avoiding equal property division

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AVOIDING THE EQUAL PROPERTY DIVISION:

WHEN EQUITABLE DOESNT MEAN EQUAL

CHARLA BRADSHAW CONNER

Gregory & Conner, P.C.303 N. Carroll Blvd., Suite 100

Denton, TX 76201940-387-1600

[email protected]

State Bar of Texas31

STANNUAL ADVANCED FAMILY LAW COURSE

August 8-11, 2005Dallas

CHAPTER 46


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CHARLA BRADSHAW CONNERGregory & Conner, P.C.303 N. Carroll Blvd., Suite 100

Denton, TX 76201

(972) 434-3828 / (940) 387-2173 fax

[email protected]

EDUCATION/LICENSE/CERTIFICATION

J.D. Southern Methodist University School of Law, 1993B.S. Texas Woman's University, Denton, Texas and Candidate for M.S., Marriage and Family

Therapy (All but thesis)

State Bar of Texas, since 1993

Texas Supreme Court, since 1993

U.S. Supreme Court, since 1998

Board Certified in Family Law by Texas Board of Legal Specialization Since 2000

Credentialed by the Texas Mediator Credentialing Association Since 2004

Certified Mediator

Collaborative Lawyer, Collaborative Law Institute of Texas

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

Texas Super Lawyer for 2003 and 2004 (Texas Monthly)

State Bar of Texas Family Law Council April, 2005 to present

Texas Academy of Family Law Specialists Treasurer (Term begins September 2005)

State Bar of Texas Family Law Section State Bar Affairs Committee (2004 to present)

Texas Academy of Family Law Specialists Director (2002 to 2005)

Texas Academy of Family Law Specialists Newsletter Editor of the Family Law Forum (2002-2005)

Texas Academy of Family Law Specialists

Delegate for the Family Law Council of Community Property States Symposium (2002-2005)

1997, 1998, 1999 Texas Family Law Council Checklists Committee for Checklist Publication

Volumes I and II

1998 to present Texas Family Law Practice Manual Form Book Committee and contributing author

PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS

Collaborative Law Institute of TexasDenton County Bar Association

Tarrant County Bar Association

College of the State Bar of Texas

Texas Family Law Foundation

State Bar of Texas, Family Law Section

1997 Texas Family Law Council Planning Committee for 1997 Advanced Family Law Course

LECTURES AND PUBLICATIONS

2005 Advanced Family Law Course: Avoiding the Equal Property Division: When Equitable Doesnt Mean Equal

2005 Family Law Council of Community Property States

2004 Advanced Family Law Course: Retirement: QDROs for Defined Benefit and Contribution Qualified Plans

under ERISA

2004 TAFLS Trail Institute: Twenty-Five Essential Factors When Drafting or Reviewing QDROs

2004 Family Law Council of Community Property States: Business Valuation

2003 Family Law Practice Seminar, University of Houston Law Center: Retirement: QDROs for Qualified Plans

under ERISA (including using QDROs for Child Support)

2003 Advanced Family Law Course: Retirement: QDROs for Qualified Plans under ERISA (including using QDROs

for Child Support)


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2002 Advanced Family Law Course: ERISA Retirement Plans: An Analysis of the New Texas Family Law Practice

Manual QDRO Forms and QDRO Drafting Tips

2001 Advanced Family Law Course: Handling ERISA Retirement Plans: An Overview and Explanation of the Texas

Family Law Practice Manual QDRO Forms and Drafting tips for Alternative Clauses

2000 Advanced Family Law Course: Retirement Plans: What to Do When No QDRO is Honored

1999 Family Law Practice Seminar, University of Houston Law Center: QDROs and Retirement Benefits

1999 Advanced Family Law Course: Expert Witness Workshop

1998 Advanced Family Law Course: "Retirement Overview and a Walk Through the QDRO"

1998 Family Law Practice Seminar, University of Houston Law Center: "QDROs What You Dont Know Can Hurt

You"

1997 Advanced Family Law Course: "Retirement, Pensions and that Ugly Word...QDROs"

1996 Distinctive Lifestyles of Northeast Tarrant County: New Alimony Law in Texas Adds Protection, March/April

1996 edition

1995 Advanced Family Law Course: "QDROs and Checklists"

CIVIC ACTIVITIES AND AFFILIATIONS

Texas Paint Horse Club Board of Directors Recording Secretary and Vice President

Past Director for the Texas World Youth Team for the American Paint Horse Association

Mayor Pro Tem for City of Westlake (May, 1997 - May, 1999)

Chairman of Planning & Zoning Committee for City of Westlake (1995-1997)


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Avoiding the Equal Property Division: When Equitable Doesnt Mean Equal Chapter 46

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................................................... 1

II. STATUTORY LAW............................................................................................................................................... 1

III. CASE LAW ............................................................................................................................................................ 1A. The Landmark Case:Murff v. Murff................................................................................................................ 1B.

Factors to Consider.......................................................................................................................................... 2

1. Fraud........................................................................................................................................................ 22. Fault/NoFault........................................................................................................................................... 53. Length of Marriage.................................................................................................................................. 74. Disparity of Earning Power ..................................................................................................................... 75. Custody of Children................................................................................................................................. 76. Tax Consequences and Liabilities ........................................................................................................... 87. Size of Separate Estate ............................................................................................................................ 98. Benefits the Innocent Spouse May Have Derived From the Continuation of the Marriage.................... 99. Health of the Spouses ............................................................................................................................ 1010. Age of the Spouses ................................................................................................................................ 1011. Education and Future Employability..................................................................................................... 1012. Need for Future Support ........................................................................................................................ 1013. Foreign Realty ....................................................................................................................................... 1114. Credit for Temporary Alimony Paid...................................................................................................... 1115. Wasting and Concealing of Community Assets .................................................................................... 1216. Attorneys Fees...................................................................................................................................... 1217. Nature of the Property ........................................................................................................................... 1218. Debts and Liabilities.............................................................................................................................. 1319. Reimbursement...................................................................................................................................... 13

C. Case Law Upholding Disproportionate Awards............................................................................................ 141. Garcia v. Garcia..................................................................................................................................... 142. Lucy v. Lucy.......................................................................................................................................... 143. Loaiza v. Loaiza .................................................................................................................................... 144. In re Marriage of Becerra ...................................................................................................................... 145. Phillips v. Phillips.................................................................................................................................. 156. Sprick v. Sprick ..................................................................................................................................... 157. Kimsey v. Kimsey ................................................................................................................................. 158. Abernathy v. Fehlis................................................................................................................................ 159. Tschirhart v. Tschirhart ......................................................................................................................... 1510. Matter of Marriage of DeVine............................................................................................................... 1511. Finch v. Finch........................................................................................................................................ 1512. Falor v. Falor ......................................................................................................................................... 1613. Faram v. Gervitz-Faram ........................................................................................................................ 1614. Golias v. Golias ..................................................................................................................................... 1615. Frommer v. Frommer ............................................................................................................................1616. Vandiver v. Vandiver ............................................................................................................................ 1617. Morrison v. Morrison ............................................................................................................................ 1718. Conroy v. Conroy .................................................................................................................................. 1719. Kluck v. Kluck....................................................................................................................................... 1720. Eikenhorst v. Eikenhorst........................................................................................................................ 1721. Oliver v. Oliver...................................................................................................................................... 1722. Rafidi v. Rafidi ...................................................................................................................................... 1723. Rutledge v. Rutledge ............................................................................................................................. 1724. Huls v. Huls ........................................................................................................................................... 1825. Roberts v. Roberts ................................................................................................................................. 1826. Gaston v. Gaston.................................................................................................................................... 1827. Hourigan v. Hourigan............................................................................................................................ 1828. Haulsler v. Haulsler ............................................................................................................................... 18


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29. Whittenburg v. Whittenburg.................................................................................................................. 1830. Waggener v. Waggener ......................................................................................................................... 1831. Duncan v. Duncan ................................................................................................................................. 1832. Bokhoven v. Bokhoven ......................................................................................................................... 1833. Vannerson v. Vannerson........................................................................................................................ 1834. Zamora v. Zamora ................................................................................................................................. 1835. Massey v. Massey.................................................................................................................................. 1836. Goren v. Goren ...................................................................................................................................... 19

37. Walston v. Walston................................................................................................................................ 1938. In re Marriage of Rice ........................................................................................................................... 1939. Zorilla v. Wahid..................................................................................................................................... 1940. Magill v. Magill..................................................................................................................................... 19

IV. PLEADINGS BE SAFE AND PLEAD IT SO YOU CAN PROVE IT............................................................. 19

V. ARGUMENTS AND IDEAS................................................................................................................................ 20A. Know Your Judge and Be Willing to Persuade Your Judge If You Have To............................................... 20B. Know your Assets and Ask for the Best........................................................................................................ 20C. Winning the Battle and Losing the WarThe Cost of Litigation................................................................. 20D. Advocate Your Arguments ............................................................................................................................ 21

1. Adultery................................................................................................................................................. 212. Disparity of Income............................................................................................................................... 223. Difference in the Size of the Separate Estates ....................................................................................... 224. Custody of the Children......................................................................................................................... 23

VI. TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES .............................................................................................................................. 23A. Proposed Division ......................................................................................................................................... 23B. Financial Planner/Financial Expert ............................................................................................................... 23C. Charts and Graphs ......................................................................................................................................... 23D. Witnesses and Mental Health Professionals.................................................................................................. 23E. Scorecard Argument...................................................................................................................................... 24

VII.CONCLUSION..................................................................................................................................................... 25


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1

AVOIDING THE EQUAL PROPERTY

DIVISION: WHEN EQUITABLE

DOESNT MEAN EQUAL

I. INTRODUCTION

This article is designed to help you be a morepersuasive advocate in cases where you are arguing fora disproportionate division of the community estate.This article will provide a full reference for case lawand statutory law on the subject and would be anexcellent resource for your trial notebook. When tryingproperty cases, we seem to fall into the same routine ofpreparing our property caseswe think we know whatour judges will do and we do little more than recite thefactors for the court to consider in making adisproportionate division. We must bring life to thecase. We must give the judge reasons to give us adisproportionate division. We often fail to trulyadvocate and persuasively argue our disproportionaterequest.

This article provides you full references, ideas,insights to argue effectively, and the inspiration to bemore creative, more insightful and more persuasivewhen you ask the court for a disproportionate divisionof the community estate. I want to thank Kevin Fullerfor his generosity in allowing me to reference his articleon this subject, Getting the Biggest (Or the Best) Pieceof the Community Pie: Factors, Strategies, andTechniques for Disproportionate Divisions and How toEffectively Prove Them Up, given at the 2001Advanced Family Law Course.

II. STATUTORY LAW

The statutory authority for a disproportionatedivision of community property is Texas Family Code(hereinafter the Code) section 7.001. This brief butimportant section of the Code provides, in its entirety asfollows:

7.001 General Rule of Property Division.

In a decree of divorce or annulment, the courtshall order a division of the estate of theparties in a manner that the court deems just

and right, having due regard for the rights ofeach party and any children of the marriage.[emphasis added]

Section 7.001 of the Code is the most important sectionin Title 1 of the Code. The origin of this statute datesback to 1841 and the mandate has consistently been forthe courts to divide the property in a manner that isjust and right, not necessarily 50/50 or equally. Theadvocate must argue the facts and circumstances so asto convince the court that justice and rightness wouldnotbe served by an equal division and that to award an

equal division, the court would have to ignore what isjust and right, and case law.

III. CASE LAW

There is an abundance of case law upholding andsupporting disproportionate divisions of communityproperty for a variety of reasons. Following is a list offactors trial courts have used to award a

disproportionate division of community property andcase law to support these factors. Further, I haveprovided a list of cases that have supporteddisproportionate divisions of community property. Themost important thing to remember in trying your case isto develop arguments to persuade the trial court that toaward an equal division in your case would be to ignorethe equities and justice of the case, and Texas case law.

A. The Landmark Case: Murff v. Murff

In the legendary case of Murff v. Murff, 615S.W.2d. 696 (Tex. 1981), the Texas Supreme Court set

out the most important factors for a court to consider inmaking a just and right division of the communityproperty. These 11 factors are as follows:

1. The disparity of incomes or earningcapacities of the spouses

2. The spouses capacities and abilities3. Benefits which the party not at fault would

have derived from a continuation of themarriage

4. Business opportunities of the spouses5. Education of the spouses6. Relative physical conditions of the spouses7. Relative financial conditions of the spouses8. Differences in the size of each spouses

separate estate9. The nature of the property to be divided10. Fault in the break up of the marriage11. Attorneys fees of the parties

In Murff, the Texas Supreme Court explained: Thetrial court in a divorce case has the opportunity toobserve the parties on the witness stand, determinetheir credibility, evaluate their needs and potentials,both social and economic. As the trier of fact, thecourt is empowered to use its legal knowledge and itshuman understanding and experience. Although manydivorce cases have similarities, no two of them areexactly alike. Mathematical precision in dividingproperty in a divorce is usually not possible. Widelatitude and discretion rests in these trial courts andthat discretion should only be disturbed in the case ofclear abuse. Murff, at 700.


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B. Factors to Consider

1. FraudIn Sprick v. Sprick, 25 S.W.3d 7 (Tex.App.El

Paso 1999, pet. denied), the court held that: (1) therewas sufficient evidence that an 81-year-old friend ofhusband's family, over whose finances husband hadpower of attorney, made a $118,900 unsecured loan tothe community, to support an implied finding that the

indebtedness did not constitute a fraud on thecommunity; (2) wife could not overcome thepresumption that the loan was on the credit ofcommunity; but (3) award of 76.6% of the net assets ofthe community property estate to wife was equitable atdivorce.

Justice Ann McClures concurrence in the Sprickcase is an excellent explanation on the concept of fraudand is quoted as follows:

Creative and inventive theories of recoveryabound for economic torts committed against

the community estate. These range fromwaste, depletion of assets, the communityopportunity doctrine and its inverse partner,the community jeopardy doctrine [FN3] tothe generic tort of fraud, which encompassesa number of varieties such as breach offiduciary duty, fraudulent conveyance,excessive gifts to children, and communityfunds expended on paramours, just to name afew. The intermediate courts have not beenconsistent in their determination of whetheran independent economic tort is actionablebetween spouses for damages to thecommunity estate. It now appears that theSupreme Court has not been entirelyconsistent either.

[FN3] The community opportunity doctrinederives from the corporate opportunitydoctrine and stands for the proposition that aspouse has an obligation to maximize thecommunity estate by taking advantage of anopportunity to invest in a lucrative ventureusing community, rather than separate, funds.The community jeopardy doctrine operates inthe reverse and suggests that a spouse alsohas an obligation to protect the communityestate from risky pursuits by investingseparate, rather than community, funds. Asmight be expected, whether an investment ispotentially lucrative or risky is easier todiscern in hindsight and is ordinarily factspecific.

Fraud as an Economic Tort

Fraud in the divorce context, as in other civillitigation, may be actual or constructive.Actual fraud is predicated upon the intent todeceive. The elements are: (1) that a materialrepresentation was made; (2) that it wasfalse; (3) that when the speaker made it, he

knew it was false or made it recklesslywithout any knowledge of the truth and as apositive assertion; (4) that he made it withthe intention that it should be acted upon bythe party; (5) that the party acted in relianceupon it; and (6) that he suffered thereby.Stone v. Lawyers Title Insurance Corp.,554S.W.2d 183, 185 (Tex.1977). "[C]onstructivefraud is the breach of some legal or equitableduty which, irrespective of moral guilt, thelaw declares fraudulent because of itstendency to deceive others, to violate

confidence, or to injure public interests." Archer v. Griffith, 390 S.W.2d 735, 740(Tex.1964). In other words, intent isirrelevant. Because of the confidentialrelationship between a husband and wife, themarital partnership is fiduciary in nature.Matthews v. Matthews, 725 S.W.2d 275, 279(Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writref'd n.r.e.). A breach of this fiduciary dutyis frequently termed a "fraud on thecommunity." In re Marriage of Moore, 890S.W.2d 821, 827 (Tex.App.-- Amarillo 1994,no writ). Generally speaking, the allegation isone of constructive rather than actual fraud:Any such conduct in the marital relationshipis termed fraud on the community because,although not actually fraudulent, it has all theconsequences and legal effects of actualfraud in that such conduct tends to deceivethe other spouse or violate confidences thatexist as a result of the marriage.Id. at 827.Constructive fraud includes actions of onespouse in unfairly disposing of orencumbering the other spouse's interest incommunity property or unfairly incurringcommunity indebtedness without the otherspouse's knowledge or consent. Massey v.Massey, 807 S.W.2d 391, 402 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1991), writ denied, 867S.W.2d 766 (Tex.1993). In the absence offraud, a spouse has the right to control anddispose of community property subject to hissole management. [FN4] Id. at 401, citing Mazique v. Mazique, 742 S.W.2d 805, 807(Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, nowrit). Although the managing spouse neednot obtain approval or consent for
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dispositions made of special communityproperty, the fiduciary relationship betweenhusband and wife requires that a spouse'sdisposition of special community property be"fair" to the other spouse. Massey, 807S.W.2d at 402, citing Horlock v. Horlock,533 S.W.2d 52, 55 (Tex.Civ.App.--Houston[14th Dist.] 1975, writ dism'd). The

managing spouse carries the burden ofestablishing that the disposition of propertywas fair. Id.

FN4. During marriage, each spouse has thesole management, control, and disposition ofthe community property that the spousewould have owned if single, includingpersonal earnings, revenue from separateproperty, recoveries for personal injury, andthe increase and mutations of, and therevenue from, all property subject to the

spouse's sole management, control, anddisposition. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 3.102(a).Community property subject to a spouse'ssole management and control is sometimesreferred to as "special community property,"particularly in older case law. All othercommunity property is subject to the jointmanagement, control and disposition of thespouses unless the spouses provide otherwiseby power of attorney in writing or otheragreement. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 3.102(c).

The Supreme Court has recently reiteratedthat Texas recognizes the concept of fraud onthe community, which it has defined as awrong committed by one spouse which maybe considered by the trial court in its divisionof the community estate and which mayjustify a disproportionate division. Schlueterv. Schlueter, 975 S.W.2d 584, 588(Tex.1998). It is not, however, anindependent tort giving rise to a cause ofaction between spouses. Id. at 586. Nor mayit give rise to a recovery for punitivedamages, inasmuch as "recovery of punitivedamages requires a finding of an independenttort with accompanying actual damages."Schlueter, 975 S.W.2d at 589, quoting TwinCity Fire Ins. Co. v. Davis,904 S.W.2d 663,665 (Tex.1995). Instead, the claim of fraudon the community is a means to an end,seeking either to recover specific assetswrongfully conveyed or to obtain a greatershare of the community estate upon divorceas compensation for the loss of communityproperty. Schlueter, 975 S.W.2d at 588,quoting Belz v. Belz, 667 S.W.2d 240, 247

(Tex.App.--Dallas 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).Where the economic tort depletes thecommunity estate so as to leave insufficientproperty available to the wronged spouse, thecourts may impose a money judgment inorder to achieve an equitable division.Schlueter,975 S.W.2d at 588, citing Murff v.Murff,615 S.W.2d 696, 699 (Tex.1981). The

money judgment serves to recoup the valueof the wronged spouse's share of the estatewhich has been lost through the fraud.Schlueter,975 S.W.2d at 588, citing Maziquev. Mazique,742 S.W.2d 805, 808 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ). "Becausethe amount of the judgment is directlyreferable to a specific value of lostcommunity property, it will never exceed thetotal value of the community estate."Schlueter,975 S.W.2d at 588. On the heelsof Schlueter, the Court was presented with

some rather egregious facts in Vickery v.Vickery, 999 S.W.2d 342 (Tex.1999)(J.Hecht, dissenting). The underlying court ofappeals' opinion was unpublished. TheSupreme Court denied the petition forreview, with Justice Hecht dissenting fromthe denial in a published opinion whichincorporates as an appendix both theintermediate court's opinion on the meritsand Justice Andell's dissent from that court'sdenial of rehearing en banc. At issue wasMrs. Vickery's recovery in a bill of reviewproceeding. The jury found Mr. Vickery,himself an attorney, liable for fraud andbreach of fiduciary duty and assessed Mrs.Vickery's damages at $6.7 million for loss ofmarital property and $1.3 million for mentalanguish, together with $1 million in punitivedamages. The jury also found that Mrs.Vickery's attorney breached her fiduciaryduty, resulting in damages of $100,000 inlost marital property and $350,000 in mentalanguish damages.

As Justice Hecht notes in his dissent,"[a]pplying Schlueter would require that theactual and punitive damages awarded Mrs.Vickery against her former husband bereversed and the case remanded to the districtcourt to reconsider what division of thecommunity is just and right. The districtcourt may consider Mr. Vickery's 'dishonestyof purpose or intent to deceive' and 'theheightened culpability of actual fraud' asfound by the jury." The fact that the SupremeCourt, by denying review, allowed the actualand punitive damages to stand gives me some
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concern as to what the current state of thelaw is for economic torts committed againstthe community estate. Id. At 14.

In Lucy v. Lucy, 162 S.W.3d 770 (Tex.App.El Paso2005, no writ), the court considered whether the trialcourt mislabeled the property theory of recovery: Is iterror to compensate the community estate for economic

torts committed by a spouse simply because the courtlabeled the relief as "reimbursement?" The courtstated:

Texas recognizes the concept of fraud onthe community which the trial court mayconsider in rendering a disproportionatedivision. Schlueter v. Schlueter, 975 S.W.2d584, 588 (Tex.1998), citing Belz v. Belz,667S.W.2d 240, 247 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1984,writ ref'd n.r.e.). A claim of fraud on thecommunity is a means either to recover

specific property wrongfully conveyed or toobtain a greater share of the communityestate upon divorce in order to compensatethe wronged spouse for her lost interest in thecommunity estate. Belz, 667 S.W.2d at 246-47. A trial court may also award a money judgment to one spouse against the other inorder to achieve an equitable division of thecommunity estate. Schlueter, 975 S.W.2d at588, citing Murff, 615 S.W.2d at 699(allowing money judgment against husbandin division of community property where hehad substantial sums in savings beforeseparation that had disappeared by the timeof trial). Because the amount of the judgmentis directly referable to a specific value of lostcommunity property, it will never exceed thetotal value of the community estate. Id. Awronged spouse should not suffer simplybecause the other spouse has depleted thecommunity such that there is not enough leftto effect a just and right division. Id. Joanasked the court for a disproportionatedivision, including a money judgment ifnecessary, to compensate the communityestate for Paul's fraudulent conduct.Schlueter also recognized that wastingcommunity assets may give rise to a similarclaim. Schlueter, 975 S.W.2d at 589. Mrs.Schlueter alleged that her husband had,without her knowledge or consent,wrongfully depleted the community assets."Such behavior is properly considered whendividing a community estate." Id. In thiscontext, we review the evidence. Pauladmitted receiving the rental payments andcashing the checks. He testified that he

would use the funds to pay the mortgage andfor incidental living expenses. While heclaimed to have given Joan a portion of themoney, Joan testified that he kept the cashand didn't give her any. Paul acknowledgedthat the income was community property, butcomplained that if his expenditures didprovide some basis for reimbursement, then

the reimbursement should be limited to netincome. Penick, 783 S.W.2d at 197. [FN4]

FN4. He alleged that the income totaled$36,300 rather than $43,200 and that he wasentitled to a deduction for maintenanceexpenses of at least $2,000 and mortgagepayments of $17,400 ($580 x 30 mos.),which would equal reimbursement of$16,900.

With regard to the bank account, Paul

complains that the trial court failed to explainits calculation, merely stating that the awardwas based on the evidence. He argues thatJoan admitted the account was communityproperty and that she was not entitled toreimbursement absent a tracing of herseparate property funds in the account. Healso claims that she did not show that Paul'sseparate estate benefited at the expense of herseparate property or the community estate.In each of these instances, Paulacknowledges the conflicting evidence.Nevertheless, the trial court as the trier offact was the sole judge of the credibility ofthe evidence, what weight was to be assignedto it, and how to resolve inconsistencies.Carrasco, 623 S.W.2d at 772. The courtobviously disregarded Paul's testimony andbelieved Joan's. Paul's underlying argumentis that Joan was not entitled to"reimbursement" on that basis or that shefailed to establish the amount of theoffsetting benefit to the wronged estate. Thefindings are limited to characterization andvalue; they do not encompass the factorswhich the trial court may have considered inmaking a disproportionate division. Weconclude that the evidence supports adisproportionate division and that Paul'sconduct was a factor which the trial courtcould rightly consider. Simple mathematicalcalculations derived from the findings of factreveal that the trial court valued thecommunity estate at $100,922. Without theequalizing judgment, the court effectuatedroughly a 55%-45% division in favor of Paul.Imposition of the judgment results in a 73%-
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27% division in favor of Joan. We concludethat the constituent elements are properlyaligned: the pleadings support the evidence,the evidence supports the findings of fact,and the findings support the judgment. Wefind no abuse of discretion in attaching amisnomer to the remedy employed. Findingno abuse of discretion, we overrule both

issues for review and affirm the judgment ofthe trial court.

In determining the division of community property, thecourt may consider proof of one spouse's dishonesty orintent to deceive, constituting actual fraud, regardingthe community assets, Schleuter v. Schleuter, 975S.W.2d 584 (Tex. 1998), and may also considerevidence of one spouse's constructive fraud intransactions involving community property, taking intoaccount Massey v. Massey, 807 S.W.2d 391 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied):

a. the size of the property disposed of inrelation to the total size of the communityproperty

b. the adequacy of the remaining estate tosupport the other spouse

c. the relationship of the parties involved in thetransaction

Unfairly disposing of the other spouse's communityproperty results in a presumption of constructive fraud.Connell v. Connell, 889 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. App. SanAntonio 1994, writ denied). However, the mere factthat a community property business venture lost moneybecause of the acts of one spouse, even if it ended inbankruptcy, does not constitute fraud. Connell v.Connell, 889 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. App. San Antonio1994, writ denied); see also Andrews v. Andrews, 677S.W.2d 171 (Tex. App. Austin 1984, no writ) (aspouse's good faith, but unwise, investment ofcommunity funds resulting in losses to the communityestate does not justify an unequal distribution of theremaining community property upon divorce).

Additionally, the trial court may take into accounta spouse's dissipation of the estate. See Massey v.Massey, 807 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. App.Houston [1stDist.] 1991, writ denied) (based on jury verdict thathusband committed constructive fraud, trial court wasentitled to award wife equalization for propertydepleted unfairly from community estate); Reaney v.Reaney, 505 S.W.2d 338, 340 (Tex.Civ.App.Dallas1974, no writ) (court took into account the husband'sdissipation of approximately $53,000 of communityassets when dividing the estate); Pride v. Pride, 318S.W.2d 715, 718 (Tex.Civ.App.Dallas 1958, no writ)(trial court rendered a money judgment against thehusband for the wife's share of $3,000 he concealed).

2. Fault/NoFaulta. Generally

The court may consider evidence of one spouse'sfault contributing to the breakup of the marriage, evenin an action in which insupportability is the onlyground for divorce pled, Velasco v. Haberman, 700S.W.2d 729 (Tex. App. San Antonio 1985, orig.proceeding); In Re Marriage of Jackson, 506 S.W.2d

261 (Tex. Civ. App. Amarillo 1974, writ dismd); Seealso Vandiver v. Vandiver, 4 S.W.3d 300 (Tex.App.Corpus Christi 1999, no pet. h.). The courts howevermay also decline to consider such evidence. Guttierezv. Guttierez, 791 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. App. San Antonio1990, no writ); Massey v. Massey, 807 S.W.2d 391(Tex. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied)(court may consider fault, but is not obligated to do so).

The court may consider the fault of one of theparties in its division whether the divorce is grantedsolely on fault grounds, or on both fault and no-faultgrounds; and further, when a divorce is granted on the

basis of fault, the trial court may, though it need not,consider the fault in breaking up the marriage as afactor in making a property division which favors onespouse. Young v. Young, 609 S.W.2d 758 760-62 (Tex.1980); Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex.1981); Hourigan v. Hourigan, 635 S.W.2d 556, 556-57(Tex. App.El Paso 1981, no writ). In addition, a courthas the discretion to hear evidence of fault if it decidesto hear the case on no-fault grounds. Vautrain v.Vautrain, 646 S,W.2d 309, 312 (Tex. App.Fort Worth1983, writ dismd). In Clay v. Clay, 550 S.W.2d 730(Tex.Civ.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, no writ),notwithstanding a jury finding of cruel treatment, thetrial court was authorized to enter a divorce under nofault provisions.

In Phillips v. Phillips, 75 S.W.3d 564 (Tex.App.Beaumont 2002, no pet. h.), the trial court awarded adisproportionate amount of the community estate toNancy. Nancy contends the trial court properly awardedher approximately 60% of the community estate withthe remaining 40% of the community estate going toJames. In his brief, James contends that the divisionwas even more lopsided in favor of Nancy and hepointed out that he was awarded a mere 23.5% whileNancy was actually awarded 76.5%. The trial courtentered a finding that James was at "fault" for thebreakup of the marriage and awarded Nancy adisproportionate share of the community estate. Thecourt went on to state that even where fault isproperly pleaded and proved, an unequal division of thecommunity estate may not be awarded to punish theparty at fault. The court stated the following:

a trial court has broad discretion individing the community estate in a divorceaction. Schlueter,975 S.W.2d at 589; Murff,615 S.W.2d at 698. The trial court exercises
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this discretion by considering many factors.Id. at 699. Excluding the "fault" factor, thenonexclusive list includes the following: (1)the spouses capacities and abilities, (2)business opportunities, (3) education, (4)relative physical conditions , (5) relativefinancial conditions and obligations, (6)disparity of ages, (7) sizes of separate estates,

(8) the nature of the property, and (9)disparity in earning capacities or of incomes.Id. The trial court may also consider whetherone of the parties to the marriage has wastedcommunity assets. See Schlueter,975 S.W.2dat 589; Beard v. Beard, 49 S.W.3d 40, 66(Tex.App.-Waco 2001, pet. denied). The factthat there are ten "non-fault" factors, as wellas the fact that the list is nonexclusive,should continue to give a trial court verybroad discretion in making its "just and right"division notwithstanding our holding that

where insupportability is the sole groundpleaded, a trial court may not factor in "fault"in its "just and right" division of thecommunity estate in order to award adisproportionate quantity of the communityestate to one spouse. Nevertheless, even if,as in the instant case, the petitioner has failedto both plead and prove a traditional "fault"ground for dissolution of the marriageresulting in the trial court's erroneouslyattributing "fault in the breakup of themarriage" to the respondent, said respondentmust still demonstrate that the trial courtabused its discretion in making its ultimate"just and right" division of the communityestate. See Tate v. Tate,55 S.W.3d 1, 6 n. 3(Tex.App.-El Paso 2000, no pet.); Lindsey v.Lindsey, 965 S.W.2d 589, 592 n. 3(Tex.App.-El Paso 1998, no pet.). This is sobecause the trial court is still permitted toconsider any other "non-fault" factor(s) inawarding a disproportionate amount of thecommunity estate to one spouse. Id. At 572.

b. Cruel TreatmentThe court may also consider a spouses cruel

treatment of the other spouse in dividing the property,even though the court grants the divorce on the no-faultground of insupportability. Barnard v. Barnard, 133S.W.3d 782 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied).

In In re Marriage of Rice, 96 S.W.3d 642(Tex.App.Texarkana 2003), the court gave anexcellent explanation of the present state of the law oncruel treatment and stated the following:

Although infrequently used since theintroduction of no-fault divorce, a Texas

court may still grant a divorce on the groundof cruel treatment. Henry v. Henry, 48S.W.3d 468, 473 (Tex.App.-Houston [14thDist.] 2001, no pet.). A spouse's conduct risesto the level of cruel treatment when his or herconduct renders the couple's living togetherinsupportable.Id. (citing Tex.Fam.Code Ann. 6.002 (Vernon 1998); Finn v. Finn, 185

S.W.2d 579, 582 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1945,no writ)). "Insupportable" means "incapableof being borne, unendurable, insufferable,intolerable."Id. (citing Cantwell v. Cantwell,217 S.W.2d 450, 453 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso1948, writ dism'd)). Mere disagreements ortrifling matters will not justify granting adivorce for cruelty. Shankles v. Shankles,445S.W.2d 803, 807 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1969,no writ). If, for instance, the complainingspouse suffers only nervousness orembarrassment, a trial court may not grant

the divorce on the ground of cruelty. Goldenv. Golden, 238 S.W.2d 619, 621(Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1951, no writ). Abuseneed not be limited to bodily injury;nonetheless, physical abuse will supportgranting a divorce on cruelty grounds.Waheed v. Waheed, 423 S.W.2d 159, 160(Tex.App.-Eastland 1967, no writ); Cote v.Cote, 404 S.W.2d 139, 140 (Tex.App.-SanAntonio 1966, writ dism'd); Blackburn v.Blackburn,163 S.W.2d 251, 255 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1942, no writ). Acts occurring afterseparation may be used to support a findingof cruelty. Redwine v. Redwine,198 S.W.2d472, 473 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1946, nowrit). Id. At 648.

c. Physical AbuseCourts seem especially willing to divide the

property unequally when one spouse has physicallyabused the other. See, for instance, Faram v. Gervitz-Faram, 895 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. App. Fort Worth 1995,no writ) (72.9% of the community property wasawarded to wife, based in part on husband's violent andabusive nature which contributed to the divorce); Finchv. Finch, 825 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. App. Houston [1stDist.] 1992, no writ) (65% of community assetsawarded to wife who testified that her husband hadabused her and her daughter).

d. AdulteryIn Abernathy v. Fehlis, 911 S.W.2d 845

(Tex.App.Austin 1995, no writ), the trial courtdeclared in its decree that Daniel's adultery caused the"breakup" of the marriage and justified adisproportionate division of the parties' communityproperty. Further, in Bell v. Bell, 540 S.W.2d 432
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(Tex.Civ.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no writ), thecourt found the acts of adultery are not limited toadultery committed before separation.

In Morrison v. Morrison, 713 S.W.2d 377 (Tex.App. Dallas 1986, dismd), the court stated that:

Furthermore, the trial court found David atfault in the breakup of the marriage because

of his adultery. We presume that the trialcourt also considered this factor when itdivided the community. Gutierrez, 643S.W.2d at 787. Based on the evidence ofCarolyn's right to reimbursement and David'sadultery, we hold that the trial court did notabuse its discretion in awarding adisproportionate amount to Carolyn. SeeMurff,615 S.W.2d at 698. Id. at 379.

3. Length of MarriageCourts consider the length of the marriage in

deciding whether to award a disproportionate divisionof community property. In the following cases, thecourts listed the length of the marriage as one of thefactors to be considered: Cappellen v. Cappellen, 888S.W.2d 539 (Tex.App.El Paso 1994, writ denied);Vannerson v. Vannerson, 857 S.W.2d 659 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied); Massey v.Massey, 807 S.W.2d 391 (Tex.App.Houston [1stDist.] 1991, writ denied); Cluck v. Cluck, 647 S.W.2d338 (Tex.App.San Antonio 1982, writ dismd);Trevino v. Trevino, 555 S.W.2d 792 (Tex.Civ.App.Corpus Christi 1977, no writ) (Court divided estateequally after three year marriage); Patt v. Patt, 689S.W.2d 505 (Tex. App. Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, nowrit) (wife who had never worked outside home andpossessed no marketable skills awarded family homeafter long marriage).

4. Disparity of Earning PowerThe court may consider the disparity of earning

power between the spouses, as well as their respectivebusiness opportunities, capacities and abilities.

In Rafidi v. Rafidi, 718 S.W.2d 43 (Tex.App.Dallas 1986, no writ), the evidence showed thatHusband was a petroleum engineer with three collegedegrees. At the time of trial he was fifty-seven yearsold. There was no evidence of health problems. Wife,on the other hand, had only a high school education.She had ifficulty obtaining employment and washandicapped by a finger injury. The Rafidis' teen-ageddaughter lived with the Wife along with three adultchildren. The evidence permits the inference that theHusband's earning capability exceeds Wife's. Anunequal division of the community estate was justified.

In Robbins v. Robbins, 601 S.W.2d 90(Tex.Civ.App. Houston [1st Dist.] 1980), the court heldthat it was not an abuse of discretion to award the wife,

who had been out of the business world for asubstantial period of time, 58% of community property,and to award husband, who had much greater earningcapacity than wife, 42% of the community estate. Seealso Vandiver v. Vandiver, 4 S.W.3d 300 (Tex.App.Corpus Christi 1999, no pet. h.).

In Bokhoven v. Bokhoven, 559 S.W.2d 142 (Tex.Civ. App. - Tyler 1977, no writ), the appellate court,

after reviewing the entire record of the trial proceeding,upheld a disproportionate property division stating: Inthis particular instance, the trial court's division ofcommunity property could be based solely upon thedifference in earning capacities of the parties as set outin the findings of fact. Id. at 144.

Although the court may award a larger portion ofthe community estate to the spouse with less educationand employment experience, it need not do so, and maybe less likely to do so if the community estate is verylarge and an equal division would satisfy the lessemployable spouses financial needs. Hanson v.

Hanson, 672 S.W.2d 274 (Tex.App.Houston [14

th

Dist.] 1984, writ dismd w.o.j.).

5. Custody of ChildrenSection 7.001 of the Code states that the court-

ordered division of community property shall have dueregard forany children of the marriage.

In Young v. Young, 609 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. 1980),the court was presented with the question of whetherthe reference to "any children" in Section 3.63 of theCode (now section 7.001 of the Code) included adultchildren. At the time of divorce the Youngs had athirty-two year old adult son who contracted multiplesclerosis as an adult. Physically disabled, this son livedwith Mrs. Young. Mr. Young contended that "anychildren" meant minor children. The Supreme Courtconstrued the statute to include adult children: theonly word modifying children in section 3.63 is any."[emphasis added]. See also McKnight v. McKnight,535 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. Civ. App.El Paso) revd onother grounds, 543 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. 1976), where theCourt held that it was an abuse of discretion to leavehusband without sufficient liquid assets to take over theresponsibilities assigned to him in fact and by divorcedecree; namely the care of two adult children andcustody of three minor children.

In Boriack v. Boriack, 541 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. Civ.App.Corpus Christi 1976, writ dism'd), the husbandwas awarded custody of all 3 of the parties children.Wife complained of an unequal division of property.The Court said the fact that Dr. Boriack was awardedcustody in itself would justify an unequal divisionfavoring him." [emphasis added].

In Liddell v. Liddell, 29 S.W.2d 868, 871(Tex.Civ.App.San Antonio 1930, no writ), the courtof appeals held that one of several factors justifying anunequal division of the property was "the burden of the
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Benedict, 542 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. Civ. App. - Ft. Worth1976, writ dism'd); Cole v. Cole, 532 S.W.2d 102 (Tex.Civ. App. - Dallas 1975, no writ).

Further, in McCartney v. McCartney, 548 S.W. 2d435 (Tex. Civ. App - - Houston [ lst Dist. ] 1977, nowrit) , the Court stated:

The trial court was not required to afford any

greater weight to the issue of tax liabilitythan to the other factors bearing upon the fairand just division of the communityproperties. However, the trial court shouldhave taken into consideration the issue of taxliability, as with other pertinent factorsaffecting the justness of its decree. Id. at439.

In McCartney, the judgment of the trial court wastherefore reversed with respect only to the matter of thetax liabilities, and the case was remanded to the trial

court with instructions to hear only such additionalevidence as may be necessary to effect an appropriatedisposition of the partys income tax liability.

In Janik v. Janik, 634 S.W.2d 323 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, no writ), in dividing theliabilities of parties, the trial court followed a verylogical approach in ordering that each debt follow theasset that secured it and that each party pay one half ofincome tax; and, considering the nature of debts andhusband's greater earning capacity, the total debt withwhich husband was burdened did not come out to animproper division.

In Robbins v. Robbins, 601 S.W.2d 90(Tex.Civ.App. Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, no writ), in itsdecree, the trial court found that if the proceeds fromthe sale of the parties' residence are not reinvested inanother house within the period of time provided by theincome tax laws, a capital gains tax liability may occur.The trial court therefore decreed that the husbandshould assume and hold the wife harmless with respectto 60% of such tax liability. In his second point of errorthe husband contended that the trial court abused itsdiscretion in requiring that he assume and hold the wifeharmless against such income tax liability. The trialcourt properly considered the income tax liability of theparties in dividing their community estate, citingMcCartney. The entire amount of the capital gainsrealized on the sale of the parties' residence wasrecognized at the time of the sale. The fact that theappellant's tax liability might be later reduced through a"rollover" of the recognized capital gain uponreinvestment of the sales proceeds in another residencedid not render the parties' potential tax liabilityincapable of determination.

The Fort Worth Court of Appeals held itpermissible for a trial court to hold a spouse responsiblefor federal income tax liability arising out of the sale of

the other spouse's separate property. Mullins v.Mullins, 785 S.W.2d 5 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 1990,no writ).

While tax liability is not technically a debt, thetrial court may take the couples tax liability intoconsideration in dividing the property. Mullins v.Mullins, 785 S.W.2d 5 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 1990,no writ); Grossnickle v. Grossnickle,935 S.W.2d 830,

848 (Tex.App.--Texarkana 1996, writ denied).

7. Size of Separate EstateEven though a court may not divest a spouse of his

or her separate property, the court may consider the sizeof a spouses separate property estate when dividing thecommunity estate. Padon v. Padon, 670 SW.2d 354,358-59 (Tex. App.San Antonio 1984, no writ; Lucy v.Lucy, 162 S.W.3d 770 (Tex.App.El Paso 2005, nowrit); Massey v. Massey, 807 S.W.2d 391 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied); Walter v.Walter, 127 S.W.3d 396 (Tex.App.Dallas 2004, no

petn); Madrid v. Madrid, 643 S.W.2d 186 (Tex.App.El Paso 1982, no writ); Capellen v. Capellen, 888S.W.2d 539 (Tex.App.El Paso 1994, writ denied);Stafford v. Stafford, 726 S.W.2d 14 (Tex. 1987);Vannerson v. Vannerson, 857 S.W.2d 659 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied); Patt v. Patt, 689S.W.2d 505 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, nowrit); Smith v. Smith, 836 S.W.2d 688 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no pet.); and Vandiver v.Vandiver, 4 S.W.3d 300 (Tex.App.Corpus Christi1999, no pet. h.).

In Tate v. Tate, 55 S.W.3d 1 (Tex.App.El Paso2000, no pet.), the judge awarded the Wife adisproportionate division of the community estate andin awarding her 51 percent of the community estate, thetrial judge may well have taken into consideration the$50,172.60 in the brokerage account and the $8,000 intravelers' checks which had been confirmed as herseparate property and which were available for herfuture support. It is equally plausible that had the trialcourt characterized those assets as community property,the estate would have been divided disproportionately,given Wife's established need for future support. In theabsence of findings of fact and conclusions of law, theHusband cannot show otherwise. On this record, wecannot conclude that a comparative 55 percent to 45percent distribution in the Wife's favor constitutes anabuse of discretion.

In sum, the court may properly consider the size ofthe separate estates of the spouses in its division of thecommunity estate. Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696(Tex. 1981).

8. Benefits the Innocent Spouse May Have DerivedFrom the Continuation of the MarriageIn making a just and right division of the estate of

the parties, the court may consider the benefits which
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