.

INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC

WARFARE

By order of the Chief of Army Staff

Major General

Chief of General Staff

Bangladesh Army

May 2007

Ltr No. 1595/28/MT-7(R&D)

The information given in this document

is not to be communicated, either

directly or indirectly, to the press or to

any person not authorized to receive it.

Code No.

GSTP-0107

AMENDMENT RECORD SHEET

Amendment List By whom Amended Date of Insertion Initials

Number Date

(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)

CONTENTS

Page

Title Page i

Amendment Record Sheet iii

Foreword ix

Contents xi

CHAPTER – I

FUNDAMENTALS OF INTELLIGENCE

Section Title

1. Introduction to Intelligence 1-1

Intelligence Mission 1-1

Primary Intelligence Tasks 1-2

Classification of Intelligence 1-7

Intelligence Challenges for Bangladesh Army 1-10

2. Doctrinal Fundamentals and Intelligence 2-1

Principles of War 2-1

Tenets of Army Operations and Intelligence 2-4

Battle Field Imperatives and Intelligence 2-5

Principles and Limitations of Intelligence 2-7

3. Intelligence in Various Levels of War 3-1

Levels of Offensive Intelligence 3-1

Strategic Intelligence 3-7

Operational Intelligence 3-9

Tactical Intelligence 3-11

4. Intelligence Architectures at Tactical Level 4-1

Company Level 4-1

Battalion Level 4-2

Brigade Level 4-4

Division Level 4-6

Common Sources and Agencies 4-9

Section Title Page

5. The Intelligence Process 5-1

Fundamental of Intelligence Process 5-1

Direction Stage 5-4

Collection Management Stage 5-6

Processing Stage 5-8

Dissemination Stage 5-16

6. Intelligence Disciplines 6-1

Open Source Intelligence 6-2

Human Intelligence 6-3

Imagery Intelligence 6-5

Signal Intelligence 6-7

Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT) 6-9

Scientifics and Technical Intelligence 6-11

Counter Intelligence 6-11

CHAPTER – 1I

SITUATION AND TARGET DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

7. Situation Development Stage 7-1

8. Collection Management Stage 8-1

9. Processing and Target Development Stage 9-1

Processing 9-1

Target Development 9-12

10. Dissemination of Intelligence Stage 10-1

Fundamental Aspects 10-1

Means of Dissemination 10-2

Section Title Page

CHAPTER – III

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR OPERATIONS OF WAR

11. Intelligence in Operation Planning 11-1

General 11-1

Intelligence in Defensive Operations 11-1

Intelligence in Offensive Operation 11-4

Clandestine Intelligence Operations for War 11-5

12. Enemy Order of Battle Analysis 12-1

13. Military Capability Analysis 13-1

Strategic Military Capability Analysis 13-1

Operational and Tactical Capability Analysis 13-4

14. Combat Effectiveness Analysis of Enemy Strength 14-1

15. Reconnaissance and Surveillance 15-1

16. Combat Indications for Various Operations of War 16-1

Combat Indication Attack – Various Types 16-3

Combat Indicators Advance 16-6

Conventional Defence 16-7

CHAPTER – IV

ELECTRONIC WARFARE AND INFORMATION OPERATION

17. Intelligence and Electronic Warfare System 17-1

System Elements for IEW 17-10

18. Electronic Warfare and Intelligence 18-1

Electronic Support Measures (ESM) 18-3

Electronic Counter Measures 18-4

Electronic Counter Counter Measures 18-8

EW in Bangladesh Army 18-9

Section Title Page

19. Intelligence in Information Operation 19-1

General 19-1

The Information Environment 19-1

Intelligence Support to Information Operations 19-6

20. Intelligence Support for Psychological Operation 20-1

Fundamentals 20-1

Planning Process and Intelligence 20-3

21. Deception and Denial 21-1

General 21-1

Deception and Military Operation 21-1

Denial 21-6

CHAPTER – V

UNCONVENTIONAL WAR AND TOTAL PEOPLE’S WAR

22. Intelligence Function 22-1

Fundamentals 22-1

Intelligence Function in Unconventional War and Total

People's War

22-5

DISTRIBUTION

All Arms / Services .... .... Scale ‘D’

BMA .... .... 50 Copies.

SI&T .... .... 50 Copies.

DSCSC .... .... 50 Copies.

All Arms / Services School .... .... 50 Copies.

Note:

1. All concerned will demand this GSTP to : AHQ, GS Branch, SD Dte, SD-4 (CAO‘s Wg) as per the

above mentioned scale. Any additional requirement, if demanded by any establishment may be fulfilled

by the said authority on the basis of its availability.

2. Surplus copies will be returned to the above address.

FOREWORD

1. Sound decisions during war depend upon timely, accurate, adequate, and usable intelligence.

Therefore, intelligence is a subject which is relevant for everyone regardless of arms and services.

Consequently, it behoves us to have a GSTP on the subject. The GSTP provides the essence of most of

the combat intelligence aspects which have been expounded in other précis and pamphlets on the issue.

2. It is the job of the intelligence officers at all levels to request or direct the acquisition of

information; to collate and evaluate it rapidly; and then to disseminate timely, accurate, adequate, and

usable military intelligence to all planners and decision makers. Such intelligence should permit sound

decisions concerning combat operations, war plans, and peace plans. But more often than not intelligence

staffs are found to have not undertaken any formal training on intelligence. This is where the book will

appear handy.

3. The book has been organized into a number of progressive sections, where the rudimentary

aspects are covered initially and thereafter other conceptual issues are delineated. The readers will learn

gradually the affairs of combat intelligence in a sequential manner which includes various processes of

intelligence functioning. A number of charts and tables have been incorporated to enable the readers to

comprehend the subject and thereafter implement it in their respective level. Matters of security

intelligence have not been included here, since a separate GSTP on the subject may be written.

CHAPTER - I

FUNDAMENTALS OF INTELLIGENCE

SECTION - 1

INTRODUCTION TO INTELLIGENCE

INTELLIGENCE MISSION

General

0101. In a world of sovereign nations, information is a prime element of national power. Intelligence, which

is best defined as evaluated information, is the vital and often pivotal foundation for national decisions. Not only

national decision, every aspect of modern days life is virtually dependent on information. Thus the present age is

known as ‗Information Age‘ where intelligence plays a very significant role. History is full of examples of the

vital role intelligence plays in battles and operations. There have been many instances in which victorious over

much larger opposing armies, commanders who have possessed detailed knowledge of the enemy, weather, and

terrain and used that knowledge in their application of fire and manoeuvre have usually been the victors.

[Information and Intelligence

0102. Tactical information is the unevaluated material of every description including that derived from

observations, communications, reports, rumours, imageries and from other sources from which intelligence is

produced. Information in itself may be true or false, accurate or inaccurate, confirmed or unconfirmed, pertinent

or impertinent, positive or negative.

0103. Intelligence is the product resulting from the collection, evaluation and interpretation of information

which concerns one or more aspects of foreign nations or of functional geographic areas and which is

immediately or potentially significant to the development and execution of plans, policies and operations.

0104. A report of enemy tanks seen moving in a certain direction at a particular time is only a ‗Tactical

Information‘ but the significance of the presence and activity of these tanks are intelligence. The significance of

a piece of information may also vary as it passes through intelligence staff up the chain of command and it is

essential that at each level evaluation and interpretation be carried out by the intelligence staff, in close co-

operation with the operational staff, against the background of the commander's mission and intentions. In other

words, any piece of intelligence received from a subordinate formation or unit should be regarded as

information until the recipient has processed it. In common usage the term intelligence can have three

applications:

a. The product resulting from evaluated information.

b. All activities, which are designed to produce intelligence.

c. The organisations, units or staffs whose functions are primarily the collection of information, its

conversion into intelligence and the dissemination of this product to those who need it.

0105. The armed forces need military intelligence, a space or earth satellite needs scientific intelligence, a

foreign office needs political or biographic intelligence and head of state needs an amalgam of these and many

more. Consequently, intelligence activity has become a vast industry, most of which goes forward in secrecy.

While the public see the intelligence operative as a cloak-and-dagger secret agent, in fact the largest amount of

intelligence work is a non-dramatic search of public sources. This includes the monitoring of foreign radio

broadcasts, the analysis of the contents of foreign publication of all kinds, and the sifting of reports from

diplomats, businessmen, accredited military attaches and other observers.

0106. Commanders require intelligence about the enemy and the battle space prior to engaging in operations

in order to execute battles, engagement and operations. Intelligence assists commanders in visualizing the battle

space, organizing his forces and achieving objectives. Intelligence also support other related functions such as

counter intelligence which helps a commander in using intelligence as a force multiplier by dealing with

enemy‘s overt and covert threat and assist operational staff in conducting warfare both in offensive and

defensive manner.

Electronic Warfare

0107. While there are no simple formulas for winning, there are certain key factors for success on the modern

battlefield. One key factor is the support provided to the various commanders through Electronic Warfare (EW)

operations. EW operations, in both peace and war, support the winning of conventional and unconventional

battles and campaigns. The mission of EW operations is to provide the manoeuvre commander with three key

forms of support i.e. intelligence, electronic warfare and counter intelligence.

PRIMARY INTELLIGENCE TASKS

General

0108. The personnel and organizations within the intelligence battle field operating system conduct four

primary intelligence tasks that facilitate the commander‘s visualization and understanding of the threat and the

battle space. These tasks are interactive and often take place simultaneously. These tasks tailored to the

commander‘s needs are shown below :

INTELLIGENCE TAILORED TO THE COMMANDER'S NEED

INTELLIGENCE TASKS COMMANDER‟S FOCUS COMMANDER‟S

DECISIONS

1. Support to Situational

Understanding:

a. Perform Intelligence

Preparation of Battlefield

b. Perform situation

development.

c. Provide intelligence

support to force protection.

d. Conduct police intelligence

operations.

Plan a mission.

Execute the operation.

Secure the force.

Which course of action will I

implement?

Which enemy actions are

expected?

INTELLIGENCE TASKS COMMANDER‟S FOCUS COMMANDER‟S

DECISIONS

2. Support to Strategic

Responsiveness:

a. Perform Indication and

Warring.

b. Ensure intelligence

readiness.

c. Conduct area studies of

foreign countries.

d. Support sensitive site

exploitation.

Orient on contingencies. Should I increase the unit‘s

level of readiness?

Should I implement the

operational plan?

3. Conduct Intelligence,

Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

(ISR):

a. Perform intelligence

synchronization.

b. Perform ISR integration.

c. Conduct tactical

reconnaissance.

d. Conduct surveillance.

Plan the mission.

Prepare.

Execute.

Assess.

Which decision point and

target, etc., are linked to the

enemy actions?

Are the assets available and

in position to collect on the

decision point, High Pay Off

Target etc.?

Have the assets been

repositioned for contingency mission?

4. Provide Intelligence Support to

Effects:

a. Provide intelligence

support to targeting.

b. Provide intelligence

support to information

operation.

c. Provide intelligence support to tactical assessment.

Destroy/suppress/

Neutralize targets.

Reposition intelligence or

Attack assets.

Is my fire and manoeuvre

effective?

Should I re-fire the same

targets?

Support to Situational Understanding

0109. General. This task centres on providing information and intelligence to the commander, which

facilitates his understanding of the enemy and the environment. It supports the commander‘s ability to make

sound decisions. Support to situational understanding comprises four subtasks: perform intelligence preparation

of the battlefield, perform situation development, provide intelligence support to force protection, and conduct

police intelligence operations.

0110. Perform Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. The intelligence staff proactively undertakes

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) by analyzing the enemy and the battle space including the

options it presents to friendly and threat forces. IPB includes input from the whole staff. There is only one IPB

in each headquarters with inputs from all affected staff cells. It is a systematic process of analyzing and

visualizing the threat and battle space in a specific geographic area for a specific mission or in anticipation of a

specific mission. By applying IPB, the commander and staff gain the information necessary to selectively apply

and maximize tactical power at critical points in time and space. IPB is most effective when it integrates each

staff element‘s expertise into the final products.

0111. Perform Situation Development. Situation development is a process of analyzing information and

producing current intelligence about the enemy and environment during operations. The process helps the

intelligence officer recognize and interpret the indicators of enemy intentions, objectives, tactical effectiveness,

and potential enemy course of action (COAs). Situation development :

a. Confirms or denies enemy COAs.

b. Provides enemy locations.

c. Explains what the enemy is doing in relation to the friendly force operations.

d. Provides an estimate of enemy tactical effectiveness.

0112. Provide Intelligence Support to Force Protection. Provide intelligence in support of protecting the

tactical force‘s fighting potential so that it can be applied at the appropriate time and place. This task includes

the measures the force takes to remain viable and functional by protecting itself from the effects of or recovery

from enemy activities.

0113. Conduct Police Intelligence Operations. Police intelligence operations (PIO) are a military police

(MP) function that supports, enhances, and contributes to the commander‘s force protection programme and

situational understanding. The PIO function ensures that information collected during the conduct of other MP

functions-manoeuvre and mobility support, rear area security, law and order, and internment and resettlement-is

provided as input to the intelligence collection effort and turned into action or reports.

Support to Strategic Responsiveness

0114. General. Intelligence support to strategic responsiveness supports staff planning and preparation by

defining the full spectrum of threats, forecasting future threats, and forewarning the commander of enemy

actions and intentions. Support to strategic responsiveness consists of four sub-tasks: perform indication and

warning, ensure intelligence readiness, conduct area studies of foreign countries, and support sensitive site

exploitation.

0115. Perform Indications and Warnings (I&W). This activity provides the commander with forewarning

of enemy actions or intentions; the imminence of threat actions. The intelligence officer develops I&W in order

to rapidly alert the commander of events or activities that would change the basic nature of the operations. It

enables the commander to quickly reorient the force to unexpected contingencies and shape the battlefield.

0116. Ensure Intelligence Readiness. Intelligence readiness operations support contingency planning and

preparation by developing baseline knowledge of multiple potential threats and operational environments. These

operations and related intelligence training activities engage the Intelligence battle field operating system (BOS)

to respond effectively to the commander‘s contingency planning intelligence requirements.

0117. Conduct Area Studies of Foreign Countries. Intelligence staffs study and understand the cultural,

social, political, religious, and moral beliefs and attitudes of neighbouring countries, allies and allied indigenous

forces in order to assist in accomplishing goals and objectives.

0118. Support Sensitive Site Exploitation. Sensitive site exploitation consists of a related series of

activities inside a sensitive site captured from an adversary. A sensitive site is a designated, geographically

limited area with special military, diplomatic, economic, or information sensitivity for the state.

Conduct Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)

0119. General. With staff participation, the intelligence officer synchronizes the support to the ISR effort

by focusing the collection, processing, analysis, and intelligence products on the critical needs of the

commander. The operations officer, in coordination with the intelligence officer, tasks and directs the available

ISR assets to answer the commander‘s essential element of information (EEI). Through various detection

methods and systematic observation, reconnaissance and surveillance he obtains the required information.

0120. Perform Intelligence Synchronization. The intelligence officer, with staff participation,

synchronizes the entire collection effort to include all assets the commander controls, assets of lateral units and

higher echelon units and organizations, to answer the commander‘s essential element of information (EEI),

priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) and information requirements (IRs).

0121. Conduct Tactical Reconnaissance. To obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, such

as signals, imagery, measurement of signature or other technical characteristics, human interaction and other

detection methods about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure data

concerning the meteorological, hydrographical, or geographic characteristics and the indigenous population of a

particular area.

0122. Conduct Surveillance. Surveillance is the systematic observation of airspace, surface, or subsurface

areas, places, persons, or things in the area of operation by visual, aural (audio), electronic, photographic, or

other means. Other means may include but are not limited to space-based systems, artillery, engineer, special

operation force, and air defence equipment.

Support Commander’s

Decision

Mission Analysis

Essential Element of

Information (EEI)

Intelligence

Requirements (IR)

Priority Intelligence

Requirements

(PIR)

COA Analysis

Indicators

Specific Information

Requirements

(SIR)

ISR Tasks

Intelligence Tasks Surveillance Tasks Reconnaissance Tasks

• Production Requirements

• Requests for Information (RFI)

• Intelligence Reach

Threat

and

Environment

Intelligence Battlefield Operating System (BOS)

0123. The Intelligence Battlefield Operating System (BOS) is one of seven battlefield operating systems.

Intelligence, manoeuvre, fire support (FS), air defence, mobility/counter mobility/survivability, combat service

support (CSS), and command and control (C2) that enable commanders to build, employ, direct, and sustain

combat power. The Intelligence BOS is a flexible force of personnel, organizations, and equipment that,

individually or collectively, provide commanders with the timely, relevant, and accurate intelligence required to

visualize the battlefield, assess the situation, and direct military actions.

0124. The Intelligence BOS not only includes assets within the military intelligence unit but also includes the

assets of all branches or BOS that conduct Intelligence BOS tasks. Every soldier, as a part of a small unit, is a

potential information collector and an essential component to help reach situational understanding. Each soldier

develops a special level of awareness simply due to exposure to events occurring in the area of operation (AO)

and has the opportunity to collect information by observation and interaction with the population.

0125. Planning and executing of military operations will require intelligence regarding the enemy and the

battlefield environment. The Intelligence BOS generates intelligence and intelligence products that portray the

enemy and aspects of the battle space. These intelligence products enable the commander to identify potential

COAs, plan operations, employ forces effectively, employ effective tactics and techniques, and take appropriate

security measures.

0126. The Intelligence BOS is always engaged in supporting the commander in offensive, defensive and

special operations. We must posture the Army for success through hard training, planning, meticulous

preparation, and aggressive execution. We can no longer allow a ‗crawl, walk, run‘ cycle in preparation for

operations. In our current environment we must maintain intelligence readiness to support operations on ‗no

notice‘. This support is comprehensive and reaches across all types of operations and levels of war to produce

the intelligence required to win on the battlefield. A combination of space, aerial, seaborne, and ground based

systems provide the most comprehensive intelligence possible.

0127. The Intelligence BOS architecture provides specific intelligence and communications structures at each

echelon from the national level through the tactical level. These structures include intelligence organizations,

systems, and procedures for collecting, processing, analyzing, and delivering intelligence and other critical

information in a useable form to those who need it and when they need it. Effective communications

connectivity and automation are essential components of this architecture.

CLASSIFICATION OF INTELLIGENCE

General

0128. The various categories of intelligence are virtually endless. The scores of different types of intelligence

that are used commonly compound the problem further, which must be broadly understood. The varieties of

headings under which these types of intelligence are classified are also enormous. Some types of intelligence are

source-oriented (such as human intelligence or signal intelligence), some form-oriented (as in raw or unfinished

intelligence), some system-oriented (electronic or telemetric), some subject-oriented (medical, economic), some

use-oriented (military, tactical) and a probable host of others.

Basic Classification

0129. Basic Intelligence. Comprises general reference material of factual nature, which results from a

collection of encyclopaedic information relating to the political, economic, geographic, and military structures,

resources, capabilities, and vulnerabilities of foreign nations.

0130. Current Intelligence. Current intelligence is the intelligence of all types and forms of immediate

interest to the users; which may be disseminated without delays to complete collation, evaluation, interpretation

and analysis.

Figure 1.1: Intelligence Process

Nature Based Classification

0131. Offensive Intelligence. Offensive intelligence means acquisitions of intelligence or conduct of

clandestine activity against a target country. This is divided into three categories basing on the levels of

intelligence such as strategic, operational and tactical intelligence.

0132. Defensive Intelligence. Defensive intelligence is that form of intelligence activities that protect

information, person, material and government from espionage, subversion, sabotage, covert action and terrorism

through detective and preventive measures. Defensive intelligence are of two types :

a. Detective or Counter Intelligence. It includes Counter Espionage, Counter Sabotage, Counter

Subversion, and Counter Covert Action. This is basically the responsibility of counter intelligence

organizations. It also encompasses all three levels such as strategic, operational and tactical.

b. Preventive or Protective Security. It includes preventive or security measures, based on the

results of detective efforts to ensure security of information, security of materials and security of

personnel. This is the responsibility of respective commanders and all ranks under them. It also

encompasses all three levels.

0133. Classification Chart. Details of the nature based classification are shown below :

Figure 1.2 : Classification of Intelligence

STRATEGIC OPERATIONAL TACTICAL

INTELLIGENCE

BASIC

CURRENT

OFFENSIVE DEFENSIVE

DETECTIVE OR

COUNTER

INTELLIGENCE

PREVENTIVE

OR PROTECTIVE

SECURITY

STRATEGIC OPERATIONAL TACTICAL

STRATEGIC OPERATIONAL TACTICAL

Classification of Clandestine Intelligence Operations

0134. Offensive Clandestine Intelligence. Offensive Clandestine Intelligence is the execution and

termination of an intelligence task, which is performed, in utmost secrecy in the face of the opposition, against a

target country. The entire operation is conceived in such a way that if compromised, its sponsorship is not

revealed and the originator can disclaim all knowledge of any such activity. Clandestine Intelligence is directed

purely against a target country in order to acquire strategic, operational and tactical intelligence as well as

dealing with all those levels through Sabotage, Subversion and Covert action. It has four components:

a. Espionage. Espionage deals with information about target country.

b. Sabotage. Sabotage deals with material or physical damage to target country‘s war and economic

programme.

c. Subversion. Subversion deals with loyalty of the citizen, politician and armed forces of target

country.

d. Covert Action. Covert action deals with the government of the target country in order to subjugate

it or replace with another suitable one for meeting own interest.

0135. Defensive Clandestine Intelligence. Defensive Clandestine Intelligence is the execution and

termination of an intelligence task, which is performed, in utmost secrecy in the face of the opposition, against a

target Hostile Intelligence Services and Subversive Organizations operating against own country or own

organization. Its main purpose is to detect and neutralize such organizations. This is also known as Counter

Intelligence and it has got four components:

a. Counter Espionage. Counter Espionage deals with detecting and neutralizing Hostile Intelligence

Services and Subversive Organizations who are involved with espionage.

b. Counter Sabotage. Counter Sabotage deals with detecting and neutralizing Hostile Intelligence

Services and Subversive Organizations who are involved with sabotage.

c. Counter Subversion. Counter Subversion deals with detecting and neutralizing Hostile

Intelligence Services and Subversive Organizations who are involved with destroying the loyalty of the

citizens, politicians and armed forces of own country.

0136. Chart - Clandestine Intelligence Operation. A chart showing branches of Clandestine Intelligence

operation is projected below :

Figure 1.3 : Classification of Clandestine Intelligence

INTELLIGENCE CHALLENGES FOR BANGLADESH ARMY

Intelligence as an Element of National Power

0137. History of Mankind is the history of conflict. In such a situation effective and efficient intelligence

organization can go a long way in maintaining sovereignty and independence of any state. During peacetime,

the silent conflict prevails in the domain of intelligence. The country who spends more on intelligence and

organizes intelligence community in most effective manner, is better protected and can also progress faster.

There is no country in the world who does not have intelligence organization. The more powerful a country is,

its intelligence organization also possess capability commensurate to its power. On the other hand poor and

weaker nations also maintain a number of intelligence organizations to ensure own sovereignty and

independence. Bangladesh is also not an exception.

0138. Importance of intelligence in national affairs or for a field commander cannot be over- emphasised. A

statesman's day often begins and ends with the reading of intelligence report or with intelligence briefing while

a field commander cannot go for a plan without the facts/figures provided by the intelligence staff. Accurate

information is essential but does not guarantee optimal decisions, while inadequate information has

demonstrably led to disaster. The need for information must be recognised and it must be collected efficiently,

interpreted with sophistication, communicated with speed to precisely where it is most needed and acted on with

skill and courage. Professional intelligence organizations at national, inter service and service level is the right

answer for this very important issue.

Types of Conflict

0139. Peace time. The peacetime goal of the Army is to train for war and all operations executed during this

time falls within the category of ‗Operations Other Than War‘. Intelligence is going to play not only a vital role

during these operations but also the only option in many situations. Historically Bangladesh Army was called

for such operations ‗In Aid of Civil Power‘ many a times. The focus of intelligence support in such operations is

concentrated on real time situation awareness and basic background information. However, intelligence

readiness and providing indication and warning are very vital for success.

0140. Near War. Bangladesh Army has gained vast experiences of Counter Insurgency and Peace Support

Operations. Army was also called for Counter Terrorism Operations in the recent past. Resolving conflict being

the major goal in a near war situation, intelligence focuses on ‗Current Intelligence‘ with the strategy of

marginalizing the opposing forces for creating a suitable environment for the political process to start.

0141. War.

CLANDESTINE INTELLIGENCE

BASIC

CURRENT

OFFENSIVE

CLANDESTINE

INTELLIGENCE

DEFENSIVE OR

COUNTER

INTELLIGENCE

ESPIONAGE

SUBVERSION

SABOTAGE

COVERT

ACTION

COUNTER

ESPIONAGE

COUNTER

SUBVERSION

COUNTER

SABOTAGE

a. Conventional. The extreme use of basic and current intelligence will be evidenced during the

period of military hostility. In fact, for Bangladesh Army, intelligence should not only be taken as a

Battle Field Operating System (BOS), but also as a Force Multiplier.

b. Unconventional. In order to strike a balance of power with a much superior adversary, Bangladesh

Army is prepared to use the unconventional warfare along-with conventional warfare where the need

for timely and effective collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence at all levels will be

increased manifold. This needs the understanding of the whole gamut of intelligence even at grass root

level.

Intelligence Challenges for Bangladesh Army

0142. General. Bangladesh Army is to face very sophisticated adversaries both from outside and within the

country in any future tactical and non-tactical situation. In a chaotic, intense and destructive environment of the

future war, intelligence organizations of Bangladesh Army are likely to face numerous odds as challenges, some

of which are discussed subsequently.

0143. External Challenge from Conventional Adversary. In any future conventional conflict Bangladesh

Army is likely to face adversaries who are mobile, use sophisticated technology for gathering and protecting

intelligence. Their air superiority will compel Bangladesh Army to avoid using heavy signature for intelligence

gathering. The communication system for intelligence purpose is likely to face wide-scale jamming and

interception loosing vital intelligence and operational security (OPSEC) both at a time. Often unconventional

forces and means will provide solution if well catered for and integrated in the overall intelligence plan.

0144. Terrorist, Insurgent and Hostile Forces. Bangladesh Army is well experienced in fighting counter

Insurgency and conducting successful peace support operation. However, many failures in those operations are

attributed to poor handling of intelligence. Terrorists, insurgents and hostile forces in peace support operation

are seen equipped with sophisticated technology, high motivation and at times even better trained. They

maintain trans-national link and are also supported by hostile intelligence services of other countries. Terrorism

of neighbouring countries is likely to have spill over effects on Bangladesh and also likely to pose a great

challenge for the Bangladesh Army.

0145. Environmental Challenges. Present day military operations are not confined within own territory. It

is spread over all continents of the world under semi normal to highly complex environment. Primary

environmental challenges come from ethno-religious, cultural and linguistic diversity, unpredictable behaviour

pattern of opposing forces, use of sophisticated technology in an unsophisticated manner, etc. Thus

environmental diversity and cultural barriers put a huge challenge on intelligence function.

0146. Organizational Challenges. Internal challenges being faced by the intelligence organizations of

Bangladesh Army revolve around resources, training and management. Centralized control of the available

resources both manpower and assets is a feasible solution. However, better training and management of the

whole community can ensure joint-ness of the intelligence community both during peace and war. In order to

bring professionalism in the rank and file and ensure continuous development of the intelligence effort, the

Army must make professionally competent intelligence analysts, experts and operatives at all levels supported

by well equipped intelligence unit.

0147 – 0200. Reserved.

SECTION - 2

DOCTRINAL FUNDAMENTALS AND INTELLIGENCE

PRINCIPLES OF WAR

General

0201. Principles of war are broad precepts based on past experience where their application with judgment

has led to victory. Bangladesh Army has accepted a list of twelve such principles of war delineated in the GSTP

0032, Operations of War, Volume 1. These principles have more or less analogous importance in the

functioning of intelligence as well. Decision makers, their intelligence staffs at all levels and commanders of

intelligence organizations, therefore need to understand the importance of principles of war in the context of

modern day intelligence functioning.

Aim

0202. The selection of aim provides the focus for all military activities. The military planner plans his

operations to satisfy the aim being duly supported by intelligence staff/organisations. Therefore, the intelligence

staff and unit/subunit commanders must bear in mind the objectives set in the collection plan while tasking

sources and agencies. The collection effort must be directed towards satisfying the Essential Element of

Information (EEI) set at the higher level and should seldom focus on unimportant details. They should have

required inquisitiveness for comprehending the essence of their commander‘s aim. When a commander is

preparing for an operation, the intelligence organizations must not divert their attention from the primary aim of

the commander. At the same time they should also look for subsequent operations that can be envisioned. Aim

once selected must be vigorously pursued. Commanders of intelligence organizations however should not

become over influenced by the aim, since it may jeopardise his collection effort.

Morale

0203. Intelligence operatives need to work not only under complex, fast moving and fluid battlefield but

many a times also without any formal logistics and support of the parent unit. A long range penetration group, a

stay behind agent or an under cover roving agent needs to live off the land. Lack of sleep, continuous alertness

for survival, working without relieves and in isolation, put tremendous burden on someone‘s morale. In such a

situation comradeship, fellow feelings, taking care by own superiors, hard training during peacetime pay a lot. It

is hard to keep the same morale at all times but commanders of intelligence organizations must keep the tempo

and maintain the morale of own sources and agencies at all times.

Concentration

0204. This is regarded as the master principle by many military theorists and it equally applies to intelligence

assets as well. As intelligence resources are always scarce compared to what is actually needed, the commanders

should economize in certain areas in order to achieve concentration of sources and agencies at the decisive

points. In the intelligence functioning, concentration will also imply the optimum utilization of the same

resources sequentially at various decision points. However, without making a priority of decision point,

resources will never be sufficient enough for meeting the collection plan. Concentration must not create a gap in

less threatened decision point and thus intelligence commanders and staffs will often find this principle

conflicting with economy of effort.

Economy of Effort

0205. Intelligence resources should not be made inadequate in one sector in order to make concentration in

other sectors. There is no question of resorting to gambling with supported commander‘s ears and eyes. A sound

intelligence appreciation and conduct of methodical ‗Intelligence Preparations of Battle Field‘ can help

intelligence staff and commanders to achieve ‗Concentration‘ and ‗Economy of Effort‘ simultaneously. As it is

not possible to be strong everywhere, it is wise to economize the intelligence resources in one sector in order to

release resources elsewhere. It however does not advocate that the efforts to be so weak that have the chance of

being not getting enough intelligence about the enemy.

Security

0206. The commanders of intelligence organizations should adopt adequate measures to protect their sources

and agencies as their disclosure may jeopardise the success of the entire operational plan. Security, although a

very important principle of war, but also a discipline of defensive intelligence. An intelligence commander in

the field must strive to conserve his collection capabilities by taking all necessarily precautions against the

counter intelligence activities of the enemy. The counter intelligence organizations are primarily meant to detect

any overt or covert threat of the enemy, which may disrupt the whole operation. Here lies the importance of

planning an aggressive and extensive ‗Counter Intelligence‘ and ‗Operational Security‘ policy at all levels.

Surprise

0207. The commanders of intelligence units and subunits should be mindful of achieving surprise by

employing novel and ingenuous methods of employing sources and agencies to prevent detection by the counter

intelligence effort of the adversary. It is not essential that the enemy be taken unaware, rather the objective

would be achieved if he identifies our effort late enough to be useful. However, while surprising, they

themselves may remain vulnerable to enemy‘s surprise. More often than not it is at the tactical level that the

surprise comes to the fore as a battle-winning factor and has decisive impact on the outcome of the battles and

engagements. Intelligence organizations are primarily meant to analyse the product of all sources of intelligence

and provide timely and accurate warning of impending threat. It can not be materialised unless a very effective

intelligence set up is available at various levels. In the context of Bangladesh the most effective means to predict

an impending threat is by employing human sources deep inside enemy held territory and near to the command

and control system of the enemy.

Aggressive Action

0208. Although aggressive actions may jeopardise the security, but commanders of intelligence units and sub

units must be aggressive in employing their sources and agencies. Aggressive action implies boldness in

determining and executing an intelligence collection plan for the intelligence organizations. It helps them to take

appropriate initiative, enjoy greater freedom of actions and dictate the terms of battle when actual fighting

occurs. It also implies taking calculated risk in deciding and executing intelligence collection task. However,

aggressive action in case of intelligence organizations will differ greatly with that of manoeuvre or fire support

elements. In latter case aggressiveness implies exposing own-self with high physical risk, but in case of

intelligence organizations it is nothing but tenacity and boldness without compromising security.

Fluidity

0209. The best way for an inferior force to survive is to create a fluid condition in the battlefield and it has

similar implications for intelligence assets as well. Fluidity increases the fog and friction and compels the enemy

intelligence commander to lose track of events. This in turn prevents him from employing his intelligence

collection resources. The idea should be to detect enemy sources and agencies wherever one can reach out

irrespective of their locations. An integrated employment of intelligence personnel with the unconventional

forces can really create a fluid tactical or operational situation. Long range penetration group of the intelligence

organization, if employed along-with stay behind agents or sleeper agents can also help respective commanders

in creating fluid situation.

Synchronization

0210. Synchronization (Sync) means fine turning of all assets employed for a common goal. In intelligence

use, the word sync would imply well orchestration of all intelligence assets for finding out information

concerning EEI or ‗Other Information Requirement (OIR). Sync does not only imply own sync but also

disrupting enemy‘s sync. In doing so, an intelligence staff can play a pivotal role in selecting the essential EEI

and OIR. The effect of intelligence sync will multiply if concentration and coordination are made during sync.

For example 'Electronic Intelligence' effort may not be coordinated with the 'Human Intelligence', but sync of

these efforts will produce more valuable and timely intelligence than if it is not done. Similarly, sync of

different sources and agencies of different intelligence organisations will produce concentration at the desired

time and place.

Flexibility

0211. Enemy intelligence sources and agencies will always be on the lookout for our attempts to collect

intelligence about them. They will also have their counter intelligence measures to thwart our collection efforts.

There may also be numerous fleeting opportunities of getting valuable intelligence about the enemy. The

commanders of intelligence units or sub units in such cases should make quick readjustment of their collection

plan and put it into execution without losing prior coordination. The best way to deal with this is to make such

readjustments, which would turn the situational disadvantage into a collection advantage. Flexibility does not

imply only flexibility in planning. The intelligence organization must also be capable of responding to changes

wished by the tactical commanders. For this, the sources and agencies must be physically agile, capable of

making quick alteration of collection method and act rapidly. Flexibility also encompasses organizational

capability to switch into a different collection plan altogether, if need arises for any intelligence organization.

Administration and Logistics

0212. Sound logistics is also essential towards an effective intelligence collection effort. It‘s a cardinal

principle of war which if ignored will result in serious consequences as far as the intelligence aspect of the

battlefield is concerned. The logistic state often dictates the practicability of an intelligence collection plan and

the time required to accumulate logistics determines the time at which the collection effort can be launched.

Many a times, unorthodox approach and thinking out of the box proved very effective in comparison to

conventional administration and logistics for the intelligence collection sources and agencies. Apart from that,

many intelligence personnel will work under cover inside enemy or enemy held territory without formal logistic

support. Therefore, advance planning and flexibility in execution can solve all such issues related to effective

intelligence functioning.

TENETS OF ARMY OPERATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE

Initiative

0213. Initiative assists a commander of an intelligence unit or sub unit to dominate the efforts of the

adversary. It demands the acumen of the intelligence commander and competent sources and agencies to outwit

the counterintelligence effort of the enemy. A commander of an intelligence unit faces not only his enemy

counter-part but also a level higher enemy formation which would challenge him. An intelligent commander,

who can take right initiative in right time and in right place, can out-match challenges posed by technically and

numerically superior enemy intelligence forces. Initiative emanates from an urge for winning the challenges

posed by the adversary and to vanquish him in the battle of wits.

Tenacity

0214. Tenacity is the staying power of the intelligence sources and agencies under overwhelming odds for a

prolonged period. As the war goes on, the spirit of the collection force tends to diminish by a host of

contributory factors, such as capture by enemy, fatigue, frequent reversals, continual physical discomfort, and an

unremitting strain on the instinct of self preservation. Keeping these situations in mind commander of an

intelligence unit should be tenacious not to fall prey to such situation. He than adopt every measures to reverse

the situation in his favour at the earliest. Initiative and tenacity goes side by side in making the situation

favourable for collecting the EEI and OIR.

Unorthodox Approach

0215. An unorthodox approach to the conduct of intelligence collection and management means departing

from traditional method and adopting original and creative methods to achieve decisive result. The commanders

of intelligence units and sub units must employ unorthodox methods, to defeat enemy counter intelligence effort

thereby executing his collection plan effectively. The best effect is achieved when the deception story portrays

the traditional course of action in conformity with enemy expectation and the actual operation is conducted on

non-traditional line. Such action when adopted completely surprises the enemy and makes the enemy

intelligence commander‘s thought-process incoherent. Deviation from the doctrinal norms leaves the enemy

intelligence staff bewildered as they find the unfolding events are contrary to what they expected. However,

there also lies an inherent danger, which must be recognized by a commander of intelligence unit employing

unorthodox method. Therefore, to employ non-traditional methods of collection of intelligence, the sources and

agencies must be prepared to carry out such undertakings by means of extensive training, competent leadership

and by awarding timely rewards.

Non Linear Engagement

0216. The sources and agencies must be employed throughout the length and breadth of the battlefield. This

helps the commanders of intelligence units to multiply his opposing intelligence commanders‘ difficulties of

counter intelligence effort and by forcing him to dissipate his effort for which he may not be well prepared. This

is going to lead to a situation, which clogs his intelligence channel, overstretches staff system and collapses his

decision cycle. Simultaneous employment of well trained and motivated unconventional sources and agencies

along with conventional intelligence operatives can bring the decisive result quickly if tenacity and initiative can

be maintained throughout. It is understood that non-linear employment of intelligence effort is nothing but

thwarting the counter intelligence effort of enemy and rendering their intelligence collection method ineffective.

A balance employment of both human intelligence and technical acquisition assets having mutual support

between them is going to ensure success all over the theatre and battlefield.

BATTLE FIELD IMPERATIVES AND INTELLIGENCE

General

0217. Battlefield imperatives have also got various intelligence implications, like that of the principles of war

and the tenets of army operation. These imperatives can not be achieved until and unless a sound system for

direction, collection, procession and dissemination of intelligence is in place. For any imperatives to be

implemented, anticipation as to how enemy course of action will unfold, identifying enemy vulnerabilities, etc

are vital. On the other hand for blending conventional and unconventional warfare; for using terrain, weather,

deception and operational security; for minimizing battlefield stress, for acting faster than the enemy, and for

maintaining balance of force for undertaking various assignments also need sound intelligence system in place.

