This article was downloaded by: [University of Birmingham]On: 11 November 2014, At: 18:59Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registeredoffice: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Australian Journal of InternationalAffairsPublication details, including instructions for authors andsubscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/caji20

Australian-African relations 2002:Another lookJolyon FordPublished online: 09 Jun 2010.

To cite this article: Jolyon Ford (2003) Australian-African relations 2002: Another look, AustralianJournal of International Affairs, 57:1, 17-33, DOI: 10.1080/1035771032000073614

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1035771032000073614

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the“Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis,our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as tothe accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinionsand views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Contentshould not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sourcesof information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims,proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever orhowsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arisingout of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Anysubstantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms &Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 57, No. 1,pp. 17–33, 2003

Australian-African relations 2002:another look

JOLYON FORD

Various recent developments and events in Africa, including the involvement in2002 of the Prime Minister of Australia in Commonwealth initiatives in relationto Zimbabwe, have made it timely to review the nature and extent of Australia’srelations with African countries. This commentary describes current Australianpolicies on Africa, including trade relations and aid programs, against thebackground of the political and economic situation in Africa in the newmillennium. In conclusion, the comment is made that Australia’s dealings withAfrican countries might have more significance to its own interests than isgenerally acknowledged. This is so particularly in respect of common stand-points on multilateral trade issues, and the future of the British Commonwealth.

Introduction

Aside from the profile given to African events in Australia in 2002 as a result ofthe Prime Minister’s chairing of the Commonwealth Chairperson’s Committee(‘troika’) on Zimbabwe, Australia’s relationships with sub-Saharan African coun-tries continue not to be the subject, in Australia, of any great deal of official,commercial, public, media, or academic interest.

Given Australia’s inevitable focus on the Asia-Pacific region, this is hardlysurprising. The most thorough recent official examination of aspects of the overallrelationship with Africa was that of the Joint Standing Committee (JSC) on ForeignAffairs, Defence and Trade in its 1996 report Australia’s Relations with SouthernAfrica. The report, noting that Africa may have ‘drifted off into the periphery ofAustralian consciousness’, cited as explanation the relatively small volume of tradebetween the two continents, the perceived limited relevance of events in Africa toAustralian domestic politics, the geographical, historical and socio-cultural dis-tances involved, and the Australian public’s perception of an homogenous entity inan incurable state of constant crisis (JSC 1996).

It is now timely, however, to briefly reassess the nature and extent of Australia’sinteractions with African countries, and to reflect upon the likely evolution ofAustralian policy and practice on Africa. At the same time, it is appropriate toconsider certain recent developments on the continent, particularly in southernAfrica. This is not only so as to gauge the significance, if any, of these events from

ISSN 1035-7718 print/ISSN 1465-332X online/03/010017-17 2003 Australian Institute of International Affairs

DOI: 10.1080/1035771032000073614

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f B

irm

ingh

am]

at 1

8:59

11

Nov

embe

r 20

14

18 J. Ford

Australia’s perspective, but also so as to comment on the wider ongoingsignificance of these developments for the African continent itself. This commen-tary aims to do so.

After setting out the prevailing economic and political climate in which notablerecent developments have taken place (including the growth in and state of tradingrelations with South Africa), remarks are made concerning the present direction ofAustralian trade, aid and political policy concerning Africa. It is worth noting thatany examination of Australia’s relationships with African countries is likely tofocus on the countries of southern Africa. Any such study is in turn bound, as theJSC report observed, to concentrate on relations with South Africa. This reflectsSouth Africa’s fairly dominant role in the economic and political life of the regionand the fact that it tends to dominate Australian–African trade. The special andevolving relationship with South Africa is thus considered in relative detail. Inconclusion, the comment is made that Australia’s relationships and dealings withAfrican countries might have more significance to its own interests than isgenerally acknowledged. In particular, it is noted that Australia’s policy on Africais relevant to its own interests in the future of negotiations on world trade reform,to comparative governance standards in the South Pacific, and to the profile,purpose and overall future, in the new millennium, of the British Commonwealthas an institution.

The context—nothing new out of Africa?

Perhaps because it was, for much of the last two decades, viewed as an Africansuccess story, recent events in Zimbabwe (including the uncritical approach takenby most African leaders to the conduct of presidential elections there in March2002), have served in the last year to focus attention again on the quality ofAfrica’s leadership generally and have added to international concern and specu-lation about the political and economic future of the continent as a whole. Thoseobservers who have put to one side the crippling virulence of the continent’scolonial structural legacy as a general explanation for the African situation,generally cite poor governance (on a base of weak public and civil institutionsrelative to an influential military, and internal, often ethnic-based disunity), as aprimary reason for the marginalisation and overall deterioration of conditions inAfrica post-decolonisation. The burden of the massive level of national debt ofmost African countries (itself partly related to past mismanagement and corruption)is another often-cited explanation for the continent’s inability to lift itself up.

The advent of the new millennium saw the continent grappling, in addition to apervasive general political and economic instability, with particular problemsincluding regional food insecurity and drought, certain long-standing conflicts, analarming increase in rural-urban migration, and the AIDS/HIV crisis.

The wider contextual setting in which these problems manifest themselves is, ofcourse, well documented: richly endowed with resources, in broad terms Africa’smacroeconomic performance has been relatively unresponsive to changes in globaldemand conditions. Its economies being historically based around production for

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f B

irm

ingh

am]

at 1

8:59

11

Nov

embe

r 20

14

Australian-African relations 2002: another look 19

export to the colonial municipality, Africa suffers from basic economic structuralweaknesses: a low degree of integration in the world economy and an excessivereliance on agriculture and primary commodities exports, with a low domesticmanufacturing base. Africa as a whole has not benefited from trends in worldeconomic growth, and most visibly it has shown a poor rate of growth comparedto other groups of emerging market economies, including Asian and Pacificeconomies (World Bank 2001). The continent contributes to just 0.7% of totalworld trade, yet receives 31% of all aid from all sources. Many African govern-ments depend on aid for half of their recurrent expenditure (Downer 2002).

