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Autochthony: Local orGlobal? New Modes in theStruggle over Citizenshipand Belonging in Africa andEurope

Bambi Ceuppens1 and Peter Geschiere21Catholic University of Leuven, IMMRC, Tiensestraat 102, 3000 Leuven, Belgium;email: [email protected];

2University of Amsterdam, ASSR, Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1012 CX Amsterdam,The Netherlands; email: [email protected]

Annu. Rev. Anthropol.2005. 34:385407

The Annual Review ofAnthropology is online atanthro.annualreviews.org

doi: 10.1146/annurev.anthro.34.081804.120354

Copyright c 2005 byAnnual Reviews. All rightsreserved

0084-6570/05/1021-0385$20.00

Key Words

citizenship, nation-building, belonging, strangers, New Right

Abstract

The past 15 years have brought an upsurge of autochthony. It hasbecome an incendiary political slogan in many parts of the Africancontinentas an unexpected corollary of democratization and the new

style of development policies (by-passing the state and decentral-

ization). The main agenda of the new autochthony movements isthe exclusion of supposed strangers and the unmasking of fake

autochthons, who are often citizens of the same nation-state. How-ever, Africa is no exception in this respect. Intensified processes of

globalization worldwide seem to go together with a true conjunc-ture of belonging (T.M. Li 2000) and increasingly violent attempts

to exclude allochthons. This article compares studies of the up-

surge of autochthony in Africa with interpretations of the rallyingpower of a similar discourse in Western Europe. How can the same

discourse appear natural in such disparate circumstances? Recentstudies highlight the extreme malleability of the apparently self-

evident claims of autochthony. These discourses promise the cer-tainty of belonging, but in practice, they raise basic uncertainties

because autochthony is subject to constant redefinition against new

others and at ever-closer range.

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Contents

INTRODUCTION.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 386

COLONIAL ROOTS:AUTOCHTHONY AND

FRENCH RULE IN THE

SUDAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 387

AUTOCHTHONY IN THEPOS TC OLONY.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 8 9Cameroon: Autochthony Versus

National Citizenship . . . . . . . . . . 390Ivory Coast: Autochthony and the

Difficult Birth of a New

Nation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 393The Great Lake Region and

Other African Settings......... 395ALLOCHTHONS BETWEEN

ETHNIC AND CIVIC

CITIZENSHIP IN FLANDERS . 397C O N C L U S I O N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 0 2

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this article is to explore the recent

upsurge of the notion of autochthony

with its implicit call for excluding strangers(allochthons), whoever they may beas a

political slogan with virulent undertones indifferent parts of the world. This upsurge

points to a general obsession with belongingthat seems to be the flip side of the intensi-

fying processes of globalization. Comparing

autochthony with the more widespread no-tion of indigenous peoples reveals certain

ambiguities inherent in this volatile quest forbelonging and for limiting the ranks of those

who lay claim to be real citizens.Autochthony and indigenous go back

to classical Greek history and have similar im-plications. Autochthony refers to self andsoil. Indigenous means literally born in-

side, with the connotation in classical Greekof being born inside the house. Thus,

both notions inspire similar discourses on theneed to safeguard ancestral lands against

strangers who soil this patrimony, as well

as on the right of first-comers to special pro-tection against laterimmigrants. Nonetheless,

these two terms have followed separate trajec-

tories, with different repercussions for issuesof belonging today. Over the past decades, the

notion of indigenous peoples has acquired anew lease of life with truly global dimensions,

especially since the founding of the UnitedNations Working Group on Indigenous Pop-ulations (1982), representing groups from all

six continents. The notion of autochthonyhas had a more limited spread. During the

1990s, it became a burning issue in many partsof Africa, inspiring violent efforts to exclude

strangersespecially in francophone areas,

but spilling over into anglophone countries.During roughly the same period it became a

key notion in debates on multiculturalism and

immigration in several parts of Europe, no-tably Flemish Belgium and the Netherlands.1

The spread of the notion into Western con-texts is of particular interest. Most Western-

ers think of indigenous peoples as otherswho live in far-flung regions and whose cul-

tures can only survive if they receive spe-cial protection, but the epithet of autochthon

is claimed by important groups in the West

itself. This term thus highlights the promi-nence that the obsession with belonging and

the exclusion of strangers have assumed inday-to-day politics worldwide, in the North

as much as in the South.The new, global dynamics of the discourse

on autochthony cantherefore serve as a strate-

gic entry point for understanding the intrigu-ing intertwining of globalization with inten-

sified struggles over belonging and exclusion.The New World Order, announced by Pres-

ident Bush, Sr., and others at the end of thecold war, seems to be marked less by freely cir-

culating cosmopolitans than by explosions ofcommunal violence and fierce attempts at ex-clusion. Appadurai (1996) signaled some years

1Recently, Umberto Bossis Lega Nordin Italy has adoptedthe term as well. Redefining its other from the southernItalian to the allochthonous immigrant (especially fromNorth Africa), it increasingly adopts the term autochthonto refer to its own people.

386 Ceuppens Geschiere


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ago that globalization and the undermining of

the nation-state inspire a vigorous produc-tion of locality. Meyer & Geschiere (1999)

characterized globalization as a dialectic offlow and closure. In a seminal contribution

based on research in Indonesia on the poli-tics of indigenous peoples, Tanja Murray Li

(2000) evokesa global conjuncture of widelydifferent trends that all converge toward agrowing concern with belonging. Neoliberal

economics, which inspire new developmentpolicies of by-passing the state and de-

centralization; political liberalization, whichturns questions like who can vote where?

into burning issues; global concern with eco-

logical degradation; the strong interest in the West in disappearing culturesall these

trends seem to be working toward a de-

fense of local roots. This conjuncture alsocreates great uncertainty and intense doubt.Belonging promises safety, but in practice it

raises fierce disagreement over who really

belongsover whose claims are authenticandwhose are not.

Two points stand out with some urgencyfrom the literature discussed below. First is

the pointmade most explicitly for Africa byAchille Mbembe (2001, p. 283; 2002, p. 7) and

AbelMaliq Simone (2001, p. 25)that no-

tions such as autochthony or indigenous ap-pear to defend a return to the local, but in

practice are more about access to the global.It may seem logical to equate autochthony

with a celebration of the local and of clo-

sure against global flows; yet, in practice itis often directly linked to processes of glob-

alization. Simone (2001, p. 25) is correct toinsist that . . . the fight is not so much over

theterms of territorial encompassment or clo-sure, but rather over maintaining a sense of

open-endedness. What is at stake is oftenlessacloserdefinitionofthelocalthanastrug-gle over excluding others from access to new

avenues to riches and power.A second point is the surprising elasticity

of autochthony discourses, allowing for con-stant shifts and redefinitions, but also making

this discourse a somewhat empty one. Simi-

lar discourses, inspiring almost identical slo-gans, can have great mobilizing power in ex-

tremely different contexts, from present-day

Africa to Europe. Studies that place the no-tion in a longer historical perspective (Arnaut

2004, Bayart et al. 2001, Geschiere & Nyam-njoh 2000, Socpa 2003) show how easily au-

tochthony discourses can switch from oneother to the next one, without losing their

credibility. This may explain their great re-

silience in the face of modern changes, eas-ily adapting to the constant redrawing of bor-

ders that seem to be inherent to processes ofglobalization. The flip-side is a certain fuzzi-

ness. In any given situation, who can claimautochthony may appear to be self-evident.

