auvsi europe 2009 - finding common ground - final

FindingCommonGround:AValueFocusedApproachto

MilitaryUASAirspaceIntegration

LukeC.G.Cropsey,Major,USAF

PhoneNumber:49‐711‐680‐6498

Email:[email protected]

Introduction

Integrating unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) into nonsegregated1 airspace is a topic of

muchdebateandsignificantenergy,particularlywithrespecttomilitaryoperations.This

paperappliesleading‐edgeresearchinenterprisearchitectingandvaluefocusedthinking

toexaminethedevelopmentofalternativeapproaches to theU.S.military’sUASairspace

integration challenge. The motivation for this research drew upon several years of

experiencetheauthorhadinattemptingtocoordinateandintegratemultipleU.S.military

and other government agencies in an effort to secure wider operational use of

nonsegregatedairspaceformilitaryUASoperations.

Figure1providesagraphicalperspectiveonwhatfullyintegratedmilitaryUASoperations

in nonsegregated airspace might look like. The author’s experience suggested the

challenges at hand were significantly broader than just the technological hurdles.

Capturingthecomplexitiesandmotivationsofeachofthekeyplayersprovedtobeakeyin

chartingacourseforward.Thispaperisabriefoverviewdescribingtheapproach,analysis

and recommendations for moving the integration of military UAS into nonsegregated

1 Nonsegregated airspace, as used in this article, refers to civil airspace that is open togeneralaviationuseandnotrestrictedtomilitaryonlyoperations.

FindingCommonGround:AValueFocusedApproachtoMilitaryUASIntegration

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airspaceforwardwithinthecontextofU.S.nationalairspacewiththehopethattheissues

and principles described in the approach may find some broader applicability in the

internationalenvironment.

Figure1.APerspectiveonIntegratedUASOperations.[1]

Approach

TheapproachtakeninthisresearchwastoidentifyaspecificsetofUASplatforms(inthis

case, high‐ and medium‐altitude U.S. Air Force UAS2) and the key organizational

stakeholdersinvolvedintheapprovalprocessesforthoseUAStooperateinnonsegregated

airspace. A value focused, enterprise framework provided the basis for key stakeholder

2U.S.AirForceUASwerechosenasarepresentativesetofplatformswithwhichtoconductthisstudy.ThechallengesandresultspresentedinthisresearcharenotuniquetotheU.S.AirForce.Theyprovideawell‐scopedcontextforarealworldforcestructurewhilebeingrepresentativeofchallengesfacedacrosstheunmannedaircraftcommunity.


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interviews,dataanalysis,andsynthesisofalternativesolutions. Keeney[2]describesthe

valuefocusedapproachinthefollowingway:

"...value focused thinking suggests a different paradigm for addressing decisions

from the standard alternative‐focused thinking paradigm. It is different in three

importantways. First,significanteffortisallocatedtoarticulatingvalues. Second,

thisarticulationofvaluesindecisionsituationscomesbeforeotheractivities.Third,

the articulated values are explicitly used to identify decisionopportunities and to

createalternatives.”

Keeney is contrastingavalue focusedapproach to thatof analternative‐focusedmethod

wheredecisionsaremadepredominatelyonthevarioussolutionsthatcometomindwhen

apersonisthinkingaboutaproblemthatneedstobesolvedinsteadofdeterminingwhat

theunderlying value is that needs to bedelivered as a result of solving a problem. The

issuethatoftenariseswithanalternative‐focusedapproachisthattheunderlyingproblem

thatneedstobeaddressedisalltoofrequentlydismissedaspeopleandorganizationsjump

straightintodiscussionsofpotentialalternativesolutionswithnoclearpictureofwhatthe

problemordesiredend‐statereally looks like. Whentheunderlyingvaluesandproblem

statements are not clearly understood across an enterprise with complex stakeholder

issues,thisoftenleadstoalotofactivitybutlittlerealprogressbecausesolutionsarebeing

discussed to different problems, often unknowingly. Conflictwithin the enterprise is an

almost inevitableresultofthiskindofapproach,andthedataconsistentlybearsthisout.