Mozambique having found long-awaited peace and civil reconciliation in thelatter 1990s, there have been other peace initiatives and successes in 2002: asuccessful democratic election in troubled Sierra Leone, peace agreements inrelation to the Democratic Republic of Congo (a conflict that was seriouslyundermining wider regional stability), the death of Jonas Savimbi and settlementwith UNITA in Angola, and admirable international boundary and other disputeresolution between Eritrea and Ethiopia and between Nigeria and Cameroon (intheir public acceptance of a boundary dispute judgment of the International Courtof Justice in relation to resource-rich coastal areas). However, a comprehensivecommentary on recent events in Africa would record reported election fraudallegations, civil unrest or instability, or serious corruption scandals in (amongothers) Cameroon, Central African Republic, Cote D’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea,Madagascar, Malawi, and Togo. Serious conflicts smoulder on in Liberia, Congo-Brazzaville and Sudan (despite promising signs as a result of a ceasefire and peaceaccord there in July 2002).

I comment below on a recent tendency to perceive the arrival of a new, peacefuland energetic age in Africa. However, it appeared to many observers at the turn ofthe century that at a time when, with the end of the Cold War and Apartheid, thecontinent appeared to have been provided with a breathing space, Africa’s histori-cal political and economic marginalisation relative to the rest of the world was onlyworsening. Allied to this was the subsisting unbridged distance of African countriesfrom the vital centre of major global governance organs (Tandon 1999).

Australia’s expressed principal policy towards Africa in recent years, meanwhile,may be understood to have been to ‘promote economic reform and capacity-build-ing so as to improve the material conditions of Africans’. In tandem with this hasbeen the aim of development of viable markets in Australia’s own interests: Africais never going to be as significant for Australian trade as South and South EastAsia, but Australia has recognised the potential for growth and development ofAustralian-African trade in niche market areas including infrastructure reconstruc-tion, power generation and water technologies, tourism, telecommunications andtransport, mining and food production (JSC 1996). In addition and comingincreasingly to the fore is a policy aimed at developing convergence of views withAfrican countries on mutual interest in the reform to world trade, in particular inagricultural produce.

It is in the context of these realities and perceptions that I briefly describeAustralia’s present trade relations with South Africa and African Indian Ocean

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f B

irm

ingh

am]

at 1

8:59

11

Nov

embe

r 20

14

20 J. Ford

countries, before examining African initiatives, since this journal last coveredAfrican issues, to breathe fresh life into the continent.

Australian trade with Africa: South Africa and other unexplored potential

It is reflective of the existing aggregate of relations with Africa to comment inrelative detail on Australia’s particular trading and other relations with SouthAfrica. South Africa and Australia observably have a relatively good, and improv-ing, relationship, which has positive implications for trade and developmentinitiatives in the region generally. The two countries first exchanged diplomaticrelations in 1945, although the relationship has not always been firm, nor has itbeen easy to find common ground. Again, this is hardly surprising: until the 1990sthere were only a handful of ministerial visits, and if anything it was Australia, ofthe two, that until the Apartheid era craved a firmer relationship, concerned toprotect strategic sea communications to the United Kingdom (Tothill 1997). Therelationship, which otherwise centred around common membership of the Com-monwealth (until 1961), wartime co-participation and sport, of course deterioratedand collapsed in the late 1960s and 1970s as a result of Australian policy onApartheid in South Africa.

On the other hand, Australian support for the anti-Apartheid movement and forsanctions against Pretoria has served to increase its status in the view of Africancountries and the African National Congress, now the ruling party in South Africa.There is no doubt that a great deal of this goodwill subsists, with various positiveflow-on effects from a policy and trade perspective (Tierney, Sibraa 2002).

Austrade has identified South Africa as ‘the gateway for Australia to the region’(JSC 1996; Dollery and Worthington 1996). Certainly, the 1996 JSC report treatedthe country on this basis, and conditioned any of its various positive statementsabout the prospects for increased trade with southern African countries, on thegrowth and success and stability of the economy in South Africa’s new democracy.

It is possible to observe the strengthening of the bilateral relationship with SouthAfrica. There exist strong community-based relations, given significant numbers ofpersons residing in Australia of South African origin, but trade is the dominantelement of Australia’s present relations with South Africa.

South Africa, and other African countries, are often perceived as being competi-tors in some of Australia’s main export markets (including coal, wool and iron ore).This remains true to a considerable extent, although it does not appear to have hadthe effect of dulling actual trade between the regions. Australia’s trade with SouthAfrica has been growing noticeably since the mid-1990s (Tierney 2002). SouthAfrica is now Australia’s 20th largest export market, between the Philippines andthe United Arab Emirates, and Australia’s 22nd largest trading partner overall.Exports totalled $1.3 billion in 2001, a 3.2% growth from 2000 (Trade 2002). Themajor exports are items for which South Africa is itself known as a producer andexporter, and which feature in the list of the biggest imports to Australia fromSouth Africa: meat (excluding bovine), crude petroleum, coal, aluminum, leather(‘confidential items’ excluded). South Africa’s market potential is likely to increase

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f B

irm

ingh

am]

at 1

8:59

11

Nov

embe

r 20

14

Australian-African relations 2002: another look 21

as it continues to implement its WTO obligations. In 2001 South Africa wasAustralia’s fastest growing market for elaborately transformed manufactures, whichhave constituted a high proportion of total merchandise exports to South Africa.South Africa was Australia’s 25th largest import market in 2000–2001. Importsfrom South Africa in 2000–2001 amounted to over $800 million. The main importitems were passenger motor vehicles, televisions, crude petroleum, paper andpaperboard, and fish. Exports to the rest of Africa meanwhile fell from $280million in 1999–2000 to $151 million in 2000–2001, although imports rosesomewhat (DFAT 2001). Exports to Africa (other than South Africa) have grownby nearly 18% between 1996 and 2002 (DFAT 2002). Australian trade with the restof Africa has tended to be commodities-based, reflecting the relative mineral andagricultural wealth of both regions.