Yet, any attempt to define the autochthonous

community in more concrete terms provokes

fierce disagreements and raises nagging sus-picion about faking. Indeed, autochthonydiscourse is of a segmentary nature: Belong-

ing tends to be constantly redefined at ever-closer range. It is precisely this emptinessan

identity with no particular name and no spec-

ified history, only expressing the claim to havecome first, which is always open to contest

that can give this notion such very violentimplications.

Below follows a brief discussion of the ge-

nealogy of autochthony in Africanotablyits role in the imposition of French colonial

rule, a crucial link to its current upsurge onthe continent. Next we discuss its new dy-

namics in postcolonial Africa in the 1990s, inthe context of what can be termed the new

politics of belonging, using Cameroon, Ivory

Coast, and the Great Lakes Region in CentralAfrica as specific examples. We conclude with

a brief comparison with the flowering of au-tochthony discourses in Europe, particularly

in Belgian Flanders.

COLONIAL ROOTS:AUTOCHTHONY AND FRENCHRULE IN THE SUDAN

Like endogenes, the term autochtonos had pos-

itive connotations in classical Greek. The

www.annualreviews.org Autochthony: Local or Global? 387


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Athenians justified their claim to superiority

over other Greeks by emphasizing that onlythey were truly autochthons of their area.

To them, moreover, their autochthony ex-plained their natural propensity for democ-

racy (Loraux 1996). Yet Nicole Loraux showsalso that this defense of rootedness was para-

doxically balanced by a celebration of a fun-damental alterity in the myths, highlightingthe role of strangers as founders of the society.

We will come back to both these aspects.The term never gained wide currency in

English. The Oxford English Dictionary de-fines autochthony, as son of the soil but lists

only historical examples for this meaning; in-

terestingly, more recent etymologies refer toits secondary usage in geology and botany (as

in autochthonous rock formations or plants).

Jean and John Comaroff (2001) pick up thisusage in an article on the widespread panicover a huge fire on the Cape Peninsula, which

destroyed South Africas cherished heritage

offynbos(a unique plant community) that fedinto the national preoccupation over the post-

Apartheid invasion of aliens from otherparts of Africa. The Comaroffs see this sur-

prising convergence as a possible explanationfor the haunting power of the autochthony

discourse in current contexts, emphasizing

its naturalizing capacity, as a naturalizingallegory of collective being-in-the-world,

that makes it seem . . . the most authentic,the most essential of all modes of connection

(pp. 64849).

In the French version, now prevalent infrancophone Africa, autochtones are people,

not plants or rocks. First introduced by theFrench at the time of the colonial conquest

of Sudan in the late nineteenth century, theconcept itself was envisaged as playing a vital

role in categorizing these new subjects to aidin adminstering these vast, newly conqueredareas. For the administrator and ethnogra-

pher Maurice Delafosse, for instance, laterto become a towering figure in organizing

French rule in West Africa, autochthony wasa kind of first criterion in his seminal three-

volume Haut-Senegal-Niger (1912). He used

it as a first step in categorizing the daz-zling variety ofindigenes: Some indigeneswere

autochthons, whereas others definitely were

not (Delafosse 1912, p. 280; Arnaut 2004,p. 207). His emphasis on this distinction was

derived from the politique des races, a fixedprinciple for setting up a colonial administra-

tion during the early decades of French rule(see Suret-Canale 1964, p. 103). Unlike the

British with their Indirect Rule, which con-

centrated on finding realchiefs, French pol-icy, at least initially, was to by-pass chiefs (who

might prove troublesome) in favor of homo-geneous cantons, populated by the same race;

hence, ruling immigrant groups had to be dis-tinguished from true autochtones. In practice,

however, the French as well soon resorted

to involving local chiefs in the administra-

tion of the new colonies (see Crowder 1964,Lombard 1967, Suret-Canale 1964). Indeed,in spite of Delafosses determined search forautochtones, in line with the politique des races,he shows himself in practice to be more in-

terested in mobile groups who had created

larger political units. For instance, he devotesnearly 40 pages to the Peulhe is clearly

fascinated by their peregrinations through-out West Africa and their reputation as em-

pire builders, whereas most autochthonous

groupsreceive only a brief mention (Delafosse1912; see Triaud 1998). Also notewor-

thy is Delafosses somewhat condescendinglanguage for these autochthonous groups,

describing them as malheureux (Delafosse1912, p. 238).

This paradox of looking for autochthons

as an anchor for the administration while atthe same time treating them as some sort of

lesser group became even more pronouncedas the autochthon/non-autochthon distinc-

tion became sanctioned under French rule.In many of the societies in the Senegal-Niger

area that Delafosse described, a complemen-

tary opposition between people of the landand ruling groups, who claimed to have

come in from elsewhere, dominated local pat-terns of organization. Thus, the chief of the

land formed (and still forms) a kind of ritual



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impelled by strong feelings from below. Some

authors (Geschiere & Gugler 1998, Monga1995, Vidal 1991) discuss the proliferation of

funeral rituals, turning the burial at home(that is, in the village of origin) into a key mo-

ment in the contest over belonging. Otherspoint to struggles over land (Lentz 2003 on

N. Ghana/Burkina Faso) or the staging of rit-ual associations (Austen 1992 on Duala) ascrucial moments in popular manifestations to

defend peoples autochthony.General studies of the autochthony ex-

plosion in postcolonial Africa are still rare. Therefore we will enlarge on the themes

outlined above with reference to three spe-

cific regional contexts: Southern Cameroon,Southern Ivory Coast, and the Great Lakes

Region.

Cameroon: Autochthony VersusNational Citizenship

The upsurge of autochthony as an incen-diary issue in Cameroon during the 1990s

has to be understood in relation to the de-termined, sometimes even desperate, strug-

gle of President Paul Biya, the former one-

party leader, to remain in power. Only towardthe end of 1990 did Biya, and then probably

under direct pressure from Francois Mitter-rand, at the time President of France, permit

freedom of association. This immediately un-leashed a proliferation of opposition parties.

The regimes stubborn refusal to meet pop-

ular demand for a National Conference in-spired the opposition to launch Operation

Ghost Town, which blocked public life inthe major cities for over a year. Biya refused

to give in and after 1992 the operation pe-tered out. The crucial presidential elections

of 1992 turned into a scandal since Biyas 38%to 35% victory over his main rival ( John FruNdi) was obtained through massive vote rig-

ging. However, Biya continued to hold outagainst all pressure, his party won all subse-

quent elections, and the recent presidentialelection (October 2004) gave him a landslide

victory (more than 70%) over Fru Ndi (still

his main rival ), who this time won only 17%of the vote. Biyas capacity for political sur-

vival is indeed impressive, all the more so

since this was taking place in the midst of adeep economic crisis. This regime is gener-

ally counted among the most troubling exam-ples of the criminalization of the state (see

Bayart et al. 1999), giving the country a topposition on the list of the worlds most cor-

rupt countries. Not only is Biya almost totally

lacking in personal charisma, he has also be-come increasingly invisible to the population,

spending much of his time abroad and lim-iting his public appearances to a minimum.

This begs the question as to how he and his

team nonetheless managed to completely out-maneuver the opposition, which had seemed

in such a strong position in the early 1990s.

