Western powerand in uence are in relative decline and non-Western power and in uence are in relativeascendancy. Were already past the time when we could be happy to rely solely uponstrategic connections to our close Western partners.


33/48

ASPI Strategy 27

Chapter 5

austRalia as a poweR buildeRin a southeast asian poweR coRe

The second novel option is for Australia to help forge a new, distinctpower core where one hasnt existed before. This would be a radicallydifferent path from the sort Australia has traditionally followed. It doesntmean merely boosting Australias own power and capabilitieswerealready allowing that option under the self-reliance leg of the tripodbut building a Southeast Asian power core, and not just an Australian one.

The essential attraction of this approach lies in its mimicry of the growthof distinct power bubbles elsewhere in Asia. At the moment, the tendency

is to identify most readily the bubbles that arise from the growth of Chinese and Indian power and the reassertion of a more operationallyrelevant Japanese Self-Defense Force in Asia, but those bubbles tend tobe in Northeast, East or South Asia. The Southeast Asian landscape is sofar not aligned to any bubble; indeed, parts of the region appear to bestrengthening their ties to the US security network. Southeast Asia isnt amarginal strategic region. As noted in the 2011 Strategic assessment (Lyonand Clegg 2011), it boasts a combined population of over 600 millionpeople and ASEAN countries have a combined GDP larger thanGermanys. (Adding Australia to those totals makes a negligible differenceto the population gure, but adds almost 30% to the GDP gure.)

ASEAN

Some will argue, of course, that adding together ASEANs strategicpotential and treating it as a single unit is fatuous, since ASEAN has neverrepresented a single strategic entity. Thats true: an overt, hardenedstrategic coresomething that took regional resilience one step furtheralong a more militarised pathwould clearly test the level of strategiccongruence and coherence in Southeast Asia. ASEAN countries haventtypically articulated strategic policies based on hard power, and theyvebeen ( par excellence ) committed to notions of order-building, both withinthe subregion and beyond it. But do we need all of ASEAN to be on board


34/48



in order to create a relatively substantial power core across the region? ASEAN comprises arange of countries, some much larger than the others. Differing levels of strategic potentialcould be attained by partnering with different states, casting the net either wider ornarrower depending upon likely areas of strategic consensus.

If such a Southeast Asian power core could be built, it would complement Australiasself-reliance policy but would require Australia to engage much more with its neighboursor at least some of its neighboursas full strategic partners. We should take as our startingpoint an objective that we want to build with our regional partners a relationship thats at

least half as strong as the one we currently enjoy with the Americans. Critics might say thataims too low. In one sense it does, but it also aims at an objective that, if realised, wouldrevolutionise Canberras regional relationships.

Indonesia

One obvious partnership, if we could realise it, would be with Indonesia. That wouldcomplement geographical proximity with high complementarity (each has things thatthe other lacks). And, applying William Rikers theory of coalition building to the problem,

we should aim at building the minimal winning coalition (Riker 1962). Moreover, it wouldbe easier to work just with one other major player. The CIA World Factbooksuggests thatin economic terms (using purchasing power parity data) adding Australia and Indonesiatogether would give a combined economic unit equivalent to about France or Italy, butwith four times Frances 65 million population.

How would we set about building the power core? In other parts of Asia, economic growthhas been the key driver of strategic in uence, so as a rst step we ought to think about apossible Southeast Asian power core in economic terms. What can we do to boost boththe Australian and Indonesian economies? Closer economic cooperation should be afundamental pillar of a closer relationship. After all, an economically stronger Indonesiawould make a better partner for Australia. A glance back at Australias major ten tradepartners shows that Indonesia hasnt been among them, but it hasnt been far off that list:indeed, the trade statistics show that it was our fourteenth largest trade partner in 200910.

The growth of our power assets would, over time, enhance our capacities to act together instrategically signi cant ways. What would we want to do together? Thats a hard question,and one we cant answer without talking a good deal more to the Indonesians. Initially, suchdiscussions might well focus on what, if anything, the two countries can do together in amore power-de ned (and less order-shaped) Asia. Do we even see power-related challengesthe same way? Conversely, do we share similar perceptions about the relative strategic costsand bene ts of creating some sort of more integrated strategic unit in Southeast Asia?What might that integrated unit look like? What could we do practically together to growa Southeast Asian power core?

At a certain point, wed want that power core to have some level of military interaction.We could devise considerably closer plans for military cooperation, with more joint exercisingand training and greater interoperability between force structures as a rst step. Perhapswe could look at building some sort of joint ready reaction force (taking a leaf out of theEuropean handbook)? Why couldnt we have agreements to use each others ports and basesin times of crisis? Maybe if we could run Australian submarines out of Indonesian ports we


35/48

ASPI Strategy 29

Australia as a power builderin a Southeast Asian power core

ASPI Strategy 29

might be able to redesign the requirements for those submarines capabilities. In the longerterm, the ladder might reach considerably higher than a rst step: why couldnt we do jointprocurement on some key capital items? Why couldnt we do joint manning of military units,so that, say, some Australian naval crews might consist of up to 25% Indonesian servicemen,and vice versa. It might be an experiment worth trying, starting with one military unit(whether it be maritime, land or air).

Wed need to beware of a partnership that focused on Indonesias internal challenges; thatwould probably prove a dif cult area. We can do close cooperation on terrorist threats

(were already doing it), but Australians would be wary about being sucked too deeply intocon icts that might have great domestic resonance in Indonesian politics but less strategicimportance for Australia. Our logical area for cooperation is in building on shared interestsin relation to non-domestic issues. Each country is attached to something of a concept of regional resilience and not merely national resilience, and its that regional area that probablyoffers the best prospects for cooperation.

Our logical area for cooperation is in building on sharedinterests in relation to non-domestic issues.

Taking initial steps towards a more integrated force structure might be easier than tackling alarger issue of strategic vision: deciding when and how we wanted to act together. Australiawouldnt want to abandon its US connection, and that might entail engagementsfuturecounter-terrorist operations in Muslim countries, for examplein which Indonesia wouldntwish to be automatically engaged. But the closer potential engagements come to beingSoutheast Asian ones, the more likely it is that the two countries might wish to act jointly.Indeed, thats the whole point of trying to develop a Southeast Asian po

australia strategy

Documents