SUPREMEJUDICIALCOURT ReporterofDecisionsDecision: 2018ME81Docket: Som-17-352Argued: March7,2018Decided: June19,2018Panel: ALEXANDER,MEAD,GORMAN,JABAR,HJELM,andHUMPHREY,JJ.Majority: MEAD,GORMAN,JABAR,HJELM,andHUMPHREY,JJ.Dissent: ALEXANDER.J.

AVISRENTACARSYSTEM,LLCv.

DARRONBURRILLHUMPHREY,J.

[¶1] DarronBurrillappealsfromapartialsummaryjudgmententered

infavorofAvisRentACarSystem,LLC,onAvis’sclaimforbreachofcontract

in theDistrict Court (Skowhegan).1 Burrill challenges the court’s (Fowle, J.)

determination,issuedasapartialsummaryjudgment,thatheisliabletoAvis

for breach of contract and the court’s (E.Walker, J.) determinations of

damages and attorney fees, awarded after an evidentiary hearing. Avis

cross-appeals, challenging the court’s failure to award it pre- and

post-judgment interest. We affirm the partial summary judgment as to

1 The caption of the court’s order on Avis’s motion for partial summary judgment lists the

DistrictCourtlocationasAugustawhilethetextoftheorderstatesthatthehearingonthemotionwasheldattheDistrictCourt inSkowhegan. Because thismatterwasdocketedasaSkowhegancase,weassumethatthereferencetoAugustawasaclericalerror.

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liability forbreachofcontractbutvacate theawardofdamagesandremand

forfurtherproceedings.

I.BACKGROUND

[¶2]Thefollowingfactsrelatingtoliabilityaretakenfromtheparties’

statementsofmaterialfactandreflecttherecordasviewedinthelightmost

favorabletoBurrillasthenonprevailingparty.SeeOceanicInn,Inc.v.Sloan’s

Cove,LLC,2016ME34,¶25,133A.3d1021. Factsrelating toAvis’salleged

damagesareasfoundbythecourt.

[¶3] OnNovember 20, 2012,Burrill, aMaine resident, rented a2012

FordMustangfromanAvislocationinLasVegas,Nevada.Burrillexecuteda

Rental Agreement and Addendum and declined the loss damage waiver

protection that was offered to him. By declining the loss damage waiver,

Burrillagreedtoberesponsiblefor“alllossofordamagetothecarregardless

ofcause,orwho,orwhatcausedit.”Thatsameday,thevehiclewasdamaged

whenitwasinvolvedinanaccidentinLasVegas.

[¶4] According to Avis, the accident caused damages to the vehicle

totaling$15,342.57.AvissentdemandsforpaymenttoBurrillonJanuary16,

2013,April3,2013,andAugust14,2014,butBurrillfailedorrefusedtopay.

3

[¶5] Avis filed a complaint against Burrill in the District Court on

July20,2015, alleging breach of contract and negligence and seeking

damages.OnMarch31,2016,afterdiscoverywasconcluded,Avismovedfor

partial summary judgment to establish liability on the claim for breach of

contract. The court (Fowle,J.) held oral argument on the motion on

September29,2016.

[¶6]InitsordergrantingAvis’smotionforpartialsummaryjudgment,

thecourtnoted theparties’agreement that thecase iscontrolledbyNevada

substantivelawandMaineprocedural law.2 Thecourtthendeterminedthat

therewerenogenuineissuesofmaterialfactthat(1)thepartiesenteredinto

avalidandenforceablerentalcontract;(2)Burrillbreachedthatcontract;and

(3) “although the parties do dispute the extent of the damages sustained

duringthecourseoftheaccident. . .damagesdidindeedoccur.”Asaresult,

the court concluded that therewerenogenuine issuesofmaterial fact as to

theelementsoftheclaimforbreachofcontractandthatAviswasentitledto

partial summary judgment on the issue of liability as amatter of law. The

2 The rental agreement did not include a choice-of-law provision, but because the rental

agreementwasexecutedinNevadaandtheaccidenttookplaceinNevada,Nevadasubstantivelawapplied. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 188 (Am. Law Inst. 1971); see alsoStateFarmMut.AutoIns.Co.v.Koshy,2010ME44,¶46,995A.2d651.

