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An Essay on the History of Civil Societyby Adam Ferguson1767.

Part First.

Of the General Characteristics of Human

Nature

Section I.

Of the question relating to the State ofNature

Natural productions are generallyformed by degrees.Vegetables grow from a tender shoot,

and animals from an infantstate. The latter being destined to act,extend their operationsas their powers increase: they exhibit a

progress, in what theyperform, as well as in the faculties they

acquire. This progressin the case of man is continued to a

greater extent than in thatof any other animal. Not only theindividual advances frominfancy to manhood, but the species

itself from rudeness tocivilization. Hence the supposeddeparture of mankind from thestate of their nature; hence our

conjectures and differentopinions of what man must have been inthe first age of hisbeing. The poet, the historian, and the

moralist, frequentlyallude to this ancient time; and under theemblems of gold, or ofiron, represent a condition, and a manner

of life, from whichmankind have either degenerated, or onwhich they have greatlyimproved. On either supposition, the first

state of our naturemust have borne no resemblance towhat men have exhibited in anysubsequent period; historical

monuments, even of the earliestdate, are to be considered as novelties;and the most commonestablishments of human society are to

be classed among theincroachments which fraud, oppression,or a busy invention, have

made upon the reign of nature, by whichthe chief of ourgrievances or blessings were equallywith-held. Among the writerswho have attempted to distinguish, in the

human character, itsoriginal qualities, and to point out thelimits between natureand art, some have represented mankind

in their first condition,as possessed of mere animal sensibility,without any exercise of

the faculties that render them superior tothe brutes, withoutany political union, without any means of

explaining theirsentiments, and even without possessingany of the apprehensionsand passions which the voice and the

gesture are so well fitted

to express. Others have made the stateof nature to consist inperpetual wars, kindled by competition

for dominion and interest,where every individual had a separatequarrel with his kind, andwhere the presence of a fellow-creature

was the signal of battle.The desire of laying the foundation of

a favourite system, ora fond expectation, perhaps, that we may

be able to penetrate thesecrets of nature, to the very source ofexistence, have, on thissubject, led to many fruitless inquiries,

and given rise to manywild suppositions. Among the various

qualities which mankindpossess, we select one or a few

particulars on which to establisha theory, and in framing our account ofwhat man was in someimaginary state of nature, we overlook

what he has alwaysappeared within the reach of our ownobservation, and in therecords of history.

In every other instance, however, thenatural historianthinks himself obliged to collect facts, notto offer

conjectures. When he treats of anyparticular species of animals,he supposes, that their presentdispositions and instincts are

the same they originally had, and thattheir present manner oflife is a continuance of their firstdestination. He admits, that

his knowledge of the material system ofthe world consists in acollection of facts, or at most, in generaltenets derived from

particular observations and experiments.It is only in whatrelates to himself, and in matters themost important, and the

most easily known, that he substituteshypothesis instead ofreality, and confounds the provinces of

imagination and reason,of poetry and science.

But without entering any farther onquestions either in moralor physical subjects, relating to the

manner or to the origin ofour knowledge; without anydisparagement to that subtilty whichwould analyze every sentiment, and

trace every mode of being toits source; it may be safely affirmed, thatthe character of man,

as he now exists, that the laws of thisanimal and intellectualsystem, on which his happiness now

depends, deserve our principalstudy; and that general principles relatingto this, or any othersubject, are useful only so far as they are

founded on just

observation, and lead to the knowledgeof important consequences,or so far as they enable us to act with

success when we wouldapply either the intellectual or thephysical powers of nature,to the great purposes of human life.

If both the earliest and the latestaccounts collected fromevery quarter of the earth, representmankind as assembled in

troops and companies; and the individualalways joined byaffection to one party, while he ispossibly opposed to another;

employed in the exercise of recollectionand foresight; inclined

to communicate his own sentiments, andto be made acquainted with

those of others; these facts must beadmitted as the foundationof all our reasoning relative to man. Hismixed disposition to

friendship or enmity, his reason, his useof language andarticulate sounds, like the shape and theerect position of his

body, are to be considered as so manyattributes of his nature:they are to be retained in his description,as the wing and the

paw are in that of the eagle and the lion,and as differentdegrees of fierceness, vigilance, timidity,or speed, are made to

occupy a place in the natural history ofdifferent animals.

If the question be put, What the mindof man could perform,

when left to itself, and without the aid ofany foreigndirection? we are to look for our answerin the history of

mankind. Particular experiments whichhave been found so usefulin establishing the principles of othersciences, could probably,

on this subject, teach us nothingimportant, or new: we are totake the history of every active being

from his conduct in thesituation to which he is formed, not fromhis appearance in anyforced or uncommon condition; a wildman therefore, caught in the

woods, where he had always lived apartfrom his species, is asingular instance, not a specimen of anygeneral character. As

the anatomy of an eye which had neverreceived the impressions of

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light, or that of an ear which had neverfelt the impulse ofsounds, would probably exhibit defects in

the very structure ofthe organs themselves, arising from theirnot being applied totheir proper functions; so any particular

case of this sort would

only shew in what degree the powers ofapprehension and sentimentcould exist where they had not been

employed, and what would bethe defects and imbecilities of a heart inwhich the emotionsthat pertain to society had never been

felt.Mankind are to be taken in groupes,

as they have alwayssubsisted. The history of the individual is

but a detail of thesentiments and thoughts he hasentertained in the view of hisspecies: and every experiment relative to

this subject should bemade with entire societies, not with

single men. We have everyreason, however, to believe, that in the

case of such anexperiment made, we shall suppose, witha colony of childrentransplanted from the nursery, and left to

form a society apart,untaught, and undisciplined, we shouldonly have the same thingsrepeated, which, in so many different

parts of the earth, havebeen transacted already. The membersof our little society wouldfeed and sleep, would herd together and

play, would have alanguage of their own, would quarrel anddivide, would be to oneanother the most important objects of the

scene, and, in theardour of their friendships andcompetitions, would overlooktheir personal danger, and suspend the

care of theirself-preservation. Has not the humanrace been planted like thecolony in question? Who has directed

their course? whoseinstruction have they heard? or whoseexample have they followed?

Nature, therefore, we shall presume,

having given to everyanimal its mode of existence, itsdispositions and manner of

life, has dealt equally with those of thehuman race; and thenatural historian who would collect theproperties of thisspecies, may fill up every article now, as

well as he could havedone in any former age. yet one propertyby which man isdistinguished, has been sometimes

overlooked in the account ofhis nature, or has only served to misleadour attention. In other

classes of animals, the individualadvances from infancy to ageor maturity; and he attains, in the

compass of a single life, toall the perfection his nature can reach:but, in the human kind,the species has a progress as well as the

individual; they build

in every subsequent age on foundationsformerly laid; and, in asuccession of years, tend to a perfection

in the application oftheir faculties, to which the aid of longexperience is required,and to which many generations must

have combined theirendeavours. We observe the progressthey have made; we distinctlyenumerate many of its steps; we can

trace them back to a distantantiquity of which no record remains, norany monument ispreserved, to inform us what were the

openings of this wonderfulscene. The consequence is, that instead

of attending to thecharacter of our species, where the

particulars are vouched bythe surest authority, we endeavour totrace it through ages andscenes unknown; and, instead of

supposing that the beginning ofour story was nearly of a piece with thesequel, we thinkourselves warranted to reject every

circumstance of our presentcondition and frame, as adventitious, andforeign to our nature.The progress of mankind from a

supposed state of animalsensibility, to the attainment of reason, tothe use of language,and to the habit of society, has been

accordingly painted with aforce of imagination, and its steps havebeen marked with aboldness of invention, that would tempt

us to admit, among thematerials of history, the suggestions offancy, and to receive,perhaps, as the model of our nature in its

original state, someof the animals whose shape has thegreatest resemblance toours.(1*)

It would be ridiculous to affirm, as adiscovery, that thespecies of the horse was probably never

the same with that of thelion; yet, in opposition to what hasdropped from the pens ofeminent writers, we are obliged toobserve, that men have always

appeared among animals a distinct and asuperior race; thatneither the possession of similar organs,nor the approximation

of shape, nor the use of the hand,(2*)nor the continued

intercourse with this sovereign artist, hasenabled any otherspecies to blend their nature or their

inventions with his; thatin his rudest state, he is found to beabove them; and in hisgreatest degeneracy, never descends to

their level. He is, in

short, a man in every condition; and wecan learn nothing of hisnature from the analogy of other animals.

If we would know him,we must attend to himself, to the courseof his life, and thetenor of his conduct. With him the society

appears to be as oldas the individual, and the use of thetongue as universal as thatof the hand or the foot. If there was a

time in which he had hisacquaintance with his own species tomake, and his faculties toacquire, it is a time of which we have no

record, and in relationto which our opinions can serve no

purpose, and are supported byno evidence.

We are often tempted into theseboundless regions ofignorance or conjecture, by a fancywhich delights in creating

rather than in merely retaining the formswhich are presentedbefore it: we are the dupes of a subtilty,which promises to

supply every defect of our knowledge,and, by filling up a fewblanks in the story of nature, pretends toconduct our

apprehension nearer to the source ofexistence. On the credit ofa few observations, we are apt topresume, that the secret may

soon be laid open, and that what istermed wisdom in nature, maybe referred to the operation of physicalpowers. We forget that

physical powers, employed insuccession, and combined to asalutary purpose, constitute those veryproofs of design from

which we infer the existence of God; andthat this truth beingonce admitted, we are no longer tosearch for the source of

existence; we can only collect the lawswhich the author ofnature has established; and in our latest

as well as our earliestdiscoveries, only come to perceive amode of creation orprovidence before unknown.

We speak of art as distinguished from

nature; but art itselfis natural to man. He is in some measurethe artificer of his ownframe, as well as his fortune, and is

destined, from the firstage of his being, to invent and contrive.He applies the same

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talents to a variety of purposes, and actsnearly the same partin very different scenes. He would be

always improving on hissubject, and he carries this intentionwhere-ever he moves,through the streets of the populous city,

or the wilds of the

forest. While he appears equally fitted toevery condition, he isupon this account unable to settle in any.

At once obstinate andfickle, he complains of innovations, andis never sated withnovelty. He is perpetually busied in

reformations, and iscontinually wedded to his errors. If hedwell in a cave, he wouldimprove it into a cottage; if he has

already built, he wouldstill build to a greater extent. But he doesnot propose to makerapid and hasty transitions; his steps are

progressive and slow;and his force, like the power of a spring,

silently presses onevery resistance; an effect is sometimes

produced before thecause is perceived; and with all his talentfor projects, hiswork is often accomplished before the

plan is devised. Itappears, perhaps, equally difficult toretard or to quicken hispace; if the projector complain he is

tardy, the moralist thinkshim unstable. and whether his motionsbe rapid or slow, thescenes of human affairs perpetually

change in his management: hisemblem is a passing stream, not astagnating pool. We may desireto direct his love of improvement to its

proper object, we maywish for stability of conduct; but wemistake human nature, if wewish for a termination of labour, or a

scene of repose.The occupations of men, in every

condition, bespeak theirfreedom of choice, their various opinions,

and the multiplicityof wants by which they are urged: butthey enjoy, or endure, witha sensibility, or a phlegm, which are

nearly the same in everysituation. They possess the shores of theCaspian, or the

Atlantic, by a different tenure, but withequal ease. On the onethey are fixed to the soil, and seem to beformed for settlement,and the accommodation of cities: The

names they bestow on anation, and on its territory, are the same.On the other they aremere animals of passage, prepared to

roam on the face of theearth, and with their herds, in search ofnew pasture and

favourable seasons, to follow the sun inhis annual course.

Man finds his lodgment alike in the

cave, the cottage, andthe palace; and his subsistence equallyin the woods, in thedairy, or the farm. He assumes the

distinction of titles,

equipage, and dress; he devises regularsystems of government,and a complicated body of laws: or,

naked in the woods, has nobadge of superiority but the strength ofhis limbs and thesagacity of his mind; no rule of conduct

but choice; no tie withhis fellow-creatures but affection, thelove of company, and thedesire of safety. Capable of a great

variety of arts, yetdependent on none in particular for thepreservation of hisbeing; to whatever length he has carried

his artifice, there heseems to enjoy the conveniencies that

suit his nature, and tohave found the condition to which he is

destined. The tree whichan American, on the banks of theOroonoko,(3*) has chosen toclimb for the retreat, and the lodgement

of his family, is to hima convenient dwelling. The sopha, thevaulted dome, and thecolonade, do not more effectually

content their nativeinhabitant.

If we are asked therefore, Where thestate of nature is to be

found? we may answer, It is here; and itmatters not whether weare understood to speak in the island ofGreat Britain, at the

Cape of Good Hope, or the Straits ofMagellan. While this activebeing is in the train of employing histalents, and of operating

on the subjects around him, all situationsare equally natural.If we are told, That vice, at least, iscontrary to nature; we

may answer, It is worse; it is folly andwretchedness. But ifnature is only opposed to art, in whatsituation of the human

race are the footsteps of art unknown? Inthe condition of thesavage, as well as in that of the citizen,

are many proofs ofhuman invention; and in either is not anypermanent station, buta mere stage through which thistravelling being is destined to

pass. If the palace be unnatural, thecottage is so no less; andthe highest refinements of political andmoral apprehension, are

not more artificial in their kind, than thefirst operations ofsentiment and reason.

If we admit that man is susceptible ofimprovement, and hasin himself a principle of progression, and

a desire ofperfection, it appears improper to say,that he has quitted thestate of his nature, when he has begun

to proceed; or that he

finds a station for which he was notintended, while, like otheranimals, he only follows the disposition,

and employs the powersthat nature has given.

The latest efforts of human inventionare but a continuation

of certain devices which were practisedin the earliest ages ofthe world, and in the rudest state ofmankind. What the savage

projects, or observes, in the forest, arethe steps which lednations, more advanced, from thearchitecture of the cottage to

that of the palace, and conducted thehuman mind from the

perceptions of sense, to the generalconclusions of science.

Acknowledged defects are to man inevery condition matter ofdislike. Ignorance and imbecility areobjects of contempt:

penetration and conduct give eminence,and procure esteem.Whither should his feelings andapprehensions on these subjects

lead him? To a progress, no doubt, inwhich the savage, as wellas the philosopher, is engaged; in whichthey have made different

advances, but in which their ends are thesame. The admirationCicero entertained for literature,eloquence, and civil

accomplishments, was not more realthan that of a Scythian forsuch a measure of similar endowmentsas his own apprehension

could reach. 'Were I to boast,' says aTartar prince,(4*) 'itwould be of that wisdom I have receivedfrom God. For as, on the

one hand, I yield to none in the conductof war, in thedisposition of armies, whether of horse orof foot, and in

directing the movements of great orsmall bodies; so, on theother, I have my talent in writing, inferior

perhaps only tothose who inhabit the great cities ofPersia or India. Of othernations, unknown to me, I do not speak.'

Man may mistake the objects of his

pursuit; he may misapplyhis industry, and misplace hisimprovements. If under a sense ofsuch possible errors, he would find a

standard by which to judgeof his own proceedings, and arrive at thebest state of his

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nature, he cannot find it perhaps in thepractice of anyindividual, or of any nation whatever; not

even in the sense ofthe majority, or the prevailing opinion ofhis kind. He must lookfor it in the best conceptions of his

understanding, in the best

movements of his heart; he must thencediscover what is theperfection and the happiness of which he

is capable. He willfind, on the scrutiny, that the proper stateof his nature, takenin this sense, is not a condition from

which mankind are for everremoved, but one to which they may nowattain; not prior to theexercise of their faculties, but procured

by their justapplication.

Of all the terms that we employ intreating of human affairs,

those of natural and unnatural are theleast determinate in their

meaning. Opposed to affectation,frowardness, or any other defect

of the temper of character, the natural isan epithet of praise;but employed to specify a conduct whichproceeds from the nature

of man, can serve to distinguish nothing:for all the actions ofmen are equally the result of their nature.At most, this

language can only refer to the generaland prevailing sense orpractice of mankind; and the purpose ofevery important inquiry

on this subject may be served by the useof a language equallyfamiliar and more precise. What is just,or unjust? What is

happy, or wretched, in the manners ofmen? What, in their varioussituations, is favourable or adverse totheir amiable qualities?

are questions to which we may expect asatisfactory answer: andwhatever may have been the originalstate of our species, it is

of more importance to know the conditionto which we ourselvesshould aspire, than that which ourancestors may be supposed to

have left.

Section II.

Of the Principles of Self-preservation

If in human nature there are qualitiesby which it is

distinguished from every other part of theanimal creation, menare themselves in different climates andin different ages

greatly diversified. So far as we are ableto account for this

diversity on principles tither moral orphysical, we perform atask of great curiosity or signal utility. It

appears necessary,however, that we attend to the universalqualities of our nature,before we regard its varieties, or attempt

to explain differences

consisting in the unequal possession orapplication ofdispositions and powers that are in some

measure common to allmankind.

Man, like the other animals, hascertain instinctive

propensities, which, prior to theperception of pleasure or pain,and prior to the experience of what ispernicious or useful, lead

him to perform many functions of naturerelative to himself andto his fellow-creatures. He has one set ofdispositions which

refer to his animal preservation, and tothe continuance of his

race; another which lead to society, andby inlisting him on the

side of one tribe or community,frequently engage him in war andcontention with the rest of mankind. Hispowers of discernment,

or his intellectual faculties, which, underthe appellation ofreason, are distinguished from theanalogous endowments of other

animals, refer to the objects around him,either as they aresubjects of mere knowledge, or as theyare subjects of

approbation or censure. He is formed notonly to know, butlikewise to admire and to contemn; andthese proceedings of his

mind have a principal reference to hisown character, and to thatof his fellow-creatures, as being thesubjects on which he is

chiefly concerned to distinguish what isright from what iswrong. He enjoys his felicity likewise oncertain fixed and

determinate conditions; and either as anindividual apart, or asa member of civil society, must take aparticular course in order

to reap the advantages of his nature. Heis, withal, in a veryhigh degree susceptible of habits; and

can, by forbearance orexercise, so far weaken, confirm, or evendiversify his talents,and his dispositions, as to appear, in agreat measure, the

arbiter of his own rank in nature, and theauthor of all thevarieties which are exhibited in the actualhistory of his

species. The universal characteristics, inthe mean time, to

which we have now referred, must, whenwe would treat of any partof this history, constitute the first subject

of our attention;and they require not only to beenumerated, but to be distinctlyconsidered.

The dispositions which refer to the

preservation of theindividual, while they continue to operatein the manner of

instinctive desires, are nearly the samein man that they are inthe other animals: but in him they aresooner or later combined

with reflection and foresight; they giverise to hisapprehensions on the subject ofproperty, and make him acquainted

with that object of care which he calls hisinterest. Without theinstincts which teach the beaver and thesquirrel, the ant and

the bee, to make up their little hoards forwinter, at first

improvident, and, where no immediateobject of passion is near,

addicted to sloth, he becomes, inprocess of time, the greatstoremaster among animals. He finds ina provision of wealth,

which he is probably never to employ, anobject of his greatestsolicitude, and the principal idol of hismind. He apprehends a

relation between his person and hisproperty, which renders whathe calls his own in a manner a part ofhimself, a constituent of

his rank, his condition, and his character,in which, independentof any real enjoyment he may befortunate or unhappy; and,

independent of any personal merit, hemay be an object ofconsideration or neglect; and in which hemay be wounded and

injured, while his person is safe, andevery want of his naturecompletely supplied.

In these apprehensions, while other

passions only operateoccasionally, the interested find theobject of their ordinarycares; their motive to the practice of

mechanic and commercialarts; their temptation to trespass on thelaws of justice; and,

when extremely corrupted, the price oftheir prostitutions, andthe standard of their opinions on thesubject of good and ofevil. Under this influence, they would

enter, if not restrainedby the laws of civil society, on a scene ofviolence or meanness,which would exhibit our species, by

turns, under an aspect moreterrible and odious, or more vile andcontemptible, than that of

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any animal which inherits the earth.Although the consideration of interest

is founded on the

experience of animal wants and desires,its object is not togratify any particular appetite, but tosecure the means of

gratifying all; and it imposes frequently a

restraint on the verydesires from which it arose, morepowerful and more severe than

those of religion or duty. It arises fromthe principles ofself-preservation in the human frame; butis a corruption, or at

least a partial result, of those principles,and is upon manyaccounts very improperly termed self-love.

Love is an affection which carries theattention of the mindbeyond itself, and has a quality, whichwe call tenderness, that

never can accompany the considerationsof interest. This

affection being a complacency and acontinued satisfaction in its

object, independent of any externalevent, it has, in the midstof disappointment and sorrow, pleasuresand triumphs unknown to

those whO act without any regard to theirfellow-creatures; andin every change of condition, it continuesentirely distinct from

the sentiments which we feel on thesubject of personal successor adversity. But as the care a manentertains for his own

interest, and the attention his affectionmakes him pay to thatof another, may have similar effects, theone on his own fortune,

the other on that of his friend, weconfound the principles fromwhich he acts; we suppose that they arethe same in kind, only

referred to different objects; and we notonly misapply the nameof love, in conjunction with self, but, in amanner tending to

degrade our nature, we limit the aim ofthis supposed selfishaffection to the securing or accumulatingthe constituents of

interest, or the means of mere animallife.

It is somewhat remarkable, that

notwithstanding men valuethemselves so much on qualities of themind, on parts, learningand wit, on courage, generosity, andhonour, those men are still

supposed to be in the highest degreeselfish or attentive tothemselves, who are most careful ofanimal life, and who are

least mindful of rendering that life anobject worthy of care. It

will be difficult, however, to tell why agood understanding, aresolute and generous mind, should not,

by every man in hissenses, be reckoned as much parts ofhimself, as either hisstomach or his palate, and much more

than his estate or his

dress. The epicure, who consults hisphysician, how he mayrestore his relish for food, and by

creating an appetite, mayincrease the means of enjoyment, mightat least with an equalregard to himself, consult how he might

strengthen his affectionto a parent or a child, to his country or tomankind; and it isprobable that an appetite of this sort

would prove a source ofenjoyment not less than the former.

By our supposed selfish maxims,notwithstanding, we generally

exclude from among the objects of ourpersonal cares, many of the

happier and more respectable qualitiesof human nature. We

consider affection and courage as merefollies, that lead us toneglect or expose ourselves; we makewisdom consist in a regard

to our interest; and without explainingwhat interest means, wewould have it understood as the onlyreasonable motive of action

with mankind. There is even a system ofphilosophy founded upontenets of this sort, and such is ouropinion of what men are

likely to do upon selfish principles, thatwe think it must havea tendency very dangerous to virtue. Butthe errors of this

system do not consist so much ingeneral principles, as in theirparticular applications; not so much inteaching men to regard

themselves, as in leading them to forgetthat their happiestaffections, their candour, and theirindependence of mind, are in

reality parts of themselves. And theadversaries of this supposedselfish philosophy, where it makes self-love the ruling passion

with mankind, have had reason to findfault, not so much with itsgeneral representations of human

nature, as with the obtrusion ofa mere innovation in language for adiscovery in science.

When the vulgar speak of theirdifferent motives, they are

satisfied with ordinary names, whichrefer to known and obviousdistinctions. Of this kind are the termsbenevolence and

selfishness, by which they express theirdesire of the welfare of

others, or the care of their own. Thespeculative are not alwayssatisfied with this proceeding; they would

analyze, as well asenumerate the principles of nature; andthe chance is, that,merely to gain the appearance of

something new, without any

prospect of real advantage, they willdisturb the order of vulgarapprehension. In the case before us,

they have actually found,that benevolence is no more than aspecies of self-love; andwould oblige us, if possible, to look out

for a new set of words,by which we may distinguish theselfishness of the parent when hetakes care of his child, from his

selfishness when he only takescare of himself. For according to thisphilosophy, as in bothcases he only means to gratify a desire

of his own, he is in bothcases equally selfish. The term

benevolent, in the mean time, isnot employed to characterise persons

who have no desires of theirown, but persons whose own desiresprompt them to procure thewelfare of others. The fact is, that we

should need only a freshsupply of language, instead of that whichby this seemingdiscovery we should have lost, in order

to make the reasonings ofmen proceed as they formerly did. But itis certainly impossibleto live and to act with men, without

employing different names todistinguish the humane from the cruel,and the benevolent fromthe selfish.

These terms have their equivalents inevery tongue; they wereinvented by men of no refinement, whoonly meant to express what

they distinctly perceived or strongly felt.And if a man ofspeculation should prove that we areselfish in a sense of his

own, it does not follow that we are so inthe sense of thevulgar; or, as ordinary men wouldunderstand his conclusion, that

we are condemned in every instance toact on motives of interest,covetousness, pusillanimity, and

cowardice; for such is conceivedto be the ordinary import of selfishness inthe character of man.

An affection or passion of any kind issometimes said to give

us an interest in its object; and humanityitself gives aninterest in the welfare of mankind. Thisterm interest, which

commonly implies little more than ourregard to property, is

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sometimes put for utility in general, andthis for happiness;insomuch that, under these ambiguities,

it is not surprising weare still unable to determine, whetherinterest is the onlymotive of human action, and the

standard by which to distinguish

our good from our ill.So much is said in this place, not fromany desire to have a

share in any controversy of this sort, butmerely to confine themeaning of the term interest to its mostcommon acceptation, and

to intimate our intention of employing it inexpressing thoseobjects of care which refer to ourexternal condition, and the

preservation of our animal nature. Whentaken in this sense, itwill not surely be thought to comprehendat once all the motives

of human conduct. If men be not allowedto have disinterested

benevolence, they will not be denied tohave disinterested

passions of another kind. Hatred,indignation, and rage,frequently urge them to act in oppositionto their known

interest, and even to hazard their lives,without any hopes ofcompensation in any future returns ofpreferment or profit.

Section III

Of the principles of Union among

Mankind

Mankind have always wandered orsettled, agreed or

quarrelled, in troops and companies. Thecause of theirassembling, whatever it be, is theprinciple of their alliance or

union.In collecting the materials of history,

we are seldom willingto put up with our subject merely as we

find it. We are loth tobe embarrassed with a multiplicity ofparticulars, and apparentinconsistencies. In theory we profess the

investigation ofgeneral principles; and in order to bringthe matter of our

inquiries within the reach of ourcomprehension, are disposed toadopt any system, Thus, in treating ofhuman affairs, we woulddraw every consequence from a principle

of union, or a principleof dissension. The state of nature is astate of war or of amity,and men are made to unite from a

principle of affection, or froma principle of fear, as is most suitable tothe system of

different writers. The history of ourspecies indeed abundantlyshews, that they are to one another

mutual objects both of fearand of love; and they who prove them tohave been originallyeither in a state of alliance, or of war,

have arguments in store

to maintain their assertions. Ourattachment to one division, orto one sect, seems often to derive much

of its force from ananimosity conceived to an opposite one:and this animosity in itsturn, as often arises from a zeal in behalf

of the side weespouse, and from a desire to vindicatethe rights of our party.

'Man is born in society,' says

Montesquieu, 'and there heremains.' The charms that detain him areknown to be manifold. Wemay reckon the parental affection, which,

instead of desertingthe adult, as among the brutes,

embraces more close, as itbecomes mixed with esteem, and the

memory of its early effects;together with a propensity common toman and other animals, tomix with the herd, and, without reflection,

to follow the croudof his species. What this propensity wasin the first moment ofits operation, we know not; but with men

accustomed to company,its enjoyments and disappointments arereckoned among theprincipal pleasures or pains of human

life. Sadness andmelancholy are connected with solitude;gladness and pleasurewith the concourse of men. The track of

a Laplander on the snowyshore, gives joy to the lonely mariner;and the mute signs ofcordiality and kindness which are made

to him, awaken the memoryof pleasures which he felt in society. Infine, says the writerof a voyage to the north, after describing

a mute scene of thissort, 'We were extremely pleased toconverse with men, since inthirteen months we had seen no human

creature.'(5*) But we needno remote observation to confirm thisposition: The wailings of

the infant, and the languors of the adult,when alone; the livelyjoys of the one, and the chearfulness ofthe other, upon thereturn of company, are a sufficient proof

of its solidfoundations in the frame of our nature.

In accounting for actions we oftenforget that we ourselves

have acted; and instead of thesentiments which stimulate the

mind in the presence of its object, weassign as the motives ofconduct with men, those considerations

which occur in the hoursof retirement and cold reflection. In thismood frequently we canfind nothing important, besides the

deliberate prospects of

interest; and a great work, like that offorming society, must inour apprehension arise from deep

reflections, and be carried onwith a view to the advantages whichmankind derive from commerceand mutual support. But neither a

propensity to mix with theherd, nor the sense of advantagesenjoyed in that condition,comprehend all the principles by which

men are united together.Those bands are even of a feebletexture, when compared to theresolute ardour with which a man

adheres to his friend, or to histribe, after they have for some time run

the career of fortunetogether. Mutual discoveries of

generosity, joint trials offortitude, redouble the ardours offriendship, and kindle a flamein the human breast, which the

considerations of personalinterest or safety cannot suppress. Themost lively transports ofjoy are seen, and the loudest shrieks of

despair are heard, whenthe objects of a tender affection arebeheld in a state oftriumph or of suffering. An Indian

recovered his friendunexpectedly on the island of JuanFernandes: He prostratedhimself on the ground, at his feet: 'We

stood gazing in silence,'says Dampier, 'at this tender scene.' Ifwe would know what isthe religion of a wild American, what it is

in his heart thatmost resembles devotion: it is not hisfear of the sorcerer, norhis hope of protection from the spirits of

the air or the wood;it is the ardent affection with which heselects and embraces hisfriend; with which he clings to his side in

every season ofperil; and with which he invokes his spiritfrom a distance, when

dangers surprise him alone.(6*)Whatever proofs we may have ofthe social disposition of man in familiarand contiguous scenes,it is possibly of importance, to draw our

observations from theexamples of men who live in the simplestcondition, and who havenot learned to affect what they do not

actually feel.Mere acquaintance and habitude

nourish affection, and the

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experience of society brings everypassion of the human mind uponits side. Its triumphs and prosperities, its

calamities anddistresses, bring a variety and a force ofemotion, which canonly have place in the company of our

fellow-creatures. It is

here that a man is made to forget hisweakness, his cares ofsafety, and his subsistence; and to act

from those passions whichmake him discover his force. It is here hefinds that his arrowsfly swifter than the eagle, and his

weapons wound deeper than thepaw of the lion, or the tooth of the boar. Itis not alone hissense of a support which is near, nor the

love of distinction inthe opinion of his tribe, that inspire hiscourage, or swell hisheart with a confidence that exceeds

what his natural forceshould bestow. Vehement passions of

animosity or attachment arethe first exertions of vigour in his breast;

under theirinfluence, every consideration, but that ofhis object, isforgotten; dangers and difficulties only

excite him the more.That condition is surely favourable to

the nature of anybeing, in which his force is increased;

and if courage be thegift of society to man, we have reason toconsider his union withhis species as the noblest part of his

fortune. From this sourceare derived, not only the force, but thevery existence of hishappiest emotions; not only the better

part, but almost the wholeof his rational character. Send him to thedesert alone, he is aplant torn from its roots: the form indeed

may remain, but everyfaculty droops and withers; the humanpersonage and the humancharacter cease to exist.

Men are so far from valuing society onaccount of its mereexternal conveniencies, that they arecommonly most attached

where those conveniencies are leastfrequent; and are there mostfaithful, where the tribute of their

allegiance is paid in blood.Affection operates with the greatestforce, where it meets withthe greatest difficulties: In the breast ofthe parent, it is

most solicitous amidst the dangers anddistresses of the child:In the breast of a man, its flameredoubles where the wrongs or

sufferings of his friend, or his country,require his aid. It is,

in short, from this principle alone that wecan account for theobstinate attachment of a savage to his

unsettled and defencelesstribe, when temptations on the side ofease and of safety mightinduce him to fly from famine and

danger, to a station more

affluent, and more secure. Hence thesanguine affection whichevery Greek bore to his country, and

hence the devoted patriotismof an early Roman. Let those examplesbe compared with the spiritwhich reigns in a commercial state,

where men may be supposed tohave experienced, in its full extent, theinterest whichindividuals have in the preservation of

their country. It is hereindeed, if ever, that man is sometimesfound a detached and asolitary being: he has found an object

which sets him incompetition with his fellow-creatures, and

he deals with them ashe does with his cattle and his soil, for

the sake of the profitsthey bring. The mighty engine which wesuppose to have formedsociety, only tends to set its members at

variance, or tocontinue their intercourse after the bandsof affection arebroken.

Section IV

Of the principles of War and Dissension

'There are some circumstances in thelot of mankind,' saysSocrates, 'that shew them to be destined

to friendship and amity.Those are, their mutual need of oneanother; their mutualcompassion; their sense of mutual

benefits; and the pleasuresarising in company. There are othercircumstances which promptthem to war and dissension; the

admiration and the desire whichthey entertain for the same subjects;their opposite pretensions;and the provocations which they mutually

offer in the course oftheir competitions.'

When we endeavour to apply the

maxims of natural justice tothe solution of difficult questions, we findthat some cases maybe supposed, and actually happen,where oppositions take place;

and are lawful, prior to any provocation,or act of injustice;that where the safety and preservation ofnumbers are mutually

inconsistent, one party may employ hisright of defence, before

the other has begun an attack. And whenwe join with suchexamples, the instances of mistake, and

misunderstanding, towhich mankind are exposed, we may besatisfied that war does notalways proceed from an intention to

injure; and that even the

best qualities of men, their candour, aswell as theirresolution, may operate in the midst of

their quarrels.There is still more to be observed on

this subject. Mankindnot only find in their condition the

sources of variance anddissension; they appear to have in theirminds the seeds ofanimosity, and to embrace the occasions

of mutual opposition,with alacrity and pleasure. In the mostpacific situation thereare few who have not their enemies, as

well as their friends; andwho are not pleased with opposing the

proceedings of one, as muchas with favouring the designs of another.

Small and simpletribes, who in their domestic society havethe firmest union, arein their state of opposition as separate

nations, frequentlyanimated with the most implacablehatred. Among the citizens ofRome, in the early ages of that republic,

the name of aforeigner, and that of an enemy, were thesame. Among the Greeks,the name of Barbarian, under which that

people comprehended everynation that was of a race, and spoke alanguage, different fromtheir own, became a term of

indiscriminate contempt and aversion.Even where no particular claim tosuperiority is formed, therepugnance to union, the frequent wars,

or rather the perpetualhostilities, which take place among rudenations and separateclans, discover how much our species is

disposed to opposition,as well as to concert.

Late discoveries have brought us tothe knowledge of almost

every situation in which mankind areplaced. We have found themspread over large and extensive

continents, where communicationsare open, and where nationalconfederacy might be easily formed.We have found them in narrowerdistricts, circumscribed by

mountains, great rivers, and arms of thesea. They have beenfound in small and remote islands, wherethe inhabitants might be

easily assembled, and derive anadvantage from their union. But

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in all those situations, alike, they werebroke into cantons, andaffected a distinction of name and

community. The titles offellow-citizen and countryman,unopposed to those of alien andforeigner, to which they refer, would fall

into disuse, and lose

their meaning. We love individuals onaccount of personalqualities; but we love our country, as it is

a party in thedivisions of mankind; and our zeal for itsinterest, is apredilection in behalf of the side we

maintain.In the promiscuous concourse of men,

it is sufficient that wehave an opportunity of selecting our

company. We turn away fromthose who do not engage us, and we fixour resort where thesociety is more to our mind. We are fond

of distinctions; weplace ourselves in opposition, and

quarrel under thedenominations of faction and party,

without any material subjectof controversy. Aversion, like affection, isfostered by acontinued direction to its particular

object. Separation andestrangement, as well as opposition,widen a breach which did notowe its beginnings to any offence. And it

would seem, that tillwe have reduced mankind to the state ofa family, or found someexternal consideration to maintain their

connection in greaternumbers, they will be for ever separatedinto bands, and form aplurality of nations.

The sense of a common danger, andthe assaults of an enemy,have been frequently useful to nations,by uniting their members

more firmly together, and by preventingthe secessions and actualseparations in which their civil discordmight otherwise

terminate. And this motive to union whichis offered from abroad,may be necessary, not only in the caseof large and extensive

nations, where coalitions are weakenedby distance, and thedistinction of provincial names; but even

in the narrow societyof the smallest states. Rome itself wasfounded by a small party,which took its flight from Alba; hercitizens were often in

danger of separating; and if the villagesand cantons of theVolsci had been further removed fromthe scene of their

dissensions, the Mons Sacer might havereceived a new colony

before the mother country was ripe forsuch a discharge. Shecontinued long to feel the quarrels of her

nobles and her people;and the gates of Janus were frequentlyopened, to remind herinhabitants of the duties they owed to

their country.

If societies, as well as individuals, becharged with thecare of their own preservation, and if in

both we apprehend aseparation of interest, which may giverise to jealousies andcompetitions, we cannot be surprised to

find hostilities arisefrom this source. But were there noangry passions of a differentsort, the animosities which attend an

opposition of interest,should bear a proportion to the supposedvalue of the subject.'The Hottentot nations,' says Kolben,

'trespass on one another bythefts of cattle and of women; but such

injuries are seldomcommitted, except with a view to

exasperate their neighbours, andbring them to a war.' Such depredationsthen are not thefoundation of a war, but the effects of a

hostile intentionalready conceived. The nations of NorthAmerica, who have noherds to preserve, nor settlements to

defend, are yet engaged inalmost perpetual wars, for which theycan assign no reason, butthe point of honour, and a desire to

continue the struggle theirfathers maintained. 'They do not regardthe spoils of an enemy;and the warrior who has seized any

booty, easily parts with it tothe first person who comes in hisway.(7*)

But we need not cross the Atlantic to

find proofs ofanimosity, and to observe, in the collisionof separatesocieties, the influence of angry

passions, that do not arisefrom an opposition of interest. Humannature has no part of itscharacter, of which more flagrant

examples are given on this sideof the globe. What is it that stirs in thebreasts of ordinary

men when the enemies of their countryare named? Whence are theprejudices that subsist between differentprovinces, cantons, andvillages, of the same empire and

territory? What is it thatexcites one half of the nations of Europeagainst the other? Thestatesman may explain his conduct on

motives of national jealousyand caution, but the people have dislikesand antipathies, for

which they cannot account. Their mutualreproaches of perfidy andinjustice, like the Hottentot depredations,

are but symptoms ofan animosity, and the language of ahostile disposition, alreadyconceived. The charge of cowardice and

pusillanimity, qualities

which the interested and cautious enemyshould, of all others,like best to find in his rival, is urged with

aversion, and madethe ground of dislike. Hear the peasantson different sides ofthe Alps, and the Pyrenees, the Rhine, or

the British channel,give vent to their prejudices and nationalpassions; it is amongthem that we find the materials of war

and dissension laidwithout the direction of government, andsparks ready to kindleinto a flame, which the statesman is

frequently disposed toextinguish. The fire will not always catch

where his reasons ofstate would direct, nor stop where the

concurrence of interesthas produced an alliance. 'My Father,'said a Spanish peasant,'would rise from his grave, if he could

foresee a war withFrance., What interest had he, or thebones of his father, in thequarrels of princes?

These observations seem to arraignour species, and to givean unfavourable picture of mankind; andyet the particulars we

have mentioned are consistent with themost amiable qualities ofour nature, and often furnish a scene forthe exercise of our

greatest abilities. They are sentiments ofgenerosity andself-denial that animate the warrior indefence of his country;

and they are dispositions mostfavourable to mankind, that becomethe principles of apparent hostility tomen. Every animal is made

to delight in the exercise of his naturaltalents and forces: Thelion and the tyger sport with the paw; thehorse delights to

commit his mane to the wind, and forgetshis pasture to try hisspeed in the field; the bull even before

his brow is armed, andthe lamb while yet an emblem ofinnocence, have a disposition tostrike with the forehead, and anticipate,in play, the conflicts

they are doomed to sustain. Man too isdisposed to opposition,and to employ the forces of his natureagainst an equal

antagonist; he loves to bring his reason,his eloquence, his

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courage, even his bodily strength, to theproof. His sports arefrequently an image of war; sweat and

blood are freely expendedin play;, and fractures or death are oftenmade to terminate thepastimes of idleness and festivity. He

was not made to live for

ever, and even his love of amusementhas opened a path that leadsto the grave.

Without the rivalship of nations, andthe practice of war,civil society itself could scarcely havefound an object, or a

form. Mankind might have traded withoutany formal convention,but they cannot be safe without anational concert. The necessity

of a public defence, has given rise tomany departments of state,and the intellectual talents of men havefound their busiest

scene in wielding their national forces.To overawe, or

intimidate, or, when we cannot persuadewith reason, to resist

with fortitude, are the occupations whichgive its most animatingexercise, and its greatest triumphs, to avigorous mind; and he

who has never struggled with his fellow-creatures, is a strangerto half the sentiments of mankind.

The quarrels of individuals, indeed,

are frequently theoperations of unhappy and detestablepassions; malice, hatred,and rage. If such passions alone

possess the breast, the scene ofdissension becomes an object of horror;but a common oppositionmaintained by numbers, is always

allayed by passions of anothersort. Sentiments of affection andfriendship mix with animosity;the active and strenuous become the

guardians of their society;and violence itself is, in their case, anexertion of generosityas well as of courage. We applaud, as

proceeding from a nationalor party spirit, what we could not endureas the effect of aprivate dislike; and amidst the

competitions of rival states,think we have found, for the patriot andthe warrior, in the

practice of violence and stratagem, themost illustrious careerof human virtue. Even personalopposition here does not divideour judgement on the merits of men. The

rival names of Agesilausand Epaminondas, of Scipio andHannibal, are repeated with equalpraise; and war itself, which in one view

appears so fatal, inanother is the exercise of a liberal spirit;and in the very

effects which we regret, is but onedistemper more by which theauthor of nature has appointed our exit

from human life.These reflections may open our view

into the state ofmankind; but they tend to reconcile us to

the conduct of

Providence, rather than to make uschange our own: where, from aregard to the welfare of our fellow-

creatures, we endeavour topacify their animosities, and unite themby the ties ofaffection. In the pursuit of this amiable

intention, we may hope,in some instances, to disarm the angrypassions of jealousy andenvy. we may hope to instil into the

breasts of private mensentiments of candour toward theirfellow-creatures, and adisposition to humanity and justice. But it

is vain to expectthat we can give to the multitude of a

people a sense of unionamong themselves, without admitting

hostility to those who opposethem. Could we at once, in the case ofany nation, extinguish theemulation which is excited from abroad,

we should probably breakor weaken the bands of society at home,and close the busiestscenes of national occupations and

virtues.

Section V

Of Intellectual Powers

Many attempts have been made toanalyze the dispositions

which we have now enumerated; but onepurpose of science, perhapsthe most important, is served, when theexistence of a

disposition is established. We are moreconcerned in its reality,and in its consequences, than we are inits origin, or manner of

formation.The same observation may be applied

to the other powers andfaculties of our nature. Their existence

and use are theprincipal objects of our study. Thinkingand reasoning, we say,

are the operations of some faculty; but inwhat manner thefaculties of thought or reason remain,when they are not exerted,or by what difference in the frame they

are unequal in differentpersons, are questions which we cannotresolve. Their operationsalone discover them: when unapplied,

they lie hid even from theperson to whom they pertain; and theiraction is so much a part

of their nature, that the faculty itself, inmany cases, isscarcely to be distinguished from a habit

acquired in itsfrequent exertion.

Persons who are occupied withdifferent subjects, who act in

different scenes, generally appear to

have different talents, orat least to have the same facultiesvariously formed, and suited

to different purposes. The peculiargenius of nations, as well asof individuals, may in this manner arisefrom the state of their

fortunes. And it is proper that weendeavour to find some rule,by which to judge of what is admirable inthe capacities of men,

or fortunate in the application of theirfaculties, before weventure to pass a judgment on thisbranch of their merits, or

pretend to measure the degree ofrespect they may claim by their

different attainments.To receive the informations of sense,

is perhaps the earliestfunction of an animal combined with anintellectual nature; andone great accomplishment of the living

agent consists in theforce and sensibility of his animal organs.The pleasures orpains to which he is exposed from this

quarter, constitute to himan important difference between theobjects which are thusbrought to his knowledge; and it

concerns him to distinguishwell, before he commits himself to thedirection of appetite. Hemust scrutinize the objects of one sense

by the perceptions ofanother; examine with the eye, before heventures to touch; andemploy every means of observation,

before he gratifies theappetites of thirst and of hunger. Adiscernment acquired byexperience, becomes a faculty of his

mind; and the inferences ofthought are sometimes not to bedistinguished from theperceptions of sense.

The objects around us, beside theirseparate appearances,have their relations to one another. They

suggest, when compared,what would not occur when they areconsidered apart; they havetheir effects, and mutual influences; theyexhibit, in like

circumstances, similar operations, anduniform consequences. Whenwe have found and expressed the pointsin which the uniformity of

their operations consists, we haveascertained a physical law.

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Many such laws, and even the mostimportant, are known to thevulgar, and occur upon the smallest

degrees of reJection: butothers are hid under a seemingconfusion, which ordinary talentscannot remove; and are therefore the

objects of study, long

observation, and superior capacity. Thefaculties of penetrationand judgement, are, by men of business,

as well as of science,employed to unravel intricacies of thissort; and the degree ofsagacity with which either is endowed, is

to be measured by thesuccess with which they are able to findgeneral rules,applicable to a variety of cases that

seemed to have nothing incommon, and to discover importantdistinctions between subjectswhich the vulgar are apt to confound.

To collect a multiplicity of particularsunder general heads,

and to refer a variety of operations totheir common principle,

is the object of science. To do the samething, at least withinthe range of his active engagements,pertains to the man of

pleasure, or business: and it wouldseem, that the studious andthe active are so far employed in thesame task, from observation

and experience, to find the general viewsunder which theirobjects may be considered, and the ruleswhich may be usefully

applied in the detail of their conduct.They do not always applytheir talents to different subjects; andthey seem to be

distinguished chiefly by the unequalreach and variety of theirremarks, or by the intentions which theyseverally have in

collecting them.Whilst men continue to act from

appetites and passions,leading to the attainment of external

ends, they seldom quit theview of their objects in detail, to go far inthe road of generalinquiries. They measure the extent of

their own abilities, by thepromptitude with which they apprehendwhat is important in every

subject, and the facility with which theyextricate themselves onevery trying occasion. And these, it mustbe confessed, to abeing who is destined to act in the midst

of difficulties, arethe proper test of capacity and force. Theparade of words, andgeneral reasonings, which sometimes

carry an appearance of somuch learning and knowledge, are oflittle avail in the conduct

of life. The talents from which theyproceed, terminate in mereostentation, and are seldom connected

with that superiordiscernment, with which the active applyin times of perplexity;much less that intrepidity and force of

mind which are required

in passing through difficult scenes.The abilities of active men, however,have a variety

corresponding to that of the subjects onwhich they are occupied.A sagacity applied to external andinanimate nature, forms one

species of capacity; that which is turnedto society and humanaffairs, another. Reputation for parts inany scene is equivocal,

till we know by what kind of exertion thatreputation is gained.That they understand well the subjects towhich they apply, is

all that can be said, in commending menof the greatest

abilities: and every department, everyprofession, would have its

great men, if there were not a choice ofobjects for theunderstanding, and of talents for themind, as well as of

sentiments for the heart, and of habits forthe active character.

The meanest professions, indeed, sofar sometimes forget

themselves, or the rest of mankind, as toarrogate, in commendingwhat is distinguished in their own way,every epithet the most

respectable claim as the right of superiorabilities. Everymechanic is a great man with the learner,and the humble admirer,

in his particular calling; and we can,perhaps, with moreassurance pronounce what it is thatshould make a man happy and

amiable, than what should make hisabilities respected, and hisgenius admired. This, upon a view of thetalents themselves, may

perhaps be impossible. The effect,however, will point out therule and the standard of our judgement.To be admired and

respected, is to have an ascendantamong men. The talents whichmost directly procure that ascendant, are

those which operate onmankind, penetrate their views, preventtheir wishes, orfrustrate their designs. The superiorcapacity leads with a

superior energy, where every individualwould go, and shews thehesitating and the irresolute a clearpassage to the attainment

of their ends.This description does not pertain to

any particular craft or

profession; or perhaps it implies a kind ofability, which theseparate application of men to particular

callings, only tends tosuppress or to weaken. Where shall wefind the talents which arefit to act with men in a collective body, if

we break that body

into parts, and confine the observation ofeach to a separatetrack?

To act in the view of his fellow-creatures, to produce hismind in public, to give it all the exerciseof sentiment and

thought, which pertain to man as amember of society, as afriend, or an enemy, seems to be theprincipal calling and

occupation of his nature. If he mustlabour, that he may subsist,he can subsist for no better purpose thanthe good of mankind;

nor can he have better talents than thosewhich qualify him to

act with men. Here, indeed, theunderstanding appears to borrow

very much from the passions; and thereis a felicity of conductin human affairs, in which it is difficult todistinguish the

promptitude of the head from the ardourand sensibility of theheart. Where both are united, theyconstitute that superiority of

mind, the frequency of which amongmen, in particular ages andnations, much more than the progressthey have made in

speculation, or in the practice ofmechanic and liberal arts,should determine the rate of their genius,and assign the palm of

distinction and honour.When nations succeed one another in

the career of discoveriesand inquiries, the last is always the most

knowing. Systems ofscience are gradually formed. The globeitself is traversed bydegrees, and the history of every age,

when past, is an accessionof knowledge to those who succeed. TheRomans were more knowingthan the Greeks; and every scholar of

modern Europe is, in thissense, more learned than the mostaccomplished person that ever

bore either of those celebrated names.But is he on that accounttheir superior?

Men are to be estimated, not fromwhat they know, but from

what they are able to perform; from theirskill in adaptingmaterials to the several purposes of life;from their vigour and

conduct in pursuing the objects of policy,and in finding the

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expedients of war and national defence.Even in literature, theyare to be estimated from the works of

their genius, not from theextent of their knowledge. The scene ofmere observation wasextremely limited in a Grecian republic;

and the bustle of an

active life appeared inconsistent withstudy. but there the humanmind, notwithstanding, collected its

greatest abilities, andreceived its best informations, in themidst of sweat and ofdust.

It is peculiar to modern Europe, to restso much of the humancharacter on what may be learned inretirement, and from the

information of books. A just admiration ofancient literature, anopinion that human sentiment, andhuman reason, without this aid,

were to have vanished from the societiesof men, have led us into

the shade, where we endeavour toderive from imagination and

thought, what is in reality matter ofexperience and sentiment:and we endeavour, through the grammarof dead languages, and the

channel of commentators, to arrive at thebeauties of thought andelocution, which sprang from theanimated spirit of society, and

were taken from the living impressions ofan active life. Ourattainments are frequently limited to theelements of every

science, and seldom reach to thatenlargement of ability andpower which useful knowledge shouldgive. Like mathematicians,

who study the Elements of Euclid, butnever think of mensuration,we read of societies, but do not proposeto act with men: we

repeat the language of politics, but feelnot the spirit ofnations: we attend to the formalities of amilitary discipline,

but know not how to employ numbers ofmen to obtain any purposeby stratagem or force.

But for what end, it may said, point out

a misfortune thatcannot be remedied? If national affairscalled for exertion, the

genius of men would awake; but in therecess of betteremployment, the time which is bestowedon study, if even attendedwith no other advantage, serves to

occupy with innocence thehours of leisure, and set bounds to thepursuit of ruinous andfrivolous amusements. From no better

reason than this, we employso many of our early years, under therod, to acquire what it is

not expected we should retain beyondthe threshold of the school;and whilst we carry the same frivolous

character in our studiesthat we do in our amusements, thehuman mind could not suffermore from a contempt of letters, than it

does from the false

importance which is given to literature,as a business for life,not as a help to our conduct, and the

means of forming acharacter that may be happy in itself, anduseful to mankind.

If that time which is passed in relaxing

the powers of themind, and in with-holding every objectbut what tends to weakenand to corrupt, were employed in

fortifying those powers, and inteaching the mind to recognise itsobjects, and its strength, weshould not, at the years of maturity, be

so much at a loss foroccupation; nor, in attending the chances

of a gaming-table,misemploy our talents, or waste the fire

which remains in thebreast. They, at least, who by theirstations have a share in thegovernment of their country, might

believe themselves capable ofbusiness; and while the state had itsarmies and councils, mightfind objects enough to amuse, without

throwing a personal fortuneinto hazard, merely to cure the yawningsof a listless andinsignificant life. It is impossible for ever

to maintain thetone of speculation; it is impossible notsometimes to feel thatwe live among men.

Section VI

Of Moral Sentiment

Upon a slight observation of whatpasses in human life, weshould be apt to conclude, that the care

of subsistence is theprincipal spring of human actions. Thisconsideration leads tothe invention and practice of mechanical

arts; it serves todistinguish amusement from business;and, with many, scarcely

admits into competition any other subjectof pursuit orattention. The mighty advantages ofproperty and fortune, whenstript of the recommendations they

derive from vanity, or themore serious regards to independenceand power, only mean aprovision that is made for animal

enjoyment; and if oursolicitude on this subject were removed,not only the toils of

the mechanic, but the studies of thelearned, would cease; everydepartment of public business would

become unnecessary; everysenate-house would be shut up, andevery palace deserted.

Is man therefore, in respect to his

object, to be classed

with the mere brutes, and only to bedistinguished by facultiesthat qualify him to multiply contrivances

for the support andconvenience of animal life, and by theextent of a fancy thatrenders the care of animal preservation

to him more burdensomethan it is to the herd with which heshares in the bounty ofnature? If this were his case, the joy

which attends on success,or the griefs which arise fromdisappointment, would make the sumof his passions. The torrent that wasted,

or the inundation thatenriched his possessions, would give

him all the emotion withwhich he is seized, on the occasion of a

wrong by which hisfortunes are impaired, or of a benefit bywhich they arepreserved and enlarged. His fellow-

creatures would be consideredmerely as they affected his interest.Profit or loss would serveto mark the event of every transaction;

and the epithets usefulor detrimental would serve to distinguishhis mates in society,as they do the tree which bears plenty of

fruit, from that whichserves only to cumber the ground, orintercept his view.

This, however, is not the history of our

species. What comesfrom a fellow-creature is received withpeculiar attention; andevery language abounds with terms that

express somewhat in thetransactions of men, different fromsuccess and disappointment.The bosom kindles in company, while the

point of interest in viewhas nothing to in flame; and a matterfrivolous in itself,becomes important, when it serves to

bring to light theintentions and characters of men. Theforeigner, who believed

that Othello, on the stage, was enragedfor the loss of hishandkerchief, was not more mistaken,than the reasoner whoimputes any of the more vehement

passions of men to theimpressions of mere profit or loss.

Men assemble to deliberate onbusiness; they separate from

jealousies of interest; but in their severalcollisions, whether

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as friends or as enemies, a fire is struckout which the regardsto interest or safety cannot confine. The

value of a favour isnot measured when sentiments ofkindness are perceived; and theterm misfortune has but a feeble

meaning, when compared to that

of insult and wrong.As actors or spectators, we areperpetually made to feel the

difference of human conduct, and from abare recital oftransactions which have passed in agesand countries remote from

our own, are moved with admiration andpity, or transported withindignation and rage. Our sensibility onthis subject gives their

charm, in retirement, to the relations ofhistory, and to thefictions of poetry; sends forth the tear ofcompassion, gives to

the blood its briskest movement, and tothe eye its liveliest

glances of displeasure or joy. It turnshuman life into an

interesting spectacle, and perpetuallysolicits even the indolentto mix, as opponents or friends, in thescenes which are acted

before them. Joined to the powers ofdeliberation and reason, itconstitutes the basis of a moral nature;and whilst it dictates

the terms of praise and of blame, servesto class ourfellow-creatures by the most admirableand engaging, or the most

odious and contemptible, denominations.It is pleasant to find men, who, in their

speculations, denythe reality of moral distinctions, forget in

detail the generalpositions they maintain, and give loose toridicule, indignation,and scorn, as if any of these sentiments

could have place, werethe actions of men indifferent; and withacrimony pretend todetect the fraud by which moral restraints

have been imposed, asif to censure a fraud were not already totake a part on the sideof morality.(8*)

Can we explain the principles uponwhich mankind adjudge thepreference of characters, and upon

which they indulge suchvehement emotions of admiration orcontempt? If it be admittedthat we cannot, are the facts less true?or must we suspend the

movements of the heart until they whoare employed in framingsystems of science have discovered theprinciple from which those

movements proceed? If a finger burn, wecare not for information

on the properties of fire: if the heart betorn, or the mindoverjoyed, we have not leisure for

speculations on the subject ofmoral sensibility.

It is fortunate in this, as in otherarticles to which

speculation and theory are applied, that

nature proceeds in hercourse, whilst the curious are busied inthe search of her

principles. The peasant, or the child, canreason, and judge, andspeak his language, with a discernment,a consistency, and a

regard to analogy, which perplex thelogician, the moralist, andthe grammarian, when they would findthe principle upon which the

proceeding is founded, or when theywould bring to general rules,what is so familiar, and so well sustainedin particular cases.

The felicity of our conduct is more owingto the talent we

possess for detail, and to the suggestionof particular

occasions, than it is to any direction wecan find in theory andgeneral speculations.

We must, in the result of every inquiry,

encounter with factswhich we cannot explain; and to bearwith this mortificationwould save us frequently a great deal of

fruitless trouble.Together with the sense of our existence,we must admit manycircumstances which come to our

knowledge at the same time, andin the same manner; and which do, inreality, constitute the modeof our being. Every peasant will tell us,

that a man hath hisrights; and that to trespass on thoserights is injustice. If weask him farther, what he means by the

term right? we probablyforce him to substitute a less significant,or less proper term,in the place of this; or require him to

account for what is anoriginal mode of his mind, and asentiment to which he ultimatelyrefers, when he would explain himself

upon any particularapplication of his language.

The rights of individuals may relate to

a variety ofsubjects, and be comprehended underdifferent heads. Prior to theestablishment of property, and thedistinction of ranks, men have

a right to defend their persons, and to actwith freedom; theyhave a right to maintain theapprehensions of reason, and the

feelings of the heart; and they cannot fora moment converse with

one another, without feeling that the partthey maintain may bejust or unjust. It is not, however, our

business here to carrythe notion of a right into its severalapplications, but toreason on the sentiment of favour with

which that notion is

entertained in the mind.If it be true, that men are united byinstinct, that they act

in society from affections of kindness andfriendship; if it betrue, that even prior to acquaintance andhabitude, men, as such,

are commonly to one another objects ofattention, and some degreeof regard; that while their prosperity isbeheld with

indifference, their afflictions areconsidered withcommiseration; if calamities bemeasured by the numbers and the

qualities of men they involve; and if everysuffering of a

fellow-creature draws a croud of attentivespectators; if even in

the case of those to whom we do nothabitually wish any positivegood, we are still averse to be theinstruments of harm; it

should seem, that in these variousappearances of an amicabledisposition, the foundations of a moralapprehension are

sufficiently laid, and the sense of a rightwhich we maintain forourselves, is by a movement of humanityand candour extended to

our fellow creatures.What is it that prompts the tongue

when we censure an act ofcruelty or oppression? What is it that

constitutes our restraintfrom offences that tend to distress ourfellow-creatures? It isprobably, in both cases, a particular

application of thatprinciple, which, in presence of thesorrowful, sends forth thetear of compassion; and a combination of

all those sentiments,which constitute a benevolentdisposition; and if not aresolution to do good, at least an

aversion to be the instrumentof harm.(9*)

It may be difficult, however, to

enumerate the motives of allthe censures and commendations whichare applied to the actionsof men. Even while we moralize, everydisposition of the human

mind may have its share in forming thejudgement, and inprompting the tongue. As jealousy isoften the most watchful

guardian of chastity, so malice is oftenthe quickest to spy the

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failings of our neighbour. Envy,affectation, and vanity, maydictate the verdicts we give, and the

worst principles of ournature may be at the bottom of ourpretended zeal for morality;but if we only mean to inquire, why they

who are well disposed to

mankind, apprehend, in every instance,certain rights pertainingto their fellow-creatures, and why they

applaud the considerationthat is paid to those rights, we cannotperhaps assign a betterreason, than that the person who

applauds, is well disposed tothe welfare of the parties to whom hisapplauses refer.

When we consider, that the reality of

any amicable propensityin the human mind has been frequentlycontested; when werecollect the prevalence of interested

competitions, with theirattendant passions of jealousy, envy,

and malice; it may seemstrange to alledge, that love and

compassion are the mostpowerful principles in the human breast:but they are destined,on many occasions, to urge with the

most irresistible vehemence;and if the desire of self-preservation bemore constant, and moreuniform, these are a more plentiful

source of enthusiasm,satisfaction, and joy. With a power, notinferior to that ofresentment and rage, they hurry the

mind into every sacrifice ofinterest, and bear it undismayed throughevery hardship anddanger.

The disposition on which friendship isgrafted, glows withsatisfaction in the hours of tranquillity,and is pleasant, not

only in its triumphs, but even in itssorrows. It throws a graceon the external air, and, by its expressionon the countenance,

compensates for the want of beauty, orgives a charm which nocomplexion or features can equal. Fromthis source the scenes of

human life derive their principal felicity;and their imitationsin poetry, their principal ornament.

Descriptions of nature, evenrepresentations of a vigorous conduct,and a manly courage, donot engage the heart, if they be notmixed with the exhibition of

generous sentiments, and the pathetic,which is found to arise inthe struggles, the triumphs, or themisfortunes of a tender

affection. The death of Polites, in theAeneid, is not more

affecting than that of many others whoperished in the ruins ofTroy; but the aged Priam was present

when this last of his sonswas slain; and the agonies of grief andsorrow force the parentfrom his retreat, to fall by the hand that

shed the blood of his

child. The pathetic of Homer consists inexhibiting the force ofaffections, not in exciting mere terror and

pity; passions he hasnever perhaps, in any instance,attempted to raise.

With this tendency to kindle into

enthusiasm, with thiscommand over the heart, with thepleasure that attends itsemotions, and with all its effects in

meriting confidence, andprocuring esteem, it is not surprising, thata principle ofhumanity should give the tone to our

commendations and ourcensures, and even where it is hindered

from directing ourconduct, should still give to the mind, on

reflection, itsknowledge of what is desirable in thehuman character. What hastthou done with thy brother Abel? was the

first expostulation inbehalf of morality; and if the first answerhas been oftenrepeated, mankind have notwithstand-

standing, in one sense,sufficiently acknowledged the charge oftheir nature. They havefelt, they have talked, and even acted, as

the keepers of theirfellow-creatures: They have made theindications of candour andmutual affection the test of what is

meritorious and amiable inthe characters of men: They have madecruelty and oppression theprincipal objects of their indignation and

rage: Even while thehead is occupied with projects of interest,the heart is oftenseduced into friendship; and while

business proceeds on themaxims of self-preservation, the carelesshour is employed ingenerosity and kindness.

Hence the rule by which mencommonly judge of externalactions, is taken from the supposed

influence of such actions onthe general good. To abstain from harm,is the great law ofnatural justice; to diffuse happiness is thelaw of morality; and

when we censure the conferring a favouron one or a few at theexpence of many, we refer to publicutility, as the great object

at which the actions of men should beaimed.

After all, it must be confessed, that if aprinciple ofaffection to mankind, be the basis of our

moral approbation anddislike, we sometimes proceed indistributing applause orcensure, without precisely attending to

the degree in which our

fellow-creatures are hurt or obliged; andthat, besides thevirtues of candour, friendship, generosity,

and public spirit,which bear an immediate reference tothis principle, there areothers which may seem to derive their

commendation from adifferent source. Temperance, prudence,fortitude, are thosequalities likewise admired from a

principle of regard to ourfellow-creatures? Why not, since theyrender men happy inthemselves, and useful to others? He

who is qualified to promotethe welfare of mankind, is neither a sot, a

fool, nor a coward.Can it be more clearly expressed, that

temperance, prudence, andfortitude, are necessary to the characterwe love and admire? Iknow well why I should wish for them, in

myself. and why likewiseI should wish for them in my friend, andin every person who isan object of my affection. But to what

purpose seek for reasonsof approbation, where qualities are sonecessary to ourhappiness, and so great a part in the

perfection of our nature?We must cease to esteem ourselves,and to distinguish what isexcellent, when such qualifications incur

our neglect.A person of an affectionate mind,

possessed of a maxim, Thathe himself, as an individual, is no more

than a part of the wholethat demands his regard, has found, inthat principle, asufficient foundation for all the virtues; for

a contempt ofanimal pleasures, that would supplant hisprincipal enjoyment;for an equal contempt of danger or pain,

that come to stop hispursuits of public good. 'A vehement andsteady affection

magnifies its object, and lessens everydifficulty or danger thatstands in the way.' 'Ask those who havebeen in love,' saysEpictetus, 'they will know that I speak

truth.''I have before me,' says another

eminent moralist,(10*) 'anidea of justice, which, if I could follow in

every instance, Ishould think myself the most happy ofmen'. And it is, perhaps,

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of consequence to their happiness, aswell as to their conduct,if those can be disjoined, that men

should have this ideaproperly formed: It is perhaps butanother name for that good ofmankind, which the virtuous are engaged

to promote. If virtue be

the supreme good, its best and mostsignal effect is, tocommunicate and diffuse itself.

To love, and even to hate, on theapprehension of moralqualities, to espouse one party from asense of justice, to

oppose another with indignation excitedby iniquity, are thecommon indications of probity, and theoperations of an animated,

upright, and generous spirit. To guardagainst unjustpartialities, and ill-grounded antipathies;to maintain that

composure of mind, which, withoutimpairing its sensibility or

ardour, proceeds in every instance withdiscernment and

penetration, are the marks of a vigorousand cultivated spirit.To be able to follow the dictates of sucha spirit through all

the varieties of human life, and with amind always master ofitself, in prosperity or adversity, andpossessed of all its

abilities, when the subjects in hazard arelife, or freedom, asmuch as in treating simple questions ofinterest, are the

triumphs of magnanimity, and trueelevation of mind. 'The eventof the day is decided. Draw this javelinfrom my body now,' said

Epaminondas, 'and let me bleed.'In what situation, or by what

instruction, is this wonderfulcharacter to be formed? Is it found in the

nurseries ofaffectation, pertness, and vanity, fromwhich fashion ispropagated, and the genteel is

announced? in great and opulentcities, where men vie with one another inequipage, dress, andthe reputation of fortune? Is it within the

admired precincts ofa court, where we may learn to smilewithout being pleased, to

caress without affection, to wound withthe secret weapons ofenvy and jealousy, and to rest ourpersonal importance oncircumstances which we cannot always

with honour command? No: butin a situation where the great sentimentsof the heart areawakened; where the characters of men,

not their situations andfortunes, are the principal distinction;where the anxieties of

interest, or vanity, perish in the blaze ofmore vigorousemotions; and where the human soul,

having felt and recognisedits objects, like an animal who has tastedthe blood of his prey,cannot descend to pursuits that leave its

talents and its force

unemployed.Proper occasions alone operating on araised and a happy

disposition, may produce this admirableeffect, whilst mereinstruction may always find mankind at aloss to comprehend its

meaning, or insensible to its dictates.The case, however, is notdesperate, till we have formed oursystem of politics, as well as

manners; till we have sold our freedomfortifies, e