Value focused thinkingstays in theproblemspaceuntil a clearpictureof theproblem is

articulated—thenthehuntforalternativesolutionsbegins.


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ThemodelusedtoimplementthevaluefocusedapproachwasonedevelopedbyMurman

et al in Lean Enterprise Value [3] and depicted in Figure 2. At this level, themodel is

relativelystraightforward3.Theinitialfocuswasoncorrectlyidentifyingwhateachofthe

key stakeholders involved in the effort to integrate military UAS into nonsegregated

airspace valued from their unique perspectives (“value identification”). In otherwords,

whatwasthefundamentalproblemtheyneededtohavesolvedtodeclare“success”. The

next step required the development of alternative solutions that would simultaneously

provide each key stakeholder a significant level of value in exchange for the effort and

resourcescommittedtothepursuitofintegratingmilitaryUASintononsegregatedairspace

(“value proposition”). Viewed another way, this is an effort to seek out a solution to

simultaneouslysolveeachofthepreviousstep’sproblems.Thelaststepinvolvedcharting

a path from the current state of affairs to one in which the value proposition could be

constructedandthedesiredvaluedelivered(“valuedelivery”).Thisanswersthequestion

ofhowyougofromwhereyouaretowhereyouwanttobe.

3Giventhetimeandspaceconstraintsofthisarticle,thetreatmentofthemethodologyanddetailsconcerningthedatacollectionandanalysishavebeenleftoutofthediscussion.Forafulldevelopmentofwhatisrequiredtoimplementthevaluegenerationmodeldescribedin this paper, see “Integrating Military Unmanned Aircraft into the National AirspaceSystem: An Application of Value‐Focused Thinking and Enterprise Architecting” atreferencenumber[4]astheunderlyingbasisforthispaper.Thefullthesiscanbefoundatthefollowingwebsite:http://web.mit.edu/lcropsey/Public/Thesis/

Figure2.ValueGenerationFramework.


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ValueIdentification

The above approach resulted in the identification of a number of key stakeholder

organizations thatare central tomovingAirForcemilitaryUASairspace integration into

nonsegregatedairspaceforward.Figure3detailsthesekeyorganizationsandindividuals

withwhominterviewswereconductedtoelicittheunderlyingvaluesofeachorganization.

Figure3.KeyStakeholderOrganizations.

ThedatafromtheinterviewswereinputintoanAccessdatabasesotheinformationcould

be resorted and filtered along organizational lines, professional backgrounds, expertise,

etc. The results of this analysis yielded a number of obvious observations, and several

others that were not so obvious. Two primary categories emerged in the data: those

findings that suggested a difference of opinion or perspective between the various

organizations (Figure 4) and those findings that suggested a consensus existed on a

particulartopicorissue(Figure5).


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The differences in perspectives captured in Figure 4 were expected given the diverse

nature of the two primary organizations (the Department of Defense and the Federal

Aviation Administration). The difference that clearly dominates the others is that of

“Safety”.OnreasontheU.S.militarybuiltUASplatformswastoreducetheriskofloosinga

pilotduringoperations.Asaresult,thetypicalmilitaryperspectiveisthatlessinvestment

needs tobemade insystemreliabilityandredundancies,andmoreriskof failurecanbe

accepted in order to procure UAS at lower costs and for riskier missions. The Federal

AviationAdministration views the removal of thepilot from thephysical confines of the

flightdeckasareasontorequireadditionalsafeguardstoensuretheaircraftdoesnotpose

a danger to others flying in the same airspace. The same act (removing the physical

Figure4.DifferingPerspectivesofKeyStakeholders.


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presenceofthepilotfromtheflightdeck)resultsinoppositeperspectivesabouttheneed

for UAS safety precautions. The same logic can be followed for the other two primary

differences inperspective, those involving the “Hurdles” thatmustbeovercome inorder

forprogresstobemade,andthe“Perceptions”eachofthetwoprimaryorganizationshave

ofeachotherandtheattitudewithwhicheachisapproachingthechallengeofUASairspace

integration.

