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(Auto)Biography and EpistemologyMorwenna Griffiths aa School of Education, University of NottinghamPublished online: 06 Jul 2006.

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Educational Review, Vol. 47, No. 1, 1995 75

(Auto)Biography and Epistemology

MORWENNA GRIFFITHS, School of Education, University of Nottingham

ABSTRACT The focus in this paper is on the epistemological status of a range ofmethods used in educational research and teacher education which may be called(auto)biographical. On the one hand the epistemological soundness of such methodsis in question, while, on the other hand, traditional epistemology itself is also inquestion as a result of a range of challenges, including those coming from feminism.This paper focuses on the challenge from feminist epistemologies. It is argued thatfeminists have demonstrated that reliable knowledge can only be achieved througha process which includes, fundamentally, the subjectivity or experiences of indi-viduals and groups of individuals; power and politics; and a dialectic of theory withindividual experiences. It is further argued that (auto)biographical methods are wellplaced to include these factors, although not all (auto)biographies will do so. It isconcluded that some, but only some, (auto)biographical methods are epistemo-logically sound. The confessional, apolitical and atheoretical ones are not so usefulas those which take account of politics and theories for public purposes.

I. Introduction

This paper investigates a matter of increasing importance and urgency in educationalresearch. Personal and autobiographical writing has become more common ineducational research in general and in work submitted for accreditation at higherdegree level in particular. This writing is in sharp contrast to more impersonalquantitative or qualitative research, such as surveys or ethnographic research. Doubtshave been expressed about the value and validity of (auto)biographical research.Suggestions have been made that it is merely confessional or anecdotal, and perhapsof more use as a motivational tool to students than as a research method. This paperaddresses those doubts, arguing that they are sometimes justified, but also arguingthat (auto)biographical research can be of the utmost value in providing reliable anduseful knowledge.

Students often ask about the validity of using their own life-experience in thinkingabout theories or reflecting on their own practice. They ask whether their ownexperience could really count as evidence, or if it has any wider validity beyond theanecdotal. Educationists often have very similar misgivings about the uses of(auto)biography in research and teaching. Some students only need the answer 'Yes!Trust me! Your own experience is a valid part of your own knowledge, as long asit is subject to public critical appraisal. And, anyway, it is your own understandingsand practices that you are trying to improve'. However, for others this is, not

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76 M. Griffiths

surprisingly, unsatisfactory. This paper is one answer to such questions in the form'Yes, because...'.

The answer to the questions is long because it is complex. The questions areepistemological and the answer depends on successfully challenging traditionalapproaches to epistemology. Challenges to traditional epistemology are plentiful andvarious, but exhibit more agreement about their criticisms than about their positivesuggestions for creating new approaches. This paper will focus on one set ofchallenges—the feminist ones—and argue that the challenges are valid but throw upproblems of their own. A resolution to these problems leads to some answers, as yetprovisional, to the epistemological questions thrown up by the use of personalexperience in educational research.

The paper begins with a preliminary consideration of the terms 'autobiography'and 'biography', as two of a number of terms referring to what I call 'life-narratives'.In the second section the epistemological status of life-narrative is questioned, but,as is pointed out in the third section, an answer to this question requires agreementover epistemology, which is, itself, also in question. Feminist theory is then used togenerate criteria against which epistemological soundness can be judged. An inspec-tion of these criteria show that autobiography is able to meet them, but only in someforms. Different forms of autobiography are considered, and it is argued thatconfessional and private forms are less likely to generate valid and valuableknowledge than other forms, many of which are often described by other life-narra-tive terms. It is suggested that the term '(auto)biography', can usefully be used toencompass autobiography, biography and other terms for life-narratives. Finally,conclusions are drawn about the validity and value of (auto)biography in educationalresearch.

II. Autobiography and Life-narrative

The focus in this paper is on (auto)biography, which I shall argue encompasses arange of associated methods used in research and teacher education which make useof personal experience. At this stage, I shall call them all by the term 'life-narrative',by which I refer to: autobiography, biography, oral history, life history, dialogic(auto)biography, journals, diaries, logs (where they are accompanied or structured byreflective comments), reflective writing using personal experiences and personalexperience presented through the medium of fiction. My definition of 'life-narrative'will remain ostensive. Some of the terms are less familiar than others, but the briefoverview of research will help to explain them.