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court granted the motion on October 5, 2016, and ordered a hearing on

damages.3

[¶7]IndisputeatthedamageshearingonMay18,2017,waswhether

the affidavit of damages executed by an Avis claims examiner included

inadmissiblehearsay. Severaldocumentswere attached to theaffidavit: the

rentalagreement;avehiclevaluationreportprepared forAvisby J.D.Power

and Associates; a bill for towing the damaged vehicle; and a record of the

vehicle’s salvage value. Burrill objected to the admissionof the affidavit on

theground that, other than the rental agreement, the attachmentswere not

“businessrecords”pursuanttothehearsayexceptioninM.R.Evid.803(6).At

thehearing,thecourt(E.Walker,J.)acceptedtheaffidavitwithitsattachments

debeneanddidnotthenruleonitsadmissibility.Avisthencalledawitnessto

testifyabouttheamountofdamages,butBurrillobjectedbecausetheidentity

ofthetestifyingwitnesshadnotbeendisclosedpriortothehearing.Because

thewitnessAvishadpreviouslyidentifiedtoBurrillwasunabletoattend,Avis

broughtadifferentwitness to thehearing. Thecourtdeclined toaccept the

testimonyofthewitnesspresent.Beforethehearingconcluded,Avisoffereda

repair estimate as evidence of damages if the court determined that the

3 Thedaybefore thedamageshearing,Avismovedtodismiss itsnegligenceclaim. Thecourtgrantedthemotionatthehearing.

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attachments to theaffidavit—specifically thevehicle valuationreport—were

inadmissible. Again, Burrill objected on the basis of hearsay, and again the

courttookthesubmissiondebene,reservingitsrulingonitsadmissibility.

[¶8] In its order on damages, the court determined that the

attachments to the affidavit, although containing hearsay, satisfied the

businessrecordsexception. Thecourtdevotedmostof itsdiscussion to the

vehicle valuation report.4 The report was not prepared by the affiant, but

instead by a third party, J.D. Power and Associates. The valuation report

purported to provide the market value of the vehicle prior to the loss by

taking into account the value of comparable vehicles with similar mileage

locatedinasimilargeographicarea,aswellasanydamagetothevehicleprior

totheloss.Theaffiantcertifiedthatthereportwaskeptintheregularcourse

ofAvis’sbusiness,thattheaffiantmaintainedthereportaspartofherduties

asaclaimsexaminerforAvis,andthatitwasmadereasonablysoonafterthe

incident. The court determined that therewas sufficient foundation for the

admissibilityoftheaffidavitandalloftheattachments.

4Therentalagreementstatedthatintheeventofdamage,therenterofthevehicle“willpayour

estimated repair cost, or if, in our sole discretion, we determine to sell the car in its damagedcondition, you will pay the difference between the car’s retail fair market value before it wasdamagedandthesaleproceeds.”

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[¶9]Basedontheinformationintheaffidavit,thecourtconcludedthat

thedamagesand fees claimedbyAviswere reasonable andgrantedAvis its

requestedamountof $15,342.57. It also grantedAvis attorney fees totaling

$5,985.00andcosts in theamountof $433.24. Thecourtdeclined toaward

Avispre-orpost-judgmentinterest.

[¶10] Burrillappealed,challengingboththegrantofAvis’smotionfor

partial summary judgment and theawardofdamages. Avis cross-appealed,

challengingthecourt’s failuretoaward it interestandcosts intheamountit

requested.

II.DISCUSSION

A. BreachofContract

[¶11] Burrill first challenges the court’s grant of partial summary

judgmentontheissueofbreachofcontract. “Wereviewatrialcourt’sgrant

of a summary judgmentdenovo, considering theevidence in the lightmost

favorabletothenonprevailingparty.Summaryjudgmentisproperlygranted

if the record reflects that there is no genuine issue ofmaterial fact and the

movantisentitledtoajudgmentasamatteroflaw.”OceanicInn,2016ME34,

¶25,133A.3d1021(citationomitted)(quotationmarksomitted).

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[¶12]Inorderforaplaintifftosucceedinaclaimforbreachofcontract,

Nevadalawrequiresaplaintifftoshow“(1)theexistenceofavalidcontract,

(2)abreachbythedefendant,and(3)damageasaresultofthebreach.”Saini

v. Int’l Game Tech., 434 F. Supp. 2d 913, 919-20 (D. Nev. 2006) (citing

Richardsonv.Jones,1Nev.405,408(1865)).