As to the level of Australian investment abroad, South Africa lies at 24th,between Ireland and Thailand. South Africa is the 19th biggest investor inAustralia, after Ireland but before South Korea (Trade 2002). The South Africangovernment appears most encouraging of foreign investment, and opportunities forAustralian companies are said to be especially good in agricultural and mineralprocessing, joint ventures with South African companies being the likely vehicle(JSC 1996). Moreover, the 1996 JSC report noted that advantages for Australianinvestors in South Africa include English language use, and similar businessculture, accounting practices and legal frameworks. However, a number of particu-lar factors critical to determining success or failure in the region were indicated.The report concluded that Australian businesses would need to make a commitmentto medium to long-term research in order to penetrate African markets, and beprepared to enter joint ventures and strategic alliances with local corporations andgovernment familiar with the peculiar African social, political and operationalconditions. In a wider sense, the report noted that Australian business wouldprobably take a while to warm to initiatives such as the ‘Look West’ policy of theWestern Australian government, discussed below. It is also fair to say that fulladvantage has perhaps not been taken in Africa by Australian business of variousAustrade initiatives, not necessarily directed to southern Africa, established in the1990s, such as the Export Market Development Grants scheme.

Not surprisingly, mining and mineral exploration is an area of particularAustralian involvement in Africa including and outside of South Africa. Forinstance, when DFAT facilitated an ‘Australia in Africa’ week in South Africa inJuly 2001, this was made to coincide with the ‘Australia in Sub-Saharan AfricaMining Conference’ (DFAT 2002). The BHP/Delta Gold Hartley platinum mine inZimbabwe was, until it collapsed, the largest single post-independence investmentin that country, at over US$200 million. The BHP-Billiton merger aside, a numberof Australian (mostly Western Australian) mining, mining equipment, explorationand services companies have invested in various African mining ventures and, inparticular, have indicated growing interest in exploring further mining opportunitiesin the relatively stable and progressive eastern-central African countries of Kenya,Tanzania and Uganda. Already, there are significant Australian commercial inter-ests in cobalt and alumina operations in Uganda and Mozambique respectively.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f B

irm

ingh

am]

at 1

8:59

11

Nov

embe

r 20

14

22 J. Ford

One discrete area in which there has been some positive bilateral cooperationwith South Africa, and which promises to be an effective aspect of the relationshipin future, is the combined maritime and military action in 2001 to protect scarcemarine resources, in particular Patagonian Toothfish, from piracy in the SouthernOcean, when a vessel with a cargo worth about $1 million was apprehended in ajoint operation between Australian and South African forces. An ad hoc agreementwith South Africa is presently in place to combat illegal fishing. Antarctic andSouthern Ocean issues, including cooperation on search and rescue, is an areawhere it is likely that the relationship will be strengthened at a governmental level.

Prospectively, another area of obvious shared concern, experience and expertise,noted by the 1996 JSC report, relates to the similar land and climate conditions, andthe challenges of farming large expanses of semi-arid land, deforestation anderosion. Thus prolonged drought and water system management are issues onwhich a great deal of technical expertise might be shared between African countriesand Australia. With a deal of development-related projects ongoing in Africa,particularly large infrastructure projects, relevant Australian companies wouldprobably find opportunities in the region, as would those specialising in theprovision of expert professional services in engineering and management.

In outlook, South Africa’s economic performance will affect that of much ofsouthern Africa, while its policy on African issues more generally, includingCommonwealth issues, is likely to be crucial to the development and direction ofthese issues. South Africa appears likely to remain an important trading partner ofAustralia and continue to be the primary gateway for any commercial engagementwith the sub-region generally. Australia is to host the next Joint MinisterialCommission in the first part of 2003, the focus of much of which is likely to bedirected towards trade relations and the perception of unexplored potential in SouthAfrican and wider African markets. In addition, in terms of Australia’s widerinterests and as developed below, South Africa is now a member, and was the firstAfrican one, of the Australian-led Cairns Group for change to the internationalagricultural trading system.

Australia and African Indian Ocean countries

Australia is a member of the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooper-ation (IOR-ARC), a group of nineteen Indian Ocean states formed with the aim offacilitating the growth of awareness of opportunities for trade and investment in theregion. It was launched in Mauritius in 1997, although its momentum has perhapsnot been sustained from those beginnings, and most recently met in May 2002.Australia’s participation in the IOR-ARC resulted from the ‘Look West’ strategydeveloped by the Western Australian government in the mid-1990s in conjunctionwith the federal government (Goldsworthy 1985).

The IOR-ARC is of particular interest to Western Australia, with WA companiesexporting merchandise worth around $5.2 billion to IOR-ARC Member States in2000–2001 (DFAT 2001). African members of the IOR-ARC include Kenya,Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, the Seychelles, South Africa, and Tanzania.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f B

irm

ingh

am]

at 1

8:59

11

Nov

embe

r 20

14

Australian-African relations 2002: another look 23

China, Egypt, France, Japan and the United Kingdom are ‘Dialogue Partners’(DFAT 2002). Most members, Australia included, seek to broaden the group toinclude input from Indian Ocean-dependant, land-locked, non-littoral states such asZimbabwe. Agreement on membership is probably critical to whether the group isseen at all as a viable trade and policy forum: the region is very diffuse, and thevarious members are very heterogeneous and diverse in terms of size and popu-lation, wealth and wealth distribution, rate of growth, etc. The region is nototherwise, or even geographically, a natural trading bloc. As such, members areafter economic cooperation rather than integration (Rajan and Marwah 1997).

Trade with all IOR-ARC countries accounts for about 16 to 18% of Australia’stotal trade. From 1994 to 1998, Australia’s trade with IOR-ARC member countriesincreased by 31%, while imports continue to grow by an average of 6% per annum.Australia’s merchandise trade with IOR countries increased by 35% in the 1995–99period, 14% higher than the increase in merchandise trade with OECD countries(21%). It is said that growth in food and beverage processing in countries such asIndia and South Africa may also provide opportunities for the export of Australianexpertise and technology, for example, dairy processing equipment or packagingtechnology, while opportunities in relation to telecommunications and informationtechnology are said to reflect a move towards the privatisation, liberalisation andexpansion of existing telecommunications systems and include options in relativelysimple but evolving markets such as Mozambique (DFAT 2001).