For the authors quoted below one obviousanswer lies in the regimes success at playingthe autochthony card. Indeed, Cameroon of-

fers a prime example of the effectiveness that

autochthony slogans can acquire in nationalpolitics.

Geschiere & Nyamnjoh (2000) show howthe regime used the growing fear among au-

tochthons in the core economic areas of theSouthwest Province and Douala city of being

outvoted under the new, democratic constel-

lation by more numerous immigrants fromthe highlands of the Northwest and West

Province (Bamenda and Bamileke; see alsoBayart et al. 2001). After the 1996 munic-

ipal elections, the government actively sup-ported large-scale and quite violent demon-

strations by autochthons in Douala, who

were protesting that Bamileke had won elec-tion to mayor on an opposition ticket in 4 of

the6 communesof the city. The demonstratorsslogans were all too clear: The came-no-goes

(the evocative pidgin term for immigrants)should go home and vote where they really

belonged. The government defended its sup-

port for this viewpoint with reference to thenew Constitution (1996), which emphasizes

the need to protect the rights of minoritiesand indigenes. There is a telling contrast

here between this and the earlier Constitution



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of 1972, at the high tide of nation-building,

which emphasized the right of any Cameroo-nian to settle anywhere in the country.

The regimes support for new-fangled eliteassociations created another arena for conflict

over belonging and autochthony (Nyamnjoh& Rowlands 1998). Again, there is a strik-

ing reversal of former policies. Under one-party rule, any form of association outsidethe party was strictly discouraged. But af-

ter the onset of democratization, the regimeeven obliged regional elites (who were mostly

civil servants and therefore in the pay of thegovernment) to form their own associations,

often with ostensible cultural aims, but in

practice with the firm order to go home andcampaign for the Presidents party. These re-

gional associations thus offered a welcome

channel by which to mobilize votes andneutralize the effects of multipartyismallthe more effective since they also served

to exclude elites who were not really au-

tochthonous to the area, thereby blocking po-litical participation by allogenes who mostly

supported the opposition parties.4 Konings(2001) describes how effective this tactical

mix of support by the regime to elite asso-

ciations and minority groups, coupled witha general emphasis on belonging, has been

in dividing the anglophone opposition thathad seemed to form a solid front in the

early 1990s. In subsequent years, the South- wests autochthons (Anglophones), just as

fearful as the (francophone) Douala of be-

ing overwhelmed by come-no-go immigrants,became the regimes staunchest supporters

(see also Konings & Nyamnjoh 2003).All this turmoil provoked a fierce debate

among academics and other intellectuals overthe rights ofautochtones versus allogenes. The

Cameroonian review La Nouvelle Expressiondevoted its May 1996 issue to a seminal

4See Geschiere & Nyamjoh 2000 and Konings 2001 onthe Association of the Elites of the Tenth Provinceanimagined province (Cameroon has only nine provinces),proclaimedby eliteswho feel excluded frombelongingany-

where else.

overview of competing visions on this burning

topic. While several contributors (e.g., NgijolNgijol, Bertrand Toko, and Philip Bissek)

warned of the dangers of using discourseson autochthony for political ends, the con-

tribution by Roger Nlep of exactly the oppo-site purport was to attain a central position

in the debates in Cameroon. His theory ofle village electoralargues that integration isthe central issue in Cameroonian politics, and

peoplecanonly be fully integrated in theplacewhere they live if there is not un autre chez soi

(another home). Therefore, if a person runsfor office in Douala and still defends the in-

terests of his village elsewhere, this must be

considered as political malversation. Thereis a clear relation here to the regimes ma-

nipulation of voters lists, telling people to go

homei.e., to the villageto vote.5

However, also emerging from these de-

bates were other notions on belonging, lessdirectly linked to the vicissitudes of national

politics. A crucial statement, as seminal asit is succinct, came from Samuel Eboua, aneminence grise of Cameroonian politics, in thereview Impact Tribu-Une (1995, pp. 5, 14):

Every Cameroonian is an allogene anywhere

else in the country. . . apart from where hisancestors lived and. . . where his mortal re-

mains will be buried. Everybody knows thatonly under exceptional circumstances will a

Cameroonian be buried. . . elsewhere. State-ments such as this emphasize how strongly

the Cameroonian version of autochthony op-

poses the very idea of a national citizenshipand the principle that every Cameroonian

. . .has the right to settle in any place. . ., cel-ebrated by the earlier Constitution at the time

of nation-building. Geschiere & Nyamnjoh(2000) underscore the growing emphasis, in

the context of autochthony politics, on theplace of burial as the ultimate test of be-longing. Protagonists of autochthony repeat

time and again that as long as immigrants,

5For an overview of more extreme voices (for instance onthe supposed ethnofascism of Bamileke), see Geschiere& Nyamnjoh 2000, pp. 430 ff.



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even if they are Cameroonian citizens, still

want to be buried back home in the village,it is clear that this is their home to which

they should return to vote (see also Geschiere2004b and Monga 1995 on the prolifera-

tion of neotraditional funeral rituals in thiscontext).

Similar arguments play a central role inthe confrontation between autochthons andallogenes studied by Antoine Socpa (2003) in

two very different parts of the country: thecapital YaoundeandtheExtreme Nord Province

where violence first erupted after democrati-zation. In both areas autochthony has a long

history. In Yaounde it was mainly the issue

of land, the alleged tricks whereby Bamilekeimmigrants succeeded in appropriating land

from the Beti autochthons, that had been

a source of animosity between the groupssince the time the town first became capi-tal of the colony under the French (1921).

But it was the new-style elections that made

these tensions acute. Socpa (p. 117 ff) de-scribes how the Bamileke who succeeded in

buying a plot for building continue to ad-dress the former owner as their landlord

(bailleur), whereas former owners refer totheir tenants (locataires) even though they

have sold the land. This choice of words be-

came heavy with meaning with the new styleof elections. To the landlords it was self-

evident that at these occasions their ten-ants should behave as good guests and

not vote for the opposition, i.e., not try and

rule in their landlords house. It was espe-cially the autochthonsrealization that their

guests nonetheless introduced the SDF, themain opposition party, in the heart of Beti

country (supposedly the fief of Biyas rulingparty) that led to violent confrontations in the

early 1990s. Socpa (p. 208 ff) also points outthe elusive nature of the autochthon notiondespite the emphasis it receives. In the com-

petition for political posts, autochthons takeit for granted that they should rule in their

own area, but some are apparently more au-tochthonous than others. After Biyas party

and his Beti won the 1996 municipal elections

in Yaounde, furious fights broke out betweenrival local clans who claimed the mayors po-

sition on the grounds that they were the

real autochthons. In this very bastion of au-tochthony that Yaounde remains within the

Cameroonian context, the discourse showsits segmentary character, subject as it is to

a constant tendency to redefine the realautochthon at ever closer range.

Socpas parallel study (chapters 68) of

the bloody collisions in the North betweenKotoko and Arab Choa illustrates another as-

pect of the malleability of the autochthonydiscourse. Here, in sharp contrast to any-

where else in the country, the Biya regime isnow clearly siding with the immigrants (the

Arab Choa) against the Kotoko who claim au-

tochthony. This surprising volte-face springs

from the determination on the part of theBiya regime to divide the northern bloc on

which the power of Ahidjo, Biyas predeces-

sor, was built and in which the Kotoko sultansplayed a pivotal role. Biyas shift to the Arab

Choa caused an explosion of banditismthis

is the area where les coupeurs des routesare al-ways threatening the highways (see Roitman

2004)and a series of bloody confrontationsbetween Kotoko and their former subjects.