[¶13] The parties agreed on the following material facts: (1) Burrill

rentedacar fromAvisonNovember20,2012; (2) thevehiclewasdamaged

on November 20, 2012, when it was involved in an accident in Las Vegas;

(3)in the rental agreement, Burrill had waived the loss damage protection

andthereforeagreedtobe“responsible...foralllossofordamagetothecar

regardlessof cause, orwho, orwhatcaused it”; (4)Avis sentBurrill several

demands for payment of the alleged damages prior to the lawsuit; and (5)

Burrill failed or refused to pay the amount demanded. Because Burrill

admittedthatthecarwasdamagedinanaccidentwhile itwasrentedunder

his name in a contractual arrangement that made him responsible for any

damage to the car, and acknowledged that he refused to pay the amount

demanded by Avis, there was no genuine issue of material fact that Burrill

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breached the rental agreement by failing to pay Avis after the car was

damaged.5

[¶14] Because there were no genuine issues of material fact as to

(1)theexistenceofavalidcontract;(2)breachofthatcontract;and(3)some

amount of damage as a result of the breach, we affirm the grant of Avis’s

motionforpartialsummaryjudgmentastoliability.SeeM.R.Civ.P.56(c)(“A

summaryjudgment,interlocutoryincharacter,mayberenderedontheissue

of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of

damages.”).

B. Damages

[¶15]Althoughtherewasnogenuineissueofmaterialfactthatdamage

did indeedoccur, thepartiesdisputed theextentof thedamages,prompting

the court to order a hearing to determine the specific amount of damages.

Burrillarguesthatthecourterredandabuseditsdiscretionwhenitadmitted,

pursuanttothebusinessrecordsexceptiontothehearsayrule,theaffidavitof

5 The trial court’s analysis of thebreach element focused largelyon thequestionofwhetherBurrill’sgirlfriend,whothepartiesagreewasdrivingthevehicleatthetimeoftheaccident,wasanunauthorizeddriveraccording to the termsof therentalagreement. The court rejectedBurrill’scontention that a conversation he allegedly had with an Avis clerk prior to renting the vehiclecreated genuine issues of material fact on the ground that evidence regarding the allegedconversationwouldbebarredbytheparolevidencerule.SeeKlabackav.Nelson,394P.3d940,949(Nev.2017).ThisremainsBurrill’smainargumentonappeal.Itisaredherring,however.EvenifBurrill’sgirlfriendwasanauthorizeddriver,heisstillcontractuallyresponsibleforthedamagetothecar.ByfailingtopayforthedamageafterAvissentdemandsforpayment,Burrillbreachedthecontract.

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anAvisrepresentativeanditsattachments6asthesoleevidenceoftheamount

ofdamages.SeeM.R.Evid.803(6).7

[¶16] “When admission of evidence under the business records

exception to the hearsay rule is challenged, we review a trial court’s

foundationalfindingstosupportadmissibilityforclearerroranditsultimate

determination of admissibility for an abuse of discretion.” JPMorgan Chase

Bank,N.A.v.Lowell,2017ME32,¶8,156A.3d727(quotationmarksomitted).

“Business records are hearsay and therefore inadmissible pursuant to M.R.

Evid. 802 unless they meet the requirements of the business records

exception in M.R. Evid. 803(6).” KeyBank Nat’l Ass’n v. Estate of Quint,

2017ME 237, ¶ 14, 176 A.3d 717 (quotation marks omitted). Rule 803(6)

providesfortheadmissibilityofabusinessrecordif

(A) The record was made at or near the time by—or frominformationtransmittedby—someonewithknowledge;(B) The recordwas kept in the courseof a regularly conductedactivityofabusiness,organization,occupation,orcalling,whetherornotforprofit;

6Burrilldidnotobjecttotheadmissionoftherentalagreementasabusinessrecord.

7 AlthoughweapplyNevadacontract law in thiscase, the local lawof the forumgoverns theadmissibilityofevidence. SeeRestatement(Second)ofConflictofLaws§138;seealsoBeaulieuv.Beaulieu,265A.2d610,612(Me.1970);Holyokev.EstateofHolyoke,110Me.469,477,87A.40,45(Me. 1913). We therefore apply the Maine Rules of Evidence when determining whether thebusinessrecordsexceptionappliestotheattachmentstotheaffidavit.

