austria - philippine domestic shipping industry

Philippine Domestic Shipping

Transport Industry: State of Competition

and Market Structure

Myrna S. Austria

PHILIPPINE INSTITUTE FOR DEVELOPMENT STUDIES Surian sa mga Pag-aaral Pangkaunlaran ng Pilipinas

RESEARCH PAPER

SERIES No. 2003-02

The author is Director of the Center for Business and Economics Researchand Development, De La Salle University – Manila. This paper was madepossible through a financial assistance from the Philippine APEC StudyCenter Network (PASCN).

She would like to acknowledge the able research assistance provided byMs. Thea Lazaro.

Myrna S. Austria

RESEARCH PAPER SERIES NO. 2003-02

PHILIPPINE INSTITUTE FOR DEVELOPMENT STUDIESSurian sa mga Pag-aaral Pangkaunlaran ng Pilipinas

Philippine Domestic ShippingTransport Industry: State of Competition

and Market Structure

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The shipping transport industry plays a very important role in the country’sdevelopment. Considering the archipelagic setting of the country, shippingprovides the primary means of interisland transport. That is, the bulk ofdomestic trade is transported by shipping; interisland travel, especially inthe southern part of the country, is also largely dependent on shipping.Considering this role, an efficient shipping industry that facilitates themovement of commodities, products and people is vital to the growth of thecountry. This is one where passengers and cargoes get to their destinationson time and in good and safe condition at the least possible cost. For cargoes,especially agricultural commodities, the transport should be in a mannerwhere their physical condition at their place of destination allows them to bemarketed at the most competitive price.

The country’s domestic shipping industry, however, has been regardedas inefficient. This is rather unfortunate as the industry has a large numberof shipping companies where competition could be expected to be a powerfulforce for eliminating inefficiency. Past studies suggest the underlyingexplanation has much to do with government regulations and policies affectingthe industry.

The industry had been highly regulated until policy reforms wereinstituted in the 1990s in response to the continuing inefficiency. This studyexamines the inefficiency of the industry in terms of the complex interactionbetween regulation and competition; and then analyzes the effects of thepolicy reforms on competition and market structure. The scope of the paperis limited to the interisland liner shipping industry because this is the sectorwhere regulation is highly concentrated and whose viability is highly sensitiveto government policy.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief profile ofthe industry. Section 3 discusses the contestability of markets in the shippingindustry, including the arguments for and against regulating the industry.Section 4 examines the regulatory framework and policies prior to theimplementation of the policy reforms. This is followed by a discussion of thepolicy reforms made through liberalization and deregulation in Section 5.

1

I

�

Introduction

2

Section 6 is an analysis of the effects of the reforms on market structure andcompetition, including the impact of competition on efficiency. Section 7 is adiscussion of the role of the MARINA in a deregulated environment. Areasfor competition policy and further reforms are then identified in Section 8.The summary and conclusions are presented in Section 9.

Philippine Domestic Shipping Transport Industry

Marine or shipping transport services consist of three types of activitiesnamely, maritime transport services, maritime auxiliary services and portservices (Fink, Mattoo and Neagu, 2000). Marine transport refers to the actualtransportation service performed once the commodity or passenger is onboard a ship until the ship reaches its port of destination. Marine auxiliaryservices refer to activities related to cargo manipulation in ports and on ships.Under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) classification,these include cargo handling, storage and warehousing, custom clearance,container station and depot, maritime agency and freight forwarding. Onthe other hand, port services refer to those activities related solely to shipmanagement in ports. Under GATS classification, these include pilotage,towing and tug assistance, provisioning, fuelling and watering, garbagecollecting and disposal, port captain’s services, navigation aids, shore-basedoperational services and emergency repair facilities. This paper willconcentrate on marine transport, as the other two types of activities haveseparate issues of their own.

The country’s domestic marine or shipping transport is composed ofthree sectors: liner, tramp and industrial carriage. Liner shipping refers to theoperation of domestic water transportation that offers their services to thepublic without discrimination to any user, have regular ports of call andhave fixed sailing schedules and frequency. Tramp shipping, on the otherhand, refers to the operation of freight vessels that are not plying a regularroute but are hired on a contractual basis by shippers under mutually agreedterms and usually carry cargoes of bulky commodities. Industrial carriagerefers to the shipping operations of companies arising from the necessity tocater to the needs of their own enterprises. Of the three sectors, only linershipping is regulated by the government.

The shipping transport industry contributes about half a percent to thecountry’s gross domestic product and this share has remained unchangedthroughout the 1990s (Table 1). Passenger traffic carried by liner shipping

3

II

�

Domestic Shipping Transport Industry:Brief Profile

increased from almost 30 million in 1990 to 44.4 million in 2000, registering a4.05 percent average annual growth rate during the period (Table 2). Thevolume of domestic cargo carried also went up from 58 million metric tonsin 1990 to 76.9 million metric tons in 2000 or a growth rate of almost 2.87percent per year.

The domestic shipping industry also plays an important role in thecountry’s international trade by carrying, between ports in the country,cargoes intended for exports and cargoes arriving as imports, or what arereferred to as transit cargoes. Between 1991 and 1998, transit cargoes grewfrom 597.5 thousand metric tons to 757.3 thousand metric tons or by 2.67percent per annum (Table 2).

The domestic shipping fleet is dominated by general cargo in terms ofgross registered tonnage (GRT) (Figure 1). Starting 1993, the domestic fleet,particularly passenger cargo and general cargo, registered a big increase intonnage such that the capacity of the industry was growing much faster thanthe passenger and cargo traffic generated (Table 3). Also very striking wasthe large drop in the average age of the passenger cargo fleet (Table 4). Aswill be discussed in Section 6 of the paper, all these changes have much to dowith the liberalization and deregulation measures instituted in the industryin the 1990s.

Liner shipping routes are classified as primary, secondary, tertiary anddevelopmental routes. The classification is based on ports being served, popu-lation and economic development in the area, and the cargo/passenger

4


Table 1. Gross value added in water transport (million pesos at constant 1985 prices)

Year Gross value added % Share to GDP

19901991199219931994199519961997199819992000

4,1973,7243,6963,7113,7703,8764,0204,2094,3254,4444,518

0.60.50.50.50.50.50.50.50.50.50.5

Sources: 1999 NSO Phil. Statistical Yearbook; National Income Accounts of the Philippines

Domestic Shipping Transport Industry: Brief Profile

5

Notes:(1) The 1996 inventory does not include vessels with sizes 3 GT and below such that the resultingfigures turned out to be smaller than the 1995 figures, thereby rendering the statistics non-comparablefor purposes of trend determination.(2) “Others” include liquid cargo/ lighterage, barging, tanker, towing, salvaging, pleasure, pilotage, andothers with no information.Source: MARINA Domestic Fleet Inventory

Figure 1. Total GRT of domestic merchant fleet, type of service, 1990-1999

Table 2. Domestic Passenger and cargo traffic, 1990-2000

Year PassengerCargo (metric tons)

Domestic Transit cargo

19901991199219931994199519961997199819992000

1990-2000

29,820,02531,715,98333,734,54736,365,33240,444,60737,873,20540,043,00641,414,64744,110,79043,228,47844,371,866

4.05

57,956,40158,634,41161,845,50565,072,55071,108,39268,100,65471,955,59476,150,04174,928,05876,538,89576,914,255

2.87

N A597,467230,863267,765232,839133,617662,961650,822687,369933,691757,272

2.67Average annual growth rate (%)

Notes: (1) NA means not available (1990 domestic cargo data includes both domestic and transit cargo)(2) Average growth rate for transit cargo from 1991-2000

Source: NSO Philippine Statistical Yearbook

6


throughput attendant to the linkages fostered. Primary routes include thosethat handle domestic volume of national significance and usually cover themajor ports of the country. Secondary routes include those that handle do-mestic volume of regional significance and are linked to ports of lesser through-puts than major ports. Tertiary routes are feeder routes that handle cargoesconsolidated and destined for primary and secondary ports. Finally, devel-

Table 3. Annual growth rate of traffic and capacity (%)

YearPassenger Cargo

Capacity Traffic Capacity Traffic

1990-911991-921992-931993-941994-951995-971997-981998-99

34.71.10.6

47.710.414.410.30.2

6.46.47.8

11.2-6.49.46.5

-2.0

21.8-2.82.1

22.20.7

-22.123.418.4

2.24.85.39.2

-4.412.6-1.52.5

Notes: Data for 1996 not included. Capacity is based on passenger cargo GRT for passenger and general cargo pluscontainer GRT for cargo.Sources: MARINA (for GRT); Philippine Statistical Yearbook (passenger traffic)

Table 4. Average age of domestic merchant fleet, by type of service, 1990-1999

Year Passenger ferry Passenger Cargo General Cargo Container Ave. Merchantfleet

19901991199219941995199719981999

10.709.599.277.789.617.638.269.98

20.6928.0328.4214.9414.838.989.409.27

7.108.028.66

10.1110.0612.1412.1013.12

21.1624.9025.7424.2423.9523.4022.4224.65

9.8610.9011.3011.2911.6111.8612.1112.08

Notes:(1) The 1996 inventory does not include vessels with sizes 3 GT and below such that the resulting figures turned outto be smaller than the 1995 figures, thereby rendering the statistics non-comparable for purposes of trend determination.(2) No data available for 1993.Source: MARINA Domestic Fleet Inventory

Domestic Shipping Transport Industry: Brief Profile

7

opmental routes do not have existing shipping operators but shipping opera-tions are economically desirable because of their potentials in agriculture,tourism or mining. Operation along these routes, during the initial stages, isnot financially viable.

III

�

Contestability of Marketsin the Shipping Industry

The literature on contestability of markets points to the importance of thethreat of competition, as distinct from actual competition, in enforcing goodbehavior and conduct among firms in the industry (Hanlon 1996). This kindof market is characterized by the following: (i) there are no barriers to entry,that is, no extra cost borne by new entrants that are not borne by the incum-bents; (ii) there are no sunk costs, that is costs that cannot be recouped whena firm withdraws from the industry; (iii) the time for the incumbents to changetheir price in response to the entry is longer than the time for the new entrant tomake profits. According to this theory, firms in oligopolistic industries willstill price at the same level as they would in a perfectly competitive market solong as the threat of competition exists. In other words, under this market, theincumbents can protect themselves from new competition only by behaving well.

A contestable market offers to consumers and the society similar benefitsfrom a perfectly competitive market (Baumol and Lee 1991). Because of thethreat of competition, firms cannot charge higher-than-competitive prices orearn excessive profits; any attempt to do so would invite new entrants toundercut the incumbents’ prices to a level that could still give them attractivereturns. Waste and inefficiency beyond that which is allowed by the currentof state of technology and level of knowledge are also avoided as these wouldbe reflected in higher costs and prices, the presence of which would invitethe entry of efficient firms. Likewise, predatory pricing and cross-subsidypricing are prevented. Predation becomes unattractive since it can only bedone if there is a prospect for making future profits large enough to recouplosses made when prices or profits were kept low to drive competitors ornew entrants away; but then excessive profits would invite entry. Cross-subsidyoccurs when a firm charges a price below cost to a particular group of custom-ers and the loss is made up for by charging excessive prices to other customers.This is not feasible under a contestable market as the excessive price wouldinvite new entrants who can sell at a lower price level. In effect, the newentrants are capturing from the incumbents the earnings that were previouslyused for cross-subsidy.

8

Arguments for and against regulating the shipping industryThe shipping industry is a highly contestable market in the absence of gov-ernment regulations that prevent market forces take their course on the func-tioning of the industry. The common argument for the need to regulate linershipping is based on the supposed danger of chronic instability due to inher-ent tendencies toward ruinous competition and monopoly (Renardet SautiConsulting Engineers 1986). That is, the industry is highly vulnerable to priceand capacity fluctuations that lead to ruinous competition and eventually tomonopoly, after the weak firms are driven out.

Price instabilityThe vulnerability to price and capacity fluctuations, if there are no limits tocompetition, is argued to be associated with the cost structure of the indus-try. Once a vessel is at berth, the only cost associated with carrying an extraton of cargo is the cost of loading and discharging it; and such marginal costis very low, an average of about 25-30 percent of the freight rate. At suchrate, an operator cannot survive. Hence, an operator will find it profitable totake an extra cargo at a rate higher than the handling cost. However, if thereis free competition, the rate would be forced to go down to the level of thehandling cost whenever there is any surplus in capacity. The industry willthen become unprofitable for all operators.

However, it is also argued that the above argument is not plausible asshipping operators do not in practice cut their rates to the level of marginalcosts once the ship is at berth. Instead, what influences the behavior of op-erators is not the marginal cost of an extra ton of cargo, but the cost of anextra voyage or set of voyages and their relation to revenues at pre-deter-mined rate levels.

Nevertheless, pricecutting is practiced but only in so far as there is over-capacity or overtonnaging in the industry. And this can lead to rate instability.

MonopolyAnother argument for government regulation is the danger of monopoly. Anatural monopoly occurs when there are economies of scale that allows alarge company to charge lower prices because its unit costs are lower than asmall company. This will eventually drive small firms from the market. Inshipping, the lower unit costs may arise from larger ships or from a largernumber of ships.

It is also argued, however, that there are no significant economies ofscale in the shipping industry (Renardet Sauti Consulting Engineers 1986) orthat economies of scale is not a significant barrier to entry in the industry

9

Contestability of Markets in the Shipping Industry

10

(Dick 1987). While a larger vessel will generally give lower costs per ton thana small ship, the cost advantage of larger vessels is offset by two factors.One, cargo handling rates increase less than proportionately with ship size,so that the larger ship tends to spend a larger proportion of its time in port.Two, smaller ships are able to provide more frequent service because of theirfaster turnaround. Hence, small ships can operate alongside with larger ships.

On the number of ships, a large fleet will not necessarily have lowercosts per ton than a small fleet. More than 80 percent of a shipping company’soperating costs are ship operating costs, the rest being terminal and adminis-trative costs. Thus, if a company increases its fleet by 20 percent, its operat-ing cost is expected to increase by the same amount (Renardet Sauti Consult-ing Engineers 1986).

Furthermore, economies of size appear to be insignificant beyond aboutthree ships, while diseconomies seem to occur beyond about 10 ships (Dick1987). This is attributed to managerial diseconomies of scale. Shipping com-panies are said to be difficult to manage because the locations of the headoffice, branch office and terminals are so dispersed. Profitability is highlydependent on capacity utilization, which in turn depends on port turnaround.This would then require some kind of loyalty to the shipping company ofofficers and crew to cooperate in speeding up turnaround. As a general rule,however, officers and crew would prefer a longer to a shorter stay in port.Hence, to increase turnaround and productivity, some kind of incentive anda good wage structure is required. In family shipping businesses, the practiceis to appoint family members to man the day-to-day operations of the busi-ness across various ports. However, as the number of ships, routes and portsincreases, the problem of control and management seems to increase dispro-portionately.

Competition in shippingRate discounting, particularly on freight rates, is a common practice in theindustry. Even when there are government regulations on rate setting, theofficial rates become just a benchmark or a base from which to discount.Actual freight rates are usually the product of bargaining between shippersand shipping operators (Dick 1987). Discount comes in various forms likeunderrecording the weight or volume of the cargo or declaring the cargo asa low-value item. Since such practices do not involve a reduction in freightrate as reflected in the bill of lading, shipping companies can make it appearthat they are following the official rates.

Discounting drives up price competition in the industry. To lessen thepressure for rate discounts, shipping companies with established financial


11

position offer longer terms for payment. But on the other hand, forwarders,traders and large companies that distribute their own products can makebargains for large discounts by offering a contract for their cargoes for afixed period. Guaranteed by the security of a contract and a large volume ofcargoes, a shipping company can thus settle for a low margin for its shippingrates.

The disadvantage of competing through rate discounting, however, isthat any discount can readily be matched by competitors. Thus, in the face ofintense rate competition, the best strategy for a shipping company is to tryand become the market leader in terms of quality of service. In practice,freight rates are not the primary but the balancing item in the services nego-tiated with shippers, as shippers and traders are more concerned with thesafety of their cargoes. That is, the cost of a late or damaged cargo could bemuch more than the savings from a small discount in freight rate.

Thus, competition in shipping is primarily in terms of quality of service.A good reputation for reliable service can insulate shipping companies fromintense competition in freight rates and can allow them to charge a premiumrate and earn a more than normal profit. But such cannot last long as thepremium invites other companies to improve on the quality of their service.However, in times of excess capacity when rate cutting is prevalent, compa-nies with good reputation are able to keep their share of the market whilecompanies offering not so reliable service destroy each other in a fight forthe crumbs. In practice, rate cutting is prevalent only among firms at thelower end of the market offering the poorest service and struggling to survive.

Contestability of Markets in the Shipping Industry

12

IV

�

Regulatory Framework and Policies:Prereform Period

Regulation of the domestic liner shipping industry was first introduced inthe country during the American colonial rule. In fact, the pattern of theearly regulations closely resembled those that applied to American railroadsand motor trucking industry. The then Board of Transportation (BOT) wasin charge of regulating the industry until the Maritime Industry Authority(MARINA) took over the function in 1985. Regulation covers route entry andrate/tariff determination.

Liner rate regulationsRegulations for liner rates began in 1928. The objective was to protect thepublic from indiscriminate charging by shipping companies and, at the sametime, protect the investment of liner operators by preventing ruinous compe-tition. Rates, or what are commonly called as tariffs, were fixed by the gov-ernment. To simplify the task of setting rates for a large number of com-modities or passengers, rates were structured by commodity or passengerclass. Commodities were initially classified as Class A for processed goodsor high value manufactured goods, Class B for semiprocessed goods or lowvalue manufactured goods, Class C for unprocessed commodities and Basicfor rice, palay, corn, corngrits, fruits, vegetables and livestocks. As will bediscussed later, some of the Basic commodities were reclassified when policyreforms were introduced into the industry. Passenger services, on the otherhand, were classified as First Class, Second Class and Third Class dependingon the kind of services and accommodation offered. Starting in 1983, thetariff structure for both passenger and cargo provided different rates withrespect to three distance ranges namely, 0-100 miles, 101-300 miles and over300 miles.

The tariff structure prescribes a set of formulae for user charges thatvary in accordance with the commodity classification or service class of pas-sengers and the direct distance between the ports of origin and destination.

13

Regulatory Framework and Policies: Prereform Period

The formula for cargo rates has a fixed and distance-related component whilethe passage rate only has a distance-related component. The fixed compo-nent reflects the cost of the vessel while loading or discharging in port and itis computed in pesos revenue per ton. On the other hand, the variable ordistance-related component reflects the cost of the vessel's time while at seaand is computed in pesos per revenue ton mile or pesos per passenger mile.A revenue ton is either a measurement ton of one cubic meter, or a weightton of 1000 kilograms, whichever gives the higher revenue to the shippingoperator.

The first rate formulae instituted in 1928 were originally cost-based,with a uniform tariff per nautical mile for most cargoes. Cost-based tariff isone which passes on the costs of providing the service to shippers withoutdiscriminating between cargoes. By the 1980s, however, the rates were bothcost- and value-based in that while the fixed and variable components wereretained, high-value goods had higher rates than low-value goods. Such prac-tice allows the cross-subsidization of the shipment of low-value goods.

For cargo rates, there was an alternative to the class rates. The lineroperators had the option to charge an ad valorem rate on any goods valuedat over P1,000 per ton. The original objective was to limit the ad valorem ratesonly on very high value goods, but with the passage of time and as inflationincreases the prices of all commodities, the ad valorem option became appli-cable to more and more commodities. The rate was 0.5 percent in 1928 and atthat time, it excluded almost all goods in the interisland trade. By the 1980s,however, the threshold included most commodities.

Throughout the period 1928-1985, the basic structure of tariffs remainedlargely unchanged (Renardet Sauti Consulting Engineers 1986). Only the levelof rates changed by periodic across-the-board increases, basically to reflectchanges in inflation rate. For the ad valorem rate, the rate is increased by thesquare of the inflation rate. The rate first increases automatically as the priceof the cargo increases and then a second time with the official increase in thead valorem percentage rate. From 0.5 percent in 1928, the rate had risen to7.3 percent by 1989. In the 1980s, the ad valorem rate became so high that itrepresented serious deviations from appropriate charges based on shippingcosts (PTF 1989).

For the class rates (passage and freights rates), upward adjustmentswere made using the revenue deficiency method. Under this method, rateadjustments are made based on the revenues that need to be generated byliner operators to provide a rate of return (ROI) consistent with Common-

wealth Act No.146 or the Public Service Act of 1936. The Act declared theprovision of shipping services, along with other services1, as a public service.The maximum allowable ROI for public utilities was 12 percent and it hasremained at this level until today. Under the revenue deficiency method, therequired revenue is compared to the actual revenue (based on audited finan-cial statements provided by the ship operators), and the difference indicatedthe deficiency in rates.

The method is too dependent on the financial reports of shipping op-erators. Before the reforms were instituted, MARINA combined the finan-cial statements of all members of the Domestic Shipping Association (DSA) toget the average for the industry from which to base the increase and thenapply an across-the-board rate increase. The method does not consider aver-age load factors and degree of efficiency of operations such that even if loadfactors are low and vessel operation is inefficient, rate increases were ap-proved so long as revenue was insufficient to obtain the prescribed ROI.Thus, even inefficient firms, which would normally be driven out of the in-dustry if market forces are allowed to operate, were made to earn profits.Since the method guarantees operators of profits regardless of their perfor-mance, there is no pressure on the part of shipowners to search for moreefficient means of meeting the country’s demand for shipping services(Balisacan 1989). Worse, the method has made the level of shipping rates toohigh over the years. It resulted in rates that did not consider the actual costof providing cargo or passenger services.

While the government fixed the rates, enforcement was weak or mini-mal. Because the rates were too high (both ad valorem and class rates) andthe enforcement was weak, discounting became the rule. A discount of 15-25percent was common in the 1980s (Nathan Associates 1991).

At the same time, however, the freight rates for Basic commodities andthe passage rates, particularly for the Third Class, were not permitted toincrease as rapidly as the general inflation rate, for social reasons.