Socpa shows just how easy it is for the gov-

ernment to reverse its arguments for deter-mined support to autochthony movements in

the South and justify its support for allogenes

in the North.

In a recent article, Geschiere (2004a)studies the vicissitudes of autochthony in yet

another part of the country: the sparsely pop-

ulated forest area of the Southeast. The articlediscusses the repercussions of the new style

of development politics, with its emphasis ondecentralization and by-passing the state.

The impact of the dramatic fall in worldcommodity prices for Cameroons main cash

crops (cacao, coffee, and cotton) and the

looming depletion of its oil reserves havemade timber a crucial export product. Thus

the Southeast, formerly the most backwardpart of the country, has become a region

of crucial importance on account of its rich



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forest resources. However, vehement oppo-

sition from global ecological movements, inthis area coupled with strongsupport from the

World Bank, against any further plunder ofthis lung of the world, led to the new forest

law (Law 94/01) of 1994, which the Cameroo-nian government agreed to only under heavy

pressure from the Bank and the IMF. As istypical in the new approach to development,the law emphasizes the role of local commu-

nities, unfortunately not further defined, ascentral stakeholders in the exploitation of the

forest and advocates far-reaching financial de-centralization. Thus, municipalities of a few

thousand inhabitants stand to receive almost

half of their taxes from logging in their areas.This insistence on redistribution and protect-

ing the community, however well-meant,

immediately set off fierce infighting over be-longing in this sparsely populated area. Localcommunities here are notoriously diffuse,

regularly splitting up according to malleable

oppositions between lineage branches. Inpractice, the village committees responsible

for managing the new community forestsare constantly at odds over accusations that

some people do not really belong. Evenkin can be unmasked as allogenes who really

belong in another village and therefore

should join the new development projectthere. Apparently there is no end to the seg-

mentary tenor of the autochthony discourse,hence its violent implications: Even within

the intimacy of these close-knit villages that

seem lost in vast tracts of almost uninhabitedforest, it has become possible to unmask

ones neighbor or relative as really being astranger.

Ivory Coast: Autochthony and theDifficult Birth of a New Nation

In Ivory Coast during the same troubled pe-

riod of democratization, the concept of au-tochthony has taken a markedly different tra-

jectory, notably in its relation to the nation. Whereas in Cameroon autochthony implies

some sort of rival for citizenship by denying

the formal equality of all citizens and defend-

ing special forms of access to the state, inIvoryCoast it refers to efforts to redefine, or even

save, the nation.In thiscountry theconcept of autochthony,

again introduced by French colonials, wasquickly appropriated by local spokesmen. One

of the first signs of a new local elan was thefoundation, as early as 1934, of an associa-tion calling itself Association de Defense des

Interetsdes Autochtones de Cote dIvoire (seeArnaut 2004, p. 208; Dozon 2000a, p. 16). At

that time, Senegalese and Dahomean clerksoccupying the lower ranks of the colonial ad-

ministration were the main target for Ivorian

autochthony. However, soon they were re-placed by other strangers in the self-

definitionof autochthons.From the1920son-

ward, cocoa production in the southern partof the colony was a magnet for immigrantsfrom the North who first came as laborers, but

soon managed to establish their own farms.

After independence in 1960, this immigrationbecame one of the mainstays in the miracle

ivoirien, thespectacular flowering of thecoun-trys economy. Both Dozon (2000a,b) and

Arnaut (2004) mention the role of PresidentHouphouet-Boignys Pan-African ideas in de-

liberatelyencouraging immigrants to push the

frontier of cocoa production ever furtherinto the South. Local communities were en-

couraged to grant land to enterprising immi-grants. Chauveau (2000, p. 107) explains how

the autochthons main chance of continuingto profit from their original rights was to hang

on to their role as tuteurs, which would allow

them to ask for regular gifts. Over time, asthe value of land rose, this tutorship be-

came a permanent and conflict-ridden ne-gotiation. Immigrants came mainly from the

northern parts of the country as well as fromthe neighboring countries of Mali and espe-

cially Burkina Faso. But Dozon (2000b) em-

phasizes that southerners hardly distinguishbetween Ivorian citizens and others among

these northerners. Their shared similar char-acteristics, e.g., many are Muslims, generated

the idea ofle grand Nordfrom which all these



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people, commonly called Dyula, whether Ivo-

rians or non-Ivorians, originated. As the 1980s ended, Houpouet-Boignys

miracle seemed to stagnate. There waspressure on increasingly scarce land; world

commodity prices for cocoa collapsed; andthe economic crisis forced young urban-

ites to return to their villages. The re-sulting increase in rural tensions gave riseto a reactivation de lideologie de lautochtonie

(Chauveau 2000, p. 114). After the 1990 elec-tions, opposition parties in the South openly

accused Houphouet-Boigny of owing his re-election to the votes of strangers and even

claimed that he himself was some sort of

allochthon (Arnaut 2004, p. 216; Dozon2000a, p. 16). Developments since his death

in 1993 and more particularly since 2000 have

reinforced the fear expressed by several au-thors of a southern bloc of autochthons con-solidating against the North (Chauveau 2000,

Dozon 2000b, Losch 2000).

This broad trajectory mayin retrospect ap-pear almost inevitable. So it is all the more

important to signal that it was marked by allsorts of unexpected turns and still contains

quite different implications. For instance,Chauveau (2000) notes how the defini-

tion of the autochtone keeps shifting as the

frontier of the cocoa zone changes. Pro-duction began in the Southeast and from

there expanded gradually into the South- west and the West. In earlier phases,

Baule (in the center of the southern part

of the country) were the main migrants,moving first into the Southeast as cocoa

production took off. Cacao subsequently en-tered their own region, but they continued

to follow the cacao frontier into the westernand southwestern parts. Thus in the 1960s,

autochthony was mainly claimed by groups inthe Southwest and West (Bete, Dida) againstBaule immigrants. Terms like allogene or

immigrant have become nearly synonymouswith northerner and Baule leaders, who since

independence have been heavily representedin the national centers of power and are

now at the forefront of defending the au-

tochthony of southernersagainst northerners.But Chauveau (2000, p. 121) warns that they

are very aware that real autochthons may

at any time redirect their grievances againstthem.

The defense of autochthony becamecouched in more ideological terms after 1993

when Houpouet-Boignys successor, HenryKonan Bedie, launched the notion ofivoirite,

mainly as a way of ousting one of his main

rivals in the election for presidency, Alas-sane Ouattaraon the grounds that both

his parents came from Burkina Faso. Do-zon (2000a,b) and Arnaut (2004, chapter 3)

show that this was part of a broader ideo-logical offensive to justify the need to distin-

guish Ivoiriens de souche (trunk) from others.

Dozon speaks of an aeropage of intellectuals

and writers around Bedie, brought togetherin Curdiphe (Cellule universitaire de recherche

et de diffusion des idees et actions du president

Konan Bedie). Politique Africaine (Curdiphe

2000, pp. 6569) published extracts of a col-

loquium at this institute in which Professor

Niangoran-Bouah (the countrys first anthro-pologist, as director of the patrimoine culturel

of the Ministry of Culture) proposes a re-grouping of the ancestors of Ivorians, or

Ivorians de souche. For him, this firstly refers

to the autochthons with a mythical originandthento les autochtones sans origine mythique.