Ensure Unity of Effort

0218. Unified actions by various intelligence organizations under a single commander, call for common

focus; standardized modus operandi, collection techniques; standard operating procedure; and a well–

established coordination and control system. Besides, the commander of the intelligence unit should also ensure

support from the sister services intelligence organisations for strengthening his effort. Appropriate

organizational climate amongst the intelligence organisations is created by fostering the spirit of mutual trust,

sharing of intelligence gathered, and supporting each other on a given assignment at all level. Sound training

also contributes a great deal to developing harmony between various units and sub units of intelligence

community by rehearsing methods and procedures and commonly understood systems. For successful

accomplishment of the intelligence objectives, the collection plan should be simple and control mechanism

should allow for decentralized execution of the collection efforts.

Dominate Events

0219. Commander of intelligence units and sub units should be able to anticipate how the situation will

unfold during the course of the campaign or battle. Only then they will be able to dominate the events by pre-

empting the intelligence effort of the adversary. This requires thoughtful anticipation of the problems that might

occur in the days, weeks or months to come in the collection effort and preparation of contingency plans to

tackle them. Though the intelligence gathering efforts may not take place as anticipated, exploring possibilities

of likely eventualities will minimize battlefield uncertainties to a significant degree. Anticipation of enemy

courses of actions requires an intelligence commander to possess acumen of high order, a thorough knowledge

of enemy forces and their doctrine and a sound judgement. To be near accurate in his forecasting of how the

enemy might act, he has to get into enemy‘s decision cycle and read the battlefield through enemy commander‘s

mind. While doing so, he should also conceive how the enemy commanders might anticipate the events so that

he can make a collection plan that will employ resources unanticipated by the enemy commanders.

Expose and Concentrate Against Enemy Vulnerabilities

0220. Thorough knowledge of enemy intelligence capabilities and his doctrine is necessary to identify enemy

counter intelligence weaknesses. Much success in collection effort will occur by concentrating own intelligence

resources against enemy‘s vulnerabilities instead of wasting resources against his strength. Enemy‘s intelligence

gathering effort can be weakened if own counter intelligence elements succeed in denying enemy to identify and

exploit own intelligence weaknesses. On the contrary, the intelligence staff should do their utmost to identify

enemy vulnerabilities and recommend to the commander the one that promises the greatest dividend if

exploited. When the enemy commander prudently shield his vulnerabilities against own exploitation, the

intelligence commander should prepare his intelligence collection plan in such a way so that during the course

of the campaign or battle, he is able to identify enemy‘s most critical vulnerabilities at the earliest and to

disseminate this intelligence to the tactical commander to enable him exploit the situation with utmost vigour.

However, while collecting information about enemy vulnerabilities, the intelligence commander must not forget

about his own weaknesses, which if exploited by the enemy counter intelligence effort, will seriously jeopardize

the accomplishment of his objectives.

Designate, Sustain and if Required Shift the Main Effort

0221. The intelligence unit and sub unit commanders must not loose his focus from the EEI which is

otherwise his main effort. He concentrates his major intelligence resources against this main effort. The sources

and agencies assigned against the main effort receive greater attention in terms of resource allocation and the

support provided by other intelligence organisations within the command. The other information required are

generally linked to the EEI so that all these information together give a complete picture about enemy

organisation and anticipated course of action. As the collection effort progresses, the commander must not

swerve from the main effort to ensure success of the collection plan. However, unanticipated events might cause

the main intelligence gathering effort to stall and the subsidiary efforts designed to collect OIR to achieve

unexpected successes. In such cases, the intelligence commander may revise the collection plan to modify the

EEI and allied OIR under the changed circumstances. In offensive operations the intelligence commander

continually seeks to circumvent the enemy counter intelligence effort in order to identify enemy weak points to

enable own force to attack them. In defensive operation, the commanders of intelligence units deny enemy to

identify our weaknesses.

Blend Conventional and Unconventional Warfare

0222. Unconventional intelligence gathering effort behind the enemy lines using the unconventional sources

and agencies should also continue together with the conventional efforts to accomplish the objectives. It must be

borne in mind that unconventional methods of intelligence collection may at times be more effective than the

conventional means. However the efforts of unconventional elements must be examined in the light of their

capability and likelihood of being implanted by the adversary against us. The unconventional sources and

agencies may be able to provide useful information about enemy forces in the rear, location of enemy‘s

command and control centres, indirect weapon systems, air defence installations, logistic bases, troop‘s

concentrations and lines of communication. To integrate the unconventional intelligence effort with the

conventional ones, two things are essential. Firstly, there must be an organizational framework within which the

unconventional sources and agencies must operate. Secondly, a well- established coordination mechanism must

exist between the conventional and unconventional efforts of intelligence gathering. However, more often than

not there is a necessity to confirm the intelligence provided by the unconventional sources and agencies before

acting on them. When unconventional sources and agencies are collecting intelligence behind the enemy lines,

they must have an effective coordination system to achieve a synergistic result. Apart from intelligence, in many

instances, the unconventional intelligence elements can provide valuable assistance in the form of providing

guide, acting as path finder etc.

Use Terrain, Weather, Deception and Operational Security

0223. The commanders of intelligence units and sub units must learn how to maximize the advantages

offered by terrain and weather and minimize their negative impact on the collection plan. Generally the side

who does it better, establishes an edge over his opponent with regards to collection of intelligence. As terrain

and weather are the medium over which the sources and agencies operate, every effort must be made to enhance

and reduce the opportunities and limitations offered by them. The effect of weather and terrain determines the

interrelationship between our intelligence gathering effort and enemy‘s counter intelligence capabilities. On the

other hand, operational security denies fore knowledge of friendly intelligence efforts to the enemy, while

deception tricks him to gather deliberately fed information. When these two are manipulated to the maximum,

they provide greater security to own sources and agencies allowing them to operate in an environment of

minimum risk and maximum effect.

PRINCIPLES AND LIMITATIONS OF INTELLIGENCE

Principles of Intelligence

0224. It is not only the principles of war that are applicable for intelligence function; over a period of time

intelligence functioning has developed own principles. By knowing the enemy and forecasting what he is likely

to do, intelligence saves lives and enables the best use to be made of the forces available. If intelligence

functioning is not guided by own principle, then lapses may occur resulting wastages of valuable resources.

0225. The conduct of the intelligence operation in the Bangladesh Army varies with the requirements posed

by the operational environments. The acquisition of intelligence in the field will pose some problems for the

intelligence personnel, which may be termed as the limitations. However, the efforts will have to be made to

produce the necessary intelligence accurately and to disseminate it in time to all concerned.

0226. Centralized Control. Intelligence is undividable and must be centrally controlled at each level to

avoid unwarranted duplication of effort, provide mutual support and ensure the efficient and economic use of all

intelligence resources. It will also ensure co-ordination among various intelligence agencies. In conventional

war, normally centralization should occur at the highest practicable level to ensure the widest possible use of the

resources available. In unconventional war the centralisation should occur at every level possible. It does not

however, mean rigidity and non-sharing of information among various agencies.

0227. Objectivity. Once collected, information must be processed with conscious objectivity. There is often

a temptation to distort information to fit preconceived ideas or previous assessments. This must be avoided at all

costs.

0228. Systematic Exploitation of Sources and Agencies. Sources and agencies must be exploited

systematically and logically. They should be methodically tasked based on a thorough knowledge of their

capabilities and limitations.

0229. Accessibility. Relevant information and intelligence must be readily available to intelligence staffs

and users. Intelligence staffs must process all information and intelligence very deliberately and this includes

continuous comparison with previously acquired data. Intelligence is of no value if not disseminated nor

accessible to those who need it.

0230. Continuous Review. Intelligence must be reviewed continuously and where necessary revised taking

into account all new information, which should be compared with that already known. All new information as

soon as it is received should be examined against the question 'does this alter the current assessment?'

0231. Timeliness. The most accurate and reliable information or intelligence is useless unless it reaches the

user in time to serve as a basis for appropriate action. Changes in a situation must be detected and reported to

user in sufficient time for due action to be taken by them. This requires a speed of communications between

policy-makers, commanders, their intelligence staffs and the collection agencies, which is sufficient to react to

change as it occurs.

0232. Vision. Intelligence operations require imagination and foresights. All intelligence resources must

be focused on the EEI of the time but the staff must always be ready to recommend others, which may have

been overlooked. They must also be alert to seize upon any unsolicited and apparently dissociated item which

may provide a vital lead to a hitherto unrecognised but crucial intelligence problem. Officers having this ability

are rightly described as having a flair for intelligence.

0233. Source Protection. Sources must be given protection commensurate with their value and their

vulnerability to detection. It is critical that intelligence staff have sufficient knowledge of sources and agencies

in order to task them effectively and with due regard to the threat they face.

0234. Co-operation. One can rarely be self-sufficient in collection of intelligence whether in peace or war.

Besides, there may be the requirement of crosscheck of a particular piece of information. That is why co-

operation is essential amongst the intelligence staffs, branches, agencies and services.

0235. Security. Unauthorised personnel must be denied information about operations of intelligence

agencies, sources of information and the intelligence product. Mere security verification or the rank does not

entitle a person to have access to all the information. It demands that information should only be passed to those

who need to know it. One should not be given classified information until one‘s need to know has been

established. In the same way one should hold some classified document or material only when his need to hold

the same has been fully confirmed.

Limitations of Intelligence

0236. Security Measures. The enemy will take defensive (security) measures to deny the information

collection by own personnel concerning his true intentions by the measures like night movements, dummy

positions, feint attacks, ruses, rumours, camouflage and concealment. This posses a serious limitation on

intelligence.

0237. Resources. Limitation of resources in the field may force to derive the conclusion from a single piece

of information that may not provide conclusive evidence as to the situation, capabilities and intention of the

enemy. Other sources will have to be created to acquire the information to form the conclusive evidence of

enemy‘s intentions.

0238. Time The time factor may also limit the accuracy and utility of the information. The time that the

information may take to reach a headquarters, where appropriate action can be taken may render it out of date or

may preclude the possibility of any action being taken at all.

0239. Change in Enemy‟s Plan. The information concerning the enemy will probably never entirely be

conclusive, complete or up to date. The enemy is free to choose his course of action and to vary the course of

action when he so desires. Therefore, an estimate can only be made regarding the enemy‘s situation, capabilities

and intentions.

0240. Training of Personnel. The performance of the intelligence staff is likely to vary due to their

aptitude, training and individual characteristics. The intelligence staff cannot categorically state what course of

action the enemy is most likely to adopt and what resources and methods he will employ. Quality of training and

a visionary mind can help an intelligence staff to have sound assumptions of enemy courses of action.

However, they must preserve a balance between the assumptions and possible alternatives. They must also

remember that providing so many alternatives may render the intelligence appreciation and intelligence

preparation of the battle field (IPB) valueless.

Remedial Measures

0241. Employment of Modern Techniques. All discipline of intelligence like Human Intelligence

(HUMINT), Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and others should be used to break

the security measures adopted by the enemy as well as to integrate all the resources for the acquisition of

information.

0242. Transmission of Information/Intelligence. Extensive and thorough arrangements for the

transmission of information and dissemination of intelligence must be made. This can be ensured by the

availability of good communication system and set procedures for passing the information and disseminating the

intelligence.

0243. Selection of Personnel. The intelligence personnel who are employed to carry out the interpretation

of the information must be selected carefully, keeping in mind, their aptitude and individual characteristics.

They should not have pre-conceived ideas regarding the capabilities and vulnerabilities of the enemy. Otherwise

they will not be able to produce vital intelligence concerning their commander's mission correctly.

0244. Training of Personnel. The intelligence personnel must be trained thoroughly so that they can carry

out skilful and enthusiastic interpretation of the information that will help them to carry out the intelligence

tasks thoroughly, completely, accurately and with increased utility.

0245. Access to Commander. The intelligence staff must have a direct access to the commander so that all

information can be passed speedily and decisions obtained promptly. This will also help the commander in

knowing the limitations of intelligence staff at a particular time so as to guide the staff in the most appropriate

moment in the most appropriate manner.

0246 – 0300. Reserved.

SECTION - 3

INTELLIGENCE IN VARIOUS LEVELS OF WAR

LEVELS OF OFFENSIVE INTELLIGENCE

Levels of Intelligence

0301. Strategic Intelligence is required for formulation of policy and military plans at national and

international levels. Oriented on national objectives, it assists in determining feasible national objectives and in

providing a basis for planning the methods of achieving them. Factors, which influence the military capabilities,

vulnerabilities and probable courses of action of the nation are considered as major concern of strategic

intelligence. The term national intelligence has the same meaning and the term is often used interchangeably.

The components of strategic intelligence are biographic, geographic, transportation, and other communication

means, sociological, political, economic, scientific, and armed forces intelligence.

0302. Operational intelligence serves the planning within a theatre of war or on a front as a whole.

Intelligence at the operational level is concerned with the nature of enemy military forces, their structure, their,

command, control and communications, their leadership etc. Such question as: what freedom of actions does the

enemy command has? how aggressively is he likely to exercise it? how effective is his command, control and

communication system, are more critical at the operational level than at the tactical level.

0303. At the lowest tier that is at the tactical level, intelligence, would be concerned with the topography and

climate of an area of operation, the organization for battle and strength of the enemy, his dispositions and likely

courses of actions etc. The tactical intelligence is also referred to as battle intelligence. It may be obtained from

within commander's own command or from higher or adjacent headquarters. It is also derived from the

interpretation of information on the enemy (both his capabilities and his vulnerabilities) and the environments

(terrain and weather). It is also obtained through interrogation of agents, ground and aerial surveillance,

reconnaissance, terrain intelligence, signals intelligence, counter intelligence, technical intelligence, imagery

interpretation, sensory data obtained from target acquisition and night observation devices. The ultimate

objective of tactical intelligence is to minimise uncertainty concerning the effects of terrain, weather and enemy

on the accomplishment of the mission. The commander employs tactical intelligence to determine how best the

available resources can be used in accomplishing the mission and maintaining the security of his command.

Differences of the Levels of Intelligence

0304. Strategic intelligence differs from operational and tactical intelligence in both scope and level of detail.

The former includes not only military elements, but also economic, political, social, geographic and biographic

elements. In any campaign, operations are constrained by time and space, both of which are outside the control

of military planners. Time and distance factors often are neutral phenomena, affecting both friendly and hostile

forces equally. Logistic limitations, while not strictly neutral, and often be calculated as such, since they occur

so frequently that their impact on military campaigns can be anticipated.

0305. Strategic military planning requires intelligence analysts to anticipate foreign movements more than

six-months in advance, to alert friendly commanders before sufficient time to support the movement of large

military forces over the vast spaces involved in strategic operations. Time and distance make actions appear to

be sluggish, because of the delays caused by neutral and logistic conditions outside the control of operational

planners. The engagement in the battle to achieve the end-state of the war, must therefore give an aim to the

whole military action, which must be in accordance with the object of the war. In other words, strategy forms

the plan of the war; and to this end it links together the series of acts which are to lead to the final decision, that

is to say, it makes the plans for the separate campaigns and regulates the tactical battle to be fought in each

decision.

0306. All levels of war are concerned with knowledge of foreign nations and with geographical or functional

areas of actual or potential military operations. All are produced by the application of the same fundamental

collection and processing techniques. Tactical and operational intelligence are usually, generated by units and

formations and service headquarter committed to theatres of operation while strategic intelligence is generated

and used primarily at National Committee on Security Affairs (NCSA), Joint Command Centre (JCC) and

services headquarters. Tactical intelligence is used throughout the command channel while operational

intelligence contributes to planning and conduct of campaigns and major operations. Tactical intelligence

reported to successively higher levels forms part of the input needed to satisfy operational intelligence and

specific aspects of strategic intelligence.

0307. As can be visualized from the foregoing, none of these levels are exclusive; levels and fields crossover

and overlap in numerous instances. This is shown in a chart in GSTP 0032 and the same is shown below with

some modification :

LEVELS OF INTELLIGENCE AND THEIR RELATION TO MILITARY OPERATIONS

FIELD TACTICAL

LEVEL

OPERATIONAL

LEVEL

STRATEGIC

LEVEL

(a) (b) (c) (d)

MAJOR SOURCES

OF INFORMATION

1. Tactical

Reconnaissance

2. Direct

Contact with

Enemy.

3. Interrogation

of enemy

prisoner.

4. Radio

Transmissions.

5. RADAR.

6. Radio

Direction

Finder.

1. Reconnaissance.

2. Direct contact

with enemy.

3. Interrogation of

enemy prisoner.

4. Air photo

reconnaissance (PR).

5. Coded Signal

Intelligence

(SIGINT) intercepts

decoded in the field

and in the rear.

6. RPV; Drones.

7. Human

Intelligence.

1. Human

Intelligence.

2. Satellite.

3. Cooperation

with Allies.

4. Open sources.

(a) (b) (c) (d)

DEGREE OF

RELIABILITY

AND LIFE SPAN

OF INFORMATION

1. Very short

life span.

2. Mostly for

immediate

action.

3. Reliability of

Information for

action very low

to medium.

1. Short to medium

time span.

2. Pressure for action

is high to very high.

3. Reliability of

information in action

very low to medium

1. Medium to

long range life

span.

2. Less pressure

for immediate

action.

3. Medium to

very High

reliability.

FOCUS OF INTELLIGENCE

TASKING AND

CAPABILITIES

1. Primarily

enemy‘s

capabilities to

be engaged.

2. Enemy‘s

immediate

intentions.

1. Analysis and

information of both

capabilities and

intentions.

2. Enemy‘s doctrine

style of fighting.

3. Enemy‘s

operational

intelligence.

1. Both military

and civilian long

range political

economic and

formal

capabilities.

2. Enemy‘s

national

objectives and

intentions.

3. Enemy‘s

allies support.

4. Enemy‘s

national

intelligence

QUALITY OF

COMMUNICATION

Very difficult to

good

Very difficult to good

Good to very

good

REQUIREMENTS FOR

INTELLIGENCE

COORDINATION

Generality low

High or very high

Very high

(a) (b) (c) (d)

CONSEQUENCE

OF FAILURE

IN ACTION

1. Defeats.

2. Setbacks can

be retrieved.

3. Sensitivity to

a single failure

is normally low.

1. A setback can

have very serious

impact even on the

strategic Level.

2. Difficult to

retrieve failure

1. Critical or

disastrous.

2. Very difficult

to retrieve.

Overlapping Interest of the Various Levels of Intelligence

0308. Regardless of form, intelligence seeks to answer a single question ‗what is the threat‘? Everything else

is a matter of degree, time and space. Strategic intelligence is a time insensitive endeavour subjected to dramatic

changes. Operational and tactical intelligence on the other hand are time sensitive and subjected to incremental

change. However, these are produced by the application of the same fundamentals and intelligence collection

techniques.

0309. Tactical level commanders may have to depend upon strategic intelligence for their initial knowledge

of the enemy and the area of operations. In this instance, the distinction between the two looses its effect.

However, information gathered and intelligence produced for strategic purposes are also useful in the conduct of

tactical operations. The description and the studies of many things are included in this category. These are,

Scientific Development, Rivers/Drainage System and Hydrograph, towns/ villages, terrain features and

trafficability, road, railway, air, sea, transportation and communications system, top personalities both civil and

military, weather and climate, political and foreign policy, sociological, cultural, linguistic and religious issues,

economic, trade and commerce, order of battle (Army, Navy and Air force) and military development, mineral

resource, power and electricity, etc.

0310. Information collected by units in the field also assists in the production of strategic intelligence. The

information may be obtained by various means. Interrogation of prisoners of war and other individuals of

intelligence interest provide strategic information on political, sociological, and industrial, transportation/

communication, technological developments, and economic conditions within the denied area. Technical and

physical characteristics of newly encountered enemy weapons or other items of equipment in addition to

providing valuable tactical intelligence may be used in producing strategic intelligence to aid in determining the

industrial or manufacturing centres and their capabilities. A diagrammatic explanation of overlapping interest is

shown below :

Figure 3.1: Use of Levels of Intelligence

0311. Understanding the interdependent relationship of all three levels of war helps commanders visualise a

logical flow of operations, allocate resources and assign tasks. Actions within the three levels are not associated

with a particular command level, unit size, equipment type, or force or component type. The concept facilitates

allocating required collection, analysis, productions, and dissemination of recourses; and facilitates the

assignment of appropriate intelligence tasks to op tactical and supporting intelligence elements.

OPERATIONAL-LEVEL

OF WAR

INTELLIGENCE

NATIONAL

JOINT FORCE HQ

ARMY HQ

DIVISION

BRIGADE

BATTALION

COMPANY

TACTICAL

INTELLIGENCE

STRATEGIC

INTELLIGENCE

LEVELS OF WAR

Figure 3.2: Level of War

0312. Certainly the demands on the strategic intelligence community in a time of war will limit the ability of

national service level staffs to access these systems. National-level intelligence systems will be maintained by

the NCSA intelligence centre once raised. However, the bulk of the all source intelligence level functions to

satisfy the requirements of national and service staffs and commanders will be performed by their intelligence

staff. However, since the focus of intelligence at the tactical level of war –evolving battles and engagements and

the rapid dissemination and exploitation of tactical information and tactical intelligence, intelligence produced at

this level, if not properly screened, could will overwhelm theatre and services level and distract them from their

necessary operational-level perspective.

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE

General

0313. Strategic intelligence is an intelligence designed for use in developing strategic- level policies,

programs, capabilities, and decisions. This is a simple definition, but to fully understand it requires an

understanding of each of its three major parts. Intelligence is usually defined as either a ‗process‘ or a ‗product.‘

or an ‗activities‘. As a process, intelligence generally is described as the targeting, collecting, analyzing and

disseminating of information on foreign entities such as nations, ultra-national organizations, and national or

international outlaws. As a product, intelligence is generally described as ‗‘product information‘‘ on those same

national threat-that is information about threat has been carefully evaluated by professional intelligence analysts.

As regards to activity, this must also be directed against those national threats.

0314. The importance of the phrase designed for use in developing strategic level policies in the introductory

definition cannot be overemphasized. The purpose of strategic intelligence is to help nation at decision makers

National Policy

Restore the lost territory

using military and

unconventional force.

Theater Strategy

Destroy the enemy

forces east of the

River Meghna.

Campaigns Operation

Iron Shield

Major Operations Attack and

destroy 33 Corps

Engagements 11 Armoured Brigade

engages enemy 66

Cavalry

Small Unit and

Crew Action

Bengal Lancer

destroy 6 x T-72 Tank.

Battles 99 Division attacks the

33 Armoured Brigade

Strategic Level

Operational Level

Tactical Level

to make decisions. If it is not used for that purpose, then the intelligence and the effort expended in its

development are wasted. Strategic intelligence help national and allied decision makers for the formulation of

national foreign and defence policy. The intelligence requirements at the national level always focus at the

reflecting the complexities of a continuously evolving national interest and international context. The strategic

intelligence community will collect, analyse, and disseminate intelligence which satisfies the constantly

changing requirements of national level decision makers. The military strategy, force structure, and intelligence

requirements of each theatre of war are distinct. The nature of alliances, adversary‘s military capabilities, and

political and military objective may be different in each theatre of war. In case of Bangladesh each services

requires access to the assets of the strategic intelligence community to support peacetime or wartime campaign

planning.

Strategic Intelligence - Components

0315. Intelligence, much like truth, can be thought of as a spiral staircase. What appears adequate in one

level, such as supporting tactical commanders, may not be satisfactory on the next higher level. While views

from the each level of the staircase might be the accurate, climbing to higher (more-long-range) perspectives

brings into view new factors, which change Judgments. In the words of British military historian B.H Liddell

Hart, ―... a complete strategic vision must extend vertically, as well as horizontally - only seeing the parts in

relation to one level may not be true on the next higher level.''

0316. National-level decision makers while, marshalling the resources of an entire nation in a war,

necessarily consider political, economic, historical, and psychological factors, along with strictly military

information. In his classic study, Sherman Kent characterized strategic intelligence as a combination of many

elements mentioned below :

a. Political character of the country

b. People

c. Economy

d. Transportation

e. Military Geography

f. Military Forces

g. Biographies of Key Leaders

0317. The components of strategic intelligence delimit a nation‘s military strength, both in terms of what

presently exist (current military capabilities) and what may exist in the future (potential capabilities), its current

trends continue. For example a country‘s industrial potential and financial wealth directly limits how much can

be spent on its military forces. Of course, not every armed conflict involves all components of strategic

intelligence. For example, the operational factors in a very short war (such as the 6-day Arab-Israeli War of

1967) involved the armed forces already formed, trained and equipped. However, all components influence the

peacetime build-up of armies, and these components determine the outcome of long wars, both insurgence wars

and more conventional territorial wars.

Purposes

0318. Strategic intelligence has two main purposes: the first has a mid to long-term nature, while the second

is more immediate. From a mid to long-term perspective, strategic intelligence assists national security decision

makers to properly prepare over the long term to defeat potential enemies or those who establish capabilities to

interfere with or resist one‘s own national goals and objective. The emphasis here is on long-range forecasts. For

example, a strategic intelligence report could indicate that an enemy will probably begin a program to double its

tank fleet over the next decade. Such intelligence might cause a defence minister to seek increased funding to

improve his nation‘s anti-tank capabilities. From a more immediate perspective, strategic intelligence assists

decision maker‘s involved in crises or situations requiring immediate or near-term action to quickly defeat real

or potential enemies. In this instance, the intelligence emphasis is on the enemy‘s present capabilities and

intentions. For example, a strategic intelligence report may indicate that foreign naval forces are about to block

an internationally important waterway. Such intelligence might cause a nation‘s leader to take immediate

unilateral measures or seek near-term international cooperation to prevent such a hostile act.

0319. Strategic intelligence is not always reactive to foreign initiatives. It may be developed at the request, or

at the anticipation of a request or need, of national policymakers. For example, a nation‘s leader who wants to

negotiate a trade agreement with a foreign power might request both his commerce and defence ministry to

provide assessments of expected responses from the foreign power‘s civil and military leaders. Both these

assessments, one from a civilian organization and one from a defence organization, would qualify as examples

of strategic intelligence. Strategic intelligence is usually 'all source' intelligence. The analysts producing the

intelligence evaluate data from many different sources, such as imagery satellites, spies, newspapers, and

embassy cables, These data‘s may come from national level collection assets such as satellites, or from factional

level assets such as frontline infantry patrols. Strategic intelligence should not be equated or confused with

information that comes only from strategic-level collection assets. A satellite picture, for example, could just as

well be part of data obtained by many different kinds of collection assets located at various levels of intelligence

operations. The 'all source' aspect is an important characteristic of strategic intelligence. It is not essential, but it

is highly desirable.

Intelligence Direction and Function

0320. At strategic level it is the NCSA who is going to roll the wheel for tasking and processing of strategic

intelligence to subordinate national agencies and inter service intelligence organization. During peace and war

Armed Forces Division (AFD) of the Prime Minister Office is going to provide staffing for functioning of

NCSA till a complete establishment is raised. NCSA should have a joint intelligence committee which is going

to decide essential elements of information (EEI), priority of intelligence task and process the collected

information by various organizations at national level. Joint Command Centre (JCC) when formed, will act as

the coordinating headquarters for intelligence functioning at joint level. Bangladesh has following agencies for

intelligence collection and processing at national level :

a. National Security Intelligence (NSI).

b. Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI).

c. Survey of Bangladesh (SOB).

d. Space Research and Remote Sensing Organization (SPARRSO).

e. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA).

f. Metrological Department

0321. Strategic intelligence seeks to answer the fundamental questions of what a foreign country‘s armed

forces can do and what it intends to do. By ascertaining a foreign country‘s strategic planning factors, we can

begin to anticipate the size and movement of military forces that state will use to reach its political goals. A

review of time and distance refines the magnitude and timing of that foreign power‘s possible military actions in

effect partially determine a foreign state‘s military capabilities. The magnitude is suggested by how large a force

can be logistically sustained, given time and distance criteria.

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

General

0322. An operational level of war, a different intelligence perspective is necessary if the peacetime and

wartime campaign planning objectives of the operational-level commanders are to be realized. This is due to the

demands on the strategic intelligence community and the focus of tactical intelligence. Operation level of war

intelligence is defined as that intelligence which is required for the planning and conduct of campaigns within a

theatre of war. At the operational level of war, intelligence concentrates on the collection, identification,

location, and analysis of strategic and operational centres of gravity. If successfully attacked, they will achieve

friendly political and military strategic objective within a theatre of war.

0323. Operational level of war intelligence focuses on the intelligence requirements of NCSA, AFD Service

Headquarters and JCC. The echelon focus at the operational level is situation dependent. It reflects the nature of

the theatre of war itself. It shows the political and military objectives of the operational level.

0324. Joint and single service military forces are employed to realize the political objectives set forth by the

NCSA. Realization of political objectives within theatre requires the defeat of those strategic and operational

centres of gravity. Identification, targeting, and defeat of these centres of gravity is contingent upon an

intelligence perspective and system which takes account of the peacetime and wartime planning imperatives of

an operational level commander.

Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (IEW) Task

0325. Five IEW tasks are performed at the operational -level of war: situation development, target

developments, electronic warfare (EW), security and deception, and indications and warning. Situation

developments at the operational level of war involve focus functions: theatre areas evaluation, analysis of the

characteristics of the operational area of operation. This includes (geographical, political, economic, industrial,

communications analysis of the entire theatre of war to discern the operational impact of significant regional

feature on the conduct of both the friendly and adversary's campaign effort threat evaluation, and threat

integration. The national inter service and service intelligence staff will discern the political and military designs

of the adversary and specific objectives within theatre. They will determine time requirement to realize these

objectives and target areas of interest (TAIs) keyed to strategic and operational centre of gravity. He follows this

enemy activity by continuously developing and refining situation, event, and decision support templates.

0326. Target development at the operational level involves the identification of those high-payoff targets

(HPTs) as part of the service command, control and communication counter measures strategy or operational

engagement scenario that, if attacked, will lead to the defeat of enemy centre of gravity. EW or joint and

combined EW at the operational level will interface with other joint and combined destructive systems in the

context of the service strategy. Operational security measures and the service deception strategy will be

incorporated in the campaign plan.

0327. The fifth IEW task, involves the continuous development and refinement of regional or theatre based

indicator lists. These allow operational-level intelligence staffs to determine changes in the political, military,

economic, and diplomatic behaviour of an adversary. This allows the theatre commander to better anticipate and

under stand NCSA actions, which may lead to the decision for military involvement.

0328. Theatre-based all source intelligence analysis is necessary for a theatre commander and the NCSA to

avoid strategic surprise. The national level indications and monitoring system in place makes this possible at the

earliest.

0329. High-intensity conflict in a theatre of war follows when the powers involved fail to adhere to long-

standing rules of behaviour. A theatre intelligence staff learns the adversary‘s political designs. The information

is gleaned during the performance of the second and third analysis of the nature of the theatre of war and threat

evaluation. This yields a broad picture of how adversary and its alliance could be expected to fight and for what

objectives.

TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE

General

0330. In tactical situations, modern field commanders must have a clear understanding of both the enemy and

the environment. It is the task of tactical intelligence to collect such crucial information through techniques that

include ground and aerial surveillance; espionage (or human intelligence) and reconnaissance; technical

intelligence of various types (e.g., signals intelligence or SIGINT; imagery intelligence, or IMINT); sensory

data obtained from target acquisition and night observation devices, etc. Tactical intelligence also comprises the

analysis and effective dissemination of information and decisions based on that information throughout the

command structure.

0331. The distinctive purviews of strategic, operational and tactical intelligence do not prevent them from

overlapping. For example tools that are used primarily in strategic contexts are often employed selectively in

tactical situations: maps and charts of terrain, climate, or infrastructure; data on capabilities of enemy systems;

political and cultural information; and so on. This is particularly so in peace time and near war conflicts,

because such conflicts are frequently motivated and constrained by complex political and cultural

considerations. Although tactical intelligence is the beneficiary of substantial amounts of strategic intelligence

(i.e. it receives data from other levels), it also provides information used to make strategic estimates.

0332. The purpose of tactical intelligence operations is to obtain and provide decision makers reliable

information about the enemy, weather, and terrain as quickly and completely as possible. The results are an

essential basis for estimating enemy capabilities, courses of action and intentions, and for planning friendly

operations. Intelligence seeks to discover the type, strength, location, organization, and behaviour of enemy

forces; their direction and speed of movement; and their intentions. It includes information about the weather

and terrain within the operational area and their effects on friendly and enemy operations.

Division of Areas

0333. Modern battle tends to be multidimensional; hence, commanders often must consider its ground, air,

and sea aspects concurrently. For example, at a minimum, a battle and ground commanders must consider the

ground and air aspects. As one way of managing the multidimensionality of battle, tactical intelligence divides

the tactical area into three distinctive zones.

a. Area of Operation. The first is the area of operations (AO), which is the portion of the battle

area necessary for the actual military operations of the command involved.

b. Area of Influence. The second is the area of influence, which is the geographic area in which

the commander directly influences operations by manoeuvre or fire support.

c. Area of Interest. Finally, the area of interest comprises the two other areas as well as adjacent

territory that extend the objectives of current or planned operations into enemy territory and up to the

resources of enemy command minimum one level up of own command.

Each of the areas is viewed in terms of width, depth, airspace, and time. The areas may vary in size depending

mainly on the size of the command and whether the force is in the attack or defence mode.

Area of interest

Area of influence

Area of Operations

Frontline Phase3

(FEBA) lines

Role of Intelligence

0334. The tactical level commander requires intelligence about the enemy and the battle space prior to

engaging in operations in order to effectively execute battles, engagements and other missions across the full

spectrum of operations, Intelligence assists the tactical commander in visualizing his battle space, organizing his

forces, and controlling operations to achieve the desired tactical objectives or end-state. Intelligences supports

force protection by alerting the commander to emerging threats and assisting in security operations.

0335. The unit may need to deal with multiple threats. The commander must understand how best the current

and potential enemies can organize, equip, train, employ, and control their forces. Intelligence provides an

understanding of the enemy, which assists in planning, preparing and executing military operations. The

commander must also understand his operational environment and its a effects on both his own and enemy

operations. The commander receives mission oriented intelligence on enemy forces and the area of operations

from the intelligence staff. He depends upon the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) effort to

collect and provide information on the enemy and battle space.

0336. One of the most significant contributions that intelligence personnel can accomplish is to accurately

predict future enemy events. Although this is an extremely difficult task, predictive intelligence enables the

commander and staff to anticipate key enemy events or reactions and develop corresponding plans or

Unit or Command

Figure 3.3: Battle Field Areas.

counteractions. The most important purpose of intelligence is to help decision making by commander.

Commanders must receive the intelligence, understand it, believe it and act on it. Through this doctrinal

concept, intelligence drives operations.

0337. Tactical information‘s encompasses those unevaluated data, gathered by or provided directly to the

tactical commander which, due to its highly perishable nature or the criticality of the situation, cannot be

processed into tactical intelligence in time and satisfy the user‘s tactical intelligence requirement. Once raw data

is validated, integrated, compared, and analysed, it becomes intelligence. In other words, the distinction between

intelligence and tactical information is in how the information must be processed and analysed, especially if

integration with other data is required to produce usable data. Information may be both tactical information and

intelligence.

0338. Terrain and weather Intelligence is the analysis of terrain of a condition in light of current and

projected weather conditions and the consequences for friendly and enemy movement and communication.

Terrain intelligence results from an analysis of the effects of the terrain on friendly and enemy operations. It

orients on the capability to move, shoot, and communicate. The terrain is analysed in terms of its military

aspects. Terrain conditions have a profound effect on both friendly and enemy operations. The terrain within

specific battlefield areas is analysed in terms of the military significance. Terrain analysis is performed to

determine the specific terrain conditions, based on current and projected weather conditions, under which enemy

and friendly forces must move, shoot, and communicate. Weather intelligence results from the analysis of the

effects of weather on both friendly and enemy operations .It is used by almost every element of a tactical force.

Commanders must be prepared to exploit favourable weather conditions and minimise the adverse effects.

0339. Order of Battle (ORBAT) Intelligence is the identification, strength, command structure, disposition of

personnel, units, and equipment of a military force. The training, tactics, logistics, electronic OBRAT and

miscellaneous data are also included in it. It is an integral part of intelligence concerning the enemy. Complete

ORBAT data is seldom provided to commanders. Instead, commanders are provided estimates and analyses on

collected ORBAT information and other intelligence data. It is significant at both strategic and tactical levels. At

the tactical level, it is used to determine enemy capabilities, weaknesses, courses of action, and intentions.

Weather and terrain information and intelligence are vital to making these determinations.

0340. Target Intelligence is the detection, identification and location of target with sufficient accuracy and

detail to permit the effective employment of weapons electronic devices and forces. The target intelligence fall

into general subcategories: movers, or moving elements; emitters, such as communications systems; sitters or

stationary targets, such as command posts or logistical installations, and shooters which shoot or fire at a long

range. Most information is used in the development of intelligence. Much of this information, however, can be

used immediately for fire, manoeuvre, or electronic counter measures. If raw data can be used for fire,

manoeuvre, or electronic counter measures as received, other data, it is called tactical information. Targeting

data is a subset of tactical information. Dissemination of tactical information must be expedited and, at some

echelons, a separate channel for routing tactical information is established.

Development of Tactical Intelligence in the Battlefield

0341. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) is a systematic approach used by the Armed Forces to

develop intelligence at any level. Bangladesh Army uses IPB as logical and systematic processes to develop

tactical intelligence. IPB is a continual, systematic process of analyzing the enemy, weather, and terrain of a

specific geographic area. IPB analysis is based on graphics such as annotated military maps, multi-layered

overlays, griddled photomaps, microfilm, and large-scale map substitutes, all capable of display on a computer

terminal.

0342. In IPB battlefield area analysis and intelligence estimates are not replaced by graphics but are

converted to them whenever possible. IPB, according to Bangladesh Army doctrine, entails four functions such

as battlefield area evaluation, terrain and weather analysis, threat evaluation and Integration of enemy doctrine

with weather and terrain data. The data developed by these functions are reduced to templates, one for each of

the functions. The process orients on the area of operation and area of interest of the command concerned.

0343 – 0400. Reserved.