The importance of investigating life-narrative is highlighted by its increasingprevalence and the increasing confidence with which it is used as a pedagogic orresearch method. This very increase of interest leads to definitional problems. Theterms used to describe various kinds of life-narrative are in a state of change, justbecause of the speed of development. For instance 'reflective journals' were some-thing of a rarity 20 years ago. They are commonplace today in both teaching andresearch. So it is not surprising that there is considerable variety in what counts asa 'reflective journal' in various institutions of Higher Education.

'Autobiography' and 'biography' are familiar enough terms with a long history.Understood widely, they encompass the other terms, which is why I use them in theterm '(auto)biography', which appears in the title. I say some more about theirmeaning in Section VIII, where I also discuss some of the problems about assuming

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(Auto)Biography and Epistemology 77

we share a common understanding of the term 'autobiography'. The other terms mayneed more explanation from the start.

Oral history or life history is well-documented as a method in the social sciences.Marshall & Rossman (1989) remark that the life-history approach is used acrosssocial science disciplines. They refer to Dollard's definition in 1935, that life-historyis a deliberate attempt to define the growth of a person in a cultural milieu and tomake theoretical sense of it. The life-history or the longitudinal case study of a singleteacher's practice has become much more widespread in educational research in thelast two decades. Goodson & Walker (1991) provide a useful autobiographicaloverview of the trend. Another example is provided by Nias (1989), who uses anumber of individual life-histories to draw general conclusions about teachers'careers. Similarly, McClure (1993) collected biographical accounts from teachers tolook at the use teachers made of 'identity' as an organising principle in their lives.Dialogic (auto)biography has developed from oral and life history. In this form, theautobiography of the author is woven into the biography she is writing. In fact, bothpartners may contribute to the writing or the co-editing. Examples from socialscience can be found in Mbilinyi et al. (1989). Educational research which draws onthis development is increasingly attracting attention and interest. An example is thework of Elbaz and Clandinin—who have, in turn, been able to pursue and developtheir research projects into individuals and selves, precisely because of the trendtowards life-narratives (F. Elbaz, 1990; Clandinin, 1989).

Journals, diaries and logs are usefully described and distinguished from each otherby Holly (1984). She says:

There are basically three types of personal documentation: logs, diaries andjournals.... The log is used now to refer to 'a regularly kept record ofperformance' ....Diaries are usually a more personal and interpretativeform of writing ....The contents of a journal are more comprehensive thanthose of either a log or a diary. It is a reconstruction of experience and likethe diary, has both objective and subjective dimensions, but unlike mostdiaries, there is a consciousness of this differentiation.... A researchjournal is a tool for focusing on a specific topic.

The usefulness of her distinctions is not that they define a universally understoodterminology—for they do not. Rather, they draw attention to some of the differentways a person can make use of autobiographical material either for research or forpersonal/professional purposes. All of these forms are popular in general educationalresearch. They are also popular in teacher education, including some courses whichare not research-based.

Reflective writing which uses personal experience is a refinement of journalwriting, in that it requires a further degree of abstract and theoretical organisation.The resulting dialectic between abstract or theoretical reflection and personal experi-ence is to be contrasted with traditional academic theorising, in which nomention—let alone use—is made of personal experience. A further development isthe use of fictionalised autobiographical writing in research and professional devel-opment. Examples can be found in Porter & Smith (1989), Winter (1989) andRowland (1991).

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78 M. Griffiths

III. A Puzzle about the Epistemological Status of Life-narrative Methods inResearch and Teaching

The epistemological significance and soundness of all this research is in question.Some commentators regard life-narrative research as a kind of case study. For thosewho believe that the social sciences should follow the methods of natural sciences,case studies are useful in so far as they can be used to make generalisations. Thepurpose of case study research is to generate testable hypotheses or to provide itemsof data ready to be tested. For those who believe that social sciences should followinterpretative approaches, case studies have a different significance. For instance,David Thomas (1992) argues that teacher narrative studies fit into the interpretivecase study approach and that they should be evaluated using criteria which willindicate their trustworthiness. He says, 'The operational definition of trustworthinessis that we trust it enough to act upon if (p. 14). Criteria for evaluation are thendrawn from Kuhn's concepts of 'shared exemplars' and 'modes of knowing, andfrom the use of case law in the judicial process. Similarly, though using a differentterminology drawn from hermeneutics, Jardine (1992) argues for the importance ofshared instances and modes of knowing.