He insists, and this is clearly very importantto him, that these groups were all already set-

tled in the country on March 10, 1893, when. . .Ivory Coast was born (Curdiphe 2000.

See Arnaut 2004, chapters 3 and 4, for a dis-

cussion of similar texts).In these enumerations ivoirite seems to

be consistent with the notion of a south-ern autochthony. But Dozon (2000a,b) warns

that, again, Bedies celebration of Ivoiriensde souche contained hidden subtexts. At a

deeper level, it underscores the special voca-

tion of the Baule (the group to which Bedieand Houphouet-Boigny both belonged) as

some sort of super-autochthons. As part ofthe broader Akan group (also including the

neighboring Ashanti in Ghana), the Baule



11/28

see themselves as endowed with state-forming

talents that distinguish them from othersouthern groups (such as the more seg-

mentary Bete). Thus, the idea of Ivoiriens

de souche implies a double exclusion: on the

one hand of northern immigrants, but onthe other hand of other southerners too, be-

cause they are supposedly less capable of lead-ing the nation on account of their culturalheritage.

According to Arnaut, the discourse shiftsnot only over region but also over time. In

1999, Bedie was ousted in a military coup un-der general Gue. In 2000, Laurent Gbagbo,

another southern politician (but a Bete from

the Southwest) won the election, from whichOuattara, the candidate of the North, was

again excluded. In September 2002, a military

insurgency in the North effectively split thecountry between North and South, the kindof geographical framework within which the

discourse of autochthony flourishes so well in

Cote dIvoire (Arnaut 2004, p. 240). UnderGbagbo, the idea ofivoirite acquired new im-

plications, accordingto Arnaut (2004, pp. 242,252) nowmore in tune with globalization pro-

cesses. It sets up the frontier in Bete land(rather than any Baule element) as a symbol of

thenation, butthen as a purifiedcommunity

of real Ivoirians. Arnaut (p. 254) concludes,Autochthony is. . . also a powerful discourse

for a regional minority to reinvent itself as anational majority. . . .

In Ivory Coast, autochthony may remain

more closely linked to the nation, albeit inpurified form, but there are segmentary ten-

dencies similar to those found elsewhere.Who the real autochthon is remains sub-

ject to bitter controversy, just as the Othercontinues to take on ever new guises.

The Great Lake Region and OtherAfrican Settings

Another hotbed of autochthony is the Great

Lakes Region, notably Rwanda-Burundi andthe adjacent parts of Congo (North andSouth

Kivu). Stephen Jacksons (2003) recent the-

sis on War Making in Goma, the capital

of North Kivu, is based on research sincethe late 1990s when RDC rebels, backed

by Rwandan and Ugandan troops, conqueredthis part of Congo. He speaks of . . .a break-

neck chase to exert control over fluctuatingidentity categories. . . (p. 247). His sec-

ond chapter, Making History and Migra-tory Identities, evokes a dazzling vortex ofidentities with ever-changing names and his-

torical claims. However, a recurring divid-ing line seems to be the opposition between

autochthons and allochthons; and a fixedpole in defining the latter are the deeply re-

sented Banyarwanda, Rwandophones who are

always suspected of plotting to deliver the re-gion to neighboring Rwanda. However, even

this more or less fixed beacon is ambigu-

ous: It can refer to recent Hutu refugees(who fled to Congo after the 1994 geno-cide of Tutsi in Rwanda and the subsequent

takeover by Kagame and his Tutsi army), but

also to their arch-opponents, the enigmaticBanyamulenge, whom autochthons often call

Congolese Tutsi. Jacksons study describesboth the surprising resilience of the idea of a

Congolese nation among the autochthonsof this remote part of the country and the

fierce debates over history in this context.

Where do these Banyamulenge come from?When did they settle in Congo? How can they

claim to belong here as well? Like Jackson, Jean-Claude Willame (1997) emphasizes, as

an important factor underlying these un-certainties, Mobutus volatile manipulations

of national citizenship, first promising the

Banyamulenge to recognize their Congolesecitizenship when he needed their support, and

then reneging when he looked for supportfrom other groups.

Malkkis references (1995, pp. 63 ff) toautochtonisation as a central trait in the

construction of a group history among Hutu

refugees from Burundi similarly highlight thenarrow link, albeit with a somewhat differ-

ent tenor, between the claims to autochthonyand the struggle over national citizenship.

The Hutu historical claim for autochthony



12/28

is essential to their hope of one day be-

ing liberated from domination by the Tutsi,with their false pretence of superiority. How-

ever, Malkki shows that such claims to be-ing autochthonous also have their flip side:

Hutu have to share their autochthony with Twa (Pygmies), which illustrates how easily

this notion can be associated with primi-tive, as still being in a first stage of devel-opment. There is a return here to the con-

notation that the concept acquired in thewestern Sudan, the area where the term was

first introduced to the continent by Frenchcivil servants: The almost prehuman au-

tochthons are socialized only by incoming

foreign rulers. Malkki (p. 63) is justified inemphasizing that for the Hutu refugees as

well . . .autochthony can be a double-edged

sword.Various authors stressthe centrality of pre-

occupations with autochthony in recent po-

litical developments in other parts of Africa

as well. Lentz (2003) emphasizes the longhistory of these tensions, predating colo-

nial times, in Burkina Faso and neighbor-ing parts of Ghana. But she also notes that

autochthony became an especially powerfulpolitical slogan in the 1990s, in the compe-

tition for jobs, but even more in the strug-

gle over access to land. The language ofautochthony also extends into anglophone

regions of the continent; it is not restricted totheanglophone part of Cameroon(see above),

but also penetrated into areas of North Ghana

bordering on Burkina and Togo (see Wienia2003). But even where the notions as such

are not current, similar discourses are highlymobilizing. The Comaroffs (2001) compare

the ominous upsurge of xenophobia in SouthAfrica against the makwere-kwere (African im-

migrants from across the Limpopo River) tothe obsession over autochthony elsewhere onthe continent. In reverse, their analysis of the

zombification of these makwere-kwere, thetendency to depersonalize immigrants, is ex-

tremely relevant to the autochthony examplesdiscussed above ( see also van Dijk 2003 on

Ghanaian immigrants in Botswana). Boones

(2003) challenging comparison of develop-ments in Senegal, Ivory Coast, and Ghana

shows how easily similar discourses, again

centering on the access to land, cut acrossthe border between anglophone and fran-

cophone Africa. Achim von Oppens recentHabilitationsschrift (2003) on Bounding Vil-

lages in Zambia presents a similar focus onthe paradox of exclusionist discourses on lo-

cality and belonging that manage nonethe-

less to remain open-ended and tuned in toglobalization.

In general, this upsurge of autochthony in Africa is cause for surprise. Historians and

anthropologists used to characterize Africansocieties as being oriented toward wealth-

in-people in contrast to the conception of

wealth-in-things prevailing elsewhere (see

Miller 1988; Guyer 1993, 2004). Africa wouldbe characterized by its open forms of organi-zation with special arrangementse.g., very

broad kinship terminology, adoption, formsof clientelismfor including people into lo-

cal groups. The current emphasis on au-

tochthony andlocal belongingthusrepresentsa dramatic turn toward closure and exclusion.

However, as the above analysis shows, this ap-parent closure may again be deceptive given

the extreme malleability of autochthony dis-

course. It is doubtful whether it can simply becharacterized as a retraditionalization and

a return to the village. Its exclusionary tenoris rather about limiting access to the state

and new global circuits (compare Mbembesand Simones emphasis, quoted above, on

the open-endedness of these discourses). Au-

tochthony can be presented as a rival tonational citizenship, but it can also pre-

tend to reinforce the nation (by purify-ing it). Despite its appeal to local belong-

ing as a self-evident criterion, its segmentarytenor creates nagging uncertainties in view

of the ever-present risk of being unmasked

as not really autochthonous. Indeed, its very emptiness, the elusiveness of who is

really an autochthon, gives it a dizzyquality. African examples of recent au-

tochthony movements suggest that the quest



13/28

for belonging is never-ending: promising

safety, yet raising basic insecurities.6

ALLOCHTHONS BETWEENETHNIC AND CIVICCITIZENSHIP IN FLANDERS

To what extent can the vicissitudes of au-tochthony in Africa help us gain closer insightintotheprevalenceofsimilardiscourseincon-

temporary Europe? Exponents of the Euro-pean New Right brandish exactly the same

slogans, in Denmark or France, in Englandor Italy. This convergence is especially strik-

ing for Flanders and the Netherlands, since in

Dutchthe sameterminology, centered aroundthe opposition between autochthons and

allochthons gained currency from the 1980s

onward. Obviously, the problems addressedare quite different from those of Africa to-day. How then can a similar discourse seem

to be equally self-evident and natural here?

In this final section, we turn our attention toEurope, particularly Flanders in Belgium

where the Vlaams Blok, a New Right party,has had notable success.

Autochthony discourses seem to thrivein those European countries, including Bel-

gium, that refuse to accept that they have be-

come immigration countries. In Europe, as inAfrica, this rhetoric comes from politicians

as much as from voters, but European au-tochthony discourses differ from their African

counterparts in two crucial ways. First, their

rise ties in not with the decline of national cit-

6For reasons of space we cannot address here the relationwith alternative notions of belonging that seem to feed onpeoples perception that the continent is in crisis. Notably,a comparison with the upsurge of Pentecostalism would be

of interest since it clearly offers a sense of belonging dif-ferent from autochthony. Most authors (see Meyer 1999)signal the deep distrust among Pentecostalists of the vil-lage and the family, equated with the devil; instead they

want to belong to a (global?) community of born-agains.However, for Malawi, Englund (2005)emphasizesthe closelinks that urban Pentecostalists retain with their villageof origin. Apparently the relation between autochthonyand Pentecostalism, although seemingly opposing dis-courses on belonging,allows for varying contradictionsandarticulations.

izenship but rather with attempts to reserve

the benefits of the welfare state to those whoare said to really belong. Second, they ex-

press not so much a fear of being outvotedby strangers under new democratic rules as

a grass-root demandfor a more representativedemocracy, in the face of the demise of the old

political ordera protest against municipal,regional, and federal governments accused ofriding roughshod over local sensibilities. In

Europe, as in Africa, autochthony discourseseasily switch from one Other to the next,

but Muslims have become a favorite targetthroughout Europe, including Flanders.

LiketheNetherlands andAustria, Belgium

used to be a pillarized society with a consoci-ational democracy, an institutionalized form

of conflict management that is group oriented

rather than individual oriented and character-ized by subcultural segmentation and elite ac-commodation (Lijphart 1977, 1981): the sta-

bilityofthesystemdependsupontheabilityof

elites that represent the different subculturesto distribute the costs and benefits of gov-

ernment so as not to advantage or disadvan-tage any of these constituencies (Lamy 1986,

p. 117). The major Belgian subculturesare ideological and linguistic. Ideological

and often overlapping cleavages separate

Catholics from anticlericals, and capital-ists from proletariat through pillars.7 The

language frontier divides the country intwo ethno-linguistically homogeneous re-

gions (dutchophone Flanders and franco-

phone Wallony) and one linguistically bilin-gual region (Brussels), as well as a small

German community in Wallony. In Flanders,as in Northern Italy, autochthony discourses

are largely part of a separatist, regionalistrhetoric that views francophone co-citizens

as equally alien as individuals of foreigndescent.

7Pillarization is a system of exclusive linkages between po-litical parties, civic associations, and a wide range of auxil-iary organizations; thus, individuals are immersed in theirsegment from the cradle to the grave by attending theirpillars schools, joining its trade unions, etc. (Mendez-Lago1999, p. 192).



14/28

During the 1960s and 1970s, Belgian

society underwent some major changes. Theeconomic and political power base shifted

from Wallonia to Flanders and the countryimported many guest workers (gastarbeiders)

from Morocco and Turkey. The languagefrontier was fixed, Belgium was federalized,

and the decline of pillarization and theongoing secularization created a floatingelectorate that regrouped itself around new

social movements and regionalist partiesoutside the pillarized system. The nego-

tiation processes that go into consensualpolitics are not transparent and coalition

interests may supersede ideological princi-

ples. The Belgian consensual politics consistin governments buying socioeconomic and

linguistic peace by compensating one sub-

culture when allocating certain resources toanother. This trade-off clearly works bestduring times of economic prosperity (Huyse

1970), but it came under pressure from

the 1960s onward as the links connectingpoliticians and electorate through pillars

weakened (Stouthuysen & Deschouwer1993). This had far-reaching repercussions

for the new labor immigrants who were par-ticularly hard hit by the economic recession.

Moreover, this was a time when international

developments such as the American airraids on Tripoli, the Salman Rushdie affair,

and the tumult over Muslim girls wearingheadscarfs in French schools all contributed

to a negative perception of Muslims.

Although not all of the new regionalistparties are extremist, they all rely upon a

bifurcation between us and them thatcan take various forms. The Vlaams Blok

is no exception. Its rise is proof of the factthat many Flemings, who now live in one of

Europes most prosperous regions, have de- veloped a siege mentality, having convincedthemselves that their wealth and/or culture

are under threat from various groups offoreigners. The Vlaams Blok was founded

in 1979 as a separatist Flemish-nationalistparty. It widened its appeal beyond the

right-wing fringe from 1984 onward as it

substituted a discourse of racial supremacyfor one of cultural incompatibility, by sin-

gling out Muslim labor immigrants. Con-

demned for racism, Vlaams Blok recently be-came Vlaams Belang. It is now the largest

party in Flanders, held from power onlyby the cordon sanitaire (the agreement be-

tween the mainstream parties not to joincoalitions with it), which is now increasingly

under pressure. Publicly, the party tries to

reinvent itself as a mainstream, conservativepartycomparable to the American Republican

Party; privately, it strengthens its ties withneo-Nazi and neofascist parties throughout

Europe.Blommaert & Verschueren (1997) and

Blommaert & Martens (1999) argue that,

in the wake of the rise of the Vlaams

Blok, government agenciesand academicsmi-norized disenfranchised Muslim labor im-migrants as a specific ethnic group, alter-

natively called migranten (migrants). LikeMartiniello (1997), they relate the success of

the Vlaams Blok rhetoric to a mainstream

Flemish-nationalist ideology that is exclusiveand assimiliationist insofar as it relies on a no-

tionofethniccitizenship,asopposedtoaWal-loon idea of civic citizenship. This would ex-

plain why Flemings are less tolerant of ethnic

pluralism (Caestecker 2000, 2001; Martens &Caestecker 2001). Blommaert & Verschueren

(1997) show how elite antiracist discourses,including those of (Flemish) employees of

federal governmental agencies dealing withracism, are suffused with a kind of homo-

geneism that does not differ fundamentally

from the essentialist racist views associatedwith the Vlaams Blok. Quantitative research

confirms that Flemings with a strong Flem-ish identification and Walloons with a strong

Belgian identification tend to have a nega-tive attitude toward Muslim labor immigrants

and their descendants whereas Flemings with

a strong Belgian and Walloons with a strongWalloon identification view them more posi-

tively (Maddens et al. 2000).Since 1989, official federal policy has

stressed the need for migrants to integrate



15/28

themselves in Belgian society by relegating as-

pects of their culture to the private sphereand publicly conforming to Belgian norms.

However, any suggestion that federal pol-icy in relation to Muslims is shaped by an

ideal of (Flemish) ethnic citizenship is coun-tered by the observation that the norms as-

sociated with Belgian society (democracy, theseparation of church and state, equality be-tween men and women, etc.) refer more to

civic than to ethnic citizenship insofar thatthey are not considered Belgian but Western.

In Martens (1997, p. 66) analysis, federal-ization of the country has exacerbated the

distinctions between Flemish and Walloon

approaches: Flemings initially expected al-lochthons to emancipate themselves through

their own civic associations whereas Walloons

stillseek to remedy widespreaddiscriminationagainst allochthons through policy measures(see Caestecker 1997, p. 54). The decline of

pillarization introduced the concept of indi-

vidual citizenship and its concomitant, civilcitizenship into Flemish political discourse.

Muslims would constitute a problem not be-cause of their ethnicity but because they are

alien to Europes democratic traditions andmust be integrated through individual inburg-ering(turning foreigners into citizens; Ver-

hofstadt 1992). This term reminds us thatboth ethnic and civic citizenship can imply a

process of complete assimilation, either to aspecific ethnic culture or to a public, political

culture that is represented as universal and, as

such, is oblivious of its own culturalness.Flemish policymakers started using the

term allochthons from the 1990s on. Theydrew inspiration from the Dutch govern-

ment, which introduced the term in its1989 report, Allochtonenbeleid (policy on al-

lochthons), considering it more neutral thanforeigners or guest workers.8 Since 1998, the

8The terms autochthon and allochthon may have enteredthe Netherlands via Canada, which became officially the

worlds first self-proclaimed multicultural state in 1971.Quebechas a Secretariat aux affaires autochtonesand Franco-phone universities offer degrees in etudes autochtones. The

regional Flemish administration has officially

recognized allochthons on its territory aspersons who are legal residents in Belgium,

who have at least one (grand)parent who wasborn outside the country and who are dis-

criminated against on the basis of their ethnicdescent or their weak socioeconomic status.9

In actual practice, though not in theory, thecategory remains restricted to Muslim laborimmigrants and their descendants, including

those born on Flemish soil, although a dis-tinction is increasingly made betweennieuwkomers (newcomers) and oudkomers (lit-erally oldcomers).

Most Flemish academics writing on the

subject share the assumption that there isa connection between economic recession

and hostility against allochthons. They re-

late the problem to the mindset of individualFlemings, be they members of a poor disen-franchised proletariat in impoverished, urban

neighborhoods suffering from anomie (Billiet

& De Witte 2000, Swyngedouw 1990) orpoorly educated individuals who spend their

time indoors watching commercial televisionbroadcasts (Elchardus & Smets 2002, Pelleri-

aux 2001). Other authors opt for a more struc-tural interpretation. Although Flemings iden-

tify primarily with their local communities

and municipal elections have always servedas the mechanism to incorporate groups into

the national polis, most academics writing on

term is used to refer to the peoples who inhabited the landbefore British and French colonization. In Quebec, bothso-called indigenous people and Francophones make pri-mordialist claims (Niezen 2003). The separatist Franco-phone Quebecois movement popularized the idea matrechez soi that inspired both the French Front National ( les

Francais dabord) and the Vlaams Blok (eigen volk eerst, onesown people first and baas in eigen land, boss in ones own

country); it differentiates between Quebecois de souche andothers.

9Although the official term stresses a link between ethnicdescent and victimization, the Vlaams Blok owes its elec-toral success to the connections it has made between (Mus-lim) culture andcriminalactivities.However, this idea hasagendered component: male Muslims pose a problem (theyare criminals, a scourge on social welfare, etc.), whereas fe-male Muslims are represented as victims of a misogynistic,patriarchal culture.



16/28

allochthons ignore the relevance of local poli-

tics, which were traditionally characterized bya high degree of factionalism and clientelism.

InhisanalysisoftheriseoftheVlaamsBlokin Antwerp, Swyngedouw (1998) observes

that the decline of pillarization and economicrecession coincided with a counterexodus

of urban working-class individuals to sociallymixed neighborhoods outside town and theamalgamation of municipalities between 1976

and 1982. The latter change interposed ge-ographical distance between the centers of

decision-making and residential areas, espe-cially in larger municipalities, at a time when

national politicians were trying to woo a float-

ing electorate by increasing clientelism. Theresults were felt notably in urban working-

class neighborhoods: first, the pillars lost

their grassroots volunteers and activists atthe same time as the decline of pillariza-tion was reducing the political power of trade

unions; second, voters in large municipalities

lost personal access to local political patrons;third, cash-strapped municipalities were in-

vesting insufficiently in impoverished neigh-borhoods. Inhabitants of previously indepen-

dent boroughs saw themselves surrounded byforeigners, and felt alienated, betrayed, and

abandoned by the municipality. The Vlaams

Blok successfully stepped into this void, set-ting itself up as the champion of erstwhile

socialist voters.Following on from Verhoevens (1997,

p. 131) observation that inhabitants of urban

neighborhoods view their Muslim neighborsas emissaries of sinister powers in their coun-

tries of origin, Ceuppens (2003, chapter 9) ar-gues that Flemings conceptualize allochthons

as alien in relation not only to the state orthe region, but also to their local communi-

ties, in a political rhetoric whose appeal tran-scends these localities. She shows that rural,middle-class voters vote for the Vlaams Blok,

which tries to exploit their fear of incomers,be they Muslim labor immigrants, refugees,

or gangs of Eastern European criminals, be-cause they want to retain their wealth and re-

gain control over their local communities

and their social welfare system. These vot-ers have a gnawing disrespect for a form of

representative government that pays no heed

to grassroot sentiments, and they see them-selves as the people rising up against forms

of centralized authority that seems to caremore for foreigners, for whom voting is not

compulsory, than for their own people, whoexpect something in return for their compul-

sory vote. They are mobilized against oth-

ers by voting for an other party outside thepillarized system.

Contrary to earlier expectations, the de-cline of pillarization has not led to a more

open, democratic politicalculture, anda num-ber of academics link xenophobia against al-

lochthons to the decline of the pillars civic

organizations (Elchardus et al. 1999, 2001).

