b737 flight controls-design_change

18
737.1 Flight Controls Design Changes and Checklists Flight Controls Design Changes and Checklists Terry Sheehan 737NG Procedures Manager Boeing Commercial Airplanes May 2004 Terry Sheehan 737NG Procedures Manager Boeing Commercial Airplanes May 2004

Upload: ricardo-ccoyure-tito

Post on 19-Jan-2015

212 views

Category:

Education


19 download

DESCRIPTION

B737 flight controls-design_change

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: B737 flight controls-design_change

737.1

Flight Controls Design Changes and ChecklistsFlight Controls Design

Changes and ChecklistsTerry Sheehan

737NG Procedures ManagerBoeing Commercial Airplanes

May 2004

Terry Sheehan737NG Procedures Manager

Boeing Commercial AirplanesMay 2004

Page 2: B737 flight controls-design_change

737.2The Boeing Company

Flight Controls FailuresFlight Controls Failures

• Flight crews have experienced flight control failures in which the leading edge devices or trailing edge flaps fail to move to the commanded position

• Lockout of leading edge devices generally occurs during retraction after takeoff

• Lockout of trailing edge flaps generally occurs during extension while on approach to landing

• Flight crews have experienced flight control failures in which the leading edge devices or trailing edge flaps fail to move to the commanded position

• Lockout of leading edge devices generally occurs during retraction after takeoff

• Lockout of trailing edge flaps generally occurs during extension while on approach to landing

BackgroundBackground

Page 3: B737 flight controls-design_change

737.3The Boeing Company

Leading Edge DevicesLeading Edge Devices

• Leading edge device lockouts occur due to excessive fluid flow

– The system sets hydraulic fuses and stops further motion

• Leading edge device lockouts occur due to excessive fluid flow

– The system sets hydraulic fuses and stops further motion

LockoutsLockouts

Page 4: B737 flight controls-design_change

737.4The Boeing Company

Leading Edge DevicesLeading Edge Devices

• Three known causes have been identified: – Debris in the system holds the LE slat pressure

relief valve in the open position – O-ring extrusion in the slat actuator cylinders

allows fluid flow between cylinders– Metallic debris in the auto slat valve (introduced

during valve production) allows fluid to flow to the hydraulic return

• Three known causes have been identified: – Debris in the system holds the LE slat pressure

relief valve in the open position – O-ring extrusion in the slat actuator cylinders

allows fluid flow between cylinders– Metallic debris in the auto slat valve (introduced

during valve production) allows fluid to flow to the hydraulic return

LockoutsLockouts

Page 5: B737 flight controls-design_change

737.5The Boeing Company

Leading Edge DevicesLeading Edge Devices

• The leading edge slat actuator has been redesigned to remove the internal pressure relief valve and to prevent separation of the O-ring

– New design introduced in January 2002– Service Bulletin issued for in-service airplanes

• Production procedures have been changed to significantly reduce the possibility of metal fracture during manufacturing

• The leading edge slat actuator has been redesigned to remove the internal pressure relief valve and to prevent separation of the O-ring

– New design introduced in January 2002– Service Bulletin issued for in-service airplanes

• Production procedures have been changed to significantly reduce the possibility of metal fracture during manufacturing

Design ChangesDesign Changes

Page 6: B737 flight controls-design_change

737.6The Boeing Company

Trailing Edge FlapsTrailing Edge Flaps

• Trailing edge flap lockouts occur due to – Sticking position transmitters– Inadvertent torque brake actuation

• Trailing edge flap lockouts occur due to – Sticking position transmitters– Inadvertent torque brake actuation

LockoutsLockouts

Page 7: B737 flight controls-design_change

737.7The Boeing Company

Trailing Edge FlapsTrailing Edge Flaps

• Position transmitters stick due to contamination in the synchronization bearings caused by the improper mixing of two types of lubricants

• The difference in the position information between the left and right indicators results in an asymmetry shutdown

• Position transmitters stick due to contamination in the synchronization bearings caused by the improper mixing of two types of lubricants

• The difference in the position information between the left and right indicators results in an asymmetry shutdown

LockoutsLockouts

Page 8: B737 flight controls-design_change

737.8The Boeing Company

Trailing Edge FlapsTrailing Edge Flaps

• Torque brake activates inadvertently and prevents further movement of the trailing edge flaps

– Occurs with flaps under high load (Flaps > 15)

• A number of failures can be attributed to momentary activation of the flap load relief function

• Torque brake activates inadvertently and prevents further movement of the trailing edge flaps

– Occurs with flaps under high load (Flaps > 15)

• A number of failures can be attributed to momentary activation of the flap load relief function

LockoutsLockouts

Page 9: B737 flight controls-design_change

737.9The Boeing Company

Trailing Edge FlapsTrailing Edge Flaps

• Position transmitters have been reworked by supplier– Warranties have been extended

• Torque brake has been redesigned– New torque brake design was introduced in

production at Line Number 696– “Toothed” torque brake design results in less

internal drag

• Position transmitters have been reworked by supplier– Warranties have been extended

• Torque brake has been redesigned– New torque brake design was introduced in

production at Line Number 696– “Toothed” torque brake design results in less

internal drag

Design ChangesDesign Changes

Page 10: B737 flight controls-design_change

737.10The Boeing Company

Flight Crew ImpactFlight Crew Impact

• These design changes have significantly reduced the number of flight control lockouts, but have not entirely eliminated them

– Flight crew must continue to accomplish non-normal checklists

• These design changes have significantly reduced the number of flight control lockouts, but have not entirely eliminated them

– Flight crew must continue to accomplish non-normal checklists

Page 11: B737 flight controls-design_change

737.11The Boeing Company

Checklist ChangesChecklist Changes

• Input from operators indicate flight crews were often confused about the proper checklist to use in the event of a flight control failure

• Boeing has worked to delete unnecessary checklists, combine checklists where possible and provide additional clarification

• Input from operators indicate flight crews were often confused about the proper checklist to use in the event of a flight control failure

• Boeing has worked to delete unnecessary checklists, combine checklists where possible and provide additional clarification

Page 12: B737 flight controls-design_change

737.12The Boeing Company

Leading Edge Flap TransitLeading Edge Flap Transit

Page 13: B737 flight controls-design_change

737.13The Boeing Company

Leading Edge Flap TransitLeading Edge Flap Transit

Page 14: B737 flight controls-design_change

737.14The Boeing Company

Leading Edge Flap TransitLeading Edge Flap Transit

Page 15: B737 flight controls-design_change

737.15The Boeing Company

Trailing Edge Flap AsymmetryTrailing Edge Flap Asymmetry

Page 16: B737 flight controls-design_change

737.16The Boeing Company

Trailing Edge Flap AsymmetryTrailing Edge Flap Asymmetry

Page 17: B737 flight controls-design_change

737.17The Boeing Company

Trailing Edge Flap DisagreeTrailing Edge Flap Disagree

Page 18: B737 flight controls-design_change

737.18The Boeing Company

Trailing Edge Flap DisagreeTrailing Edge Flap Disagree