SECTION- 4

INTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURES AT TACTICAL LEVEL

COMPANY LEVEL

General

0401. The intelligence architecture includes the director, coordinator, producers and executors at each

echelons of command. Armour and infantry companies close with and destroy the enemy and through direct

contact, collect significant quantities of timely and accurate information of value to themselves and higher

echelons. They, in turn, are supported by their parent battalions, brigades and divisions.

0402. Many of the information needs at this level are satisfied by resources assigned to the companies.

Company commanders are concerned most about the enemy, weather, and terrain in their immediate areas –

most of which they obtain through visual reconnaissance performed personally or by their subordinates. Targets

are acquired and immediately informed to battalion headquarters. Enemy moves to the right or left is noted, and

higher and adjacent units are notified.

0403. In the course of collecting information for their own use, companies also collect information and

capture exploitable sources of information of significant value to higher commands. This information may

include indications of enemy morale, trainings, and combat effectiveness; the appearance of new weapons; and

changes in tactics. Such information is passed to battalion for use and for processing and reporting to higher

echelons. Captured enemy soldiers, equipment, and documents are evaluated for exploitation. The results of

such actions may prove to be the significant value as either tactical or strategic intelligence.

Company Commander the Main Architect

0404. Company commanders are the directors, coordinators, producers, and executors of company

intelligence operations. They direct and coordinate company resources to satisfy company intelligence

requirements and those asked by the battalion. They request additional support from the battalion when required.

They need, almost exclusively, tactical information which requires no processing or analysis. Any analysis

required is done as a mental process by the company commanders and subordinate leaders. More detailed

processing requirements are satisfied by battalion and higher echelon staffs. Companies deploy patrols,

observation post and listening post and also task subordinate platoons to collect the information needed. Counter

intelligence support for company operational security is provided as part of the support provided to the brigade

and battalion. The fire support team located with the company is critical collector of information of intelligence

value. As they observe the battlefield and develop targeting data, this information is forwarded and analyzed to

produce intelligence. The resources available to the company commanders for the execution of intelligence

requirements are depicted in the following illustration :

Figure 4.1: Company Resources

10 km

RESOURCES NOMINAL RANGE

2 km 5 km ORGANIC REOURCES

Troops Patrols

SUPPORITNG RESOURCES

Vehicles Personnel

Sensors

FIRE SUPPORT

Ground

Surveillance

Radar (GSR

if available)

BATTALION LEVEL

General

0405. The battalion, like the company, relies primarily on tactical information for the execution of the battle.

However, its intelligence requirements exceed those of companies. The battalion receives information form the

companies and other available collection resources which must be processed to limited degree and passed to the

battalion commander and brigade intelligence staffs. The battalion, in turn, provides support to its subordinate

companies. For these reasons, the battalion should be provided with larger intelligence capability than the

companies.

Coordinators

0406. The coordinator of battalion intelligence operations is the battalion second in command supported by

respective intelligence officer and operational staff (adjutant). The intelligence officer has staff responsibilities

for intelligence to include tactical information, security, and counter intelligence. The operational staff

(adjutant) is responsible for operation and operational security. However, responsibilities for operations and

operational security are relatively limited, and counter intelligence requirements are normally submitted to, and

satisfied by, the brigade or higher headquarters through intelligence officer.

0407. At battalion level, the intelligence officer is concerned primarily with coordinating tactical information

and reconnaissance and surveillance operations. He plans and coordinates the operations of resources organic to

the battalion the field artillery support and division intelligence resources supporting the battalion. Requirements

which exceed the capabilities of these resources are passed to the brigade intelligence staff.

Producers

0408. The battalion intelligence office is the primary producer of intelligence at battalion level. It consists of

one officer and one intelligence sergeant with a section. They prepare the reconnaissance and surveillance plan,

an informal collection plan, and other plans as necessary, It uses the companies, platoons, fire support teams,

ground surveillance radar (GSR) if available and other supporting units to collect information needed by the

battalion. It forwards requests for information support that are beyond the capability of battalion assets to the

brigade or adjacent battalion intelligence office.

0409. The intelligence office provides the battalion with a limited analysis capability. It maintains a small

intelligence data base and analyses and integrates information to produce target data and intelligence. It

promptly disseminates tactical information to the battalion staff and to higher, lower, and adjacent units. The

battalion intelligence office is a key link in the intelligence system. It is the first processing element to receive

front-line information about the enemy. It is a key element in expediting the flow of that information.

Executors

0410. The executors at battalion level are the commanders of the companies and other units organic to, or

supporting, the battalion. Tasking for reconnaissance patrols, GSR or Remotely Employed Sensors (if available)

and observation mission are passed to the companies, mortar platoon, or fire support unit. Intelligence unit

resources if attached to, or supporting the battalion may be allocated to the companies or held under battalion

control.

0411. Out of the organic resources listed above, the primary importance to the intelligence officer is the

battalion screen. Although the operational staff has the responsibility for planning and directing the overall

operations of the screen platoon, the intelligence officer must recommend aggressive reconnaissance missions

for it. The intelligence officer must ensure that collection missions are integrated into the operations of the

screen. These require constant active coordination on the part of intelligence officer with the operational staff

and the screen commander. The battalion resources for intelligence operations are shown in the chart below :

RESOURCES NOMINAL RANGE

5 km 20 km 10 km BATTALION

SCREEN

FIRE SUPPORT

COMPANIES

FRONT LINE TROOPS ATTACHED ASSETS

TROOPS

VEHICLES

SENSORS

SUPPORTING AVIATION

VISUAL OBSERVATION

3 km

GROUND

SURVEILLANCE

RADAR (GSR)

Figure 4.2: Battalion Resources

Figure 4.2: Battalion Resources

BRIGADE LEVEL

General

0412. Brigades within a division have no organic Intelligence and Electronic Warfare (EW) resources other

than the intelligence staff section. Still, the scope of brigade intelligence operations is much greater than that of

the battalion. To meet requirements, the brigade commander relies on subordinate battalions and support

provided by element attached from the division intelligence unit and other division elements in the bridge‘s area.

These normally include a filed artillery regiment and a field engineers company. Intelligence support will also

include intelligence assets deemed appropriate which may be attached (such as a surveillance squad), placed in

direct support or organised into an intelligence team. An intelligence team may be in direct support to the

brigades deployed forward areas.

0413. The intelligence requirements of the brigade still emphasize tactical information; however the need for

intelligence, EW, and counter intelligence support is of nearly equal importance, tactical information is required

for the operation in progress. Intelligence is required for planning operations for the next 12 to 48 hours. EW is

essential to reinforce fire and manoeuvre in disrupting the command and control of enemy first and second

echelon brigades. Additionally, the brigade is the focal point for counter intelligence support for itself and its

subordinate battalions.

Coordinators

0414. The operation and intelligence staff are the coordinators of EW and intelligence operations at brigade

level. Working closely, these two staff officers identify their requirements and coordinate actions to satisfy

them.

0415. At brigade the intelligence staff is responsible for intelligence, protective security, and counter

intelligence. Generally the intelligence staffs identified counter intelligence requirements and requests support

through the support elements. He is also responsible for supervising the brigade command post and for staff

supervision of intelligence and counter intelligence operations supporting the brigade.

0416. Brigade operational staffs are responsible for EW operation and operational security which far

outweigh those at the battalion level. Most importantly, they integrate EW with fire and manoeuvre to maximize

its effectiveness.

Producers

0417. The producers at brigade include the under command combat, combat support and combat service

support unit and team of the supporting intelligence unit. The functions of the brigade intelligence office are

similar to that of the battalion. However intelligence requirements, particularly analysis and production, are

grater than those of the battalion. The brigade intelligence office coordinates closely with the EW support

element\ to ensure the intelligence effort between organic collection assets and supporting EW assets. The

brigade intelligence office does following :

a. Work out detail intelligence preparation of battle fields (IPB).

b. Develops and coordinates the collection plan.

c. Prepares and transmit tasking messages and requests for information to satisfy collection

requirements.

d. Develops data for the brigade intelligence estimate or final IPB.

e. Processes intelligence.

f. Disseminate tactical information and intelligence.

g. Provides intelligence support to EW and operational security.

Figure 4.3 : Brigade Resources

Figure 4.3: Brigade Resources

Executors

0418. The executors at brigade level include the battalions subordinate to the brigade, the armour, support

battalion, field artillery engineer, elements, and intelligence elements if attached. The battalions perform

reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition operations, and report information to the brigade. These

operations may be a result of normal battalion operations or specific tasking from the brigade.

0419. The non-organic resources operating in support of the brigade, such as artillery, air defence, and

engineer units, also perform above activities as they conduct their operations. Artillery radar locates enemy

indirect fire systems, while their forward observers collect information on enemy units close to the forward

defended localities. Air defence elements observe enemy aircraft and report information. Engineer units observe

the condition of terrain and obstacles, as well as enemy activities.

0420. When diverse intelligence resources are deployed to support a brigade, the intelligence staff may

organize them into a direct support team. This is done to simplify the command and sustainment of these

resources. When this type of team is formed, the team commander exercises command and control of all

intelligence resources in the team.

0421. Division interrogation teams may be placed in direct support of a brigade. These team will concentrate

on screening as many enemy prisoners or detainees as possible. Those prisoners or detainees found to be

knowledgeable and cooperative during the screenings will be given brief interrogations. All tactical information

obtained from these prisoners or detainees will be reported as rapidly as possible. The interrogation team can

also translate documents and act as interpreters, but such activities are not their primary mission. The

interrogation team is tasked by and reports to the brigade intelligence staff.

0422. Ad hoc operational security evaluation teams may be formed by the division operational staff and assist

the brigade commander in evaluating operational security posture. These teams normally consist of unit

personnel with expertise in the areas to be monitored and counter intelligence personnel. The teams advise on

possible compromises and recommend adjustments to current operational security measures. They identify

weaknesses and risks by examining unit function, communications signature and tactical deployment, determine

vulnerabilities to enemy collection systems, and identify compromises of information's.

10KM 20KM 30KM 40KM

NOMINAL RANGE RESOURCES

Organic Battalions

Front Line Troops

Patrols /Scouts Artillery

Visual Observation

CM/CB Radar Air defence

Visual Observation Radar

Intelligence Team Long range surveillance

Counter intelligence

-----------------------------------------------

-----------------------------------------------

Vehicles

Personnel

Interceptor

Jamming

Engineers

Visual Observation

Combat Aviation

Visual Observation

Ground Surveillance

Radar (GSR)

DIVISION LEVEL

General

0423. At the division level Grade-II intelligence staff is the principle coordinator of Intelligence. He is

assisted by a Grade III Intelligence Staff Officer. Intelligence staffs are responsible for:

a. Preparing detail IPB.

b. Developing and coordinating the collection plan;

c. Preparing, transmitting and tasking for and reports and submit these once received.

d. Developing data for the intelligence estimate and final IPB.

e. Developing and maintaining the intelligence data base;

f. Processing intelligence;

g. Disseminating tactical information and intelligence.

h. Providing intelligence support to EW and operational security.

j. Providing intelligence support to psychological operation duties.

k. Providing counter intelligence support to division.

Division Architectures

0424. Subordinate brigade and division units are the producers who coordinate intelligence and EW support

responsive to the commander‘s needs. Analysis at this level will include intelligence preparation of the

battlefield. Executors also include subordinate brigades, battalions, direct support field and air defence artillery,

engineer elements, and direct support field intelligence unit, which also include interrogation teams. The

battalions, supporting artillery, and engineer units all perform reconnaissance, surveillance, and target

acquisition operations. Artillery radar locates enemy direct fire systems, forward observers collect information,

air defence units observe enemy aircraft, and all report information on routes, tactics, types, and numbers.

Engineers provide information on terrain, obstacles, and enemy activities. Operational security is monitored and

evaluated by teams or individuals especially trained in Operational Security and Counter Intelligence.

0425. Division coordinators are the divisional intelligence officer and operations officer Grade-II, supported

by their respective staffs. They direct IPB and target value analysis efforts within the command. The intelligence

staff has the added responsibility of formulating division document and personnel security policy. The

operational staffs have to formulate similar EW and operational security policy and they have to manage these.

Under direction of intelligence staff the division field intelligence unit closely coordinates and supervise

intelligence, counter intelligence, special security, weather reporting, and terrain reporting operations. They also

coordinate with the operations element and fire-support element to ensure that Intelligence and operations are

integrated to support the commander‘s scheme of manoeuvre and fire-support targeting.

0426. Division-level producers include division level intelligence collection processing and dissemination

personnel, intelligence unit as well as operational security, EW, and weather and terrain analysis personnel

brought from under command unit.

05 10 20 30 40 50 60

Km

FRONT LINE TROOPS

PATROLS

TACTICAL AVIATION

GROUND RECONNAISSANCE

AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE

ARTILLERY

VISUAL OBSERVATION

MOVING TGT. INDICATOR RADAR

AERIAL OBSERVERS

AIR DEF. ARTILLERY RADAR

ENGINEERS SERVICE Visual

FIELD INT UNIT

LONG-RANGE SURVEILLANCE

COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE

ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE

GROUND VEHICLES

SURVEILLANCE PERSONNEL

RADAR

Figure 4.4 : Division Resources.

RESOURCES RANGES

COMMON SOURCES AND AGENCIES

Methods and Techniques For Information Collection

0427. The methods and techniques for collecting information can be grouped into four categories:

a. Reconnaissance and Surveillance. This includes reconnaissance from ground or air, and may

involve managing an observation post, patrolling, tasking drone, or using radar, image intensification

or other technical devices.

b. Interview and Interrogation. This is the questioning of a prisoner of war, defector, refugee, or

other person who is known or thought to possess information.

c. Examination. Examination is the inspection of material used by the enemy, such as documents,

weapons and ammunition, or vehicles and equipment of technical or tactical interest. It also includes

chemical agents‘ detection and identification.

d. Clandestine Operations. These covers clandestine activities involving the use of trained agents

to penetrate enemy control area or zone, establishments and installations, and the employment of

enemy nationals who are willing to act as agents, or the use of civilians as informants, with or without

their knowledge.

0428. Of these four categories reconnaissance‘s and surveillances are the principal concern of intelligence

staffs in field formations and, in conjunction with interrogation to secondary level, will provide most of the

tactical intelligence available to commanders in the field. The remaining categories, including detailed

interrogation, are dealt with by specialist intelligence staffs some of whom may be deployed to field formations,

and the intelligence obtained by them will be disseminated through normal channels.

Types of Sources

0429. Directed Sources. Sources, which can be tasked by an intelligence officer to provide answer to his

questions, are directed sources. Like artillery elements which provide information after examining Duds, Shell

Fragments, Craters and Contaminated Areas is a directed source.

0430. Undirected Sources. Sources which provide information but an intelligence officer has no control

over them are undirected sources. In general, undirected sources consist of written material of all sorts and radio

or television broadcasts, relating to forces and areas of operations, actual or potential, which may contain useful

information. Examples are:

a. Newspapers and Periodicals. These containing details of personalities and current events, or

political and economic developments.

b. Maps, Charts, Town Plan, Guide Books, Directories and Tide Tables. These contain detailed

topographical information.

c. Annual Reports. Annual reports of commercial concerns, state-owned and private commercial

agencies, international enterprises and so on, containing indications of industrial and economic

capabilities, growth and development potential.

d. Scientific and Technical Journals and Papers. These contain detailed studies of activities in

their respective fields.

e. Reference Books. Containing a variety of details, from lists of naval vessels and aircraft types to

the professional, technical and academic qualifications and positions held by individuals.

0431. Casual Sources. Casual sources are those sources, which may or may not be known to exist and

which provide useful information unexpectedly. For example, enemy electromagnetic emissions, Enemy

military personnel like prisoners of war, deserters, wounded and dead enemies, Own returned personnel like

escapee, evader, released and liberated persons etc, civilians like liberated civilians, refugees, displaced persons,

co-operative enemy nationals and captured enemy document are casual sources.

Sources Available in the Field

0432. Enemy Activity. The true source is the enemy or any manifestation that can be directly determined by

sensors. The enemy activity may be observed or may not be observed fully as under:

a. Detectable Activity. Enemy activity such as movements of troops, the presence of armour,

weapon emplacements, stockpiling of supplies/ construction material and the amount and type of

weapon fire will provide valuable battle information. Enemy intelligence collection activities and

surveillance methods also provide valuable information.

b. Lack of Activity. The lack of enemy activity or the fact that the enemy has not engaged in

certain activities is often of great value. For example, the information that the enemy has not moved his

reserves or that he has not displaced certain support units may influence the commander's course of

action.

c. Deception of Activity. The volume and type of information available from enemy activities are

limited by the capabilities of the means to detect/ observe them and the measures taken by the enemy to

mask his activities. For example the enemy may use hills to cover troops movement from radar line of

sight detection or he may use the noise of field artillery fire to cover the sound of vehicular movement.

0433. Enemy Military Personnel. These include prisoners of war deserters, dead and wounded who are

among the valuable sources of information :

a. Prisoners of War. These are a valuable source of information of immediate tactical value.

Maximum information is obtained through skilful handling from the time of capture until the

interrogation is completed. They frequently carry personal or official documents which either alone or

when compared with other known data reveal new information or confirm information, which is

already known. Enemy prisoner of War can provide information about troop dispositions, enemy

identifications, arms and equipment, fortifications, terrain, morale and psychological warfare.

b. Deserters. Enemy deserters are handled as prisoners of war but are segregated from other

prisoners. Since deserters may exhibit ideas and attitudes, which are not typical of the bulk of the

opposing troops and may even include pretending deserters delivered into our hands for deceptive

purposes. The reports of interrogation of deserters are clearly marked as information from deserters.

c. Wounded and Dead. Enemy wounded and deeds are searched for documents and marks of unit

identification. Enemy wounded is frequently more receptive to interrogation than are unwounded

prisoners of war because of the shock and low morale.

0434. Own Military Personnel/ Returned Personnel. Own military personnel who have been in enemy

territory and who evaded capture or escaped can provide limited information concerning roads, railways,

bridges, enemy concentration/ moves. They may not be able to provide accurate data of the proper locations and

exact time of observation.

0435. Civilians. Liberated civilians, refugees, displaced persons and co-operative enemy nationals

ordinarily are not trained military observers. Nevertheless they may have information useful for the production

of strategic value as well. The personnel of these categories are screened carefully in order to detect and

apprehend line crossers or stay behind enemy agents.

0436. Captured Documents. A captured document is any piece of recorded information, which has been in

the hand of the enemy. Great care must be taken while exploiting the documents because these may contain

enemy propaganda or may have been prepared and planted by the enemy to be captured in an effort to confuse

and deceive :

a. Exploitation. Captured documents when classified and examined by qualified persons, furnish

information, which is ordinarily more reliable than the information obtained from the prisoners of war.

This information may include Order of battle, Plans, Logistic support, Technical methods, and Codes

and ciphers.

b. Evacuation. Documents taken from a prisoner of war are evacuated with the prisoner in custody

of the guards, so that the prisoner can be interrogated as to the contents of the document. Documents

from other sources are transmitted through the intelligence channels. Below division the documents are

delayed for a minimum of time only by the unit capturing it for rapid understanding and quick

inspection for such information that can be of immediate tactical value to that unit.

c. Categories of Document. At divisional level the document will be assigned a category

dependent on the type of information contained in the documents. These include the followings :

(1) Category „A‟. Documents of immediate tactical or strategic value.

(2) Category „B‟. Documents contain cryptographic items and information related to enemy

radio systems.

(3) Category „C‟. Documents contain information of lesser value to intelligence staffs.

(4) Category „D‟. Documents contains no information of apparent value to intelligence Staffs.

0437. Enemy Material. Captured material more often is of strategic value. Examination of the captured

material by technically qualified personnel ultimately serves any of the following five principal purposes:

a. Development. Help in the development of effective counter weapons and counter tactics.

b. Exploitation. Help for the exploitation of new ideas for our own tactical and strategic benefit.

c. Deduction. Help in making the deductions as to the state of enemy resources for war.

d. Training. The enemy material may be used by our own forces including the publication of

literature and other aids to assist in the training of troops.

e. Weaknesses. The limitation weaknesses of the material deduced will be exploited to our own

advantage.

0438. Enemy Electromagnetic Emissions. Intercept of enemy radio communications, enemy

electromagnetic emissions are valuable sources of information of enemy plans and orders, unit identification and

locations, locations of fire control surveillance devices, and similar data. Exploitation of these sources extends

the depth of intelligence and contributes significantly to intelligence production (to include the ones used for

target acquisition). Normally the means utilised to exploit these sources are capable of all weather,

day-and-night operations and often may provide unique insight into enemy plans or actions.

0439. Duds, Shell Fragments, Craters and Contaminated Areas. Duds and shell fragments reveal the type

and calibre of the enemy supporting weapons. Analysis of the shell craters by qualified artillery personnel may

lead to the location of the supporting weapons. Examination of the areas contaminated by the nuclear, biological

and chemical agents may lead to the identification of the particular agent employed.

0440. Imageries. Imageries obtained from manned or unmanned flights are particularly useful to the

commanders in operational planning. Properly exploited, it is an excellent means for collecting information to

assist in followings:

a. Enemy Concentrations. Locating enemy concentration of infantry, mechanised infantry,

armoured units, installations, dumps, deployment of weapons etc.

b. Terrain Analysis. Helps analysing the terrain.

c. Intelligence Data. Confirming of denying intelligence data obtained from other sources or

agencies.

d. Damage. Assessing damage caused by own artillery fire and air raids.

e. Mosaics. Preparing mosaics and panoramas for planning purposes.

f. Maps. Correcting existing maps for details, which do not exist on maps.

g. Equipment. Recognition of enemy major pieces of equipment by type and model.

h. Target. Acquisition of target and its exact location.

0441. Ground Surveillance Radar (GSR) and Sensors. GSR and sensors are a source of valuable

information concerning the movement of enemy personnel and equipment within the detection range of the

radar being used. These radars are especially useful during periods of poor visibility. Information originating

from these units is also processed through normal intelligence channels.

0442. Maps. These are a principal source of terrain information. Map accuracy is determined by the data

used in the preparation of the map. Maps are supplemented by aerial or ground photographs, side-looking

airborne radar (SLAR), sketches, visual observation etc.

0443. Weather Forecasts, Studies and Report. The local meteorological data is provided by the locating

batteries/ regiments with divisional/ corps artillery. However, the weather forecast is the responsibility of the

Meteorological Department.

0444. Intelligence Reports. These reports prepared by higher, lower, adjacent formations units and

reference material prepared by or for the intelligence directorates of three services fall under this categories.

Frontline Agencies

0445. Frontline Troops. One of the most important agencies available to the intelligence staff is the

frontlines soldier. The soldier can be one of the best agencies of information, if he has been properly trained. He

must know what to look for and how to report his observations. He must be made to realise the importance of

turning in all scraps of papers and enemy material in order that these items will reach the hands of intelligence

staff in time to be of use to them.

0446. Patrol. Patrol can be of two types :

a. Mounted Patrols. A fighting or reconnaissance patrol may be mounted on a wheel or track

vehicles to collect information about the terrain, enemy strength, location, movements, defences,

minefields, demolitions, location of weapons, command posts, observation posts etc. Their advantage

lies in their mobility, radius of operations and the long range of communication. These patrols,

however, cannot operate effectively at night.

b. Dismounted patrols. These may be reconnaissance or fighting patrols, which operate on foot

and provide the same information as the mounted patrols. However, these patrols are capable to operate

at night under poor visibility, in any type of weather, and over any type of ground. However their rate

of movement is slow, radius of operation is short and the range of communication is also relatively

short.

0447. Special Observers. The primary mission of the frontline soldier is fighting and he is often in no

position to report what he sees. To overcome this deficiency, certain soldiers have the primary mission of

observing and reporting :

a. Observation Posts. There are other personnel located on the front lines who are specially trained

in observing that can assist the intelligence staff in collecting information. They include the

artillery/mortar observers located on the frontline.

b. Listening Posts. At night or when the visibility is poor, listening posts are established to obtain

information regarding the existence of the enemy in the area, his movements and activities. These posts

perform their tasks by listening to the sound produced by the enemy movements. Electronic listening

devices may be employed to improve the range and efficiency of listening.

c. Aerial Observation Posts. The aircraft of the army aviation perform missions such as

reconnaissance, observation, liaison and adjustment of artillery fire.

0448. Reconnaissance in Force. Sometimes the information cannot be gained by stealth. Own troops have to

take the offensive action to force the enemy to disclose his positions. This is known as the reconnaissance in

force, which can reveal the enemy's fighting efficiency and attitude. Such attacks are expensive in terms of

casualties.

0449. Aerial Reconnaissance. It is different from the aerial observation posts as it involves the employment

of the air force. The air force can provide :

a. Visual Reconnaissance. It determines the enemy‘s dispositions, movements, and location of

supply installations, command posts, large troops/ armour concentrations and reserves. However, the

pilot can only have a glimpse of the enemy activities because of the speed of the aircraft.

b. Armed Reconnaissance. It also performs the same tasks in addition to having the capability of

attacking selected targets as well.

c. Photographic Reconnaissance. It provides vertical/ oblique photographic coverage of the

desired area.

0450. Intelligence Agencies. It is the main function of the intelligence staff to collect information about

terrain, weather and enemy. They should obtain most of the information from the reports and messages from the

collecting agencies, specialist teams and from the higher and adjacent headquarters as well as subordinate units.

0451. Specialist Team. These teams may be organic or attached to a formation. They work under the control

of intelligence staff. The various especially teams are :

a. Prisoners of War Interrogation Teams. These teams interrogate enemy prisoners of war and

obtain information of terrain, weather and enemy. These teams will also interrogate civilians who are

also a valuable source of information.

b. Photography Interpretation Teams. The air photographs provided by the air force and satellite

imagery are good source of information. By studying these in detail, these teams can determine the

enemy troop‘s locations, concentrations, fortifications, pattern of deployments etc.

c. Other Agencies. These include all the intelligence units, which employ clandestine means for

procuring information about the enemy. In addition these could also include research workers, analysts

of enemy press and radio etc. They are controlled by the formations/ organisations under which they

work

Capabilities and Limitations

0452. Capabilities and limitations of any particular source/agency are given below :

SOURCES AND AGENCIES - CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS

Ser

No

Sources/ Agencies Capabilities

Limitations

(a) (b) (c) (d)

1. Forward troops in

Contact

(Unit and formation

headquarters)

All enemy activity within

sight and sound range.(This

is extended by the

employment of sensory

surveillance devices such

as infrared, night viewing

aids, radar etc).

Weather conditions, terrain and

degree of enemy camouflage and

the range of sensory devices

themselves.

2. Patrols

a. Short Range by

Forward Troops.

(Unit and

formation

headquarters)

Enemy activity in the

Forward Edge of Battle

Area.

(1) Usually operate by night and

limited degree of night

observations.

(2) Time taken to obtain a report

Detailed.

b. Long Range by

Special Troops . (Formation

headquarters)

Enemy activity in reserve

and rear areas.

(1) Difficulties in positioning

and maintaining patrols.

(2) Difficulties of

communications.

(a) (b) (c) (d)

3. Visual

Reconnaissance.

a. Army Aviation

Squadrons

Enemy held forward

areas

(1) Vulnerability In all cases bad

weather.

(2) Restricted and visibility are

Range major limitation.

b. Air Force

(Liaison Officers).

Enemy activity in forward

and rear areas

(1) Number of Air crafts

available.

(2) Difficulty in accurate

observation and reporting, owing

to limitation speed of modern

aircraft.

(3) Enemy camouflage and

deception.

(4) Enemy counter measures.

4. Imagery

Interpretation.

a. Army Aviation

Squadrons.

Enemy forward areas,

Photos by Polaroid cameras.

(1) Flying confined to forward

edge of battle area.

(2) Size of aircraft limits camera

capacity. (3) Rapid results but

limited copies.

b. Air Force.

(Photo Interpreter)

Enemy forward and rear

areas covered by photo,

infrared RADAR sensors

(1) Enemy air action.

(2) Time required for detailed

interpretation.

c. Drone.

(Photo Interpreter)

Enemy forward and rear

areas covered by photo,

infrared sensors.

(1) Enemy counter measures.

(2) Limited coverage

5. Captured Personnel

Material.

a. Prisoners of War

and Deserters

(Interrogation Teams)

Information concerning

those subjects which the

subjects which the prisoner

of war or deserter has

knowledge.

Information on prisoner of war

and deserters depend on;

(1) Rank, intelligence and

knowledge.

(2) Seniority, training and

knowledge Morale.

(3) Availability of trained

Interrogators with linguistic

ability in the right place.

b. Captured

Documents

(Translators)

Any aspect of enemy

activities and intentions in

particular, order of battle

and technical information is

frequently obtained.

(1) Deception.

(2) Delay in translation.

(3) Documents often captured

too late to be use for current

operations.

c. Captured

Equipment.

Technical Teams)

Can reveal enemy's

readiness for particular

types of operation (e.g.

Intelligence operations

chemical equipment) or

state of development

(1) Evaluation takes time.

(2) A lot can be deduced

(a) (b) (c) (d)

6. Escapers and Evaders.

(Intelligence/

considerable Security

Personnel)

Local enemy activity and

topographical information

(1) Security clearance may be

necessary if escaper or evader has

been in hands for a period.

(2) Ability of escaper or evader

to relate what he has seen to a

map or air photograph.

7. Civilians.

(Intelligence/ Security

Personnel).

Local enemy activity and

topographical information

(1) Lack of military knowledge

and training in accurate reporting.

(2) False information may be

planted by the enemy.

8. Enemy Electronic

Equipment and Signal

Communications.

(Signals Intelligence)

Can reveal locality of

enemy headquarters and

groupings of formation.

Intentions and activities

may be disclosed by

interpreted messages

(1) Enemy signal security, and

wireless silence.

(2) Degrees of signals

intelligence coverage available

(3) Weather conditions.

9. Enemy Artillery/

Missiles

(Artillery Intelligence

Staff)

Location of enemy

missiles, guns and motors,

their re- enforcement and

pattern of fire can give a

knowledge of enemy order

of battle, boundaries and

intentions

(1) Location by sound ranging

and RADAR is dependent on

enemy weapons firing.

(2) Locations by air subject to

normal air photo reading.

limitations.

(3) RADAR needs line of sight.

10. Enemy Engineer

Capabilities.

(Engineer Intelligence

Staff).

Topographical, tactical and

technical intelligence of

engineer nature.

11. Secret Agencies.

(Agents and

Informants)

Enemy locations and

activities.

(1) Depends on skill and

reliability of agent or informant.

(2) Communication difficulties.

0453 – 0500. Reserved.

SECTION - 5

THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS

FUNDAMENTAL OF INTELLIGENCE PROCESS

Relationship Between Operational and Intelligence Process

0501. Commander‘s operations process includes plan, prepare, execute and assess in order to continuously

design and conduct an operation (see Figure 5:1). They cannot successfully accomplish the activities involved in

the operation process without information and intelligence. The design and structure of intelligence operations

support the commander‘s operations process by providing him with intelligence regarding the enemy, the battle

field environment and the situation.

0502. Intelligence operations consist of the functions that constitute the intelligence process: direction (plan

and prepare), collection, processing and dissemination, just as the activities of the operations process overlap

and recur as circumstances demand. The operations process and the intelligence process are mutually dependant.

The commander, through the operation process, provides the guidance and focus through essential elements of

information (EEI) and other information requirement (OIR) that drives the intelligence process. The intelligence

process provides the continuous intelligence essential to the operations process. Intelligence about the enemy,

the battlefield environment and the situation allows the commander and staffs to develop a plan, seize and retain

the initiative build and maintain momentum and exploit success (Figure 5:2). The intelligence process is just one

of the mechanisms that provides input to build the enemy course of action and facilitate the commander‘s

situational understanding.

Figure 5.1: The Operation Process.

Battle

Command

ASSESS ASSESS

ASSESS

Cyclic Activities of Intelligence Process

0503. The assessment of hostile capabilities and the forecasting of their intentions or possible reactions to our

own plan requires knowledge of a wide range of subjects. At the higher levels these will normally include

history, geography, economics and ethnology as well as diplomatic, commercial and strategic policies. At the

lower levels we need to know the area of operations, the organisation and strength of the hostile country and

elements and their likely courses of action.

0504. All assessments must be constantly reviewed and amended if additional information is received or

changing circumstances lead to the alteration of our own or the hostile plans and operational activities. To meet

this continually changing situation we must have a planned, methodical and logical system to produce

intelligence. The Intelligence process or intelligence cycle meets this requirement at all levels of command. The

process has four cyclic stages, shown below with diagram :

Figure 5.2: The Relationship between the Operation and Intelligence Processes.

Facilitates

Situational

Understanding

Relevant information

(which includes intelligence) COMMANDER

PREPARE EXECUTE

PLAN

Operations Process

Assessment

is a

continuous

function

The Operations Process

provides guidance and

focus which drives the

intelligence Process

DISSE-

MINATE

DIRECT

PROCESS

ANALYSIS

COLLECT

TASK

The intelligence process

provides continuous

intelligence input essential to

the operations process

Commander‘s

Intent

Process,

Analyse and

Disseminate,

are continuous

functions

Intelligence Process

Figure 5.3 : Diagram of the Intelligence Process.

0505. Direction Stage. This stage usually begins with the commander's statement of his intelligence

problem. This statement of problem may be explicit, implied by the commander's general mission or result from

the application of the cycle to a previous or concurrent intelligence problem. Having defined the intelligence

problem this stage continues with :

a. Intelligence Appreciation / Intelligence Estimate or IPB to visualise the hostile course of action

(COA).

b. The determination of information requirements.

0506. Collection Management Stage. Collection stage is defined as the process of tasking and gathering

information from all available sources and agencies.

0507. Processing. Processing is defined as the stage whereby information becomes intelligence through

collation evaluation, integration, interpretation and analysis,. The conversion of information into intelligence

involves the three closely related steps of collation (intelligence data base), evaluation, interpretation and

analysis.

0508. Dissemination. The main function of this stage is the timely distribution of information and

intelligence, in the most suitable form and by any suitable means, to those who need it. This is the product that

the commander has asked for.

Operation of the Intelligence Process

0509. The cycle activity of the intelligence process stems from the constant need to check, confirm or refute

and re-assess every deduction or conclusion. Initially these deductions or conclusions are drawn from IPB and

intelligence appreciation/estimate and subsequently from the information obtained under the collection plan or

from unsolicited information. Comparison, as a mental process, is repeated far more than any other in the mind

of an intelligence officer. He must be constantly thinking back and comparing, thinking forward and planning.

He must relate to what has happened in the past and he must do it automatically when, for example he is trying

to assess the reliability of a source, the accuracy of piece of information or the significance of it. Checking and

revising are inherent in every intelligence function and it is this constant re-thinking that constitutes the cycle

activity, which gives the intelligence process its another name intelligence cycle.

0510. Although the defining or stating of the intelligence problem sets the cycle in motion, and initially the

stages of Direction, Collection, Processing and Dissemination will follow one another in chronological order, as

soon as material begins to flow through the channels, these stages will overlap and coincide so that they are all

going on simultaneously.

0511. The original intelligence appreciation/estimate, whether it is written down or not, and the assessment of

hostile capability and intentions, will be under continuous review and revision. This will lead to further

intelligence problem, amendments to the collection plan, the production of new intelligence and further

re-assessment.

DIRECTION STAGE

General

0512. The key to the operation of the Intelligence process is the commander. He must set the cycle in motion

by deciding what he wants to know about the enemy within the time and space limits set by his mission. This is

called ‗Determination of Intelligence Problem‘ with the object of making sure that the intelligence effort is

properly directed. This statement of intelligence problem may be explicit, implied by the commander‘s mission

or result from the application of the cycle to a previous or concurrent intelligence problem. Having answered the

intelligence problem the stage continues with the determination of information requirements by doing an

intelligence appreciation/ estimate/ IPB.

The Intelligence Problem

0513. The commander will direct his intelligence staff and give them clear instructions on the intelligence he

needs and where necessary, set a time limit, so that the intelligence staff has an exact understanding of the task

facing them. The commander's direction must be as specific as possible and he should state his intelligence

requirement in order of priority and emphasise which of them are critical.

0514. Although the importance of proper direction by the commander has been emphasised, there may be

occasions when he cannot give precise instructions. For instance, particularly in a counter insurgency operations

situation, it may not be possible for a commander to state his mission and requirements so precisely. In these

circumstances the intelligence staff would follow the procedure outlined below :

a. An intelligence staff would first relate his commander's mission, no matter how broadly stated, to

all available basic and current intelligence bearing on the area of operations. From this it would then be

possible to define the main threat.

b. Once the threat has been established the intelligence problem can be stated.

c. This can then be followed by the Intelligence Appreciation/Estimate/ Intelligence Preparation of

the Battle Field (IPB), discussions with the operations staff and the listing of the information

requirements.

d. From these the commander can select those, which are critical to his planning or decision-making

and the remaining procedure of the intelligence process can begin. In all circumstances the commander

must make this selection before the intelligence staff takes any collection action.

0515. A divisional intelligence appreciation may conclude that the enemy will attack in a given strength,

direction and time, with certain objectives. As a result, a brigade of that division may be ordered to prevent

penetration within certain boundaries. The brigade commander must then determine the intelligence problem

involved in his operation. This might be worded as: ‗will the enemy attack in my sector? If so, how, where,

when and in what strength and what are his immediate objectives likely to be?‘ Again at unit and battle group

level the Commander's intelligence problem will normally take the following form :

a. What is the enemy going to do, and if so :

(1) How will he do it ?

(2) When will he do it ?

(3) Where will he do it ?

(4) In what strength ?

b. They will relate these questions to unit and battle group area of interest and the commander‘s

mission.

0516. The question of enemy strength is an important aspect of the intelligence problem and whenever

possible, what is known as the 'level of enemy command' must be determined. This expression merely describes

the size of the opposing enemy force which could affect our commander‘s mission. Thus for instance, for a

battalion in defence, level of enemy command might be a brigade.

Intelligence Appreciation/ Estimate and IPB

0517. The intelligence appreciation is logical and orderly examination of the intelligence factors affecting the

accomplishment of commander's operational mission. Intelligence appreciation is carried out from the enemy

point of view. Intelligence appreciation is carried out at direction stage and re-assessed/ re-appreciated prior to

dissemination stage of intelligence cycle. It is always updated with the receipt of information about enemy. If it

is carried out at the direction stage, then the primary objective of the intelligence appreciation is firstly to meet

the Intelligence problem given by the commander and secondly to list the information requirements, which will

form the basis of a systematic collection plan. But if it is carried out at dissemination stage of intelligence cycle,

the objective is to reassess/revise the previous intelligence appreciation with newly processed

information/intelligence which will serve as a basis for planning operation by the commanders and for

disseminating intelligence to his staff and to other headquarters. It provides the commander with an analysis of

the area of operations, enemy strength and enemy capabilities that can influence his mission.