Australia’s aid to Africa

Aside from trade, development assistance and humanitarian aid is a prominentfeature in the totality of Australia’s relationship with African countries and the areain which it is often most visible in Africa itself (Ford 2002). The objectives ofAustralia’s aid program include human resource development, capacity-building,institutional governance and democratisation. The most frequent requests are forAustralian technical expertise, particularly in the education, water and sanitation,landcare and labour market sectors (JSC 1996). It might be noted that in generalterms Australia has now slipped two places to 15th on the OECD aid donors’ list,measured proportionally to GNP. Although aid donations directly from the Aus-tralian community have risen by an average 13% a year, in 2002–2003 develop-ment assistance is to be only 0.25% of GNP. This is the lowest ever level, and wellbelow the UN target of 0.7% for a country of Australia’s level of development(ACFOA, 2002).

The 2002–2003 Budget reveals an official program estimate of $35.6 million anda total aid flow of $60.1 million to Africa (grouped for both aid and trade purposeswith the Middle East) (Budget, 2002). It is clear that Australia will now concentratein Africa on indirect, selective assistance. Australian aid will focus on governance,education and HIV/AIDS in southern Africa (Downer 2002). Australia has alsoprovided (through its separate emergency program) natural disaster support andrelief in Africa on a case by case basis, for example support to Mozambique duringand after massive floods in March 2000 in that country.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f B

irm

ingh

am]

at 1

8:59

11

Nov

embe

r 20

14

24 J. Ford

The structure of Australia’s recent official assistance programs reveals anincreasing focus on providing practical training assistance to Africans to enablethem to contribute and be heard on global economic reform, something discussedbelow and something that is also in Australia’s wider interest. It remains to be seenwhether there will be significant public or NGO criticism of the increasinglynarrow or targeted focus of direct Australian official aid to African countries, andits policy to rely more on the indirect provision of aid. Critics of the new policymight argue that the decision to direct assistance towards efforts to increase Africancapacity to take part in multilateral negotiations is one based too heavily onAustralia’s self-interest and one that results in a decline in available aid for urgentprojects. However, compared to year-to-year provision of aid, even if directed tocapacity building, increased trade opportunities and the removal of barriers toparticipating in the global economy are strategies of vastly more potential toAfrican growth and empowerment and self-respect. It is perhaps encouraging, froman African perspective, that Australia’s most recent aid policy statements appear toexpressly recognise this (Downer 2002). Recent ministerial expression has beengiven in Australia to the fact that aid, however well-directed, is itself no solutionto the economic problems of the developing world and can not amount to morethan a fraction of what can be obtained by developing countries through trade andinvestment (Vaile 2002).

2002 and the African Union: something new out of Africa?

July 2002 saw the launch of the African Union, successor body to the Organisationof African Unity (OAU). The plan is that the body will eventually have a securitycouncil, a parliamentary forum, rationalisation of intra-continental duties andtariffs, central banking and a court of general jurisdiction. A common currency isindicated but is by any estimate a very long way off.

The African Union has been officially welcomed and supported by the EuropeanUnion and other significant regional and national entities. It is too early, andbeyond the scope of this commentary, to reflect at any length on the possible profileand effectiveness of the body. Continental and regional political and economicrecovery is greatly assisted by the progress of individual countries such as Uganda,but instability is perceived to be contagious particularly by an internationalcommunity that continues to see Africa as one homogenous zone. It is, for onething, interesting that the new body is, like the OAU, to be headquartered in AddisAbaba, Ethiopia. The African Union has a big enough task, part of which is todistance itself from the record of the OAU. While the OAU had an effectiveanti-colonial and anti-apartheid voice, it did very little in the course of its existenceby way of effective dispute settlement between African states, and its record ofpeer-review and criticism in the context of multiple gross abuses of power byAfrican leaders was notably poor. It will be interesting to see whether the patternof African reluctance to publicly criticise other leaders will give way to effectivepeer censure. Cynical commentators have observed that an international Africanorganisation is unlikely to be very much more than the sum of its various parts.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f B

irm

ingh

am]

at 1

8:59

11

Nov

embe

r 20

14

Australian-African relations 2002: another look 25

The launch of the African Union followed several other recent developments onthe continent. The familiar problems of African countries have been noted above.In recent years, and not least since 1994–1996 and the birth of a new South Africa,observers (many of them African) have identified the beginning of an ‘AfricanRenaissance’ and the crystallisation of a new, African approach to the continent’stroubles. The foremost proponent of this positive message is undoubtedly SouthAfrican President Thabo Mbeki, successor to Nelson Mandela. Mbeki’s ideas onAfricanism, unity and rejuvenation closely resemble those of, among others,Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah, icon of Cold War African nationalism and a father ofthe idea of pursuing an overarching African socio-political unity with an African-centred outlook. Nkrumah believed that part of the continent’s problems lay in thelack of a single, uniting African polity able to bring weight to bear in internationaldecisions affecting Africa. He believed that the only antidote to a chaotic descentinto multiple, ethnicity-based mini-states was a centralised federation-type unity.He was instrumental establishing the OAU in 1963.

Mbeki’s Africanist vision is reflected in the ‘partnership of mutual accountabilityand responsibility between North and South’ represented by the New Partnershipfor Africa’s Development, NEPAD. It has been adopted as policy by the AfricanUnion. Part of the initiative has been the Millennium African Project (MAP), thekey theme to which is a united commitment by African leaders ‘to take ownershipand responsibility for the sustainable economic development of the continent’ so asto address ‘the continued marginalisation of Africa from the globalisation process,and the social exclusion of the vast majority of our people’ that constitutes ‘aserious threat to global social stability’ (RSA 2001). As Mbeki told the WorldEconomic Forum in New York in January 2001, the focus of NEPAD is increasedinvestment, rather than increased aid, or at least better targeted aid and technicalsupport aimed at existing capacity constraints, and includes a telecommunicationsstrategy for Africa. Mbeki has set up the African Renaissance Institute, dedicatedto ‘the creation of conditions for sustained democracy’. The focus on entrenchingdemocracy and on improved governance is clear. President Mbeki has, uponvarious occasions, expressly acknowledged that improving the quality of Africangovernance is not a goal secondary to or necessarily dependent upon further aid oreconomic upliftment (although improved governance and institution-building maythemselves require material aid and technical assistance).