Hooghe (2003) nuances this view by arguingthatsomeorganizations,notablytradeunions,have less positive perceptions of allochthons

than others. The very notion of foreignersacquired an edge in Belgium only since the

extension of the suffrage to the male work-

ing class after World War I and with the development of the welfare state, as different

interest groups wanted to reserve the bene-fits of the welfare state exclusively to citizens

(Caestecker 2000, 2001). After World War II,

trade unions took a more inclusive approach,and started to defend the rights of all their

members, irrespective of their nationality orethnic background. However, their focus on

maintaining the standard of living of those infulltime employment rather than on securing

jobs for all means that in practice, they do not

represent the great majority of Muslim laborimmigrants who are now unemployed. This

focus feeds into assumptions held by manymembers (some 80% of all Belgians belong

to a pillarized trade union) that these peopleare foreigners and as such should not profit

from the benefits of the welfare state; it goes

some way toward explaining why even tradeunion members support a corporatist party

such as the Vlaams Blok. Although the partyis opposed to the presence ofallforeigners

on Flemish soil, it is only its rhetoric that has



17/28

caught on, railing against those aliens who

rely upon the benefits of the social welfarestate or who are construed as posing a threat

to Flemings prosperity (Ceuppens 2001).Arnaut & Ceuppens (2004) observe that

on the one hand, the idea that allochthonsdo not belong in Flanders builds on an older

discourse that denies the legitimacy of thepresence of Francophonesin theregion, whileon the other hand, Francophones, not la-

bor immigrants or refugees, are now increas-ingly represented as parasites feeding upon

a welfare system sustained almost exclusivelythrough Flemish toil. They argue that scal-

ing, combined with a conceptual confusion

between race and culture as well as be-tween different types of others, allows the

Vlaams Blok not only to paint a gloomy pic-

ture of ones own people as threatened byaliens, but also to redefine the latter cate-gory between the national, regional, and local

levels: expatriates, Eurocrats, Anglophones,

refugees, non-European labor immigrants,Eastern European thieves, niggers, Mus-

lims, Francophones, Walloons, etc. Even thecategory of ones own people is not fixed.

In its propaganda aimed at francophone vot-ers in Brussels, until very recently, the party

conveniently failed to mention that it wants to

incorporate the city into a Flemish republic.It argues that foreigners sponge off our

(Belgian) welfare state despite rejecting thele-gitimacy of the Belgian state while also accus-

ing Francophones of feeding off Flemish la-

bor. Although it is no secret that some promi-nent party members deny the Holocaust,

the party publicly condemns anti-Semitism.Many party leaders prefer paganism to Chris-

tianity, which they view as a foreign import,butthepartynevertheless identifieswith a Eu-

ropean civilization informed by the heritageof Christianity and the Enlightenment (whenfirst condemned for racism, it set itself up as a

champion of freedom of speech) under threatfrom Muslim hordes. Arnaut & Ceuppens

conclude that these mixed messages appeal tovoters because they createtheillusion of being

able to control and expel the different types of

others whom they confront at different lev-els; as such, the confusions offer security and

become a source of empowerment.

In sum, most Flemish academics stressthe link between recession and xenophobia.

However, they also relate the rise of theVlaams Blok and the exclusion of so-called

allochthons to the different cleavages that ei-ther preceded the immigration of laborers of

Muslim descent to Belgium or came into be-

ing independent of them. Overlooked is thefact that identification with a pillar was never

officially recognized and that the identitiesof Flemings and Walloons refer only to

public language use in specific regions, irre-spective of ethnic background or private lan-

guage use. By contrast, the Flemish adminis-

trations formal recognition of allochthons (in

contrast to the Brusseler or Walloon author-ities) can introduce a difference between cit-izens. This oscillation between discourses on

ethnic and civiccitizenship risksobscuringthesocioeconomic dimension. The official defi-

nition reinforces the idea that allochthons are

discriminated against because of their culturalspecificity and thus it hampers their inclu-

sion in theFlemish nation as a disenfranchisedclass. And inevitably, by including an ethnic

element in its definition of allochthons, the

Flemish administration is itself subscribing inthe logic of the Vlaams Blok, reinforcing the

view that these aliens can be excluded fromthe benefits of our welfare state. Holmes

(2000) reminds us that the ideal of the activewelfare state, which the Belgian federal and

Flemish regional governments now embrace,

disrupts the idea of automatic, national sol-idarity and creates new openings to exclude

people considered foreigners, even if theyare fellow-citizens, as is the case with many

allochthons in Flanders. Simultaneously, thenotion of equality for all is replaced by the

idea of equal opportunities for all. This allows

autochthony discourses to represent Muslimlabor immigrants, refugees, Francophones,

etc., as undeserving poor whohave forfeitedtheir chance for equal opportunities because

they refuse to integrate fully in Flemish



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19/28

EventheAthenianfamilieswhoweresoproud

of their autochthony had myths about theirorigins from elsewhere. And even the Beti,

who have now become the arch-autochthonsof Cameroon, express their unity by a myth

of an only partially successful crossing of themajestic Sanaga river on the back of a huge

python. Autochthony needs movement as a

counterpointto define itself. It is preciselythis

basic instability that makes it such a danger-ous discourse. It seems to offer a safe, even

natural belonging. But it is haunted by abasic insecurity: apprehension about its own

authenticity, the need to prove itself by un-masking fake autochthons, that inevitably

leads to internal division and violence.

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Annual Re

Anthropolo

Volume 34,

Contents

Frontispiece

Sally Falk Moore p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p xvi

Prefatory Chapter

Comparisons: Possible and Impossible

Sally Falk Moore p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 1

Archaeology

Archaeology, Ecological History, and Conservation

Frances M. Hayashida p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p43

Archaeology of the Body

Rosemary A. Joyce p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 139

Looting and the Worlds Archaeological Heritage: The InadequateResponse

Neil Brodie and Colin Renfrew p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 343

Through Wary Eyes: Indigenous Perspectives on Archaeology

Joe Watkins p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 429

The Archaeology of Black Americans in Recent Times

Mark P. Leone, Cheryl Janifer LaRoche, and Jennifer J. Babiarz p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 575

Biological Anthropology

Early Modern Humans

Erik Trinkaus p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 207

Metabolic Adaptation in Indigenous Siberian Populations

William R. Leonard, J. Josh Snodgrass, and Mark V. Sorensen p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 451

The Ecologies of Human Immune Function

Thomas W. McDade p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 495

vii


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Linguistics and Communicative Practices

New Directions in Pidgin and Creole Studies

Marlyse Baptista p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p33

Pierre Bourdieu and the Practices of Language

William F. Hanks p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 67

Areal Linguistics and Mainland Southeast Asia

N.J. Enfieldp p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p

181

Communicability, Racial Discourse, and Disease

Charles L. Briggs p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 269

Will Indigenous Languages Survive?

Michael Walsh p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 293

Linguistic, Cultural, and Biological Diversity

Luisa Maffi p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 599

International Anthropology and Regional Studies

Caste and Politics: Identity Over System

Dipankar Gupta p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 409

Indigenous Movements in Australia

Francesca Merlan p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 473

Indigenous Movements in Latin America, 19922004: Controversies,

Ironies, New Directions

Jean E. Jackson and Kay B. Warren p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 549

Sociocultural Anthropology

The Cultural Politics of Body Size

Helen Gremillion p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 13

Too Much for Too Few: Problems of Indigenous Land Rights in Latin

America

Anthony Stocks p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p85

Intellectuals and Nationalism: Anthropological Engagements

Dominic Boyer

authoctony annurev.anthro.34.081804

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