Route licensingOriginally, the shipping industry was exempted from government regulationunder the Public Service Act of requiring operators of all public service toobtain a certificate of public convenience (CPC) (Chapter II, Section (13a) of


14

1 Also included as public service are any common carrier, railroad, street railway, subway or motor vehicle engagedin the transportation of passengers or freight or both, shipyard, marine railways, wharf or dock, ice plant, ice-refrigerationplant, canal, irrigation system, gas, electric light, water supply and power, petroleum, sewerage system, wire orwireless communication system, broadcasting stations and other similar public service.


15

the Act). A CPC is an authorization to operate a public service; and in thiscase, the authorization to a vessel for domestic water transportation servicesfor commercial use. Route licensing, however, was introduced in 1972. Thecommonly accepted reason for its introduction was that the major routeswere overtonnaged while many of the other routes were inadequately servedor had no service (Nathan Associates 1991). The objective therefore of regu-lating entry was to bring capacity and demand into balance.

For a CPC to be granted, the following requisites must be compliedwith:· The applicant must be a citizen of the Philippines, or a corporation or

a co-partnership, association or joint-stock company constituted andorganized under the laws of the Philippines, at least 60 percent of thestock or paid-up capital belongs entirely to Philippine citizens;· The applicant must be financially capable of undertaking the proposed

shipping service and of meeting the responsibilities incident to itsoperation; and,· The applicant must prove that the operations of the public service

proposed and authorized to do business will promote the publicinterests in a proper and suitable manner.

CPCs are given on a vessel-to-vessel basis, specifying the exact routeand schedule. There was a deliberate policy, throughout the pre-reform pe-riod, of limiting competition by restricting market entry. The general prin-ciples for issuing a CPC were prior-operator, prior-applicant and protectionof investment or what are commonly referred to as "grandfather rules." Theprior applicant rule means that priority is given to the first applicant, amongthe various applicants, for a CPC. Prior operator rule means the priority isgiven to an existing authorized2 operator in a route, and in each segment ofthe route, by virtue of a CPC or provisional authority (PA) issued. On theother hand, protection of investment rule means the protection and conser-vation of investment that have already been made by operators.

Following are the two types of application for a license:· An application for a route for which the applicant/operator has no

franchise, i.e. new entrant in a route.If the route being applied for is already serviced by a franchised3

operator, the BOT/MARINA conducts a market evaluation upon re-ceipt of an application for the route to see if the entry of additional

2 An authorized operator is one who has been issued either a certificate of public convenience (CPC) or provisionalauthority (PA).3 A franchised operator is one that has been issued a certificate of public convenience (CPC).

operators in the route is justifiable. If the demand warrants addi-tional fleet, the application is not immediately approved. The existingoperator is first given the priority to put in additional vessel/s tomeet the demand; only when he cannot meet the demand within sixmonths will the application of a new operator is approved.

However, if the route is already served by nonfranchised opera-tors, the "prior applicant rule" applies.

For a development route, entry is allowed and the new entrant isprotected in his investment by not allowing another operator to plythe same route until such time that he has recovered his investment.Since there was no limit in the number of years by which the operatoris protected to recoup his investment, there was no incentive for himto make his operation efficient. On the other hand, if market condi-tions warranted additional tonnage, entry was open to additionaloperator/s, but subject to the "prior operator rule." That is, prioritywas given to the original operator to put in the additional tonnage.· An application to expand capacity in a route for which the operator

already has a franchise.If the demand called for additional capacity, a franchised opera-

tor was allowed to increase 50 percent to his capacity, at minimuminterval of three years. If there were several existing franchisedoperators in the same route, the "prior-applicant rule" applied.

However, in all the above rules, the past service records of theoperator/s or the new applicant/s were not taken into consideration.

During the early years of franchising, compliance was low. Some linersdid not register and those that did were issued CPCs that did not specifytheir routes (1986 study). In 1977, a freezing program was introduced in theindustry through Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 11 with the aim to controlovertonnaging in the industry. Under the program, all operators were sup-posed to secure provisional authority to operate. But there was confusion inthe administration of franchising. Prior to assuming the full responsibility ofhandling franchising, MARINA served as the technical arm of the BOT. Butsince MARINA and BOT issued approvals independently of each other, theprogram did not improve the capability of the government to control andmonitor capacity.

In 1978, MC No. 16 was issued declaring a policy to protect establishedshipping companies already providing adequate service from undue compe-tition. Under the policy, no new operator was allowed to enter primary andsecondary routes and only one operator was allowed for the tertiary route.Where there was more than one existing operator in a tertiary route, merger

16


17

or joint services was promoted or encouraged. MC No. 26, issued in 1982,introduced the rationalization of the interisland shipping operations. Amongother things, the circular required all operators (i) to observe their autho-rized routes, sailing frequency and schedules, and that any deviation fromsuch without appropriate authority shall be penalized; (ii) not to abandon,withdraw or suspend service without authority from the BOT; and (iii) notto reroute vessels and doing so was illegal if pursued without an amendmentof the CPC. Under the circular, too, acquisition of new vessels was regulated,limiting it only to the modernization of tonnage in the route and giving pri-ority to existing operators. 4

Impact of and problems arising from government regulationsThe past regulations of the domestic shipping industry had adverse im-pact on the economy. This is well documented in the findings of severalstudies and is summarized in this section. These documents include theInterisland Shipping Regulation Study prepared by the Renardet SautiConsulting Engineers in 1986; findings of the Presidential Task Force (PTF)on Interisland Shipping Industry in 1989; the Philippine Transport SectorReview in 1990; and the studies prepared by Nathan Associates, Inc., theInterisland Liner Shipping Rate Rationalization Study in 1991 and the LinerShipping Route Study in 1994.

OvertonnagingAs discussed earlier, regulating the routes was meant to reduceovertonnaging of the industry. Over the years, however, onvertonnaginghas persisted. This was manifested in low load factors in most cases. Inshort, route franchising did not succeed in bringing capacity and demandon balance although it moderately succeeded in limiting overtonnaging inindividual routes.

Several factors contributed to the persistent overtonnaging. Route fran-chising can only deal with the distribution of capacity between routes but not onthe absolute level of capacity of the industry. That is, if a vessel was refusedentry in one route, it could find its way in another route; or if it was with-drawn from a particular route, it was only rerouted to another route. Hence,the overall capacity of the industry was maintained or even increased if the

4 Acquisition of new vessels is allowed if it can be proven that there is general deterioration of services in terms of quality andreliability. All existing operators are given equal opportunity and advance notice on the need to modernize; and if noapplication is received within six months, application from new entrants are entertained on a first come, first servedbasis.


18


vessel involved was new. The origin of overtonnaging is at the vessel importapproval stage. In the past, refusal of import approvals rarely happened.

The 12 percent cap on the return on investment is also said to havecontributed to the overtonnaging of the industry. One practice in the industryto circumvent the cap is for shipping operators to horizontally expand byacquiring more vessels thereby increasing their assets, which in turn, formpart in the computation of the required revenue to obtain the ROI. Suchpractice does not promote efficiency where the use of vessels is maximizedat the least cost. Additional vessels and tonnage should be dictated by anincrease in demand and not by the desire to meet the prescribed ROI.

The high rates arising from the revenue deficiency method also causedthe overcapacity in the industry. The high rates were sufficient to guaranteeprofits even at low load factors.

Flaws in the tariff structureThe tariff structure established in 1928 suffered from major flaws. First, therate differentials between classes did not reflect differences in the cost ofproviding services for each commodity group but instead it was an attemptby the government to incorporate consideration of "what the market willbear" into the regulation process. The product value was generally supposedto indicate what the market would bear as a proxy for price elasticity ofdemand for the product. As discussed below, this resulted to the discrimi-nation of some commodities and particular routes in the provision of ship-ping services.

Second, the commodity classification was also problematic as rates forsome commodities were set too low thus, failing to ensure the availability ofsufficient services at all times. This was true, in particular, for the Basiccommodities. At the same time, rates for other commodities were set toohigh to permit them to bear the charges.

Third, the application of a uniform rate formula for all routes wasinappropriate as it did not consider both cargo inflow imbalances and cargomixes. The unit cost per ton of cargo increases as capacity utilization falls.High capacity utilization rate cannot be achieved if there are large imbal-ances in the inbound and outbound traffic. Hence, rates for routes with agood balance of traffic in the two directions were not appropriate for routeswith large imbalances. Also, the mixture of class of commodities determinedthe earning potentials of the routes. Hence, routes with a high proportion ofClass A or Class B commodities in the total cargo traffic had higher earningpotentials than routes with a higher proportion of Class C (Basic) com-modities.

19


Effects on the economyThe flaws in the tariff structure and rate setting created adverse effects onthe economy. In general, the adverse effects fell disproportionately on theproducers and traders of agricultural commodities. The very low rates forbasic commodities limited the availability of appropriate services foragricultural products. In particular, grain shippers from Mindanao haddifficulty in obtaining sufficient cargo space because the rates were too low5

to make the commodities attractive to operators. In turn, the unavailabilityof sufficient liner services, inhibited the growth of inter-island trade andagricultural diversification; and resulted to high storage costs, commodityvalue losses resulting from deterioration and high charges for the alternativeand limited services of trampers and air transport.

On the other hand, since the passage rates were not permitted to increasewith the general inflation rate, they failed to keep pace with the increasingcost of providing passenger services. The practice in general is for cargoservices to subsidize passenger services. This made profitability in passengerservice difficult to achieve and resulted to both the tendency to overloadand provide very low service standards, which in turn, resulted in some ofthe major maritime disasters in the country’s history. It also hindered theintroduction of liner services on new routes as it raised the minimum levelof traffic required to make the service profitable.

Overall, the past regulatory system protected inefficient industryoperation.

5 The rates are lower than those imposed by tramp operators for hauling grains.

20

V

�

Liberalization, Deregulation and OtherGovernment Policies

The problems arising from the regulations of the industry and the majormaritime disasters and accidents that claimed thousands of lives towardsthe end of the 1980s prompted the government to finally introduce policyreforms in the industry (PTF 1989). The reforms came through the deregu-lation of the passage and freight rates and the liberalization of routes. Asdiscussed below, the process of reform was implemented gradually start-ing 1989 and is still continuing at present.

The change in policy was meant to introduce and/or enhance the levelof competition in terms of the rates charged and the quality of servicerendered while at the same time to attract new shipping investments byleveling the playing field for existing and new operators.

Deregulation of liner ratesA summary of the reforms for liner rates is shown in Table 5. Changes inpolicies and regulations were first initiated in 1989 under MC No. 46 as aresult of the recommendations of the Presidential Task Force on the Inter-island Shipping Industry. Early reforms included the (i) abolition of thecharging of ad valorem rates, although a 3/10 percent surcharge of thedeclared value of the commodity was imposed, except for Basic commodities;(ii) reclassification of Basic commodities to Class C (Basic); and (iii)deregulation of the first and second class passage rates.6 For the latter, aminimum of 50 percent of vessel capacity should be allocated to Third Classaccommodation. The deregulation allowed operators to determine the ratesthey will charge for their services.

Further reforms were made in 1990 under MC No. 57. The 3/10 per-cent surcharge was abolished; hence, all commodities were charged thecorresponding class rates. Freight rates for refrigerated cargoes, transitcargoes, and livestock were also deregulated. A most welcome reform was

6 First Class passenger rate was first deregulated in 1983.

Liberalization, Deregulation and O

ther Governm

ent Policies

21

Table 5. Government regulations on domestic shipping rates.

(i) charging of ad valoremrates abolished; (ii) ClassBasic reclassified asClass C (Basic); (iii) 50%of passenger capacityallocated for third classaccommodation.

(i) Rates for refrigerated,transit and livestockderegulated; (ii) Fork tariffsystem used fordetermining regulated rates.

(i) Increase in the fork rateby 12% and 8% forpassage and freight rates,respectively.

(i) 6% rollback on freightrates.

(i) automatic fueladjustment whenever fuelprices increase/decreaseby at least 10%; (ii)increase in the upper/lower limit of the fork tarifffrom +/-5% to +10%/-15%effective Jan. 1993

regulated

regulated

regulated

regulated

regulated

regulated

regulated

regulated

regulated

regulated

regulated

regulated

regulated

regulated

regulated

regulated

regulated

regulated

regulated

regulated

regulated

regulated

regulated

regulated

regulated

deregulated

deregulated

deregulated

deregulated

deregulated

deregulated(since 1983)

deregulated

deregulated

deregulated

deregulated

Implementing guidelineson the rate increase andchanges in level andstructure

Implementing guidelines onthe rate increase andchanges in level andstructure

Implementing guidelines onrate increase

Implementing guidelines onthe rollback of interislandlines rates

Implementing guidelines onthe automatic fuel adjustmentmechanism and the+10%/-15% limit on the forktariff system

MC 46, May1989

MC 57, May1990

MC 59, April1991

MC 66, May1992

MC 67, May1992

EO/MC& year Title of EO/MC

Passage Rates Freight/Cargo Rates RemarksFirst Class Second class Third class Class A Class B Class C Basic/Class

C (Basic)

22

Philippine D

omestic Shipping T

ransport IndustryTable 5. Continued

(i) Class C (Basic) to bereclassified into Class Cin 1993.

(i) DOT-accreditedvessels exempted fromallocating 50% of theirpassenger capacity to 3rdclass passenger; (ii)freight rates of fruits andvegetables shipped inventilated containersderegulated.

(i) implementation ofderegulated rates followDOSCON process; (ii)passage & freight rates formonopolized/cartelizedroutes regulated; (iii) forktariff system still appliesfor regulated rates

(i) DOSCON processabolished.

regulated

abolished;reclassifiedas Class C

regulated

regulated

deregulated,except non-containerized

basiccommodities

deregulated,except non-containerized

basiccommodities

deregulated

deregulated

deregulated

deregulated

deregulated

deregulated

deregulated

deregulated

regulated

regulated

regulated

regulated

deregulatedderegulatedderegulatedderegulated

deregulatedderegulatedderegulatedderegulated

Implementing guidelines onthe DOTC Dept Order No. 92-587 defining the policyframework on the regulationof transport services

Policy guidelines in theregulation of domestictransport services

Deregulating domesticshipping rates (EO 213);Rules and regulations toimplement the provisions ofEO 213 (MC 117)

Revised rules andregulations implementingderegulation of shipping rates

MC 71,October1992

MC 80,November1993

EO 213,Nov 1994;MC 117, Oct1996

MC 153,Dec 1999

Note: The table is a chronological presentation of the EO and MC. The remarks column only include the salient features not included in the preceding circulars, unlessstated as abolished.

EO/MC& year Title of EO/MC

Passage Rates Freight/Cargo Rates RemarksFirst Class Second class Third class Class A Class B Class C Basic/Class

C (Basic)

23

the introduction of the fork tariff system for the determination of freightand passage rates.7 Under the system, rates are allowed to fluctuate be-tween upper and lower limits from a given reference or indicative rate,thereby providing some flexibility in the determination of rates. For cargoes,the system provides a mechanism for the shippers and shipping operators tonegotiate for the rates within the band set by the government. The first forktariff system had a lower and upper limit of –5 percent and +5 percent of thereference rate, respectively. This means that a domestic shipping operatormay increase its freight rate of a given commodity or shipment up to a maxi-mum of 5 percent and may deduct a maximum of 5 percent on the base rate.

In 1991 (MC No. 59), the reference rate for the fork tariff system wasincreased by 12 percent for the passage rate and by 8 percent for the freightrate. In 1992 (MC No. 66), a 6 percent rollback on freight rates was adopted.Also, the lower and upper limit of the fork tariff system was increased from+/-5 percent to +10/-15 percent. A mechanism for automatic fuel adjustmentwhenever prices of fuel increase or decrease by at least 10 percent was alsoinstituted. Under the mechanism, however, shipping operators cannot uni-laterally adjust their rates. Instead, MARINA will automatically adjustthe rates with the issuance of the appropriate Order increasing or decreas-ing the rates within five working days after the increase/decrease of fuelprice.

The early reforms, however, were unable to correct the problems iden-tified earlier. For one, the flexibility provided by the fork tariff system wasvery limited as the rates could not vary to the extent that operating costsvary with respect to routes, ship technology especially with the introductionof container service and roll-on roll-off (RORO) service, quality of packag-ing, and changes in cargo handling methods. Second, the compulsory re-quirement to allocate 50 percent of passenger capacity to accommodate thirdclass passengers made pure passenger vessel operation less viable. Third,the reclassification of Basic commodities to Class C (Basic) failed to correctthe insufficiency of appropriate liner service for these commodities. Finally,the deregulation of the second and first class passenger service did not causemovement of passengers from third to second class (Nathan and Associates1991).

Hence, further deregulation was made towards the end of 1992 (MCNo. 67), this time involving the freight rates for Class A and Class B cargoes.

7 Only members of the Conference of Interisland Shipowners and Operators and any other operators who have filedapplications for rate increase by paying the corresponding fee and issued the corresponding Order are authorized touse the fork tariff system.

Liberalization, Deregulation and Other Government Policies


24

The operators were however required to file their rates for Class A andClass B and any changes thereafter, with the MARINA. In 1993 (MC No. 80),Class C (Basic) was abolished and the commodities classified therein werereclassified as Class C. Fruits and vegetables in ventilated containers werealso deregulated. For passage rates, vessels accredited by the Departmentof Tourism as serving tourist areas were exempted from the requirement ofallocating 50 percent of their total passenger capacity to Third Class passen-gers; and accordingly, their rates were deregulated. However, if the vesselonly has First Class and Second Class passenger accommodation or wherethe Third Class passenger accommodation is less than 50 percent of the pas-senger capacity, the Second Class passage rate was regulated.

Further deregulation of freight rates was made in 1994 throughExecutive Order No. (EO) 213, with implementing guidelines under MC No.117 issued in 1996. All freight rates were deregulated, except fornoncontainerized basic commodities. However, for monopolized andcartelized routes, passage and freight rates continue to be regulated. Thefork tariff system is still applied to all regulated rates, the upward adjustmentof which continues to follow the revenue deficiency method; but this time,the rate increase is computed on a per company basis.

The implementation of deregulated freight rates, however, was anothermatter as operators were not allowed to determine on their own the ratesthey will charge for their services. Instead, the Domestic Shipping Consulta-tive Councils (DOSCONs), composed of shippers/consumers, operators andrepresentatives from the government, was instituted to provide a forum forthe process of consultation and negotiations for the implementation of thederegulated rates or any upward adjustments of the rates. Hence, the de-regulation as provided for in EO 214 only modified the process of fixingcargo rates that was previously exercised by the government through quasi-judicial procedures.

The DOSCON process, however, was abolished in late 1999 when theimplementing guidelines of EO 213 were revised under MC No. 153. Underthe revised guidelines, all an operator needs to do is to file a notice of adop-tion of deregulated rates with the MARINA, and when qualified, MARINAwill issue an Order within 30 days upon receipt of the notice. The deregu-lated freight and passage rates should remain in force for at least three monthsbefore any upward adjustment is allowed.

Upward adjustments of deregulated rates can take effect 15 days afterthe publication of the notice for increase filed with the MARINA in one dailynewspaper of national circulation and in one daily newspaper of regionalcirculation in the port/s affected by the rate adjustment.

For regulated rates, upward adjustment is still based on the revenuedeficiency method. Under the new policy environment, the method may no

longer be appropriate as the financial statements of shipping companies in-clude their deregulated operations.

In general, the deregulation of the liner shipping rates has been a slowprocess. It took the government more than 10 years to gradually deregulatethe liner rates. Yet, it was only in the year 2000 that government interventionin rate setting was lessened. With deregulation, the shipping companies cannow consider the traffic imbalances and cargo mixes in setting the rates forthe routes they serve. While there are still areas that remain regulated, thesecan be overcome and can be strategic areas for modernizing the industry.For example, shipping companies can upgrade their vessels and facilities andbe accredited with DOT and be exempted from allocating 50 percent of theirpassenger capacity to third class and enjoy the deregulated rates. Also, theexemption of noncontainerized basic commodities from deregulation shouldencourage the use of other shipping technology in transporting these com-modities, like RORO vessels.

Much is still desired, however. The rate for Third Class passenger is yetto be deregulated.

Route liberalizationLiberalization of the routes was first introduced in 1992. Two general prin-ciples are observed for the issuance of a CPC. First, the interest of the publicis paramount. That is, the interest of the public shall prevail over the grand-father rules of the prereform namely, prior applicant, prior operator andprotection of investment. Second, the presumption of public need for a ser-vice is deemed in favor of the applicant for a CPC while the burden of prov-ing that there is no need for a proposed service shall be with oppositor/swho is/are the current authorized operator/s.

Given these principles, routes were opened to entry to at least two op-erators (MC No. 71 and MC NO. 80 in 1992). Monopolized routes were openedfor entry to additional operators. Operators in developmental routes, on theother hand, were accorded protection for their investment for a maximumperiod of five years, after which, the route is open to entry to at least oneadditional operator. This was a big contrast to the prereform period regula-tion where an operator in a developmental route is accorded protection ofhis investment for an indefinite period, that is, until he has recovered hisinvestment. This change in rule would definitely encourage the operator toincrease his efficiency for him to be able to recover his investments beforecompetition from additional operators sets in. Entry of newly-acquired ves-sels in routes already served by existing franchised operators, including de-velopmental routes, is also deregulated provided that the entry will intro-duce innovative, technologically and cost-effective shipping services, amongothers.

26


Operators are allowed to withdraw or suspend their operations afternotifying MARINA 15 days prior to such and after informing the public. Anoperator, however, forfeits his CPC if he abandons, withdraws, or suspendshis operation for four months without notifying MARINA. Increase in capac-ity is also allowed through replacement with a bigger vessel, introduction ofadditional vessels and/or increase in frequency of service of existing vessels.An operator can also change his routing pattern through the omission ofports, addition of one or more ports, or the introduction of an entirely newroute provided however that the change does not pose any conflict with theschedule and frequency of service of existing operators and that no route isleft unserved by the rerouting.

The initial liberalization efforts were further strengthened with the is-suance of EO 185 in 1994 and its corresponding implementing rules and regu-lations under MC 106 in 1995. In particular, all routes that have been servicedby any operator for an aggregate period of at least five years shall be openfor entry to additional operators. Likewise, any operator who pioneers inthe provision of a certain technological level of shipping service in a develop-mental route is allowed to charge market-accepted freight and passage ratesdifferent from the fork rates. The adoption of such rates after five years,however, is dependent on the evaluation of MARINA. Also, when capacity isincreased through the replacement of a vessel, the CPC of the vessel to bereplaced is revoked. The revocation of CPC will ensure that the vessel re-placed will not be used anywhere else and hence, will not result in increase intonnage in the routes. Similarly, when capacity is increased through the in-troduction of additional vessel that is chartered from a franchised operator,the original franchise of the vessel is revoked. This policy was again a bigcontrast to the prereform regulation where the CPCs of vessels replaced werenot revoked.