AsFigure5illustrates,therewerethreemainpointsonwhichconsensuswasevidentinthe

data collected during the interviews: the need for “Advocacy” by senior leadership, the

general“Approach”thatshouldbetakentoformulatingasolution,andthedesiredoverall

“End‐State” for integrated UAS operations in nonsegregated airspace. The consensus

Figure5.PointsofConsensusofKeyStakeholders.


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observed in the data on these points provides common ground for beginning to build a

basisforsuccessfulcooperationandastrategyformovingforward.

Figure6illustratestheresultsofthecompleteddataanalysisfortwokeystakeholders,the

UASmilitaryoperator(AirCombatCommand)andtheairspaceregulator(FederalAviation

Administration).Eachboxrepresentsaspecificitemofvaluetothatorganization,andthe

colorrepresentsthecurrentextenttowhichthatorganizationbelievesthevalue isbeing

delivered(blue=high,green=satisfactorily,yellow=marginally,red=marginally).Thisis

denoted by the vertical position on the graph. The value is also ranked by its relative

importancetothestakeholder,themostimportantvaluesoccurringfurthertotheright.

Figure6.CurrentValueDeliveryofTwoKeyStakeholders.

It is worth noting that these values and the extent of their delivery are taken from the

perspectiveoftheorganizationitself.Thisexercisewasrepeatedforeachkeystakeholder.

A successful effort occurs when all of the values articulated by each stakeholder are


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deliveredatanacceptablelevelofvalue.Thegoalofthenextphaseoftheanalysis,“Value

Proposition”,istoarchitectaconceptwherebythisgoalcanbeattained.

ValueProposition

Thisphaseoftheeffortrequirestheabilitytoseethesituationfromtheperspectiveofeach

ofthekeystakeholders,toputyourselfintotheirframework,andthenfocuscreativityon

generating alternative solutions for delivering value to each of the stakeholders. The

theoretical development needed in system and enterprise architecting will not be

addressedinthispaper,butthereaderisreferredtoreference[4]foracompletetreatment

ofthemethodologyusedtodeveloptheresultspresentedinthefollowingsection.

Inthemostgeneralsense,thegoalofthisphaseintheanalysisistoachievealignmentin

the values of each stakeholder with respect to the objectives of the effort. Significant

discussion and analysis revealed that the currentdefinition and scopeof activities being

pursuedbythekeystakeholderswerenotsufficientlyalignedtoprovidethevaluedelivery

each sought in return for their efforts. Figure 7 illustrates this disconnect by

demonstratinghowagivenUASlevelofperformancetranslatesintotwodifferentlevelsof

operational flexibility inmilitary controlled airspace versus civil controlled airspace. In

militaryairspace,thedecisiononoperationalflexibilityrevolvesaroundthecapabilitythe

UASbringstobearonthemissionobjectiveswhileweighingtherisktothemilitaryservice

member engaged in themission versus the risk ofmission non‐accomplishment. In the

civil airspace, the emphasis is on preserving the safety of the airspace users and

populationsonthesurface‐‐whilemaintainingthecapacityof theairspacetosupport the

ever‐increasingdemandsofboththenumberofaircraftandrequestedroutes.


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Figure7.Defining"OperationalFlexibility"fromDifferentPerspectives.

Theimmediateimpactofthesetwofundamentaldifferencesinthewaytheseorganizations

approachtheproblemisthelevelofoperationalflexibilityeachiswillingtoassigntoa

givenUASperformancelevel.Ingeneral,themilitaryiswillingtodrawsignificantlyhigher

levelsofoperationalflexibilityfromaUASthanthecivilregulatorduetothesedifferences

inunderlyingvaluesandobjectives.Thechallengeistoarriveatanobjectivethatboththe

militaryandtheFAAwillseeasdirectlycontributingtotheirprimaryvalueneeds.In

Figure7,the“Capability”axiswasusedasaproxyforthevaluesof“Training”and

“Operations”detailedinFigure6.Pastandcurrenteffortswerescopedtoenablethesetwo

militaryvalues.Unfortunately,thesetwomilitaryvaluesdonotinherentlycorrespondto

primaryFAAvalues.


