authenticity rousseau

8/8/2019 Authenticity Rousseau

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writingscan lead and the fanaticalendsto which hispolitical insightscan beput.He mightinvite,eveninitiate,outlandish eadings hroughhis own tex-tualdesigns,but heinterpreter'sask s tomapa trueandsteadycoursebytri-angulatingawayfromthe extremes.The threebooks underreview all insist thatRousseauspeaks n importantways to issues of ongoing politicalconcern,andthey all locate this impor-tance in a "thirdway,"a temperatemiddle coursebetween whatRousseau'sproseandpreviousreadersoftenconfigureas sharplydrawnalternatives. nRousseau and the Politics of Ambiguity:Self Culture,and Society,MiraMorgensterninks these alternatives o the axes of liberalthought-publicandprivate, ndividualismandcommunalism,masculine and feminine-allof which Rousseauunsettles n his pursuitof the notionandideal of authen-ticity.InHypocrisyandIntegrity,RuthGrant eases outRousseau'spoliticalinsights througha comparisonwith that masterof extremes,Machiavelli.Rousseau emerges as neither nostalgic nor utopian but as a clear-eyedobserverofpoliticswho can countenanceduplicity n theinterestsof preserv-ing individualintegrity.Nicole Fermon'sDomesticatingPassions: Rous-seau, Woman nd Nation identifies a thirdway in Rousseau's focus on thefamily:its institutionaland sentimentalreform,Fermonargues,was key tohis republicanagenda.Threading hroughthese very differentanalyses is a sharedconcerntoovercomethe conceptualandpoliticaldualisms thatthreaten o underminethe coherence and the relevanceof Rousseau'sthought.A more complex,practical,subtle,andworldlypoliticalvision can be foundin his work,theysuggest,if one takes care to avoidtheextremes.Thisis notamatterof selec-tivereading(although hequestionof which texts assumeprominence s notirrelevant)but of an interpretive mperative:as a misogynist,a democraticpurist,or a righteously uncompromisingmoralist,Rousseau is easy to dis-miss. The threeauthors hus set out todisabusereadersof theseexaggeratedimpressions,and n so doing theyoffer alternative ersionsof a theoristmoresensible,prescient,discriminating, nd unironic han one might expect.Butthe middle s notnecessarilymiddling,andeach of these booksmakes a com-pelling claim forthepolitical insightsthatemergefrom a soberedup Rous-seau.Theyalso showhowintemperateobrietycan be or,perhaps,how read-ing sobrietyinto his political vision introduces ts own intemperance.Myclaimis not aboutperformativeontradiction,he curiousreplicationof pre-cisely what is being decried. Neitheram I pointingto the inevitabilityofexcess, in Rousseau'soranytext.My pointis that these books tell us some-thing abouthow interpretationworks, in addition to telling us somethingaboutRousseau.


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Therearemultipleways of imposingform,thusmultiplemeaningsavail-able in anytext,andnoimposition s benign: hese aretruismsof interpretivepractice.Less self-evident is how to understand he relationshipbetweenimposing form on a text and the meaningswe find there:how, in makingsense of a text, we make claims about what is politically intelligible. It istempting to assimilate the various sense-making moves used byMorgenstern,Grant,and Fermon o theparadigmof liberalism, nasmuchaseach of themassociates Rousseau'srelevancewith his abilityto circumventthatparadigm's imitations.Thus,his contribution o politicaltheoryis dis-tinguishedby a refusalto be constrainedby achoice between stateand econ-omy, interest andvirtue,or individualandcommunity,andlikewise, Rous-seau's contribution becomes intelligible insofar as political theory isorganized around these incommensurablechoices. Within this politicalgrammarof (a highly attenuated)liberalism, complexity is indeed anachievement,hard-nosed ealismmore mpressive till,andsensitivity ohis-torical variationnothingshortof a miracle.But these books also speak to issues that exceed liberalism's definitiveconcerns.Specifically,theyeachaddress he issue of how one findsmeaningin texts.Morgenstern's xplorationof ambiguityandauthenticity,or exam-ple, derives from hercommitment o readthe text "on its own terms" vii) inthe course of pursuinga feminist interpretation thatunpacksthe implica-tions of Rousseau'sconclusions in awaythatcanultimatelyprove iberatingto women and to all of humanity"xv). She introducesherapproachby dis-tinguishing t from"acertain 'orthodox' endency n Rousseauscholarship"that assesses his contributions"in terms of a particularpolitical agenda,"insistingthather own feministreadingwill eschew thistoo convenientsim-plification (vii). These framing concerns-literalism, feminism, and theformemancipation akes-reappear throughout he book at every interpre-tivejuncture.Like Morgenstern's,Fermon'saccountpromisesto attend o how Rous-seau's texts speakof and to women;unlikeMorgenstern, he does not labelher accountfeminist. She opens with the claim that Rousseau'sappealstosentiment, ove, andthefamilyshow how he "questions raditional nd mod-erntools of knowledge,and does so in the voice of woman,in the femininevoice, because the Othervoice, thatof thepatriarchy ndof themalesubject,is inadequate loneto discuss thecomplicatedhumanmovementsof politics"(3-4). ThusFermonties Rousseau's narrative erformance o his projectofinstitutional eform: herelationshipsnecessary o his self-rulingcommunityentailreworking hepassions,mostcentrally hrough maginedand remem-beredexperiencesof the mother.The dangersandpossibilities of passion,