The implementing guidelines of EO 185 were revised under MC No.161 in 2000, providing further dimension to the liberalization efforts. In par-ticular, the conditions or criteria under which possible protection could beaccorded to operators were specified. These include conditions for the exist-ence of ruinous competition and protection of investment of pioneering op-erators. Only under the conditions specified should entry of additional op-erators to a route be restricted. The conditions set therefore added greatertransparency to the rules of the game.


27

Other government policiesCabotage LawForeign shipping lines are not allowed to ply the country’s interisland routes.

Domestic Shipping Modernization ProgramTo complement the liberalization and deregulation efforts, the governmentimplemented the Domestic Shipping Modernization Program (DSMP) fundedby a loan package from the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) ofJapan and administered by the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP).The program has two phases: Phase I (1995-2000) with a loan package of 14.8billion yen or roughly P3.91 billion for the modernization of interisland ves-sels; and Phase II (1999-2005) with a loan package of 19.5 billion yen or P6.7billion for the development of port facilities in rural areas.

Phase I was used to finance the replacement of vessels (new buildingsand/or second hand), rehabilitation and/or upgrading (bringing to class)and modernization of interisland fleet; acquisition, rehabilitation, and mod-ernization of shipyards and port cargo handling equipment; and workingcapital. As of June 2001, almost 84 percent of the package has been loanedout, most of which went to passenger-cargo vessels and tankers (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Loans released by sector, DSMP I,as of June 2001

Source: IRR, Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP)

DSMP I distribution per sector

tankers

gen. cargo vessels

pass/ cargo

pass/ ferries

barging/ lighterage

shipyards

terminal facilities

port developments

(in Pmillion)

872.52

474.65

868.20

489.00

231.02

8.30

95.50

240.00

3,279.19


28

This explains the increase in the capacity (GRT) of passenger vessels and thedecline in their average age as discussed earlier in Section 2 of the paper.

For Phase II, as of June 2001, a total of P5.8 billion from the loan packagehas been released and distributed across the various sectors as shown inFigure 3.

DSMP II distribution per sector

tankers

gen. cargo vessels

pass/ cargo

pass/ ferries

barging/ lighterage

pilotage

shipyards

terminal facilities

port developments

maritime education

(in Pmillion)

505.50

29.38

672.50

118.00

174.00

47.00

322.00

10.50

3,388.70

502.10

5,769.68Note: Maritime education not included in Phase ISource: IRR, DBP

Figure 3. Loans released by sector, DSMP II,as of June 2001

29

VI

�

Market Structure and Competition

The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is used as an indicator of marketstructure. The index is measured as the sum of the squares of the marketshares. It is compared with the ratio 1/n where n is the number of operatorsin the industry. The higher the index relative to 1/n, the less competitive theindustry is. The inverse of the index gives the number of equal sized com-petitors that would provide a degree of competition equivalent to that actu-ally observed in the market share data. Hence, it is used as a measure of thenumber of effective competitors.

The aggregate indicator of market structure for the industry is basedon the primary and secondary routes only, i.e., tertiary routes were excludedin the computation. Since the tertiary routes involve short distance traveland hence more frequencies of trips, the total passengers and cargoes plyingthese routes would be larger in number compared to the primary and sec-ondary routes. And since HHI is based on market shares, including them inthe computation would distort the picture.

However, the aggregate indicator of market structure may give verylittle insight on the extent of market power in the different routes becausethe interisland fleet is distributed across so many different routes. It is pos-sible that a small operator may capture a large market share in a particularroute by concentrating its fleet in that route while a large operator may notcapture a significant market share if it spreads its fleet across several routes.Thus, it is important to also examine the market structure by routes. Theroutes are classified based on the value of 1/HHI as shown in Table 6.

The study used secondary data and interviews of shipping operators toanalyze market structure and competition in the shipping industry. Second-ary data on passenger and cargo traffic by route and shipping company weregathered using the 1998 annual traffic reports of shipping companies submit-ted to the MARINA. This is the latest data that are available and complete.Much as the study would like to include early years to represent the pre-reform period so that an analysis on whether or not the policy reforms have


made an impact on the market structure could be made, the annual reports ofshipping companies were not complete.8 Hence, to get a sense of the impactof the reforms in the absence of data, interviews were made with four ship-ping lines based in Metro Manila, six shipping lines based in Cebu, threeshipping associations, and the Distributors Management Association of thePhilippines (DMAP).

Data on passenger traffic were used in measuring the market structurefor the passenger service. For cargo service, since different units of measure-ment were used for cargo traffic, aggregation was impossible.9 Thus, data oncargo revenue was used.

Furthermore, since the latest secondary data available is 1998, the analysisof the study on market structure does not reflect the possible effects of MC153 and MC 161, which provided further dimension to the government’sefforts on rate liberalization and route deregulation, respectively.

30

8 The 1993 data were initially processed but the annual reports of some of the shipping companies were missing.MARINA has data on annual total passenger and cargo traffic but not by route and shipping company which is what isneeded in analyzing market structure and competition.9 Units of measurements include kg, metric tons, and pieces.

Market structurePassenger ServiceThe HHI shows that the domestic shipping industry is highly concentrated(Table 7). The five largest operators accounted for as much as 90 percent of

Table 6. Classification of routes

Classification Indicator(1) routes with only one (1) operator

monopoly

(2) routes with at least two (2)operators

i. only one (1)effective competitor

ii. substantial competition

iii. Mild competition

HHI 1

1HHI

1< < 1.4

< # of peratorsHHI

1

HHI1

< # of perators1.4 <


31

Table 7. Indicators of market structure, passenger service, 1998

Indicators

Share of top five firmsShare of top three firms

Herfindahl index (HHI)Number of operators (n)1/n1/HHI

90.2672.94

0.21037.00 0.027 4.76

The five largest players in the passenger service (from largest to small-est), in descending order, are Negros Navigation Company, WG&A, SulpicioLines, Philippine Fast Ferry Corporation and Cebu Ferries Corporation. Onesignificant characteristic of these operators is that, three of them are newcompetitors, being established only during the reform period. WG&A is aproduct of the merger of three shipping giants (William Lines Inc., Carlos A.Gothong Lines, Inc. and Aboitiz Shipping Corp.) in 1996. Philippine Fast Ferry(PFFC) is also a product of the merger in 1998 of the Cebu-based UniversalAboitiz, Inc. and Bacolod-based Sea Angels Ferry Corporation, a subsidiaryof Negros Navigation Company. Cebu Ferries Corporation (CFC) was estab-lished in 1996 as a subsidiary of WG&A. Both PFFC and CFC had been piv-otal to the birth of the fast ferry industry in the country. The other twoplayers (Negros Navigation and Sulpicio Lines) are old time players, beingestablished long before the reforms were introduced. Analysis of the different routes shows that the top five players oper-ate most of the primary routes (Appendix Table 1). However, there is notone route where they operate together. On the other hand, the top threecompanies operate together in eight routes, all originating from Manila(Manila-Cagayan de Oro, Manila-Cebu, Manila-Davao, Manila-Dumaguete,Manila-General Santos, Manila-Iligan, Manila-Iloilo and Manila-Tagbilaran).

About 50 percent of the primary routes have at least two operators andthe remaining 50 percent only have one operator (Table 8 and AppendixTable 1). Nonetheless, the presence of at least two operators in a route doesnot guarantee that competition exists. Of the 26 primary routes with at leasttwo operators, substantial competition exist only in seven routes or less than

the total passengers. The inverse of HHI shows that out of the 37 opera-tors plying the primary and secondary routes, less than five are effectivelycompeting.


32

14 percent of the total number of primary routes, while five routes wereeffectively monopolized, as there was only one effective competitor. The restof the primary routes (27 percent) can be described as having only mild com-petition. A very good example of this is the Cebu-Bohol route where therewere nine operators plying the said route but less than three were effectivelycompeting for the passenger market. Another is the Cebu-Dumaguete routewhere there were six operators but only three were effectively competing.

For the secondary passenger routes, almost 59 percent was monopo-lized; 13 percent was characterized by substantial competition; 13 percenthad only mild competition; and 15 percent was effectively dominated byonly one competitor (Table 8 and Appendix Table 2).

On the other hand, monopoly was present in nearly 78 percent of thetertiary routes (Table 8 and Appendix Table 3). Operation in about 5 percentof the routes were effectively dominated by one operator. Substantial com-petition was found in only 8 percent of the routes.

Cargo ServiceFigures on freight revenue also show that the industry is highly concentrated.The five largest operators together carried 91 percent of the total revenue(Table 9). Out of the 66 operators, less than five are effectively competing.

The five largest players in the cargo service, in their order, includeWG&A, Sulpicio Lines, Lorenzo Shipping Corporation, Solid Shipping Cor-poration and Negros Navigation. Lorenzo Shipping and Solid Shipping arepurely cargo services.

Table 8. State of competition, passenger service, 1998

Route ClassificationPrimary Secondary Tertiary

Number (%) Number (%) Number (%)

26

265714

52

50.0

50.0 9.613.526.9

27

19766

46

58.7

41.315.213.013.0

27

19766

46

58.7

41.315.213.013.0

Note: See Appendix Tables 1 to 3 for details.

Routes with only 1 operator

Routes with at least 2 operatorsRoutes with only 1 effective operatorRoutes with substantial competitionRoutes with mild competition

Total number of routes

33


Table 9. Indicators of market structure, cargo service, 1998

Analysis of the routes shows that there are only three routes (Manila-Cagayan,Manila-Dumaguete and Manila-General Santos) where the top five compa-nies operate together. Furthermore, close to two-thirds of the primary andsecondary cargo routes had at least two operators but less than 15 percentexperienced substantial competition (Table 10 and Appendix Tables 4 and 5).On the other hand, a greater majority (76 percent) of the tertiary routes werestill monopolized (Table 10 and Appendix Table 6).

Findings common to passenger and cargoThe dominance of the top five companies in both passenger and cargo ser-vices, was prevalent in the primary and secondary routes, regardless of theroutes’ state of competition (Table 11). In other words, they effectively con-trol the market in these routes. Regular monitoring of the routes then be-comes necessary to ensure that the top five players do not abuse their market

Share of top five firmsShare of top three firms

Herfindahl index (HHI)Number of operators (n)1/n1/HHI

91.12

70.920.21766.000.0154.61

Indicators

Table 10. State of competition cargo service, 1998

Route ClassificationPrimary Secondary Tertiary

Number (%) Number (%) Number (%)

25

4471027

69

36.2

63.810.114.539.1

16

309615

46

34.8

65.219.613.032.6

444

135393858

579

76.7

23.36.76.510.0

Note: See Appendix Tables 4 to 6 for details.


Routes with at least 2 operatorsRoutes with only 1 effective operatorRoutes with substantial competitionRoutes with mild competition

Total number of routes


power, more so given the fact that the percentage of routes with substantialcompetition is relatively small.

Substantial competition is expected in routes common to the top five ortop three players. It is surprising, however, that this is not the case. In fact,there was only mild competition in those routes. Only in the Manila-Dumaguete

34


35

passenger route, where the top three companies operated together, was theresubstantial competition.

Substantial competition is also expected in the major ports because thesupposed large passenger market and volume of cargoes will draw moreplayers into the routes. However, the analysis of the routes originating fromManila or Cebu, two of the countries major ports, shows otherwise. Most ofthe routes either have only one operator or are characterized by only mildcompetition (Table 12 and Table 13).

A further analysis of the individual routes shows that operators havetheir own niche markets. And this is true even for the five largest operators.A good example of this is Solid Shipping Lines that operates in only threecargo routes (Manila-Cagayan, Manila-Dumaguete and Manila-GeneralSantos). Also, the five largest players are not always the dominant player inthe routes where they operate. An example of this is the Dumaguete-Zamboanga cargo route that includes WG&A and Sulpicio Lines as operatorsbut which are not the dominant players.

Analysis of the routes with only one effective competitor or mild com-petition shows that the dominant player or players get the bulk of the marketwhile the rest have very small share. The market shares of the dominantplayer or players range from 83 percent to almost 100 percent for the routeswith only one effective competitor and from 59 percent to almost 100 percentfor those with mild competition (Table 14). An example is the Cebu-Ormocpassenger route where there were six operators but 84 percent of the passen-ger traffic went to only two players. Another is the Cebu-Bohol passengerroute with nine operators but only three operators captured 83 percent of themarket. It is possible that the dominant players offer lower rates or theyhave more vessels and larger capacities enabling them to capture a largesegment of the market and leaving the crumbs to the rest who probably haveonly small capacities. Pursuing this issue however is beyond the scope of thispaper since it requires an analysis of the cost structures of the individualoperators.

The high concentration in the tertiary routes for both passenger andcargo services may not really pose a problem since these are usually consid-ered “thin routes” where traffic is insufficient to attract more than one opera-tor. That is, only one operator is required to make the operation profitable andefficient. As discussed in Section 2 of the paper, there is less economic activityand population in the tertiary routes, implying smaller passenger and cargotraffic compared to the primary and secondary routes. What is critical, how-ever, is the close monitoring by MARINA of the services of operators plyingthe said routes to make sure that these operators do not abuse their marketpower to the detriment of the welfare of passengers and shippers.

36


Table 12. State of competition, routes originating from Manila and Cebu,passenger services, 1998

Routes with only1 operator

Routes with substantialcompetition

Routes with only 1effective competitor

Routes with mildcompetition

MANILAPrimary routes

Mla-BatangasMla-DadiangasMla-San CarlosMla-Zambales

Secondary routesMla-CoronMla-LeyteMla-MindoroMla-Tacloban

Tertiary routesMla-ButuanMla-CalubianMla-CorregidorMla-DumaguitMla-El Nido- LiminangcongMla-Zambales

CEBUPrimary routes

Cebu-DadiangasCebu-DavaoCebu-EstanciaCebu-MasbateCebu-NasipitCebu-Zamboanga

Secondary routesCebu-BacolodCebu-CalbayogCebu-CatanduanesCebu-TaclobanCebu-Talibon

Tertiary routesCebu-CamotesCebu-DawahonCebu-HiligaynonCebu-JetafeCebu-Lapu-lapuCebu-LarenaCebu-LaziCebu-Sta Fe

Mla-DipologMla-DumagueteMla-EstanciaMla-Masbate

Mla-RoxasMla-Surigao

Cebu-Tubigon

Cebu-ButuanCebu-Palompon

Cebu-Naval

Mla-Gen SantosMla-Nasipit

Mla-BacolodMla-CotabatoMla-Ormoc

Cebu-Jagna

Cebu-DipologCebu-OzamisCebu-Surigao

Cebu-CamiguinCebu-Iligan

Mla-Cagayan de OroMla-CebuMla-DavaoMla-IliganMla-IloiloMla-Palawan/Puerto PrincesaMla-TagbilaranMla-Zamboanga

Mla-OzamisMla-Palompon

Cebu-BoholCebu-DumagueteCebu-Gen SantosCebu-IloiloCebu-Palawan/Puerto PrincesaCebu-Tagbilaran

Cebu-DapitanCebu-LeyteCebu-Ormoc

Source: Appendix Tables 1 to 3.

37


Table 13. State of competition, routes originating from Manila and Cebu,cargo services, 1998

MANILAPrimary routes

Mla-BatangasMla-Cebu-IliganMla-Cebu-Iligan-Dumaguete

Mla-DadiangasMla-Cebu-Gen SantosMla-NasipitMla-Puerto Princesa

Secondary routesMla-CoronMla-BaybayMla-Cebu-BacolodMla-MaasinMla-PalomponMla-Tilik

Tertiary routesMla-AklanMla-BaisMla-CalubianMla-Danao EscalanteMla-Iligan-MargosatubigMla-Illigan-SionMla-LiminangcongMla-Palawan-LucenaMla-PollocMla-PulupandanMla-Toledo

CEBUPrimary routes

Cebu-Cotabato-Dumaguete

Cebu-Cotabato-Gen Santos

Cebu-DadiangasCebu-Dumaguete-Gen Santos

Cebu-Iligan-Cagayan de Oro

Cebu-Iligan-IloiloCebu-Iloilo-PalawanCebu-NasipitCebu-Tubigon

Mla-DipologMla-EstanciaMla-MasbateMla-San Carlos

Mla-ButuanMla-CotabatoMla-RoxasMla-Surigao

Mla-Jolo

Cebu-JagnaCebu-Zamboanga-Gen Santos

Mla-Catbalogan

Cebu-MasbateCebu-Puerto PrincesaCebu-Tagbilaran

Mla-BacolodMla-CagayanMla-CebuMla-DavaoMla-DumagueteMla-Gen SantosMla-IliganMla-IloiloMla-PalawanMla-TagbilaranMla-Zamboanga

Mla-OrmocMla-OzamisMla-Tacloban

Mla-Escalante

Cebu-BoholCebu-CagayanCebu-DavaoCebu-DumagueteCebu-Gen SantosCebu-IloiloCebu-PalawanCebu-Zamboanga



Routes with only 1operator



38

Table 13. Continued

Intermodal competitionThe market power in the passenger service is now constrained by competi-tion from other modes of transportation. In particular, the deregulation ofthe air transport industry has captured part of the First and Second Class

(CEBU con’t.)Secondary routes

Tertiary routesCebu-BagoCebu-BantayanCebu-BantilanCebu-BataanCebu-BauanCebu-Bilangbilangan East & WestCebu-BoronganCebu-BulanCebu-Cagayan de OrocilloCebu-Calbayog-GuiwanCebu-CamiguinCebu-CatainganCebu-CebuCebu-Cotabato-ZamboangaCebu-GuiuanCebu-Iloilo-LegaspiCebu-Iloilo-PasacaoCebu-JetafeCebu-KiwalanCebu-LarenaCebu-LaziCebu-LiloyCebu-MagallanesCebu-Mindoro-TagbilaranCebu-NabilidCebu-OroquiettaCebu-PollocCebu-Pulupandan-OzamisCebu-San CarlosCebu-San FernandoCebu-San JoseCebu-Sta Fe

Cebu-Talibon

Cebu-BaisCebu-Batangas

Cebu-CalbayogCeub-DapitanCebu-OrmocCebu-OzamisCebu-PalomponCebu-Tacloban

Cebu-CatbaloganCebu-MaasinCebu-Tandag

Cebu-BacolodCebu-ButuanCebu-DipologCebu-Surigao

Cebu-CamotesCebu-CotabatoCebu-IliganCebu-LegaspiCebu-LeyteCebu-Naval

Source: Appendix Tables 4 to 6.



Routes with only 1operator


39


Table 14. Range of market shares of dominant players in routeswith only 1 effective competitor and routes with mild competition (%)

passengers. This is particularly true during off peak season when airlines areable to offer budget fares that come very close to the Third Class passengerrates of shipping lines. The fast travel by air and the comfort that it providesmore than compensate for the price difference thereby, enabling airlines tocapture a sizeable chunk of the passenger market.

In addition, the budget airfares opened an alternative mode of travel toa market that formerly cannot afford to travel by air. The best examples ofthese are housemaids from the southern part of the country who are work-ing in Metro Manila or students from the south studying in universities inMetro Manila. On the other hand, the introduction of fast ferries providesgood competition to airlines flying the secondary and tertiary routes.

Also, the development of roads and other infrastructures (like bridges)in the southern part of the country opened an alternative to shipping trans-port. An example of this is the construction of the Marcelo Fernan Bridgeconnecting Cebu City and Lapu-lapu City that has reduced the number ofpassengers plying the Lapu-lapu-Cebu ferry route because some passengersnow prefer to travel by land considering the reduction in traffic caused bythe construction of the bridge. Also, land transport from Manila to the Visayasand even to Davao has become increasingly popular to travelers because ofthe cheaper bus fare, providing competition to the Manila-Tacloban, Manila-Catbalogan or Manila-Davao shipping routes.

Nonetheless, market power in the cargo service still lies in the hands ofthe shipping industry.

Routes with only one (1) effectivecompetitor

Routes with mild competition

Passenger84.1 - 98.683.2 - 99.989.0 - 99.9

Cargo84.0 - 99.087.2 - 98.987.2 - 98.9

78.3 - 98.570.0 - 94.471.3 - 93.9

59.0 - 99.867.3 - 99.867.3 - 99.8

Source: Appendix Tables 1 to 6

CompetitionBecause of the absence of data, the results of the interviews with shippinglines and the executive director of the DMAP will be used in analyzing theeffects of the policy reforms on competition. The results of the interviewreveal that the most significant impact of the reforms is the increase in com-petition in the industry. Given this information and the indicators of marketstructure in 1998 discussed in the preceding section, it can be deduced thatthe industry was more concentrated prior to 1998. The merger of the ship-ping giants was initially perceived to be a threat by the other major player.But since shipping companies operate by maintaining niche markets, the mergerdid not make the industry more concentrated nor did it increase the marketpower of the merged companies.10 The merger in fact promoted competition.The merger was the response of the companies involved in increasing theirefficiency as a result of competition.

However, the increase in competition is felt only in the primary andsecondary routes. This confirms the finding in the preceding section thatmajority of the tertiary routes are still run by single operators. The increasein competition in the primary and secondary routes came from additionaloperators in the routes. The reforms provided new operators the opportu-nity to gain entry in routes where entry was previously restricted by thegrandfather rules.

The increase in the number of competitors in the routes is beneficial topassengers and shippers because it gave them several choices of shippinglines for the service they require. For shippers, competition did not onlyincrease choices for their cargoes but it also increased their linkage to theirports of call. The immediate results of competition are the improvement inthe quality of service.

Quality of serviceBecause competition increased, shipping operators were forced to improveon the quality of their service. Customer service and satisfaction drive upcompetition thereby improving efficiency. Improvement in the quality of ser-vice also meant the introduction of new facilities and amenities on board,and improvement or upgrading of facilities not only in passenger accommo-dation but also in ticketing and booking facilities.11 Upgrading of facilitiesencouraged certification from ISM and ISO.


10 The argument is based on the interview with shipping lines. The executive director of the DMAP thinks otherwise.

40


Improvement and upgrading of facilities resulted to the modernizationof the domestic fleet. Bigger and better vessels were acquired. As shownearlier in Table 3, there was an increase in industry fleet particularly forgeneral cargo and passenger cargo starting 1993. Also, the average age ofvessels for passenger cargo substantially declined from 21 years in 1990 toless than 10 years in 1999, indicating newer vessels plying the routes (Table 4).

It is also said, however, that the modernization of the domestic fleetresulted in the overtonnaging of the primary routes during the early stage ofthe reform process. Such situation, however, is expected as shipping compa-nies adjust their operations to the new environment. Likewise, the increasein capacity during the first half of the 1990s was in anticipation of the ex-pected increase in passenger and cargo traffic in the future. That is, sincevessel acquisition takes time, vessels deployed today are meant not only toaddress present demand but also future capacity. However, prolongedovertonnaging could endanger competition. There is a general observation,however, that most shipping companies are now reducing their fleet andconsolidating their operations. The reduction in fleet was also partly due tothe fact that the increase in demand for shipping services expected earlierdid not materialize.

Improvement in facilities is best exemplified by the advent of fastcraftvessels. Dubbed as “a home right at sea,” these fast speed crafts extend thebest of services and the best of convenience enabling passengers to crisscrossislands and regions in a short period of travel. The fast craft vessels openeda new marketing strategy in the transportation business. Operators of fastcraft vessels have established links with airlines and large shipping lines withoperations originating from Manila, operating in a hub-and-spoke pattern.That is, the airlines and large shipping lines bring passengers through theprimary routes while the fast craft vessels will bring these same passengersto their destinations in the secondary routes. Visayas is the hub of the country’sfastcrafts operation. The strategy has propelled commerce and trade andaccelerated tourism and tourism-related activities in the southern part of thecountry.

However, the profitability of the fastcraft industry is observed to bedifficult to sustain. It is said that fast crafts are not yet appropriate for thecountry, considering the country’s level of development. Fastcraft vesselsgenerally cater to the A-B crowd or those belonging to high-income group ofthe society. Domestic sea passengers in the country are mostly the C-D crowd

11 One shipping operator in Cebu has a ticketing and booking office that looks better than the ticketing offices of domesticairlines.

41

42


or low-income group of the society. Likewise, fast crafts are good only forshort distance travel; but then again, most passengers in these routes are theC-D crowd and a few businessmen who travel to places not within the reachof air transport. It is observed that some of the fast-craft vessels have beenpulled out from some of the routes.

For cargo services, improvement in quality means the availability ofsufficient and appropriate services. The latter was achieved through improve-ment in technology in cargo services, like the use of RORO vessels and con-tainerization.12 However, the use of RORO vessels is more appropriate forthe country considering its archipelagic setting. Large benefits can be de-rived from RORO operations by avoiding handling at two ports as well astime losses and value losses derived from the time spent at ports. On theother hand, containerization is more appropriate for long voyages like ininternational shipping.

Services in the tertiary routes, on the other hand, remained unimprovedbecause of the lack, if not absence, of competition. Old vessels and motorizedbancas are still used, endangering the lives of passengers.

Passage and freight ratesAvailable data on the actual rates charged by two of the major players in theindustry show that rates for both passage and cargo have increased in realterms (Tables 15 to 18). What is striking however is the large increase in ratesafter 1999 compared to the years before it. This is true regardless of the classof commodity or passenger, except for the first class passenger of WG&A.

As discussed earlier in the paper, the DOSCON process was abolishedin late 1999 allowing companies full freedom to determine their deregulatedrates. However, the three automatic fuel rate adjustments in 2000 totaling19.15 percent contributed to the large increase for the period 1999-2000. Onthe other hand, the general rate increase of 20 percent adopted by the ship-ping association in November 2000 contributed to the increase in 2000-2001.The uniform increase for all shipping operators is alarming as it has a sem-blance of a cartel-like arrangement.

Nonetheless, the deregulation has corrected what otherwise were verylow cargo rates arising from the past regulatory system. This could be seenfrom the large increase (53.3%) in cargo rate of the Manila-Tacloban route in1999-2000 (Table 14). Based on the interview, the route is a classic example of

12 Vessels designed to use the RORO method of cargo handling are designed with a ramp at the stern. Over the ramp,connected to a pier, loaded vans pass aboard, stowing themselves under their own power. On the other hand,containerization is a method of carrying cargo in vessel container vans stowed on deck or in the cargo hold of a ship.

43


RouteClass ACebu/ DavaoIloilo/ BacolodIloilo/ CotabatoManila/ BacolodManila/ CagayanManila/ CebuManila/ CotabatoManila/ DavaoManila/ IloiloManila/ SurigaoManila/ TaclobanClass BCebu/ DavaoIloilo/ BacolodIloilo/ CotabatoManila/ BacolodManila/ CagayanManila/ CebuManila/ CotabatoManila/ DavaoManila/ IloiloManila/ SurigaoManila/ TaclobanClass CCebu/ DavaoIloilo/ BacolodIloilo/ CotabatoManila/ BacolodManila/ CagayanManila/ CebuManila/ CotabatoManila/ DavaoManila/ IloiloManila/ SurigaoManila/ Tacloban

-2.85

1.71

-2.85-4.801.71

-2.85-2.91-2.82-2.85

-2.85

1.12

-2.85-4.802.89

-2.85-2.92-2.85-2.85

-2.85

1.19

-2.85-4.801.71

-2.85-2.92-2.85-2.85

1.92

8.14

1.923.898.141.921.991.891.92

1.92

8.69

1.923.896.901.922.001.921.91

1.93

8.70

1.923.908.141.936.471.931.93

-4.13

-9.58

-4.13-4.02-9.58-4.13-4.13-4.13-4.13

-4.13

-9.58

-4.13-4.02-9.58-4.13-4.13-4.13-4.12

-4.13

-9.58

-4.13-4.02-9.58-4.13-0.57-4.13-4.13

9.22

0.27

-5.030.270.27

-5.030.270.27

-17.83

0.27

0.27

-5.030.270.27

-5.030.260.270.27

0.27

1.41

-5.030.27

-1.82-5.03-0.320.270.27

5.39

3.973.97

-1.0514.8023.228.30

18.403.97

53.31

14.79

3.963.96

-1.0514.7922.168.30

14.793.97

25.61

14.17

2.81-3.39-1.0514.8025.848.306.673.97

25.63

19.38

31.8231.8129.7019.3811.2218.5115.7431.819.09

19.38

31.8131.8129.7019.3812.1718.5119.3831.809.09

20.04

31.8231.81

-30.5619.3811.2218.5019.3831.829.09

Source: Quarterly Report on Actual Rates Charged of Shipping Companies submitted to theMARINA.

Table 15. Annual increase in cargo rates, Sulpicio Lines (%, 1995 prices)

1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01

44


Table 16. Annual increase in cargo votes, WG&A (%, 1995 prices)

1999-00

-6.25-6.25-1.7921.134.92

21.1316.7613.8421.13-6.2521.13

-6.25-6.25-1.7921.124.75

21.1221.1213.8421.08-6.2521.1221.12

-6.25-6.25-1.6421.134.74

21.1321.1413.8421.13-6.2521.1421.14

2000-01

0.000

0.00022.60227.86922.60719.70717.64822.6020.000

22.606

0.000

0.00022.59827.86222.60022.59917.64822.6370.000

22.59922.600

0.000

0.00022.60227.86822.60722.60817.64922.6020.000

22.60722.607

Source: Quarterly Report on Actual Rates Charged of Shipping Companies submitted to theMARINA.

RoutesClass ACebu/ DavaoIloilo/ BacolodIloilo/ CotabatoManila/ BacolodManila/ CagayanManila/ CebuManila/ CotabatoManila/ DavaoManila/ IloiloManila/ SurigaoManila/ TaclobanClass BCebu/ DavaoIloilo/ BacolodIloilo/ CotabatoManila/ BacolodManila/ CagayanManila/ CebuManila/ CotabatoManila/ DavaoManila/ IloiloManila/ RoxasManila/ SurigaoManila/ TaclobanClass CCebu/ DavaoIloilo/ BacolodIloilo/ CotabatoManila/ BacolodManila/ CagayanManila/ CebuManila/ CotabatoManila/ DavaoManila/ IloiloManila/ RoxasManila/ SurigaoManila/ Tacloban

1998-99

1.78

-2.85

-7.47-7.47-7.47-7.47-7.47-7.47-7.47

1.78

-2.85

-7.47-7.47-7.47-7.47-7.47-7.47-7.47-7.47

1.78

-2.85

-7.47-7.47-7.47-7.47-7.47-7.47-7.47-7.47

45


Table 17. Annual increase in passenger rate, WG&A (%, 1995 prices)

Routes1st class suite-super 1st class suite-regular 1st class state-super

1998-99 1999-2000 1999-01 1998-99 1999-2000 1999-01 1998-99 1999-2000 1999-01

Iloilo/ CotabatoManila/ BacolodManila/ CagayanManila/ CebuManila/ CotabatoManila/ DavaoManila/ IloiloManila/ RoxasManila/ Surigao

17.12

16.379.99

11.9312.06

7.95-1.0210.55

24.5515.2822.0520.6823.1918.2628.24

17.02

28.6413.85

5.188.517.563.27

16.97

3.82

17.84

13.517.33

11.168.926.92

-2.8510.51

19.1316.2521.3219.4525.8716.2330.35

18.41

34.8614.52

5.298.259.53

17.84

3.81

18.04

12.2511.038.485.627.59

16.888.01

30.2712.2527.4522.8835.6610.3023.7519.8222.32

26.1511.5612.8111.260.00

13.333.349.85

Routes1st class state-regular 1st class cabin-super 1st class cabin-regular

1998-99 1999-2000 1999-01 1998-99 1999-2000 1999-01 1998-99 1999-2000 1999-01


16.70

11.336.307.146.576.41

17.2011.84

21.3211.3324.9625.2540.6310.4023.7119.8625.28

34.3910.7711.5212.12

0.00

12.693.269.83

12.23

12.966.525.996.89

108.7818.26

9.83

33.8917.5625.7521.7627.6523.4124.6419.7925.17

26.635.58

11.9612.8914.3511.1113.16

3.2611.11

15.18

13.004.865.855.306.86

17.247.30

19.2325.0022.1727.64

2.9724.1619.7223.92

5.9811.9614.5814.4032.8414.18

3.2611.18

Routes2nd class business-super 2nd class business-regular 2nd class tourist-super

1998-99 1999-2000 1999-01 1998-99 1999-2000 1999-01 1998-99 1999-2000 1999-01


16.14

8.156.715.320.978.57

-2.186.76

28.5214.5427.0823.2531.7824.7927.2325.4024.22

26.6513.1715.0112.7717.0214.1015.43

11.95

15.15

7.887.517.303.609.30

-1.226.58

2.6826.1826.7122.1730.9520.9229.4623.7528.27

58.1513.3215.1911.8215.9412.3615.71

14.95

15.15

7.959.406.174.618.68

18.467.21

30.3019.2028.9525.2341.1922.1832.7715.6629.28

26.3416.8515.1312.48

8.2710.8019.08

6.9515.23

Routes2nd class tourist-regular 3rd class economy-super 3rd class economy-regular

1998-99 1999-2000 1999-01 1998-99 1999-2000 1999-01 1998-99 1999-2000 1999-01


15.84

6.6910.6815.14

6.019.44

17.154.83

19.7927.1428.2270.0222.1935.3015.5538.71

17.0015.1712.9616.5110.5119.606.9815.17

2.99

11.500.711.690.022.002.863.31

34.7719.5646.9226.8634.8622.6638.2324.6127.75

17.3916.7415.3816.8620.6015.2222.6913.9329.03

0.31

0.20-0.860.45

-2.912.090.340.38

30.1220.0126.5126.8831.2022.3641.8525.1427.84

18.0117.1815.6916.7518.1815.1123.2714.5830.68

Source: Quarterly Report on Actual Rates Charged of Shipping Companies submitted to the MARINA.

46


47


the large imbalance between inbound and outbound cargo traffic. That is,the ship is full from Manila to Tacloban but not vice-versa. Hence, beforederegulation, the regulated rate for the route did not reflect the cost of pro-viding the shipping services. Given the abolition of the DOSCON process,the market could have corrected the rate and contributed to the large in-crease that occurred in 2000. This argument is strengthened by the fact thatthe rate increase in 2000-2001 was already small (9.1%).

It would have been helpful to examine the cargo rates for basic com-modities as the deregulation of rates for these commodities, when container-ized, is expected to increase the rates. This is because the regulated rates fornoncontainerized basic commodities were so low that these were unattrac-tive to shipping operators. However, data on rates for basic commodities arenot available.

Based on interviews with shipping companies, during off-peak seasonwhen there is excess capacity, cut-throat competition leads to “fare diving.”Some companies go to the extent of cutting their rates to the level that is justenough to get a break-even income or recover the cost of oil. This is trueeven for regulated rates because enforcement is weak. But the worst sce-nario is when a shipping operator practices fare diving and yet still earnsprofits by overloading. This practice adversely affects competition because itpunishes operators who follow regulations. Likewise, overloading puts thesafety of passengers at risk.

Impact of competitionCompetition pressures the shipping companies to produce the quality of servicedesired by passengers and shippers at the least cost. In other words, competi-tion drives them to become efficient. Companies whose quality of service ispoor, whose costs are high or whose profit margins are excessive will lose theircustomers to their rivals and eventually be driven out the market. Thus, onlythe efficient ones remain.

This section of the paper examines how competition promotes efficiency inthe industry. Ideally, efficiency would be measured in terms of the costs andprofit margins of companies. However, financial data are difficult to obtain; andif ever they could be obtained, they may not reflect the true financial operationsas it is accepted that businessmen maintain different books of accounts depend-ing on what purpose these will be used. Thus, the analysis here deals, not onefficiency per se, but on the process by which competition promotes the level ofefficiency. This is called the transfer mechanism, defined as the process wherebyoutput is reallocated from less to more efficient operators (Dick 1987).

48


The indicator used is the turnover of firms that takes into account the entryand exit of companies arising from competition. Again, only those plying theprimary and secondary routes were considered. The shipping companies areclassified into two: (i) those established before the policy reforms, called the“old order” companies; and (ii) those established after the policy reforms, calledthe “new order” companies. The cut off year is 1992 since the liberalization ofroutes occurred towards the end of that year. Also, exit is defined as when anoperator does not operate in any of the routes (primary and secondary) for twoor three consecutive years. Mergers are considered new entrants in the in-dustry.

There were about 103 shipping companies that operated in the industryduring the period 1990-1998, 76 of which were established before policy reformswere instituted and 27 were established during the reform period (Table 19). Bythe end of 1998, only 37 or 49 percent of the old order companies still existed.That is, 51 percent are no longer operating, probably due to the stiff competitionbrought about by the reforms or they have acquired new names due to mergeror acquisition.

The liberalization of route entry, on the other hand, enabled 27 newshipping companies to enter the industry during the period 1993-1998. None-theless, only 16 or 59 percent survived by the end of 1998. In other words, 11exited the industry, that is, they could have succumbed to competition.

However, despite the high survival rate of the new order companies,(59 percent as against 49 percent for the old order companies), the survivingcompanies are still dominated by the old order companies. That is, 70 per-cent of the surviving firms were established before the reforms. Likewise,these operators control about 64 percent of the industry’s cargo capacity and63 percent of passenger capacity.

It is important to note that exit from the industry was highest in 1998(15 operators) when there was financial crisis. On the other hand, entry washighest in 1994 (11 operators).

A further analysis of the surviving companies show that 43 percent ofthem are growing in their capacity; 34 percent experienced a decline in theircapacity while the remaining 23 percent did not register any change in theircapacity since they were established (Table 20). There was also a redistribu-tion of capacity from among the surviving companies. The share of the grow-ing companies increased from 51 percent in 1990 (or when they were estab-lished) to 86 percent by 1998. Their absolute tonnage in 1998 was 43 percenthigher. On the other hand, the share of the declining companies went downfrom 48 percent to 12 percent.

49


Table 19. Entry-exit of firms, domestic shipping industry, 1990-1999

YearCompanies

established beforepolicy reforms

Companiesestablished afterpolicy reforms

Grand total

19901991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

Total

757501

7414

7102

6902

6700

6709

5807

5108

4306

37

entrantsexit

entrantsexit

entrantsexit

entrantsexit

entrantsexit

entrantsexit

entrantsexit

entrantsexit

entrantsexit

000

110

1110

1251

1652

1937

1521

16

757501

7414

7102

69112

7810

795

107459

703

155827

53

Sources: MARINA Route InventoryMARINA Vessels with Valid Authority per LinkMARINA List of Authorities Issued


50

If competition is effective, the redistribution of capacity from decliningto growing companies should be accompanied by the redistribution of out-put from the less efficient to more efficient companies. Unfortunately, whetherthis in fact occurred with the surviving companies in 1998 cannot be analyzedfrom the data available. It is possible that some of the growing companieswere able to increase their capacities for reasons other than commercial effi-ciency. On the other hand, it is also possible that companies experience adecline in capacity not because of commercial pressure but because of marineloss. This could be an interesting area of further research to ascertain whetherthe competition arising from the reforms in fact increases the level of effi-ciency of the industry.

51

VII

�

The Role of MARINA in aDeregulated Environment

As presented earlier, MARINA takes charge of regulating the shipping in-dustry. Created under Presidential Decree No. 474 in 1974, the agency wasmandated, among other things, to provide for the effective supervision, regu-lation and rationalization of the organizational management, ownership andoperations of all water transport utilities and other maritime enterprises.Before the reforms were instituted, the agency’s regulatory functions includethe regulation of interisland rates, regulation of entry by granting of routecertificate of public convenience or provisionary authority, and regulation ofsafety and service standards.

Under a deregulated and liberalized environment, MARINA shouldchange the nature of how it regulates the industry so as to create the muchneeded competition and contestability in the market. This is crucial since lesscompetition has been realized, even after implementing policy reforms. In-stead of just responding to applications for new or expanded shipping ser-vices, MARINA should be proactive where the unavailability of desirableservices is concerned. It should identify underdeveloped routes or routeswhere there is shortage of vessels or routes that are not served and thenfacilitate investments for these routes by publicly inviting investors and grant-ing investment incentives. MARINA should focus on allowing new entrantsin the tertiary routes where there is practically no safe, reliable and adequateservice and where there is rampant overloading of passengers during peakseasons.

MARINA should also strengthen its developmental functions. Of par-ticular concern is MARINA’s apparent weak monitoring capabilities. Atten-tion to this concern becomes all the more important since, as discussed ear-lier, only a small percentage of the routes (whether primary, secondary ortertiary) experience substantial competition and that the top five companiesof the industry dominate the routes, regardless of the routes’ state of compe-tition. Under the current setup (MC No. 153), MARINA will intervene only ifpassengers and shippers file a complaint against the rates and services of

52

shipping companies and only if sufficient basis and justification is submitted.Such regulation should be modified. Monitoring should be on a regular ba-sis, i.e. not only when complaints are filed, to ensure that the interests ofshippers and passengers are protected against overcharging and poor ser-vice standards, and that the dominant firm or firms in each route do notabuse their market power. Regular monitoring would, in the first place, pre-vent shipping companies from making actions contrary to the regulations.


Monitoring should be done in tandem with the Philippine Coast Guard(PCG) that gives the vessels the authority to sail. As discussed earlier, ashipping operator can resort to fare diving or large discounts and still earnprofits by overloading its passengers. Such practice can be avoided if thePCG strictly monitors the vessels.

However, for MARINA to be able to exercise its monitoring functionseffectively and for it to be able to identify routes requiring adequate ship-

Table 20. Surviving firms, growing and declining based on Net Registered Tonnage(NRT) change

Old Order FirmsGrowingDecliningno changeTotal

New Order FirmsGrowingDecliningno changeTotal

IndustryGrowingDecliningno changeTotal

1614737

3137

19151044

No. of firms

88,465.29151,228.58

1,755.40241,449.27

72,283.08406.00

2,110.0874,799.16

160,748.37151,634.58

3,865.48316,248.43

NRT beg

36.6462.630.73

100.00

96.640.542.82

100.00

50.8347.951.22

100.00

%

135,883.6032,438.961,755.40

170,077.96

94,508.97289.61

2,110.0896,908.66

230,392.5732,728.573,865.48

266,986.62

NRT end

79.8919.071.03

100.00

97.520.302.18

100.00

86.312.33.2

100.00

%

Note: Data for nine firms are either incomplete or notSource: MARINA Route Inventory

53

The Role of MARINA in a Deregulated Environment

ping services, a database that is easily accessible to the shipping operators,investors, researchers, policymakers, and the public in general must be es-tablished. Current regulations require shipping companies to submit to theMARINA quarterly reports of passenger/cargo traffic and the actual ratescharged by their vessels, whether regulated or deregulated. Nonetheless,such reports remain as reports and are not being processed into a database.13

The database should include, at the very least, passenger/cargo trafficand freight/passage rates by shipping company and by route; number ofoperators per route and vessel capacity per route. The effectiveness of MA-RINA as an investment facilitator and regulator on a day-to-day basis hingesmuch on the availability of this critical information. MARINA therefore needsto invest on establishing the database and on its computer facilities and hu-man resources.

MARINA should focus its regulatory power on service standards andsafety regulations to avoid maritime accidents. It should ensure the seawor-thiness of the vessels (condition of the hull, requirements for navigational/firefighting/life-saving equipment, manning requirements, etc.) and that ship-ping operators strictly observe the minimum service standards.

One particular issue confronting the MARINA these days is the basisfor the approval of upward adjustment of regulated rates. The approach cur-rently used is still the revenue deficiency method. However, the approach isno longer appropriate as the financial statements of shipping companies in-clude their deregulated operations.

13 This is based on the experience of the author in making this study. No data on freight/passage rates or passenger/cargo traffic by routes and by company are readily available.

VIII

�

Areas for Competition Policyand Further Reforms

Competition policyLiberalization and deregulation should not be undertaken in isolation. The policyreforms should be complemented by competition policy to ensure that the com-petition and other benefits arising from liberalization and deregulation are noteroded by possible development of market power among shipping lines. Asdiscussed earlier, substantial competition exists in only a small percentage of theroutes and that cartel-like arrangements have been observed to exist in the in-dustry.

One area for competition policy is on merger and acquisition or consoli-dation. Fierce competition can push companies into bankruptcy, merger orconsolidation. The latter can have both positive and negative effects. On thepositive side, efficiency could be enhanced as it allows shipping companies toconsolidate their functions like marketing, ticketing, repair and maintenance,etc. On the negative side, there is the fear that the end result will be a largecompany becoming so dominant that it can exert considerable market power.

The country’s shipping industry has seen merger and consolidation hap-pening in response to the reforms. The merger did not result to an increase inmarket power of the merged companies, at least for now, since the current con-cern of the companies is more on consolidating their functions and not much onincreasing their market share. The picture could change, however, once the con-solidation has been completed.

Hence, a policy on merger and consolidation should be defined in sucha way that mergers and consolidation would not result to reduced serviceand less competition. The efficiency effects should be weighed against themarket power effects. In short, merger should be in the interests of the trav-eling public.

Another important area to consider is the development of the tertiaryroutes. The shipping industry has become an important source of competi-tion for the air transport industry in providing transport services to thecountry’s islands in the south (Austria 2000). The system of providing gov-

54

55

ernment incentives to shipping operators developing the tertiary routes shouldtherefore be designed in such a way that the efficiency arising from theintermodal competition will not be distorted.

Further reformsThe government should continue its deregulation efforts. Of particular inter-est is the regulated rate for non-DOT accredited vessels that either only of-fers first and second class accommodation or whose third class accommoda-tion is less than 50 percent of the total passenger capacity. This regulation hasno rationale as the first class and second class passenger services have al-ready been deregulated.

One important issue remaining for deregulation is the third class pas-senger service. About 70 percent of passengers take the third class service,majority of whom also come from the C-D crowd. The regulated rate for thisservice is regarded by shipping companies as very low and cannot covercost. The operation is therefore cross-subsidized, and often by cargo rev-enue. Since most of the cargo rates are already deregulated, passenger-cargovessels are placed at a disadvantage against pure cargo vessels because cross-subsidization is no longer feasible under a deregulated environment. This isalso aggravated by the fact that current regulation requires passenger ves-sels to allocate 50 percent of their passenger capacity to third class passen-gers, except for DOT-accredited vessels. Given the sensitivity of the issuebecause of its social implications, any attempt to deregulate the third classpassenger service should be carefully looked into. A balance should be struckbetween social objectives and economic efficiency.

Two other significant areas for reform are the ceiling on the return oninvestment and the application of the revenue deficiency method for upwardadjustment of regulated rates. Both are anticompetitive. The ceiling on ROIserves as a disincentive for efficient shipping companies because the returnmay not be commensurate to the level of service rendered. Based on theresults of the interview, many of the shipping companies regard shipping asless profitable than other competing investments. The ceiling on ROI makesthe industry less attractive to investors.

On the other hand, the revenue deficiency method awards inefficientcompanies because it guarantees return, regardless of the level of efficiency.As presented earlier, the method can no longer be applied under the newenvironment because the financial statements of companies also include theirderegulated operations.

Areas for Competition Policy and Further Reforms

56

IX

�

Summary and Conclusions

Regulation has a long history in the country’s shipping industry. This paperexamined the conflicting forces of past government regulations and competi-tion and their impact on the industry. The restrictive regulations have weak-ened, if not prevented, competition thereby rendering them ineffective inachieving the avowed aim of regulatory policy, which is to promote effi-ciency.

The inefficiency and the consequent adverse impacts on the economyprompted the government to institute reforms through liberalization andderegulation in the 1990s. Competition has improved, undermining industrypractices leading to an improvement in the quality of service. Nonetheless,substantial competition exists in only a small percentage of the routes. Agreater majority of the routes are still effectively monopolized or experienceonly mild competition. The top three or top five companies in the industryeffectively dominate the different routes, regardless of the routes’ state ofcompetition. What is more striking is the large increase in cargo and passen-ger rates after the reforms. The cartel-like arrangement that is observed toexist in the industry may have contributed to this.

The policy reform has been a slow process and much is still desired.There is a need for competition policy to ensure that the benefits derivedfrom liberalization and deregulation will not be eroded by the possible abuseof market power among the shipping lines. Likewise, the commercial successor failure of shipping companies in a liberalized and deregulated environ-ment hinges much on their responsiveness to market requirements; in short,their competitiveness. However, competitiveness depends on a host of fac-tors that include shipping costs and physical and administrative infrastructures. It has always been argued that domestic shipping costs (fuel,interest rate, insurance, and income and freight taxes) and handling costs inthe country are higher than other countries in the region (Lorenzo 1997; PISA2001). On the other hand, port facilities in the country are far below world-class standards, with some ports still undeveloped.

57

Summary and Conclusions

Finally, the high domestic shipping cost in the country is causing thepressure for the lifting of the cabotage law to enable domestic shippers availof lower shipping costs from foreign vessels. The lifting of the cabotage lawwill expose interisland shipping to the pressures of international competi-tion. This would be advantageous for the country in the long run as it willincrease the pressure for efficiency among all players in the industry. How-ever, the government needs to identify what measures and actions must beundertaken, including their sequencing, during the transition to full liberal-ization in order to prepare domestic shipping lines against foreign competi-tion. At the very least, the domestic shipping environment should be im-proved by addressing the domestic issues (as mentioned above) affecting theindustry’s competitiveness.

58

Appendixes

Appendix Table 1. Dominant/effective players per route per type of market, passengertraffic, primary routes, 1998

Effective CompetitorsHerfindahlIndex(HHI)

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

0.54

0.54

0.35

0.54

0.37

0.61

0.51

Number=1/HHI

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.86

1.87

2.89

1.84

2.70

1.64

1.96

Name of Operator/s

Sicat Ferries, Inc.

Cebu Ferries Corp

Sulpicio Lines Inc

Sulpicio Lines Inc

Negros Navigation

Sulpicio Lines Inc

Sulpicio Lines Inc

George and Peter Lines

Sulpicio Lines Inc

Negros Navigation

Sulpicio Lines Inc


Negros Navigation

Sulpicio Lines Inc

Sulpicio Lines Inc

Negros Navigation

Negros Navigation

Negros Navigation

Negros Navigation

WG&A Philippines

Sulpicio Lines Inc

Negros Navigation

Negros Navigation

Negros Navigation

Negros Navigation

Negros Navigation

Cebu Ferries Corp, Sulpicio Lines


Company B*, Arrel Shipping,

Victoriano Millanes

WG&A, Sulpicio Lines

Sulpicio Lines, WG&A, Negros

Navigation

Sulpicio Lines, Negros Navigation


Share

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Route


Batangas/ Puerto Princesa

Cagayan de Oro/ Tagbilaran

Cebu/ Dadiangas

Cebu/ Davao

Cebu/ Estancia

Cebu/ Masbate

Cebu/ Nasipit

Cebu/ Zamboanga

Dadiangas/ Zamboanga

Davao/ Zamboanga

Dumaguete/ Ozamis

Dumaguete/ Zamboanga

General Santos/ Zamboanga

Iligan/ Tagbilaran

Iloilo (Estancia)/ Zamboanga

Iloilo/ Davao

Iloilo/ General Santos

Iloilo/ Iligan

Iloilo/ Palawan

Manila/ Batangas

Manila/ Dadiangas

Manila/ San Carlos

Manila/ Zambales

Palawan/ Cagayan de Oro

Palawan/ Davao

Palawan/ General Santos

Routes with at least 2 operators

Routes with substantial competition

Cagayan de Oro/ Jagna

Cebu/ Cagayan de Oro

Cebu/ Tubigon

Manila/ Dipolog

Manila/ Dumaguete

Manila/ Estancia

Manila/ Masbate

PasssengersCarried

35,801

3,682

4,663

11,797

264

1,855

4,244

7,311

34,521

5,381

10,995

9,671

12,199

3,056

22,869

7,919

25,370

8,799

22,285

128,225

18,608

5,960

6,460

3,311

127

225

197,636

158,758

181,314

91,099

356,754

56,761

139,328

Numberof

Operators

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

2

2

3

2

3

2

2

59

Appendixes

Appendix Table 1. ContinuedEffective CompetitorsHerfindahl

Index(HHI)

PasssengersCarried Number=

1/HHI Name of Operator/s ShareRoute

Numberof

Operators

0.88

0.97

0.86

0.73

0.97

0.37

0.33

0.71

0.51

0.68

0.54

0.40

0.52

0.60

0.64

0.60

0.54

0.46

0.67

2,916

2,359

51,695

100,322

103,980

239,093

277,557

1,746

12,524

11,257

472,250

406,331

663,471

175,719

128,207

645,024

186,402

192,526

176,144

1.13

1.03

1.17

1.37

1.03

2.69

3.07

1.40

1.97

1.47

1.87

2.49

1.92

1.66

1.56

1.66

1.86

2.17

1.50

Cebu Ferries Corp

Negros Navigation

Negros Navigation

WG&A Philippines

WG&A Philippines

Romulo Wagwag, Ormoc

Enterprises, MY Lines

Phil Fast Ferry, Negros Navigation,


Sulpicio Lines

Cokaliong Shipping,

Negros Navigation

Cebu Ferries Corp

Phil Fast Ferry, Negros Navigation

Sulpicio Lines, WG&A



WG&A

Negros Navigation, WG&A

WG&A, Negros Navigation


WG&A

93.8

98.6

92.2

84.1

98.5

83.2

84.3

82.8

98.5

80.4

96.5

87.6

97.7

90.8

78.3

98.7

96.3

93.1

79.0

Routes with only 1 effective competitor

Cebu/ Jagna

Davao/ General Santos

Dumaguete/ Tagbilaran

Manila/ Gen. Santos

Manila/ Nasipit


Cebu/ Bohol

Cebu/ Dumaguete

Cebu/ General Santos

Cebu/ Iloilo

Cebu/ Palawan/ Puerto Princesa

Cebu/ Tagbilaran

Manila/ Cagayan de Oro

Manila/ Cebu

Manila/ Davao

Manila/ Iligan

Manila/ Iloilo

Manila/ Palawan/ Puerto Princesa

Manila/ Tagbilaran

Manila/ Zamboanga

2

2

2

3

3

9

6

2

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

3

2

Source: 1998 Annual Traffic Reports of Shipping Companies submitted to the MARINA.


60

Appendix Table 2. Dominant/effective players per route per type of market, passengertraffic, secondary routes, 1998


1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

Number=1/HHI

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

Name of Operator/s

Shipshape Ferry, Inc.

Sulpicio Lines Inc

Negros Navigation

FJP Lines

Lapu Lapu Shipping Lines

Cebu Ferries Corp

Age Shipping Lines

Sulpicio Lines Inc

Sulpicio Lines Inc

Negros Navigation


Sulpicio Lines Inc

Cokaliong Shipping Lines

Sulpicio Lines Inc

Negros Navigation

Negros Navigation

Negros Navigation

San Nicolas Lines Inc.

Sulpicio Lines Inc


WG&A Philippines

Sulpicio Lines

Sulpicio Lines Inc

Cebu Ferries Corp

Rogelio Tan

Sulpicio Lines Inc

Sulpicio Lines Inc

Share

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Route


Batangas/ Romblon

Baybay/ Maasin (Leyte/ Leyte)

Cebu/ Bacolod*

Cebu/ Calbayog

Cebu/ Catanduanes

Cebu/ Tacloban

Cebu/ Talibon

Cotabato/ Iloilo

Cotabato/ Zamboanga

Dapitan/ Tagbilaran

Dapitan/ Zamboanga

Davao/ Surigao

Dumaguete/ Leyte (Maasin)

Dumaguete/ Ozamis

Iligan/ Ozamis

Iloilo/ Bacolod*

Iloilo/ Ozamis

Manila/ Coron

Manila/ Leyte (Baybay/ Maasin)

Manila/ Mindoro (Tilik)

Manila/ Tacloban

Masbate/ Leyte (Baybay/ Maasin)

Masbate/ Surigao

Palawan/ Tacloban

Surigao/ del Carmen

Surigao/ Leyte (Baybay)

Surigao/ Maasin

PasssengersCarried

6,760

4 4

2,998

12,571

37,056

40,933

46,984

9,318

26,703

8,763

793

3,182

6 8

10,995

7 0

1,274,943

6,635

4,538

8,018

7,217

46,940

326

805

118

1,189

1,650

2,768

Numberof

Operators

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Appendixes

61

Appendix Table 2. ContinuedEffective CompetitorsHerfindahl

Index(HHI)

0.50

0.56

0.51

0.62

0.54

0.54

0.89

0.97

0.90

0.72

1.00

0.79

0.76

0.45

0.57

0.52

0.42

0.64

0.66

Number=1/HHI

2.00

1.78

1.96

1.62

1.84

1.84

1.12

1.03

1.11

1.39

1.00

1.26

1.32

2.24

1.75

1.92

2.38

1.56

1.51

Name of Operator/s

Concepcion Ang, Adelia Membreve

Sulpicio Lines, Cebu Ferries Corp


MY Lines Inc, San Juan

Shipping Corp



Santos Cruz


Cebu Ferries Corp


Negros Navigation

WG&A Philippines

Sulpicio Lines

Negros Navigation, George and

Peter Lines

Southern Pacific Transport Corp

Phil Fast Ferry Corp, Cebu

Ferries Corp

Negros Navigation, George and

Peter Lines

WG&A Philippines

WG&A Philippines

Share

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

94.3

98.6

94.8

83.2

99.9

88.4

85.9

94.4

70.0

84.3

80.8

78.2

78.7

Route



Bohol (Ubay)/ Leyte (Maasin or Bato)

Cagayan de Oro/ Tacloban

Cebu/ Butuan*

Cebu/ Palompon

Manila/ Roxas

Manila/ Surigao


Bato/ Maasin (Leyte/Leyte)

Cebu/ Dipolog*

Cebu/ Ozamis

Cebu/ Surigao

Manila/ Bacolod*

Manila/ Cotabato

Manila/ Ormoc


Cebu/ Dapitan

Cebu/ Leyte

Cebu/ Ormoc

Dumaguete/ Dapitan

Manila/ Ozamis

Manila/ Palompon

PasssengersCarried

3,506

987

298,773

7,251

256,116

187,004

11,614

17,900

318,299

60,083

571,605

101,900

27,753

43,931

44,861

568,271

87,065

148,083

45,169

Numberof

Operators

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

4

3

6

4

3

2



62

Appendix Table 3. Dominant/effective players per route per type of market, passengertraffic, tertiary routes, 1998


1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

Number=1/HHI

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

Name of Operator/s

Seaford Shipping Lines

Negros Navigation

Negros Navigation

Negros Navigation

Negros Navigation

Negros Navigation

Negros Navigation

Negros Navigation

Negros Navigation

Dionisio Albania

Sulpicio Lines Inc

Sofronio Bogtai

Sofronio Bogtai

Sofronio Bogtai

Sofronio Bogtai

Patrocinio Cuaca

Tabango Express

Patrocinio Cuaca

Elizabeth Carino

Sulpicio Lines Inc

Sto. Nino Ferry Boat Services

Arturo Olasiman

Arturo Olasiman

Cesar Sitjar

Teresita Koga

Sulpicio Lines Inc

Philippine Fast Ferry

Gomez Brothers Shipping Lines

Margarito Tan

Dionisio Montalban

Iluminado Dacallos

Agustine Romano

Manuel Estrada

Emilio Morate

Florencio Apacible

Florencio Apacible

Reynaldo Cajefe Jr

Agustine Romano

Antonio Vencio

Avelino Arraz

Share

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Route


Bacolod/ Bataan

Bacolod/ Cagayan de Oro

Bacolod/ Davao

Bacolod/ Estancia

Bacolod/ General Santos

Bacolod/ Legaspi

Bacolod/ Ozamis

Bacolod/ Palawan

Bacolod/ Zamboanga

Batangas (Tinglay)/ Batangas (Mabini)

Baybay/ Calubian

Baybay/ Kawit

Baybay/ Moabog

Baybay/ Monsirat

Baybay/ San Juan

Bogo/ Placer

Bogo/ Tabango

Bogo/ Villaba

Buenavista/ Iloilo

Butuan/ Cagayan de Oro

Cadiz/ Bantayan

Calbayog / Guinbarocan

Calbayog/ Labangbaybay

Calbayog/ Maripipi

Calbayog/ Tagapulaan

Calubian/ Maasin

Camiguin/ Ormoc

Carbon/ Inabangan

Catbalogan/ Borongan

Catbalogan/ Brgy Saugan

Catbalogan/ Buenavista

Catbalogan/ Canhawan Gote

Catbalogan/ Daram

Catbalogan/ Guintarean

Catbalogan/ Haplaan

Catbalogan/ Jocopon

Catbalogan/ San Rogue

Catbalogan/ Sitio Bitoon

Catbalogan/ Tarangnan

Catbalogan/ Villareal

PasssengersCarried

589

37,524

1,332

3

1,514

1,547

467

14,709

2,385

3,400

3 5

440

250

425

511

10,176

1,452

18,421

584

125

6,533

550

550

1,950

606

5

2,844

9,841

1,992

7,948

1,730

4 9

12,480

5,640

430

3,036

4,899

5 0

294

3,668

Numberof

Operators

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

63

Appendixes

Appendix Table 3. Continued


1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

Number=1/HHI

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

Name of Operator/s

Palacio Shipping

Concepcion Ang

Roble Shipping

Carmelo Simolde

Metro Ferry Cebu

Palacio Shipping Inc


FJP Lines

Roger Bandao

Virgilio Arbolado

Virgilio Arbolado

Sulpicio Lines Inc

Carlito Latonio

Sofronio Bogtai

Sofronio Bogtai

Cesar Sitjar


Sulpicio Lines Inc

Sulpicio Lines Inc

Sulpicio Lines Inc

Gaudencio Baruc

Gaudencio Baruc

Negros Navigation

German Gutierrez

Teresita Gananan

Nomn Novyar

Tripple "S" Divers Services


Negros Navigation


Sulpicio Lines Inc

Negros Navigation

Negros Navigation

Sulpicio Lines Inc



M/ V Intan

Zenaida Petracorta

Tristar Sea Ventures Inc

Saturnino Atienza

Antonio Mogasa

Casiano Obligado, Jr

Share

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Route

Cebu/ Camotes

Cebu/ Dawahon

Cebu/ Hiligaynon

Cebu/ Jetafe

Cebu/ Lapu-lapu

Cebu/ Larena

Cebu/ Lazi

Cebu/ Sta Fe

Cogon/ Sta Ana

Cuyo/ El Nido

Cuyo/ San Vicente

Dadiangas/ Iloilo

Danao/ Camotes

Danao/ Kawit

Danao/ Moabog

Danao/ Naval

Dapitan/ Lazi

Davao/ Dadiangas

Dipolog/ Iligan

Dipolog/ Tagbilaran

Doong / Hagnaya

Doong/ Vito

Dumaguete/ Estancia

Gravahan/ Pag-asa

Guimaras/ Pulupandan

Guimaras/ Roxas City

Hilutungan/ Boyong

Hilutungan/ Shangrila

Iligan/ Bacolod

Iligan/ Lazi

Iligan/ Ormoc

Iloilo/ Cagayan de Oro

Iloilo/ Zambales

Jagna/ Nasipit

Kalusuan/ Boyong

Kalusuan/ Shang rila

Lapinig,Garcia/ Bohol (Ubay)

Limasawa/ P. Burgos

Mactan/ Dumilon

Madredejos/ Kawit

Magalona/ Iloilo

Mandaue/ Bohol

PasssengersCarried

5,302

2,604

31,696

23,901

2,933,142

3,855

167

12,949

22,501

2 0

5 5

9,211

18,680

455

569

9 4

543

3 4

534

12,065

231

130

3

238,416

600

204

3

103

725

2,919

189

52,247

6,635

1,042

1 5

155

5,268

10,968

572

4,731

3,055

5,174

Numberof

Operators

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

64




1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

Number=1/HHI

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

Name of Operator/s

Sulpicio Lines Inc

Sulpicio Lines Inc

Sun Cruises

WG&A Philippines


Negros Navigation

Ever Lines

Ever Lines

Ever Lines

Sulpicio Lines Inc

Arturo Susas

Sulpicio Lines Inc

Edison Dalag




Cesar Sitjar

Teodulo Lapure

Teodulo Lapure

Teodulo Lapure

Cesar Sitjar

Teodulo Lapure

Teodulo Lapure

Teodulo Lapure

Teodulo Lapure

Teodulo Lapure

Teodulo Lapure

Manuel Perez

Antonieto Pedericos

Sofronio Bogtai

Sofronio Bogtai

Sofronio Bogtai

Sofronio Bogtai

Sofronio Bogtai

M/V Lilly/ Dona Antonina/ Dona Anita

Daima Shipping Corp

M/V Lilly/ Dona Antonina/ Dona Anita

Armando Salva

Eutiquio Caringal

Rolando Liwanag

Jaime Macaya

Magnolia Shipping Corp

Share

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Route

Manila/ Butuan

Manila/ Calubian

Manila/ Corregidor

Manila/ Dumaguit

Manila/ El Nido- Liminangcong

Manila/ Zambales

Margos/ Malangas

Margos/ Subanipa

Margos/ Talusan

Masbate/ Calubian

Masbate/ Maya

Masbate/ Ormoc

Maya/ Logon

Mindoro/ Burunga

Mindoro/ Libertad

Mindoro/ Semerara

Naval/ Bato

Naval/ Binalayan

Naval/ Burabod

Naval/ Calbani

Naval/ Canduhao

Naval/ Casibang

Naval/ Hagonoy

Naval/ Maripipi

Naval/ Trabugan

Naval/ Ulog

Naval/ Viga

Odiongan/ Oangay

Ormoc/ Camotes (Pilar)

Ormoc/ Dapdap

Ormoc/ Kawit

Ormoc/ Lanao

Ormoc/ Moabog

Ormoc/ Monsirat

Ozamis/ Kolambugan

Ozamis/ Mukas

Ozamis/ Tubod

Paradise/ Insular

Perez/ Antimonan

Romblon/ Lucena

Romblon/ San Agustin

Sagasa/ Alicia

PasssengersCarried

22,026

11,813

25,235

43,567

1,557

6,460

4,041

3,328

1,495

833

6,415

3,123

6,023

2,630

7,173

8,136

2,260

107

101

8 4

2,110

7 6

165

168

9 1

7 3

6 3

3,666

19,240

1,228

1,050

1,035

990

733

36,279

491,114

35,741

30,800

5,180

4 2

600

518

Numberof

Operators

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

65

Appendixes



1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

Number=1/HHI

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

Name of Operator/s

Analita Richa

Myrna Espinosa

Juana Lopez

Negros Navigation

Danilo Lines


Robinson Royo

Timoteo Batton

Timoteo Batton

Celeste Tenperateba

Santa Rosa Sea Trans, Inc.




Jose Castro





Honesto Lipao

Sulpicio Lines Inc

BCT Shipping Lines

Vicente Mejia

Genara Malbacias

Leonardo Dauhog

Leonardo Dauhog

Pedro Felizarta

Pedro Felizarta

Joedina Baleos-Gumagay

Romulo Alvarina

ABC Liner & Ferry Boat Services


P.S. Rodriguez Ferry Service

Jeffrey Pages


Aleson Shipping Lines

Company A*

Sampaguita Shipping Corp.




Magnolia Shipping Corp.

Share

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Route

Samal/ Caliclic

Samal/ Davao City

Samar/ Mandaue

San Carlos/ Estancia

San Carlos/ Toledo

San Jose/ Antique

Sibuyan/ Roxas

Sta Ana/ Isla Rita

Sta Ana/ Pearl Farm

Sta Cruz/ Tucanga

Sta Rosa/ Ang-asil

Sta Rosa/ Boyong

Sta Rosa/ CMMC

Sta Rosa/ Shangrila

Sto Tomas/Talaga

Subanipa/ Malangas

Sulpa/ Boyong

Sulpa/ CMMC

Sulpa/ Shang rila

Surigao/ Cagdianao

Surigao/ Calubian

Surigao/ Dapa

Surigao/ Pinut-an

Surigao/ Quezon (Albor)

Tab-oc/ Bagacay

Tab-oc/ Hingatungan

Tab-oc/ San Francisco

Tab-oc/ Tib-o

Tacloban/ Balangiga

Tacloban/ Giporlos

Talisay/ Tampi

Talusan/ Alicia

Tangil, Dhug/ Negros

Tangil/ Dumanjug

Zamboanga/ Alicia

Zamboanga/ Basilan

Zamboanga/ Dipolog

Zamboanga/ Pagadian

Zamboanga/ Sandakan

Zamboanga/ Siocon

Zamboanga/ Sirawai

Zamboanga/ Talusan

PasssengersCarried

14,464

22,311

392

9 6

128,321

6,416

365

2,600

692

12,784

50,888

1 6

3

1 8

9,800

401

168

5 9

129

1,193

178

33,750

4,178

470

385

360

487

314

1,838

1,515

19,971

586

73,409

51,254

1,876

134,191

4 1

17,847

6,285

11,845

10,803

3,540

Numberof

Operators

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1


66



0.54

0.50

0.55

0.54

0.50

0.50

0.52

0.54

0.53

0.50

0.54

0.57

0.50

0.56

0.51

0.54

0.21

1.00

0.86

0.83

0.94

0.93

0.80

0.89

0.81

0.80

0.85

0.15

0.47

Number=1/HHI

1.85

1.98

1.83

1.84

1.99

1.99

1.93

1.86

1.90

1.99

1.85

1.76

2.00

1.78

1.96

1.85

4.76

1.00

1.16

1.21

1.07

1.08

1.24

1.13

1.23

1.25

1.18

6.52

2.13

Name of Operator/s

Almyre Cortez, Santiago Regalado


San Juan Shipping Lines, MY Lines

Jose Pedida, Virgilio Arbolado


Magnolia Shipping Corp.,

Sampaguita Shipping Corp

Rodolfo Monilla, Juanito Tiu

Miller Santiago, Michael Jude

Placencia

Isidro Refil Jr, Michael Jude

Placencia

Cipriano Buante, Arturo Susas

Glifford Roy, Eladio Olit

Ever Lines, Magnolia Shipping Corp



Magnolia Shipping Corp., Ever Lines



Magnolia Shipping Corp., Ever Lines

Cesar Radjab, Candido Balunos,

Zosimo Barsarsa, Paquito Osake

Phil Fast Ferry Corp

RP Tamula and Sons

Cebu Ferries Corp

Cebu Ferries Corp

Felicisima Villanueva

Manolito Ompad

Lina Riega

Ever Lines

DIMC Shipping Inc

Zenaida Esperanza

Gaspar Valera, Bords Transport Corp

Hadjio Ahmad, Magnolia Ship. Corp.

Share

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

99.9

92.6

90.4

96.8

96.2

89.0

94.0

89.6

89.1

91.9

46.2

36.5

Route



Bataan/ Dumanguit

Butuan/ Jagna

Cebu/ Naval

Cuyo/ Iloilo

Cuyo/ Roxas

Jolo/ Sitangkai

Magallanes/ Butuan

Masbate/ Iloilo

Masbate/ Roxas

Maya/ San Isidro

Romblon/ Roxas

Sagasa/ Talusan

Siasi/ Sitangkai

Zamboanga/ Sagasa

Zamboanga/ Sitangkai

Zamboanga/ Subanipa

Paradise Beach/ Caltex Sosa

Routes with only one (1) effective competitor

Batangas/ Mindoro (Calapan)

Benoni/ Balingoan

Cebu/ Camiguin

Cebu/ Iligan

Sta Ana/ Ekron

Sta Rosa (Lapulapu)/ Dap-dap

(Lapulapu)

Surigao/ Basilica

Zamboanga/ Malangas

Dumaguete/ Larena

Zamboanga/ Tawi- tawi


Babak/ Sasa

Bongao/ Sitangkai

PasssengersCarried

60,083

137,069

11,026

125

105

1,593

1,090

13,732

15,400

28,057

782

3,686

1,762

5,156

2,455

12,935

54,058

1,341,506

229,947

197,635

1,582,824

114,276

161,792

14,838

8,392

62,788

930

861,367

8,127

Numberof

Operators

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

5

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

3

3

9

3

67

Appendixes



0.07

0.07

0.65

0.71

0.44

0.43

0.51

0.69

0.16

0.48

0.39

0.69

0.40

0.34

0.24

0.45

0.49

0.63

0.64

Number=1/HHI

15.26

15.31

1.54

1.41

2.26

2.31

1.97

1.46

6.26

2.08

2.56

1.45

2.50

2.95

4.11

2.22

2.06

1.59

1.56

Name of Operator/s

Dioneto Villanueva, Charlito

Villanueva, Fulgencio Aron, Jerly

Cooper, Avelino del Rosario, Pablo

Villanueva, Dante Elisio, Jorge

Pelayo, Antonio Alcazaren,

Aguinaldo dela Torre, Bobby Cahilig,

Rolando Tapuz, Reynaldo Bantang,

Gertacio Gumboc, Nellie Tamboon

Maria Balena, Santiago Siloterio,

Leonardo Tarrarona, Danny

Guillermo, Nerissa Pelingon,

Agripino Alcoran, Ed Gando,

Visitacion Galotera, Romeo Tigolo,

Ed Colmenares, Nelia Camon,

Bellardo Espinosa, Ernesto

Cedalanga, Fernando Espinosa,

Ely Canja

Neva Quezon

Romeo Derio


Hadjio Ahmad

Max Baat, Matilde Baat

Franco Mabigat

Erlinda Atianzar, Andrea Vargas

Hadjio Ahmad, Sampaguita

Shipping Corp

Lucita Balanay

Martino Palacio

Rogelio Martines

Jesus Parilla, Mario Reta

Tomas Alvares, Gregorio Pernia



Ever Lines


Share

84.3

81.6

77.2

82.5

59.7

59.0

80.3

80.5

39.5

83.3

58.5

81.1

56.3

79.2

59.8

61.2

66.5

82.9

76.5

Route

Caticlan/ Boracay

Guimaras/ Iloilo

Guimaras/ Negros Occidental

Iloilo (Estancia)/ Iloilo (Gigante)

Jolo/ Bongao

Jolo/ Siasi

Liloan/ Sibulan

Palawan/ Mindoro (San Jose)

Penaplata/ Sta Ana

Siasi/ Bongao

Siquijor/ Dumaguete

Sta Ana/ Kapution

Sta Ana/ Samal

Sta Ana/ Sta Cruz

Sta Cruz/ Quezon (Catanauan/

Gen Luna)

Zamboanga/ Bongao

Zamboanga/ Jolo

Zamboanga/ Margosatubig

Zamboanga/ Siasi

PasssengersCarried

97,275

146,576

23,434

2,717

8,371

7,967

7,952

2,310

194,507

6,883

50,562

65,883

38,652

75,487

4,322

9,585

33,318

12,930

4,647

Numberof

Operators

3 3

2 1

2

3

3

3

4

2

7

3

6

3

5

4

5

3

4

2

2


68



Sun Lines

Magnolia Shipping Corporation

Sulpicio Lines Inc.

Sun Lines

Negros Navigation Company


Ocean Express Shipping Corp


Sulpicio Lines Inc.

Arrel Shipping

Sulpicio Lines Inc.


Cebu Ferries Corporation

Sulpicio Lines Inc.

William, Gothong & Aboitiz, Inc.

William Michael Shipping Corp.



Sulpicio Lines Inc.


Sulpicio Lines Inc.




Via Marine Corporation, Terban

Marine Corp

Terban Marines Corp, Via

Marine Corp

Terban Marines Corp, Via

Marine Corp


Sulpicio Lines, Lite Shipping

Corp, Cebu Ferries Corp

Sun Lines, Magnolia Shipping

Lines


Appendix Table 4. Dominant/effective players per route per type of market, cargo revenue,primary routes, 1998

Effective CompetitorsNumber=

1/HHI

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.69

1.81

1.97

1.84

2.99

1.66

1.90

Name of Operator/s Share

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Route


Cagayan de Oro/Iligan/Tagbilaran

Cebu/ Cotabato/ Dumaguete

Cebu/ Cotobato/Gen. Santos

Cebu/ Dadiangas

Cebu/ Dumaguete/ Gen Santos

Cebu/ Estancia

Cebu/ Iligan/Cagayan de Oro

Cebu/ Iligan/Iloilo

Cebu/ Iloilo/ Palawan (Brookes)

Cebu/ Nasipit

Cebu/ Tubigon

Dadiangas/ Zamboanga

General Santos/ Cebu/ Dumaguete

Iligan/ Cagayan

Iloilo (Estancia)/ Zamboanga

Iloilo/ Puerto Princesa/ Palawan

Manila/ Batangas

Manila/ Cebu/ Iligan

Manila/ Cebu/ Iligan/ Dumaguete

Manila/ Dadiangas

Manila/ General Santos/Cebu

Manila/ Nasipit

Manila/ Puerto Princesa

Palawan/ Davao

Tagbilaran/Iligan/Cebu



Batangas/ Puerto Princesa

Batangas/Masbate/Puerto Princesa

Batangas/Pasacao/Puerto Princesa

Cagayan/ Jagna

Cebu/ Jagna

Cebu/ Zamboanga/Gen Santos

Manila/ Dipolog

CargoRevenue

72,436.80

18,496.00

14,114.50

25,933,846.19

53,297.10

22,325.00

67,992.30

103,600.00

132,700.00

641,884.59

134,851.50

21,520,435.14

98,711.50

1,453.38

7,229,858.05

24,448.44

4,641,173.87

110,372.85

288,072.64

54,455,246.17

114,543.60

3,986,782.48

49,564,716.59

776,404.12

147,424.40

4,702,649.71

2,679,924.29

1,477,070.66

822,316.86

2,031,495.45

188,046.90

23,882,824.87

HerfindahlIndex(HHI)

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

0.59

0.55

0.51

0.54

0.33

0.60

0.53

Numberof

Operators

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

2

2

2

2

3

2

2

69

Appendixes

Sulpicio Lines, Negros Navigation


Negros Navigation, Seaford

Shipping Lines

Sulpicio Lines

Teng Tick Hua


WG&A Philippines Inc


Negros Navigation

Sulpicio Lines

Cebu Ferries Corp, Triton

Shipping Corp

Ormoc Enterprises, Lite Shipping

Corp, Nelson Uy, Manolito Abapo


Sulpicio Lines, Lorenzo

Shipping Corp

Phil Fast Ferry Corp, George and

Peter Lines

Cebu Ferries Corp, Sulpicio

Lines, WG&A

Negros Navigation, Cokaliong

Shipping, WG&A,Lorenzo Shipping

Victan Transport Services, Negros

Navigation, Cebu Ferries Corp

George and Peter Lines, Sulpicio

Lines, Lite Shipping Corp

WG&A Philippines Inc

Negros Navigation, Phil Fast Ferry

Corp, Philip Go

Negros Navigation, WG&A,

Galactic Shipping




Negros Navigation, Hosanna

Shipping


Appendix Table 4. ContinuedEffective Competitors

Number=1/HHI

1.78

1.84

1.99

1.13

1.38

1.26

1.30

1.12

1.01

1.05

1.84

3.59

2.19

1.85

1.78

2.67

3.68

3.19

2.56

1.49

2.57

2.94

1.71

2.08

2.16

2.33

2.02


100.0

100.0

100.0

94.0

84.0

89.0

87.0

94.0

99.0

98.0

84.0

87.0

91.0

84.0

84.0

82.0

81.0

94.0

2.2

80.0

94.2

85.7

95.6

98.0

95.1

76.4

90.6

94.8

90.6

Route

Manila/ Estancia

Manila/ Masbate

Manila/ San Carlos


Cebu/ Masbate

Cebu/ Puerto Princesa

Cebu/ Tagbilaran

Davao/ Zamboanga

Dumaguete/ Zamboanga

Iloilo/ Palawan

Palawan/ Cagayan


Cagayan/ Tagbilaran

Cebu/ Bohol

Cebu/ Cagayan

Cebu/ Davao

Cebu/ Dumaguete

Cebu/ General Santos

Cebu/ Iloilo

Cebu/ Palawan

Cebu/ Zamboanga

Davao/ General Santos

Dumaguete/ Tagbilaran

General Santos/ Zamboanga

Iligan/ Tagbilaran

Iloilo/ Davao

Iloilo/ General Santos

Iloilo/ Iligan

Manila/ Bacolod

CargoRevenue

8,601,481.06

21,574,856.26

1,581,070.00

1,252,909.07

1,003,866.20

66,776,308.80

21,921,461.37

4,541,445.21

2,633,327.87

25,320.49

1,124,401.58

939,943.65

75,464,446.24

154,237,641.74

41,199,217.31

28,219,026.84

11,164,007.84

3,773,296.70

36,241,689.67

1,060,800.89

1,464,389.78

3,201,282.49

3,067,418.09

10,225,379.99

8,357,274.35

3,387,507.92

347,282,893.07


0.56

0.54

0.50

0.89

0.73

0.80

0.77

0.89

0.99

0.96

0.54

0.28

0.46

0.54

0.56

0.37

0.27

0.31

0.39

0.67

0.39

0.34

0.58

0.48

0.46

0.43

0.50

Numberof

Operators

2

2

2

2

3

9

6

3

2

2

3

8

1 0

9

1 5

9

1 5

5

1 2

4

4

7

4

3

4

9

5


70

WG&A, Sulpicio Lines, Solid

Shipping Lines, Lorenzo

Shipping Corp



Solid Shipping Corp

WG&A, Solid Shipping Lines,

Lorenzo Shipping Corp


WG&A, Negros Navigation, Lorenzo

Shipping Corp, Sulpicio Lines



Sulpicio Lines, WG&A, Lorenzo

Shipping Corp


Number=1/HHI

3.82

2.61

3.17

1.45

2.73

1.86

3.62

1.55

2.17

2.93


94.8

86.0

69.5

83.0

95.7

88.6

99.8

59.0

85.3

98.7

Route

Manila/ Cagayan

Manila/ Cebu

Manila/ Davao

Manila/ Dumaguete

Manila/ General Santos

Manila/ Iligan

Manila/ Iloilo

Manila/ Palawan

Manila/ Tagbilaran

Manila/ Zamboanga

CargoRevenue

711,473,013.28

1,004,747,524.76

678,986,652.52

428,166,781.64

518,799,626.22

87,277,223.44

40,950.00

127,482,600.03

63,169,311.82

411,264,594.59


0.26

0.38

0.32

0.69

0.37

0.54

0.28

0.65

0.46

0.34

Numberof

Operators

6

4

4

5

6

4

7

5

3

4


71

Appendixes

Shipshape Ferry

Sulpicio Lines

Triton Shipping Corp



Sulpicio Lines


San Nicolas Lines

Sulpicio Lines

Sulpicio Lines

San Nicolas Lines

Sulpicio Lines

Cebu Ferries Corp

Sulpicio Lines

Sulpicio Lines

Adelia Membreve

Age Shipping Lines, VG

Shipping Lines


WG&A, Sulpicio Lines, Lorenzo

Shipping Corp



Water Jet Shipping Corp,

Sulpicio Lines


FJP Lines




MY Lines Inc


Sulpicio Lines Inc

Negros Navigation

Appendix Table 5. Dominant/effective players per route per type of market, cargo revenue,secondary routes, 1998


1/HHI

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.61

1.63

2.88

1.94

1.81

1.67

1.14

1.04

1.26

1.30

1.13

1.18

1.05

1.11

1.02


100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

93.8

95.7

88.7

87.2

93.8

91.7

97.4

94.6

98.9

Route


Batangas/ Romblon

Cotabato/ Estancia

Dapitan/ Tagbilaran

Dapitan/ Zamboanga

Dumaguete/ Maasin

Manila/ Baybay

Manila/ Cebu/ Bacolod

Manila/ Coron

Manila/ Maasin

Manila/ Palompon

Manila/ Tilik

Masbate/ Baybay

Palawan/ Tacloban

Surigao/ Baybay

Surigao/ Masbate

Ubay/ Maasin (Leyte)



Cebu/ Talibon

Manila/ Butuan

Manila/ Cotabato

Manila/ Roxas

Manila/ Surigao

Surigao/ Maasin


Cagayan/ Tacloban

Cebu/ Calbayog

Cebu/ Dapitan

Cebu/ Ormoc

Cebu/ Ozamis

Cebu/ Palompon

Cebu/ Tacloban

Dumaguete/ Ozamis

Iloilo/ Ozamis

CargoRevenue

78,350.00

22,434.02

147,632.51

627,914.64

22,104.30

866,733.60

121,180.00

16,351,889.42

675,801.52

4,460,893.86

6,032,910.14

5,313.57

6,249.09

87,843.63

2,698.01

2,440.00

3,841,071.00

138,164,503.77

178,602,482.64

51,427,590.30

21,212,430.20

128,739.98

3,091,078.38

2,977,751.60

6,634,164.37

115,271,400.59

35,972,196.03

608,053.68

56,340,849.08

4,023,557.76

1,153,112.90


1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

0.62

0.61

0.35

0.51

0.55

0.60

0.88

0.96

0.80

0.77

0.88

0.84

0.95

0.90

0.98

Numberof

Operators

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

2

2

3

2

2

2

3

2

3

7

3

3

9

3

2

72


Angelina Balansag, Santos Cruz

Negros Navigation, Lilygene

Shipping Lines


Cokaliong Lines, Sulpicio Lines

Cokaliong Lines, Sulpicio Lines


Hosanna Shipping, Mintrade

Shipping Lines


Teng Tick Hua, Magnolia Shipping

Corp, WG&A

Negros Navigation, West Visayas

Shipping Co., WG&A

WG&A, Sulpicio Lines, Lorenzo

Shipping Corp

WG&A Phil. Inc, Sulpicio Lines

WG&A Phil. Inc, Negros Navigation

WG&A Phil. Inc, Sulpicio Lines

Domingo Paredes


Number=1/HHI

1.61

2.35

2.16

2.11

1.90

2.15

1.93

1.47

2.86

3.59

2.58

2.01

2.14

2.00

1.55


96.5

81.0

96.2

97.3

92.5

94.4

92.4

79.9

99.8

67.3

100.0

99.7

87.0

99.8

77.1

Route


Bohol (Ubay)/ Leyte (Maasin or Bato)

Cebu/ Bacolod

Cebu/ Butuan

Cebu/ Dipolog

Cebu/ Surigao

Cotabato/ Zamboanga

Davao/ Surigao

Dumaguete/ Dapitan

Iligan/ Ozamis

Iloilo/ Bacolod

Iloilo/ Cotabato

Manila/ Ormoc

Manila/ Ozamis

Manila/ Tacloban

Surigao/ del Carmen

CargoRevenue

253,013.00

9,467,232.84

61,216,008.94

5,467,990.76

9,075,612.38

8,216,667.17

1,073,524.86

2,073,705.07

111,672.08

21,608,455.42

8,800,336.99

27,828,093.48

110,356,039.06

110,425,202.20

8,162.00


0.62

0.43

0.46

0.47

0.53

0.46

0.52

0.68

0.35

0.28

0.39

0.50

0.47

0.50

0.65

Numberof

Operators

3

9

6

4

8

4

3

2

4

1 0

3

3

3

3

2


73

Appendixes

Timoteo Batton

ZDS-ATOM FSA

Lite Shipping Corporation

Conrado Geraldoy




V- Lines

Palacio Shipping Inc.