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(C)Makingtherecordwasaregularpracticeofthatactivity;(D) All these conditions are shown by the testimony of thecustodian or another qualifiedwitness, or by a certification thatcomplies with Rule 902(11), Rule 902(12) or with a statutepermittingcertification;and(E) Neither the source of information nor the method orcircumstancesofpreparationindicatealackoftrustworthiness.[¶17] Here, the affiant sought to certify the business records by

affidavit pursuant to Rules 803(6)(D) and 902(11). “[S]ubdivision 11 of

Rule902 makes it possible to lay the foundation for domestic business

records without the need to call a live witness.”8 Field & Murray, Maine

Evidence§902.11at554(6thed.2007).

[¶18] Aperson certifying the records pursuant toRule902(11)must

stillbeaqualifiedwitness,however. SeeM.R.Evid.803(6),902(11). Aswe

have previously explained, “[a] qualifiedwitness is onewhowas intimately

8 M.R.Evid.902(11)requires thatthepartyseeking tocertifybusinessrecords inaccordance

withtherulemust,beforethetrialorhearing,providetheadversepartywithreasonablewrittennotice of the intent to offer the record andmustmake the record and certification available forinspection. Thepurposeofthenoticerequirementistoensurethattheadverseparty“hasafairopportunity to object to the authenticity of the record or on the basis of hearsay.” SeeM.R.Evid.902(11).Thereisnoindicationintherecordwhethernoticewasprovided,butattheoutsetof thehearing,BurrillappearedtohavebeenawareofAvis’splantouse theaffidavitasproofofdamages.NeitheratthehearingortoushasBurrillobjectedtotheaffidavitbasedonlackofnoticepursuanttoM.R.902(11);hisobjectionswereandaretotheattachmentstotheaffidavit.Theruleprovides that, “[i]n the event of an adverse party’s objection to a record offered under thisparagraph, the courtmay in the interests of justice refuse to accept the certification under thisparagraphand require thepartyoffering the record toprovide appropriate foundationbyotherevidence.”M.R.Evid.902(11).Thecourtdidnotdosoatthehearing,andonappeal,Burrilldoesnotchallengethecourt’sfailuretodoso.

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involvedinthedailyoperationofthebusinessandwhosetestimonyshowed

thefirsthandnatureofhisknowledge”butwho“neednotbeanemployeeof

the record’s creator.” Estate of Quint, 2017 ME 237, ¶ 15, 176 A.3d 717

(quotationmarksomitted). Whererecordsarecreatedbyonebusiness and

then transmitted toanother, therecordswillbeadmissiblepursuant toM.R.

Evid.803(6) “if the foundational evidence from the receiving entity’s

employee is adequate to demonstrate that the employee had sufficient

knowledgeofbothbusinesses’regularpracticestodemonstratethereliability

andtrustworthinessoftheinformation.”BeneficialMe.Inc.v.Carter,2011ME

77, ¶13, 25 A.3d 96. In order to satisfy the requirements for the business

records exception in the circumstances of this case, the witness must

demonstrateknowledgethat

• theproduceroftherecordatissueemployedregularbusinesspractices for creating andmaintaining the records that weresufficiently accepted by the receiving business to allowrelianceontherecordsbythereceivingbusiness;

• theproduceroftherecordatissueemployedregularbusinesspracticesfortransmittingthemtothereceivingbusiness;

• by manual or electronic processes, the receiving businessintegrated the records into its own records and maintainedthemthroughregularbusinessprocesses;

• therecordatissuewas,infact,amongthereceivingbusiness’sownrecords;and

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• thereceivingbusinessreliedontheserecordsinitsday-to-dayoperations.

EstateofQuint,2017ME237,¶16,176A.3d717(quotationmarksomitted).

[¶19]Here,thecertificationoftheAvisrepresentativefailedtoprovide

the foundational predicate necessary for admission in evidence of the

attachedvehiclevaluationreport.SeeDeutscheBankNat’lTrustCo.v.Eddins,

2018 ME 47, ¶13, 182 A.3d 1241. The affiant certified that the vehicle

valuationreportwas(1)abusinessrecordkeptwithinAvis’sclaimfileforthe

incident; (2)maintained aspartofher duties as a claimsexaminer forAvis;

(3) kept in the regular course of Avis’sbusiness and as part of its regularly

conducted activity; and (4) made reasonably soon after the incident.