The NEPAD idea was put to G8 leaders in early July 2002, and emerged withsome support. While African countries did not get everything they wanted from theG8 meeting—subsidies, trade barriers and debt relief being disappointments forthem—Africa received some substantial aid commitments (up to half of the totalG8 aid budget, although conditional on meeting governance outcomes) and acommitment to African input to and leadership of the development agenda.However, donors will be keen for details on how past corrupt or inefficientpractices and uses will be avoided (Herbert 2002).

Right at the centre of NEPAD is the ‘Democracy and Political GovernanceInitiative’ which sets out standards and conduct of good governance. The regimefor external peer review and censure in the ‘African Peer Review Mechanism’ is

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f B

irm

ingh

am]

at 1

8:59

11

Nov

embe

r 20

14

26 J. Ford

both a large chunk of the cornerstone of Mbeki’s vision, and the part most undercriticism since NEPAD was launched in 2001. This has mostly been in relation tothe reaction of African leaders, including Mbeki, to events in Zimbabwe, includingthe chaotic land reform program and the re-election of Robert Mugabe in electionsthat were described by the Commonwealth Observer Group in that country as notbeing free and fair. Mbeki’s NEPAD efforts, and South Africa’s image, stood to bediscredited internationally in the absence of an unequivocal expression of concernat the course of events in Zimbabwe (Hawker, 2002). Mbeki’s failure to publiclycriticise his neighbour at the time appeared to profoundly alarm many observers inSouth Africa’s own new democracy, who generally focused upon the extraordinaryapparent indifference, in the light of South Africa’s own recent political history, ofthe South African government to the plight of Zimbabwean voters. Many Westernobservers, meanwhile, appeared to find Mbeki’s behaviour and statements on theissue opaque and indecisive. The equivocal stance also affected internationalconfidence in South Africa, where the Rand lost 20% of its value in the six monthsto early 2002, a devaluation that most analysts attributed directly to responses tothe Zimbabwe issue.

However, the issue was (and still is) not without a deal of complexity that isperhaps not always appreciated by overseas analysts. Only a handful of mediaobservers have pointed out that the South Africans had (and have) much more atstake in the outcome of the Zimbabwe crisis than do the range of groups andinterests pressuring Mugabe. Outright condemnation and isolation of its neighbourat around the time of elections in March 2002, and since, might have had highlyunpredictable results for South Africa and the region. It may be, too, that the scaleof the predicted, ongoing humanitarian crisis in the region is one explanation forthe approach of the South Africans to their neighbour. Instead of criticism, and aswell as joining John Howard and Nigerian president Abasanjo on the Common-wealth troika on Zimbabwe, Mbeki pursued, and still pursues, an apparent policyof quiet diplomacy with Mugabe.

The general consensus of African leaders at the WEF Africa Economic Summitin Durban in May 2002 was that it was too early to use Zimbabwe as a test casefor the NEPAD peer review mechanism, because the political and economicproblems in Zimbabwe had come before the whole concept of peer review wassettled and understood. However, as Greg Mills of the South African Institute ofInternational Affairs has pointed out, while the South African government hasattempted to avoid the portrayal of Zimbabwe as a test of the will of Africangovernments to self-sanction the behaviour of fellow leaders, whether Pretoria likesit or not, its treatment of Zimbabwe by unequivocal expressions has a great dealto do with whether the developed world supports NEPAD in any meaningful way.‘After all’, Mills has said ‘if not Zimbabwe, what other state, when and how?’(Mills 2002). A view that the priority in the region is ground-level stability may bethe underlying reason for South Africa’s choice of quiet diplomacy over any overtcondemnation of Mugabe. However, it is arguable that at some point, for NEPAD’scredibility, fidelity to democratic principles and practice must become the publiclyarticulated basis of operation (Ford 2002). That is to say, while Nkrumah believed

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f B

irm

ingh

am]

at 1

8:59

11

Nov

embe

r 20

14

Australian-African relations 2002: another look 27

that the world only had regard for size and influence, so that the continent’s prioritywas unity, the modern world (including international investors) has an equally highregard for political accountability and respectability. It remains to be seen whetheran African solution can at all be found in the adoption, at least to date, of anuncritical, single voice for the sake of the ideal, or appearance, of African unity.

Australia and the Zimbabwe issue 2002

Before the late 1990s, Australia’s relationship with Zimbabwe was characterised bya growing, if modest, commercial relationship founded upon a warm diplomaticbase. The Zimbabwe-Australia Business Council was established in 1994, withmembers primarily from Zimbabwe’s commercial sector and Australian companiesoperating in Zimbabwe. Australian presence in Zimbabwe (initially in the form ofcontribution to the 1979–1980 Commonwealth Monitoring Force) was mainly inagriculture and mining. The relationship is now at its lowest ever point.

Australia held the chair of the Commonwealth in 2002. A Commonwealth‘troika’ on Zimbabwe, already referred to, was formed, with John Howard as itschair, at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Coolum,Queensland in May 2002 following the adverse report of the CommonwealthObserver Group on the quality of Zimbabwe’s presidential elections in earlyMarch, which had prompted Zimbabwe’s suspension from the Commonwealth on19 March. At a troika meeting in Abuja, Nigeria in late September, described byJohn Howard as ‘profoundly disappointing’, Howard (whose efforts were describedby British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw as ‘well beyond the call of duty’) wasunable to convince the other two members of the troika, Presidents Mbeki andObasanjo, to fully suspend Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth (AAP, 2002).

Australia’s Prime Minister remains involved in the Zimbabwe issue. Thetwentieth meeting of the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group on the HarareDeclaration (CMAG), the second meeting since CMAG’s reconstitution duringCHOGM in Coolum, was held in London in October–November 2002. In itsconcluding statement CMAG reviewed developments in the countries within itsremit (Fiji Islands, Pakistan, Solomon Islands and Zimbabwe, reaching conclusionson each) and considered the report of the Zimbabwe troika’s September meeting.CMAG agreed not to take any further action given the decision of the troika to‘remain seized’ of the issue and to continue its on-going efforts. CMAG next meetsin London in late March or April 2003 on a date yet to be agreed (CMAG, 2002).It is interesting to note that since October 2002, an Australian (Matthew Neuhaus,former High Commissioner to Nigeria) heads the Political Affairs division of theCommonwealth Secretariat in London.