Gerardo Gubo


Hadji Sab Tiri Jalali





Rover Shipping Services


Felicito Geraldoy

V- Lines

Inter-Island Maritime Corporation

Sto Nino Ferry Boat Services

Analyn Cordero

Via Marine Corporation

Terban Marine Corporation


La Felicidad Marine Corporation











Super Diamond Shipping Lines, Inc



Appendix Table 6. Dominant/effective players per route per type of market, cargo revenue,tertiary routes, 1998


1/HHI

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00


100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Route


Adecar/ Panabo

Alicia (Guicam) / Mabuhay (Hulahula)

Argao/ Loon

Bacolod/ Bais

Bacolod/ Bataan

Bacolod/ Butuan

Bacolod/ Del Pan

Bacolod/ Dipolog

Bacolod/ Dumaguete

Bacolod/ Guimaras

Bacolod/ Hilongos

Bacolod/ Languyan

Bacolod/ Legaspi

Bacolod/ Leyte (Isabel)

Bacolod/ Mindoro (Sablayan)

Bacolod/ Palawan

Bacolod/ Pasacao

Bacolod/ Pasig

Bacolod/ San Jose

Bacolod/ Sta Catalina

Bacolod/ Toledo

Bantayan/ Cadiz

Bantayan/ Roxas

Batangas (PSPC) / Batangas (CTX)

Batangas (Shell)/ Batangas (Caltex)

Batangas/ Amlan

Batangas/ Cimlong (BTGS)

Batangas/ CTX Shell (Pandacan)

Batangas/ Currimao

Batangas/ Dadiangas

Batangas/ Ludo

Batangas/ Mabini

Batangas/ Maricalum (Bulata)

Batangas/ Masbate

Batangas/ Naga (Apocemco)

Batangas/ Negros

Batangas/ Pagbilao

Batangas/ Puerto Galera

Batangas/ Quezon (Mauban)

Batangas/ Sabah

CargoRevenue

393,000.00

147,965.51

3,141,004.00

8,000.00

80,406.00

31,605.00

206,896.20

30,000.00

186,474.38

143,500.00

39,200.00

351,231.00

676.00

1,279,028.10

82,272.00

1,555,951.00

64,000.00

257,457.60

20,000.00

27,000.00

240,000.00

340,711.00

20,000.00

365,891.10

487,132.43

108,775.00

217,690.54

328,603.88

8,499,865.64

2,475,452.22

586,708.47

155,268.72

534,714.98

1,504,926.77

1,920,341.98

249,602.50

416,787.27

416,787.27

365,455.99

712,116.80


1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

Numberof

Operators

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

74


Cesar Datinguinod



Sulpicio Lines Inc.

Jones Carrier

Sofronio Bogtai

Sofronio Bogtai

Sofronio Bogtai

Antonieto Pedericos

Sofronio Bogtai



Casiano Obligado Jr
















Jones Carrier




Jones Carrier


Sulpicio Lines Inc.

Ever Lines Inc.

V- Lines

Rover Shipping Services


Sulpicio Lines Inc.

Triton Shipping Corporation


Number=1/HHI

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00


100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Route

Batangas/ Sabang

Batangas/ Sta. Ana

Batangas/ Tolong

Baybay/ Calubian

Baybay/ Gingoog

Baybay/ Kawit

Baybay/ Moabog

Baybay/ Monserrat

Baybay/ Pilar Camotes

Baybay/ San Juan

Bislig/ Davao/ Jolo

Bislig/ Picop

Bohol (Pres. Carlos P. Garcia) /

Mandaue (Looc)

Bohol (Ubay)/ Legaspi

Bohol (Ubay)/ Sablayan

Bohol (Ubay)/ San Fernando

Bohol (Ubay)/ Talibon

BRC/ Navotas

BRC/ NPC CIP Cebu

BRC/ NPC Naga

BRC/ Pandacan

BRC/ Poro

BRC/ Rosario

Butuan/ Batangas

Butuan/ Bislig

Butuan/ Hilongos

Butuan/ Hinunangan

Butuan/ Ozamis

Butuan/ San Fernando

Butuan/ Sorsogon

Butuan/ Tacloban

Butuan/ Zamboanga

Cagayan de Oro/ Bantayan

Cagayan de Oro/ Catbalogan

Cagayan de Oro/ Dadiangas

Cagayan de Oro/ Mindoro

Cagayan de Oro/ Mindoro (San Jose)

Cagayan de Oro/ Ozamis

Cagayan de Oro/ Pasacao

Cagayan de Oro/ Polloc

Cagayan de Oro/ Pulupandan

CargoRevenue

61,000.00

628,485.82

244,461.00

185.45

135,386.25

4,945.00

4,270.00

3,400.00

79,969.00

3,530.00

126,700.00

385,127.04

4,110.00

98,700.00

114,125.00

92,825.00

14,400.00

4,264,791.11

522,824.01

538,490.55

20,537,504.29

1,227,651.78

5,632,988.58

119,000.00

249,600.00

40,792.00

26,000.00

6,767.04

595,000.00

52,000.00

142,503.27

26,000.00

244,581.46

24,310.00

171,360.00

54,000.00

25,500.00

64,000.00

128,640.00

98,640.00

238,800.00


1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

Numberof

Operators

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

75

Appendixes

Ever Lines Inc.



Efren & Thelma Bungalso

Oscar Gerdiano

Arturo Olasiman

Arturo Olasiman

Arturo Olasiman

Arturo Olasiman

Teresita Koga

Gomez Brothers Shipping Lines

Margarito Tan

Iluminado Dacullos

Armando Sarayan

Agustin Romano

Agustin Romano

Manuel Estrada

Emilio Morate

Florencio Apacible

V- Lines

Armando Sarayan

Armando Sarayan

Florencio Apacible

Agustin Romano

Reynaldo Cajefe

Dionisio Montalban

Agustin Romano


Antonio Vencio


Eastern Pacific Lines

Lapu-Lapu Shipping Lines


Aquilina Guro

Wilson C. Rabanos

Lilygene Shipping Lines

Torcuato Bahian

Efren & Thelma Bungalso

Sultan Shipping

Torcuato Bahian

Torcuato Bahian



Number=1/HHI

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00


100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Route

Cagayan de Oro/ San Carlos

Cagayan de Oro/ San Jose

Cagayan de Oro/ Toledo

Cagayan de Orocillo/ Puerto Prinsesa

Cagbalete/ Mauban

Calbayog/ Guinabarocan

Calbayog/ Labangbaybay

Calbayog/ Mataloto

Calbayog/ Poblacion

Calbayog/ Tagpulaan

Carbon/ Inabangan

Catbalogan/ Borongan

Catbalogan/ Buenavista

Catbalogan/ Buluan

Catbalogan/ Canhawan

Catbalogan/ Cinco

Catbalogan/ Daram

Catbalogan/ Guintarean

Catbalogan/ Jocopon

Catbalogan/ Leyte (Isabel)

Catbalogan/ Mombon

Catbalogan/ Rama

Catbalogan/ Real/ Haplayan

Catbalogan/ Samar

Catbalogan/ San Roque

Catbalogan/ Saugan

Catbalogan/ Sitio Bitoon

Catbalogan/ Sogod

Catbalogan/ Tarangnan

Cebu/ Bago

Cebu/ Bantayan

Cebu/ Bantilan

Cebu/ Bataan

Cebu/ Bauan

Cebu/ Bilangbilangan East & West

Cebu/ Borongan

Cebu/ Bulan

Cebu/ Cagayan de Orocillo

Cebu/ Calbayog/ Guiwan

Cebu/ Camiguin

Cebu/ Cataingan

Cebu/ Cebu

CargoRevenue

56,000.00

52,000.00

154,000.00

57,000.00

28,087.50

760.00

37,207.00

1,305.00

480.00

56,472.00

91,321.00

123,910.00

9,799.00

41,248.00

6,721.00

24,041.00

23,040.00

35,750.00

152,507.00

42,000.00

33,100.00

64,200.00

5,405.00

4,398.00

82,020.00

69,616.00

25,584.00

26,000.00

3,320.00

11,786.00

50,000.00

1,733,688.67

185,000.00

482,812.50

427,018.35

95,000.00

80,000.00

23,000.00

350,000.00

40,000.00

60,000.00

365,123.60


1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

Numberof

Operators

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

76


Sun Lines

Torcuato Bahian

Sultan Shipping

Sultan Shipping

Carmelo T. Simolde




Torcuato Bahian

Eduardo Jarque

Sultan Shipping

Eduardo Jarque


Sulpicio Lines Inc.

Teng Tick Hua

Ever Lines Inc.

Eduardo Jarque


FJP Lines

Sulpicio Lines Inc.


Felicito Geraldoy

Virgilio Arbolado

Virgilio Arbolado

Carlito Latonio

Sofronio Bogtai

Sofronio Bogtai


Galactic Shipping Inc.




Sulpicio Lines Inc.

Sulpicio Lines Inc.


Conrado Geraldoy


Hosanna Shipping

Sulpicio Lines Inc.





Number=1/HHI

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00


100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Route

Cebu/ Cotabato/ Zamboanga

Cebu/ Guiuan

Cebu/ Iloilo/ Legaspi

Cebu/ Iloilo/ Pasacao

Cebu/ Jetafe

Cebu/ Kiwalan

Cebu/ Larena

Cebu/ Lazi

Cebu/ Liloy

Cebu/ Magallanes

Cebu/ Mindoro/Tagbilaran

Cebu/ Nabilid

Cebu/ Oroquietta

Cebu/ Polloc

Cebu/ Pulupandan/ Ozamis

Cebu/ San Carlos

Cebu/ San Fernando

Cebu/ San Jose

Cebu/ Sta Fe

Cotabato/ Dadiangas

Cotabato/ Davao

Cotabato/ Roxas City

Cuyo/ El Nido

Cuyo/ San Vicente

Danao/ Consuelo, Camotes

Danao/ Kawit

Danao/ Moabog

Dapitan/ Lazi

Davao/ Basilan

Davao/ Batangas

Davao/ Bislig

Davao/ Bungao

Davao/ Dadiangas

Davao/ Dipolog

Davao/ Escalante

Davao/ Guimaras

Davao/ Jolo

Davao/ Legaspi

Davao/ Masbate

Davao/ Nonoc

Davao/ Ormoc

Davao/ Ozamis

CargoRevenue

55,007.90

60,000.00

100,000.00

124,000.00

80,129.00

26,307.55

1,536,462.12

638,884.67

65,000.00

178,960.50

80,000.00

49,454.70

258,631.10

425,729.40

111,142.00

48,000.00

84,000.00

227,122.00

2,538,314.98

1,994.15

67,192.74

40,000.00

2,249.40

10,150.45

231,340.00

5,960.00

6,045.00

114,977.13

49,880.00

4,118,617.56

111,275.00

186,792.33

54,513.67

22,382.12

92,334.83

3,000.00

151,492.92

586,720.00

99,037.92

2,001,815.45

98,672.39

42,045.16


1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

Numberof

Operators

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

77

Appendixes



Sulpicio Lines Inc.


Jones Carrier






Gaudencio Baruc

Gaudencio Baruc


Jones Carrier






Sulpicio Lines Inc.


Felicito Geraldoy


V- Lines


Milton Ian

Uni-Orient Pearl Ventures Inc.


Eugenio Chan



Gerardo Gubo

Gerardo Gubo

Nomn Novyar

Gerardo Gubo

Leonardo Dauhog

Leonardo Dauhog

Leonardo Dauhog

Leonardo Dauhog




Number=1/HHI

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00


100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Route

Davao/ Pulupandan

Davao/ Tacloban

Davao/ Tagbilaran

Dipolog/ Dumaguete/ Cebu

Dipolog/ Gingoog

Dipolog/ Liloan

Dipolog/ Ozamis

Dipolog/ San Jose

Dipolog/Davao/Tacloban

Dipolog/Zamboanga/Pagadian

Doong/ Hagnaya

Doong/ Vito

Dumaguete/ Bataan

Dumaguete/ Gingoog

Dumaguete/ Kiwalan

Dumaguete/ Lapu-Lapu

Dumaguete/ Larena

Dumaguete/ Lazi

Dumaguete/ Ormoc

Dumaguete/ Polloc

Dumaguete/ Siom

Dumaguete/ Tandag

Dumaguete/ Toledo

Escalante/ Pulupandan

Ferna/ Oroq

Gasan, Marinduque/ Pinamalayan,

Or Mindoro

General Santos/ Leyte (Isabel)

General Santos/ Masbate

General Santos/ Mavias

General Santos/ Pagadian

General Santos/ Puerto Princesa

Guimaras/ Kalibo

Guimaras/ Masbate

Guimaras/ Roxas City

Guimaras/ Victorias

Hingatungan/ Bacagay

Hingatungan/ Kikilo

Hingatungan/ San Francisco

Hingatungan/ Tib-o

Iligan/ Basilan

Iligan/ Batangas

CargoRevenue

90,000.00

399,429.64

10,057.93

393,766.24

234,651.00

24,310.00

26,000.00

26,000.00

61,492.10

31,042.80

6,440.00

2,850.00

284,173.68

50,331.90

57,821.00

92,523.55

1,425,616.52

1,696.75

48,922.36

4,941.06

228,355.45

45,000.00

70,000.00

42,000.00

204,416.10

7,085.06

172,000.00

32,748.96

466,059.87

38,531.50

41,885.45

12,000.00

28,750.00

10,200.00

269,600.00

1,600.00

2,500.00

900.00

8,000.00

35,566.50

319,500.00


1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

Numberof

Operators

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

78





Sulpicio Lines Inc.

Sulpicio Lines Inc.




Hosanna Shipping







Hosanna Shipping




Sulpicio Lines Inc.


Ever Lines Inc.

Felicito Geraldoy

Sulpicio Lines Inc.

Jones Carrier

HBT Shipping Corp.

Felicito Geraldoy


Hadji Sab Tiri Jalali

Antonio Mogasa

Jones Carrier

V- Lines

HBT Shipping Corp.

Jones Carrier


Danilo Lampadero



Jones Carrier

Sulpicio Lines Inc.




Number=1/HHI

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00


100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Route

Iligan/ Cebu/ Amlan

Iligan/ Cebu/ Pasar

Iligan/ Davao/ Malalag

Iligan/ Dipolog

Iligan/ Dipolog

Iligan/ Dipolog/ Davao

Iligan/ Iloilo/ Amlan/ Picop

Iligan/ Lazi

Iligan/ Legaspi

Iligan/ Ormoc/ Cebu

Iligan/ Ormoc/ Leyte

Iligan/ Pasacao/ Cebu

Iligan/ Pasar/ Cebu

Iligan/ Picop/ Cebu

Iligan/ Picop/ Davao

Iligan/ San Jose

Iligan/ Sulu

Iligan/ Zamboanga/ Davao

Iligan/Zamboanga/Dipolog

Iloilo (Estancia)/ Cotabato

Iloilo/ Aklan

Iloilo/ Catarman

Iloilo/ Contillon

Iloilo/ Dadiangas

Iloilo/ Danao Escalante

Iloilo/ Escalante

Iloilo/ Galo

Iloilo/ Jetafi

Iloilo/ Lamitan

Iloilo/ Magalona

Iloilo/ Mariveles

Iloilo/ Ormoc

Iloilo/ Pulupandan

Iloilo/ Subic

Iloilo/ Tagbilaran

Iloilo/ Victorias City

Ipil/ Ormoc/ Iligan

Jagna/ Bohol (Ubay)

Jagna/ Gingoog

Jagna/ Nasipit

Jagna/ PKS

Jagna/ Sablayan

CargoRevenue

109,480.21

25,844.00

78,810.00

258,190.63

14,052.67

210,071.20

109,580.62

118,225.33

770,550.00

28,968.00

246,642.78

58,575.00

51,688.00

110,180.95

183,787.16

297,879.87

7,356,551.92

108,657.18

26,431.50

901,101.23

15,945.23

140,000.00

35,000.00

4,949,209.88

88,470.91

77,695.45

10,000.00

24,500.00

217,068.00

19,900.00

269,306.61

35,750.00

123,354.55

333,563.64

119,393.00

298,851.00

196,068.33

88,125.00

81,094.30

5,630.17

88,125.00

176,250.00


1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

Numberof

Operators

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

79

Appendixes




Den Tadus

Celeste Temperatura


Saturnino Atienza





V- Lines




Ever Lines Inc.

Zenaida Petracorta


Ever Lines Inc.


Jones Carrier

Jones Carrier

Jones Carrier

Lina C. Echin

Jones Carrier

Juana Lopez

Philip Go


Hosanna Shipping

Sulpicio Lines Inc.





Amparo Shipping Corp.

Sulpicio Lines Inc.

Sulpicio Lines Inc.


Ever Lines Inc.

Ever Lines Inc.

Julian Grimaldo

Arturo Susas


Number=1/HHI

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00


100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Route

Jetafi/ Bais

Jetafi/ Bohol (Ubay)

Jetafi/ Legaspi

Jolo/ Basilan

Kaputian/ Sta Ana

Kawit/ Legros

Kawit/ Madredejos

Leyte (Isabel)/ Batangas

Leyte (Isabel)/ Dapitan

Leyte (Isabel)/ Pasacao

Leyte (Isabel)/ Pulupandan

Leyte (Isabel)/ Roxas

Leyte/ Ozamis

Leyte/ Pagadian

Leyte/ Toledo

Leyte/ Zamboanga

Limasawa/ Burgos

Loon/ Talibon

Malangas/ Margos

Malangas/ Subanipa

Mandaue/ Basilan

Mandaue/ Calbayog

Mandaue/ Catanduanes

Mandaue/ Masbate

Mandaue/ Masbate

Mandaue/ Samar

Mandaue/ Zamboanga

Manila/ Aklan

Manila/ Bais

Manila/ Calubian

Manila/ Danao Escalante

Manila/ Iligan/ Margosatubig

Manila/ Iligan/ Siom

Manila/ Liminancong

Manila/ Palawan/ Lucena/ Surigao

Manila/ Polloc

Manila/ Pulupandan

Manila/ Toledo

Margos/ Subanipa

Margos/ Talusan

Marinduque/ Quezon

Masbate/ Maya

CargoRevenue

30,018.00

88,125.00

85,125.00

25,322.00

1,069.00

70,000.00

167,740.00

180,000.00

90,400.00

1,096,128.57

145,267.00

30,575.00

40,950.00

140,585.20

90,000.00

56,000.00

50,700.00

27,000.00

30,991.21

1,900.80

1,453,146.41

86,053.51

116,869.29

346,750.00

618,593.85

4,168.00

70,000.00

4,186,374.02

4,186,374.02

71,424.14

1,311,000.00

86,073.20

238,497.83

5,905,085.78

199,663.65

19,590.50

8,581,533.99

81,426.90

102,671.15

35,592.00

28,087.50

8,785.00


1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

Numberof

Operators

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

80


Sulpicio Lines Inc.





Jones Carrier

Cesar Sitjar

Teodolo Lapure

Teodolo Lapure

Teodolo Lapure

Cesar Sitjar

Teodolo Lapure

Teodolo Lapure

Teodolo Lapure

MY Lines, Inc.

Teodolo Lapure

Teodolo Lapure

Teodolo Lapure



Manuel Perez

Philippine Fast Ferry Corporation

Sofronio Bogtai



Sofronio Bogtai

Sofronio Bogtai


Lina C. Echin

Sofronio Bogtai

Sofronio Bogtai

Antonieto Pedericos

RP Tamula and Sons

RP Tamula and Sons




Sulpicio Lines Inc.


Emma Maglente

Vito Coronacion



Number=1/HHI

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00


100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Route

Masbate/ Zamboanga

Mindoro/ Burunga

Mindoro/ Leyte (Isabel)

Mindoro/ Libertad

Mindoro/ Semerara

Naga/ Maasin

Naval/ Bato

Naval/ Binamalayan

Naval/ Burabod

Naval/ Calvani

Naval/ Canduhao

Naval/ Casibang

Naval/ Hagonoy

Naval/ Maripiri

Naval/ Palompon

Naval/ Trabugan

Naval/ Ulog

Naval/ Viga

Negros/ Pasig

Nonoc/ Lapu-lapu

Odiongan/ Oangay

Ormoc/ Camotes

Ormoc/ Dapdap

Ormoc/ Dapitan

Ormoc/ General Santos

Ormoc/ Kawit

Ormoc/ Lanao

Ormoc/ Leyte (Isabel)

Ormoc/ Mandaue

Ormoc/ Moabog

Ormoc/ Monserrat

Ormoc/ Pilar Camotes

Ozamis/ Kolambugan

Ozamis/ Tubod

Ozamis/Zamboanga/Dipolog

Pagadian/Toledo/Zamboanga

Palawan/ Basilan

Palawan/ Dipolog

Palawan/ Masbate

Palawan/ Mindoro

Palawan/ Occi Mindoro

Palawan/ Puerto Princesa

CargoRevenue

64,650.32

547,108.00

613,536.15

1,786,875.00

1,138,966.00

47,727.21

14,700.00

1,123.00

1,562.00

2,040.00

257,000.00

2,029.00

4,440.00

4,393.00

1,642.85

1,415.00

2,270.00

2,025.00

243,105.00

5,094,650.56

30,100.00

329,740.00

14,830.00

156,286.58

7,003.76

5,320.00

15,705.00

110,000.00

201,200.00

17,400.00

6,190.00

291,090.50

2,916.28

4,361.78

24,968.10

44,427.20

343,300.00

24,487.10

77,863.50

9,200.00

111,218.00

33,600.01


1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

Numberof

Operators

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

81

Appendixes

Marlo Calumbayan

Franco Mabigat


Pearl Farm Beach Resort

Eustaquio Caringal


Patrocinio Cuaca

Teng Tick Hua

Rolando Liwanag

Eulogo & Celia Mazo

Teodolo Mindoro

Teodolo Mindoro

Victoriano Lo

Rodolfo Gabalonzo

Rodolfo Gabalonzo

Liwanag Mendoza



Ever Lines Inc.


Danilo Lines




Lilia Flores

Asman Jaide

Roger Bandao

Martino Palacio

Joel Bustamante

Joel Bustamante

Celeste Temperatura

Jose Castro






Hosanna Shipping

Honesto Lipao

Sulpicio Lines Inc.

Eduardo Jarque

Amparo Shipping Corp.