There is an alternative understanding of the value of life-narrative research inwhich it is affirmed that pieces of research are of interest for the particular life orcircumstance which is being described and explained. This understanding of life-nar-rative derives from another tradition of educational research: action-research.Action-research places the emphasis on the actor and the particular situation in whichaction is taking place. Reflective journals, fictionalised autobiographical writing andreflective writing using personal experience are not presented as of use only in so faras they provide hypotheses for more rigorous investigations, as building blocks oftheory or as contributions to case law. They are required as part of a focus on theself and self-knowledge.

Both Carr and Whitehead are particularly clear about this. For all their differences(which are significant), both work within an action-research tradition. Carr (1989)argues that educational science must go beyond both the 'empirical-analytical' and'historical-hermeneutic' to become (p. 33):

A form of reflectively acquired self-knowledge which, by making individ-uals more consciously aware of the social and ideological roots of theirself-understanding, thereby 'empowers' them to think and act in morerationally autonomous ways.'

Whitehead (1989) argues that educational research has to focus on the self as 'aliving contradiction'. He proposes (p. 6):

An organic view of educational theory which is living in the publicconversations of those constituting professional practice.... Educationaltheory is being created through the theorising of individuals about theirown professional practice as they attempt to improve the quality of theirown and their pupils' learning.

For those working within the tradition of action-research there is no epistemologicalproblem about the use of life-narratives. They fall squarely into the area ofeducational theorising. However, for those who want to use life-narrative beyond thestrictly educational or for those who want to include educational research in the

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(Auto)Biography and Epistemology 79

social sciences, the epistemological problem remains. Unfortunately, those whomake use of narrative methods are not always clear about how far the arguments,developed in the traditions of action-research, are valid for life-narrative in general.In the rest of this article I shall argue that life-narrative need be neither case law norbuilding block, but yet be reliable, useful knowledge, whether or not the specificarguments about action-research and educational science or research are valid.

IV. Epistemology Itself Put into Question

Neither Carr's nor Whitehead's approaches fit into traditional conceptions of episte-mology. Action-research approaches are part of a range of challenges to traditionalepistemology which have become increasingly outspoken and confident. By 'tra-ditional epistemology' I refer to the tradition which springs from Descartes, Locke,Hume and Kant, and their fascination with the possibility of certainty and objectivity.Challenges to the tradition are part of a general philosophical move away from thehope of Newtonian causal precision, i.e. away from a reliance on an objectivity,derived from direct sense experience and reason, which will produce universal truths.

Different challenges to the traditions are often lumped together as 'anti-positivist',as if it were a coherent position, which it is not—any more than 'positivism' is sucha position. The upholders of the traditions (so-called 'positivists' ) argue that thesubjective in the sense of personal, anecdotal and individual has been thought todetract from the certainty, reliability and usefulness of knowledge. It is of use onlyin so far as it can be used to generate universals. The opposing argument (so-called'anti-positivist') tend to the view that Western traditions have failed to generatereliable (or useful or ethical) knowledge, just because they do not pay properattention to the subjective. The dichotomisation is only useful as a guide to an areawhich needs closer attention if it is to be understood. In fact, the Western traditionsof epistemology are subject to challenge from several directions which, unfortunatelyfor those wanting neat categories, overlap with each other.

Challenges can be found within the familiar and mainstream reaches of philoso-phy, such as phenomenology and its heirs and Alistair Maclntyre's explorations ofrationality and justice. The most radical set of challenges come from post-mod-ernisms, post-structuralisms and feminist epistemologies, all of which have arisenoutside mainstream philosophy. In the rest of the paper I shall put feministepistemologies in focus, arguing that they provide a useful approach to understand-ing the epistemological significance of life-narratives in general.

Fifteen years ago the idea of a feminist epistemology was a startling one. Previousfeminist epistemological challenges had been focused on the masculine bias inherentin knowledge 'as usual'. Critiques were made in several areas of knowledge, notablyliterature, history, philosophy, natural science and, significantly for educationalresearch, the social sciences. As these critiques deepened and widened, it becameclear that the idea of 'bias' itself and the notion of objectivity on which it was basedwere in question. The result was a ever-increasing focus on epistemology itself.

Alternatives to the traditional epistemologies were developed. Development wasnot along a single path. Feminists provided a range of possible epistemologies. Itsoon became apparent that there is no such thing as a definitive 'feminist epistemol-ogy'. Overviews of some of these debates can be found in Garry & Pearsall (1989),Nicholson (1990), Stanley (1990), Braidotti (1991) and Lennon & Whitford (1994).