In addition to pressure exerted through the Commonwealth, Australia has madebilateral representations to the Zimbabwean government, which have been ignored(DFAT 2002). It has however increased its humanitarian assistance to the country.

Expressing regret, Australia announced ‘smart’ sanctions, foreshadowed byHoward in Abuja to the other members of the troika, against the ZimbabweGovernment on 13 October 2002, as a result of continual failure by the Mugabe

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f B

irm

ingh

am]

at 1

8:59

11

Nov

embe

r 20

14

28 J. Ford

government ‘to respond to the international community’s profound concern abouthuman rights abuses and the subversion of the rule of law’ in Zimbabwe. Thesanctions regime included travel bans, a freeze on assets, downgrading of culturallinks, and suspension of ministerial links and non-humanitarian food aid, althoughit was noted that Australia provided $26 million in food aid to the region in 2002.The statement accompanying the sanctions calls upon the Zimbabwe government to‘restore Zimbabwe to full compliance with Commonwealth principles’ (Downer,2002a).

In the meantime the bilateral relationship is stagnant. Exports and imports halvedbetween 1997 and 1998 and have yet to recover. Qantas no longer operates aservice to Harare, while tourism appears to have slowed altogether. An AustralianCricket Board tour of the country in 2002 was cancelled over security concerns. Itremains to be seen whether policy on Zimbabwe will in any way affect Australia’sparticipation in cricket World Cup games some of which are scheduled to be playedon Zimbabwean soil in 2003.

The significance of African events to Australia’s interests

DFAT’s Annual Report 2000–2001 summarised Australia’s relations with most ofthe continent in that period by stating that policy outcomes achieved were that‘trade liberalisation, economic reform, good governance and human rights [were]supported, and Australian economic interests [were] fostered in the countries ofsub-Saharan Africa’. DFAT reports are however revealing of the paucity—andpotential—of Australia’s relationships with African countries. For example, theAnnual Report 2000–2001 shows that while a series of meetings was held in thatperiod with eleven ‘key developing countries’ to promote greater understanding oftheir interests in the agricultural reform agenda, only one of these countries, Egypt,was African. (On the other hand, there has been an increase in recent officialcontact at a high diplomatic level, in addition to CHOGM, since Foreign MinisterDowner visited Africa and the Middle East in 2000 and a Joint Ministerial meeting,attended by Trade Minister Vaile, took place in Pretoria in October 2000. Forexample, Senator John Tierney led a Parliamentary delegation to Nigeria and SouthAfrica in November 2002).

Recent annual reports of DFAT show that while non-official linkages andpartnerships between Australia and other countries were developed through thework of such bodies as the Australia-India Council (a body funded by DFAT), thereis no roughly equivalent body designed to foster and increase trade and otherrelations between Africa as a whole, and Australia. It is arguable that direct officialinitiatives leading to mutually beneficial trade and investment (including increaseddiplomatic presence) should be considered so as to capitalise on the goodwilltowards Australia that exists in many African countries (Sibraa 2002) and tomaximise existing opportunities for trade and other exchanges. The establishmentof an Australia-Africa Council, modelled loosely on the Australia-India Council,has been mooted and some discussions have taken place on this. Such a body, itis argued by proponents, would assist in ascertaining appropriate areas for the

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f B

irm

ingh

am]

at 1

8:59

11

Nov

embe

r 20

14

Australian-African relations 2002: another look 29

provision of development assistance, while also coordinating trade, investment,tourism and student exchanges (Daymond 2002).

The case of Nigeria is a prime example of the nature of Australian engagementwith Africa, outside of South Africa. A significant country, Nigeria is the world’sfifth largest producer of crude petroleum, has a population of 125 million and is thehub of the ECOWAS sub-region of fifteen states (Soule 2002). Australia haslimited relations with Nigeria, aside from Commonwealth contacts and perhaps anobservable acknowledgment that Nigeria is a leading African country. A TradeAgreement was signed in 1989 but has yet to be implemented and is still underreview. Perhaps real distance, combined with a perception that Australia producesmuch the same goods, has led to neglect of trade possibilities in this and similarcountries. Nigerian representatives to Australia note that a central problem withtrade relations is the myth of low purchasing power: a perception of generalpoverty means that the size of the consumer market is overlooked. Distance is afactor, but Nigerian officials have noted that African countries do brisk businesswith South East Asian economies (Soule 2002). The fact that Australian expertiseor investment in, say, agriculture and mining would be much sought-after in acountry such as Nigeria is thus often obscured. Officials have noted that the successof exports of Holden motor vehicles to the Middle East could easily be mirroredin Africa, and that there are abundant opportunities for investment in areas ofAustralian corporations’ expertise: solid mineral mining, civil construction,telecommunications, electricity, oil and gas. Relations that do exist could be moreefficient: 63% of imports to Nigeria from Australia take the form of dairy products,but these are currently routed through third parties in Europe (Soule 2002). TheNigerian experience and connection, undeveloped as it is, is despite Nigeria havingdiplomatic representation in Canberra, something most African countries do nothave.

I have observed above that Australian relations with African countries revolvemainly around trade, as well as development or humanitarian issues, the lattercertainly dominating that space in the Australian public mind devoted to thingsAfrican. However, I would suggest that there are three ways in which therelationship may now be understood to be of somewhat more significance than isgenerally acknowledged.

Firstly, Australia’s new engagement with African countries, if any, is aimed atgarnering African support for action on global issues, especially trade issues, ofparticular concern to Australia.