However,becausetheaffiantdidnotcertifythatshehadanyknowledgeofJ.D.

PowerandAssociates’s regularbusinesspractices,she failed to layaproper

foundation for the reportpursuant toRule803(6), and the court abused its

discretion by admitting the document in evidence. See id.¶14. For these

same reasons, the affiant failed to lay a proper foundation for the towing

invoiceandsalvageproceedsdocumentation9aswell.10

9AsBurrillpointsout,evenifthesalvageproceedsdocumentationwereadmissible,thatrecord

ismeaninglesswithoutthemarketvalueofthevehicleprovidedinthevehiclevaluationreport.

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[¶20] Further, the affidavit was used to accomplish more than is

contemplated by Rule 902(11). In addition to Avis’s attempt to lay the

foundationfortheadmissionoftheattachmentspursuanttoRule803(6),the

affidavitset forth thebasis forotherportionsof thedamagesawardaswell.

Notonlydid the affiantprovide theamountallegedlydue for thedamage to

the vehicle itself and the towing fee, she also listed a loss-of-use fee of

$1,238.79, title and license fees in the amount of $101.80, and an

administrativefeeof$150.00.Althoughtherentalagreementstatedthatthe

signatorytotheagreementwouldberequiredtopayforsuchfeesintheevent

ofdamagetothevehicle,noneoftheotherattachmentspurportedtoprovide

a basis for the specific amounts of those fees. A certification submitted

pursuanttoRule902(11)canonlylaythefoundationforabusinessrecord;it

is not a device to provide a basis for damages that are not included in the

attachedbusinessrecords.11 SeeField&Murray,MaineEvidence§902.11at

10 Theaffiantproperlycertifiedtherentalagreement,however. Therentalagreement,unlike

the vehicle valuation report, the towing invoice, and the salvage proceeds documentation, waspreparedbyAvisandmeets the requirementsofRules803(6)and902(11). Because itwasnotprepared by a third party and because the affiant laid the proper foundation pursuant to Rule902(11), the rental agreementwouldbe admissible. Although the rental agreement informs thesignatoryofthetypesoffeesandcostsheorshewillincurintheeventofdamagetoorlossofthevehicle, it does not provide the specific amountsof those fees and costs. The rental agreementalonethereforecannotprovideabasisforthedamagesawardsoughtbyAvis.

11 Therefore,paragraphs3and4oftheaffidavit—whichprovidethetotalamountofdamagessufferedbyAvisandalistoffeesandcoststhatcomprisethattotal—arenotcertificationspursuanttoRule902(11)andarethusinadmissiblehearsay.SeeM.R.Evid.801(c),802.

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554. Because Avis presented no admissible evidence12 as to the amount of

damages,itfailedtoproveitwasentitledtothedamagesawardedtoit.

[¶21] According to Nevada contract law, when a plaintiff has

established liability on behalf of the defendant in a claim for breach of

contractbuthas failed to provideproof for the specific amountofdamages,

theplaintiffisentitledonlytonominaldamages.13SeeGramanzv.T-Shirts&

Souvenirs, 894 P.2d 342, 347 (Nev. 1995); Commercial Cabinet Co. v. Mort

Wallin of Lake Tahoe, 737P.2d 515, 517 (Nev. 1987) (explaining that “[a]

plaintiffwhoprovesarighttodamageswithoutprovingtheamountaswellis

only entitled tonominaldamages”);Richardson, 1Nev. at408.BecauseAvis

established liability on behalf of Burrill but failed to prove the amount of

actual damages, we vacate the court’s award of damages and remand with

instructionsforthecourttoawardAvisnominaldamagesinaccordancewith

Nevada law. Further, given that Avis will be entitled to an award of only

12Avisalsoofferedarepairestimateattheconclusionofthedamageshearing“ifthefairmarket

value report were to be rejected.” The repair estimate, like the fair market value report, wasprepared by a third party. There was no reference to the repair estimate in the affidavit ofdamages,nordidanAvisrepresentativetestifytoanypersonalknowledgeofthebusinesspracticesofthecompanythatpreparedtherepairestimate.Therefore,therepairestimatewouldlikelyhavebeen inadmissible hearsay as well. See Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Eddins, 2018 ME 47,¶14,182A.3d1241.