0518. The IPB is a systematic and continuous system of analysing the enemy, weather and terrain in a

specific geographical area. This approach integrates enemy doctrine with terrain, weather, mission and the

specific battlefield environment which is designed to support military decision making process. It concentrates

on building a database prior to the hostilities and highlights applicable data in support of tactical operations.

This results in an intelligence estimate and a analysis of the battlefield area that show probable COAs and

intentions and indicate targeting opportunities. Graphics are basic to IPB analysis, i.e. intelligence is

communicated with picture, but the analysis of the area of operations and intelligence appreciation is not

replaced. Continuity is maintained not by rewriting volumes of materials, but through graphic renewal or

update.

0519. IPB can be applied to all theatres and types of conflict. All the stages of IPB involve staff work of

preparation of various graphics templates. These templates are nothing but pieces of talc sheets or cellophane

papers placed over the map, preferably of 1: 50,000 scale. These templates are illustrated with various graphics,

based on the data available. These graphic templates are generally prepared manually as such; preparation of the

templates can be both manpower intensive and time consuming. However, use of computers in preparing the

graphic works will make the process faster and more accurate.

0520. It must be remembered that IPB is only an assessment of enemy intentions and not a prediction. In this

context it is important to examine as many possible enemy options as time allows based not on ‗what the enemy

is going to do‘ but on ‗what he is capable of doing‘. This will enable intelligence staffs to present a series of

options in order of probability while ensuring that the possibility of own forces being taken by surprise is

reduced to the minimum.

COLLECTION MANAGEMENT STAGE

General

0521. After the completion of first part of the direction, the second part of intelligence process continues with

:

a. Making a Collection Plan, based on the information requirements.

b. Tasking sources and agencies to collect the necessary information.

c. Keeping a continuous cheek on the productivity of sources and agencies and where necessary re-

tasking them.

d. The delivery of collected information provided by sources and agencies.

0522. Collection planning is a logical plan for determining indications from Essential Elements of

Information (EEI) and Other Information Requirement (OIR) and translating them into orders and requests for

specific information. This provides the staff officer with a convenient aide-memoir, enabling him to record the

various sources and agencies available, their tasks, the time by which their reports are required and confirmation

of their receipt. Area of interest is the area within which the intelligence staff of a formation or unit is

responsible for the collection and subsequent dissemination of all available information or intelligence.

Normally this area will be limited by the rear and flank operational boundaries of the formation or unit

concerned but the distance that it extends into enemy territory will depend upon known or appreciated enemy

positions in the depth which are likely to directly affect the mission of the commander concerned and

Capabilities of the collection agencies available to the formation and to the higher commanders.

Purpose of Collection Plan

0523. The main purpose of making collection plan is to ensure that all the information that the commander

needs are collected. It is therefore, imperative that the intelligence staff should be able to recognise the pertinent

requirements and plan for obtaining the answer well in advance. The efficiency of intelligence functioning in a

unit or formation area of responsibility largely depends upon a well thought out and logical collection plan.

0524. The aims of an intelligence collection plan are :

a. It focuses the attention of intelligence staff to the specific intelligence problem in a given tactical

situation.

b. It helps in systematic and complete coverage of collection effort.

c. It forms the basis for making specific requests or allotting tasks to various sources and agencies

available with a formation or a unit.

d. It assists the intelligence staff in organising the intelligence operations in their area of

responsibility.

e. It avoids omissions, conflicts and unnecessary duplication in the collection effort.

Strategic Collection Plan

0525. The plans made at the national level are focused on strategic issue. These serve broadly two purposes,

first the evaluation of nation‘s foreign policy vis-à-vis other countries and second the planning of strategic

requirements of a future campaign in any theatre of operation.

Operational Collection Plan

0526. At operational level collection plans are evolved for acquiring constant elements of information,

strategic and technical intelligence as well as the tactical intelligence. Moreover the scope and projection of

army operation and the need for simultaneous planning for a number of operations warrant consideration of the

following factors. As it is not possible for subordinate formations to carry out concurrent planning for present

and future operations, the army arrange to procure and disseminate the constant elements of information

concerning these future operations to the subordinates and units.

Tactical Collection Plan

0527. Tactical collection plans are made with a view to collect information of tactical nature in a combat

zone. Obviously, the magnitude of the collection effort at various levels from a sub unit to a division will be

different but essentially the collection will be confined to information on terrain, enemy and weather. In certain

areas of a division‘s area of operations responsibility, there would be a requirement to collect information on

constant elements of information (basic information) as also political, economic and ethnic aspects, which may

affect the accomplishment of the commander‘s mission. The scope of planning at various levels is briefly

discussed as under:

0528. At Division Level. The intelligence staff at this level would receive the basic information from their

higher headquarters. During the period, when hostilities are not yet started, their collection plan will cater for

acquisition of constant elements of information to keep these up-to-date so that just before the formation is taken

to field, the intelligence collection plan for the mission of the commander is executed and information obtained

within the time needed for the planning of operation. The intelligence staff will have to cater for the impending

or projected operation of the units and formation who may be currently assigned to their initial mission :

a. Basic of Plans. Preliminary and initial intelligence planning is based largely on assumptions,

which need constant review.

b. Flexibility. The plan must incorporate flexibility because when there is a large time lag between

planning and execution, there is a likelihood of change in assumptions on which the plan was based

originally. The provisions should therefore be made for all foreseeable eventualities.

0529. At Unit and Brigade Levels. The collection plans at these levels are based on the mission assigned to

them by the superior formation headquarters. There would be occasions when these formations or units would

be employed more than one phase of an operation. Under such circumstances, these units or formation will be

able to plan for acquisition of detailed information in respect of first phase of operation, while depending upon

the superior formation headquarters to provide them with the constant elements of information in respect of the

entire combat area in which they are likely to operate later. The intelligence staff at will have to plan the

collection of information required for subsequent phases of operation assigned to their formations or units. As

soon as the initial phases are over, the intelligence staff at unit and brigade level will employ their sources and

agencies for collection of detailed information in respect of their next assignments.

PROCESSING STAGE

Procedure for Processing

0530. General. Processing is the phase in which information becomes intelligence. The sequence for

processing varies with the nature and urgency of the information. Tactical information or partially developed

intelligence which is needed immediately is disseminated before it is completely processed.

Information that is not of immediate value is processed before it is disseminated. Processing is defined as the

step where information becomes intelligence through collation, evaluation, analysis, integration, interpretation

and analysis. This definition is condensed into four closely related activities :

a. Collation.

b. Evaluation.

c. Interpretation and

d. Intelligence Analysis.

0531. Prompt Action. Information is processed without waiting to collect additional information.

Intelligence derived from incomplete information may be essential. There is always a time lag between the build

up of a target and the time the information is available. Complete information of the target may not be available

until the target has started to dissipate. As time is available, a search is directed for additional information to

complete, confirm or refute the intelligence developed from incomplete information.

0532. Sequence. The sequence of processing depends on the nature and urgency of the information.

Collation is usually the first step; however, on urgent items collation may occur simultaneously with evaluation

and interpretation. Information needed immediately by higher, lower or adjacent headquarters is disseminated

before it is completely processed. Information not of immediate concern, but of possible future value, is

normally processed before being disseminated.

0533. Evaluation and Interpretation. It may occur simultaneously followed by immediate dissemination.

For example, information from a reliable source and believed to be true may state that the enemy is about to

launch a major attack. In this case, collation is of secondary importance and the intelligence report that an attack

is imminent is disseminated as soon as possible.

0534. Reporting. Reporting of information to higher echelons may occur concurrently with processing. For

example, to decrease the production time of intelligence related to nuclear targets, commander may order that all

information concerning specified enemy units, areas or activities are reported concurrently with processing at

lower headquarters.

Collation or Intelligence Data Base

0535. Collation is the system for receiving, registering, sorting and recording all reports or data coming into

an intelligence office, with the primary objective of comparison. Collation is a time consuming phase of

intelligence processing. It is also expensive in manpower and man-hours, but the efficiency of the system, the

accuracy of its contents and the ease with which they can be extracted and related to one another, depends on the

speed and efficiency with which information can be interpreted and converted into intelligence. Proper collation

methods help in organising raw and unprocessed data's into groups that will help its correct interpretation. All

systems, especially at unit level, should be as simple as possible to maintain and operate, using the minimum of

manpower. The maximum use should be made of visual presentations, on maps, traces or overlays which are

easily understood far more quickly from a clearly marked map than from pages of detailed summaries and notes.

0536. Collation is defined as the grouping together of related data's to provide a record of events and to

facilitate further processing. In effect it is the procedure for receiving, sorting and recording all reports data's

arriving in an intelligence office, at any level.

0537. Basic Consideration. The design of a collation system must have the aim of facilitating the recording

of information, the retrieval of individual or related reports and the storage of intelligence for dissemination or

reference. The system must ensure that no pertinent information is lost and no time is wasted considering

irrelevant information. The indexing and categorising of subject matter must be related to the projected area and

scope of operations and must be based on :

a. The stated or anticipated information requirements.

b. The intelligence needs of the operational staff.

c. The anticipated volume of information and frequency of reports at peak periods.

0538. Characteristics. In operation of the collation system must bear the following characteristics :

a. All relevant reports are recorded and indexed to enable swift and easy retrieval.

b. The relationship between separately recorded but related report is immediately apparent.

c. Interpretation can be based on all relevant facts.

d. Pertinent information is highlighted and not obscured by a mass of trivial facts.

e. Gaps in basic or current intelligence are highlighted to assist in collection planning.

f. Information and intelligence are recorded in a manner, which minimizes the need for regrouping

or rephrasing before dissemination.

0539. Standardisation. Time and effort can be saved, particularly at the lower levels, if collation systems

can be standardised throughout a theatre of operations. In particular the use of standardised terminology and

definitions will assist in the clarity, brevity and speed of recording and disseminating intelligence.

0540. Need for Direction. An intelligence officer must ensure that his collation system does not expand by

taking interesting subjects not immediately relevant to the intelligence and operational requirements. The

commander and the operations staff must state their requirement clearly, without this directions it will be

extremely difficult for any intelligence officers to design or operate an effective and economic collation system.

0541. Selection of Subject Headings. In-flowing traffic, information is always in a large volume. As such

the headings under which reports and other material are recorded and filed should also be standardised if

possible. The collation of material which is not relevant to the operational demand will overstrain the system

and prejudice its efficiency. Clear thinking initially helps in placing this information under different subject

headings, in their proper perspective which will accelerate dissemination when time is very important.

0542. Cross Referencing. The cross referencing of related items and connecting reports is essential to

enable rapid retrieval for interpretation or dissemination. The system should be as simple as possible and full

use should be made of such aids as colour coding.

0543. Visual Presentations. The maximum use should be made of graphic means such as maps, overlays,

charts, histograms and graphs to record and illustrate trends, types of activity, dispositions, organisations and

capabilities. Such methods of recording information have the advantage of :

a. Presenting the salient facts fully, without confusing detail.

b. Conveying the maximum amount of information in the minimum amount of time.

0544. Hand-Over of Record. It is essential that, on relief, an incoming unit be given all intelligence records,

files and relevant collated material to ensure maximum continuity for the incoming Intelligence Staff. The

utmost discretion must obviously be exercised in the hand over of sources such as agents and informants,

bearing in mind the vital requirement for protection. Generally speaking sensitive sources can be satisfactorily

handed over to a personal basis, provided adequate time for hand over is allowed. The requirement for

maximum security in the hand over of intelligence records is of paramount importance, specially those that

relate to sources.

0545. Stages of Collation

a. Intelligence Journal or Logging. This is the system of registering of all reports/messages by

keeping of a chronological record of every relevant item of information and intelligence received, using

the normal operational log form. The log is the only central record to which all information can be

referred and must therefore be kept with great care. In order to save time and effort a combined

operation and intelligence log is normally kept at brigade and lower level in conventional war situation.

In counter insurgency situation a separate intelligence journal will often be maintained. At division and

higher levels two separate operation and intelligence logs are maintained by respective staff.

b. Recording. This covers all aspects of map marking, filing and card indexing. The scope, nature

and extent of any intelligence office collation system will always be dictated by the nature of

operations, the time factor, the manpower available and the space available.

Evaluation

0546. General. Evaluation is defined as the appraisal of an item of information in terms of pertinence,

reliability, credibility and accuracy. Evaluation is part of a virtually instantaneous mental reaction to each piece

of information by the trained intelligence officer, i.e. a certain extent it runs concurrently with collection.

0547. Pertinence. The examination of information for pertinence specifically determines whether or not the

information is :

a. Pertinent. With regard to the enemy or to the characteristics of the area of operations.

b. Requirement. Needed immediately and if so, by whom.

c. Value. Possible present or future value and to whom.

0548. Reliability. The source of information and the agency by which it was collected are both evaluated for

reliability. The headquarters closest to the source or agency is ordinarily the best judge of the reliability of the

source or agency. The principal basis for judging the source or an agency is :

a. Previous Experience. Experience with members of some units may have proved them to be

more reliable sources than members of other units.

b. Knowledge of Unit. Knowledge of the training, experience and past performance of units

indicates the reliability of those units as collecting agencies.

c. Test of Reliability. An additional test of the reliability of source and agency is ‗under the

conditions existing at the time, could this information have been obtained‘?

0549. Credibility. There must be degree of probability sufficient to establish confidence in the truth of

information.

0550. Judgment of Accuracy. It means the probable truth of the information. It is based on the answers to

the following questions :

a. Fact. Is it possible for the reported fact or event ?

b. Consistent. Is the report consistent within itself ?

c Confirmation. Is the report confirmed or corroborated by information from different sources or

agencies ?

d. Agree/Disagree. Does the report agree or disagree in any way with other available information?

e. Likely True. If the report does not agree with information from other sources or agencies then

which one is more likely to be true ?

0551. Comparison of Report. The most reliable method of judging the accuracy of a report is by comparing

it with similar information which may already be available under the proper category in the intelligence record.

Whenever possible the intelligence staff obtains confirmation or otherwise of information through different

agencies and sources.

0552. Difference between Higher and Lower Echelons. Remarkable differences in the evaluation of the

accuracy of information may occur between higher and lower echelons. The reason for this difference is the fact

that higher echelons, which have more sources of information and intelligence than lower echelons, have a

correspondingly greater opportunity to confirm, corroborate or refute the accuracy of reported data. Regardless

of the source, the accuracy of incoming information and intelligence is re-evaluated at each echelon.

0553. Evaluation Scale. The evaluation of each item of information is indicated by a standard system. The

evaluation of reliability of source is shown by a letter and the evaluation of accuracy of information by a

numeral. Evaluation grading is made at the lowest headquarters possible. Although both letters and numbers are

used to indicate the evaluation of an item of information, they are independent of each other. A completely

reliable agency may report information obtained from a completely reliable source, which, on the basis of other

information, is judged to be improbable. In such a case, the evaluation of the information is A-5. A source

known to be unreliable may provide raw information that when confirmed by reliable sources are accepted as

accurate information. In such a case, a report is evaluated F-6 may be accurate and should not be arbitrarily

discarded. There will always be differences in the evaluation of information at different levels of command

because higher headquarters will usually have a greater volume of information, which can be used for

comparison. It may sometime assist intelligence staffs to obtain a more accurate interpretation if they regard

intelligence disseminated by lower levels as reliable information and process it in the ordinary way.

0554. Evaluation of Source. The evaluation of source is represented with alphabetic order for example an

‗A‘ evaluation of a source is assigned under only the most unusual circumstances. For example, this evaluation

may be given when it is known that the source has long experience and extensive background with the type of

information reported. A grading of ‗B‘ indicates a source of known integrity. A ‗F‘ grading is assigned when

there is no adequate basis for estimating the reliability of the source. Agencies are ordinarily graded A, B or C.

However, when the source and the collecting/reporting agency are evaluated differently, only the lower degree

of reliability is indicated. The evaluation of reliability of sources is represented as under :

a. Completely reliable - A

b. Usually reliable - B

c. Fairly reliable - C

d. Not usually reliable - D

e. Unreliable - E

f. Reliability cannot be judged - F

0555. Awarding of Grading for Accuracy of Information. The awarding of evaluation of a piece of

information is made as under :

a. Grading–1. If it can be stated with certainty that the reported information originates from a

source other than that for already existing information on the same subject, it will be classified as

‗Confirmed by other sources‘ and will be graded as ‗1‘.

b. Grading–2. If no proof in the above sense can be established and if no reason exists to suspect

that the reported information comes from the same source as the information already available on the

subject, it will be classified as ‗probably true‘ and will be graded as ‗2‘. If the contents of the report are

confirmed in essential parts by information already available, the procedure in (b) will also apply to the

unconfirmed information contained in the report.

c. Grading–3. If the investigation reveals that the reported facts, on which no further information

is yet available and are compatible with the previously observed behaviour of the target, or if the

known background of a person leads to the deduction that he might have acted as reported, the

information received will be classified as ‗possibly true‘ and will be graded ‗3‘.

d. Grading–4. Reported but unconfirmed information, the contents of which contradict the estimate

of the development or the hitherto known behaviour of the target, will be classified as ‗doubtful‘ and

will be graded ‗4‘ as long as this information cannot be disproved by available facts.

e. Grading–5. Reported information which is not confirmed by available data and which

contradicts the experience hitherto assumed to be reliable with regard to the development of a target or

issue is classified as ‗improbable‘ and will be graded in category ‗5‘. The same classification is given

to report information that contradicts existing data on a subject originally graded ‗1‘ or ‗2‘.

f. Grading–6. If the investigation of report reveals that a basis for allocating ratings ‗1‘ or ‗5‘ is

not given, the reported information will be classified as ‗truth cannot be judged‘ and will be graded as

‗6‘.

Interpretation

0556. Interpretation is an objective and impartial mental process based on common sense, service knowledge,

previously obtained information, comparison and deduction. New information is compared with what is already

known and the combination and comparison of the old with the lead to fresh intelligence. The procedure can be

made easier by splitting the mental exercise in three ways :

a. Identification. Who or what is it ?

b. Activity. What is it doing ?

c. Significance. What does it mean ?

0557. Nevertheless, interpretation takes time and requires experience. Lack of time, particularly in fast

moving operations or lack of experience may compel the unit intelligence officer and even perhaps the

intelligence staff at brigade headquarters, to leave interpretation to higher authority and concentrate on the

handling and rapid dissemination of evaluated information.

0558. This is not merely a matter of unit nomenclature. On receiving for example a contact report, the

intelligence officer must try to decide what the enemy force is, because the size or nature of it may be a clue to

enemy intentions. This often involves comparison with previous information in order to assess whether there is

any change or new development.

0559. Having considered identification and activity, any conclusions must be related to any combat indicators

which have been established, but in making his deductions every intelligence officer must take into account the

enemy's need to gain surprise and therefore to employ deception. Deliberately misleading indications may be

'planted' and it is for the intelligence officer to keep an open mind, Particularly, should a single item of

conflicting information appear, he must be constantly on the lookout for reliable confirmation of any apparent

pattern out of the information gathered.

0560. The answers to the questions of identification, activity and significance, fitted into the intelligence

picture, will lead to deductions and conclusions, and it will nearly always be necessary to obtain more

information to confirm or refute them.

0561. Thus, in practice interpretation is the making of deductions from reported facts and deductions may

sometimes be wrong. It is therefore of the greatest importance that when disseminating any intelligence by any

means, an intelligence officer differentiates clearly between reported fact and his deductions. There may be

occasions when several interpretations are equally plausible. When this happens all the options must be stated.

Intelligence Analysis

0562. Analysis is the separation of a whole into its parts to allow an examination and interpretation of the

information. Analysis is the 'working' of collected intelligence/information to explore contexts and anticipated

events in their fullest political, military, economic, diplomatic and cultural implications. Any intelligence can

follow analytical process but intelligence analysis is basically a research work to be done by specialist

intelligence staff. However, the analytical process is a desk job and may be conducted at any level depending

upon the problems and requirement of user. However at different headquarters a special desk can be assigned

with the task of analysis to provide intelligence to the users.

0563. It is the analyst who must make bring of all the data and attempt to put the pieces together and place it

in a wider perspective. Having concluded that the analyst is at the centre of the intelligence process, it seems

appropriate to examine the question, what is analysis? and in particular, what is intelligence analysis? Following

definitions will clarify its position :

a.. Analysis is the testing of the validity of a hypothesis. Its validity is tentatively accepted with

increasing confidence as more and more implications are traced and matched with reality. But as soon

as one falsehood is found, the hypothesis is declared invalid.

b. Analysis is stage in the intelligence processing cycle whereby collected information is reviewed

to identify significant facts. The information is compared and collated with other data and conclusions

are made that also incorporate the memory and judgment of the intelligence analyst.

0564. Analysis typically involves certain methods and techniques, some of which are statistical; others which

are not, which reveal patterns and trends that often reveal the probability of conclusions and some are research

oriented. The basic ingredients of any intelligence analysis include :

a. Hypothesis. It is the possible conclusions or guess that might be drawn at the beginning for a

particular intelligence problem. Generally, hypotheses refer to events or situations that we are presently

unable to observe directly. These events may have happened in past, possibly happening now or may

possibly happen in the future.

b. Evidence. Evidence is any observable sign, indicator or datum which one believes is relevant in

deciding among hypotheses one entertains.

c. Assumption. Assumptions are the bonds which connect facts and pieces of evidence to support

a hypothesis. In essence, analysts are piecing a puzzle together, knowing that some of the puzzle parts

are missing. Assumptions allow filling the gaps caused by the missing puzzle pieces. As time passes,

new evidence will often surface which will allow you to replace assumptions. When comparing

hypotheses, fewer assumptions increase the plausibility of a hypothesis, while many assumptions will

make the hypothesis more doubtful.

Role of Intelligence Analyst

0565. There is no intelligence analysis tasks imaginable in which the analyst begins a task with all possible

hypothesis, evidence and assumptions already provided. If these ingredients were provided, this would simply

mean that some other analyst had already been working at the task for a considerable period of time. The

process of generating new possibilities, evidence and arguments is intimately related to the process of asking

questions. As an intelligence analyst, one must ask questions of what he knows about the events or situations of

interest. The more training and experience he has in the details of intelligence analysis tasks, the better the

questions he can ask.

0566. An analytical problem rarely has just one possible conclusion. Usually several possibilities exist,

especially when facts or evidence are not available. In some cases, hypotheses, which can concern either past,

present or future events, may take the form of guesses, with little evidence (at first) for support. Evidence

usually refers to observable data or items of information that appears relevant to hypotheses. However, in some

cases, missing evidence can also have significance.

0567. Job as an intelligence analyst may have its tedious moments, but no one can ever say that you are doing

mindless work. The major reason is that three ingredients of intelligence analysis, just mentioned, are never

provided for an analyst, one must discover them for each problem he is solving. This is where imagination,

creativity or inventiveness comes in.

0568. At all level the mission of the Intelligence analyst is to convey the truth to commanders and decision

makers. The intelligence analyst‘s job therefore requires knowledge and understanding of the realities of past

and current events and the anticipation of future events. Analysts act as the decision eyes and ears to the country

and the organisations. They report and forecast as objectively as possible. Their job is specialist in nature and

follows all modern research methodology and technical advancement.

0569. To provide commanders and decision makers with accurate and actionable intelligence, analysts

produce a verity of products, ranging from briefings to hard-copy publications to videotapes. Usually these

products support a specific task or request. Often the products respond to ―standing requirements,‖ meaning the

need for the data is constant. Order of battle or organisation analysis for example, would fall under this category.

Other products are, responding to a current development of interest or concern to the decisions-maker. Crisis

situation, like a bomb explosion in the country, often precipitate requirements for rapid intelligence production.

DISSEMINATION STAGE

Considerations

0570. General. Dissemination can be defined as the timely transmission of information and intelligence in an

appropriate form to the units or agencies, which can make timely and effective use of the data. The primary

purpose of dissemination is to enable the commander to make decisions with confidence; a secondary purpose is

to provide knowledge, in the light of which new information may be processed. Intelligence is used in much the

same manner at all echelons. The means of dissemination are likewise the same at all levels, with variations

occurring in the volume, coverage and frequency.

0571. Recipient. The core concept of dissemination as regards to recipient is ‗need to know‘. However, as a

general guideline, intelligence should be disseminated within the producing headquarters, to next higher, next

lower and adjacent units.

0572. Priority. Priority in dissemination is judged by its usefulness to the recipient, means of dissemination

available and the value of information. Though short cut is never suggested in intelligence cycle, but at times the

information may be of such value that time does not permit complete processing before the information is

disseminated. If done so, the recipient must be made aware of this fact.

0573. Means. Dissemination means selected should be those, which ensure timely receipt of

information/intelligence in an appropriate form. The means selected should be consistent with priority and

should not interfere, as far as possible, with the operational messages.

Principles

0574. Timeliness. Speed of dissemination is essential to ensure that intelligence is received in time to be of

use for planning or decision making.

0575. Accuracy. The accuracy is of utmost importance in intelligence work. The two important aspects in

this context are, firstly, the statement of the fact and secondly, the interpretation of these facts into intelligence.

The intelligence staff must, therefore, understand the intricate difference between these two.

0576. Brevity. Reports must be kept as brief as possible, but at the same time include everything that the

recipient needs to know. Commanders seldom have time to wade through lengthy documents or listen to verbose

oral briefings. Full use of traces, annexes and facsimile processes should be made to cover additional detail.

0577. Interpretation. Wherever possible all facts must be correctly evaluated and their significance

interpreted before dissemination. In all intelligence reports, whether oral or written, a clear distinction must be

preserved between established facts and the deductions made from them. In written reports, such interpretation

must be made clear.

0578. Standardisation. Reports are understood more quickly if they are laid out in a logical sequence under

convenient standard headings. The format should be covered in standing operation procedures.

0579. Distribution. Formations and units must not be kept in the dark on a piece of information which is

readily available and of interest to them. The dissemination must, however, be carried out on 'need to know'

basis. Therefore, if the doubt exists as to the usefulness of information to a particular recipient, it will be

disseminated.

0580. Regularity. Items of obvious urgency must be disseminated as they occur and should not be held for

inclusion in routine intelligence summaries, which are originated at regular intervals. Care should be taken to

avoid overloading communication systems and whilst regular routine reporting is necessary, repetition should be

avoided by the use of phrases such as 'No change' referring to previous reports.

0581. Security. Whilst excessive secrecy can render intelligence ineffective, it is important that it be

disseminated on a strictly 'need to know' basis and that, in the case of written intelligence messages, the

appropriate security classification is realistically assessed. As a general rules such messages may be sent in clear

only if the enemy, should he intercept them, has no time to react. Such safeguards will go far towards ensuring

the security of our own operations and preserving the security of our sources. The need to protect the latter is

paramount. The enemy may have no time to redeploy his force to meet a new tactical situation, but he may have

plenty of time to deal with a compromised source, particularly one located within his own area of influence.

Means of Dissemination

0582. Oral. This saves time, allows for on-the-spot questions and discussion and can be illustrated by a

visual display. It can have an immediate impact on commanders. There can be following types of oral

dissemination :

a. Staff Visits. The exchange of information or intelligence among the intelligence staff of the

higher, lower and adjacent formations/units is facilitated by frequent staff visits.

b. Briefings. Briefings are a better means of dissemination because these allow the listeners to use

both sight and hearing senses in absorbing the presentation of the briefer. These will allow the briefer

an opportunity to respond with direct questions. The questions guide the briefer and give them an

opportunity to feel the interest and needs of the listeners. Briefing can be of following two types :

(1) Impromptu. To meet the immediate needs of a commander or visitor who wants to be

brought up to date as rapidly as possible.

(2) Formal. Formal briefings need proper preparation and presentation. In a unit, company or

squadron commanders will normally be given a short, formal intelligence briefing before a

planned operation or before moving into a new area.

c. Telephone Calls. Telephone calls are also a kind of oral dissemination when in the form of

conversation. They are far superior to the exchange of written messages. However, this may pose

security hazards.

0583. Automatic Data Processing (ADP). Automated data base is ideal for handling large amounts of data

using normal written formats. It enables transformation of incoming digital information straight into the

database. Authorise person will have complete access to it via a local area network (LAN). This enables to

transfer incoming digital information straight into the database, thus ensuring instant dissemination within the

command‘s Intelligence section. The LAN also enables to immediately satisfy some intelligence request.

0584. Written. Following standard sequences, which allows for formal recording of intelligence estimates

and written briefs remain available for reference. These are a valuable means of disseminating information and

intelligence because they permit presentation of intelligence to the recipient in an integrated and comprehensive

form designed to meet the anticipated requirements of a variety of users. There are numerous intelligence

documents and each is designed to satisfy a particular dissemination requirement. The type and form of

intelligence documents prepared and disseminated by intelligence staff at each headquarters varies with the

requirement. Details of types of written dissemination are given at GSTP 0101 and also in section 10 of this

GSTP.

0585. Selection of Means of Dissemination. Several factors must be taken into consideration while

selecting the means of dissemination in order to achieve timely and proper dissemination. Selection of means is

influenced by the following :

a. Availability. The means of dissemination available.

b. Security. The most secure means should be chosen, consistent with the need of timely

dissemination.

c. Urgency. The urgency of the information and intelligence.

d. Details. The details of the information or intelligence to be disseminated. For example,

information or intelligence consisting largely of photographs can not be disseminated by radio or

telephone.

e. Pertinence. This is the pertinence of the information or intelligence. For example information or

intelligence of slight use to an agency would not normally be disseminated by the most rapid means.

f. Location. Location means this location of producer and user. For example, if both the producer

and user were in the same building, all information and intelligence could be disseminated by

messenger or personal contact. If, on the other hand, the producer and user were separated by a great

distance and there was no possibility of direct contact, then an indirect method of dissemination, such

as radio or courier would be used.

0586 – 0600. Reserved.

SECTION - 6

INTELLIGENCE DISCIPLINES

General

0601. Intelligence disciplines are categories of intelligence function. The Army‘s intelligence disciplines are

Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), Signals

Intelligence (SIGINT), Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT), Technical Intelligence (TECHINT)

and Counter Intelligence (C Int).

0602. When discussing collection method, we refer to these categories as Intelligence Disciplines. Some

similarities exist between the collection methods with the primary difference but the origin of the product or the

method used to interpret the product will vary. For example, radio or television broadcasts fall under public

consumption which are open-source information but encrypted radio or television transmissions fall under

SIGINT. A satellite photograph from a commercial company is like a special open source information, yet

imagery from a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft is IMINT. Both IMINT and MASINT can use spectral imagery in

developing an interpretation of the image. Similarly, obtaining especially selected open source publications may

involve HUMINT resources. This blurring of the discipline is really an academic argument at least from the

analytical perspective. So we conveniently sidestep the issue. How the ‗discipline‘ obtains the data will often

have little impact on assessment itself. The analyst, however, should have a familiarity on the capabilities and

limitations of discipline. Because this will help to identify which collection asset will best satisfy the analyst‘s

needs.

Types of Intelligence Discipline

0603. Open Source Intelligence (OSINT). OSINT is defined as the intelligence products, organisations and

activities that incorporate open sources of information and intelligence in the production of intelligence.

0604. Human Intelligence (HUMINT). HUMINT is the collection of foreign information by a trained

HUMINT collector from people and multimedia to identify elements, intentions, composition, strength,

dispositions, tactics, equipment, personnel and capabilities. It uses human sources as a tool and a variety of

collection methods both passively and actively to collect information.

0605. Imagery Intelligence (IMINT). IMINT is intelligence derived from the exploitation of imagery

collected by visual photography, infrared, lasers, multi-spectral sensors and radars.

0606. Signal Intelligence (SIGINT). SIGINT is a category of intelligence comprising either individually or

in combination of communication intelligence (COMINT), electronic intelligence (ELINT) and foreign

instrumentation signals intelligence (FISINT).

0607. Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT). MASINT is technically derived intelligence

that detects, locates, tracks, identifies and/or describes the specific characteristics of fixed and dynamic target

objects and sources. MASINT collection system includes but are not limited to radar, spectro-radiometric,

electro-optical, acoustic, radio frequency, nuclear detection and seismic sensors as well as techniques for

gathering chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) and other material samples.

0608. Scientific and Technical Intelligence (S&T). S&T is intelligence derived from the collection and

analysis of threat and foreign military equipment and associated materiel for the purpose of preventing

technological surprise, assessing foreign scientific and technical (S&T) capabilities and developing

countermeasures designed to neutralise an adversary's technological advantages.

0609. Counter Intelligence (C Int). C Int counters or neutralises hostile intelligence collection efforts

sabotage and subversion through collection, counter intelligence investigations, analysis and production,

functional and technical services and finally neutralise those threat through various means.

OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE

Definition and Sources

0610. Any unclassified openly discussed information which has an intelligence value is known as Open

Source Intelligence (OSINT). Most of us are familiar with open-source material like newspapers, books, journal

periodicals, radio and television. OSINT can also include commercial databases, patents, theses, photos and

even commercial satellite images. Another growing component is grey literature which includes symposium

reports, corporate brochures, academic research efforts and 'think-tank' studies. Grey literature can also include

reports free of proprietary or copyright restrictions.

Advantages of OSINT

0611. The main advantages of using OSINT are ease of handling, relatively low expense and timeliness. It

can afford an opportunity to share information with allies. The different types of data available to the public

have also increased worldwide, running from level proceedings to military orders of battle. For years the

Intelligence Community used open source information primarily to assess scientific and technological (S&T)

developments.

0612. Open sources are most valuable when used in conjunction with other intelligence assets. Open source

information can serve as a useful flag if it conforms or contradicts information obtained from other intelligence

collection methods. Areas where open source have made distinct and meaningful contributions include

proliferation issues, terrorism and illegal narcotics movements. In general, open sources can provide insight

especially about an event, including background and focus.

Disadvantages of OSINT

0613. Ironically, the main disadvantage of OSINT is volume. We are truly in an information age and

experiencing information explosion. As noted above, over the last few years we have seen an exponential

growth of its quality of available information and in the topical diversity of that information. In 1982, for

example, only few commercial databases were available. Today we have an estimated 8,000 commercial data

bases produced around the world.

0614. Another disadvantage of OSINT is the supervisor who believes enormously that 'if the information

isn‘t classified, it is worthless. However, even the 'traditional' intelligence discipline can include untrustworthy

data. Camouflage, concealment and deception programmes can have an adverse impact on all collection efforts,

particularly if the analyst does not evaluate the relevance, credibility and strength of the evidence under

consideration. Admittedly, open sources are frequent outlets of biased and misleading information or even the

product of deliberate deception activities. But no analysts worth his assessment solely on one intelligence

discipline and the use of multiple sources should negate the impact of disinformation efforts.

OSINT and the Future

0615. From the Intelligence Community‘s stand point fewer information needed in the future will deal with

strength of military forces. Although we will see increased involvement with arms control issues and the

implementation. Instead, we will focus more foreign economic developments and support of military

peacekeeping operations abroad. In short, the Intelligence Community is facing a fundamental restructure. With

the wide variety to tasks we are asked to do, we must use all the resources available to us both classified and

unclassified to supports the decision-makers and policy makers. Good intelligence analyst requires his emphasis

on timeliness, relevancy, accuracy and completeness. We can no longer accomplish this tasks relying solely on

the tradition which is often expensive and sometimes risky classified collection means. Open source

information, when used properly, act as a flag for identifying new intelligence developments or issues causes us

OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE (OSINT)

Capabilities and Advantages :

- Can use for targets where collection priorities are low.

- Relatively cheap, compared to the other intelligence disciplines.

- Easier to disseminate and share.

- Unlimited coverage of most topics, huge volumes of information.

- Generally very current.

Limitations and Disadvantages :

- Huge volumes of information can overload the analyst or researcher.

- Can require considerable time for researching, not always easy or quick to find the best

source.

- Easy to accept at face value.

- Diversity.

to reassess a previous hypothesis if the information conflicts with other sources or give us confidence if it

confirms data from classified collection means.

HUMAN INTELLIGENCE

General

0616. HUMINT is intelligence collection using human as both collectors and sources of information. In the

traditional collection method, HUMINT is the only non technical intelligence collection discipline. Overt

HUMINT is collected by observation from knowledgeable human source or openly available media. Clandestine

HUMINT is collection under maximum constraints on the basis of possible denial. HUMINT collection does not

involve 'covert actions' which are really operations designed to precipitate of response or reaction by the targets.

However, sources of HUMINT include spies, interrogation of prisoner of war, trade fairs and expositions,

subject-matter experts and attaché exchanges.

0617. The National Security Intelligence (NSI) is the lead agency for HUMINT in Bangladesh. The

Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) is the defence HUMINT manager for HUMINT collection

requirements which coordinates with NSI. Field Intelligence Units at division level are the primary HUMINT

agencies.

Analysis of Human Intelligence

0618. Human intelligence includes all information derived through human sources. Tactically it is

represented by interrogation of enemy prisoners of war and civilian detainees, translation of captured enemy

documents, long range surveillance operations, patrols and observation posts, liaison with local military or

paramilitary forces and the local populace are the most importantly reports from friendly troops.

0619. It has the potential to discover the most guarded secrets to include enemy intentions. It generally has an

advantage in the collection of less precise and quantifiable information requiring qualitative and value

judgments. Examples of the most lucrative human intelligence targets are those which involve plans and

intentions, deliberations and decisions, research and development, doctrine, leadership, training, and morale.

0620. Human intelligence sometimes suffers in timeliness of information. However, much overt tactical

human intelligence is immediately exploitable as combat information. The ideal human intelligence sources are

privacy to decisions and intentions before they are widely communicated or acted upon – a requirement most

other sources cannot meet. An analysis of human intelligence is shown below:

IMAGERY INTELLIGENCE

HUMAN INTELLIGENCE (HUMINT)

Capabilities and Advantages :

- Gauge intentions, plans.

- Determine capabilities.

- Crisis contributor; can give appraisals of mode, report perceptions.

- On site verification a person can see, touch and confirm.

- Cost effective; “non artificial” intelligence collector with multiple sensors and multi-

tasking capability.

- Flexible; a person can adapt to changing situations.

Limitations and Disadvantages :

- Lack of timeliness.

- Placement may be difficult and access limited.

- Motivation factors; “Why is he or she telling me this” ? Wants revenge ?

- Source reliability questions; at least partially relates to motivation.

- Human factors; bias, forgetfulness and imperfect memory.

- Legal issues.

IMAGERY INTELLIGENCE

General

0621. Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) involves the exploitation of a permanent and objective record produced

by a camera, scanner or other imaging devices. Commonly, it is simply a picture of something. For many

people, imagery is the only way to really confirm an activity. Types of imagery include visible light, near

infrared, far infrared and radar.

0622. At the strategic intelligence level Space Research and Remote Sensing Organization (SPARRO) and

Survey of Bangladesh provide the lead. In this aspect Army Headquarters reviews and forward requests for

images coming from various formations and finally they request strategic images collection assets and

Bangladesh Air Force to provide the same. Army Headquarters will also maintain and control own indigenous

tactical photo reconnaissance assets for providing the imagery intelligence.

Analysis of Imagery Intelligence

0623. It is derived from radar, photographic, infrared and electro-optic imagery. Imagery are analysed by

imagery analysts to identify and locate enemy activity, installations and land equipment. Side looking airborne

radar has the capability to detect vehicle movement over large areas, has a stand-off capability of considerable

distance and has the capability to be digitally down linked to the ground for in-depth analysis. Photographic

imagery analysis is very accurate and is susceptible only to more sophisticated camouflage, concealment and

deception techniques. Positive identification of equipment can be made from photographic imagery in most

cases. Infrared needs no light to image and best results are obtained at night. The system has the capability to

detect individual in a low-intensity conflict. Electro optic systems are similar to photographic systems but differ

in that the image is a digital recording which can be manipulated to obtain optimum results.

0624. The disadvantages of IMINT depend on the limitations of the various sensors. Weather is a factor to

some extent for all of the sensors. Radar, since it is an emitter, is susceptible to jamming. Photography is limited

for all practical purposes, light hours and has no near-real time capability. Time sensitive requirements may be

missed due to the time required for aircraft return and film downloading and processing. Infrared sensors require

the aircraft to fly at low altitude (less Than 3,000 feet) and directly over the target. Electro optic systems suffer

most of the limitations photography does, though not to the same extent. Some correction can be made to the

image by digital enhancement.

Use of Space for Military and Other Purpose

0625. The earth‘s atmosphere is divided into a number of regions classified according to their temperature

changes. The five major regions are Troposphere, Stratosphere, Mesosphere, Thermosphere and Exosphere. The

exosphere at altitude of 150 km is the lowest altitude that can sustain a circular orbit for one revolution without

propulsion. This has been accepted as the most common definition of where space begins.

0626. A satellite can only see a relatively small area at the same time. For this reason mapping a large area

(or the whole Earth) takes a lot of time and most satellite images are on average several years old. Because

imaging satellites are in low Earth orbits, real-time imaging of a certain area is complicated. However, spy

satellites can do this during wars and other military operations or to provide data for intelligence agencies. Still,

the troops frequently find out that the ground truth is different from the images that were taken some times ago.

0627. Satellite imagery can be combined with Geographical Information System (GIS) data. For example, the

Earth Viewer can combine the images with maps and other information from various sources. In the early 21st

century satellite imagery became widely available when affordable, easy to use software with access to satellite

imagery databases is offered by several companies and organisations.

0628. Toady satellites in the orbit can provide communication links to troops in the field, enabling them to

talk directly to their commanders. Other satellites can provide accurate and timely information regarding the

weather to be found or expected at any location enabling tactics to be adopted to make most of the weather

conditions. There are satellites which allow military commanders to fix his exact location on the globe and

navigate with only a few meters of error confirming unprecedented accuracy to his weapon systems. Military

commanders are also provided with data regarding his enemy by satellite which can look beneath the

camouflage, listen to enemy communications, identify and locate the radars associated with weapon systems and

much more. Meanwhile, watchful satellites keep an eye on the enemy‘s missile sites, ready to give warning of

any impending launch of nuclear missile. It can, therefore, be truly said that warfare has spread from the known

dimensions of land and air to space, the latter being the natural extension of the air environment in the third

dimension.

Air Photography

0629. Air photography is probably the largest single source of information concerning the enemy. This is

especially true in wartime when access to enemy territory is difficult or impossible. Air Photography provides a

means of obtaining accurate information more quickly than by any other sources of military intelligence.

0630. The principal uses of air photography for military intelligence purposes are as follows :

a. The production of material for the compilation of target maps.

b. The recording of results of attacks, whether with bombs or other weapons.

c. The detection of military movement on roads, railways, tactical areas and at sea.

d. The surveillance of targets or areas of strategic or tactical importance, industries and stock piles.

e. The preparation and revision of maps.

0631. There is a difference between air photo reading and interpretation. Air photo reading is merely to scan

an air photo under a stereoscope and determine whether it is a canal, building, road, railway, bridge etc. It does

not call for an assessment of the target for military use. For interpretation one has to read the photographs

correctly and then from the information available or signatures on air photographs derive at interpretation which

becomes intelligence.

0632. Aerial photograph has several advantageous features as opposed to visual reconnaissance, which,

despite its simplicity, does not meet the complex nature of reconnaissance information needed in planning.

These are :

a. The information collected is unbiased and unprejudiced as the camera does not lie.

b. A permanent photographic record of a vast amount of details can be kept.

c. Information can be collected over areas inaccessible to man.

d. Comparative study of an area can be made by successive photo covers.

e. Permits accurate measurement and location of various targets.

f. Permits detailed study of a target with the use of instruments and specialists in any particular

field.

g. Special kinds of equipment can be used to overcome natural difficulties like weather, haze etc.

Very low level sorties using special equipment can be flown to avoid enemy action.

h. Special equipment permits real time displays too.

j. Largest source of tactical and strategic intelligence.

k. Quickest means of obtaining accurate and up to date information.

l. It contains more details than map.

m. It can give complete picture of ground slope including three dimension view.

SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE

General

0633. It is the product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration and interpretation of

information derived form intercepted electromagnetic emissions. It is divided into communications intelligence

(COMINT), electronic intelligence (ELINT) and foreign instrumentation signal intelligence (FISINT).

0634. Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) comes from intercepted communications, radar and telemetry. Traditional

SIGINT has had three sub-disciplines :

a. Communications Intelligence (COMINT). Intercept of foreign communication systems by other

than the intended recipient.

b. Electronic Intelligence (ELINT). Intercept of foreign non-communication electromagnetic

emanations other then nuclear detonations or radio sources.

c. Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence (FISINT). Intercept of equipment parameters and

performance monitoring control systems, telemetry, beacons, command links and fuse arming signals.

With the computer age upon us, SIGINT includes a fourth category: Digital communication signals used to

transmit data between machines.

Analysis of SIGINT

0635. An analysis of SIGINT is given below :

COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE (Comint)

0636. As its name indicates, COMINT is the intelligence obtained by the interception, processing and

analysis of the communications of foreign governments or groups, excluding radio and television broadcasts.

The communications may take a variety of forms--voice, morse code, radio-teletype or facsimile. The

communications may be encrypted or transmitted in the clear.

0637. Many governments also targets the communications between different components of a large number

of governments. On some occasions both components are located within the country, on other occasions at least

one is located outside national boundaries. Communications that may be targeted include those between

government officials, different ministries, a ministry or agency and subordinate units throughout the country and

abroad, arms factories, military units during exercises and operations, police and security forces and their

headquarters.

0638. Another major set of COMINT targets are associated with economic activity (of both the legal and

illegal variety) for example, the communications of multinational corporations and narcotics traffickers. In

1970, the predecessor to the Drug Enforcement Administration informed the NSA that it had a requirement for

any and all COMINT information which reflects illicit traffic in narcotics and dangerous drugs. Specific areas of

interest including organisations and individuals engaged in such activities, the distribution of narcotics, narcotic

cultivation and production centres, efforts to control the traffic in narcotics and all violations of law.

ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE (Elint)

0639. Electronic intercept operations are intended to produce electronic intelligence (ELINT) by intercepting

the non-communication signals of military and civilian hardware, excluding those signals resulting from atomic

detonations. Under NSA project KILTING, all ELINT signals are stored in computerised reference files

containing the most up-to-date technical information about the signals.

0640. The earliest of ELINT targets were World War II air defence radar systems. The objective was to

gather emanations that would allow the identification of the presence and operating characteristics of the radars-

-information that could be used to circumvent or neutralise the radars (through direct attack or electronic

countermeasures) during bombing raids. Information desired included frequencies, signal strengths, pulse

lengths and rates and other specifications. Since that time intelligence, space tracking and ballistic missile early-

warning radars have joined the list of ELINT targets.

SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE (SIGINT)

Capabilities and Advantages :

- Passive activity; just listening.

- Can indicate levels; are they talking more ? Less ?

- Can indicate a change in status or direction.

- Can give clues to intentions.

- Usually reliable data.

Limitations and Disadvantages :

- Requires an active target; can listen only if someone is transmitting.

- Susceptible to deception; fake transmitters, misleading statements.

- Can require considerable time to decode or analyse.

- Requires a large numbers of highly-trained personnel resources, including

linguists and computer programmers and technical analysts.

- Some SIGINT collection effort is expensive to run and maintain.

Foreign Instrumentation Signal Intelligence (FISINT)

0641. A subcategory of SIGINT is Foreign Instrumentation Signal Intelligence (FISINT). Foreign

instrumentation signals are electromagnetic emissions associated with the testing and operational deployment of

aerospace, surface and subsurface systems that have military or civilian applications. Such signals include but

are not limited to, signals from telemetry, beaconing, electronic interrogators, tracking-fusing-aiming/command

systems and video data links.

0642. A subcategory of FISINT is Telemetry Intelligence (TELINT). Telemetry is the set of signals by which

a missile, missile stage or missile warhead sends data about its performance during a test flight back to earth.

The data relates to structural stress, rocket motor thrust, fuel consumption, guidance system performance and the

physical conditions of the ambient environment.

Other Categories

0643. Two further categories of SIGINT were listed by expect such as non-imaging infrared and coherent

light signals. The former involves sensors that can detect the absence/presence and movement of an object via

temperature. The term "coherent light signal" refers to lasers and hence this category includes the interception of

laser communications as well as the emissions from Soviet laser research and development activities.

0644. The case with which signals (whether communications or electronic signals) can be intercepted and

understood depends on three factors; the method of transmission, the frequencies employed and the enciphering

system (or lack of) used to conceal the signals meaning from unauthorised personnel.

0645. The most secure form of transmission is that sent by cables, either land lines or underwater cables.

Communications or other signals transmitted through such cables cannot be snatched out of the air. Interception

of cable traffic has involved physically tapping into the cables or using 'induction' devices that are placed in the

proximity of the cables and maintenance of equipment at the point of access. This might be unobtainable with

respect to hardened and protected internal landlines, the type of landline that carries much high-priority, secret

command, control and communications.

MEASUREMENT AND SIGNATURES INTELLIGENCE (MASINT)

Analysis of MASINT

0646. MASINT is technically derived intelligence that detects, locates, tracks, identifies and describes the

especially signatures of fixed and dynamic target sources. It can provide the analyst with details about a beyond

literal exploitation, providing information on performance and composition. MASINT covers the entire

electromagnetic spectrum. It involves radar, laser, optical, infrared, acoustic, nuclear radiation, radar frequency,

spectrometric, and seismic sensing systems as well as gas, liquid, and solid materials sample and analysis.

0647. Products include seismic reports of nuclear weapons tests, radar signatures of weapon systems and

chemical composition of air and water samples. MASINT has a number of sub-disciplines, including :

a. Acoustic .

b. Electro-optical.

c. Radar.

d. Geophysics or Seismic.

e. Laser.

f. Infrared.

g. Radio Frequency (RF).

h. Effluence and Debris.

j. Nuclear Radiation.

0648. An Analysis of MASINT is shown below :

0649. Radar intelligence (RADINT) is the intelligence obtained from the use of non-imaging radar, similar to

electronic intelligence in that no intercepted communications are involved. However, RADINT does not depend

on the interception of another object's electronic emission. It is the radar which emits electronic signals radio

waves and the deflection of those signals allows for intelligence to be derived. Information that can be obtained

from RADINT includes flight paths, velocity, manoeuvring, trajectory, and angle of descent.

SCIENTIFICS AND TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE

0650. Scientific Technical Intelligence (S&T) is the intelligence that derived from the collection and analysis

of threat and foreign military equipment and associated material for the purpose of preventing technological

surprise, assessing foreign S&T capabilities and developing countermeasures designed to neutralise the

adversary's technological advantages.

0651. This is that intelligence concerning technological developments and the performance and operations

capabilities of foreign material which now or eventually may have a practical application for military purposes.

This types of intelligence contributes significant to fulfilling the intelligence requirements of tactical units.

Typical S&T targets at tactical levels include enemy equipment and facilities. Tactical units must rapidly

evacuate captured equipment and personnel of S&T intelligence units who exploit them in support of tactical

and strategic requirements.

0652. Tactical information and intelligence may result from action taken within any of the categories

previously described. For example, signal intelligence may provide a key element of intelligence that tell the

commander when the enemy will attack. Imagery intelligence may provide the strength of the attacking force.

0653. Human intelligence may provide knowledge of where the enemy will strike. Taken separately or in

isolated increments, it is unlikely that a complete picture of the battlefield can be developed. However, the

integration of these bits of intelligence with other information provides a composite picture that allows the

commander to 'see' the battlefield. The composite picture of the battlefield is the result of intelligence from all

sources.

COUNTER INTELLIGENCE

General

0654. Counter intelligence is those intelligence activities intended to detect, evaluate, counteract or prevent

hostile intelligence collection, subversion, sabotage, terrorism, or assassination conducted by or on behalf of any

country, persons or organization operating to the detriment of the Bangladesh Army. It includes the

identification of the hostile multidiscipline intelligence collection threat; determination of friendly

MEASUREMENT AND SIGNATURES INTELLIGENCE (MASINT)

Capabilities and Advantages :

- Access-sensors can acquire data on hard-to-see target.

- Quantifiable; not very subjective.

- Reliable; not very subjective.

- Provides technical intelligence data on equipment and performance.

- Can assist with treaty compliance inspections and verifications.

- Provides unique signature data across the Electro-magnetic spectrum.

- Provides automate target identification data.

Limitations and Disadvantages :

- Requires personnel with technical abilities to interpret the data accurately.

- Highly technical and specialized.

- Depending on the sub-discipline, it may require activity from the target.

- Difficult to gauge intentions.

- Sensor limitations.

- Most Sensors and MASINT collection programmes are expensive.

- Little in common among MASINT sub-disciplines; this makes it difficult to

develop all-around expertise.

vulnerabilities to that threat and the recommendation and evaluation of security measures. Counter intelligence

supports operational security, rear operations, and tactical deception. This section describes, in general terms the

enemy intelligence threat, tasks which must be performed, and the integration of counter intelligence with the

command's tactical operations.

0655. Counter intelligence support to operational security orients on defeating or degrading an enemy's multi

disciplined intelligence effort. It includes those counter human intelligence, counter imagery intelligence and

counter signal intelligence measures necessary to oppose effectively the collection systems available to the

enemy at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. It also includes counter intelligence analysis performed as

an integral part of the operational security process.

Threat

0656. Intelligence collection and target acquisition are the means by which ground commanders acquire

information on opposing forces. Rapid success in military operations, a basic tenet of enemy doctrine, demands

that commanders have timely information on the terrain, weather, and their opponents.

0657. Any potential adversary will have an excellent intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination

capability. This capability is organic to all echelons from command to unit. He recognizes that in order to make

maximum use of his massed fire power and mobility, their target acquisition capabilities must be characterized

by accuracy and short reaction times. Tactical reconnaissance is conducted to varying depths by specialized

reconnaissance units as well as all other troop units.

0658. Air reconnaissance is a good source of tactical intelligence to any adversary and is undertaken by

aircraft of the frontal aviation. These air craft have visual, photo, infrared, radar and signal intelligence

capabilities. A certain portion of reconnaissance missions are accomplished by pairs of fighter and ground attack

aircraft assigned locate and attack missions. Potential adversaries have extensive intercept capabilities for both

radio and radar. Intercept units are moved forward just behind leading manoeuvre regiments. They have the

capability to intercept all electronic. These ranges are greatly extended when airborne intercept equipment is

used. Information derived from the intercept of 'Clear' traffic is immediately evaluated and exploited.

0659. Their direction finding (DF) capability is equivalent to that for intercept. While information from DF is

evaluated quickly, it is unlikely to provide a sufficiently accurate fix on a moving, tactical target. If a strike is

required, confirmation is most likely accomplished by aerial reconnaissance. Targets within artillery range, such

as forward command and control facilities, are attacked within minutes after DF.

0660. Reconnaissance in depth is carried out by specially trained personnel. Organized into teams, they

operate long forward of the main force and can be expected to infiltrate deep into own division, brigade and unit

rear areas. Their primary mission is to collect information concerning tank, heavy weapons, units in assembly

areas, moving headquarters, technology and communication facilities. Normally, teams are equipped with long

range radios and except in emergencies, probably report by burst transmission on a scheduled basis to minimize

detection.

0661. All tactical formation of the adversaries‘ army have organic tactical ground reconnaissance capabilities.

Mechanized and tank divisions have reconnaissance battalions and companies equipped with tanks and scout

cars and infantry fighting vehicles. Brigades on the march dispatch battalion sized advance guards forward of

the main body. The advance guard sends a company forward, and that company deploys reinforced platoon

strength for reconnaissance purpose, Armour, Engineer and artillery troops all have their reconnaissance

elements which are attached to leading reconnaissance units in the advance. Corps and divisional artillery

brigades have an organic target acquisition capability. Generally, these units have surveillance and weapons

locating radars. They are also capable of sound ranging and flash spotting from the forward line.

0662. Potential adversaries‘ military doctrine stresses attacking opposing forces throughout the depth or their

disposition. They fully appreciate the important role that special forces can play in support the main attack.

These operations consist of a variety of military and paramilitary operations to include partisan warfare,

subversion, sabotage, and terrorism conducted during periods of peace and war. It also includes other operations

of a covert or clandestine nature. The overall objectives are similar regardless of mission category and include :

a. Weakening the military capabilities of the target country.

b. Supporting follow on conventional military operations.

0663. Strategic special warfare missions are controlled by the national intelligence organization. These

missions, conducted in the heartland of the opposing forces, are aimed at reducing the later's ability to continue

fighting and toward breaking the national will to resist. Strategic missions include efforts to intimate and

demoralize the populace, create chaos and disrupt public services and undermine national resistance.

0664. Strategic special warfare missions also may be performed by select regular airborne forces. These

would not be normal air borne missions which generally require coordination with front line operations, but

small, elite airborne groups which operate at great depths behind enemy lines. Their basic objective are to

weaken enemy operational readiness and combat effectiveness. Their missions could include :

a. Neutralization of major opposition headquarters.

b. Destruction of weapons of man destruction.

c. Sabotage to support disruption of communication and key logistics.

0665. Operational special warfare mission in support of the command and crops are carried out under the

control of the commander of a command. Air bourns forces, the clandestine special purpose units, and army

special are employed for:

a. Preparation and security of landing sits for regular airborne forces.

b. Intelligence on the location and strength of enemy forces.

c. Sabotage operations against airfield, railway line, road and rail bridges and commu-nications

system.

d. The use of terror to intimidate the population.

e. Organizations of local guerrilla or partisan groups.

0666. The level I threat includes activities of enemy agents, sabotage by enemy sympathizers, and activates

of terrorist organization. Level II includes diversion, sabotage, and reconnaissance conducted by tactical units

smaller than battalion size. level III includes airborne operations, air assault insertions, and amphibious

operations of battalion size of larger. Counter intelligence provides support in countering all target levels;

however, Counter intelligence is most effective in providing indications and warning regarding level I and level

II threat activities.

Support to Operation Security

0667. The intelligence threat described in the preceding paragraphs means tactical commanders must take

specific action to minimize the enemy's ability to collect against them. Such actions are embodies in the

command's operational security program. This program includes the coordinated application of a variety of

measures and procedures tailored to the unique requirements of each unit, mission, and situation. This requires a

totally integrated effort consisting of actions in three major categories of operational security measures; counter

surveillance, countermeasures, and deception measure.

0668. Counter surveillance measures are those measures routinely taken to protect the true status of friendly

activities and operations from enemy intelligence activities. They include measures which are integrated in

communication, correct electronic maintenance procedures and camouflage and concealment. Such measures

generally are required by regulations, directives or SOP.

0669. Countermeasures are planned, recommended, and selected to overcome specific operations which are

not countered by more routine counter surveillance. Once a friendly vulnerability is identified and determined to

be a risk, an specific counter-measures is developed to preclude exploitation by the enemy. Countermeasures

may include both protective and offensive action. Protective measures include those taken to protect against

hostile collection without directly attacking the collector. Offensive measure includes electronic counter

measures, fire, and manoeuvre directed against the collector. Although countermeasures are always written into

each SOP, specific countermeasures are dependent upon the situation and the mission.

0670. Operational security encompasses every element of the command and requires the involvement of

commanders, staffs, and troops to be effective. In fact, every soldier must take an active part in protecting the

command through operational security. Operational Security is directed and guided by the commander,

coordinated by the operations officer, supported by other staff members, and executed by the soldiers of each

unit.

Counter Intelligence Support to Operational Security

0671. General. Counter intelligence support is a critical element in any effective operational security

program. Counter intelligence functions, performed by the intelligence staff, are integrated with the operational

security functions of the operational staff. An accurate assessment of enemy intelligence capabilities is the

foundation of friendly vulnerability assessments and the development of effective operational security measures.

Identifications and assessment of the hostile intelligence threat are accomplished through a continually updated

data base maintained by the counter intelligence analysis personnel. Included in the operational security data

base are friendly force profile made up of signatures, patterns, and indicator. These show how a unit might

appear through the eyes of the enemy. The friendly force data is crucial to planning operations because it aids in

developing essential element of friendly information (EEFI), operational security measures, accurate appraisal

and effective deception plans.

0672. Profiles. Profiles are comprehensive studies of a unit and its activities to include equipment, doctrine,

SOPs, and so forth. Profiles result from actions, to include the timing of those actions, taken by military units

and individual soldiers. Once compiled, unit profiles provide a picture of the unit as the enemy sees it. Analysis

of a unit's profiles can reveal signatures and patterns about unit procedures and, over time may be used to

determine intentions. Collectively, profiles can be used by the enemy to help predict probable course of action.

0673. Signature. Signatures are unique characteristics of a unit which result from the presence of a unit or

activity on the battlefield. Signatures are detected because various units have different equipment, are of

differing sizes, emit different electronic signals. and have different acoustic, thermal (infrared), and seismic

signature. Detection of individual signatures can be grouped by analysts to show installations, units and

activities.

0674. Patterns. Patterns are stereotyped actions which habitually occur in a given set of circumstance.

Military forces have SOPs for virtually everything they do. Predictable patterns may be developed by

commanders, planners, and operators. Types of patterns are as numerous as there are procedures in military

operations. For example, before every offensive operation the volume of communications increases dramatically

and then drops off equally dramatically just before the attack. Enemy analysts would note this pattern and be

able to predict a unit's intentions for all future offensives.

0675. Indicators. Indicators are pieces of information concerning a military unit and its activities (much like

a piece of puzzle) which allow enemy analysis to make estimates to friendly capabilities, weaknesses, and

intentions. In preparing for a tactical operation, it is virtually impossible for military forces to avoid or conceal

all indicators. In many cases, these activities can be detected by the enemy and used to predict probable courses

of action. Indicators that cannot be eliminated or concealed may be considered as a basis for a deception plan.

Identification and interpretation of specific indicators are critical tasks in intelligence operations weather the

indicator is friendly or enemy. Intelligence people look for indicators, analyze them, and make estimates of

capabilities, vulnerabilities and intentions. These analyses lead to requests for information and planning and

eventually provide d the basis for decisions and orders.

0676. Vulnerability Analysis. Friendly force vulnerabilities are identified through comparison of friendly

indicators and hostile collection capabilities. As an aid to analysis, IPB techniques are applied to friendly force

patterns and signatures so we can see ourselves as viewed by enemy collection systems. For example, the range

and focus of hostile collection means can be plotted on a map and, with inter-visibility overlays, and

determination made of what friendly activities are vulnerable to enemy observation. Further, IPB can be applied

to develop operational security measure recommendations. For example, a map overlap could be constructed to

indicate which routes minimize detection during movement, or which areas would afford concealment and cover

for signature unique equipment.

0677. Protect EEFI. Operational security measures must be systematically developed to protect EEFI from

enemy detection. Generally, there are six options for the decision maker :

a. Apply one or more operational security measures.

b. Accept risk of detection.

c. Use deception.

d. Change the operation enough to eliminate the vulnerability.

e. Any combination of the above.

f. Prohibit the activity (cancel the mission).

Support to Rear Operation

0678. The primary purpose for conducting rear operations is to retain freedom of action to conduct close and

deep operations. The objectives of rear operations are to :

a. Secure the rear areas and facilities.

b. Prevent or minimize interference with command, control and communications.

c. Prevent or minimize disruption of combat support and CSS forward.

d. Provide unimpeded movement of friendly units throughout the rear area.

e. Provide area damage control (ADC) before, during and after hostile actions or natural disaster.

0679. Counter intelligence supports rear operations through a variety of actions designed to defeat or assist in

defeating the enemy threat to our rear areas. Each action is based on the threat posed by enemy agents, elements

and units normally used against the rear. Operating in the enemy rear areas, these units try to prevent effective

and timely employment of reserves. They also serve to generally disrupt enemy offensive and defensive

capabilities.

0680. Counter intelligence support to rear operations includes those functions performed in support of

operational security. It also includes a number of other functions normally not accomplished in support of the

operational security mission. Counter intelligence personnel conduct liaison with local police and intelligence

agencies. both military and civilian, to foster a very gad of cooperation and to obtain information. Generally,

liaison is established in peace and carried over into war. The cooperation obtained from such agencies through

liaison efforts is critical to neutralizing the level I threat.

0681. The counter intelligence analysis personnel creates and maintain black, gray and white lists to permit

rapid identification of key indigenous personnel in rear areas. Persons on black lists are those personnel whose

capture and detention are of prime importance to the Bangladesh Army. They include known or suspected

agents, saboteurs, enemy sympathizers and other who represent a serious threat to rear area security, Gray lists

contain the identities and locations of those personalities whose inclinations and attitudes towards the political

and military objectives of the Bangladesh Army are obscure. Regardless of their political inclinations or

attitudes, personalities may be listed when they are known to possess information or particular skills required by

Bangladesh forces. They also may be individual whose political motivations require further exploration before

they can be of use to Bangladesh Forces. White lists contain the identities and lactations of individuals who have

been identified as being of intelligence or counter intelligence interest.

0682. Counter intelligence identify and assist in neutralizing special warfare teams and cells, and important

priority in rear operations. Information provided by counter intelligence personnel is passed to local police or

military forces. Counter intelligence teams conduct incident investigations of suspected sabotage, subversion

and espionage directed against the rear area. These investigations can lead to the identification and elimination

of perpetrators of hostile actions in the rear area. Pattern analysis of multiple incidents can reveal enemy plans

and intentions. Counter intelligence conduct tactical human intelligence operations to exploit captured personnel

who can identify other hostile agents and saboteurs, pinpoint team locations, or provide other information. Time

constraints generally preclude extensive tactical human intelligence operations, but enemy agents, sympathizers,

and terrorists can often be neutralized.

Support to Deception

0683. Battle field deception includes all actions at tactical level taken to mislead the enemy into actions

which are counter to enemy interests. Based not the command, control and communications recommendation,

the commander selects a deception objective. The operations include manipulating, distorting, or falsifying

information availability\le to the enemy to ensure security of actual plans, operations, or activities. Generally,

deception operations require an high degree of security through the application of effective operational security

and other support to achieve effectiveness. Part of the support provided is counter intelligence. Counter

intelligence supports deceptions with :

a. Analysis of the intelligence threat.

b. Recommendations of deception measures.

c. Support to the security of the deception and the actual operation.

d. Evaluation of the implementation of deception measures.

e. Evaluation of the effectiveness of the deception.

0684. Analysis of the enemy intelligence system is the critical elements of any deception. Analysis is

performed on the information maintained in the hostile intelligence collection data base, which is used for both

operational security and deception; when this analysis is accomplished for operations security purposes, it

focuses on enemy capabilities. When supporting deception, it focuses on enemy intelligence vulnerabilities.

Counter intelligence analysis of the enemy intelligence system determines :

a. The types of collectors, their capabilities and limitations, to which false information must be

presented.

b. The minimum requirements for realism in deception measures.

c. The strengths and weaknesses of enemy intelligence analysis to further determine the amount of

information needed for the enemy to draw appropriate conclusions.

0685 – 0700. Reserved.

CHAPTER - II

SITUATION AND TARGET DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

SECTION - 7

SITUATION DEVELOPMENT STAGE

General

0701. Situation and target development are the processes that provide commanders the intelligence and

targeting data they need to plan in any operation or battle. Both the processes are conducted simultaneously

incorporating Intelligence Preparation of Battlefield (IPB) and the Intelligence Process function. Both are

continuous and are performed by commanders and intelligence staffs at all echelons. Beginning in peacetime,

they become the essence of intelligence production during hostilities.

0702. Situation development enables commanders to see and understand the battlefield in sufficient time and

detail to employ their forces and weapon systems effectively. In situation development, the intelligence staff

uses IPB to produce a description of enemy force disposition on the battlefield in terms of location, size, type,

direction, rate of movement and activity. This portrayal is based on an analysis of intelligence holdings which

are continuously updated through the collection and processing of information. Situation development conforms

to four stages of intelligence process :

a. Direction through Situation Development.

b. Collection Management.

c. Processing and Target Development.

d. Dissemination of Intelligence.

0703. Target development is the process of providing timely and accurate locations of enemy movers,

emitters, shooters and sitters that may impact on current and future operations. Effective target development is

based on situation development and is accomplished throughout the commander‘s area of operations and

interest. It provides commanders the targeting data they need to effectively attack targets with fire, manoeuvre

and Electronic Warfare (EW) means.

0704. Situation and target development represent the essence or final goal of the intelligence production

process at the tactical level. Both are dependant on the collecting, processing and disseminating of information.

This chapter describes how the collection management, processing and dissemination functions are performed

so as to support situation and target development. It focuses on collection management procedures; the collation,

evaluation and interpretation of information and dissemination of the end products to its users.

Mission Analysis

0705. IPB, in addition to being an information processing function, provides a basis for accomplishing

situation and target development. IPB orients the mission planning, collection, processing and dissemination

efforts of situation and target development. Because of its important role, IPB is described first so that the other

functions in this chapter can be better understood.

0706. Mission planning is the initial step in preparing for war or for future operations during war. Mission

planning guides the IPB process by focusing on unit contingency areas. It draws together, in priority, the

information needed to build the IPB data base. Upon receipt of a mission, commander analyse it to determine its

key elements. They complete the analysis based on the analysis of the battlefield area presented by the

intelligence staff and available information provided by other staff members. After completing mission analysis,

commanders restate the mission and issue planning guidance. Planning guidance results in the preparation of

staff estimates. The intelligence estimates along with other staff estimates are presented to commanders for use

in determining what actions must be taken to accomplish the mission. Using these estimates commanders decide

on a course of action and announce their concept of the operation.

0707. The commander‘s guidance and concept of the operation are the basis for action by his staff. From

these and individual analysis of the mission team members determine what Intelligence Electronic Warfare

(IEW) requirements must be satisfied to prepare and execute the mission and build the IPB data base. The staff

mission analysis is the first step in determining planning requirements. Each staff member analyses the

commander‘s restated mission to determine the specific tasks to be performed. They consider the effects of

individual requirements on the planning of their own and other staff sections and subordinate units.

0708. Once the staff has determined its planning requirements, a great deal of information will be required

for the IPB effort and the analysis of the battlefield area. In most cases, the intelligence staff will be responsible

for acquiring all the needed information. Each intelligence staff identifies individual requirements of the

command and identifies the probable sources of the data. They focus planning requirements on answering

questions about the enemy, weather and terrain. Generally, they plan for :

A. ACQUISITION OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE FOR INITIAL COMMAND

AND STAFF PLANNING.

b. Dissemination of intelligence.

c. Acquisition of intelligence during movement.

d. Collection, processing and dissemination of information after deployment.

e. Counter intelligence support before, during and after the operation.

0709. The intelligence staff needs information to satisfy individual planning needs and provide other staff

elements and subordinate units the information they need. Information needed includes composition,

disposition, equipment and effectiveness of enemy forces in the mission area and Terrain, trafficability, ground

and air avenues of approach, barriers, obstacles, line of sight and climatic conditions.

0710. The operation staffs IEW planning requirements are in the areas of targeting, EW, deception and

operational security to support manoeuvre, electronic counter measures (ECM) and rear area operations.

Generally, the operational staff plans for integration of jamming and deception with fire and manoeuvre and

Protection of the combat force during the planning period, movement and after arrival in the area of operations.

0711. In addition to information to support fire and manoeuvre, the operation staff needs information to

support ECM, deception and operational security planning. To support these functions, the intelligence provides

the commander and operational staff information about :

a. Enemy situation.

b. Weather conditions.

c. Terrain.

d. Long-range operational requirements.

e. EW needs and special requirement of the area of interest.

f. Enemy order of battle.

g. Enemy EW capability.

h. Enemy intelligence capability.

j. Reliability of local nationals.

k Enemy vulnerability to deception.

IPB

0712. IPB is a systematic and continuous process of analysing the enemy, weather, and terrain in a specific

geographic area. This approach integrates enemy doctrine with the weather and terrain, the mission and the

specific battlefield environments. IPB helps to systematically determine and evaluate enemy capabilities and

vulnerabilities. The IPB continuous is a process. It concentrates on building the IPB data base prior to hostilities

and outlines its applicability in support of tactical operations. This results in an intelligence estimate and

analysis of the battlefield area which shows probable enemy courses of action and intentions. Mission planning

sets the IPB process in motion.

0713. Graphics are basis to IPB analysis. Most intelligence can be communicated with pictures. Annotated

military maps, multilayered overlays, griddled photomaps, microfilm and large-scale map substitutes all capable

of computer assisted cathode ray tube display are used in the IPB process. These graphics become the basis for

intelligence and operational planning. The analysis of the battlefield area and the intelligence

appreciation/estimate are not replaced by graphics but are merely converted to them where possible. Currency is

maintained through graphics renewal or update.

0714 IPB provides a basis for collection management planning before the battle and guides the effective

employments of collection resource during the battle. The graphic data bases developed and maintained through

IPB coupled with conventional data bases provide a foundation for situation and target developments. They

provide a means for projection significant for predicting enemy intentions. By comparing them with actual

events and activities as they occur, the intelligence staff can provide the commander with timely complete and

accurate intelligence.

IPB Process

0715. Detailed IPB products are prepared at army and division which provide needed products to brigades

and battalions to assist their IPB by compensating for their lack of time and personnel resources. Below brigade,

the IPB process is less formal, producing detailed products only when time and resources permit. IPB orients on

the area of operations, the area of interest and the enemy faced that expected to be operating in those areas.

There are four stages of IPB. These are; define of battlefield environment, describe the battlefield effect,

evaluate the threat and determine the threat courses of action. Templates are vital to the IPB process. Template,

normally drawn to scale, is a graphic illustration of enemy force structure, deployment or capabilities. It

provides a means for seeing the battlefield and a sound basis for command judgements and decisions affecting

resource allocation. It is used as a comparative data base to integrate what we know about the enemy with

specific weather and terrain information. Templates enable us to visualise enemy capabilities and predict likely

courses of action before the battle, and confirm or refute them during combat. Templates also provide a means

for continuous identification and assessment of enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities. Information graphically

displayed on templates can be added, changed or deleted as the situation changes.

0716. The following chart describes the four principal types of templates developed during the IPB process

and explains how and when each should be used :

IPB TEMPLATES

TEMPLATE DESCRIPTION PURPOSE WHEN

PREPARED

(a) (b) (c) (d)

Enemy doctrinal deployment

for various types of operations

without constraints imposed

by weather and terrain.

Composition, formation,

frontages, depths, equipment,

numbers and ratios and high

value targets are types of

information displayed.

Provides the basis for

integrating enemy

doctrine with terrain

and weather doctrine in

processing, information

used to establish

probable location of

unlocated units

Threat

Evaluation

Depicts how the enemy might

deploy and operate within the

constraints imposed by the

weather, terrain and current

strength.

Used to identify critical

enemy activities and

location. Provides a

basis for situation and

target development and

High Value Target

(HVT) analysis.

Threat

Integration

Doctrinal

Situation

(a) (b) (c) (d)

Depicts location where

critical events and activities

are expected to occur and

where HVT will appear in a

particular time.

Used to predict time-

related events within

critical areas. Provides

a basis for collection

operation, predicting

and confirming enemy

intentions and locating

HVT.

Threat

Integration

Depict decision points and

target areas of interest keyed

to significant events and

activities. The intelligence

estimate in graphic form.

Graphically establishes

a decision to time/space

relationship. Used to

prepare commanders to

make tactical decision

related to battlefield

events. Assist the

commander/ staff in

synchronizing the

battle.

Threat

Integration

Function 1: Define the Battlefield Environment

0717. The first function of the IPB process is battlefield area evaluation. When the areas of operation and

interest area applied to the battlefield, the analyst‘s attention is focused on a specific geographical area for

enemy, terrain and weather effects analysis. The limit of the command‘s areas of operation (fire, EW, and

manoeuvre)are prescribed by higher headquarters. There is no limit to a unit‘s area of interest; it is

recommended by the intelligence staff based on Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops and Time available and

approved by the commander. The Dimensions of the areas of operations and interest are in terms of width,

depth, airspace and time.

0718. In addition to Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops and Time available and the commander‘s concept of

the cooperation, the intelligence staff must consider several other factors when recommending the unit‘s area of

interest. Foremost is the security of the command. The area of interest must extend (in an irregular shape and as

far as needed) in all directions to safeguard the command from surprise. The area of interest must also be deep

enough to support planning for future operations.

Function 2: Describe the Battlefield Effect

0719. The second function of the IPB process is terrain and weather analysis. It is also known as analysis of

battlefield environment. This function is focused on the military aspects of the weather and terrain and their

effects on friendly and enemy capabilities to move, shoot, and communicate. Terrain Analysis includes the

following five factors (short title: OCOKA) :

a. Observation and fields of fire.

b. Concealment and cover.

c. Obstacles.

d. Key terrain.

e. Avenues of approach and mobility corridors.

0720. Observation and Fields of Fire. Observation relates to the impact terrain has on the capability of

battlefield systems. In the IPB context, it refers primarily to visual and electronic Line of Sight LOS determined

through (LOS) analysis. Many battlefield systems require LOS to function effectively. These systems include

radios, radars, Electronic Support Measures (ESM) systems, direction finders, jammers, direct fire weapons and

human vision.

Event

Decision

Support

0721. Concealment and Cover. Concealment is protection from observation. Cover is protection from the

effects of fire. Concealment is vital to operational security and deception. Concealment and cover offered by the

terrain to both friendly and enemy forces is determined through IPB.

0722. Obstacles. Obstacles are natural and artificial terrain features that stop, canalise impede or divert

military move. Their direct influence on mobility makes them one of the most important considerations in

terrain analysis.

0723. Key terrain. Key terrain is any feature or area of which, the seizure, retention or control will effort a

marked advantage in the conduct of operations to either combatant. The determination of key terrain is

depended on the echelon of the command, the mission, the enemy and the situation. The commander may

designate certain key terrain as decisive terrain if it will have an extraordinary impact on the mission. To

disseminate terrain as decisive is to recognise that the mission depends on seizing or retaining it.

0724. Avenues of Approach. Avenues of approach are air or ground routes by which a force may reach an

objective or key terrain. They are evaluated in terms of their :

a. Potential to support manoeuvre.

b. Access to the terrain and adjacent avenues.

c. Degree of canalisation.

d. Concealment and cover.

e. Observation and field of fire.

f. Obstacles.

0725. Final Step. The terrain analysis process emphasises the use of graphic to portray the effects of

trafficability and indivisibility on operations. A terrain factor matrix and a series of overlays are prepared to

develop a terrain graphic data base to facilitate threat integration. Several steps are followed to organise and

refine the information needed to accurately analyse a specific piece of terrain. The terrain factor matrix guides

the selection of terrain and weather factor overlays needed to analyze the terrain. Engineer terrain analysis

begins with a detailed review of the terrain data base to identify information gaps. Terrain factor overlays

graphically portray the military aspects of terrain (types and spacing of vegetation, soil, climate conditions and

variations) in the area of operation. The final step of the terrain analysis process selects the avenue of approach

that supports friendly and enemy capabilities to move, shoot, and communicate. It further describes terrain

analysis and its importance to tactical operations.

0726. Weather Analysis. Weather has a significant impact on both friendly and enemy capabilities.

Analysing the weather in details to determine how it affects friendly and enemy capabilities to move, shoot and

communicate is critical to this function of IPB. Because the weather has tremendous effect on terrain. Terrain

and weather analysis are inseparable factors of intelligence.

a. Locating Battery Weather Team and Engineer Terrain Teams work together during much of the

analysis process. The weather teams analyses climatic data to determine the characteristics of weather

in the battlefield area. The terrain team analyse the effects of weather on tactical operations and

integrates climatic and current weather data with terrain analysis. This information is integrated into a

three steps operation known as the weather analysis process. To determine the impact of weather on

terrain and operations. This process incorporates developing as :

(1) Weather data base

(2) A weather factor analysis matrix

(3) Weather factor overlays

b. During peacetime, historic weather conditions for at least five years past are used to determine

significant weather parameters in the area of operations. The weather team focus on specific periods

within each season that may deviate from the seasonal norm. The weather data base is continually

updated and is used as the foundation for analysing the effects of weather on tactical operations.

c. The weather factor analysis matrix helps to determine what weather effects overlays will be

required. It identifies the weather factors that are militarily significant and correlates their effects with

specific intelligence use and tactical applications. As in terrain analysis, maximum use of graphics is

instrumental in analysing the effects of weather on combat operations. Through weather effects

overlays, weather data is converted into graphic displays. Various weather effects will have significant

impact on tactical operations. Cloud cover at low levels will have a significant impact on low level

attack helicopters, close air support aerial visual observation and some aerial surveillance systems.

d. A combined obstacle overlay combines all terrain and weather induced obstacles resulting from

this analysis. It focuses on significant terrain areas. Next, avenues of approach and mobility corridors

(MCs) are identified. Avenues of approach are identified for friendly or enemy forces at the same

echelon and one below and mobility corridors for forces two echelons below. Once the most viable

avenues of approach and mobility corridors have been selected, overlays are prepared depicting each.

Analysis enables the developments of LOS for weapons, communications, target acquisitions,

intelligence collection and Integrating Terrain and Weather, ECM systems for each option.

Function 3: Evaluate the Threat

0727. The third function of the IPB process is threat evaluation. It consists of a detailed study of enemy

forces, their composition and organisation, tactical doctrine, weapons and equipment and supporting battlefield

functional systems. The thrust of this function is to determine enemy capabilities and how they operate as

prescribed by their doctrine and training.

0728. Threat evaluation also includes an evaluation of high value target (HVT) and doctrinal rates of

movement. HVTs and movement rates are revaluated during threat integration within the constraints imposed by

a continuing process as new capabilities to wage war develop and as doctrine change. Threat evaluation follows

a multi step process.

0729. Development of a detailed threat order of battle data base by the processing section is vital to threat

evaluation. A current, accurate and comprehensive data base on potential enemy forces facilitates a thorough

evaluation of their doctrine and capabilities. To develop the threat data base a review of the mission and area of

interest is required. Through this review, identification and dissolution of threat forces significant to the mission

are accomplished. As information about the enemy is assembled, gaps are identified and information

requirements led to the collection management section.

0730. When the threat data base has been developed and evaluated, the intelligence staff and the processing

section must determine what doctrinal templates are required. Determining which enemy echelons should be the

focal point of attraction is the first step. Generally the 'one up and two down' formula is used so that attention is

concentrated on those enemy echelons that pose the greatest threat.

0731. Requirements for doctrinal templates of battlefield function systems are also identified. Those

battlefield functional system which tell the most about enemy operations are template. This matrix allows rapid

analysis of the relationship between battle systems and the operations supported by those systems. It helps the

analyst to conduct Target Value Analysis (TVA) and determine additional needs and requirements.

0732. Doctrinal templates convert enemy order of battle factors into graphic portrayals. They are models of

how the enemy might look according to doctrine and training it not constrained by the weather and terrain. They

portray various echelons and types of units for various capabilities and schemes of manoeuvre. They also

graphically portray the composition and disposition, frontages and depth, spacing and signatures of these

echelons and units. The final step in determining doctrinal template needs to compare currents requirements to

previously prepared templates. If additional templates are needed, the analyst must request for it or prepare new

one.

0733. Doctrinal templates may include a portrayal of higher echelon supporting elements or elements

normally deployed with the unit being templated. They may be further refined into doctrinal templated subsets.

These subsets might include battlefield functional systems or weapons and equipment deployments. Such

templates, especially those depicting weapons and equipment deployments, are very useful in identifying types

of enemy units and specific formations. Subsets may be equally useful in determining enemy intentions.

Function 4: Determine Threat Course of Action

0734. General. The nucleus of the IPB process is the integration of enemy doctrine with weather and terrain

data. The objective of threat integration is to determine how the enemy will fight as influenced by weather and

terrain. Threat integration, sequential process is accomplished through the development of situation, event and

decision support templates.

0735. Situation Template. A situation template depicts enemy dispositions for a specific instant in time.

Thus, several situation templates or situation ‗snapshots‘ may be created to show how the enemy may change

his disposition during the conduct of an operation.

0736. Event Template. Once the analyst has hypothesized the probable enemy course of action, he creates

an event template to test his hypothesis. The event template provides the information needed to project what

events will most likely have to occur related to enemy courses of action. As an enemy force moves along a

mobility corridor, it will be required to do certain things at certain time appliances which are dictated by terrain,

weather and tactics. Based on this, the analyst selects named areas of interest (NAI) where he expects to see

certain activities or events of which have tactical significance. The analyst projects a sequence and timing of

events based on an analysis of the relationship of NAI to one another and to specific available courses of

actions. Activity or the lack there of confirms or denies the enemy course of action.

0737. Named Area of Interest (NAI). NAI are points or areas along a particular avenue of approach or

mobility corridor when activity or lack of it, will help to confirm or deny a particular enemy course of action.

NAI are only plotted on the event template. Activity in NAI-1 would indicate whether mobility corridor alpha or

bravo was being adopted as the route of advance. Forward movement of enemy bridging elements as the force

approached a destroyed bridge at NAI-5 would be an indication that a river crossing would be attempted rather

than a move to NAI-6 where river crossing would be less difficult. Other NAI in the example represent

intermediate points for collection planning purposes or tracking for target development purposes.

0738. Decision Support Template (DST). The matrix enables the analyst to more precisely correlate what

event or activity is expected within the geographical location and at what time the event is expected to take

place. The event analysis matrix is normally prepared at divisions and above. This capability, along with

doctrinal and situation templates provides the basis for critical node or HVT analysis. The estimated time

between NAIs within a mobility corridor are derived by determining the effects of terrain and normally seasonal

conditions (derived from earlier functions) on doctrinal rates of advance (opposed or unopposed, as

appropriate). The event template and event analysis matrix allow for the initiation of precise collection

requirements, maximising the use of limited collection assets against the vast array of potential targets on the

future battlefield. By knowing in advance what the enemy can do and comparing it with what he is doing, the

analyst has the basis for predicting what the enemy intends to do next. Such information provides the basis for

queering intelligence collection and constructing DSTs.

0739 – 0800. Reserved.

SECTION - 8

COLLECTION MANAGEMENT STAGE

General

0801. The collection management process is an activity that acts and reacts to Collection Requests and

Requests for Information. The purpose of collection management is to identify and satisfy a valid need for

intelligence/information required by a decision maker. The process, while somewhat complicated, identifies

priorities for collection assets. It also allows for the combining of similar requests from different agencies and

organisations into a single collection mission and ensures collection requirements do not duplicate information

already available.

0802. Perhaps the most important person in the collection management process from the intelligence analysis

perspective is the Collection Manager (CM). This is a person who knows what systems are available and best

suited to meet the needs of the analyst. Even more important, the CM knows how to submit Collection Requests

(CRs) in the proper format. As the central figure of the process, the CM coordinates and facilitates the activities

of two cyclic, mutually supporting functions :

a. Collection Requirement Management (CRM).

b. Collection Operations Management (COM).

0803. Analysts responsible for producing and disseminating intelligence products are an integral part of

CRM. Production organisations like the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence organises inter service

oriented production play a vital role in identifying gaps in intelligence data and in justifying collection

requirements. Their all-source intelligence production organisation determines if data already available can

satisfy Requests for Information or if a new collection requirement exists.

0804. Collection management is the timely, efficient process of formulating detailed collection requirements

and tasking collecting agencies for required information. The overriding purpose of collection management is to

use the limited resources available to answer the commander‘s Essential Elements of Information (EEI), Other

Information Requirements (OIR). The intelligence staff is the principal CM and is assisted by other CMs in the

formation intelligence. Units‘ collection managers in the intelligence section receive approved EEI and

Information Requirement (IR) from the intelligence staff. They place each requirement in priority order and

based on commanders‘ guidance, prepare collection plan how to satisfy each. Specifically they :

a. Assess collection and reporting implications of each new requirement and plan collection

operation.

b. Develop multidiscipline tasking that exploits the capabilities of intelligence resources, reflects

established priorities and detects enemy deception attempts.

c. Identify and task collection units or agencies.

d Maintain a constant awareness of the agencies.

e. Maintain a constant awareness of the operational status of collection resources.

f. Evaluate requirements satisfaction, provide requester feedback and adjust collection plans.

0805. Specific collection planning steps and considerations that optimise collection results include :

a. Checking with the collated information first to see if a request for intelligence information can be

answered with data already available.

b. Keeping currency with the event template and the changing terrain, weather and enemy situation

data available to the collation staff.

c. Considering collector status, capabilities and limitations for each situation.

d. Maximising multi-disciplined operations and emphasising cueing, expansion and verification of

information.

e. Providing continuity of operations.

f. Ensuring that collection units or agencies are given specific orders and requests.

g. Asking higher headquarters for information and verifications.

h. Ensuring that collection requirements are assigned priorities and are current.

j. Ensuring that timely feedback on request status is provided.

Collection Plan

0806. The CRM process begins with a collection plan. It addresses EEIs or OIRs. EEIs and OIRs are

basically the same in that they identify what a commander needs to accomplish i.e. a given mission and assigned

operational tasks. In CRM, the analysts will receive Requests For Information (RFIs) from subordinate or lateral

organisations and either answer them from available data or identify an intelligence gap. When data is lacking,

the analyst working with the CM can validate intelligence CR, determining which asset resources will best

satisfy a request.

0807. The collection plan is a dynamic tool used to coordinate and integrate the efforts of all collection units

and agencies. Since the collection effort involves continuous planning, an entirely new collection plan is seldom

prepared except when a unit first enters combat or enters a news operation phase. The collection plan is

continually revised as required. In effect, it is a state where new entries are written and outdated entries are

removed.

0808. Because information requirements are more complex at higher echelons, the collection plan is normally

more extensive and formal at these levels. At any level, however, collection planning is essentially a mental

process and the collection plan, regardless of the format being used, is merely an aid. It is not a substitute for

thinking and is maintained only to the extent that it assists in planning and supervising the collection effort and

maintaining continuity between shifts in the command post.

0809. Of the seven major intelligence collection disciplines, five come under the collection management

process: Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT),

Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT) and Counter Intelligence only Open Source Intelligence

(OSINT) and Scientific and Technical Intelligence (S&T) is not 'managed' since everyone in theory can 'collect'

data from unclassified publications and data banks.

Collection Management Process

0810. Each collection effort begins by processing Information Requirement IR. These requirements may take

many forms and are generated by many sources: The commander‘s EEI and OIR as identified by the intelligence

staff, targeting needs of the operational staff, tasking from higher echelons and RFI from subordinate and

adjacent commands. At all echelons, most of IRs requirements are based on information needs associated with

Named Area Interest (NAI) and Target Area Interest (TAI) developed through IPB. Regardless of their origin,

the CM transforms them into specific collection requirements. This transformation must be performed as

quickly as possible while ensuring optimum employment of the limited resource available. Collection

management cycle is shown below :

Figure 8.1 : Collection Cycle.

THE COLLECTION MANAGEMENT CYCLE

RECEIVE

AND

ANALYSE

REQUIREMENTS

DETERMINE

RESOURCE

AVAILABILITY

AND

CAPABILITY

TASK

COLLECTION

RESOURCES

EVALUATE

REPORTING

UPDATE

COLLECTION

PLANNING

Receipt and Analysis Step

0811. There are steps in receiving and analysing requirement. These steps are shown in a chart below and are

discussed in subsequent paragraphs :

Figure 8.2 : Receipt and Analysis Step.

Receive Requirements

0812. When any requirement is received in the collection management section it is first logged in the shift

journal and identified by assignment of a control number. Requests and tasks from elements outside the

headquarters are identified by the control number assigned by the originating headquarters.

0813. Next, the validity of the requirement is determined. A requirement generated outside the command is

generally accepted as valid. Requirements from the command are checked to ensure that each merits

commitment of collection and processing resources. A requirement is then sent to the processing section of the

command where an attempt is made to answer it immediately. This step is important. If the information is

readily available the processing section provides an immediate answer through the collection management to the

requester. This reduces the workload of the processing section and collection management section and reduces

requirements for collection resources. The processing section checks each requirement to see if the information

is readily available in data bases. If the information is not in the data bases, collection subsystems are checked.

The key is knowing what recently completed collection actions have the potential for answering the

requirement. Only after available information has been researched should a requirement be validated for new

collection action.

Determine Indicators

0814. A necessary step in directing the collection effort is to determine those enemy activities or

characteristics of the battlefield area which answer the IR. This procedure is called determination of indicators

and is a function of the processing section assisted by other command post elements. An indicator is any

positive or negative evidence of enemy activity or any characteristic of the battlefield area that points toward

enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities or intentions. The ability to read indicators (including recognition of enemy

deception indicators) may contribute to the success of friendly operations, since an analysis of all available

indicators will be the basis for recommendations to the commander for a specific course of action. A thorough

knowledge of the enemy, the characteristics of the battlefield, and the general capabilities of collection assets is

required to develop indicators. Particularly valuable is a detailed knowledge of :

a. The enemy organisation, equipment and doctrine.

b. The personalities of major enemy commanders when possible.

c. The past performance of enemy units.

d. Terrain and weather factors.

e. The event template for current operation.

0815. Indicators have certain characteristics which are considered during the selection process. By

considering these characteristics, the best possible indicators can be derived. The determination of indicators is

based on those characteristics which reflect :

RECEIPT AND ANALYSIS STEP

RECEIVE

REQUIREMENTS

DETERMINE

INDICATORS

DETERMINE

SPECIFIC INFORMATION

REQUIREMENTS

DETERMINE REPORTING

REQUIREMENTS

a. Normal doctrinal activity or disposition.

b. Activity required for a particular course of action.

c. Actions within enemy capabilities and limitations.

d. The characteristics of enemy commanders.

e. Possible or practicable operation.

f. Collection characteristics.

0816. Event templates are used to determine indicators. They allow the correlation of a particular event or

activity with probable enemy courses of action. Additionally, they are used to determine when and where that

activity should occur. By determining what events or activities must occur for an enemy to follow a particular

course of action, attention is focused on the indicators associated with those events or activities. Event templates

help to decide :

a. Where to look ?

b. When to look ?

c. What to look for ?

After determining indicator for each requirement, the processing section develops specific information

requirements (SIR) for each indicator.

Determine Specific Information Requirements

0817. Indicators and target characteristic are analysed to determine SIRs. These are the basic questions that

need to be answered to confirm or deny the existence of an indicator. For example, as an indicator or possible

enemy intentions, the location of a particular enemy air defence element is needed. The SIR in this case would

be a question asking whether or not there is any air defence element at that location. However, such a

requirement may be only one part of a broader requirement.

0818. The accurate determination of indicators and specific IR is essential for effective collection

management. Knowing where, when and what to look for helps in selecting what to look with. This in turn

maximises the use of limited collection assets against a vast array of collection targets. After indicators and

specific information requirement have been prepared, the processing section passes them to the collection

management section for collection action.

0819. After being validated by the processing section and returned to the collection management section, new

requirements are compared against others in the active collection requirements file. The intent is to identify

duplication. If the requirement is a duplicate one, the requester‘s address and other specific needs are noted on

the original requirement. When the requirement is answered, each addressee is provided with the information

needed.

0820. If a requirement is not a duplicate one, the copy is filed in the collection file as a control measure and

for use in disseminating collected and processed information. The next step is to evaluate each requirement

based on its time sensitivity. The evaluation is made based on the time required to :

a. Process the request.

b. Assign it to a collection unit or agency.

c. Collect and report the information.

d. Disseminate the resulting intelligence in time to meet the needs of the requester.

0821. The next step is to assign a priority to each requirement. The commander‘s EEIs are always the highest

priority collection requirements which also include requests for information and tasks from higher headquarters.

These are evaluated based on standing operating procedures and guidance. Requests and requirements from

outside the headquarters generally carry a priority assigned by the originators. These priorities are evaluated in

light of current collection actions and integrated with existing priorities and appropriate action. The primary

basis for determining the priority of any requirement is its criticality to friendly mission accomplishment and the

time the information is needed or will no longer be of value. Priorities must be passed to collection agencies to

ensure that they collect what is needed, rather than that which is easy. Requirements are listed on the collection

plan by priority and reporting requirements are then determined for each.

Determine Reporting Requirements

0822. Reporting requirements specify when, where, and in what detail information is to be reported.

Reporting requirements are developed in terms that are understandable by collection units or agencies. The

purpose is to provide the collection agency with specific collection and reporting requirements which ensure that

the right data is collected and report promptly to the appropriate end user.

0823. Tactical information is reported to the requester or user as soon as it is collected using the most direct

means available. When developing reporting requirements for tactical information, the first task is to identify to

which recipients collection units should report. Secondly, a determination is made as to what reporting

requirements are necessary for reporting tactical information for intelligence processing purpose. This may

involve a different level of detail. Usually, reporting tactical information should follow standing operating

procedures.

0824. Reporting requirements must include the identity of all units and headquarters requiring the

information. Commanders who do not receive the intelligence they need at the specific time may miss a fleeting

opportunity to catch the enemy at a disadvantage. Once determined, information and reporting requirements

influence the selection of specific collection units and agencies.

Determine Resources Capability and Availability

0825. Capability. Asset capabilities must be known by the CM. These include factors such as frequency

ranges for electronic support measures (ESM) systems, other system ranges, aircraft mission duration, mobility,

linguistic capabilities and other similar factors. This knowledge is used to determine which asset is capable of

collecting information that will answer specific information requirements. Human intelligence resource

capabilities must be obtained from the parent organisation.

0826. Availability. For organic agencies the CM needs to know the collection capability and the percentage

of that capability available at a given time. For higher echelon resources, it is necessary to know the number of

resources allocated and the approximate availability.

0827. Selection. Once the available resources have been identified by unit and type, potential units are

selected for each IR. This selection is made by comparing each available unit‘s resources against the CR, based

on five critical selection factors :

a. Range.

b. Timeliness.

c. Technical characteristics.

d. Environment (terrain and weather).

e. Enemy.

The following chart defines sources and agencies and shows what units and activities fit into each category :

SOURCES AND AGENCIES

SOURCES AGENCIES

A source is a person, system, or activity from

which information is originally obtained. Source

may or may not be under friendly control.

Agency is any individual or organisation

which exploits a source to collect and / or

process information.

COMMON SOURCES COMMON AGENCIES

(a) (b) (c) (d)

Captured enemy

documents and material

Recovered military

persons

Displaced persons

Lower and adjacent

commands

Military

Police

Psychological

Operation

Units

Enemy electromagnetic

emissions

Enemy activities

Local residents

National agencies

Shell and missile

fragments

Nuclear bursts

Refugees Civil Affairs Units Air Defence

units

Contaminated areas Sounds Chemical units Combat

support units

(a) (b) (c) (d)

Radioactive material

reports

Imagery

Craters

Engineer units

Terrain teams

Combat

service

support unit

Weather forecast Odors

Duds

Ground Surveillance

Radar (GSR)

Weather teams

Counter

Intelligence

Teams

Interrogation

Teams

Field

Intelligence

Units

Maps Artillery

Civilian agencies Enemy Prisoner of

War

Troops

Reconnaissance Troops

Support Company

Patrols

0828. Relationship between Capabilities and Requirement. A system‘s capability is limited by its range.

Range also, however, may not be the determining factor. A GSR, for example may be within range of target but

not able to detect the target because of an interruption by weather or terrain. In some cases, a system‘s range

may be flexible, depending on its height above the ground or be limited by the technical design of the intended

target. Range may limit some HUMINT agencies such as patrols or reconnaissance troops. The following

illustration shows the correlations between specific information requirements and systems availability and

capability :

Figure 8.3 : Capability Requirement Correlation.

Time Line

0829. System timeliness is defined as the period beginning when an IR is received and ending when the

information is delivered to the requester. System timelines in the sum of times from T to T6. Times required to

complete each of the events shown in the graph should be calculated or estimated for each available system

based on the tactical situation and the local standing operating procedure. Times will vary, depending on

mission priority assigned, specific system availability for the collection requirement and related information

processing and dissemination means. The events shown in the following graph depict the general timeliness

sequence that must be considered during any system capability assessment :

Figure 8.4 : Event Time Line Sequence.

T4

System

selection

Request

Mission

Mission Preparation

Collection Operation

Processing

Analysis

T T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6

RECEIPT OF

INFORMATION

REQUEST

TIME OF

COLLECTION

REQUESTED

INFORMATION

DELIVERED

SYSTEM TIMELINESS= T+T1+T2+----+T6

SPECIFIC

INFORMATION

REQUIREMENT

SYSTEM AVAILABILITY AND

CAPABILITY ELEMENTS lo

cate

wh

ere

iden

tify

wh

en

sear

ch

typ

e

mo

del

freq

uen

cy

spee

d

alti

tud

e

bo

re

sig

ht

loca

l

len

gth

EC

M

RANGE TO TARGET RANGE OF PLATFORM

OR COLLECTOR

TIME AVAILABLE TIMELINESS OF

RESPONSE

CHARACTERISTICS

OF THE TARGET

CHARACTERISTICS

OF THE COLLECTOR

LOCAL WEATHER WEATHER

LIMITATIONS

ENEMY THREAT THREAT TO

THE COLLECTOR

TERRAIN TERRAIN INFLUENCE

ON COLLECTOR

SELECTED RESOURCES

0830. Timeline is also affected by dependence on communications not included as part of the collection

system. Tasking and reporting must flow over communications links that are highly vulnerable to enemy action,

limited by range, and difficult to maintain during rapid displacement. Although the agency selected may be

perfectly capable of acquiring the information needed, reporting may be delayed by communications problems.

Select Collection Resources

0831. After availability and capabilities are determined, units and agencies are selected and tasked to acquire

and report information. During this process all units are considered for tasking against every requirement.

Capable assets are selected by a process of elimination. Various procedures may be used to select the unit to

collect specific information. One procedure is to use a selection worksheet re-prepared in a format similar to the

one in the following illustration :

ASSET SELECTION WORKSHEET

Formation :

Unit :

DTG :

Collection Manager :

Target Range :

Specific information requirement :

Time Required :

Characteristics :

ASSETS

Capability Factors Environmental Factors

Capable Remarks Range

Time-

liness

Character-

istices

Wea-

ther Threat Terrain

+ + + + + + +

+ + + + + + +

ASSETS SELECTED :

0832. In many case the worksheet may be pre-printed with current resources listed. It is used to consider the

major factor determining the capability of an asset to satisfy specific information requirements. The CM begins

the unit and agency selection process by listing all available units and resources along the left-hand column of

the worksheet. Next, the specific IR and its key elements are entered on the top of the form. As each asset or

factor combination is considered, a mark is entered on the unit selection worksheet to identify the capability of

that asset against that factor. One of three marked used :

a. + = fully capable

b. 0 = Marginally capable

c. - = Incapable

0833. A single dash under any factor eliminates that asset from consideration. Often the experienced CM can

readily identify one or more asset or factor combinations that would result in an incapable rating. This

constitutes of considerable saving of time, since a large percentage of the incapable assets can be eliminated by

a quick inspection of the asset or factor combinations. When there is doubt about the capability of an asset, refer

to the appropriate documents.

0834. Enemy capabilities are considered during the system selection process. In many cases, enemy action

will restrict the use of, or reduce the effectiveness of a particular system. Weather plays a particularly important

role in the selection process. Weather can affect both capability of system to collect data and the exploitation of

the date collected. Terrain also influences the selection of systems.

0835. All outstanding intelligence requirements and the tactical situation are considered in collection

planning. However, certain collection factors must be considered before tasking orders are sent. These factors

include resource integration, cueing of one system by another to build the required data package, and the

selection of a proper resources mix and redundancy to increase the probability of completing the collection

mission successfully while defeating enemy deception attempts.

0836. Employing a mix of systems not only increases the probability of collection but also provides more

complete information. Employing a mix of systems is always desirable if the situation and available resources

permit it. Mixing systems also uncovers deception attempts by revealing discrepancies in information reported

by different collectors.

0837. An agency must be physically capable of providing the desired information in a timely manner. Within

the limits imposed by other considerations, the collection workload is balanced among formation intelligence

units and other units. Balance, however, is a very minor consideration when compared with the importance of

other factors.

Task Collection Resources

0838. Following agency selection, IR tasking is prepared. IR tasking is directed towards a unit or agency

rather than a specific asset. However, because of the completed collection planning process described above, the

CM is able to direct tasking to a unit with assets capable of collecting the information. The purpose of IR

tasking is to provide the selected unit with a specific requirement, but not with specific instructions for carrying

out the mission.

Requests for Intelligence Information (RII)

0839. RIIs are generated by a subordinate command to obtain intelligence or information collection support

for needs that exceed organic capabilities. RFI are prepared using the RII or a similar narrative format. Requests

received that exceed organic requirements are always consolidated and forwarded to the next higher echelon as

RII. A request reaching corps is at the highest echelon of tactical RII processing. Regardless of the echelon

originating the request or requirements tasking, the tasking is prepared to indicate the degree of urgency and the

type of request being made. Requests are assigned priorities depending on criticality and the timeline specified

by the requester.

0840. Division and brigade intelligence requirements tasking is directed toward division field intelligence

unit commanders and commanders of other elements capable of collecting the information. Priorities are

assigned to each IR tasking based on those previously established. When new intelligence requirements‘ tasking

is generated in an ongoing operation, high priority requirements may pre-empt lower-priority mission previously

tasked. Besides tasking directed to subordinates request may be sent to higher or adjacent commands. ICR,

which exceed the capabilities of organic assets, are prepared as specific requests for information using the RII.

Requests may include information concerning adjacent areas of interest, the command‘s own area of interest at

ranges beyond the capabilities of organic resources, or other information not obtainable by the command.

Tasking Documents

0841. Tasking documents are used to levy IR on the various agencies. In the case of organic systems, this

involves orders to units in accordance with command policy and SOP. As a general rule, intelligence

requirements tasking at both corps and division is done through either fragmentary orders, the intelligence annex

to the operational order SOP.

0842. The intelligence annex is standardised Instructions on how to prepare the intelligence annex are

contained in JSSDM-2003. Paragraph 3 of the intelligence annex, intelligence acquisition tasks, implements the

collection plan. It contains a complete list of current orders and RII. Except for collection orders which are a

part of the unit SOP, previously issued tasking not repeated in the intelligence annex are automatically

cancelled. When intelligence orders and requests are lengthy, they may be placed in an appendix to the

intelligence annex. The purpose of the intelligence annex is to :

a. Issue instructions to subordinate commander and requests to higher headquarters to collect

information before or during the initial phase of an operation.

b. Provide intelligence orders or guidance, which varies from SOP, for handling of PWs, refugees,

captured documents and materiel during the documents and materiel during the operation, and NAI

particularly important to the issuing headquarters.

c. Confirm the orders and requests for information that have been made in fragmentary form and

that are still current at the time the annex is issued.

d. Preserve brevity, clarity, and simplicity in the body of the order.

e. Amplify an order when information is limited application to the entire command or is primarily

technical in nature.

f. Disseminate information and intelligence at the start of an operation and when there is a major

change in mission.

0843. Fragmentary Order is used most frequently because IR continually changes. Operation order has a

prescribed format, but Fragmentary Orders do not. Those elements found in a complete order are omitted when

they have no changed, are not essential, or are unavailable or incomplete at the time of issue.

Tasking Flow

0844. Division is the point where national, departmental, joint, multination and tactical levels are integrated.

Requests beyond the capability of corps division systems are passed by the collection manager to Army

Headquarters, national level, or other services for action. Conversely, national and other services task division

systems through Army Headquarters. The CM incorporates these requirements into collection planning as other

requirements that must be answered. Regardless of the echelon originating requirements tasking, the tasking is

prepared according to a number of general considerations. Requests are normally categorised by degree of

urgency and type. The degree of urgency determines the time constraints placed on the request. Requests are

assigned a priority depending on criticality and how soon the information must reach the requester. RFI

forwarded to national systems should specifically state the time the information is required by the user.

Reconnaissance and Surveillance

0845. Surveillance is the systematic observation of aerospace, surface or subsurface area, place persons or

this by visual aerial, electronic photographic or other means. Surveillance is normally used to gain information

on the subject over a long period of time to note any changes that may take place. Because of the

interrelationship reconnaissance and surveillance, the same assets used to execute reconnaissance missions may

also be used for surveillance tasks.

0846. Reconnaissance is undertaken to obtain by visual observation or other detection method, information

about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy or to obtain data concerning the

meteorological, hydrographical or geographic characteristics of a particular area. Reconnaissance is a directed

effort to obtain information on a subject at a particular time.

0847. As noted above, surveillance mission are characterised by systematic, although not necessarily routine

or constant, watch of persons, places or thing by human intelligence or resources. Surveillance missions are

usually pre-planned and are particularly suited to :

a. Cover large areas rapidly and repetitively.

b. Minimise risk to the collector.

c. Observe or detect change on the enemy side of the forward areas.

d. Keep other collectors stand by for more detailed coverage.

0848. Planning for surveillance operations is conducted after determining the general mission of the tactical

force. Surveillance mission are often developed as a joint effort involving all of the intelligence organisations

having an interest in the same area of operations. This is due to the limited availability of surveillance systems

and the large number of overlapping requests that could be generated in a joint or combined operations.

0849 A reconnaissance mission seeks to obtain information by visual or other detection means and is

characterised by limitations of coverage to one or more specific target areas at a particular time without the

requirement for systematic coverage. Reconnaissance missions are conducted by HUMINT, IMINT and

SIGINT resources and are designed to :

a. Collect specific, detailed information at a particular location and time.

b. Support current or planned operations.

Evaluate Reporting

0850. Collection management does not end with the issuance of orders and requests. Steps are taken to ensure

that orders and requests are received by the collection agencies and that they are clearly understood. Collected

and processing section reports are monitored through out the collection process to ensure that intelligence and

information are reporting the right user in a timely manner. Reporting are selectively extracted for sampling and

are reviewed for :

a. Timeliness. The time the event took place compared to the time the event was reported. This

comparison reveals delays and possible problems with the reporting of collected information.

b. Format. Reports are checked to see if they contain the proper addresses and data elements.

c. Responsiveness. Reports are checked to see if the information being reported satisfies the

commander‘s priority information requirement. The following illustration shows the report evaluation

process.

Figure 8.5 : Report Evaluation Process.

Update Collection Plan

0851. An important aspect of the collection management process is the cancellation of IR tasking and the

updating of the collection plan. The CM must always be able to cancel requirements to make room for new high

priority tasks in response to the commander‘s operational needs. For example, if an armoured division

commander is moving north and suddenly sees an opportunity for a flanking manoeuvre to the west, collection

management must have the flexibility to provide responsive support.

0852. When requested information is reported back to the collation management section, it must be matched

with the collection requirement it satisfies. The collection management effort is only effective if it can match

incoming information with CR. The incoming information may not come from the collector that was tasked and

may, by coincidence, partially satisfy another requirement. If so, the old CR, which is now broader in scope than

necessary must be rewritten to fill the specific information gap.

0853. Collection agencies must be notified of modifications to CR. The modified requirement may also

require a new priority and an adjustment to its time specification. Each time the requirements is modified or

satisfied, the collection plan is updated. Updating the collection plan is a continuous process requiring close

attention. It is updated upon :

a. Fulfilment of Priority Information Requirement (PIR) and IR.

b. Receipt of new PIR and IR.

c. Modification of existing PIR and IR.

d. Changes in enemy, weather or terrain which dictates a change in tasking.

0854. The processing section determines when PIR and IR have been satisfied. When it is determined that a

requirement has been satisfied the collection management section is notified immediately. Satisfied

requirements are removed from the collection plan and collection actions against those requirements cancelled.

This frees tasked resources for other collection mission. Fulfilled PIR and IR also are compared with the

collection planed to determine unsatisfied requirements. Unsatisfied EEI and OIR, related indicators and SIR are

reviewed to determine if :

SELECTIVELY

EXTRACT COLLECTOR REPORT FOR EVALUATION

REVIEW REPORTS FOR

TIMELINESS RESPONSIVENESS

AND FORMAT

REVIEW PROCESSING

SECTION NOTATION OF SOURCE RELIABILITY AND

INFORMATION ACCURACY

REVIEW REPORTS FOR PRIORITY INFORMATION AND

INFORMATION

REQUIREMENT SATISFACTION

RESULTS: REPORTING IS EVALUATED FOR RESPONSIVENESS,

TIMELINESS AND FOR SATISFACTION OF IR.

a. The IR is still valid.

b. Further tasking necessary to fulfil the requirement.

0855. Fulfilled and unsatisfied requirement no longer applicable are deleted from the collection plan. Often

during the analysis process, the processing section identifies void in the intelligence data base. The CM is

notified that adjustments are needed to the collection plan. When notified of a void in the collection plan, steps

are taken to update the collection plan and initiate the appropriate collection action. Collected information is

reported to the collection management section. As incoming reports are received they are noted on the collection

plan and forwarded to the processing section for processing. During information processing, data to support

situation developments are obtained.

0856 – 0900. Reserved.

SECTION - 9

PROCESSING AND TARGET DEVELOPMENT STAGE

PROCESSING

General

0901. In the situation development process, intelligence is developed in response to the commander‘s

information and operational needs. It is then evaluated and integrated into an all-sources product to provide a

continuing estimate of enemy intentions. Through process, situation development provides all sources

intelligence for tactical decisions. Processing is the transformation of information into intelligence and targeting

data. The objective of information processing is to :

a. Answer the commander‘s requirements regarding enemy movers, emitters, shooters, sitters,

capabilities, vulnerabilities, probable courses of action, intentions, terrain and weather in the battlefield

area.

b. Develop the targeting data required for effective attack of mover, emitter, shooter and sitter

targets.

Intelligence Data Base

0902. The intelligence data base provides the basic information required in the situation development

process. The data base is created for potential contingency area before hostilities. It is a combination of what we

think we must know, what we know and what we don‘t know about the enemy, weather and terrain It :

a. Is established and maintained by the processing section.

b. Focuses on specific area.

c. Contains information on enemy, weather, terrain, sociology, politics, training, economics,

psychology and other factors.

0903. The following matrix depicts data base information requirements by echelon. The intelligence data

base is created by accomplishing a thorough, in-depth IPB analysis. Existing order of battle to include technical

data is used to create the initial data base. After hostilities begin, the data base is maintained and refined to

reflect all pertinent knowledge of the enemy, weather and terrain in the friendly unit‘s area of interest.

0904. The intelligence data base must be functionally organised for the intelligence production process to be

successful. Organising the data base is done by separating information either manually or by automation into

appropriate files. These files should consist of the intelligence journal, order of battle data, IPB products and

situation map (SITMAP). The number of files maintained should be determined by time and resources.

Available elements of the data base are shown in the following illustration :

DATA BASE ELEMENTS

INTELLIGENCE

JOURNAL

WEATHER

ORDER OF

BATTLE DATA

TECHNICAL

DATA

DATA BASE

IPB

PRODUCTS

INTSUM

COORDINATE

REGISTER

SITMAP AND

OVERLAY

TERRAIN

Figure 9.1 : Data Base Elements.

DATA BASE NEEDS BY ECHELON

SERIAL CATEGORY OF INTELLIGENCE BN BDE DIV ARMY JFHQ

1. Identification,

organisation,

weapons,

equipment,

location, tactical

deployment,

movement and

strength of --

Companies x x

Battalions x x x

Brigades x x x x x

Divisions x x x x

Corps x x x

Command/Army x x

2.

Logistics

All classes and types of

supply

x x x

Requirements x x x

Procurement x x

Distribution x x x

Transportation x x x

Installations x x x

Terminals x x

Evacuation and Salvage x x

Maintenance x x x

Continued.

DATA BASE NEEDS BY ECHELON

SERIAL CATEGORY OF INTELLIGENCE BN BDE DIV ARMY JFHQ

3.

Unit

effectiveness

Personnel strength x x x x x

Amount and condition

of weapons/equipment

x x x x x

Status of training x x x x x

Efficiency of personnel x x x x x

Length of time unit in

combat

x x x x x

Traditions and past

performances

x x x x x

Personal traits of unit

commander

x x x x x

Status of technical and

logistical support unit

x x x x x

Morale, health,

discipline and political

reliability

x x x x x

4.

Terrain

Obstacles x x x x

Rivers x x x x x

Bridges x x x x x

Fords x x x x x

Ports and harbour x x

Observation and fields

of fire

x x x

Concealment and cover x x x

Key terrain x x x x

Ground and air avenues

of approaches

x x x x

Drop zone and landing

zone

x x x x

Barriers and

fortifications

x x x x x

Roads x x x x x

Built-up areas x x x x

Continued

DATA BASE NEEDS BY ECHELON

SERIAL CATEGORY OF INTELLIGENCE BN BDE DIV ARMY JFHQ

5.

Weather

Temperature x x x x x

Ground visibility x x x x x

Surface winds x x x x x

Precipitation x x x x x

Snow and ice cover x x x x x

Winds aloft x x x x x

Cloud cover x x x x x

Light x x x x x

Severe weather x x x x x

6.

NBC

Location of nuclear

explosions and yield

x x x x x

Nuclear and chemical

weapons

x x x x x

Status of training x x x x x

7.

Electronic

data

Emitter nomenclature x x x x

Emitter type x x x x

Mode of emission x x x

Frequency range x x x

Location accuracy for

Direction Finder

x x x x

Associated use-units or

weapons

x x x x

Intelligence Journal/Log Sheet

0905. The intelligence journal is a permanent, chronological record of each message or documents entering

or leaving the processing section and may contain administrative data according to standing operating

procedure. The journal provides a cross reference—a complete compilation of all incoming reports for the

purposes of future recovery. The journal covers a specified time, usually 24 hours and is recorded on prescribed

format. The journal file contains the formal and incoming or outgoing documents collected during the specified

time. Documents are posted with the corresponding journal entry number and filed in sequence. The journal is

an invaluable tool during continuous 24 hours-a-day operations involving personnel shift changes.

Order of Battle Data

0906. Order of battle is the identification, strength, command structure and disposition of the personnel, units

and equipment of any military force. In low intensity conflict campaigns involving irregular force units,

auxiliary and under ground elements are included in such data base. This data base consists of evaluated

information on the enemy :

a. Composition.

b. Disposition.

c. Strength.

d. Training status.

e. Tactics.

f. Logistics.

g. Combat effectiveness.

h. Electronic technical data.

j. Miscellaneous data.

0907. Data is developed in many fields outside the scope of order of battle, but all intelligence are ultimately

related to it. For example, scientific technical intelligence produces intelligence on the capabilities of weapon

systems, but order of battle intelligence determines the effect of weapon capabilities and characteristics on

enemy tactics, combat effectiveness and organisations. Order of Battle files are cross-referenced and organised

for rapid access and retrieval. They are kept current and used to identify gaps in data holdings. These files

provide a format for recording enemy combat losses.

0908. Combat loss data, resulting from post event assessment provides input to compute enemy strength.

Information concerning strength provides indications of enemy capabilities and assists in determining the

probable courses of action or options open to enemy commanders. A lack or a preponderance of strength has

the effect of lowering or raising the estimate of the capabilities of an enemy force. Similarly, a marked

concentration of units in an area gives indications of enemy objectives and probable courses of action. During

peace time, changes in the strength of potential enemy forces are important factors which indicate the enemy‘s

intention to wage war.

Situation Map

0909. The basic situation map provides a temporary graphic display of the current, known dispositions and

major activities of both friendly and enemy forces. The basic situation map provides a format for accurate

notations of enemy forces relative to friendly boundaries. The purpose of the intelligence situation map and all

associated overlays is to contribute to sound tactical decisions. The primary intelligence uses of the situation

map and associated overlays are to :

a. Display the enemy situation and disposition.

b. Provide a basis of comparison to determine the significance of newly received data pertaining to

enemy forces.

c. Provide a basis for briefings and intelligence reports.

d. Focus attention on intelligence gaps which require redirection of the collection effort.

e. Assist in determining patterns of enemy movement and probable courses of action.

0910. Separate overlays are used in conjunction with the situation map to display all other information

regarding the enemy. The following are examples of the types of entries, that may be posted on the current

situation map overlay to show following elements of enemy :

a. Unit identifications.

b. Unit locations including time of information.

c. Boundaries.

d. Locations of major weapons systems.

e. Command Posts.

f. Logistics centres.

g. Aircraft staging areas.

h. Landing zone and Drop zone.

j Nuclear, Biological and Chemical contaminated areas.

0911. Posted information varies with the size of the friendly unit maintaining the situation map. For example,

division situation map will normally show the location of enemy units down to battalion level. Smaller elements

of some critical enemy units, such as artillery may be shown. If the presence of weapon system is considered a

decisive factor in a particular operation, they are shown. Reports of system weapons and equipment can be

critical to the analytical effort whenever such information would contribute to the identification and location of

the unit to which assigned.

0912. The situation map overlays are normally limited to secret information. All incoming information which

meets the classification levels can be posted of on the situation map overlay. More than one overlay may be

necessary to allow for an uncluttered presentation and to facilitate functional integration.

Electronic Order of Battle Overlay

0913. Electronic order of battle overlays are used to graphically depict communication and non

communication emitters (radio/radar/ jammer) and associated units, facilities and activities which have been

located through electronic support measures and signal intelligence. There will be many more emitters than

units on the battlefield. To attempt to depict on one graphic all order of battle elements on are graphic would

quickly clutter a single 1:50,000 scale overlay. Therefore, it is recommended that a separate overlay to be used

for the emitter data elements listed below. Emitter types and signal parameters can be associated with particular

units. Not all the elements listed will be known or will be appropriate for a single emitter. These elements may

include :

a. Emitter type.

b. Modulation.

c. Frequency.

d. Unit identification or level of command.

e. Weapons system association.

f. Date and time of observation.

g. Journal number of message providing the data.

Intelligence Production Process

0914. The processing system convert reported intelligence and information from the subordinate units into

all-sources intelligence using a basic production process. The section receives data in two forms. The first is

information data which has not been subjected to correlation or analysis. The second is the processed

intelligence. Through the process illustrated below, both types of input are correlated and analysed to give the

processing system further refined intelligence.

0915. The following illustration provides an overview of the analysis and production process.

Figure 9.2 : Analysis of Production Step.

Receive Intelligence and Information Reports

0916. General. The first step in the intelligence production process is the receipt and routing of incoming

information's. In this step information is logged in, checked for reliability and distributed for further evaluation.

An over view of this process is shown in the following illustration.

Figure 9.3 : Receipt and Routing Step.

ANALYSIS AND PRODUCTION STEP

Receive Intelligence

and information

Reports

Evaluate Intelligence

and Information

Reports for Accuracy

and Pertinence

Update Intelligence

Files

Estimate Enemy

Probable Courses of

Action and Intentions

Develop Targeting

Data

Monitor Collection

Plan

Produce Intelligence

Reports

RECEIPT AND ROUTING STEP

Determine

Internal

Distribution

Log and

Distribute

Incoming

Reports

Determine

Sources and

Agencies

Reliability

Determine

Credibility

of Infor-

mation

0917. Determine Internal Distribution. Distribution is determined and noted on each incoming report.

Experience has proven that a logical sequence for routing data is important. Establishing an SOP stating who

gets a certain report first, second or third is essential. Flow charting may be used to describe the distribution

scheme.

0918. Log and Distribute Incoming Reports. Incoming reports are logged in the journal and distributed

immediately after received. Reports may be received through message centre channels, by courier or by either

radio or telephone. If the report is received verbally, the information is transcribed before processing. The

logging and filing of incoming messages and reports provide a historical record of data transaction and allow

personnel to refer to previously reported data for :

a. Comparing newly reported data.

b. Adjusting collection efforts.

c. Evaluating the responsiveness of collection agencies to produce pertinent data on time.

0919. Determine Source or Agency Reliability. Sources reliability is determined and recorded on the

incoming report by the collecting unit or agency. The processing system personnel also judge reliability based

on the past performance of the reporting unit or agency and assess an overall reliability factor for each incoming

report. The overall reliability factor is marked on each report and clearly distinguished from the factor assessed

by the reporting agency :

a. The reliability of each incoming item is evaluated by a standard system using letters A to F. The

overall source or agency reliability factor is signified by various degrees of confidence as shown in the

following table.

b. Determine credibility of information. Credibility is designated by a number between 1 and 6.

c. To determine the combined ratings, the two aspects evaluation, reliability and credibility must be

considered independently. The rating is expressed as a letter number combination. For example,

information received from a usually reliable source that is judged as probably true is rated as B2

Information from the same source but judged as ― truth cannot be judged" is rated as B6.

0920. Evaluate Intelligence and Information Reports. The second step in the process is evaluating

intelligence and information reports. All incoming reports must be examined for pertinence in terms of

reliability and reliability factors. A decision is then made concerning the reports value. Event template is a

valuable aid in determining a report is value. If a report is determined not to be pertinent, it will be filed for

possible future reference. Coordination with the collection manger is made to modify or clarity tasking.

Pertinent information is then fused with other information in the data base. Information is evaluated for

pertinence by determining whether the information is :

a. Pertinent in regard to the enemy or to the characteristic of the battlefield area.

b. Needed immediately.

c. Of future value.

d. Of no apparent value.

e. Of value to higher lower or adjacent unit.

0921. Update Files. Intelligence files are updated by fusing incoming intelligence reports with information

in the data base. Fusion is accomplished by :

a. Reviewing reports to determine the area and enemy unit.

b. Searching files for corresponding information.

c. Noting the previous report number and source or agency on the new report.

Significant data is extracted from the reports and posted to the appropriate file. Extract from SIGINT, ESM and

collateral reports are used to update the enemy Order of Battle and collateral SITMAP overlays. Periodically, all

SITMAP overlays are compared with the source SITMAP. By making this comparison, the flow of movement

can be observed and enemy concentrations will appear more clearly.

RELIABILITY OF SOURCE / AGENCY TABLE

LETTER DEGREES OF

RELIABILITY

USE

A Completely reliable Only assigned under the most unusual circumstances.

B Usually reliable Indicates a source or agency of know integrity.

C Fairly reliable Indicates a source or agency that is fairly reliable.

D Not usually reliable Indicates a source or agency not usually reliable.

E Unreliable Indicates a source or agency usually unreliable.

F Reliability cannot be

judged

Assigned when there is no adequate basis for

estimating the reliability of the sources.

CREDIBILITY OF INFORMATION TABLE

NUMBER DEGREES OF

CREDIBILITY

USE

1 Confirmed by other

sources

Used when it can be states with certainty that the

information originated from two or more different

sources.

2 Probably true Used when no proof of the above can be established and

no reason exists to suspect that the reported information

comes from the same source.

3 Possibly true Used when investigation reveals that the reported facts

are compatible with the previously observed behaviour

of the target or its known background of a target leads

to the deduction that the target might have acted as

reported.

NUMBER DEGREES OF

CREDIBILITY

USE

4 Doubtful Used when reported but unconfirmed information

contradicts the estimate of the development or the know

behaviour of a target.

5 Improbable Used when reported information is not confirmed by

available data can contradict the experience as summed

to be reliable with regard to the development of a target

or issue.

6 Truth cannot be

judged

Used when an investigation or a report reveals that a

basis for allocating ratings 1 to 5 does not exist.

0922. Further File Integrations. Once the preceding steps have been accomplished, a second level of

processing is required for further file integration. This is accomplished by :

a. Posting the Essential Element of Information (EEI) and Other Information Requirement (OIR)

number to the reporting EEI and OIR has been partially or totally satisfied.

b. Identifying all significant information if no EEI and OIR have been satisfied.

c. Fusing data with known intelligence.

d. Updating the all source SITMAP.

e. Comparing the enemy order of battle overlays and other overlays with the all – source SITMAP.

f. Reviewing event analysis matrixes.

g. Identifying major enemy movements and concentrations.

h. Updating event analysis matrixes.

j. Considering impact of events on Target Area of Interest (TAI)and Named Area of Interest

(NAI).

k. Updating Order of Battle, if necessary.

EEI and OIR are answered when the information is available. Questions are answered when there is a

reasonable probability (80 percent or better) that the answer at hand is correct. The EEI and OIR should be

answerable at this point in the intelligence process unless the requirement involves predicting enemy intentions.

If intention is required then process the probable courses of action from which to predict intention.

0923. Estimate Enemy Probable of Courses of Action (COA). An overview of this phase of the

intelligence production process is shown in the following diagram.

Figure 9.4 : Probable COA Step.

0924. Compare Information and Intelligence. Comparing reports with event

analysis matrix is done by :

a. Reviewing each report to see if it correlates with indicators in the event analysis matrix or might

be a deception attempt.

b. Posting usable information on decision support templates. As this information is poster, each

mobility corridor (MC) is analysed for the enemy‘s indicated course of action.

c. Determining if events support enemy use of particular MCs.

d. Identifying indicator of enemy probable courses of action.

e. Considering the impact of events on TAI and NAI.

This phase provides an updated decision support template.

Formulate Conclusions

0925. Conclusions are the last step in the interpretation of information. Conclusions are reached by logical

decision, based on an analysis of available intelligence, knowledge of the battlefield area and the enemy‘s

situation, capabilities and vulnerabilities. The following illustration provides an overview of this step :

FORMULATE CONCLUSIONS

Compare Decision and

Situation Templates

Identify Courses of Action

Still Available to the Enemy

Eliminate Courses of Action

no Longer Available

Update Decision Template

and Event Analysis Matrixes

FORMULATE CONCLUSIONS

Based on Available Information

of Enemy Situation, Disposition,

and Probable Course of Action---

--

PROBABLE COA STEP

Compare Information and

intelligence Reports with

Event Analysis Matrixes

Compare with Friendly

Operations Templates

Formulate Conclusions

DETERMINE

ENEMY PROBABLE

COURSES OF ACTION

Intelligence Staff Estimate

Processing Section

Report File

Provide

Input

File

Figure 9.5 : Formulate Conclusion.

0926. As posted intelligence reports begin to fill out decision support templates, the templates are compared

with the situation templates to identify those courses left open to the enemy commander. Courses of action

which, by virtue of enemy disposition, are no longer viable are eliminated. Templates are updated as necessary

to reflect these changes.

0927. An estimate of the enemy‘s most probable course of action and intentions are the result of situation

development. Estimating enemy intentions are accomplished by :

a. Analysing the current enemy situation as depicted on the decision support templates.

b. Determining the enemy‘s most probable course of action based on those courses of action left

open to the enemy commander, the disposition and composition of the enemy force and the friendly

situation. This effort focuses on answering the EEI.

TARGET DEVELOPMENT

Types of Target

0928. Intelligence can never be completed. Limited time and resource, battlefield confusion and enemy

deception all work to degrade the quality and quantity of intelligence. To provide the best intelligence, possible

intelligence collectors are concentrated on the most valuable indicators of enemy intentions and targets of the

highest value.

0929. In order to plan intelligence collection and decide which collector to task, the targets for intelligence

collection are divided into categories. These categories allow matching the activity (such as movement along a

section of road) with the collection capable of detecting it. Most enemy units simultaneously fall into more than

one category. But it is the activity as specific type of target that will answer a specific intelligence need. The

four categories of targets are :

a. Movers: Moving elements of the enemy force.

b. Emitters: Communications and non-communications systems.

c. Shooters: Weapons and weapons systems.

d. Sitters: Stationary targets.

0930. Movers. The detection, location and tracking movers are important in identifying enemy pattern of

activity. Movement patterns help to locate enemy concentrations of combat power defensive positions, line of

communication (L of C), key installations and movement of reserves. By tracking movers in the area of interest,

precise times and locations for attack high pay of target may be determined. Movers are often lucrative targets

by themselves.

0931. Emitters. Since virtually every unit on the battlefield uses communications and non-communications

emitters, electromagnetic emissions are especially lucrative sources of information and intelligence. Analysis of

electromagnetic emissions provides:

a. Targeting data for fire support, offensive air support and jamming systems.

b. Intelligence collected through the interception of enemy communications.

c. Intelligence derived from traffic analysis and cryptanalysis.

d. The identification and locations of weapons, units and systems through the detection and

locations of both communications and non communications emitters.

0932. Shooters. Shooters include all direct and indirect fire weapons and missile system. Generally, shooters

are located through their projectiles after they are fired or launched. However, missile systems, due to their

nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) capability, may be located and destroyed as movers, emitters or sitters

before they can be fired.

0933. Sitters. Sitters are fixed or semi-fixed targets such as enemy command posts (CPs) and service support

facilities. They may include other more mobile targets which have stopped and are not shooting or emitting.

Such targets may include forces in an assembly area, weapons in ready or firing positions but not firing and

other such targets. Sitters can be critical to enemy operations and their destruction can severely degrade enemy

combat power over the long term. Identifications and location of sitters may provide indications of enemy

intentions.

Resources for Target Acquisition

0934. Information collected against each of these targets may be used as tactical information, as direct

targeting data and as intelligence. The resources available to each commander for use against the four target

categories are listed in the following table, additionally; an enemy unit may be an emitter-shooter-sitter or

emitter-mover target at the same time. Therefore, more than one resource may be employed against the same

target.

COLLECTION RESOURCES

RESOURCES TARGETS

MOVERS EMITTERS SHOOTERS SITTERS

Interrogators x x

Controlled Sources x x

Counter Intelligence x x

Reconnaissance x x x

Troops x x x

HF/VHF Intercept x

VHF/UHF Intercept x

Multichannel Intercept x

Photo Recce x x x

Infrared x x x x

Ground Surveillance

Radar (GSR)

x

Weapons Locating Rader x

Technical Intelligence

Units

x x x

Special Operating Forces x x x x

Fire Support Team x x x

Army Aviation x x x

Battlefield Surveillance

(Artillery) Radar

x x

Air Defence Radar x

Develop Targeting Data

0935. Target development is the process of providing targeting information to support the commander‘s

tactical plans. Performed by the processing system at corps and division and to a more limited degree by

intelligence staff at brigades and battalions. It is an integral part of the all source intelligent analysis and

production process. The same collection, IPB and analysis functions that support situation development also

support target development. Where the objective of situation development is an estimate of enemy intentions,

the objective of target development is to provide direct or correlated targeting data which meets the

commander‘s target selection standards. An overview of the target development process is shown in the

following illustration.

Figure 9.6 : Target Development Process.

0936. There are two objectives in the target development process. The first objective is to provide direct

targeting data (Combat information) to commanders for immediate fire and manoeuvre in close operations. The

second objective is to collect and correlate information from all sources to develop targeting data for attacking

second echelon target in deep operations. Direct targeting data results from the immediate identification and

location of targets and reporting that information directly to FSEs for attack. This normally occurs when

accurate detection, identification and location of a target is obtained from a single source and is immediately

available for fire support use. An example of this would be armour target acquired by GSR.

Target Value Analysis (TVA)

0937. Correlated targeting data result from comparing or correlating information from multiple sources to

accurately fix a target. Target correlation includes TVA. TVA is a methodology for identifying HVTs and

HPTs. HVTs are elements or resources of an enemy formation which the enemy commander considers to the

essential to accomplishing a specific tactical objective. HVTs are determined independently of friendly

capabilities to acquire and engage them. HPTs are HVTs which can be successfully acquired and engaged by a

friendly force to a degree which makes the enemy formation vulnerable to exploitation. It is the successful

friendly exploitation of the enemy formation which results in the tactical PAYOFF. Using IPB template, TVA is

done before the battle so that during the battle the commander can quickly select and attack specific targets to

manipulate the enemy force. When faced with a numerically superior enemy force, commanders will not have

enough resources to attack every target acquired. Therefore, TVA must be keyed to determining which targets

out of the entire enemy array should be attacked to achieve the greatest tactical benefit for the resources

expended. TVA determines :

a. The critical targets.

TARGET DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

TACTICAL REQUIREMENTS

1. Close Operations.

2. Deep Operations.

3. Rear Operations. 4. Command, Control, Communication

Counter measures.

5. Post-Attack Assessment.

TARGET CORRELATION

1. Analyse Information.

2. Develop Targeting Data. 3. Update Target Sheets.

4. Report Target Data to Fire support

Element (FSE).

5. Determine Target Attack Damage.

TARGET VALUE ANALYSIS

1. Determine HVTs and HPT.

2. Prepare Target Spread Sheet.

3. Prepare Target Sheet.

TARGET ACQUISITION

1. Focus Collection on HVTs and HPTs. 2. Cue and Employ Collection Systems.

3. Report Direct Targeting Data.

b. When these targets should be attacked.

c. Where these targets should be attacked.

0938. TVA links the effects of attacking a target directly target behaviour. TVA begins in IPB by a detailed

analysis of enemy doctrine tactics, equipment organisations and expected behaviour. Information derived is then

used to project how, in each tactical formation, the enemy will respond when confronted with different tactical

situations. Activities, behaviour, equipment and elements of the selected enemy force which are critical to

successful operation in each situation are identified. An example of this is the engineer company in an

mechanise infantry during a advance to contact. When the mechanise infantry is faced with making a river

crossing, the engineer company‘s location within the march formation changes. Other preparatory activities also

must take place in order for the river crossing to succeed. Through TVA is listing of actions and elements are

developed that would prevent the mechanise infantry from conducting a river crossing. Preventing the river

crossing may accomplish the desired effect by disrupting, delaying or blocking the mechanise infantry based on

the commander‘s tactical plan. In depth TVA provides a means of determining which targets would be attacked

for the greatest tactical benefit in a given situation. These targets are identified as HPTs.

0939. When conducting TVA, the situations value of target is a significant factor. As the distance from the

forward line of own troops (FLOT) increase, the value of combat forces decreases with respect to Service

Support Unit forces and facilities. For example, at the forward line of own troops (FLOT), a tank battalion is a

significant threat and is a very important target to the manoeuvre battalion commander. However, 10 kilometres

forward of the FLOT, that tank battalion is not as important to the success of the enemy‘s immediate mission as

an ammunition supply point or a fuel dump. Recognition of these situational value elements is important in

TVA.

0940. TVA tools are an effective means of functionally applying TVA and include target spread sheets and

target sheets. These tools should be prepared in conjunction with the IPB effort. Target Spread sheets are a

means of describing and identifying target in specific tactical situations at various echelons of forces. Target

sheets support sport sheets and list the critical elements of various target groups which, when attacked, will

restrict options or capabilities. Both of these products are classified because often nature of the information

depicted. Once completed these sheets are used by the intelligence staff, operational staff and fire support

element as shown in the following chart.

SPREAD SHEET USER

Intelligence Staff Operation Staff/Echelon

1. Focus intelligence collection assets.

2. Determine target development needs.

3. Recommend target priorities to

operational staff and commander.

1. Develop target priorities for the commander.

2. Development methods of attack.

3. Establish priority for attack.

4. Develop fire support plans.

5. Develop ECM plans.

0941. The target value matrix is divided into five columns. The first three columns describe three effect

desired from attacking the target. The Xs in the columns identify which effects cab be achieved in a particular

situation against the size of formation for which the sheet is being prepared.

0942. The target set column lists the 08 target sets identified previously. The RELATIVE WORTH column

depict the worth of attacking one target set with respect to the other target sets on the sheet. The subdivisions in

the column are not scaled and should not be interpreted as absolute values. This column allows a rapid

identification of the priority different target sets should have when resources for attack are scarce.

0943. For target sets assigned a relative worth, brief statements describing the rationale for attacking each set

are placed, in columnar form, to the right of the target value matrix. Specific HVTs for each target set assigned,

a relative worth are also listed in column form, to the right of the appropriate attack rationale statement. Specific

HVT listing will also contain the number of the appropriate target sheet describing each HVT for easy reference.

For example, in the river crossing scenario, the engineer target set may be assessed as critical with an attack

rationally statement to the effect 'Halt or impede preparation of crossing site and execution of crossing'. A

specific HVT in this case might be the ferry crossing site with reference to a target sheet number for that HVT,

for example, Ferry Crossing Site.

0944. A target sheet is prepared for each potential HVT. The target sheet is numbered or references identifies

the target and provide information on the size, doctrinal location, vulnerability, signature (visual and electronic)

and probable impact of the loss of the target on the enemy‘s operation. A sample target sheet is providing below

:

SAMPLE TARGET SHEET

TARGET CATEGORY : Engineer

HIGH VALUE TARGET : TGT 75. Ferry crossing site.

FUNCTION : Provide rapid crossing of water obstacles for tanks and other

non- amphibious systems.

DESCRIPTION :

--- TGT radius- point target.

--- Posture- exposed on water surface FEBA distance.

COMPOSITION : Vehicles normally 2 ferries or rafts (if river over 300m wide

may be as many as 5).

PERSONNEL :

SIGNATURE :

VISUAL :

ELECTRONIC :

OTHER :

DEGRADATION :

-- Non-amphibious forces must find alternate means to cross.

-- Force that secured bridgehead is not reinforced.

Figure 9.7 : Sample Target Sheet.

0945. The target value matrix also contains information on enemy doctrine. This includes likely formations

and distances (doctrinal template), objectives of the force and likely enemy courses of action if the attacks on

these forces are successful.

SAMPLE TARGET SPREAD SHEET (EXTRACT)

DIS

RU

PT

DE

LA

Y

LIM

IT

TARGET SET

RELATIVE

VALUE

Relative

value of

attack in

this

situation

.

Contribution in

this situation to

disrupt/delay

unit responses.

x C3

x Fire Support

x x x Manoeuvre

x ADA

Engineer

x x Intelligence

The

nuclear/chemical

target set is high

payoff a division

and higher levels

regardless of the

situation. Its

contribution

varies too greatly

to be predictable,

thus, the

different

graphical

treatment

x x Radio Electronic

Combat

x x x Nuclear/Chemic

al

x

x x x

DESIRED EFFECT

THREAT IS ATTACKING THREAT IS DEFENDING

DISRUPT

Preclude the efficient

interaction of combat and

supporting systems

Same.

DELAY

Alter arrival time of the force

outside planned/ predicted

movement schedule

Slow defensive preparation and or

delay reinforcement.

LIMIT Cause the force to shift to

another avenue of approach. Isolate the defender.

NOTE: Actual target spread sheets will also contain information on the size of forces,

tactical situation specific HVTs and doctrinal templates.

Figure 9.8 : Sample Target Spread Sheet.

0946. When completed, TVA results in a list of high payoff targets for each enemy echelon of command and

tactical situation. These lists are used jointly by the operation, intelligence and fire support staffs to develop a

high payoff target matrix. A sample high payoff target matrix is provided in the following illustration. An

approved high payoff target matrix can then be used to further refine attack criteria and attack guidance as to :

a. What targets are to be attacked (in order of priority) ?

b. When they are to be attacked ?

c. Why they are to be attacked ?

d. What are the condition for success and failure ?

Scientific and Technical Intelligence (S&T)

0947. S&T intelligence target lists must also be considered in target development. These lists can be used by

fire support and operation staffs to disrupt, destroy or capture facilities, depots or critical materials which are

important to the sustainment of enemy combat operations. These lists also may contain key enemy logisticians,

industrialists, scientists, engineers, laboratory technicians or specific document.

0948. S&T intelligence targets are categorised and listed by priority and reflect the target‘s criticality to

current and planned operations :

a. Priority I. Highly critical to the out come of the campaign and are probably perishable.

b. Priority-II. Highly critical to out come of the battle and are probably perishable.

c. Priority-III. Significant, not perishable.

d. Priority-IV. Desirable, not perishable.

Data for Targeting

0949. Targeting data is developed for those targets that must be attacked to support the commander's tactical

plan. Selected future targets are identified by the Operational Staff as early as possible. This permits the

detection, location and tracking of these targets as they enter the command‘s battlefield area. This facilitates

early target development which allows attack of targets at the optimum time and distance from the FLOT.

0950. Collection of information for target and situation development normally occurs simultaneously. The

collection manager establishes separate collection missions when priorities are sufficiently high and planned

collection missions will not provide the specific information desired. Information to support target development

is acquired by the same resources which collect for situation development and is divided into the same

categories (movers, emitters, shooters, and sitters). Information collected for targeting purposes requires greater

location accuracy than that of collected for answering EEI and OIR. When determining reporting requirements

to support target development, the collection manager must ensure that the specific derails needed is stated in

the collection requirement. Reporting requirements must include :

a. Target location accuracy required to include the sensor‘s target location error if applicable.

b. Time target was last observed at the reported location.

c. Target description.

0951. The time required to process collected information must be as short as possible to ensure that target

data can be developed and reported in minimum time. The objective to enable attack of the target while it is still

where it was detected. This means that targeting data must be reported as expeditiously as possible.

0952. Targeting data must be reported in time for decisions to be made and fire control procedures to be

completed before a target leaves a desired attack area. Quick fire channels are established between the

intelligence staff and operational staff for use in reporting targets as they meet pre- established criteria.

SAMPLE HIGH-PAY OFF TARGET MATRIX

Priority Target Set

(TS)

Target Sheet

Number

Description

1.

2.

8 (TS)

1 (TS)

77, 79

29, 34

Division, Army Main Command Post.

Division Artillery Command Post.

3. 2 (TS) 5 Command vehicle.

4. 2 1, 2, 18 Artillery Unit fire direction centre,

command observation post, field artillery.

5. 1 25 , 30 Regimental Main Command Post,

6. 3 51, 50, 46, 48 Assembly Area, Mechanised/Armour

Company

7. 4, 7 63, 64, 91, 92 Air defence electronic warfare Site,

Radio/Radar interception Sites.

8. 9 115, 116 Regiment/Division Petrol Points

9. 10 120, 121 Division /Army Ammo Depots

NOTE :

1. List may have any number of target priorities.

2. This list is jointly developed by intelligence and Operational staff.

Post attack assessment is performed by processing system as part of the processing function to determine the

effects of deep attacks against the enemy‘s follow on and supporting echelons. Damage reports and other

information used to assess the effectiveness of the attacks are handled in the same way as other reports are

handled. The reports are evaluated from reliability and credibility, logged in, distributed and used to update

intelligence files.

0953. The corps or division operational staff established the planned time and desired effects of an attack.

After the attack, it is than determined. Through analysis, if the criteria established by the operational staff have

been satisfied satisfaction of the attack criteria is determined by deciding whether or not the desired damage was

done to the enemy. The post attack assessment process is shown in the following illustration :

Monitor Collection Plan

0954. Processing section personnel constantly monitor the collection plan to provide immediate responses to

collection requirements and recommend adjustments to the collection plan to meet processing section needs. To

fulfil EEI, OIR and TAI information needs, the collection plan must ensure that the required information is

collected to answer the critical questions asked by the commander. The processing section monitors the

collection plan and identifies gaps by :

a. Reviewing template files and the TAI overlays.

b. Determining if TAI information needs to match EEI and OIR.

c. Comparing EEI and OIR to the all source SITMAP and the event analysis matrixes.

d. Determining the satisfaction of EEI, OIR and event indicators.

e. Identifying, if necessary, additional information needed to fulfil TAI needs and the commander‘s

targeting guidance.

f. Informing the collection management section of additional collection needs.

0955. Once gaps are recognised, appropriate orders and request are issued by the collection management

section to eliminate unproductive coverage and focus on updated collection requirements. The collection

management section is notified immediately of a gap in intelligence holdings.

Produce Intelligence Reports

0956. Intelligence reports are produced both processing section to satisfy situation and target development

requirements. Reports are generated based on information developed through IPB, extracted from incoming

reports or developed through all source analysis. The production process focuses on identifying reportable

information and preparing and transmitting the report to the necessary units or agencies. Reports are prepared

after :

POST ASSESSMENT

Operational Staff

Determines

Desired Effects on

the Enemy

Determine

information

needs

Include Post

Attack

Assessment info

Requirements in

Collection Plan

Receive

Damage

Reports

Analyse

Results of

Attack

Terms of

Desired

Effect

Disseminate

Results of

Assessment

Figure 9.9 : Post Assessment.

a. Reviewing the decision support template and EEI and OIR file.

b. Reviewing the estimate of the enemy‘s most probable courses of action.

c. Identifying enemy events which satisfy EEI and OIR.

d. Identifying enemy intentions supported by actual events.

0957. A distribution planning file is used to control the reporting of intelligence. This list or matrix that

provides a ready reference for determining the distribution of each report. The file is used in conjunction with

the SOP, which stipulates report formats for each report. If an item of information does not fit within the

established reporting criteria and intelligence spot report is transmitted.

0958. Reporting the enemy‘s intended or actual use of weapons of mass destruction or the location of these

weapons is especially critical. If it is determined that the enemy has or intention to imitate of weapon of mass

destruction attack this information must be reported to higher, lower and adjacent commands by the fastest

means with the highest message precedence. Initial reports are sent using a FLASH message precedent;

subsequent reports are transmitted with immediate message precedence.

0959 – 1000. Reserved.

SECTION - 10

DISSEMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE STAGE

FUNDAMENTAL ASPECTS

General

1001. The final function supporting situation and target development is dissemination. Intelligence and

combat information are of little value if not delivered when and where needed. Failure in this aspect defeats

thorough and successful collection and processing effort. Since most intelligence and all tactical information are

time sensitive, they must be disseminated to commanders and others who need it, when they need it and in a

form they can use.

1002. Timely dissemination of intelligence enables commanders to make decision with confident. It also

provides knowledge in light of new information which may be processed. Intelligence is used in the same way at

all echelons. The means of dissemination are likewise similar at all level but volume, distribution and frequency

vary. Intelligence is disseminated within the producing headquarters and to the next higher, next lower and

adjacent units. Dissemination to lower and adjacent units is more difficult and yet more important, because:

a. The intelligence picture at lower echelons changes more rapidly.

b. The requirement for greater details may result in delay.

c. The specialised intelligence produced only at higher echelons may have significant bearing on the

operations of lower echelons.

1003. Tactical information and targeting data are the mainstay for brigade and battalion commanders and fire

support units. Commanders use this data for immediate action against the enemy. Any element that obtains

combat information must disseminate it by the fastest and most direct means available.

Requirements for Dissemination

1004. Timelines. Intelligence and combat information are disseminated in time to permit formulation of

plans and initiation of action using that data as a basis. Certain items of information, such as a report of an

impending counterattack, must be disseminated immediately to permit maximum reaction time. The immediate

significance of such combat information is obvious and thus does not require much evaluation before

transmitting. After transmitting, it is analysed for further significance. The resulting intelligence is disseminated

as rapidly as possible.

1005. Usable Form. Intelligence must be disseminated in a form which will permit its ready use. The form

varies according to the nature and location of the prospective user, the urgency, nature of the intelligence and

available means of dissemination. Dissemination to the commander, the unit staff and subordinate units located

near the Command Post (CP) is accomplished through personal briefing using the Situation Map (SITMAP).

Combat information and intelligence should be disseminated in the form of brief message to permit prompt

understanding and use. Written intelligence estimates, intelligence annexes and intelligence reports are effective

dissemination tools when the requirement is for general dissemination of a large amount of information.

1006. Pertinence. Caution must be exercised to ensure that all intelligence is disseminated to all units and

agencies which have a need for it. Dissemination should not result in units frequently receiving irrelevant

intelligence which they can not use or large amounts of information that ties up their communications channels.

This is especially valid in the case of dissemination to brigades and battalions, because of their limited

capabilities for processing and storage. Generally, dissemination to subordinates is based on the pertinence of

the intelligence to the unit concerned. Intelligence is disseminated to adjacent units on the same basis without

going through the chain of command. Conversely, virtually all intelligence should be disseminated upward.

1007. Security. The enemy‘s awareness that friendly forces have certain intelligence concerning their

situation may cause them either to alter their actions so that the intelligence is no longer valid or to strengthen

their security effort. This makes subsequent collection of information by friendly agencies difficult.

Accordingly, dissemination is accomplished with adequate transmission security. Classified message which are

transmitted by a means susceptible to enemy interception are normally encrypted.

MEANS OF DISSEMINATION

General

1008. There are various means available for the dissemination of combat information and intelligence.

Combat information is transmitted by the most direct means. Intelligence may be disseminated by:

a. Any available communication means.

b. Direct contact in the form of conferences, briefing and liaison visits.

c. Issuance of intelligence documents such as Intelligence Annexes, Intelligence Summary

(INTSUM) and Periodical Intelligence Reports (PERINTREP).

1009. Dissemination with a headquarters is usually made by personal contact, verbal reports briefing and by

distribution of intelligence estimates and written reports. The urgency of the information, the types of

communications available and security requirements. With the exception of tactical information, the selection of

communication means is usually the function of the collection management section.

Selection

1010. Selecting the most suitable means to be used for dissemination depends principally upon the nature and

urgency of the intelligence and the means available. When wide dissemination of a comparatively large amount

of intelligence is require, it is usually disseminated by the issuance of appropriate intelligence documents. As

examples, during the planning phase of an offensive operation, written intelligence estimates and intelligence

annexes to operations plans are used. INTSUM, PERINTREP and periodic intelligence summary

(PERINTSUM) are also used similarly during the current phase. Electrical communication means are effective

for the dissemination of intelligence message. The imposition of radio silence requires that message to be

delivered by visual means or by messages or courier. Graphic materials such as sketches, overlays and reports

can be disseminated by means of facsimile equipment. Availabilities of automatic data processing (ADP)

equipment will permit rapid dissemination of urgent items.

Products

1011. The products used to disseminate combat information and intelligence depend upon their intended use.

Command Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) dictates what products to use and when to use them. Spot

reports are one time reports used by all echelons to transmit intelligence or information of immediate value. The

spot report is afforded the most expeditious means of transmission consistent with required security. There is no

prescribed format for the spot report; however, it should provide information on size, activity, location, unit,

time and equipment.

1012. The intelligence report (INTREP) is a standardised report which is disseminated on a requirement

basis. An INTREP is prepared when facts influencing the enemy capabilities have been observed or when a

change in enemy capabilities has taken place. The INTREP is passed to higher, lower and adjacent units at the

discretion of the commander producing the report. It is dispatches as quickly as possible following receipt to the

information and is sent by the most expeditious means available. There is no prescribed format for the INTREP

except that the acronym 'INTREP' will be the first item to appear in the report. However, when involve in joint

service operations, originators of INTREPs will use the format contained in Chapter V, JCS publication 12.