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andtheneed to transposemeaningbetweentext and world: hese initial con-figurationsndicate the terms on whichshe reads Rousseau.A tensionbetweenformalprinciplesandthe practiceof politics framesGrant'sstudy,which opens with a comfortinglyfamiliarcondemnationofhypocrisythatis quicklymadeless so. "But s hypocrisyalwayssuch a badthing?"she asks, pointingto the counterexampleof the destructivelyandunattractively elf-righteousantihypocrite.n the course of puzzlingthroughthisquestion(whose answer,as I havealreadysuggested,is no), Grant itu-ateshertexts on oneor the otherside of an ancient-modern ivide:does Rous-seau'sapparent ommitment o virtuemean thathe is toopremoderno offerviablealternatives o liberalism?Hersubsequent nterpretationf hisethicalcontributionsakes its bearingsfroma worldemptiedof politicalideals.In highlightingquestionsof interpretive rocedure, hese books issue aninvitation,perhapsa challenge,to considerhow their differentconclusionsreflect andincorporatedifferentreadingprotocols.Again, the observationthattheypresent hree ncommensurable ersionsof Rousseau's"teachings"is, in andof itself, neithersurprisingnorparticularly nteresting.But whatwarrants loserinspection s how theirdifferentreadings lluminate herela-tionshipbetween nterpretive ndpoliticaldesigns:they exemplifyhow read-ing practicesestablisha logic of political intelligibility,and thus how anyconclusionsaboutthepoliticalsense that,forexample,freedom,equality,orsex canmakedependonpriorandtypicallyuntheorizednterpretivehoices.Whatemancipatory nd feministpoliticalidealsemergefromareadingpro-tocol thatstrives o be literalandagenda ree?How doesaninterpretationhatadjudicatesbetweentheauthor'shistoricalreferentsand his fluctuatingnar-rativevoice define a reformistpolitics?Andwhat counts as a realisticpoliti-cal ethic within a frameworkthat pits ancient virtue against modernself-regard?

AMBIGUITYWITHOUT MBIVALENCEForMorgenstern,hecommitment o read Rousseau'stexts on their owntermsmeansfindingcoherence n theirapparentlymultipleclaims.Ofpartic-

ularconcernarehisportrayals f women,which shepresentsasbeingof two,disparatesorts. The firstcorresponds o the familiar model of submissivedevotionandcoquettishexcess, while thesecondsuggestsa womanwillingand able to assertindependentviews. Morgenstern uggests thatthe key tomakingsense of these differentrepresentationsies in the denouementsofRousseau'sliteraryworks.That his heroinesdie, his romancesfail, and hisnatural amily leaves "terror nd bloodshedin its wake"(4) pointto some-


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thingmorecomplexthanprevious nterpreters aveacknowledged.Further-more, to acceptthe conclusionthat women are the victims of a patriarchalprojectoriented oward iberatingmen,or thattheprojectas a whole derivesfrom adespairingvision of irreconcilablealternatives,s to ignorethepossi-bility of a unified andpositivescheme.Morgenstern inds this scheme andthusRousseau'spoliticalandnarrative oherence nthe notionof ambiguity.Ambiguity characterizesa life in which indeterminaciesare endemic.Sketched n contrast o liberalism'srigiddemarcations-where "there s nomiddleground,no shades of grey"-ambiguity introduces hangeand insta-bilityas the definitive eaturesof Rousseau'sworldview(6). Tothrive n thisworldrequiresrecognizingacomplexitywhose navigationMorgensternik-ens to moving along a continuum:whatappearas antitheticaldispositions,attitudes,and drivesareindissolubly inkedtogether,not as binarypairsbutas adjacentpositions. Successfully negotiatingthis tightropecharacterizesauthenticity,a moral andpersonal mperative hatMorgenstern uggests isbothunique o anindividualanda "sharedhuman rait": chievinganauthen-tic "sense of Self' confirmsa commonhumanity xiii).Morgensternrepeatedlyunderscoresthe difficultiesinherent in such aproject.They arise not only from an unpredictableworld but also from thenecessary inks betweenameliorativeanddegenerativewaysof being."Con-sequently,"Morgenstern oncludes,"thegreatest hreat othe achievementofauthenticity-particularlywhere women are concerned-is the ability ofinauthenticityo masquerade s its opposite(i.e., authenticity)and thereforepotentially o doomall of humanity o perpetratets ownmoral andspiritualdestruction"6-7). Thetragicoutcomes thatMorgensterndentifies n Rous-seau's stories of moraland sexual maturation llustratethis point: Sophie,Emile, Julie,andthecivilizingsavagesof the Discourse onInequalityallbearwitness to the personalandpolitical consequencesof inauthenticchoices.But anemancipatorychemeisembedded n thislitanyof failure nasmuchasthe charactersreveal how social values andprinciplescan militateagainstauthentic hoosing,particularlyorwomen.Thus,according oMorgenstern,Rousseau nvites his readers o rethink heirownpoliticalandpersonal imi-tations,by grapplingwith his imperfect iteraryresolutions.In so doing hiswritings"serve as a metatextof politicaltheory,engagingthe audience notmerely as passive spectatorsbut also as activeparticipantsn the ongoingenterpriseof formulatinga dynamicand authenticpoliticaltheory" 241).A greatdealhingeson how one interpretsailure.Some readerswill ques-tion whetherJulie's death nLaNouvelleHeloisesignalstheinauthenticity fher maritalchoice, for example,or whetherthe failure of Emile's marriageandhis decision to leavehiscountryrevealthathe also"optsout of authentic-ity" (119). Both the conventionsof the romance ormandtheuncertain tatus