13 Nominaldamagesaredefinedas “[a] triflingsum”andare“awarded for the infractionofalegal right,where theextentofthe loss isnotshown.” NominalDamages,Black’sLawDictionary(10thed.2014)(quotationmarksomitted).“Theobtainingofnominaldamageswillalso,inmanycases,entitleaplaintifftocosts.”Id.(quotationmarksomitted).

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nominaldamages,wevacate the awardof attorney fees toAvis to allow the

courtonremandtodeterminewhetherandtowhatextentattorneyfeesare

properinthiscasepursuanttotherentalagreement.

[¶22] Finally, we reach the issue raised in Avis’s cross-appeal of

whether the court erredwhen it failed to award it interest pursuant to the

expresstermsoftherentalagreement.BecauseNevadacontractlawapplies

inthiscase,Nevadalawalsogovernstherecoveryofinterest.SeeRoc-Century

Assocs.v.Giunta,665A.2d220,221(Me.1995);seealsoRestatement(Second)

of Conflict of Laws § 207 & cmt. e (Am. Law Inst.1971). On remand, we

instruct the court to apply Nevada law to determine whether and to what

extentinterestshouldbeawardedtoAvis.

Theentryis:

Partial summary judgment affirmed. Awardofdamages vacated. Remanded for furtherproceedingsconsistentwiththisopinion.

ALEXANDER,J.,dissenting. [¶23]IconcurintheCourt’sholdingaffirmingthetrialcourt’sgrantof

partialsummaryjudgmentdeterminingthatDarronBurrillisliableforbreach

of contract as a result of his allowing an unauthorized driver to damage a

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vehicle owned by Avis Rent a Car System, LLC. With liability decided, the

Courtrecognizes that therearenogenuine issuesofmaterial fact that there

was“someamountofdamageasaresultofthebreach.”Court’sOpinion¶14.

[¶24] The amount of damage, including some amounts that do not

appear to be disputed, is established by the affidavit submitted by the Avis

claims representative. The Court references M.R. Evid. 902(11) to suggest

that Avis may have given insufficient notice of its intention to rely on the

affidavit to prove a point without calling a live witness. Court’s Opinion

¶17n.8. As theCourt’s opinion recognizes,Aviswasprepared topresent a

live witness to support its damages evidence, but the live witness was,

erroneouslyinmyview,excludedbythetrialcourt.Court’sOpinion¶7.

[¶25] The Court approves the use of the affidavit, recognizing that,

pursuant to M.R. Evid. 902(11), it is possible to lay the foundation for

admission of a business record, M.R. Evid. 803(6), without a live witness.

Court’s Opinion ¶20. I respectfully dissent from that part of the Court’s

opinionholdingthatportionsoftheaffidavitandsupportingexhibitsprovided

bytheAvisclaimsrepresentative,whowasassignedtovaluetheclaimandbe

a custodian of the records related to the claim, do not qualify as business

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recordspursuanttoM.R.Evid.803(6),andthusmaynotsupportawardofany

damagesinthismatter.

[¶26] “Business records are hearsay and therefore inadmissible

pursuanttoM.R.Evid.802unlesstheymeettherequirementsofthebusiness

recordsexceptioninM.R.Evid.803(6).”KeyBankNat’lAss’nv.EstateofQuint,

2017ME237,¶14,176A.3d717.Whenadmissionofevidenceasabusiness

record is challenged, we review the trial court’s foundational findings to

support admissibility for clear error and its ultimate determination of

admissibilityforanabuseofdiscretion. JPMorganChaseBank,N.A.v.Lowell,

2017ME32,¶8,156A.3d727;MidlandFundingLLCv.Walton,2017ME24,

¶18,155A.3d864.

[¶27]M.R.Evid.Rule803(6)authorizestheadmissibilityofabusiness

recordif

(A) The record was made at or near the time by—or frominformationtransmittedby—someonewithknowledge;(B) The recordwas kept in the courseof a regularly conductedactivityofabusiness,organization,occupation,orcalling,whetherornotforprofit;(C)Makingtherecordwasaregularpracticeofthatactivity;(D) All these conditions are shown by the testimony of thecustodian or another qualifiedwitness, or by a certification that

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complies with Rule 902(11), Rule 902(12) or with a statutepermittingcertification;and(E) Neither the source of information nor the method orcircumstancesofpreparationindicatealackoftrustworthiness.[¶28] The purpose of the business records exception is “to allow the

consideration of a business record, without requiring firsthand testimony

regarding the recorded facts, by supplying a witness whose knowledge of

businesspractices forproductionand retentionof the record is sufficient to

ensurethereliabilityandtrustworthinessoftherecord.”BeneficialMe.Inc.v.