The depth of disagreement between different feminist epistemologies is striking.

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Less obvious are the common threads that runs between them. The commonalitiesrather than the differences are what concern me here. They all emphasise thesubjective consciousness or the self of an individual. Lennon & Whitford (1994) say:

In different ways all of these strands of thought implicate the subject in theproduction of knowledge. It is argued that it is not simply due to badpractice that masculine subjects have allowed their subjectivity to imprinton their product. Such imprinting is inevitable. Knowledge bears the marksof its producer.

There are two other connecting threads which are significant. One is politics and theother is theory, abstraction or structure. The first, power or politics, is perhaps aninevitable consequence of the fact that all of the epistemologies are feminist: feministtheory is predicated on the significance of power. 'Politics' here includes both microand macro deployments and constraints of power, where 'micro' refers to theface-to-face personal interactions and 'macro' refers to the use of gender as acategory, at least in the analysis of particular discourses, even if not as a universal.

The other thread which connects the epistemologies is theorising. This thread is aconsequence of the fact that feminism is a collective enterprise. None of the feministepistemologies assume or argue that the perspective of an individual woman can, byitself, produce feminist knowledge. All the epistemologies have a theory about theproduction of knowledge using individual subjects as members of a collective whichmay (indeed probably will) change the perspectives of the original individuals orsubjects and the knowledge that they have.

V. Constructing Epistemology

In this section I will make some remarks about moving on from epistemologicalchallenge: moving from critique to construct, a phrase I take from Gunew (1990).She summarises the central paradox of the attempted movement (p. 25):

Feminism as construct is an attempt to move feminist knowledge beyondthe stage of being an oppositional critique of existing male-defined know-ing, knowledge and theory. The central paradox in this area is the questionof where feminist knowledge should situate itself, from where does itderive an authority or legitimacy which is not constructed by the prevailingstructures of knowledge?

Stanley & Wise (1990) suggest an approach which resolves the paradox. They arguethat research techniques and their results are as important for methodology andepistemology as epistemology is for methodology and techniques. This is suggestiveof a spiralling procedure in which methodological principles are derived fromepistemological critiques. These methodological principles can then be used to shaperesearch techniques (often called 'methods' in social science). As the methodologyand techniques are used and tested, they, in turn, can be used to criticise theepistemology and refine it into a coherent system. The novelty in this is the use oftechniques and their results to derive epistemology. In most traditional epistemologyonly methodology (often called 'method' in philosophy) is considered and actualempirical results carry little or no weight.

The spiralling procedure is coherent with the conclusions of the last section.There, I said that, for all their differences, all the feminist epistemologies agree that

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(Auto)Biography and Epistemology 81

knowledge must be grounded in individual 'experience', 'perspectives', 'subjec-tivity', 'consciousness' or 'position in a discourse'. They also agree that 'powerrelations' cannot be added on afterwards, but are fundamental. The critique isprecisely that there is no possibility of the acquisition/creation of reliable, usefulknowledge from a de-humanised 'God's eye view' or 'view from nowhere'. Thus theconstruct has to start from the premise that knowledge has to be built up in a waythat calls into question its own methods of building. It is also one that requiresengagement with the acquired knowledge by knowers as part of its method.

The procedure may sound circular, but it is not: success is not guaranteed. It ispossible that feminist epistemologists are making an attempt to reconcile principleswhich are irreducibly contradictory. For instance, on the one hand these epistemolo-gies are political so they must (in some sense) be commutarian, group-based orsocially aware/sensitive. On the other hand these epistemologies pay attention toindividual experience and subjectivity and what can be learnt from it. The attempt toreconcile the individual and the social has a long history in Western theory ofprivileging one or the other of them. It may be that this renewed attempt will havethe same result—and is thus doomed to failure.

VI. Methodological Principles

The arguments of the last two sections show that epistemology must include,fundamentally, the subjectivity and experiences of individuals and groups of individ-uals; power and politics; and a dialectic of theory with individual experiences. Thesethree factors cannot be understood independently of each other. The argument is thatindividual experiences are inherently political, and traditional epistemology hasignored this. This analysis also means that the category of the individual is betterunderstood as a self or subjectivity, which, unlike the traditional concept of 'person'or 'mind', allows space for the political in its construction. So new ways ofanswering epistemological questions will have to be found which do not make themistake of ignoring fundamental categories or making unwarranted assumptions. Intraditional epistemology the following are normally taken into account: language andthe world; language and the individual; the individual and the world. I am followingBlackburn's scheme here, (Blackburn, 1984), but other introductory texts give asimilar account. This approach leaves out the social (except as language), let alonethe political, and assumes the individual. Critics of traditional epistemologies needmethodological principles which will include what they charge traditionalists withleaving out.

The critics have problems of their own in turning epistemological critique intosatisfactory methodological principles. Early in the new wave of feminism it was justassumed that experience could be politicised. Consciousness-raising groups startedfrom personal experience and it was expected that the process would changeindividual consciousness. Personal experiences of, for instance, home, sexuality andconversations became politicised into women's issues. Personal responses to issuessuch as nuclear war were legitimised in the political sphere and changed the waysuch issues were approached from the (supposedly) impersonal and public to thepersonal and individual. This was the time in which sisterhood and universalfeminism seemed possible and desirable. Actions assumed a unity among women.However it soon became obvious that this use of experience was problematical andthe issue quickly became very vexed indeed.

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82 M. Griffiths

At issue is the nature of political affinity. The question was the relation ofexperience to gender. What did women share that men did not? Was it an experienceof victimisation? Or of some universal similarity such as child-care? Or of relegationto the natural rather than the cultural? Or something more essential—of the body?This set of questions was put into sharper focus by the criticisms of working-class,Black and non-Western women, among others, who doubted that what they sharedwith the dominant group of middle-class, White, Western women was of particularsignificance to them. Fragmented identities came to replace sisterhood in the politicsof identity. However, it was soon noticed that the same questions just appearedagain. What exactly was the shared experience of being, say, a Black, working-classor a White, working-class woman? To put it another way, when Black working-classwomen talked of shared experience, what exactly were they sharing?

The debate about natural sex differences and about essentialism has sharpened thequestions, so that it is now possible to see where the answers might lie. Thepossibilities of 'shared experience' can be schematised as follows (noting that theexperience in question may be either or both of the senses identified by Smith(1987): 'putative reality' and 'what we make of i t ' ) :

(1) there may indeed be natural sex differences other than those of the body;(2) even if there are not, the metaphorical or social or psycholinguistic milieu in

which children develop means that bodily sex differences are symbolised intopsychosocial ones;

(3) even if this were not the case, society and individuals within it habitually treatthe two sexes differently and welcome or exclude girls and boys, men andwomen, into different social circles;

(4) even if individuals, or groups of individuals, try to overcome the norms of thesociety in which they find themselves, they have to use a language which isunequal with regard to the two sexes, structurally and lexically;

(5) all the above is too simple if it is taken as referring to all social groups—themanifestations of symbolism, societal inclusions and exclusions, and language,are all different for different social classes and 'races'.

Points 2-6 above show the importance of language in framing and constrainingself/subjectivity and experience. Indeed, language has turned out to be of centralimportance to feminists. As Deborah Cameron says (1992, pp. 1-2):

Feminists do not consider language as a side-issue or a luxury, but anessential part of the struggle for liberation.... The more we hear anti-fem-inists bleating that language is 'trivial' or a diversion from 'the real issues',the more we may suspect they are protesting too much: perhaps the issueof language has an extraordinary subterranean importance for those criticswho deride feminist concern with it.

A theory of language is implied by my schematising of the relationship betweenexperience and politics. It is as follows. Ordinary language has a considerable but notabsolute power to determine what we see and do. Groups which share particularexperiences (such as women) develop languages of their own. But some groups havea greater power to legitimatise their own language as the proper one. A particularcase here is the language of theory. It is specialised to those who produce knowl-edge—these people are usually men. The specialisation is maintained by processesof control, so that the production of knowledge is controlled by men.

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(Auto)Biography and Epistemology 83

The theory of language is compatible with a synthesis of the two main strands inthe philosophy of language: communication and formal semantics. For reasons ofspace, I shall merely describe the synthesis briefly, inevitably distorting it somewhatas I do so. It is as follows. Communication is possible because human beingscombine a common interest in communication with a capacity to do it. The processwas first described by Grice and has been much discussed. It is as follows: a personP does an action A so as to induce a belief, action or feeling B in person Q, intendingthat Q should be aware of the reason P did A. Moreover, Q's awareness is part ofthe reason that Q does B. Such a process can be difficult, as anyone knows who hastried to make themselves understood without using a common language. It is easedwith time, as conventions, including the use of particular signs (words, symbols,grammatical structures, intonations), become established. New utterances and con-ventions regularly appear in human groups as a result of the Gricean mechanism.While the continued existence and maintenance of language depends on Griceancommunication, a lot of communication can proceed without recourse to it. This isbecause human beings live in groups which already have language, in whichutterances and conventions have become frozen into habits and rules. These are thehabits and rules of grammatical, lexical and social meanings: the stuff of linguisticand discourse analysis. Bennett (1973) calls this communication, which does not relyon Gricean mechanisms, 'Plain Talk' and argues that (p. 170):