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Figure8illustratesthelogicusedtore‐scopetheUASairspaceintegrationeffort,changing

theprimaryfocusfromthatof“Training”and“Operating”(Denotedinthefirstpartofthe

figureasthe“OriginGoal”oftheactivity)to“RestorethePrincipleofManeuver”inthe

secondpartofthefigure.Thisrepresentsafundamentalshiftinperceptionandexecution

ofasolution.Onthemilitaryside,“training”and“operating”arenotinandofthemselves

thepurposeforfieldingaUAS(theyaremeanstoanend).Ratheritistoachievesome

battlespaceeffectwhileconformingtoagivensetofconstraints(denotedinthesetof

boxesatthetopofeachoftheschematicsinFigure8).Themorefundamentalrequirement

forachievingthisbattlespaceeffectistheneedtorevitalizethe“PrincipleofManeuver”4on

theUAStoenabletheabilityofthemilitarytoFind,Fix,Track,Target,EngageandAssess

(F2T2EA)anenemyasset.

4The“principleofmaneuver”isahigher‐levelobjectiveofthemilitary–oneofnine“principlesofwar,”outlinedinU.S.militarydoctrine.Theprincipleofmaneuvercallsforplacingtheenemyinapositionofdisadvantagethroughtheflexibleapplicationofcombatpower.AsitrelatestotheUASissue,itcanbemorespecificallytiedtothosecharacteristicstraditionallyembodiedinairpower,requiringfreedomofnavigation,globalaccess,flexibilityandresponsiveness.Allofthesecharacteristicsdependontheprincipleofmaneuvertoenablethem,andallofthemaresignificantlylimitedincurrentlyfieldedUAS.

Figure8.AligningPurposetoValues.


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FromtheFAAperspective,trainingandoperatingwithUASdidnotaddresstheneedto

preservethesafetyorthecapacityoftheairspaceinanyintrinsicway(illustratedinthe

firstschematicinFigure8astheredboxtotheleft).Infact,onthefaceofit,allowing

militaryUASintononsegregatedairspaceactuallycausesadecreaseinthesafety,reducing

thecapacityoftheairspacetoaccommodateessentialmarginsinspaceandtime.The

extenttowhichtheFAAiswillingtoprovideadditionaloperationalflexibilitytoUAS

operationsisdirectlytiedtotheirperceptionofhowwelltheUAScandiscernlocalair

trafficandmaneuvertoavoidpotentialmid‐aircollisionsandrespondtoairtraffic

controllersre‐routingtheUAStoaccommodatethechangingairspacepicture.Thecurrent

FAAperceptionisthatthereisverylittleabilityonthepartoftheUAStomaneuverina

responsivewaytoavoidpotentialmidaircollisionthreatsortorespondtoFAAdirection

(botharelegalrequirementsforflightinnonsegregatedairspace).Bychangingthescope

oftheactivityto“RestoreManeuver”,boththemilitaryandtheFAAfindapurposethat

deliversthedesiredvaluefortheiractiveengagementontheissue.Inthisway,asingle

problemdefinition(“RestoreManeuver”)nowaddressesthefundamentalvalueorproblem

statementfromeachkeystakeholder.

ValueDelivery

Thefinalstepintheanalysiswastotaketheinsightsfromtheabovevalueidentification

andvaluepropositionsteps,considerthecurrentcontext,andthenarchitectapath

forwardthatwillprovidefortheconditionsneededforsuccessfulvaluedeliverytoeach

keystakeholderparticipatingintheeffort.Severalalternativearchitectureswere

consideredforthis,butonlythefinalarchitecturewillbediscussed.Onceagain,thereader

isreferredtoreference[4]foracompletedevelopmentoftheresultsofthisanalysis.


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TheoverallapproachformovingforwardisdepictedinFigure9.Thebackdroptothis

architectureisathreefoldpolicyputforwardbytheU.S.DepartmentofDefenseto1)Do

noharmintheairspace,2)Conformtotheexistingairspacestructureratherthan

attemptingtocreatenewtypesofairspace,and3)Settheprecedentforhowfuture

activitiesofasimilarnatureshouldbepursuedandtoprovideanexampleofasuccessful

endeavorforothercountriestouseasatemplate.