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of Emile's unfinishedsequel might suggest thata narrativeof loss is notunequivocallyarepresentation f failure.ButMorgenstern oldsfirmlythatto leave the contradictionsbetween these stories' idealbeginningsand theirmonstrousends unresolved s "grosslyto misread hem" 2). Andyet, whileshe insistson the self-evidenceof the stories'tragicends,the critical nterpre-tive workof her book is to constructustifications or them:what unresolveddilemmasarebeing signaled by adultery, nslavement,anddeath?Morgenstern'sonstructions over arangeof texts andthemes,beginning,appropriately nough,with language. Language,she suggests, "serves as aparadigm f allhumandevelopment"nthat tscomplexitiesreflect andenterinto theambiguityof everyrelationship10).On onehand, anguage ncludesan "individualistic/humanistic"imensionthatpromotesuniqueness;on theotherhand, t includesa"social" lementthatestablishescommunity hroughthe communicationof love andneed. Rousseau'sparadoxicalobservation,accordingto Morgenstern,s that this twofoldnature,of humans and theirlanguage, can leave them both internallyrent: individual interestsmightappearat odds withsocialinterests,andtheexpressionsof a commonhuman-ity mightbe usedformanipulation.Whatcontains he threatof contradictioninherentnlanguageandmen is Rousseau'snarrative esign:by offeringtwodifferentpicturesof individualityandcommunity,he pointsto anauthenticand an inauthentic esolution.

Morgensterndentifies the firstof these doubled visions in the Essay onLanguages'stwofold originarystory of southernand northern anguages.She then turnsto the Social Contract,whereconcernsaboutauthentic an-guage emerge in discussions of the legislator's task; to the Letter tod'Alembert,which introduces he problemof theatricality ogetherwith itsliberatoryvariation; nd to La NouvelleHeloise, whereaneveryday heatri-calitydirectedby Wolmarperpetuates life of inauthenticityhatpasses forits contrary.The book's subsequentdiscussions of pity, imagination, ove,and the family all move along this explanatoryroute,where integration ssimultaneouslypromisedand threatened.magination,orexample,"makespeople able to reach out to one another n conceptualandpracticalterms,[but] t also establishesthe basisfor a Self-referential nd selfish social rela-tionship" (72). This is similar with love, whose "Self-referential"and"Other-directed"imensionseachpull in destructiveandsalutarydirections(81-83), and thefamily,which can "nurturewhatever mbersof authenticitymightexist within an inauthenticworld" 181) but can likewiseproduce he"false consciousness"on displayat Clarens(212).As the elaborations of ambiguity multiply, the distinction betweenauthenticand inauthentic hoice growsmoreurgentand more tenuous.Per-hapsfor thisreason,Morgenstern epeatedly nvokes the need for close and


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carefulreading. Chidingthe likes of Starobinskiand de Man for missingRousseau'sunivocalmessage,she mustersa ferocioustextualdetail todocu-ment an ambiguitywhose transcendence erves as the measure of correctinterpretation.Here the evidence of narratedalternatives-the portraitsofauthenticand inauthenticresolution-gives way to reading between thelines, as thepromiseof anuncompromisedmiddlebeginstorelyon substan-tiatingwhat is not there.My pointis not thatMorgensterns making thingsup;rather, heis insistingon thesignificanceof thecharacters' ailureevertorealizeanimplicitideal.But as herpersistentworrythatauthenticity an bemistaken oritsoppositesuggests,thisliteralism s anythingbutself-evident.Morgenstern's entral askentailsholdingapartwhatRousseau'srepresenta-tions alwaysshow as interwovenorcoincident.Consider the elucidation of Julie's inauthenticity.Morgensternrecon-structsthe situation of the heroine of La NouvelleHeloise by imaginingitthrough he complexarrayof love's possibilities.Onone hand,Julie's deci-sion not to runawaywith her lover St. Preux ndicatesa selfless motivation:giving uptheexclusivityof passionate ove underscoreshercommitment obroader social goods and goals. On the otherhand, passionatelove alsothreatensa loss of self, by destabilizing nterpersonal oundaries;hus,"it ispreciselyher own Self-concern that motivatesher denial of love" (101). Inher search for individualhappiness,Julie opts for the passionless love offriendship.But"friendship oes notalwaysbringwithit truehonestyorhap-piness,"Morgensternobserves,and the Clarenshousehold reveals ust howinsidiousfriendship an be:"The riendlyairof the estatemasksacentralizedsystemof authority, evisedbyWolmarandexecutedbyJulie" 102). Julie'ssubsequent onfession thatsheis unhappyat Clarensannounces hefailureofthatsystem.The moral o thestory s thusrevealed:havingfled from ove outof self-concernonly to find that self destroyedby a loveless marriage,Julierealizes that she cannot do without love. But of what sort? She needs a"dynamic,authentic,andmutual"relationship,which means one thatis notshapedbythe unfreedomsand nauthenticities haracteristic fthe world hatthe novel represents 106).Morgenstern erivesacrystal-clearmessagefrom Rousseau'sambivalentstory line, throughan interpretivemethodthatperforceexceeds the text:authenticitys alwayswhat fails to materialize.As aresultof thisrepresenta-tionalfailure,we arepresentedwith an ideal thatknows no worldlyornarra-tive form.Tobe sure,this is often thewaywith ideals.ButhavingbeenurgedtorecognizeRousseau's iberatory omplexity, t is odd to see thisfiguredasan exercisein futiledesigns.So, too, it is difficult o seeMorgenstern's fteningenuousformulationsdisciplinedinto predictabilityby the algorithm orauthenticity.Most troublingabouthercommitment o unambivalent nds is