Plain Talk is not a vehicle of merely marginal and dependent kinds ofmeaning. On the contrary, it is behaviourally indistinguishable from muchof what occurs at the very centre of ordinary human language.

The value of this (over-briefly described) theory is that it explains both the powerof language to determine thought and action and also the limits of its ability so todo. We use conventions and rules which are frozen history, in discussions whichdepend on an element of Plain Talk. However, since most human communication isat least partly Gricean, it is possible for the rules to melt as the Gricean element isincreased. I will suggest some ways this can happen. Indeed, language would beimpossible if the rules were rigid. All of it would resemble our interchanges withcomputers and bank dispensers.

A striking omission in the synthesis (even when described less briefly) is theexistence of power differences in social groups. However, the inclusion of power isfundamental. Language has been created out of the communication of human beingsin groups and is maintained in them, but these groups are ones in which not all kindsof persons are equal in status. The assumptions on which Gricean intentions are builtwill include assumptions of power differentials. Thus the descriptions of the worldbuilt up in the group will reflect that disparity. If men are more powerful, theperspectives of men will carry more weight. Moreover, to enter the conversation atall requires that one is positioned as a male or a female, with implications for themeanings available to him/her. Women's single-sex groups will develop their own'dialect'. The upshot of all this is that the frozen history of a language includesfrozen social history. So even if the status of women changes, the language will stillreflect the historical state of affairs.

Language can be changed: although communication relies on frozen meanings,they can be re-melted. This is most easily done by changing the composition ofcommunicating groups: this can be a political action. For instance, the gendercomposition can be changed. There are several possible results of such an action.

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84 M. Griffiths

Firstly, the logic, or lack of it, underlying the use of the words of ordinary Englishcan be shown and laid open to criticism. Secondly, unnamed concepts in a languagecan be identified and named. Thirdly, the systematic effects of being positioned as,say, a male or female can be shown. Finally, the metaphorical substructure of thelanguage can be addressed [1]. The result of all this is a slow and piecemeal changein the language.

The improved understanding of experience and language makes it possible tobegin the move from epistemological critique to methodological principle. Individualexperience can be used in creating knowledge, but has to be continually re-appraisedin the light of the very changes in language which it will help to bring about. Sincechanges in language come about from groups of people in communication with eachother, these groups, and the changes they bring about, can be political. Change inexperience comes about from changes in language, but the experience remainsindividual (though changed).

New problems arise at once, of course. Sex is not the only source of differentiationin societies. Experience and language are also structured by class, colour, religion,nationality and so on. Thus it might appear that communicative groups should beorganised in ways which reflect these divisions. This would have been possible,perhaps, if there were only a few such differences. However, the fragmentationinvolved brings the group sizes down to very small indeed—too small to have aneffect on ordinary language.

The questions that now need to be asked are still barely formulated. The answersare in the form of hopeful slogans, rather than careful argument. There are two mainareas in question. The first is to do with fragmentation and the recognition that mostpeople will not identify 100% with any group in which they find themselves. Thesecond is to do with multiple languages and the possibility of translating from oneto the other. The answers are being sought in a celebration of hybridity, fluidity andimpurity and in the recognition of a network of languages relying on multilingualabilities in the population. This is work in progress.

To summarise this section: the move has been made from epistemological critiqueto methodological principles. The requirement of the critique was to include,fundamentally, the subjectivity and experiences of individuals and groups of individ-uals; power and politics; and a dialectic of theory with individual experiences. Themethodological principles are: knowledge can only be gained using a method whichallows for reflection on experience, using theory, in a number of different group/pol-itical perspectives, which will bring that experience into question and may requirechanges in language. This indicates a process of returning to old knowledge using thenew perceptions and then using the result to re-work the new perceptions. In brief:for knowledge to be gained, a method needs to include: (1) individual experience; (2)theory; (3) time for a process of reflection and re-thinking; and (4) the perspectivesof various groups chosen on political grounds [2].