Figure9.ArchitectureforAchievingUASIntegrationintoNonsegregatedAirspace.

Constrainingthewayforwardistheneedtodeveloptheappropriatestandardsfor

consistentachievementofobjectivesandperformancemeasuresthattranslatedirectlyto

keystakeholdervaluedefinitions.Atthecenteroftheentirearchitectureisacollaborative

processinwhichallofthekeystakeholdersareequalpartnersinchartingacourse

forward.Thiscollaborativeprocessisbuiltonthethreepillarsofeffectiveorganization,

knowledge,andinformationtechnology.Theoverarchingstrategyisoneinwhichasetof

simplerulesareusedtoguidethedirectionandintentoftheeffort,andasetofcritical


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processesareputinplacebywhichtomakedecisionsortoestablishcriteriabywhich

decisionswillbemadeatsomefuturepoint.Alloftheseactionswillbetakenona

platform‐by‐platformproductdevelopmentbasisratherthantryingtocollectivelysolve

theentireproblemforalltypesofUASplatforms.

Thisprovidesaconvenient,top‐levelapproachforattackingthechallengespreviously

noted;however,itbecomesmuchmorecomplexasthedetailsforhowtoimplementthis

architectureareconsideredinlightofthemanyconstraintswithinwhichasolutionmust

bepursued(thesecontextspecificdetailsarenotconsideredhereforthesakeofspace).

Ratherthanprovidingthespecificsofacontextuallydependentsetofactions,anoverview

oftheenterprisetransformationprocessdevelopedbyNightingaleandSrinivasan[5]is

depictedinFigure10toprovidethereaderwiththescopeofactivitiesandtypesofissues

Figure10.EnterpriseTransformationProcess.


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thatmustbeaddressedinordertomoveaneffortfromitscurrentstatetooneenvisioned

bythevalueproposition.Withoutthisdetailedlevelofplanning,actuallyrealizingthelevel

ofdesiredvaluedeliverywillbearemotepossibility.

Conclusion

Insummary,thevalue‐focusedapproachimplementedinthisresearchprovedtobehighly

effectiveatidentifyingtheunderlyingvaluedefinitionswhileclearlydemonstratingthe

limitationsofthecurrentalternative‐focusedapproaches.Itnotonlyprovidedinsightinto

whytheexistingeffortstointegratemilitaryUASintononsegregatedairspacehavemet

withlessthanresoundingsuccess,butitalsoprovidedthebasisonwhichtogleanthe

insightsnecessarytorestructuretheeffortintoonethatshouldyieldmoresubstantive

resultsinthefuture.Thelynchpintofuturesuccesswillbetheextenttowhichtheeffort

canberecastaroundtheconceptof“maneuver”,andthedegreetowhichthekey

stakeholdersseethevalueinpursuingit.

References

1. RequirementsAnalysisActivityCenterUASAICONOPsBriefinginJIPTWorkingMeeting.DepartmentofDefense:Washington,DC.5June2007

2. Keeney, R.L.,Value-Focused Thinking: A Path to Creative Decisionmaking.1996,Cambridge MA:Harvard University Press.416.

3. Murman, E.,etal.,Lean Enterprise Value: Insights from MIT's Lean Aerospace Initiative.2002,New York, N.Y.:St. Martin's Press LLC Scholarly and Reference Division and Palgrave Publishers Ltd.343.

4. Cropsey, L.C.G.,Integrating Military Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the National Airspace System: An Application of Value-Focused Thinking and Enterprise Architecting,inEngineering Systems Division.2008,Massachusetts Institute of Technology:Cambridge, MA.p.422.http://web.mit.edu/lcropsey/Public/Thesis/

5. Nightingale, D.andJ. Srinivasan,Enterprise Transformation Roadmap.Massachusetts Institute of Technology,Cambridge, MA.2008

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