Carter,2011ME77,¶12,25A.3d96. Important for thiscase, “[t]heaffiant

whose statements are offered to establish the admissibility of a business

record...neednotbeanemployeeoftherecord’screator.”Id.¶13.Thus,“if

the records,” in this case vehicle valuation records, “were received and

integrated into another business’s records and were relied upon in that

business’sday-to-dayoperations,anemployeeofthereceivingbusinessmay

beaqualifiedwitness.”Id.

[¶29] A qualified witness must demonstrate knowledge that the

producerof the recordused regularbusinesspractices to create the record;

the receiving business integrated the record into its own records and

maintained them through regular business processes; and the receiving

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businessreliedon theserecords in itsday-to-dayoperation. See id.¶14. If

theaffiantdemonstratestherequisiteknowledge,recordscreatedbyanother

source,applying its regularbusinesspractice,willbeadmissiblepursuant to

M.R.Evid.803(6).Id.

[¶30] The Avis representative’s affidavit of damages bases its

informationonseveralsources, not just the J.D.Powerreport focusedonby

the Court. There is no dispute that the Avis representative assembled and

possessedthebusinessrecordsandthatshe,herself,calculatedthedamages

amountsassertedbyAvisandfoundbythetrialcourt.

[¶31]TheAvisrecordsincludeacopyofaninvoicefor$155fortowing

chargesincurredbyAvis. Acopyofthat invoiceis includedintheappendix.

Other than a generalized hearsay objection, there is no dispute indicated in

the record that the towing chargewas incurred, thatAviswasbilled for the

charge, that the bill was paid, or that the bill was made a part of Avis’s

business records in the regular course of Avis’s business. Accordingly, the

towing charge being part of Avis’s business records, therewas no apparent

basistoobjecttothetrialcourt’suseofthe$155towingchargeincalculating

thetotaldamagesamount.

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[¶32] Therealsoappearstobenodisputeaboutthecalculationofthe

salvageproceedsforthevehicleintheamountof$6,905.

[¶33]Theprimarydisputerelatestothecalculationofthefairmarket

value of the vehicle at the time of the loss,which the claims representative

assertedwas$20,601.98.ThisclaimisbasedonaJ.D.Power/MitchellVehicle

ValuationReport attachedasExhibitB to theAvis representative’s affidavit.

This report demonstrates that it is based on a review of documentary

evidence, including vehicle valuations for comparable vehicles available for

saleintheLasVegasarea.ThesevaluationsaredrawnfromAutoTrader.com,

Cars.com and other sources, including dealer contacts. Most of the report

appears to reflect document-based reviews, necessary considering the very

fast time forpreparationof thevaluationreportprovided to theAvisclaims

representative.

[¶34] The trial court found that the Avis representative reasonably

relied on the J.D. Power report in reaching her conclusions regarding the

vehiclevaluationandthatthevehiclevaluationreportwasadmissibleaspart

of theAvis business records pursuant toM.R. 803(6) after finding that “the

Affidavit provide[d] a sufficient foundation for the reliability and

trustworthinessofthereport.”Thecourtbasedthatfindingonthefollowing

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observations: thevehicle valuation reportwasmadewithin two daysof the

accident;preparingandmaintaining sucha reportwouldbe in theordinary

courseofbusinessforaclaimsrepresentativeatacar-rentalcompany,whose

jobit istocreateacompleteandreliablerecordofthedamagetoacar;and

nothing indicated that the report was prepared in an unusual or

untrustworthyway. The court also referenced the inclusion of J.D. Power’s

valuationmethodologyinthereport,whichthecourtfoundtobe“rigorously

objective and mathematical, and transparent about its sources of

information.”

[¶35] In reality it appears that thevaluation reportdamagesnumber

wasdeterminedlargelybysubtractingtheundisputedsalvageproceedsfrom

thevaluationsof comparablevehiclesoffered for sale in theLasVegas area,

identifiedbyaninternetreview.