VII. A Particular Case: autobiographies

As argued in Section V, techniques are needed with which to develop the epistemol-ogy and methodology which gave rise to them. Autobiography is a good candidatefor such a technique, because not only does it focus on individual experience, but itis also possible to apply the other principles. Therefore, it should be possible forautobiography to be a good source of knowledge for the teller and listeners.

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(Auto)Biography and Epistemology 85

In an autobiography, theory may be reinterpreted in the light of experience, andexperience in the light of theory. Autobiography as simple narrative is just a firststage and of only limited use. Among the many examples which go beyond this areSt Augustine's Confessions, Valerie Walkerdine's (1990) exploration of psychologi-cal theory in a series of articles and Michele Le Doeuff's (1991) essay inphilosophy. Each of these use autobiography to aid in the reinterpretation of theoryin the light of experience and experience in the light of theory.

In a non-theoretical autobiography, time may just appear as the linearity of thenarrative. However, a process of reflection and re-thinking will undermine suchlinearity. In a single piece of theoretical work, time needs to be seen as a theme: thepassage of it and its effect on the theorising of the experience needs to be exhibited.St Augustine does this, as described, almost exasperatedly, by R. Elbaz (1988), whois expecting a different view of time. Both Le Doeuff and Walkerdine consider andreturn to incidents in their lives as they develop their arguments. Walkerdine,especially, explicitly uses earlier and later understandings of a particular experience,and the difference between them, in order to understand the experience and thepsychological theory.

If the autobiography is to conform to the methodological principles, the inclusionof perspectives drawn from political groupings is needed. Very often these perspec-tives are implicit. This makes the work of use, but only of limited use. St Augustine'sConfessions (Chadwick, 1991) has been a major source for social history as well asfor theology. Theologians can make use of the social history elements to inform theirtheology. St Augustine, himself, pays no attention to political groupings—notsurprisingly in the 5th century. He has no consciousness that he talks as a man, forinstance. On the other hand, Le Doeuff uses gender as an organising concept, whilerecognising other divisions. Walkerdine uses both gender and class. For both womenthese organising divisions are fundamental to the theory they develop.

VIII. Light Thrown on the Puzzle Described in Section III

In Section VII referred to the use of autobiography in epistemology. But the focusof the article is on '(auto)biography' Or 'life-narrative': is 'life-narrative' the same as'autobiography'? Indeed, it may be thought that St Augustine, Walkerdine and LeDoeuff are not good examples of 'autobiography'.

We share an idea of autobiography. It is not always realised how specific the ideais to our time and culture. Firstly, the concept of an autobiography is a recent one.The word appears in the English language for the first time in 1809 (whereas theword 'biography' goes back to the Greeks). Rousseau, for instance, in 1781, beganhis Confessions (Cohen, 1953) with an explanation (p. 17):

I have resolved on an enterprise which has no precedent, and which, oncecomplete, will have no imitator. My purpose is to display to my kind aportrait in every way true to nature, and the man I shall portray will bemyself.

Secondly, his confessional mode, focused on himself, is very different from, say, StAugustine's. The idea that confession is a direct expression of experience, truth andself-knowledge is historically and culturally specific, as Foucault has argued con-vincingly in his series of books on sexuality.

Much critical attention has been given to the definition of an 'autobiography'. The

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86 M. Griffiths

standard view is that the more personal, confessional and true the autobiography, thecloser it is to the ideal. It is, of course, possible to find what are now regarded asautobiographies which were written earlier than the 19th century, even though theywere not named as such by the authors or readers. For instance St Augustine andAl-Ghazzali wrote in the 5th and 12th centuries, respectively. However, it is oftenclaimed that Rousseau was right in his belief that his enterprise had no precedent.His Confessions are held to be the first true autobiography. The reasons for the claimare that Rousseau set out to write about his own personal feelings as an individualand in doing this he used the (modern) confessional mode.

The standard view of 'autobiography' is now being brought into question as otherforms of autobiographical writing attract critical interest. For instance, autobiograph-ical writing may be focused on political or social considerations. The point here isthe significance of the fact that the authors are aware of the social and politicalconsiderations. The interest in the individual may be subordinate in interest to thepolitical considerations, as in Latin American testimonies or American slave narra-tives. Alternatively the inclusion of social and political material together maydemonstrate how the author is partly constructed by the social and political.Autobiographical writing may include fantasy, showing how subjectivity depends onthe myths and stories current in a culture. Similarly, the author may refer to the selfas a fictional being.

Secondly, there may be a movement away from the depiction of a life as linear andunified. This may be the result of the autobiography taking the form of a journal orjottings. It may also be done self-consciously. Fragments can be jumbled or thereader invited to read in the order which suits them. Fantasy may be included for thisreason. On the one hand, the use of myths and stories is a way of uniting fragmentsof experience, but on the other, a single fragment of experience can be framed by twoor more myths or stories at the same time.

Finally, there may be an intention to blur the boundaries of the self with otherpeople known personally to the writer. The result is that autobiography and biogra-phy can be blurred into each other, by talking about the self in the third person,almost as a character, or by writing about another, biographically, to give meaningto the autobiography. An autobiography may be premised on the assumption that anindividual's life and self are inextricable from the lives and selves of others. Anotherblurring of the boundaries occurs when one person tries to write the autobiographyof another, trying to write as that person would write, from the inside, withoutinterpretation (even while recognising that this is impossible), so that their autobi-ography can be told.

It is clear that when autobiography is interpreted widely, it subsumes the otherforms of life-narrative. In particular, biography has been shown to overlap withautobiography, especially when it is used for theoretical purposes. It is often difficultto tell where one starts and the other ends. The term '(auto)biography' n a s j j e e n

coined to express this. It is clear now why I said in Section II that understood widely,'(auto)biography', encompasses the other forms of 'life-narrative': oral history,journals, diaries and logs, dialogic and reflective (auto)biography, including thatwhich makes use of fantasy.

I shall continue to use the term 'life-narrative' and '(auto)biography' interchange-ably. It is important to note, however, that although 'life-narrative' and'(auto)biography' can be used in a way that makes them synonymous, doing so canbe misleading. The critical discussion of non-standard autobiographies is esoteric.

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(Auto)Biography and Epistemology 87

Most people assume they understand the term 'autobiography'—and may easilyassume that they understand '(auto)biography'. They are likely to be more cautiousin the interpretation of 'life-narrative'. It is likely someone asked to use 'autobiogra-phy' will assume that the result should be personal, confessional, individualistic,atheoretical and non-political. They would, in fact, produce exactly the kind ofwriting which is not so useful in the production of knowledge. As Razack says, inher excellent article on the role of story in the construction of knowledge byoppressed groups (1993, p. 56):

There are landmines strewn across the path wherever story-telling is used... it should never be used uncritically

We can now draw some epistemological implications. '(Auto)biography' (when itfulfils certain criteria) appears to solve epistemological problems thrown up by thecritiques of traditional epistemology. At present, it appears to be a good technique,epistemologically sound, if the methodological principles are used systematically. (Ifthey are not, there is indeed a danger that any of the practices introduced in SectionII will be merely anecdotal.) However, the soundness remains in question. There isa need for further testing and criticism over the years, because epistemology andmethodological principles need to be developed in conjunction with the use ofparticular techniques, as explained in Section IV.

The principles introduced in this article are not enough on their own. On their ownthey do not constitute a complete epistemology. While they are needed if knowledgeis to be reliable and useful, they are coherent with a number of mutually competingepistemologies. Thus decisions still have to be taken over the validity of, forinstance, empirical, interpretative, post-modern or action-research approaches—or ofsome combination of them.

There are further questions for educational research, because of the need todistinguish teacher education and research. It is obvious that there may be pedagog-ical reasons for including '(auto)biographical' methods. For instance, it is oftenclaimed that they are useful for motivating students, or a good way of linking theoryand practice. However, the distinction does not hold where teacher education isresearch-based. The argument of this article shows that pedagogical methods may beresearch-based, even where they were introduced for pedagogical reasons.

The answer to the students described in the Introduction of the article has indeedbeen a long one. On a postcard, it might appear: 'Yes, because ultimately knowledgecan only be produced through the careful consideration of individual experience. Butbe warned! Your experience is not enough on its own. You will need to use itcarefully: bearing in mind relevant theory and your political position. And you willhave to be prepared to reflect and re-think your understanding of the experience overtime.'

Correspondence: Dr Morwenna Griffiths, School of Education, University of Not-tingham, Nottingham NG7 2RD, UK.

NOTES

[1] For more detail of this view of possibilities for changing language see Griffiths (1992).[2] I have used a less detailed version of this argument to show how these criteria can be applied to the

particular case of a reflective journal in Griffiths (1994).

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