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98 POLITICALHEORYFebruary001that it removespolitics fromthe texts. Likethe language,pity,imagination,andlove on which Morgensternpersuasivelyshows that it depends,Rous-seau'spoliticsis madeintelligibleby beingmade authentic.Thus anarrativeof citizens who are "forced o be free" mplicatesno actualpolitical designs,inasmuch as that narrative remains a literal impossibility. And soMorgenstern's lose readingof theSocial Contract, ikeher close readingofLa NouvelleHeloise, makes the textmeaningfulby positinga series of dis-tinctions hatcanonlybeimagined:authenticpoliticsentailsalienationbutofa"good" ort(149), and t enablespositivetransformation utonlywhen "thepeople [are]in charge" 169).At some pointit is fair to ask,why laborto maintaindistinctions hatthetextconsistentlyfails to keepclear? Whencethispetitionto authenticityasthe circumventionof everythingupsetting, urid,equivocal,andrhetoricallyexactingthat Rousseauwrote?Why arepolitical representations uthenticonly whentheyelude thestruggle,confusion, ntemperance, ndpainthatherepeatedlyrepresents?Since I do notshareMorgenstern's elief thatreadingtexts "ontheir own terms"requiresclarifyingthe author's ntentions,I willnotguessat hers.But theconsequencesof herchoices areclearenough.Thus,while she celebrates Rousseau's "metatextual" nvitation to readers toactivelytheorize heirpolitical ives,her owninterpretivetrategy igures hetext as hazardouswithoutthedirectionof aninterpreterwho readscarefullyenoughto makeintelligiblean absent deal.Lackingthisfirmhand,a readermightconcludethat oveactuallygivesrise toimpossiblechoices, thatdemo-craticrule neverrenders tatepower benign,andthatRousseau'sadmirationfor women'swills is nota signthathe meantto relieve theirsuffering.Aban-donedtoreading hese texts"ontheirownterms," nemightcome to believethat in Rousseau's ambivalentrepresentations-of contracts,romance,andmen-he shows how perversea realized idealcan be.The political implicationsof Morgenstern'sversion of literalismalsoinformher feminism. As already ndicated,she introducesher analysisbyunderscoring he unintelligibilityof the claim that Rousseau might havemeantwomen to suffer,and she returns o this theme in the book'sclosingdiscussion.And herdecision notto addressquestionsof gender nbetweenisutterlyconsistentwith the general interpretiveplan: retrievingRousseau'semancipatoryvision entails steeringclear of the inauthenticityof actualpolitical representations, e theythe forcedfreedomsrepresentedn his writ-ings or the "particular oliticalagenda" hatfeminismrepresents.So whenMorgensterneassures eaders hatRousseau'semphasisonbreast-feedingsjust "hisattempt o reestablishthe family on an emotionallyhonest basis"(182), we recognizein this sobering simplificationanotherconsequenceofthe decision tokeeppoliticsat a distance romthetext:sexualequality, oo, is


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anideal mademeaningfulonly in its absence,andsexualemancipationwilldependon the same literalism hat leaves readersrelianton the interpreter'ssteadyinggaze. Intheend,it seemsthatwhile Rousseau'sgeniuswas to giveform to aninescapableflux andambiguity, t is unimaginable hat he mightteachambiguous essons.And whenthis becomes thenecessaryconditionofthe text's intelligibility,we encountera feminist Rousseau unburdenedbygender,a democraticRousseauwho transcendspoliticalsubjection,andanideal of freedomthat is sometimesindistinguishablerom its opposite.

A FUNNYTHINGHAPPENEDON THEWAYTO VINCENNESFermon s alsoattuned otextualambiguities,buthermethod ornegotiat-ing them is nottopressharderon the text.Rather, he is interested n parsingthe unity of Rousseau's project againstthe historicalbackdropof ancienregimeFrance:"Asa studyin thehistoryof politicalthought, his workpro-

poses to trace,through heinterpretationf various exts anddiverseexperi-ences, the influencesthat ed Rousseau o the ardentadvocacyof hisparticu-larpoliticalvision"(14). The particularpoliticalvision Fermonsketches iscenteredon arepublicof sentiment,a politicalcommunitywhere "emotion-ally securecitizens, confirmed n their individualandcommunalidentity,"makepossible an associationof self-rulingmen (6). She underscoresat thebeginningthat"thepoliticalproblem"of genderand womenfigures promi-nently in heranalysis:as mothers,which is to say, as agentsandobjectsofemotional andmaterial ntimacy,women are pivotalto Rousseau'sproject(4). Readilyacknowledginghis ambivalenceabout women's effect on men,Fermon argues that the family's transformativepotential depends onwomen's domestication:as creaturesof passionateexcess, theywill alwaysthreaten o disruptcivic life.FermonsuggeststhatRousseau'spoliticalvisionhad its real-life counter-part n a reformprojectoriented oward he aristocratic ousehold.Motivatedby a twofoldantipathyowardemergingbourgeoisvaluesand thecorruptionof ancien regime France,Rousseauturnedto the relativelyself-sufficientpatriarchaldemesnefor a model of domesticsociality:"this is because thenobilityalonecombinesboth aninclusive householdand an ethos of respon-sibilityto anentitymoresignificant hanthe individual"28). Thearchetypeis Clarens,which represents ess an ideal than"a difficultaccommodationmeant to correctthe worst abusesof materialand social life in the ancienregime" 29). Amongitscorrectionsare amarriageunencumbered y sexualpassion,aparentalpedagogyoriented oward he reformof character ndthe