[¶36]Burrillhasnotdemonstratedthatthetrialcourtclearlyerredin

its findings. TheAvis representative certified that the valuation reportwas

“prepared at the request of and on behalf of Avis” and that the reportwas

“keptwithintheclaimfileforthisincident;maintainedaspartof[her]duties

as a Claims Examiner for Avis; kept in the regular course of Avis’s business

andpartofitsregularlyconductedactivity;thatitwasmadeatorreasonably

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soonaftertheincident;andthatthecopyisanexactduplicateoftheoriginal.”

Becausethetrialcourtdidnoterr,andbecausethevaluationreportfitswithin

this Court’s articulation of the purpose of the business records exception to

thehearsayrule, itwaswithinthecourt’sdiscretiontoadmittheaffidavit in

itsentirety.SeeMidlandFundingLLC,2017ME24,¶18,155A.3d864.

[¶37]Asthetrialcourtstated:“Avismaynotbeinthevehiclevaluation

business,butitscarrentalactivitiesrequirereliablemeansofvaluatingcars,”

especiallyininstanceswhereitsrentalcarssustaindamage.TheAvisclaims

examiner appropriately requested a third party in the vehicle valuation

businesstocreateareportonthevehicle’svaluationpriortodamagefroman

accident. Thereportwas“keptwithin theclaim file for [each] incident”and

“kept in the regular course of Avis’s business and part of its regularly

conductedactivity.”Althoughlitigationmaybepossibleinsomeinstancesof

damage to Avis’s rental cars, a vehicle valuation report commissioned

immediatelyafteravehiclehasbeendamagedcannotbeconsidered tohave

been“prepared inanticipationof litigation”byanadvocate in thesameway

thataforensicreportpreparedbyanexpertadvocatingforonepartywould

be.SeeStatev.Tomah,1999ME109,¶10,736A.2d1047.

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[¶38] The Court’s application of the business records exception to

reject all of Avis’s claimed damages and direct an award of only nominal

damages disregards the damages not addressed in the J.D. Power report,

including the apparently undisputed $155 towing charge. Court’s Opinion

¶41. Thus, rather than nominal damages, damages of at least $155 are

established without regard to the propriety, or impropriety, of the claims

representative’sutilizingtheJ.D.Powerreportinmakinghercalculations.

[¶39] As to that report, the trial court correctly found that the Avis

representative properly utilized that valuation report, with its method of

calculation explicitly documented and based largely on documentary

informationavailableinbusinessrecords,vehiclevaluationreports,oronthe

internet through websites such as AutoTrader.com and Cars.com—material

thatappears toberegularlyandwidelyutilized incalculatingcarvaluations

andcarappraisalsintoday’sinternetage.

[¶40] Burrill does not challenge the amountofdamages awarded; he

only challenges the admission of the claims representative’s affidavit in its

entiretyasabasisfortheaward.Becausethetrialcourtdidnoterrorabuse

its discretion in determining that the affidavit and its attachments satisfied

M.R. Evid. 803(6), this Court should affirm the award of damages in the

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amountof$15,342.57,oralesseramountthatincludestheundisputedtowing

charge,and theundisputedsalvageproceedsdeducted fromthecomparable

vehiclevaluationbasedonapparentlyundisputeddocumentreviews.

[¶41]Burrillalsochallengesthecourt’sawardofattorneyfeestoAvis.

Hedoesnotchallenge theamountof theawardbutargues thatbecause this

Court should determine that the court erred in granting Avis’s motion for

partial summary judgment, it should also vacate the attorney fees award as

well.BecausethisCourtshouldaffirmthegrantofpartialsummaryjudgment

and the award of damages, it should also affirm the award of attorney fees.

See Estate of Gagnon, 2016 ME 129, ¶¶ 15-16, 147A.3d356. The rental

contractprovidedforattorneyfeesintheeventofabreach.Avissubmittedan

attorney fee affidavit outlining the charges. It was within the trial court’s

discretion to grant the attorney fees in the amount included in the attorney

feesaffidavit.

Walter F. McKee, Esq., and Henry E.M. Beck, Esq. (orally), McKee Law, P.A., Augusta, for appellant Darron Burrill Cheryl J. Cutliffe, Esq. (orally), Basham & Scott, LLC, Brunswick, for appellee Avis Rent A Car System, LLC Skowhegan District Court docket number CV-2015-152 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY