b. david burke - transcendence in classical samkhya

Transcendence in Classical SāmkhyaAuthor(s): B. David BurkeSource: Philosophy East and West, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Jan., 1988), pp. 19-29Published by: University of Hawai'i PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1398948 .

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B. David Burke Transcendence in classical Simkhya

Certain interpretations of the purusa/prakrti distinction as they pertain to the question of release (moksa/kaivalya) will be investigated herein to see if the current state of the art yields an adequate understanding of the Samkhya position. The first topic to be undertaken is the subject/object distinction as enunciated by Daya Krishna. This will be followed by a discussion of some problems in the conception of the nature of bondage and liberation as found in the writings of Richard Garbe, A. B. Keith, K. C. Bhattacharya, P. Chakravarti, Anima Sen Gupta, N. Sinha, and Gerald J. Larson. Finally, a recommendation will be made that we not consider purusa as "spirit" and that we recognize "kaivalya" as playing a very different function in Samkhya from "moksa."

Daya Krishna, in an article in this journal, "Is TIvara Krsna's Samkhya Karika really Samkhyan?" expresses his concern over what he perceives to be the attempts of Anima Sen Gupta and Mudumba Narasimhsvamin to read the early Samkhya system as a monistic one, drawing it ever nearer to Vedanta. He correctly states that dualism and atheism are the hallmarks of classical Samkhya. It is curious, then, that, immediately after stating his objections, he attempts to introduce Sarmkara's subject/object distinction. I quote at length:

As in most Indian philosophical systems bondage is due to error, it will be the realization of what it regards as the true nature of reality which will give the soul release or liberation .... The fundamental adhydsa in Samkhya is, as everybody knows, the identification of the subject with the object or of the object with the subject. The classic statement of this is not found in a work ostensibly Samkhyan, or written by a thinker even remotely thought by anybody to subscribe to Samkhya philosophy. It is the advaitic Samrkara who opens his commentary on the Brahma Siutras with a statement which, in my opinion, is the classic expression of Samkhyan adhydsa. He writes: "It is a matter not requiring any proof that the object and the subject whose respective spheres are the notion of the 'Thou' (the non-ego) and the 'ego', and which are opposed to each other as much as darkness and light are, cannot be identified."

This quotation, even though from Saiikara, will, I hope, be taken as epitomiz- ing the Samkhyan position. The subject and the object cannot be and ought not to be identified. Their identification is the fundamental error and the dissolution of the error is the realization of the complete separation of the one from the other. When the subject realizes that it is not the object at any level whatsoever, it is released from all error and suffering and attains liberation or moksa. This realization of non-identity or complete distinction is itself the state of liberation, or at least ought to be so according to the Samkhya. The statement "I am not this" may be taken to characterize Samkhyan liberation, provided we understand by "I" the pure subject or purusa and by "this" the pure object or prakrti.

B.David Burke is a Ph.D. Candidate in the Department of South and Southwest Asian Studies, University of Minnesota. He also serves on the Board of the Minnesota Consortium for South Asian Studies.

AUTHOR'S NOTE: I wish to extend my thanks to the Philosophy East and West reader, whose comments have helped to shape and strengthen this article. I, of course, assume full responsibility for any mistakes of omission or commission contained herein. Philosophy East and West, volume 38, no. 1 (January 1988). © by the University of Hawaii Press. All rights reserved.



20 Burke

Logically, then, the purusa in the state of liberation must be aware ofprakrti and of its complete separation from it in all its forms and at all its levels. The pure subject or purusa being of the character of consciousness, and consciousness being of the nature of witness (sdksin), it must be aware of (drsta) prakrti, even in the state of liberation. The difference between bondage and liberation in Samkhya cannot consist in the awareness or non-awareness of prakrti, but in identification or non-identification with it.1

My first point is this: it is clearly dangerous to apply the writings of a philosopher of one darsana in an attempt to try and make his words fit those of another. The Samkhya Kdrikds, as admitted by Daya Krishna, do not speak of the subject/object distinction, but only ofpurusa and prakrti. If we wish to apply Samrkara's statement to Samkhya, we must be clear as to what constitutes subject and what constitutes object.

Second point: Professor Krishna clearly states that the pure subject is purusa and the pure object is prakrti. He also states that it is the subject which must realize the fundamental error (adhydsa) of confusing the object with itself and that when it does so it obtains moksa. He seems to imply that the subject is the pure subject, and herein lies the confusion. The Kdrikds are quite clear on the point that purusa is passive consciousness unable to pursue anything actively. Activity lies within prakrti's realm. It is the buddhi (mahat) that, through the actions of the ahamtkara and the other twenty-three evolutes, comes to realize that purusa is entirely separate from prakrti. Kdrikd 62 makes it quite clear that activity, including transformation (parinama) and transmigration (samsdra), is all on the side ofprakrti.2

Thirdpoint: by not clearly delimiting the separate activities of the buddhi and the aharhkdra, it appears as though it is a purusa which, in some sense, instigates the escape from samsdra through its proper realization of the true state of affairs. Daya Krishna implies that purusa is a subject whose character is that of consciousness. Rather, purusa is consciousness pure and simple. It is not an entity which has the attributes of consciousness and witness. It is consciousness functioning in the system as a witness. In fact, the purusa is eternally unbounded, and it is prakrti's side (buddhi, ahamtkdra, and so forth) which is clouding the issue and making a purusa appear to be in bondage. By clearly delineating the activities of knowledge and realization as being subsumed under prakrti, we avoid such issues, and this is clearly the import of the Karikds.

For Sarhkara, the subject, Brahman, possesses a degree of reality higher than the universe and all it contains. For Samkhya, the purusas and prakrti have equal metaphysical status, though their functioning is in distinct realms. That is to say, the concept/entity/ground of a purusa functions as an epistemological principle, while prakrti functions ontologically. The purusa is considered an object from prakrti's standpoint as prakrti analyzes its differences from purusa. In this sense, though not in Daya Krishna's, the prakrti is the active, knowing, feeling, realiz- ing subject which mistakenly thinks it operates on, "binds," its object, the eternally unbound purusa. By introducing a subject/object distinction into Sam-



21

khya, the terms have, in a critical sense, gotten turned around. Purusa, being pure consciousness, is taken as the pure subject because its innate and eternal state of passivity has been neglected. If we want to say that subjects (in some sense) operate on objects, then we'll have to consider prakrti as subject and purusa as object-an unhappy conclusion for most interpreters of Samkhya!

Fourth point: By stating that, "as in most Indian philosophical systems, bondage is due to error ..." and "the fundamental adhydsa in Samkhya is ... the identification of the subject with the object or of the object with the subject," Daya Krishna comes dangerously close to claiming that nondiscrimination (aviveka) or ignorance (avidya) is the root cause of bondage. For Samkhya, this is just not the case. Ignorance caused by nondiscrimination is what causes prakrti's evolutes to remain in the transmigratory cycle, but the root cause of that cycle is prakrti's "willing" to manifest itself once in all its complicated glory to a purusa.3 (At the level of myth, one is reminded of Krishna allowing his mother Devaki to look into his mouth and see, just once, the entire universe.) This "willing" causes the conjunction (sarmyoga) with a purusa. Through ignorance the conjunction remains harmful to prakrti and ensnares prakrti in samtsdra until the buddhi comes to understand the purusa's true nature. At that point, the karmic momentum in the gunas takes a little time to cease (as the potter's wheel keeps spinning for a time after the potter has ceased using it), and, upon the death of the human individual, the three gunas are once again in a state of equilibrium (prakrti) with respect to one another. Ignorance keeps one bound to sarhsdra, but it is not the initial cause of being so bound.

Fifth point: For Daya Krishna, it is the purusa that is, in a primary sense, bound. He cites Kdrikds 67 and 68 as supporting this while recognizing, in a footnote, that Kdrikd 62 runs counter.

There are, of course, some problems. Karika 62 flatly declares that the self is neither ever bound nor ever liberated. It is only the prakrti which is so. However, the overwhelming evidence of the other Karikas points in another direction, especially Karika 68....4

An internal tension between these three Kdrikis has been recognized, but Pro- fessor Krishna makes no attempt at their reconciliation. As this is not an uncommon procedure among Samkhya's interpreters, throughout the secondary literature there is a decided uneasiness as to which metaphysical principle (purusa, prakrti, or both) 'kaivalya' is appropriate.

Thus, Garbe, while generally recognizing that it is prakrti which transmigrates, tries to have it both ways: Soul [purusa] is perfectly indifferent and, therefore, also not the vehicle of moral responsibility. This office is assumed by the subtile or internal body, which is chiefly formed of the inner organs and the senses, and which surrounds the soul. This internal body accompanies soul from one existence into another, and is, therefore the real principle of metempsychosis.... [D]iscriminative knowledge delivers soul from the misery of the endless flow of existence and abolishes the necessity of being born again.5



22 Burke

Gerald J. Larson has taken cognizance of Kdrikd 62 while simultaneously holding that prakrti's release is done purusartha (for the sake of purusa) "... to bring about the salvation or release of purusa." 6 Rather than attempt to deal with what it means to say that prakrti is released, Larson focuses on the first part of the Kdrikd, which states that a purusa is unbound and does not transmigrate. Because the purusa in itself is pure, translucent consciousness, it cannot be bound or liberated. It only appears as if bound, liberated, etc., from the perspective of man in the manifest world. In fact, the purusa is simply a presence in the world. The purusa is in the world but not of the world. When viewed from this perspective the statement that purusa is neither bound nor released is more intelligible, for by its very nature it could not be bound.7

What does it mean to say that an entity is in the world but not of the world? We might wish to make such a statement about a visitor from another planet, for instance, but is it not also true that when that visitor is in our world he is also, at that time, in some sense or other of our world; that is, can he not then be predicated as somehow being a part of our world, over and above being in it? Even though his origin is different, he is now functioning in the world and is, therefore, in some sense, to be considered of it as well. But, for classical Samkhya, purusa is absolutely separate from prakrti. It is neither in prakrti nor of prakrti.

Larson is obviously troubled by Kdrika 62 and chooses only to render it "more intelligible" in the light of his conviction that it is the salvation or release of purusa with which the Samkhya Kdrikds are concerned. But, consciousness and awareness are distinct. Consciousness is passive, inert, sdksin (witness), agentless (purusa). Awareness is active questioning of an agent (prakrti). Purusa is pure consciousness; and, by its being in proximity to buddhi, buddhi appears as though it has consciousness when, in fact, all it has are awareness and intelligence. Sitra 99 in the Sdmkhyapravacanasutra clearly spells this out: "(Actual) superinten- dence is of the Antahkarana [includes manas, karana, and buddhi], because it is lighted up by Purusa, as is the case with the iron."

Bh.sya: ... For the illumination of the antahkarana consists merely in a particular conjunction with Consciousness which is eternally shining, that is, in nothing but the reflection of Consciousness produced through a particular conjunction. And not that Consciousness passes into the antahkarana, whereby associatedness would be the result.8

Keith, Johnston, Garbe, Oltramare, Oldenberg, Edgerton, Frauwallner, van Buitenen, Bhattacharya, Sinha, and Larson have all done important work on Samkhya. If anything shines through clearly from their works, it is that Samkhya is not an unbroken, linear tradition. The works of the Samkhya schools that have survived are inconsistent and often apparently contradictory. Through the preceding authors' techniques of historical investigation and imaginative recon- struction, we now know much more about Samkhya than did scholars in pre- vious generations. The current state of the art shows that the interpretation of



23

Samkhya is an active philosophical pursuit, an open field ripe for new, consistent interpretations based on the primary literature.

I wonder, then, is it too much to grant that, although various schools and individual works of Samkhya may hold apparently contradictory positions, a small text such as TIvarakrsna's Sdmkhyakdrikas might be consistent within itself? The tensions are there-purusa and prakrti both appear to need and seek for salvation-but are these tensions more the product of inconsistency in the translations than in the original text? I believe that to be the case, and I shall now argue for a more consistent framework.

Larson cites Kdrikds 31,42, 63 and 69 as the four Kdrikds where the compound term 'purusdrtha' occurs.9 I am now going to argue that consistently putting the common gloss "for the sake of" on 'artha' does basic harm to the classical Samkhya philosophy. 'Artham', as an indeclinable, tends to make one go into an automatic translation mode much as a computer would select the statistically most common pattern of translation. However, as a translator, one must constantly be on one's guard for textual consistency.

The crux of my argument will center on Kiriki 62 not as an embarrassment or inconsistency in the text, but as the primary point. If we accept the teaching that purusa is always and entirely unbound, and that only prakrti is bound and capable of transformation (parindmavdda) and transmigration, what happens to the translation ofpurusdrtha as "for the sake ofpurusa"? If purusa is in a constant state of liberation, how can it possibly need anything further done for its sake? What I think has happened here will become clearer if we look at certain statements of the interpreters of Samkhya: Keith But in the end nature [prakrti] succeeds in her object, and like a bashful maiden seen in deshabille, who withdraws forever from the sight of the man who has seen her, nature, having fulfilled her object, withdraws from spirit forever, when spirit has realized its essential distinction from nature. Then comes to an end the paradox by which spirit, which has really no connection with nature and is unaffected by the misery inherent in nature, considers itself bound and suffers transmigration, while nature undertakes the changes of evolution for the sake of spirit, since in herself she is not conscious of misery. In truth the spirit is not bound, does not undergo transmigration, and is not released, but these processes are applicable to nature, but only for the sake of spirit.10 Sen Gupta In this world, we find that the whole of creation is marching towards freedom which seems to be its supreme goal. Pure unconscious matter can never have the goal of freedom which belongs to the soul. So, we are led to believe that there must be bound souls which are to be made free in and through this process of world creation.... Bondage means a false unification of consciousness with matter and liberation means its dissociation. Unless, there is Pravrtti (striving) in Nature there will be no change and mutation, and consequently, the distinction of a static prakrti from a static purusa cannot be fully realized.1 Chakravarti This revelation of her own self to the purusa is the end of prakrti. Purusa's end, on the other hand, is to free himself from the clasp of prakrti. Though he is



24 Burke

undefiled and without any attribute, yet he ascribes pleasure, pain and such other properties of prakrti to his own self, and thus becomes affected by them. Really speaking, he is not to be touched by those attributes. But due to his constant association with the prakrti, he fails to discriminate his own self from that of her. But when this non-discriminative knowledge ceases to function, he can differentiate himself from the prakrti, and thus regains his true nature.12

These examples could be further multiplied, but the interesting point about all of them is that (1) Purusa is consistently seen as spirit or soul which, in some sense, needs to be set free, and (2) prakrti has the purpose of enabling purusa to realize (if not obtain) its freedom.

Larson has offered the following useful definition of purusa:

... the self or soul but more precisely the principle, of consciousness, since Samkhya interprets most of the usual functions of the self or soul in terms of antahkarana (or "internal organ" made up of intellect [buddhi], ego [ahamhkdra] and mind [manas]) which is a manifestation of prakrti. The purusa is simply a contentless witness (sdksitva), its only function being that of passive presence.... [T]he purusa is totally inactive (akartrbhava), totally detached (madhyasthya, uddsTna), and isolated (kevala, kaivalya) from prakrti....13

While offering this definition, he is inconsistent in his acceptance of it. Thus, for Larson, purusartha still means that prakrti functions, in some sense, for the sake of the salvation of a purusa.

In all the cases just mentioned, the fault lies in not taking seriously the need to consider purusa as something very distinct from the soul or spirit. In fact, I am convinced that no one term in Samkhya can be adequately translated as "soul." The antahkarana, as Larson points out, by itself is devoid of consciousness, and consciousness is typically held to be an important feature of a soul. The antahkarana, with the five tanmatras (subtle elements: sound, touch, color, smell, and taste), the five organs of action, and the five organs of perception together compose the subtle body suksma-sarfra, which is manifested from the three gunas once they have lost their condition of prakrti. It is the saksma-sarfra which is affected by moral attributes (karman) and which transmigrates, not the purusa. Unlike in Garbe's contention, the antahkarana-and, for that matter, the suksma-sarlra-does not surround or accompany the soul on the transmigratory cycle. That would imply that the purusa is caught up in transmigration and would be inconsistent with Kdrikd 62. The point is that the saksma (particularly its antahkarana portion) and the purusa together play the role within the system that is normally reserved for dtman in other Indian darsanas. The antahkarana consists of a person's psychic functions while the purusa is consciousness.

One must again be careful here not to say that the purusa has consciousness or consists of consciousness. Bhattacharya is correct in his claim that "the self is pure consciousness, not embodied consciousness nor consciousness of a content having the form of an object." 14 In Samkhya, the dtman has been discarded for a pure, unblemished purusa, which is constantly immobile and passive and which is incapable of transformation and transmigration. Only the material side



25

of things is allowed to be caught up in error and samsdra. Unlike Vedanta, however, the material side (prakrti and so forth), including transmigration, is ultimately real. It is not a product of mdyd. There is no one single entity that can be labeled 'soul' in Samkhya. There are antahkaranas that are enmeshed in samsdra and are aware of their plight thanks to their indirect association with consciousness (purusa). But the "awareness," "bondage," and "knowledge of their plight" are all spun out from prakrti's side. Thus, it is highly detrimental to the essence of Samkhya to refer to purusa as "soul."

This interpretation is consistent with Kdrikd 62, but can it be consistent with those Kdrikds which claim prakrti functions as purusartha? There are currently two primary translations of purusartha. The first is found in the writings of Larson, Keith, Sen Gupta, and Sinha among others. This is "for the sake of purusa," which has become the prevalent translation in the secondary literature. The second translation takes purusdrtha to mean "for the object (or purpose) of purusa." Holders of this interpretation include A. K. Majumdar, E. H. Johnston, and, implicitly, S. S. S. Sastri. That the difference of interpretation is not readily apparent is brought forcibly home by Larson's statement of Johnston's position:

From evidence in Yoga suitra Johnston asserts that Isvarakrsna did contribute the new notion of purusartha, with respect to the problem of the coming together of prakrti and purusa-i.e., prakrti undergoes change for the sake of the purusa.1 5

In fact, what Johnston wrote was:

None of these changes need have been the invention of TIvarakrsna, but the evidence of the YS. suggests the possibility that he did contribute one novelty in the theory that prakrti comes into action to effect the purpose of the purusa, thereby finally doing away with the older explanation that avidyd was the cause of the implication of the soul in the universe. 6

It is my contention that the term purusdrtham needs to be translated primarily as "for purusa's objective or purpose" and only as "for the sake of purusa" in a very special sense. The term appears only in Kdrikds 31, 42, 63, and 69. It is instructive to compare the translations of these Karikds by Sinha, Suryanara- yana Sastri, and Larson. Throughout, Larson translates 'purusdrtha' as "for the sake of purusa." 17 N. Sinha translates the term as "for the purpose of purusa" in 31 and 42, "for the sake of purusa" in 63, and as "for the end of purusa" in 69.18 Sastri translates it as "goal of the Spirit" in 31, 42, and 69, and as "for the benefit of the Spirit" in 63.19 Sastri states that "the goal of the Spirit" is "release" without specifying whose release, although he does recognize that purusa is eternally unbound.20 Thus, the only Kdrikd for which all three of these transla- tors agree that purusdrtham should be translated along the lines of "for the sake of purusa" is 63.

If we are to abide by the restrictions of Kdrika 62, then we must say that it would make no sense to say that purusdrtham means "for the sake of purusa" in the sense of purusa's release. But it would make a great deal of sense if "for the



26 Burke

sake of purusa" was taken to mean "for the sake of helping purusa fulfill its function," that is, "serving indirectly to secure the release of the siksma-sarira from the transmigratory cycle by enabling buddhi to realize the absolute distinction between purusa and prakrti." Sinha speaks directly to this point:

The "experience of Purusa" consists in his being the indifferent spectator of the changes that take place in Buddhi; his "bondage" is nothing but the reflection on him of the bondage, that is, the impurities of Buddhi; his "release" is merely the removal of this reflection which, again, depends upon the recovery by Buddhi of its state of pristine purity, which means its dissolution into Prakrti. To say that the activity of Prakrti is for the benefit of Purusa is, therefore, a mere figure of speech. It is really for the purification of the Sattva of Buddhi.21

Before I can state the special sense in which purusdrtham needs to be translated as "for the sake of purusa" in Kdrikd 63, we must first turn our attention to Kdrikds 56, 57, and 58. These are the most problematic Kdrikds for our interpretation of purusartham as "for purusa's objective" to succeed.

(56) ity esah prakrtikrto mahadddivisesabhitaparyan pratipurusavimoksdrthamt svdrtha iva pardrtha drahbhah

This creation, brought about by prakrti-from the great one (mahat) down to the specific gross elements-(functions) for the sake of the release of each purusa; (this is done) for the sake of another, as if it were for her own (benefit).22

TIvarakrsna's line of argument continues onto the next sutra (57) where an analogy is drawn with the secretion of unintelligent milk (prakrti's evolutes) functioning for the sake of the calf (purusa). Again, the Sanskrit shows "purusa- vimoksa."23 In Kdrikd 58, we find the phrase "purusasya vimoksdrtham."24 These three occurrences of the term 'vimoksa' are the only usages of 'moksa' in any of the Kdrikds, and they all are used in speaking of the condition of purusa. All translations of which I am aware render this term as 'release', considering it to be synonymous with kaivalya.

This, I wish to urge, is a critical mistake. These Kdrikds are building to the main point of Kdrikd 62, which is that purusa is ever free. Moksa refers to the state of eternal release of a purusa, which is never abrogated, while the term kaivalya has two referents: (1) the state of isolation between purusa and prakrti, and (2) the realization by a particular buddhi that purusa and prakrti are entirely and eternally isolated from each other and that their conjunction (safmyoga) was only apparent due to the buddhi's avidyd stemming from its aviveka between a purusa and prakrti. Thus, in the Kdrikds, moksa is not the equivalent of kaivalya.

Taking up Kdrikd 63, again, we find it stated that:

By seven forms does Prakrti bind herself by herself; and it is she who, by one form, releases herself for the sake of Purusa.25

This Kdrikd explicitly states that prakrti is responsible for its own binding. Prakrti's release performs tho functions: (1) it fulfills purusa's objective of enabling the prakrti to realize its absolute, eternal isolation from purusa, and (2)



27

it enables prakrti to stop clouding up the mirror that is purusa with the images of its evolutes. In this second sense alone is the action done "for the sake of purusa." However, as these reflections ofprakrti's evolutes have no real material conjunction (samzyoga) with purusa, but only an apparent conjunction (and, therefore, have no real effect on purusa), the primary meaning of purusdrtham must be taken in the sense of (1). This is also true for Kdrikds 56, 57, and 58.

Following on the heels of Kdrikd 63, there are some very interesting interpretations of Kdrikds 67 and 68.

(67) samyagjidnddhigamdd dharmddTndm akdranaprdptau

tisthati satmskdravasdc cakrabhramavad dhrtasarTrah

Having arrived at the point at which virtue, etc. has no (further) cause, because of the attainment of direct knowledge (samyagjidnddhigamdd), the endowed body (i.e. the body in association with purusa) yet continues because of the force of past impressions (samskdras), like a potter's wheel.26

(68) prdpte sarfrabhede caritdrthatvdt pradhdnavinivrttau

aikdntikam dtyantikam ubhayam kaivalyam dpnoti

With the cessation of prakrti due to its purpose having been accomplished, (the purusa) on attaining separation from the body, attains isolation (kaivalya) which is both certain and final.27

As one can see from the Sanskrit, the term purusa appears in neither Kdrikd 67 nor 68. Sinha and Larson have added the term in their translations for the sake of clarity and Sastri has preferred the term 'Spirit', which is his normal gloss for 'purusa'.28 It is my contention that this addition in 67 and 68 is unjustified and runs counter to the continuity that needs to be achieved with Kdrikd 62. If we are correct in our assertion that purusa only partially fulfills the function played by dtman in other transmigration schemes, then, in 67 and 68, the emphasis should be on the subtle body suksma-sardra, which continues for a time through momentum. In Kdrikd 68, the subtle body, achieving absolute and final separation from the physical body, enables the various evolutes of the material gunas to cease their operations absolutely and finally and the three gunas to regain equilibrium (prakrti) forever with respect to that purusa. Since a purusa never has direct connection with the body, the concept of separation is not, in a primary sense, applicable. The conjunction (sarhyoga) of prakrti with purusa does not connote a material connection as sarhyoga denotes in Nyaya-Vaisesika, for instance. For Samkhya, 'sarhyoga' is only an apparent material connection, likened to the rose's image in the "mirror" of a pure crystal, which makes it appear that somehow the rose is in the crystal when, in fact, it is not.

Kdrikds 56, 57, and 58 are concerned with the ever present state of moksa of each individual purusa. Kdrikds 67 and 68 are concerned with the recognition of the isolation ofpurusa and prakrti from each other. The terms moksa and kaivalya



28 Burke

are not at all synonymous and have not been so used by TIvarakrsna. The moksa of purusa is primary and continuous. The term kaivalya places its emphasis on the disinterested and "burned out" functioning of the three gunas as they once again enter a state of prakrti. As purusa is not an entity endowed with consciousness but is consciousness itself, so prakrti is not a thing which is composed of the three gunas. Prakrti is the condition of equilibrium between the three gunas.

As purusa and prakrti have equal metaphysical status, it would seem that a purusa cannot have moksa without prakrti having a similar, balancing, concept. That concept, as far as it goes, is kaivalya. Kaivalya designates not a state of absolute release for prakrti, but only an absolute noninterest in and isolation from a particular purusa. Samkhya does not raise the question of the absolute noninterest in and isolation from all purusas. Just as it is not particularly interested in explaining the beginning point of all creation (other than to claim that prakrti wills to expose herself to a purusa), so it is not interested in explaining the endpoint of the three gunas being in a condition of prakrti with respect to every purusa.

In other words, moksa applies to a purusa, kaivalya applies to the regained indifference between the three gunas in a state of prakrti with respect to a particular purusa and that particular purusa, and there is no unique technical term to apply to prakrti once the three gunas in equilibrium are again indifferent to allpurusas. The term moksa, or an analogous term of equal complication and stature, is simply not appropriate for psychic and material matter alone. For Samkhya, soteriological knowledge (moksajnina) is applicable only to that part of us all which is held to be the very essence of our spiritual being-consciousness.

NOTES

1. Daya Krishna, "Is TIvara Krsna's Sam.khya Karika really Samkhyan?" Philosophy East and West 18, no. 3 (July 1968): 199-200.

2. Nandalal Sinha, The Samkhya Philosophy, in The Sacred Books of the Hindus (Allahabad: The Panini Office, 1915), vol. 11, Simtkhya-Karika, p. 47.

3. Sinha, Samtkhya-Karika, pp. 45-49. 4. Krishna, "Tgvara Krsna's Samkhya Karika," p. 201. 5. Richard Garbe, Philosophy of Ancient India (Chicago, Illinois: The Open Court Publishing

Company, 1897), p. 11. 6. Gerald J. Larson, Classical Samkhya (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1979), pp. 174 and 176. 7. Larson, Classical Samkhya, pp. 204 and 173. 8. Sinha, Samkhya-Pravacana-Siitram, Book 1, Sfitra 99, pp. 148-149. 9. Larson, Classical Siamkhya, p. 176.

10. A. B. Keith, A History of the Samkhya Philosophy (Delhi: Nag Publishers, 1975), p. 97. 11. Anima Sen Gupta, Classical Samkhya: A Critical Study (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal

Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1982), p. 85. 12. P. Chakravarti, Origin and Development of the Samkhya System of Thought (New Delhi:

Oriental Books Reprint Corp., 1975), p. 230. 13. Larson, Classical Samkhya, p. 243. 14. K. C. Bhattacharyya, Studies in Philosophy, vol. 1 (Calcutta: Progressive Publishers, 1956),

p. 192.



29

15. Larson, Classical Siamkhya, pp. 46-47. 16. E. H. Johnston, Early Sdmkhya (Delhi: Shri Jainendra Press, 1974), p. 88. 17. Larson, Classical Sdmkhya, p. 176. 18. Sinha, Sdtkhya-Kdrikd, pp. 28, 35, 47, and 51. 19. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, The Sdnkhyakdrikd of Isvara Krsna (Madras: University of

Madras, 1973), pp. 69, 86, 112, and 119. 20. Sastri, Sdnkhyakdrikd, pp. 70 and 111. 21. Sinha, Sdmkhya-Kdrikd, "Preface," p. 10. 22. Larson, Classical Samkhya, p. 272. 23. Sinha, Sdmkhya-Kdrikd, pp. 44-45. 24. Ibid., pp. 45-46. 25. Ibid., p. 47. 26. Larson, Classical Samkhya, p. 275. 27. Ibid. 28. Sastri, Sdnkhyakdrikd, pp. 116 and 118.



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