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acceptanceof socialroles,anextendedcommunity hatavoidsoverlyprivat-ized interestsandidentities,andanautarkic ystemof production hatmini-mizes marketnfluence.Unpersuadedhat he heroine'sdeathsignalsfailure,Fermonreads t insteadas"thereal and ragiccost"thatJulie(and"thosewhoneed her") must pay, as well as a sign of a successful familial reform:"institutionalizationrecedes oss,"she observes n comparingJulie'sdeathto thedisappearance f the legislator n the Social Contract 52).Fermon'scentraltext is thusLa NouvelleHeloise, but she elucidates itsreformistmessageby drawingon a wide rangeof work. She reads inEmile,forexample,confirmation f atheoryof politicsthataimsfor"accommoda-tion rather han revolution":moralfreedomdependson thedevelopmentofjudgmentandunderstanding, otonany particularorm of rule(117). Whilethe family's absence or, rather, ts eliminationin Emile might give pause,Fermonsees this as a "negative trategy"n pursuitof the same educationalend:to promoteproperlysocial sentimentsby reining n passion(114). TheSocial Contractalsopointsto familialsociabilityas thelinchpinof self-ruleand group cohesion by emphasizingthe importanceof procreativeabun-dance,the need forpatrioticattachment,heperniciouseffects ofpartialasso-ciations,and the significanceof mores(the "onlylaw Rousseauultimatelythinksis important"105]). Herargumentaboutdomestic reform husjoinsananalysisof Rousseau'sexplicitfamilialdepictionswith anexplorationofthe broader ocial, emotional,and economic contextsin which his familieswouldappear.And as indicated n Fermon's ntroduction, hese contextualfigurationsarenot limited to Rousseau'swritings.Readingin his appealsto Rome andGenevaan attentionto real-worlddesigns, Fermonsuggests that he offers"whathe believesto be sound,practicaladvice basedon his opinionas a stu-dent of historyand apoliticalreformer,not asaprophetorphilosopher"34).Thus,she includes a discussionof Calvin'ssixteenth-centurynitiativescon-cerningmarriageandAugustus's ntroduction f the JulianLaws inresponseto Rome'scrises of civic and maritalmores.These events areimportant orunderstandingRousseau's approach,Fermonsuggests, because they sub-stantiate he importanceof state interventiono the maintenanceof republi-can families while offeringa method to "transferl]oyaltyandpowerfromthe clan to the state"(80). In otherwords,thesejuridicalreforms sketchalogic anda historicalpracticeof preciselywhat Rousseau'spoliticalvisionwould entail.In a similar ashionFermoncontextualizesRousseau'sattraction oagrar-ian communalism through discussions of Cato's exemplary virtue andQuesnay'sagrarian apitalism.Thelatter-together withEnglishindustrial-ization-constitute developmentalpossibilitiesagainstwhich Rousseauwas


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reacting. Fermon borrowsfrom Walt Rostow to characterizeRousseau'sattemptedreform of the aristocratichousehold as "a prophylacticto thetake-offmodel"(132). Shethen assesses thepatriarchalismf thispreventa-tive by perusinghistoricaldebates on authority.The dilemmaof state andpaternalpowersketchedbyFilmer,Locke,andothersmakesRousseau'soth-erwise "incomprehensible"reference oran autarkic eudal household essjarring,Fermonconcludes:hisegalitarian mpulsesneverruledoutimperfectbut extantremedies to pressingproblemsof corruptionand an ascendantbourgeoisie(155).The "politicalproblem"of women receivessome of thiscontextualizingtreatment.Fermonlinks the theme of virtuous love threading hroughLaNouvelleHeloise to contemporaneous oncerns aboutwomen'sconduct,inand outside of marriage, and concludes that the bourgeois ideal ofcompanionatemarriageand the aristocratic ealityof libertinagemotivatedRousseau's iterarycreation.Shealso findsa significantcorrelationbetweenthe contentof his reformagendaand the formthroughwhich he pursued t:novelreadingwas theculturalpracticeof thetargeted ocial classes andtheparticularpassion of women. And while casting women as "specialistsinsentimentaleducation"reflectsa generalshift in social values, she writes,Rousseaumemorialized hatroleby placingit at the centerof his literaryandpoliticaltale (46). In these ways Fermondraws on extratextual esourcestobringcoherence o hisapparently isparate ndambiguousrepresentations:unified political agendaemerges out of narrativecomplexity throughthemediationsof historicalforms.Sometimesthese mediatingmoves areabrupt.Considerthe shift fromadiscussionof Cato'spatriotismandthoughtsonhusbandry,o areiteration fRousseau'spreference or the sentimentalandpoliticalvirtuesof the aristo-cratichousehold,to agloss on the"practicallimate"surrounding ebatesonFrencheconomic development 131). These sharp urnscan be challengingand notonly to readersworried hat heanalysismightbeconflatingtwohis-torical figures-Cato the Censor and Cato the Younger-in elucidatingRousseau'sreal-world deal.A moregeneralchallengeis howto understandthe relationship between historical antecedents and textually wroughtvisions. Whetheror not one is persuaded hatRostowis a helpfulresource,this inventive possibility signals a new interpretive mperative:findingreformism nhis noveldesignsmeanssubjecting hem to the termsof histori-cal inquiry.While onemightquibblewithFermon'sparticularhoices-whyso much Rome and so little Sparta?Why Quesnayandnot Morelly?lAndwhyso little attentionothe Brennerdebates?2-the morepressingconcern swhetherthe worldbeyondthe text canoffertheremedyof unreconstructedoriginals:prototypes, ree of all narrative dornment.


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politicallyunintelligibleside of thedivide,and insofarasjuridicaland insti-tutionalstructuresderivetheir coherence from extratextual vidence, theyalwaysremainat aremovefromthe effects of gender.Theproblem, inally, snot thatFermonties gender's intelligibilityto its historical articulationbutthatshe takes historicalarticulation o be somethingthathappensoutsidetexts.On onehand,Fermon's nterest nteasingoutthepossibilitiesrepresentedby Julie, Clarens,and a readingpubliccaptivatedby themsuggests a keenawarenessof narrative's istorical ffects.On the otherhand,whatsheunder-standsto be representedhere are either iteralcorrespondences r "inexpli-cable"elisions,bothof which obscure hepracticeof narrativenterpretation:thesecondby mystifyingit, the firstby denyingthat t eventakesplace.ButFermon'sowninsightsintroduceapoliticsof interpretationhat nvitesus torethinkboth literaland imaginedtruthsand thus the interpretivemethodsthroughwhich these differencesare secured.If, as she claims, Rousseau'sgoal is to establisha republicof sentiment, henhis stateis as implicated nmetaphor s arehis unrealwomen.Andtomakepoliticalsense of hisrepubli-canismrequiresrefusinganyinterpretive hoice thatopposespassionatetopractical ntentionsandnarrativeo historicaldesigns.

THEPOLITICSOFDECEPTIONGrant s also interested n thefit between Rousseau's deals andpolitical

practice,butshedoes notpursue hisrelationshiphrougha modelof histori-cal correspondence.Her centralquestionsarewhen and how one mightjus-tify departures rom a "purelyprincipledstance,"most particularlyn therealmof politics(2).Thedepartureshat nterestherarethose associatedwithhypocrisy,adissimulatingpractice hatplaysonthegapbetweenappearanceandreality: t entailsseemingto be whatone is not orseemingtobelievewhatone does not.Grant uggeststhatthispractice s anindispensable eatureofpolitical and social life. Entertaininghis possibility forces us to confrontwhat she presentsas the uncritical-naive or optimistic-appeal to reasonand reasonablenessmadeby liberaltheorists. It also invites us to considerhow one mightmeaningfullydiscriminateamongbetterand worse ways ofbeing hypocritical.To this end, Grantintroducesthe notion of integrity,whichis theattribute f one "whocan be trusted o do therightthingeven atsome cost to himself."Hergoal is to considerthepossibilityof anethicallyunprincipledpolitics, and for this she turnsto Machiavelliand Rousseau,bothof whomappreciated"theproblematic haracter f anyattempt o con-ductpolitics honestlyandrationally"16).


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Grant hus takesherbearings rom thepolitical insightsthatMachiavelliand Rousseaushared,and these arenot,as some readerswould haveit, bestcharacterizedas a civic republicanbent. She pointsinstead to theirsimilarunderstandingf dependence,passion,and"pressuresowardevil" asconsti-tutive featuresof all politicalrelations(13). Extensivelysurveying he kindsof deception that Machiavelliendorses, she concludes that his convictionconcerningthe exploitationof principlesderives from an understanding fboth theparticularnatureof political relationshipsand themoregeneralten-dencies of men. Human railtyas much asunadorned uplicitywarrants ec-ognizing andusing the fact thatmen will regularlybreakfaith,and in rela-tions of dependencewithuncertain llies,manipulations neededto motivateactionor acquiescence.Grant anvasses his familiar errainoargue orthecomprehensivenatureof Machiavelli'sconviction:deception s neithera last resortnor anunfortu-nate byproductof particularregimes but an essential political tool. Thisapplies equally to situations in which people's particular nterestswouldappearto coincide. HereGrantaddressesthe alternatives epresentedby amodel of economicrationality,whose accountof negotiated rade ntroducesthepossibilityof anhonestlyself-interestedpoliticsanda realpolitikmodelof openlypursuednationalnterest.TurningoMandragolaasastudy npsy-chological and ethical affects, she shows how outcomes that benefiteverycharacter n the play requiredeception:individual satisfactiondependsonmaintainingheappearance f propriety."In hissituation,"heobserves,"toask why hypocrisyis necessaryis to ask why law,religion, andhonor-orpublic moralityaltogether-are necessary" 48). The inevitabilityof decep-tion arisesfrom the simple fact that men are often immoralandyet societycannotdo withoutmorality.So, too, it arises from the less simplerealitythatpoliticaldiscoursemakesappeals o vanity,ambition,and otherpassionsnotreducible o arationalcalculationof interest,and thispassionaterealm "cre-ate[s] opportunities or hypocriticalmanipulation"52). The full force ofthese observations s achievedwhen Grant racesout their mplications or ademocraticpolitics:becausetheprinciplesof egalitarianism ndgovernmen-talaccountabilityncreasebothdependenceand the value of candor,hypoc-risy is aptto be especially prevalent n democracies.

Rousseau entersthe analysisafter thepoliticalstagehas been set. Grantinsists thathis political prescriptions o notmandatearighteous nflexibilitybut rathera combinationof "purityand the pragmatism"hat characterizesintegrity(61). She elaborates his point by contrastingMoliere's charactersand Rousseau'scritiqueof themin theLetterto d'Alembert.The contrast scapturedn a two-by-twomatrix hatcategorizesmoderateand moralistver-sions of integrityandhypocrisy.The moderate ategoriescomprisedegener-


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ate andgenuinewaysof beingmorallyflexible:while bothtypesexhibit thepracticalmorality characteristicof "cool-headed,tolerant,and forgivingpeacemakers,"hedegenerateone is marredby a complacentandultimatelycravenwillingnessto rationalizenjustice 89).Themoralistcategories ntro-duce similardistinctionsbetweenways of strictlyadhering o principle: hedegenerateandgenuine typesareequallypassionatemoralists,butonly thelatterremainsdisinterested,unsanctimonious, nd thusconcernedabout us-tice. Grantemphasizes that Rousseau intended the genuine moralist-hisown ideal of integrity-to impressandinspirehis readers:"it is preciselyRousseau'saim as an authorto alter the objects of our admirationand toimproveourmoral udgments" 78).But whether genuine moralism representsa viable political positionremains unclear:Grantsuggests that its premiseof a naturalgoodness andunityand tstendency oencouragewithdrawalaiseconcerns.She alleviatesthemby reassessingtheuncompromising spectof the ideal.Observing hatboth Considerationson the Government f Poland and the Social Contractincludeprudentialpolitical prescriptions t odds with Rousseau'sprinciplesof egalitarianismand political freedom,she suggests thathis ideal is lessaboutmoralrigiditythan t is about a consequentialist alculation.Further-more,hisreflectionsonlyingsketchapracticalmorality nwhich a clearcon-science dependson pursuing ust ends. In these ways, Rousseau'swritingssupportthe possibilityof justifiable political deceptioneven as they makeproblematicwhatthe termsof this ustificationmightbe: he both ntroducesadistinctionbetweenmoraland factualtruthand "seems to severthe connec-tion betweenthe two"(123).

Turning o theexamplesofjustified deceptionrepresentedby thelegisla-tor,Emile's tutor,and Wolmar,Grant dentifiesin all threean orientationtoward securing their deceived beneficiaries' freedom. This "distinctiveunderstandingof freedom,"she elaborates,concernsthe "absence of per-sonal dependence,that is, the absence of subjectionto the privatewill ofanother ndividual" 132). And although t is producedthroughmanipula-tion, this freedomis not necessarilyillusoryinasmuchas it allows for "thepsychologicalexperienceof autonomy" 134). The project might well failand it might be unacceptablypaternalistic,but one must neverthelesscon-frontthe particularqualityof Rousseauian reedom:"self-consciousness ssimply not a necessaryrequirement"138).Havingestablished hatdeceptiondoes notperse compromise ndividualintegrity,Grant takes up Rousseau'sown bleak estimationof how infre-quentlyhisprudential oliticssucceed.She tiesthisbleak visiontohisunder-standingof a human endency oward orruption.A retracingof theFirst andSecond Discourse's devolutionsprovides opportunities o reiterateone of


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Grant'scentralclaims, thatdependence-social, sexual,andeconomic-isthe sourceof all that threatensntegrity.And the greatestof these is social:"Dependenceon opinion,"Grantconcludes,"emergesas the true source ofcorruption" 153). Because the mechanismof this dependence is amourpropre,the relativesentimentof self-love tiedto vanity, ealousy,and ambi-tion,thekeysite of corruptions inmen'sminds:"The ransformationf nat-uralman, free and good, into social man,dependentandcorrupt, s funda-mentallya psychologicaltransformation"154). Thereason forRousseau'spessimismbecomes clearer:corruption an be avoidedonly by avoidingthesocialdependencies hatappear o be thenecessaryconditionof ourpoliticallives. But Grant nsists that thisdire conclusion also suggestsa strategy ormaintainingpersonalintegrityinasmuch as the dependencerelationsthatRousseaudepictsare not of apiece: "Dependence hat s just andalso eithermutual,impersonal,or personalbuthidden,can actuallynurturentegrity"(167).What,then,are the lessons to be drawn orlivingethicallyin the modempoliticalage?Insofaras Rousseau'swritingsdepictthesimultaneouspursuitof moralpurityandprudential ompromise, heysubstantiate hepossibilityof anethicaldepartureromprinciples.Whatpreservesmoralpurityare thecharacterand sentiments of the one who would depart.Thus, the terms ofintegritypertainultimatelyto how we feel: "Rousseau ssues a challengetoopena pathto theheart hrough hesophisticatedandsophisticmoral wran-gling of the modem age. And because the heartspeaks clearly and with avoice commonto all,his ideal does notcollapseintothepure subjectivismofauthenticity.t has agenuinemoralcore" 174).ThischaracterizationchoesGrant'searlier claim that self-consciousnessis not germaneto Rousseau'sideal.Italsohighlights hedecidedlyun-Machiavellian ositionreadersmustassume to find that ideal viable: the clear and common voice of the heartspeaksneitherto foxes nor to lions. Orrather,f it speaks,it speaksonly ofopportunitiesormanipulation.Butcouldthisindicate hatGrant'sRousseauis more Machiavellian hantheoriginal?Afterall, she insiststhathis goal ispreciselyto changethewaysreaderschoose their deals:he teaches that"wemust learntojudge peoplemoreby the heart hanby thehead,moreby theirsentimentsandcharacter hanbytheirprinciplesandactions" 84). In a worldcharacterized ypersistentdeception, t is difficult oimagineamore Machi-avellianprojectthan one that would sentimentalizepoliticaljudgment.To entertainthis possibility is to confront the profoundambiguityofGrant'sown conclusions. While she neverdirectlyidentifies this sentimen-talizationas a Machiavellianmoment in Rousseau'sargument,neitherdoesshe close the gap betweenthe subjectiveexperienceof integrityandobjec-tive, worldlypower.Indeed,she solidifies thatgapby figuringdependence,


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108 POLITICALHEORYFebruary001

passion, and "pressures oward evil"-the definitive features of a politicsunderstood o be insistentlyhypocritical-as fundamentallypsychologicalconditions.Whether t is thefeelingof autonomyortheperceptionof a com-mon interest,the characterswho exemplifyRousseau's ideal do so in theirheartsandminds,even as theyremaindeeplyidentifiedwith apoliticalsoci-ety overwhich most of themexertno control.Grant s of course awareof thisirony, but by expressing it as a problemof Rousseau's paternalism,sheobscureshow her own interpretive esignsevers thedeterminants f ethicalaction from theworld in whichthataction must be taken.Weare thusled tothe conclusionthat he ethicalpossibilitiesofmoder politicsapplyprimarilyto affective states.Consider her reading of the Second Discourse, which follows awell-known line-that dependence breeds corruption-to arrive at theless-knownconclusionthatthiscorruptingdependence s bestunderstoodasa functionof internaldevelopments.Thereis, of course,nothingextraordi-naryaboutemphasizing hesignificanceof amourpropren Rousseau'stale.What s notable s Grant'sgentlypersistentreiterationhat t must be under-stood separatelyfrom social and economic developments.In otherwords,sociopoliticalinequality-whether shapedbyjuridical,economic,or sexualdifference-is notunjust n and of itself but n itspsychologicaleffects. Likehis commitmentto freedom, Rousseau's egalitarianismbears ultimatelyuponour nnerconditions.As aresult, usticebecomesa functionof our sen-timentsandperceptionsandpertainsonly secondarily o economic orpoliti-cal arrangements. n these ways, Grant'sinterpretationurges us to lookbeyondthe mereappearance f unequalprivilege,power,andcontrol ograsptherealityrepresentedby character nddisposition.So we need not be trou-bled by the disparate reedoms Rousseau sketchesfor his virtuous womenand virtuousmen because in everycase we arepresentedwith anhonestandadmirable haracter:heycanall be trusted o "dotheright hing,"nevermindhow differentthose things mightbe.Likehisexemplarywomen,Rousseau'ssocial contractors resenta strik-ing exampleof howminimallyhis genuinemoralismdependson real-worldeffects: their integrityas citizens remains undiminishedby the fact that,beneficentlydupedby the legislator, hey "do notunderstandwhatthey aredoing"(137). What,then, are the implicationsfor those who would wieldactualpower, n andon thepoliticalworld?Is it enoughthat n maneuveringthrough he "moralwranglingof themoder age,"Wolmar,Emile'stutor,andlawgiversmeanwell?Again,Grant's onclusionsare ess thanclear.Sheelu-cidates "three distinct standards"-truth, justice or morality, and free-dom-that mightobtain nevaluatingheirapparent eceptions:"'Beneficialmanipulation' eems to violatethe first and thethird n the name of promot-


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ing the second. It sacrificestruthand freedomto promote ustice or virtue"(128). We neverreada directaccountof what usticemightbe orentail,evenasGrantreflects on the "seriousabuse" o which thisstandard emainsopen.Butinconcludingthat ts "final est" s "themoralcharacter ndhappinessofthe 'ruled,"' heappearsosuggestthatRousseauianjusticehasnothing o dowithdemocracy;rather,t haseverything o do withmaintainingdemocracyas a stateof mind,perhapsmindlessness(131).Are we thento conclude that the integrityof those who would exerciseactual political power depends on their antidemocraticconvictions? Nodoubt,some readerswill find this a curiousconclusion to drawfrom Rous-seau. But it becomes intelligiblethroughan interpretivepracticethat con-structs ntegrityas a qualityof heartand head whose connectionto politicalpracticesandinstitutions s at best oblique.Thus, in Grant'sdescriptionofRousseau's egislatorasa Machiavellianactorenmeshed ndependencerela-tions thatnecessitatedeception,one can lose sightof the fact thathe playsnorole in actual political operations. A direct comparison betweenMachiavelli's awgiverandRousseau'smighthave made thatclear:whiletheformer s advisedto"concentrate llauthoritynhimself," he latter"doesnotandmust nothaveanylegislativeright," ven if thepeoplethemselvesshouldthinkotherwise.3This introduceshepossibilitythatpreciselythelegislator'spoliticaldisenfranchisement uthorizeshis deceptions.But thatinterpreta-tion awaitsananalysisof sovereignty,andRousseau'sprincipledustificationof powerremainsextraneous o ananalysisof integrity.This is not to say that Rousseau'selusive argumenton themoral truthofmajoritarianoutcomes could not benefit from Grant'sinquiry into howrepublicansunderstandhemselvesto "do therightthing."On the contrary,Rousseau'svision of directdemocracyseems to offer a prime interpretiveopportunity:s his modal votera prudentmoderate,a moderatemoralist,orsomethingelse altogether?But Grantchooses not to explore the integrityassociatedwith directpolitical participationn the state.Given theformthatIhaveimposed nreading hese threebooks-that interpretive ractice s itselfapoliticalact-it is difficultto avoidassessingthischoice in lightof Grant'sownpoliticalinsightsandconvictions: s it anexampleof ajust deception?Isan interpretationhat transformsMachiavelli's"dangerouspolitical reali-ties" into a problemof psychological corrosionoccluding as much as itreveals? But to answer these questionswould requireassessing authorialintentions,and while Grantoffershertypologiesof integrity o facilitate ustsuch assessments, it seems more prudentto stick to appearances.And itappears hat n choosingto figureRousseau'sgeneralwill as aunityof inter-est andsentiment,butnotasaunityof practice,Grant ustainsaninterpretive


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NOTES1. JeanMorelly'sCode de la Nature(1755) includedan attackon propertyvery similar to

Rousseau's,aswell asmakingmoralclaims fora social orderbasedonreciprocating nd nterde-pendent productiverelations.2. RobertBrenner's"Agrarian lass Structure ndEconomicDevelopment nPre-IndustrialEurope,"originally published in 1976 in Past and Present, challenged commercializationaccountsof Europeandevelopmentand nitiated ong-runningdebatesabout hesignificanceof(village and demesnelevel) class relations n thetransition romfeudalto capitalisteconomies.See T. H. Aston and CharlesPhilpin,eds., TheBrennerDebate (Cambridge,UK: CambridgeUniversityPress, 1985).3. See Discourses on the First TenBooks of TitusLivius,I, chap. ix, in Machiavelli,ThePrince and theDiscourses(New York:RandomHouse, 1950), 138, andRousseau,Du ContratSocial, II, chap.vii, in OeuvresCompletesde Jean-JacquesRousseau,ed. BernardGagnebinand MarcelRaymond(Paris:Gallimard,Bibliothequede la P16iade,1959-1995), vol. 3, 383.

ElizabethWingrove eachespolitical theoryandfeminist thoughtat the UniversityofMichigan,AnnArbor.She haspublishedworkon Rousseau,Althusser,andArendt.

authenticity rousseau

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