Number=1/HHI

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00


100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Route

Palawan/ Quezon

Palawan/ San Jose

Palawan/ Zamboanga

Pearl Farm/ Insular

Perez/ Atimonan

Pililia/ South Harbor

Placer/ Bogo

Puerto Princesa/ Pulupandan

Romblon/ Lucena

Romblon/ Roxas

Romblon/ San Agustin

Romblon/ Sibuyan

Romblon/Mangabong, Orr Mindoro

Roxas/ Bantayan

Roxas/ Negros Occidental

Sablayan/ Bauan

Sablayan/ San Jose

Sagasa/ Alicia

Sagasa/ Talusan

San Carlos/ Estancia

San Carlos/ Toledo

San Jose/ Antique

San Jose/ Bais

San Jose/ Talibon

San Juan/ Anilao

Siasi/ Sibutu, Tawi-tawi

Sta Ana/ Cogon

Sta Ana/ Kaputian

Sta Ana/ Mindanao

Sta Ana/ Pigasaan

Sta Cruz/ Tucanga

Sto Tomas/ Talaga

Subanipa/ Malangas

Subic/ Bislig

Subic/ Navotas

Subic/ Pandacan

Subic/Batangas/Legaspi

Surigao/ Aklan

Surigao/ Cagdianao

Surigao/ Calubian

Surigao/ Gingoog

Surigao/ Lucena

CargoRevenue

150,000.00

164,480.00

171,650.00

15,525.00

118,000.00

21,826,623.68

17,474.00

159,700.00

10,080.00

15,300.00

60,500.00

904,000.00

103,440.00

3,000.00

6,000.00

184,450.00

13,054.00

3,010.85

80,248.71

93,969.00

3,271,292.20

1,678,049.00

26,000.00

40,915.00

43,000.00

131,291.00

2,194.00

2,369.00

6696.45

60,998.60

1,419.00

30,000.00

1,961.70

454,689.30

353,786.45

544,635.01

2,605,207.00

136,363.64

47,533.00

260.84

166,883.85

3,263,398.14


1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

Numberof

Operators

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

82


Lina C. Echin

Vicente Mejia

Jones Carrier


Domingo Paredes


Tabango Express

Pedro Felizarta

Pedro Felizarta

Pedro Felizarta

Joedina Gumagay

Rogelio Germones


Romulo Alvarino

Felix Delantar



Lina C. Echin


Eduardo Jarque


Jones Carrier





Sulpicio Lines Inc.




V- Lines





Jones Carrier


Felicito Geraldoy



ABC Liner



Number=1/HHI

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00


100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Route

Surigao/ Mandaue

Surigao/ Pinut-an

Surigao/ Roxas

Surigao/ San Jose

Surigao/ Talisay

Surigao/ Zamboanga

Tabango/ Bogo

Tab-ok/ Bacagay

Tab-ok/ San Roque

Tab-ok/ Sta Lucia

Tacloban/ Balangina

Tacloban/ Bolusao

Tacloban/ Catbalogan

Tacloban/ Giporlos

Tacloban/ Lawaan

Tacloban/ Leyte (Isabel)

Tacloban/ Lucena

Tacloban/ Mandaue

Tacloban/ Masbate

Tacloban/ Nabilid

Tacloban/ Ozamis

Tacloban/ Roxas

Tacloban/ Sablayan

Tacloban/ Sogod

Tagbilaran/ Batangas

Tagbilaran/ Bohol (Ubay)

Tagbilaran/ Dipolog

Tagbilaran/ General Santos

Tagbilaran/ Hinunangan

Tagbilaran/ Lapu-Lapu

Tagbilaran/ Leyte (Isabel)

Tagbilaran/ Liloan

Tagbilaran/ Loon

Tagbilaran/ Ozamis

Tagbilaran/ San Carlos

Tagbilaran/ San Fernando

Tagbilaran/ Talibon

Tagbilaran/ Tandag

Tagbilaran/ Zamboanga

Talibon/ Colorado

Talisay/ Tampi

Talusan/ Alicia

CargoRevenue

165,600.00

23,555.50

98,251.84

26,000.00

125,600.00

81,584.00

14,540.00

1,310.00

1,060.00

490.00

108,747.00

22,176.00

32,708.00

5,000.00

3,000.00

321,032.80

198,000.00

486,300.00

52,000.00

118,209.00

24,310.00

467,885.00

26,000.00

64,833.00

3,452,731.56

89,840.00

141,001.24

6,873.87

26,000.00

34,500.00

32,500.00

21,810.00

38,400.00

3,056.05

48,185.00

60,000.00

113,100.00

30,000.00

41,775.00

10,292.00

19,358.00

3,255.10


1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

Numberof

Operators

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

83



Maayo Shipping, Inc.




Jefren D. Pages

Reynaldo Baleno

Rodolfo Manalo





Den Tadus

Den Tadus





Hadji Jalleh Jayyari

Sing Hock Chua Amik







Hadji Jalleh Jayyari

Terban Marine Corp, La Felicidad

Marine Corp

WG&A, Palacio Shipping Lines,

Negros Navigation

Philip Go, Lite Shipping Corp

Almyre Cortes, Santiago Regalado


Number=1/HHI

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.78

2.60

1.98

1.98


100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Route

Talusan/ Sagasa

Talusan/ Zamboanga

Tampi, San Jose/ Ayungon,

Negros Oriental

Tampi, San Jose/ Bato, Samboan,

Cebu

Tampi, San Jose/ Lazi, Siquijor

Tampi, San Jose/ Tan-awan, Oslob,

Cebu

Tangil/ Dumanjug

Tinglay (Batangas)/ Mabini

Tinglay (Batangas)/ Pisa

Toledo/ Bohol

Toledo/ Naval (Tacloban)

Toledo/ Pasacao

Toledo/ Talibon

Zamboanga City/ Zamboanga

del Sur/Norte

Zamboanga del Sur/Norte/ Basilan

Zamboanga/ Alicia

Zamboanga/ Bais

Zamboanga/ Bislig

Zamboanga/ Bohol (Ubay)

Zamboanga/ Limaong

Zamboanga/ Malabang

Zamboanga/ San Jose

Zamboanga/ Sandakan

Zamboanga/ Siocon

Zamboanga/ Siom

Zamboanga/ Sirawai

Zamboanga/ Sogod

Zamboanga/ Tungawan



Bacolod/ Batangas

Bacolod/ General Santos

Bacolod/ Tagbilaran

Bataan/ (Dumanguit)

CargoRevenue

8,636.50

44,572.60

4,687.95

3,741,252.35

7,492.80

235,019.35

102,324.00

89,650.00

50,000.00

160,000.00

96,000.00

70,000.00

170,000.00

64,999.00

15,000.00

22,870.75

18,702.00

240,000.00

31,283.00

38,000.00

1,090,980.00

52,360.00

1,763,851.60

767,373.55

203,018.17

550,111.40

39,200.00

10,000.00

1,806,755.16

1,770,738.41

169,190.50

38,924.00


1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

0.56

0.39

0.50

0.50

Numberof

Operators

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

2

3

2

2

Appendixes


84

La Felicidad Marine Corp

Terban Marine Corp


Terban Marine Corp

La Felicidad Marine Corp,

Terban Marine Corp

Terban Marine Corp, La Felicidad

Marine Corp


Ocean Express, Jones Carrier

Eastern Pacific Lines, Cebu Ferries

Corp, Lorenzo Shipping Corp,

Sulpicio Lines

Galactic Shipping, Cebu Ferries

Corp, Lorenzo Shipping Corp

Lite Shipping Corp, Conrado

Geraldoy

Cebu Ferries Corp, Phil Fast Ferry

Corp, Palacio Shipping Inc

Palacio Shipping Lines, Ever Lines,

Sultan Shipping

Sulpicio Lines, Lorenzo Shipping

Corp, Cebu Ferries Corp


Francisco Alboroto, Dominga

Ligoyligoy, Aurelio Leong

Eduardo Jarque, Jones Carrier

Neva Quezon, Escolastico

Geonanga


HBT Shipping Corp, Lorenzo

Shipping Corp

Miller Santiago, Michael Jude

Placencia

Ocean Express Shipping Corp,

Rover Shipping Lines

Celso Arboleda, Rodolfo

Gabalonzo

HBT Shipping Corp, V- Lines

Ocean Express Shipping Corp,

Ever Lines Inc

Aquilina Guro, V- Lines


Number=1/HHI

1.91

1.83

1.99

1.71

1.98

1.64

3.56

1.22

1.76

1.99

2.78

2.85

1.78

2.65

1.87

1.88

1.92

2.00

1.69

1.95

1.89

1.89

1.90

1.79


100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.00

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Route

Batangas/ Anibong

Batangas/ Aparri

Batangas/ Poro

Batangas/Masbate/Calapan

Butuan/ Jagna

Cagayan de Oro/ Bataan

Cagayan de Oro/ Davao

Cagayan de Oro/ General Santos

Cebu/ Bais

Cebu/ Batangas

Cebu/ Pasacao

Cotabato/ General Santos

Cuyo/ Roxas

Davao del Sur/ Gen Santos

Dipolog/ Jagna

Guimaras/ Negros Occidental

Iloilo/ Cuyo

Iloilo/ Dumaguete

Iloilo/ Masbate

Iloilo/ Pasacao

Iloilo/ Roxas

Iloilo/ San Jose, Mindoro

Manila/ Jolo

Masbate/ Bauan

CargoRevenue

4,281,575.98

11,986,524.64

52,335,700.49

1,524,746.53

1,252,878.38

192,159.45

206,142.15

222,078.37

47,833.00

327,000.00

364,281.50

75,844.10

19,607.59

152,124.10

927,410.25

193,974.75

25,542.56

171,092.91

100,196.00

242,000.00

41,150.00

160,007.27

402,000.00

167,910.00


0.52

0.55

0.50

0.59

0.50

0.61

0.28

0.82

0.57

0.50

0.36

0.35

0.56

0.38

0.54

0.53

0.52

0.50

0.59

0.51

0.53

0.53

0.53

0.56

Numberof

Operators

2

2

2

2

2

2

4

3

2

2

3

3

2

3

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

Appendixes

85

Lina Riega, Cesar Borja

Eduardo Jarque, Jones Carrier

Leonardo Dauhog, Pedro Felizarta

V- Lines, Lite Shipping Corp

Inter-island Maritime Corp, Lite

Shipping Corp

Galactic Shipping, Magnolia

Shipping Lines

Joyalcyd Corp, Sing Hock Chua

Amik

Sampaguita Shipping Corp,


Magnolia Shipping Lines,

Ever Lines

Magnolia Shipping Lines,

Ever Lines

Negros Navigation

WG&A Philippines


Terban Marine Corp

Terban Marine Corp

Eduardo Jargue

RP Tamula and Sons

Lite Shipping Corp

Cebu Ferries Corp

Cebu Ferries Corp


Avelino Arraz

Lapu-lapu Shipping Lines


BCT Shipping Lines

WG&A Philippines

Cebu Ferries Corp

Sulpicio Lines

Cebu Ferries Corp

Rolando Gamilong

Leonardo Dauhog

Cebu Ferries Corp

Roger Marcelo

Gerardo Gubo



Number=1/HHI

1.69

1.91

1.62

1.80

2.00

1.87

1.77

2.00

1.73

1.82

1.20

1.35

1.02

1.08

1.24

1.20

1.04

1.03

1.29

1.08

1.27

1.03

1.12

1.31

1.19

1.31

1.15

1.03

1.36

1.29

1.33

1.03

1.30

1.36

1.16


100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

91.2

85.2

99.0

96.3

89.0

90.7

98.0

98.6

87.2

96.0

71.1

98.4

94.3

86.9

91.1

87.1

93.3

98.6

84.8

87.0

85.3

98.4

86.9

84.4

92.8

Route

Surigao/ Basilica

Surigao/ Dipolog

Tab-ok/ San Francisco

Tacloban/ Mindoro (San Jose)

Tagbilaran/ Toledo

Zamboanga/ Dipolog

Zamboanga/ Lamitan

Zamboanga/ Sitangkai

Zamboanga/ Subanipa

Zamboanga/ Talusan


Bacolod/ Cagayan de Oro

Bacolod/ Zamboanga

Batangas/ Calapan

Batangas/ Pasacao

Batangas/Calapan/Pasacao

Baybay/ Dipolog

Benoni/ Balingoan

Cagayan de Oro/ Butuan

Cagayan de Oro/ Cotabato

Cagayan de Oro/ Ormoc

Cagayan de Oro/ Zamboanga

Catbalogan/ Villareal

Cebu/ Catbalogan

Cebu/ Maasin

Cebu/ Tandag

Dumaguete/ Cagayan de Oro

Dumaguete/ Cotabato

Dumaguete/ Dadiangas

Dumaguete/ General Santos

Guimaras/ Pulupandan

Hingatungan/ Tab-ok

Iligan/ Ormoc

Iloilo (Gigante Norte)/ Iloilo(Estancia)

Iloilo/ Bantayan

Jolo/ Bongao

CargoRevenue

150,715.00

1,770,229.22

16,241.30

78,500.00

137,500.00

77,834.90

246,540.19

781,615.70

354,474.61

62,399.61

19,220,657.32

1,607,320.06

187,665,518.13

4,435,253.24

2,060,381.83

1,113,681.86

1,419,177.25

26,369.56

2,384,611.52

1,272,943.29

483,206.18

322,025.00

1,768,496.58

2,337,195.98

1,354,200.00

5,698,152.18

1,236,068.40

7,195,808.35

11,467,787.41

81,190.00

13,830.00

225,963.45

138,309.50

125,250.00

217,105.60


0.59

0.52

0.62

0.56

0.50

0.53

0.56

0.50

0.58

0.55

0.83

0.74

0.98

0.93

0.80

0.83

0.96

0.97

0.78

0.92

0.51

0.97

0.89

0.77

0.84

0.76

0.87

0.97

0.74

0.77

0.75

0.97

0.77

0.74

0.87

Numberof

Operators

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

6

3

4

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

3

2

3

3

2

4

3

2

6

2

2

2

2

2

2


86

Max Baat

Douglas del Rosario

Sulpicio Lines

Isidro Refil

Arturo Susas

Sulpicio Lines


Rufino Augusto

Domingo Paredes

Leonardo Dauhog

Pedro Felizarta


WG&A Philippines

Abdusakar Tan

Jose Leal, Agustin Nepomuceno

Dolorosa Ibo

Aquilina Guro

WG&A Philippines, Negros

Navigation

WG&A Philippines, Rover Shipping

Services, William Michael Shipping

Corp

Jaime Geraldoy, Eva Norono

Palacio Shipping, WG&A, Lite

Shipping Corp


Dionisio Albania


La Felicidad Marine Corp,

Terban Marine Corp

Dominador Taglorin, Felix Rabasto,

Charlito Villanueva, Dioneto

Villanueva

Eduardo Donan, Rodolfo Monilla,

Edilberto Bajao


Cebu Ferries Corp, Phil Fast

Ferry Corp

Cebu Ferrries Corp, Sulpicio Lines



Number=1/HHI

1.35

1.23

1.02

1.39

1.33

1.01

1.12

1.02

1.27

1.16

1.30

1.02

1.33

1.35

2.28

1.47

1.49

1.69

3.59

1.96

2.12

1.58

1.59

1.52

1.88

3.97

3.15

1.49

2.55

1.94

1.62


85.3

89.7

99.1

83.2

85.4

99.5

94.4

99.2

88.0

92.7

86.7

98.8

86.1

84.8

89.8

82.0

79.3

94.9

89.0

94.6

41.3

75.9

75.6

78.3

94.8

67.4

62.8

80.9

86.4

88.0

89.0

Route

Liloan/ Sibulan

Mandaue/ Bantayan

Manila/ Catbalogan

Masbate/ Roxas

Maya/ San Isidro

Ormoc/ Masbate

Pagadian/ Zamboanga

Sta Rosa/ Dapdap

Surigao/ Dapa

Tab-ok/ Kikilo

Tab-ok/ Tibo

Tacloban/ Batangas

Tacloban/ General Santos

Zamboanga/ Pagadian


Antimonan/ Alabat

Babak/ Sasa

Bacolod/ Bauan

Bacolod/ Davao

Bacolod/ Iligan

Bacolod/ Romblon

Bacolod/ Tacloban

Batangas/ Legaspi

Batangas/ Mindoro

Batangas/ Pandacan

Batangas/Calapan/Masbate

Boracay/ Caticlan

Butuan/ Magallanes

Cagayan de Oro/ Batangas

Cebu/ Camotes

Cebu/ Cotabato

Cebu/ Iligan

CargoRevenue

10,280.00

1,571,062.17

3,576,428.10

189,850.00

158,180.00

645,907.79

405,090.55

22,008.00

8,345.00

9,710.00

22,515.80

2,870,870.42

485,020.42

2,524,315.25

120,603.60

7,937.20

142,646.25

2,107,167.25

845,039.66

46,500.00

257,328.47

7,631,981.52

102,349.90

9,849,942.35

3,857,366.46

525,474.50

263,707.50

4,428,294.45

8,565,790.15

16,838,080.91

42,424,129.13


0.74

0.82

0.98

0.72

0.75

0.99

0.89

0.98

0.79

0.86

0.77

0.98

0.75

0.74

0.44

0.68

0.67

0.59

0.28

0.51

0.47

0.63

0.63

0.66

0.53

0.25

0.32

0.67

0.39

0.52

0.62

Numberof

Operators

3

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

3

2

3

6

2

4

5

3

5

2

2

2

3

3 5

1 0

3

3

5

1 0

3

Appendixes

87

Victan Transport Services,

Hosanna Shipping

Hosanna Shipping Corp, Palacio

Shipping Inc

MY Lines, San Juan Shipping Lines

William Michael Shipping Corp,

Cebu Ferries Corp

Cebu Ferries Corp, Lorenzo

Shipping, Palacio Shipping Inc

Jones Carrier, WG&A Philippines

Cebu Ferries Corp, George and

Peter Lines, Ever Lines

Mabjunnix Shipping, Cesar

Sumalpong

Philip Go, Lite Shipping

Cebu Ferries Corp, Ever Lines,

Hosanna Shipping

Via Marine Corp

Inter-island Maritime Corp,

Sulpicio Lines


SKMMOOA, Maria Balena, Santiago

Siloterio, Anacleto Galabo, Anita

Galve, Ruthelo Geonanga, Eduardo

Gando, Nelia Canon, Fernando

Espinosa, Nerissa Pelingon

Romeo Geraldoy

WG&A Philippines, Sulpicio Lines

WG&A Philippines, Sulpicio Lines

Hadji Ahmad, Asman Jaide,



Den Tadus

Erwin Tan, Sampaguita Shipping

Lines, Hadji Tan, Radzma Burahan,

Anton Burahan, Hadji Daud

Liwanag Mendoza

Ocean Express Shipping Lines

Hadji Hahmad, Sampaguita

Shipping Corp

Hadji Hahmad



Number=1/HHI

2.56

2.20

1.63

2.33

2.94

2.09

3.26

2.12

2.03

2.87

1.54

2.30

2.05

10.30

1.44

1.91

2.01

2.78

1.47

1.51

5.97

1.58

1.56

1.90

1.43

1.40


85.5

88.0

92.6

57.6

90.3

97.2

89.2

85.2

89.8

87.8

78.2

88.1

86.7

69.9

81.3

80.1

84.4

94.7

79.9

78.6

85.9

75.7

76.7

94.8

82.5

82.6

Route

Cebu/ Legaspi

Cebu/ Leyte (Isabel)

Cebu/ Naval

Davao/ Iligan

Dumaguete/ Davao

Dumaguete/ Dipolog

Dumaguete/ Iligan

Dumaguete/ Siquijor

Dumaguete/ Tacloban

Iligan/ Zamboanga

Iloilo/ Batangas

Iloilo/ Butuan

Iloilo/ Cagayan de Oro

Iloilo/ Guimaras (Jordan)

Iloilo/ Negros Occidental

Iloilo/ Tacloban

Iloilo/ Zamboanga

Jolo/ Siasi

Jolo/ Sitangkai

Jolo/ Tawi-tawi

Jolo/ Zamboanga

Mamburao/ Bauan

Manila/ Escalante

Siasi/ Bongao

Sitangkai/ Bongao

Sitangkai/ Siasi

CargoRevenue

725,000.00

336,314.50

813,952.28

2,124,285.09

2,357,924.61

940,929.87

339,605.86

124,429.40

104,546.94

1,961,677.41

5,824,441.02

176,425.62

17,632,866.97

1,967,178.25

32,100.00

442,697.73

10,892,946.35

269,735.15

45,876.80

78,889.00

7,258,975.93

149,455.56

172,000.00

336,099.65

198,573.75

55,298.85


0.39

0.46

0.61

0.43

0.34

0.48

0.31

0.47

0.49

0.35

0.65

0.43

0.49

0.10

0.70

0.52

0.50

0.36

0.68

0.66

0.17

0.63

0.64

0.53

0.70

0.71

Numberof

Operators

3

4

3

3

4

3

5

5

3

6

4

3

9

2 4

2

4

5

4

2

2

1 0

2

2

3

3

2


88

Erlinda Atianzar, Andrea Vargas,

Caesar Playda, Alejandro Requina,

Jesus Basarten, Flaviano Cuenca

Jesus Plarilla, Diana Barail

Marites Pielaga

Jones Carrier, Eduardo Jarque

Jones Carrier

Cebu Ferries Corp, Hosanna

Shipping

Sulpicio Lines, William Chiong

Alibasa Alih, Jovito Chiong,

George Tan


Sing Hock Chua Amik

Ever Lines

Ever Lines


Hadji Mubin Daud, Magnolia

Shipping Corp

Jasper Askalani, Lino Lao,

Jainal Tiking


Number=1/HHI

5.97

2.12

1.42

1.99

1.55

1.85

1.67

3.26

1.54

1.47

1.50

1.40

1.53

2.42

2.74


91.0

87.1

81.9

97.7

77.1

97.4

89.8

92.1

58.0

80.1

78.8

82.9

77.5

88.7

99.0

Route

Sta Ana/ Penaplata

Sta Ana/ Sta Cruz

Sta Cruz/ Gen Luna

Tacloban/ Dipolog

Tacloban/ Gingoog

Tacloban/ Iligan

Tacloban/ Zamboanga

Zamboanga/ Basilan

Zamboanga/ Bongao

Zamboanga/ Leyte (Isabela)

Zamboanga/ Malangas

Zamboanga/ Margosatubig

Zamboanga/ Sagasa

Zamboanga/ Siasi

Zamboanga/ Tawi-tawi

CargoRevenue

5,085.00

6,612.00

175,980.00

6,558,856.11

2,922,366.00

1,477,130.15

144,690.38

1,033,976.45

1,665,807.60

100,750.00

223,787.19

302,255.13

109,345.01

1,327,871.60

968,649.00


0.17

0.47

0.70

0.50

0.65

0.54

0.60

0.31

0.65

0.68

0.67

0.72

0.65

0.41

0.36

Numberof

Operators

7

3

2

3

2

3

4

4

3

2

2

2

2

4

4


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Philippine Exporters Confederation Inc. 1999. Unbundling FreightRates Imposed by Foreign and Domestic Shipping Lines on InterislandTransport of Export and Import Cargoes. Manila: Trade and InvestmentPolicy Analysis and Advocacy Support Project, Philexport.

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90

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