It is evident that Australia has, for some time now, consciously and publiclysought to revise existing notions of trade policy and approaches to trade negotia-tions, and adopt new and creative approaches to the complex, multi-layeredmultilateral system. This has led to a deliberate Australian approach in relation todeveloping countries, including African countries, in recognition that these coun-tries have found a new degree of influence in the WTO and related negotiations,by weight of both numbers and share of trade. In 2002 the Prime Minister gavesubstance to the adopted position of Australia being responsive to the concerns andpriorities of developing countries by announcing that Australia would grant tariff

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f B

irm

ingh

am]

at 1

8:59

11

Nov

embe

r 20

14

30 J. Ford

and quota-free access to the world’s least developed countries, with particularmention being made of sub-Saharan Africa, from July 2003 (Howard 2002).Australia convened a meeting of ministers and others from 25 countries of variouslevels of development in Sydney in November 2002. A considerable proportion ofthese 25 countries were African (Egypt, Kenya, Lesotho, Senegal, South Africa).

It is clear that Australia intends to build on what it sees as its ‘extensiveexperience and credibility with developing countries’, including as chair of theCairns Group, so as to further Australian objectives, especially in the reform ofworld agricultural trade (Vaile 2002). Agriculture is vital to Australia’s exportperformance, one in five dollars earned overseas being earned from agriculture; twothirds of Australia’s agricultural produce is exported. Tariffs on agriculturalproducts meanwhile remain three times higher on average than other types ofproduct. Australia, including through the Cairns group, has said it intends to ‘standside by side’ with developing countries ‘to challenge the agricultural protectionismrife in certain parts of the world’ (Vaile, 2002).

It is for this reason that a most significant aspect of the relationship with Africais Australia’s desire to build African consensus for a new WTO round agenda, insupport of Australian policy objectives. Minister Vaile has emphasised that this isnot simply a gesture, but something directly in Australia’s own interests: ‘Aus-tralia’s long-standing commitment to a rules-based WTO system—in which allWTO members can participate—remains the bedrock of the Liberal/NationalGovernment’s trade policy’ (Vaile 2002).

While observers note that Africa tends not to be heard in the inner circle ofinfluential global governance and decision-making bodies, it is the case that bysheer weight of numbers, a united African stance could have significant importancein decisions in such multilateral bodies (one need only think of voting blocs onGeneral Assembly resolutions during the Cold War). More than 100 of the 145members of the WTO are developing countries, many of them African. Australiais thus actively involved in assisting African governments to develop convergingviews on trade liberalisation, for example by training officials from Africancountries in trade negotiation techniques (in conjunction with the South Africangovernment). It devotes an increasing amount of its development assistance fundingto such projects.

The second aspect, seldom considered, of the relationship is as follows. Africa(mainly through the Commonwealth) might be seen as a testing ground forAustralian policy on governance issues, a developed, coherent and credible notionof which is increasingly seen as of critical importance to stability in Australia’sown neighbourhood. If indeed we have been witnessing the ‘Africanisation’ of theSouth Pacific (Reilly 2000), Australia’s position on any Commonwealth disciplineand censure affects its ability to retain credibility and show consistency andprecedent in action when dealing with (Commonwealth and other) countries closerto home, in the so-called ‘arc of instability’, such as Fiji and the Solomon Islands.Australian regional policy on the sorts of issues commonly thrown up in Africanaffairs (constitutionalism and election supervision are examples) might thus requirea consistency that suggests closer attention to the official position on African

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f B

irm

ingh

am]

at 1

8:59

11

Nov

embe

r 20

14

Australian-African relations 2002: another look 31

events. Australian performance in Africa is important to its image, nearer home, asa firm, consistent and trustworthy partner in wobbly times and to its learnedcapacity to successfully carry off stabilising outcomes.

Thirdly, and finally, having chaired the Commonwealth and hosted CHOGM2002 at a time when the continued relevance of the British Commonwealth washeavily in question, Australia will in 2006 host the Commonwealth Games. Tomany observers, the success of the 2002 Games in Manchester, coinciding as it didwith Commonwealth political paralysis over Zimbabwe, served only to highlightthe questions surrounding the future of the Commonwealth as an organisation ofany wider significance.

The majority of Commonwealth countries are African or, for whatever reason,identify strongly with African issues and concerns. As observed above, Australia’sCommonwealth policy on South Pacific Commonwealth countries such as Fiji islikely to be affected by its policy on African countries. It may be that forthcomingdevelopments in African Commonwealth countries, including the nature of anyAustralian responses, will have a great deal to do with whether that organisationsurvives the 2006 Games (let alone the next CHOGM in Abuja, Nigeria, inDecember 2003) as a body of any real political relevance beyond a looseassociation centred around common history, cultural activities and sport.

Outlook

Australia’s new millennium relations with sub-Saharan African countries are likelyto remain modelled on present relations with the equally distant and disparatecountries that make up the Cairns Group. Any increased activity and engagementis likely to be trade-related, and then in niche markets, and on discrete issues, ratherthan of a more generalised nature. The particular relationship with South Africa,one based mainly on trade and investment, appears likely to improve and tocrystallise further, with a possible increase in non-trade related engagements andexchanges. It is likely that the existing relationship with sub-Saharan Africa’s othermain powerhouse, Nigeria, will receive further attention, including towards theAbuja CHOGM in December 2003, leading to possible further engagement withand trade involvement in the West African region generally. With the apparentcurrent approach being that official contact only follows the establishment ofsufficient economic links, and not vice versa, it is unlikely that additional country-specific or regional diplomatic stations will be set up in the absence of substantiallyincreased trading volumes. For example, DFAT has recently ‘provided the Govern-ment with advice for a review of policy on Libya leading to a resumption ofdiplomatic relations (suspended since 1987)’ in the light of ‘a range of Australiancommercial interests in Libya’ (DFAT 2002). Australia’s primary overall engage-ment with African countries is likely to remain one revolving around the provisionof narrowly targeted development assistance, in particular, technical assistanceaimed at strengthening the capacity of African countries to take part in new tradenegotiations.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f B

irm

ingh

am]

at 1

8:59

11

Nov

embe

r 20

14

32 J. Ford

Notes

1. There has been periodic treatment in this journal of certain aspects of the relationship. See alsogenerally on this period Gareth Evans and B. Grant Australia’s Foreign Relations in the World ofthe 1990s (Melbourne University Press, 1995) Chapter 16 (Middle East and Africa). As the presentcontribution is by way of observation and commentary, it is not otherwise extensively referenced.

2. Noting Minister Downer’s contemporaneous statement of the ‘often-overlooked fact’ that ‘Aus-tralia is an Indian Ocean country as well as an Asia-Pacific nation’.

3. For an examination in this journal of connections prior to the establishment of official relations in1945, see another Tothill contribution in 2000 AJIA vol 54(1) p63. See also C. MulrooneyAustralia’s Relations with South Africa 1901–1975 (MA Thesis, University of Sydney, 1980)(Fisher Library Rare Book Res, Sydney). On observations in the mid-1990s as to the future of therelationship of South Africa with Australia, see R. Bruce and R Ghosh Australian Policy TowardsSouth Africa: Observation on the Future (Nedlands Publishers, WA, 1994) (Discussion Paper,Dept. of Economics, University of Western Australia).

References

AAP 2002. ‘Howard says troika meeting was profoundly disappointing’ Sydney Morning Herald, 26September 2002.

ACFOA 2002. Australian Council for Overseas Aid, Annual Report 2002, Canberra. ( � http://www.acfoa.asn.au/about acfoa/ACFOAAnnualReport2002.pdf � [4 December 2002]).

Budget 2002. ‘Ministerial Statement on Australia’s Overseas Aid Program 2002–03’, Budget2002–2003, Canberra ( � http://www.budget.gov.au/2002–03/ � [4 December 2002].

CMAG 2002. Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group. Press Release 2/82 of the CommonwealthSecretariat 1 November 2002 ( � www.thecommonwealth.org � [4 December 2002]).

Daymond, I. 2002. I. Daymond, Chairman, National Australia-Southern Africa Business Council,Annual Conference, Canberra 29 November.

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) 2001. Annual Report 2000–2001, Canberra( � http://www.dfat.gov.au/dept/annual reports/ar.html � [4 December 2002]).

——. 2002. Annual Report 2001–2002 Canberra.( � http://www.dfat.gov.au/dept/annual reports/ar.html � [4 December 2002]).

Dollery, B. and Worthington, A. 1996. ‘Economic Growth and Political Stability in South Africa:Possible Australian Initiatives’ 1996 AJIA Vol 50(2) p189.

Downer, A. 2002. ‘Australian Aid: Investing in Growth, Stability and Prosperity’, Eleventh Statementto Parliament on Australia’s Development Cooperation Program, Canberra, September. ( � http://www.ausaid.gov.au/about/eleven.html � [4 December 2002]).

——. 2002a. ‘Australia Implements Bilateral Smart Sanctions Against Government of Zimbabwe’,Media Release, 13 October ( � www.foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2002 � [4 December2002]).

Ford, J. 2002. ‘Australia’s Aid to Africa’ The Drawing Board—An Australian Review of PublicAffairs (16 October) ( � www.econ.usyd.edu.au/drawingboard � [4 December 2002]).

Goldsworthy, D. 1985. ‘The Hawke Government and Africa: Hands across the Indian Ocean?’ 1985AJIA Vol 39(3) p139.

Hawker, G. 2002. ‘Zimbabwe, AIDS and President Mbeki’ Journal of Contemporary Analysis, vol 74,no.2, Mar-Apr 21.

Herbert, R. 2002. South African Institute of International Affairs. Various online media sources 4–8July (including � www.medilinks.org � news item 7 July 2002 [13 August 2002]).

Howard, J. 2002. Address to APEC Leaders CEO Summit, 25 October ‘Tariff-free Access for theWorld’s Poorest Countries’. Media Release, Canberra, ( � www.pm.gov.au/news/media releases/2002 � [4 December 2002]).

JSC, 1996. Australia’s Relations with Southern Africa, Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs,

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f B

irm

ingh

am]

at 1

8:59

11

Nov

embe

r 20

14

Australian-African relations 2002: another look 33

Defence and Trade, Canberra, Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 1996 ( � http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/jfadt/africa/reptindx.htm � [4 December 2002]).1

Mills, G. 2002. South African Institute of International Affairs, quoted in The Zimbabwe Independent,7 June 2002.

Rajan, R. and Marwah, S. 1997. ‘Towards an Indian Ocean Economic Alliance: Commentary onMembership Issues’ 1997 AJIA Vol 51(2) p195.2

Reilly, B. 2000. ‘The Africanisation of the South Pacific’ 2000 AJIA Vol 54(3).RSA 2001. The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), Department of Foreign Affairs,

South Africa ( � http://www.dfa.gov.za/events/nepad.htm � . See also � http://www.nepad.org � [4 December 2002]).

Sibraa, Kerry 2002. ‘Learning from the Past’, address to the National Australia-Southern AfricaBusiness Council, Annual Conference, Canberra, 29 November.

Soule, R. (High Commissioner for Nigeria) 2002. ‘Nigeria: an African Market for Australian Exportand Investment’, address delivered in absentia to the National Australia-Southern AfricaBusiness Council, Annual Conference, Canberra, 29 November.

Tandon, Y. 1999. ‘The WTO and Africa’s Marginalisation’ 1999 AJIA Vol 53(1) p83.Tierney, J. 2002. ‘Reflections on South Africa’, address to the National Australia-Southern Africa

Business Council, Annual Conference, Canberra, 29 November.Tothill, D. 1997. South African-Australian Diplomatic Relations—The First Two Decades 1945–1961

(Doctoral thesis, as summarised in an International Discussion Paper in Diplomacy, Universityof Leicester, Diplomatic Studies Programme, August 1997 ( � www.le.ac.uk/csd/dsp/n3tothill.htm � ) [3 December 2002].3

Trade 2002. ‘Australia’s Trade Outcomes and Objectives Statement 2002’, DFAT, Canberra( � www.dfat.gov.au/trade/policy toos.html � [4 December 2002]).

Vaile, M. 2002. ‘The Doha Development Agenda’. Address to the National Press Club, Canberra, 13November. ( � www.trademinister.gov.au/speeches/2002/ � [4 December 2002]).

World Bank 2001. African Development Indicators, World Bank publishing, March 2001.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f B

irm

ingh

am]

at 1

8:59

11

Nov

embe

r 20

14

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f B

irm

ingh

am]

at 1

8:59

11

Nov

embe

r 20

14