1013. The INTSUM contains a brief summary of information or intelligence interest covering a periods of

time designated by the commander. The INTSUM provides a summary of the enemy situation in forward and

rear areas, enemy operation, capabilities, weather and terrain characteristic. The INTSUM is an aid in assessing

the current situation and updates other intelligence reports. Negative information may be included in the

INTSUM, but unnecessary information is excluded. The INTSUM reflects interpretations and conclusions of

enemy capabilities and probable courses of action. The INTSUM is normally prepared at brigade and higher

echelons and is disseminated to higher, lower and adjacent units. It has no prescribed format except that

INTSUM will be the first item of the report.

1014. The supplementary intelligence report (SUPINTREP) is a standardised report form used for more

comprehensive review concerning information on one or several specific intelligence targets. It may also contain

selected intelligence data collected over an extended period of time and may include items contained in the

INTREP or INTSUM. The nature and content of data contained in the SUPINTREP dictates the specific

dissemination. At the commander‘s discretion, the SUPINTREP is passed to higher, lower or adjacent units. It is

normally produced on special request or in support of a particular operational plan and dispatched by the most

suitable means available.

1015. The PERINTREP is a summary of the intelligence situation for a specified period, normally 24 hours,

in a tactical situation. The PERINTREP is a means of disseminating detailed information and intelligence. It

covers the enemy situation, operation capabilities and vulnerabilities, characteristics of the area of operations

and counter intelligence. Other intelligence documents such as Scientific and Technical (S&T) intelligence

summaries, intelligence interrogation report, translations of captured documents, weather and climatic

summaries may be disseminated as annexes to the PERINTREP. The use of abbreviations and unnecessary

reference to map coordinate are avoided. The PERINTREP is normally prepared at corps and higher echelons.

Dissemination is made by the most suitable means, usually by liaison officers or messengers to staff, adjacent

units, subordinate and higher headquarters at the next two higher and lower echelons. The PERINTREP should

be disseminated in time for use in day planning. In joint service operations, the PERINTREP is replaced by the

PERINTSUM. The format for the PERINTSUM is contained in GSTP 0101.Weekly intelligence summary

generally follows the format of a PREINTREP (or the PERINTSUM in joint service operations). This report

normally is prepared at echelons above corps. (EAC).

1016. Imagery analysis reports disseminate imagery intelligence (IMINT). The basic types of imagery

analysis reports are the reconnaissance exploitation report, initial programmed interpretation report and

supplemental programmed interpretation report. These reports are prepared and disseminated by the imagery

analysis personnel in the field intelligence unit.

1017. Intelligence interrogation and translation reports summarise the results of interrogation of enemy

prisoners, civilian detainee or refugees and translations or summaries of enemy documents. Information of

immediate value is disseminated through spot reports. Other information is disseminated in the most suitable

form for the user. At Army Headquarters information received from interrogation and translation reports is

included in the PERINTREP.

1018. Information on enemy bombing, shelling or mortaring activity is initially disseminated by means of

bombing report, shelling report or mortaring report (BOMREP, SHELREP, or MORTREP) as appropriate.

Submission is the responsibility of the affected unit. SHELREP and MORTREP are provided to the affected

unit‘s fire support officer (FSO) for input to the counter fire element of the force artillery command post.

Reports are rendered as normal messages and are transmitted by the faster means available. Each transmission is

preceded by SHELREP in the case of enemy artillery or by the code word ―BOMBREP‖ in the case of an

enemy air attack.

1019. Initial reports and data of enemy or un-identified nuclear detonation and biological or chemical attacks

are disseminated from the sources, through designated headquarters to the highest headquarters. Reporting is by

flash precedence. Initial and follow up reports are evaluated at each headquarters and the results are

appropriately disseminated. Warning of expected contamination from a nuclear burst or biological or chemical

attack is disseminate by the first headquarters capable of determining such information.

Automated Intelligence Support

1020. The introduction of computer and dedicated intelligence communications will enable the intelligence

staff to collect, process, analyse and produce more pertinent, reliable data in a much shorter time than with

current manual systems. Currently, almost all analysis are done in manual mode. The analytic function

described in this chapter is performed by the analyst with assistance from automation. This process is time

consuming, cumbersome and personnel dependent. Automated assistance is presently being incorporated into

many newly fielded systems. Systems still in engineering and advanced development include automated

assistance.

1021 – 1100. Reserved.

CHAPTER - III

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR OPERATIONS OF WAR

SECTION - 11

INTELLIGENCE IN OPERATION PLANNING

GENERAL

1101. Intelligence is the key that unlocks the planning process of all other staff branches. Every effort is

made to collect information on terrain, whether and enemy before development of friendly courses of action.

Maximum use is made of IPB to provide predictive intelligence. The analysis of terrain and weather show how

these two factors affect the capabilities of both friendly and enemy units to move, shoot and communicate. The

doctrine template and later the situation template portrays how the enemy formations would array their forces at

different stages of the battle. These analysis helps in producing enemy courses of action that later drives

development of friendly courses of action. While analysing the situation in the IPB process, one need to

consider both area of operation and area of interest simultaneously.

1102. While the intelligence staff carries out IPB, the operation and logistic staff take a stock of the

availability of the units and formation, their capabilities, equipments, status of supplies, present dispositions and

determine the short fall vis-à-vis the requirement of projected operation. They also make every effort to bring

them to the highest standard of readiness and impart training special to the operation in hand.

1103. Logistic staff with the help of intelligence staff gathers logistic intelligence. It is the information that is

essential for formulating any viable logistic plan. These include information on terrain, climate, road, rail and

river communication network, airfields, availability of civil resources (source of fuel, stock at fuel storage depot,

water resources, public health facilities, electrical power, military production by local manufactures etc).

Logistic intelligence is generally collected through own intelligence staff, higher formation and command

channel. These information are to be evaluated and interpreted at various levels to suit their particular

requirement.

INTELLIGENCE IN DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

General

1104. Reduction of enemy strength to achieve a more balanced correlation of forces is the basic aim of the

defensive operation. For this, the defenders take maximum advantage of terrain, weather and time to gain

positional and preparation advantages over the enemy forces and destroy the attackers when they expose

themselves during the process of attack. However, as the destruction of enemy forces is hardly possible by a

single major campaign/battle, the defenders constantly seek to repulse enemy attacks and prevent them from

gaining their operational /tactical objectives by skilful application of fire and manoeuvre. The commanders

conducting defensive operation look for omissions of the attackers and exploit them to the full as the mistakes

multiply due to the disruptive activities of the defenders. While the power of the attacker diminishing due to

battle losses, physical fatigue and continual reversals, the defenders gradually grow stronger and go over to the

offensive.

Intelligence Function in Defence

1105. Intelligence in defensive operations enables the commander to see the battlefield clearly. Before enemy

makes contact with the friendly forces, the function of intelligence is to monitor enemy movements and to seek

high value targets. It provides commander with early warning of enemy intentions and targets for fire and

manoeuvre forces. It also detects enemy deception attempts and reports them in sufficient time for the

commander to act effectively. During operation in covering troops area and main defensive position, the

intelligence staffs try to identify enemy‘s main effort as early as possible. For this, they try to detect enemy

signature formations whose commitments convey the intention. Generally the commitment of enemy signature

formation indicates his point of main effort. Intelligence supports reserve operations by identifying enemy

thrust lines, reporting extent of enemy penetration and forecasting his future intention. The rear area security is

aided by the intelligence staff mostly in the form of giving early warning of enemy landings detection and

identification of enemy agents and saboteurs. The commander responsible for rear area security must maintain

close liaison with intelligence staff to respond effectively against rear area threat.

1106. The air attack on any target during defensive operation must be based on intelligence. Initial attack will

most likely be by air force assets conducting both Air Interdiction and Battlefield Air Interdiction missions.

Battle damage assessment must be made to provide information on the effectiveness of attacks so that a decision

can be made to re-attack, continue to track or seek other targets.

1107. Enemy‘s doctrine, habit, equipment and likely course of action greatly influence the planning of

defence. A commander must look at his own deployment through the enemy commander‘s eye and try to

recognise the vulnerabilities, which he may exploit. The commander must visualise enemy objectives and

approaches so that he can array forces in relation to likely enemy movements. He should also anticipate how

enemy forces would be echeloned for the attack and exactly at what point the follow up forces would join the

battle. He then can plan slowing down of the closure rate of enemy formations so that forces in position can take

on one enemy echelon at a time. The purpose is to upset enemy‘s attack timetable and create exploitable gaps

between his committed forces and reserves.

Use of Terrain in Defence 1108. Any aspect of terrain that hinders enemy movement and prevents his manoeuvre and concentrations

must be exploited to the full. The defenders should place themselves in areas where the attackers will be put at a

disadvantageous position during the actual conduct of the attack. Controlling the vital ground is essential for the

successful prosecution of the defensive operation. When it proves to be of decisive importance, the entire

defensive plan is anchored on it. However, vital ground and enemy objective may not coincide if enemy does

not have adequate information concerning terrain and friendly deployment. Terrain alteration due to sudden

weather change or the effect of seasonal variations must also be considered while planning. Wherever possible,

the obstacle value of various terrain features are to be analysed in detail and reinforced to impede enemy

movement as well as protect friendly positions and manoeuvre.

1109. As it has already been explained the defence aims at achieving favourable correlation of forces by

fighting from an advantageous position. Retaining important terrain features on the battlefield and denying

enemy access to the same features achieve this aim. The defender aims at defeating enemy attack by taking

advantage of prepared positions and exploiting enemy vulnerabilities during the move.

Deception in Defence

1110. Deception in defensive operation aims to mislead the enemy regarding friendly pattern of deployment

in area of operation. The covering troops fight the battle in a way that prevents enemy from seeing the main

defensive position and knowing how friendly forces have been distributed over the entire battlefield. Preferably

the covering troops fall back to the main defensive position from the flanks so as to deny knowledge of the

actual FEBA to the enemy forces. When the main defensive battle begins, the defenders seek to lure the enemy

into selected killing areas by allowing him to advance rapidly along selected routes. Reserve operations are also

masked by skilful implementation of a deception plan that diverts enemy attention to another sector when the

decisive stroke is delivered. Whenever deception is planned, it should always be tied to the main defensive plan

to avoid giving contradictory signals to the enemy commander so that friendly intention is not deciphered.

Threat to Operational Security in Defence

1111. To provide structure for and to describe the threat, three levels of threat activities are used.

a. Level I threat includes enemy controlled agents‘ activity, sabotage by enemy sympathizers and

terrorist.

b. Level II threat mainly comprises diversionary and sabotage operation conducted by

unconventional forces and raid, ambush and reconnaissance operations conducted by combat units.

c. Level III threat consists of specialized operations such as helicopter borne operation, airborne

operation, amphibious operation and infiltration operation. These threat activities will not occur in

specific order. The rear area may face one or all actions at one time. Additionally some activities may

take place well ahead of general hostilities including terrorist attack against key personnel and

activities.

Intelligence Function in Tactical Redeployment

1112. Intelligence effort should be concentrated on finding out the enemy capabilities and intentions prior to

the commencement of tactical redeployment. This will be more necessary if the timing of the tactical

redeployment is linked to the enemy‘s ability to launch a major attack. Once a tactical redeployment has started

it may be difficult to obtain timely information of enemy intentions from ground troops. Air reconnaissance is of

great value at this stage. Reconnaissance by army aviation and air force will play an important part in obtaining

information about enemy movements. Stay behind parties with the assistance of unconventional forces and

intelligence organisation also can produce valuable information. However, information of enemy activity in the

rear area will also be a matter of great urgency.

1113. During the tactical redeployment heavy demands are placed on the intelligence systems. The

intelligence system provides early warning if the tactical redeployment is discovered by the enemy before it is

completed. As the tactical redeployment progresses, the intelligence system places an increasing reliance on

unconventional or human collection assets from the intelligence organisation. Such sources are employed on

high-speed avenues of approach and along potential parallel flanking routes that the enemy may attempt to use

in pursuit.

1114. The larger the redeploying force, the more important security becomes to prevent the intention of the

operation from being prematurely revealed to the enemy. Once the operation begins, deception operations are

directed to confuse the enemy. Limited objective attacks or feints are used for this purpose.

INTELLIGENCE IN OFFENSIVE OPERATION

Intelligence Function in Offensive Operation

1115. The success of an offensive operation will depend on speedy acquisition of intelligence both before and

during the operation. A sound operation plan can only be made after obtaining detailed intelligence on the

enemy and the terrain. As the operation progresses a continuous flow of combat intelligence will allow the

commander to modify his plan and identify 'fleeting opportunities' in time to react to them.

1116. Infiltration at any scale needs an accurate intelligence and careful planning. Precise information

regarding enemy strength, disposition, reinforcement capabilities, command, control and communication system

would call for both conventional and unconventional technique of information gathering. Specific information

irrespective of gaps/lanes between defended localities or obstacles especially mine-fields, enemy forces depth

locations and their overall surveillance and target acquisition plan will be essential for any infiltration plan.

Beside conventional intelligence gathering effort, unconventional forces operating at the rear and on the flanks

of the enemy will best suit the requirement of providing such vital information.

1117. Intelligence is primarily needed to assess the right time for launching a pursuit by accurately detecting

the indications of enemy‘s collapse. Mobile troop should reconnoitre on a wide front, taking considerable risks

to find routes forward, which are not covered by enemy rear guards. Air reconnaissance should be bold and

continuous.

Deception in Offensive Operation

1118. Deception is closely linked with the operational plan and is therefore, the responsibility of the

operations staff that issue orders for implementation of deception plans. But the success of it depends on

detailed knowledge of the enemy, which is the preview of the intelligence staff. Therefore, in working out and

executing a deception plan there must be the closest liaison between the operations and intelligence staff.

Deception in offensives will have the following objects.

a. To provide the commander with freedom of action to carry out his mission.

b. To gain surprise.

c. To mislead the enemy and persuade him to adopt a course of action that is to his disadvantage and

which own forces can exploit.

1119. Infiltrating forces must consider all measures to avoid detection. The passage of the groups through the

enemy positions and their movement to their attack positions/ forming up place (FUP) may be accompanied by

feints and demonstrations, including preparatory fires in areas not included in the infiltration.

Electronic Warfare (EW) in Offensive Operation

1120. The pursuing force should employ all available means of electronic countermeasures to confuse the

enemy, to deny him use of his command, control and communications and to hinder his attempts to consolidate

and reorganise.

1121. EW operation must support offensive operation. This can be done if the EW plan is developed early

and is fully integrated into the overall operational plan. It must also be updated continuously in the light of

changes in the tactical situation. The nature of offensive operations will demand that EW assets are deployed

well forward in order to develop the EW information base for further EW support of operation. The tasks of EW

will be :

a. Information Gathering. By means of Electronic Support Measures (ESM) all enemy electronic

emissions can be located, intercepted and identified. This information can then be used with other

intelligence to build up the combat intelligence picture. Prior to contact with the enemy ESM may

provide information from which indicators of enemy Order of Battle (ORBAT), tasks, locations,

dispositions and intentions can be obtained. After contact, changes in enemy ORBAT, his location,

activities and main effort can be identified. EW could also assist in target acquisition and development.

b. Increase Combat Power. By provision of a capability to disrupt the enemy‘s use of the

electromagnetic spectrum at critical times in battle.

Enemy Reconnaissance and Security of Operations

1122. Because of enemy reconnaissance and the length of time, which may pass before battle is joined,

formations should mask their intentions for as long as possible. Own intentions can be concealed by adopting

flexible dispositions which do not limit the force to a single type of manoeuvre. Active deception and security

operation also help to conceal own intentions. Covering troops should operate well forward during operational

manoeuvres to give the force information on the enemy‘s dispositions and time and space in which to act. As

battle is joined formations adjust their final movement and look for opportunities to defeat enemy defence in

depth. In particular they seek ways to employ operational reserves effectively.

CLANDESTINE INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS FOR WAR

General

1123. Clandestine Intelligence Operation is not a peace time effort only. It is conducted both during peace

and war, even more prior to or during war than during peace. Clauswidth stated that commanders at all level

especially at higher level face the biggest challenges from fog of war or uncertainty of war. In the period prior to

hostility, the decision makers and planners at strategic level want to avoid being strategically surprised and

during war commander at operational level want to avoid tactical surprise. Whatever modern instrument that has

come up in the field of Signal Intelligence, Imagery Intelligence or Technical Intelligence, it can not read the

human mind and it can not get a copy of the latest operational or campaign plan. It is ultimately the human

Intelligence through espionage or agent operation the secret of the secrets can be extracted. It is not only the

espionage or secret intelligence gathering but also the other fields like sabotage, subversion and covert action

that we have to resort to.

1124. Hundred of historical examples can be sited where special type of agent operation were conducted prior

to or during war. Russo-Japan war and Austo Hungarian War of 19th century and last two World Wars are

classical example of employing agent for military operation. The side used it most had ultimately signed the

peace treaty. Though it appears difficult in present day battle but still the trade craft is being used in all modern

warfare. Boldness, tenacity and secrecy are the crux of the whole operation. Centralised planning, distribution of

responsibility and decentralised execution keeping the overall campaign goal will be the pillar to success.

1125. When one side has resource short fall and the other side is much superior in economic, military and

technical field, intelligence can act as a force multiplier if meticulously planned and executed. Dividend can be

very high as compared to the expenditure. This can be taken as a very good lesson for Bangladesh, when we

have to compensate our resource constraints in the face of potential mighty adversary. This should not be taken

as a special operation conducted by commando troops only.

Method of Operation

1126. General. This is basically under cover operations conducted by intelligence organisation deep inside

enemy territory or enemy held territory with the help of locally recruited agents or own personnel working as an

agent. In the context of war, different types of agent operations are specially required, which are :

a. Agent in Place/ Penetration Agent.

b. Roving Agent.

c. Resident Agent.

d. Stay Behind Agent.

e. Dormant/ Sleeper Agent.

f. Covert Action Agent.

1127. Agent In Place/ Penetration Agent. Agent in place is an agent who is able to obtain intelligence

information or material by being within the specific target itself. He has either been successful in gaining

placement and access within a designated target or he was already in the target and was recruited as an agent.

National level intelligence organisation or inter service intelligence organization should plan for placement of

agent in place in order to monitor troops, aircraft and ship movement. This is a full time job and must be

resorted to during peace in and around all known Army, Air force and Naval bases. Agent should also be

employed in the nearest Command Corps, Division, Air Base, Naval Base to get access to the operation plan and

other information of that are operationally very important. Another group of agent should be employed for

monitoring strategic intelligence like war production, scientific development, economic vulnerability,

transportation and commutation etc of the enemy country.

1128. Roving Agent. Roving Agent is an agent who arrives in the vicinity of target and is able to move

within the area. He is given specific instructions by the agent handler as to where or when he is to travel, how he

is to travel and what target he is to observe. This agent may be an individual dispatched from base country or

third country into the vicinity of the target. He may be a legal traveller or an illegal border crosser depending

upon the method of lunching (illegal or legal).

1129. Resident Agent. Resident Agent is an agent who obtains intelligence information or material by being

in the vicinity of the target. He may be an individual who was recruited because he was already residing in the

vicinity of the target or he may have been dispatched to take up residence near the target, but does not live in the

immediate vicinity of the target.

1130. Stay Behind Agent. Stay behind Agent is an agent recruited for the specific purpose of staying behind

in the area from which friendly forces are to be or have been withdrawn and to collect information or to operate

as subsequently directed. He is also sometimes referred to as sleeper agent. They operate normally in the enemy

occupied area or closely enemy territory under suitable cover with a reasonable status to support his cover

identity. They will live of the land and pass on the secret information through clandestine wireless. They are

normally employed along the enemy axis of advance in order to gather maximum information through

observation or through agent net. It is the responsibility of formation to plan for such operation.

1131. Sleeper Agent/ Dormant. Sleeper Agent / Dormant agent are either infiltrated into target countries or

recruited from among local citizens. These agents remain inactive and completely disassociated from

clandestine activities till such time they are needed. They are usually made active during war. They normally do

not perform any job unless they are activated prior to the hostility. This helps them in not being blown. They are

employed deep inside enemy territory for all types of intelligence Job. The very location may be a chock point

or vital ground or nearer to vital military installation like air field, ammunition depots, sea port, cantonment etc.

They provide vital information regarding deployment of NBC, missile, tank, bridge equipment, ship and air

movement. Another type of sleeper are employed for destruction of communication system, vital war materials

and assassination of key personal to have demoralising effect. They are employed at the strategic level by inter

services and national intelligence organisation under an overall plan.

1132. Covert Action Agent. In order to provoke subversion, agitation, mass movement, insurgency and

terrorism, a group of specially trained agent handlers are sent to the problem areas of the enemy country. With

the shelter of the local supporters these agent handlers motivate and train more agents for subversive action

against enemy country. A peace time strategic intelligence analysis and link is a pre-requisite for success.

a. Saboteur. There are special saboteurs employed during the war, either by para drop or by off

shore landing or by land infiltration. They occupy safe houses maintained by agent in place or sleepers

one after another under suitable cover and reach near to the target, destroy it and withdraw to the safe

area.

b. Provocation Agent. Their purpose is to provoke the intelligence agencies of the target country

into course of action which will benefit own intelligence organisation.

c. Confusion Agents. An agent who is launched to deliberately feed false or misleading

information to enemy intelligence agencies is known as confusion agent.

How to Plan Clandestine Intelligence Operation

1133. Planning Consideration. Clandestine intelligence for war must be planned and partially executed

during peace. Following aspects need to be considered prior to engaging for such operation :

a. In 1st stage through Strategic Intelligence Analysis of the enemy country is the foremost priority.

This analysis must need to be elaborated.

b. In 2nd stage a vulnerability study to be conducted for both own and enemy country which will

lead to the places need to be observed, targets need to be destroyed and organisations need to be used

for covert action and other support facilities to be availed for sound execution of the mission.

c. Basing on the priority of locations, targets and organisations the requirement of manpower and

fund will be worked out.

d. Requirement may be executed in phases basing on the resource constraint and requirement of

prevention from of breech of security.

e. A decentralised clandestine training should be conducted for different types of agent and their

likely mission.

f. Maintenance of secrecy is the crux of the whole business. Therefore adequate security and

deception must be catered for planning, training, preparation dispatch and employment of these agents.

1134. National and Inter Services Level. Basing on the campaign plan chalked out at the highest level a

complete plan for war time agent operation is also worked out at the national or inter services intelligence level.

This plan is based on the campaign requirement and the strategic intelligence analysis. In this plan location,

target and organisation are identified and responsibility is distributed to various organisation. Broad policies,

provision of fund, training and employment are mentioned.

1135. Service Level. Basing on the above plan service HQ works out their plan. Their minimum jurisdiction

will be corresponding command level and peace time location of command reserve of the enemy. Service should

also execute sabotage and covert action if assigned by the national plan. For Air Force and Navy the entire

opposite force should be made the target for clandestine operation.

1136. Formation Level. It is very difficult to ascertain up to which they should operate. Putting up a

mileage limitation is no way justifiable due to enemy denial and deception and likely fluidity of war. During

peace and prior to war, formation intelligence unit can operate external network in and around enemy

cantonment and military installation. During war their look out should be the depth or reserve formation. They

should also employ stay behind agent from own trained personnel behind the enemy line and in the enemy

occupied area. Primary means of communication should in this stage be clandestine wireless. Agent should live

off the land with necessary fund provided and should use previously worked out safe houses or contacts houses.

Their cover should also support their livelihood and mission.

Support Agent Operation

1137. Basic Types. A support agent is an individual who can assist in obtaining of intelligence under the

management of an agent handler. This category is further divided into four types, like spotter, investigators,

trainees and principle agents.

1138. Communication Agent. Agents who assist in the technical means of communication within the

intelligence activity is not a communication agent. These agents include radio operators, computer operator etc.

1139. Safe House Keeper. An agent, who is an attendant, takes care of and manages a safe house and also

retains the appearance that such a house is being occupied under normal conditions.

1140 – 1200. Reserved.

SECTION - 12

ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE ANALYSIS

General

1201. Order of Battle (ORBAT) intelligence is an integral part of intelligence analysis at all level.

Intelligence analysts consider ORBAT intelligence and integrate it with other intelligence pertaining to weather,

terrain, and other factors to determine threat capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable course of action. This

chapter describes the ORBAT analysis process and the tools used to develop and integrate ORBAT.

1202. ORBAT is the identification, strength, command structure and disposition of the personnel, units and

equipment of any foreign military force. Data is developed in many fields outside the scope of ORBAT, but all

intelligence is related ultimately to it. For example, technical intelligence (TI), produces intelligence on the

capabilities of weapons systems, but ORBAT intelligence determines the effect of weapon capabilities and

characteristics on enemy tactics, combat effectiveness and organisation.

Order of Battle Factors

1203. The ORBAT consists of evaluated information on enemy, allied and neutral forces on the following

factors:

a. Composition.

b. Disposition.

c. Strength.

d. Tactics.

e. Training.

f. Logistics.

g. Combat Effectiveness.

h. Electronic ORBAT.

j. Miscellaneous Data.

Composition

1204. Composition is the identification and organisation of units and formations. It applies to specific units

or commands as opposed to type of units. Unit identification often is called the key to ORBAT intelligence

because it leads to the answers to many questions concerning the enemy. Unit identification consists of the

complete designation of a specific unit by name or number, type, relative size or strength. Through

identification, the ORBAT analyst develops a history of the composition, training, tactics and combat

effectiveness of an enemy unit. The identification of a specific unit within organisation alerts the analyst to the

possible presence of other unidentified or unallocated units of the same organization.

1205. Organisation is the physical structure of an unit and the relationship of the various elements within the

structure. Knowledge of the organisation of an unit or military force aids in developing accurate intelligence on

current strength and combat efficiency. Further threat capabilities as they relate to tactics, training and logistics

are difficult to assess accurately without knowledge of the current organisation.

1206. The basic self-sufficient tactical unit (normally in infantry division) is considered when developing

intelligence concerning composition. In some countries, the field army is considered the basic self-sufficient

tactical unit. In other, it is the brigades. The importance of this concept lies in the term 'self-sufficient'. Units

subordinate to self-sufficient tactical units, although capable of limited independent action, cannot sustain

themselves over relatively long periods of time. Subordinate units seldom are employed independently or

separately from the basic self-sufficient tactical unit. For example, a new Wolf land (WL) Infantry Brigade is

reported in the Area at Ocean line. When one of these brigades is located, suspect that the remaining elements of

the division also are in the area. Composition also implies grouping and regrouping of combat and combat

support unit of the same formation or even other formation.

Disposition

1207. Disposition consists of the location of enemy units and the manner in which these units are deployed

tactically (or administratively in times of peace). In addition, disposition includes the recent, current and

projected (or probable) movements of enemy units. Location refers to a geographical area or position occupied

by an unit or formations units. Knowledge of the strength and location of an enemy force assists the intelligence

officer in determining the capabilities of the enemy force and its effect upon the accomplishment of the friendly

mission. Data of this type is collected during peacetime and forms the basis for assessing capabilities during the

initial period of hostilities.

1208. Tactical deployment is the relative position of units and formation with respect to one another or to the

terrain. Tactical formations are designed for exacting the various tactical manoeuvres and usually are based

upon doctrine. If this deployment is predetermined, it leads to an accurate appraisal of probable enemy courses

of action. The knowledge of how units are arranged in echelon indicates ( if the enemy assumes the offensive)

which units are used in the initial attack and which units are employed in supporting and reserve roles. Tactical

deployment with respect to terrain is also important. A study of disposition with an analysis of the terrain leads

to conclusions concerning enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action. This may be

accomplished this through the intelligence preparation of Battle Field process.

1209. Movement of units is part of disposition. Movement is the physical relocation of a unit from one

geographical point to another. Patrol activity may be an indication of planned movement but, in itself, is not

movement. Movement is significant because it automatically changes the tactical deployment of the opposing

forces. When a threat unit has moved, is moving or possibly will move in the future, it becomes capable of

execution a number of actions which affect the conduct of the battle (or the current political situation). Such a

unit moves into an attack position, moves to reinforce or to replace a unit or performs other missions. In view of

these possibilities, movement of a unit becomes important. The ORBAT analyst must continually monitor unit

movements on order to provide correct and detailed data on enemy disposition.

Strength

1210. Strength describes a unit or formation in terms of personnel, weapons and equipment. Information

concerning strength provides the commander with an indication of enemy capabilities and helps determine the

probable courses of action or options open to threat commanders. A lack of strength or a preponderance of

strength has the effect of lowering or raising the estimate of the capabilities of an opposing force. Likewise, a

marked concentration or build-up of units in an area gives the commander certain indication of enemy

objectives and probable courses of action. During peacetime, changes in the strength of potential enemy forces

are important factors which may indicate changes in the enemy‘s intention. Enemy strength computations are

described separately in another section.

Tactics

1211. Tactics in ORBAT intelligence include tactical doctrine as well as tactics employed by specific units.

Tactical doctrine refers to the enemy‘s accepted principles of organisation and employment of force for the

conduct of operations. Tactics, on the other hand, describe the manner in which units conduct an operation.

From knowledge of tactical doctrine, the ORBAT analyst knows how the enemy may employ forces under

various conditions and in certain type of situations or special operations. Units normally are expected to perform

according to certain patterns within the framework of their tactical doctrine. All Armies establish basic

principles and patterns for the employment of infantry, mechanized unit, tank, and artillery units in the offence

and defence. For a more specific nature, in specialized tactical doctrine, employment of a certain unit in a given

situations during combat or training activities is analyzed, because it indicates possible changes in enemy

doctrine. Doctrinal template, is one method of graphically portraying enemy tactics.

Training

1212. Individual and unit training contribute significantly to the combat effectiveness of any military

organisation. The thoroughness, degree and quality of initial training which the recruit, specialist, junior leaders

and officer receive are major factors in determining the overall efficiency of an armed force. Unit training,

normally conducted in seasonal cycles form small unit exercises to large-scale manoeuvres, is an essential part

of the training necessary for a unit to operate at its full potential. Each type or phase of training a unit

accomplishes adds to its capabilities and effectiveness.

1213. Specialized training that a unit receives may point to its ability to undertake certain missions beyond its

normal doctrinal capabilities or responsibilities. Therefore, it is easier to appraise the combat effectiveness of a

unit when the degree and quality of its training are known, as well as any specialized training it undertakes.

Logistics

1214. Logistics closely relates to combat effectiveness. The adoption of a course of action depends on the

ability of the logistical system to support that action. With knowledge of the current capabilities of an unit‘s a

logistical support structure, we can make a more accurate evaluation of its capabilities, strengths and combat

effectiveness. Also, the location of elements of a unit‘s logistical support structure indicates the disposition of

manoeuvre formations and combat support elements. Categories of logistical information include :

a. All classes and types of logistical requirement.

b. Supply lines of communication.

c. Logistical policies.

d. Procurement methods.

e. Distribution priorities and procedures.

f. Transportation networks and modes.

g. Installations, logistical control points and terminal.

h. Dumping Policies.

j. Evacuation and Salvage Procedures.

k. Repair and Maintenances.

Combat Effectiveness

1215. Combat effectiveness describes the abilities and fighting quality of an unit. Numerous tangible and

intangible factors affect it. Combat effectiveness affects the capabilities of a unit or army and is predicated by

analysing followings:

a. Personnel strength.

b. Amount and condition of weapons and equipment.

c. Status of training.

d. Efficiency of the Officers, Junior-commission officers and Non- commission officers.

e. Quality of leadership.

f. Length of time the unit has been committed in combat.

g. Traditions and past performance.

h. Personality traits of the unit commanders.

j. Geographical area in which committed.

k. Morale, esprit, health, discipline and political reliability (or belief in cause)

l. Status of technical and logistical support of the unit.

m. Adequacy of military schooling at all levels.

n. National characteristics of the people.

Electronic ORBAT

1216. Electronic ORBAT information is required to conduct Electronic Warfare. This data includes

communication and non-communication equipments such as emitter type and nomenclature (including encoding

equipment), modulation, multiplex capability, pulse duration, pulse repetition frequency, bandwidth, associated

weapons systems and other technical characteristics of electronic emissions. They also include critical

communications nodes such as Command Post and logistical control points. They support enemy electronic

order of battle (EOB) template. With electronic technical data, a more accurate evaluations of the enemy‘s

vulnerability to electronic countermeasures (ECM) and deceptions is made; signals intercept and directions

finding (DF) for the production of SIGINT is made easier and support is given to electronic counter-

countermeasures (ECCM) by assessing the enemy EW capabilities.

Miscellaneous Data

1217. Know Your Enemy. Miscellaneous data includes supporting information needed by an analyst to

develop other ORBAT elements. It includes basic intelligence described as 'know your enemy'. Information on

uniforms and insignias is an important part of 'know your enemy' intelligence. This information assists in

establishing unit identification and organization and in determining morale and esprit de corps.

1218. Personality Files. A personality file contains information on certain characteristics and attributes

which describe individual members of a military force. Knowledge of personalities is important in identifying

units and in some cases, predicting the course of action the unit will take. Personality data, therefore, is valuable

because the tactics and combat efficiency of particular units are often closely related to key individuals within

its command structure.

1219. Unit History. This includes information and intelligence on the elements of a specific unit; on present

and past parent units; personalities who have commanded the units and other details like past performance and

activities which describe, limit, or clarify the capabilities of the unit concerned. The development of unit history

is important in determining the capabilities and limitations of a unit. Military or paramilitary units, like

individuals, develop characteristics which distinguish them from other units. Just as they consider the various

qualifications and traits of enemy personalities, ORBAT personnel also must consider a enemy unit as a

personality in analyzing its capabilities and limitations.

1220. Unit Code/Tactical Number/Field Post. Some foreign armies use systems of code number, names or

false tactical markings to conceal true designations (or affiliations) of units, field post number (unit mailing

address), and vehicle identification or side numbers. These systems, when properly analysed are valuable

sources of information that are related to unit composition and disposition.

ORBAT Book

1221. General. An ORBAT book is a summary of all basic intelligence concerning the composition,

disposition, identification, subordination and strength of a service that function in ground or ground support

role. It normally is published by the Service Headquarters and by the Inter Services Intelligence Organisation.

The level or echelon of units shown depends on the level of command for the intended user. Generally, this is at

least one echelon above and two echelons below that of the intended user. During peacetime, units, which form

only on mobilization, are identified as such.

1222. Contents. The ORBAT book includes the following information for each unit :

a. Identification to includes numerical designator and type of unit, nationality (unit) religion.

b. Field Post Number.

c. Parent Formation (brigade, division, corps, command).

d. Category and effective strength.

e Location to includes Place name (and country if deployed abroad), Installation

number or name (if applicable), Military geographic region (if applicable) and

Universal transverse meter (UTM) coordinates (supplement with geographic

coordinates whenever possible).

1223. Additional Data. The following data are also included :

a. Code name or code number (enemy assigns official name or number).

b. Nickname (unofficial popular name).

c. Honours or honour titles.

d. Unit insignia.

e. Latitude and longitude of subject (in addition to UTM coordinates)

f. Commander‘s name, rank, initials and specialty and those of other key personnel.

g. Combat effectiveness (including any data on specialized training).

h. Turret numbers, vehicle registration numbers, or other tactical signs.

j. Any other data at the discretion of the originator.

k. Encyclopaedia or target data inventory numbers.

The structure of an ORBAT book varies. However, it normally contains three sections: namely General, detailed

ORBAT and Summaries of Supporting Documents.

Strategic ORBAT Hand Book

1224. The Strategic ORBAT handbook, which is often referred to as a handbook of military forces, is a

summary of basic intelligence on a foreign nation‘s political or governmental structure and military

establishment , including its tactics and doctrine. It includes more technical data's such as the logistical system

used and the characteristics of weapons and equipments.

1225. The ORBAT handbook normally deals with only one country. It deals with two or more countries in

separate parts, especially when these countries are closely associated with each other by pact, geographically or

in some other way. As minimum, it contains :

a. History, Governmental and Political Structure. This includes a short history of the nation and

a comprehensive description of its governmental and political structure.

b. Armed Forces Organisation. This includes a description of the nation‘s military establishment

(including paramilitary and an explanation of how command and control of the is affected. This also

includes a complete explanation of the organisation and composition of all the various types of ground

force units and formations. The organization and composition of a new ground force unit also is

included if that unit is likely to be placed under command or in support of the ground forces in time of

war.

c. Logistical Support Organization. An explanation of the logistical system the ground forces

employs from ministerial level to the lowest echelon.

d. Strategic and Tactical Doctrine. A description of reserve forces, the mobilization system and

times required for mobilization.

e. Military Education and Training. This includes a description of the military education and

training system and an explanation of the personnel recruitment and selection process.

f. Uniforms and Insignia. A full description of all armed forces uniforms, ranks, and insignia.

g. Weapons and Equipment. A listing and brief description including characteristics of the various

types of weapons and equipment found in the armed forces. The list includes weapon and equipment‘s

country of origin, availability of technical expertise and likelihood of availability of equipments and

spares.

h. Allies. A list of likely military and political allies and type of support each may render.

1226. The contents of the ORBAT handbook are organised in the sequence shown above. When included,

organisation and tabular data are presented as follows :

a. Governmental and Political Structure and Armed Forces Organisation. Organizational charts

are to support the narrative description of these subjects where possible. There is no format for such

charts.

b. Organisational Structure. One should depict organisational structure for each type of unit and

arrange the organisational diagrams in the following sequence: headquarters, combat units, combat

support units, service support units.

c. Tables of Personnel, Weapons, and Equipment. Produce the tables according to available

information.

1227. Amendments of ORBAT handbook are done periodically. The timing and degree of amendment are

left to the discretion of the originator. They should, however, initiate amendment action whenever some one can

detect a substantial change to intelligence contained in the handbook or whenever it has a number of minor

amendments.

Installation Handbooks

1228. Ideally, installation handbooks contain complete information concerning every military installation in

every city in the country. They are useful, particularly during peacetime, for establishing which forces are

already in place. During wartime, the usefulness of installation handbooks decreases somewhat. However, they

still indicate likely production facilities reserve mobilisation and training centres.

Miscellaneous References

1229. Other publications and periodicals prepared at departmental and area command levels are of value to

the ORBAT analyst. These references may deal specifically with ORBAT or with any or all phases of tactical,

operational, and strategic intelligence. The External Intelligence Organization produces studies on general

military capabilities and economic factors which has impact on military capabilities. Directorate General of

Forces Intelligence makes special studies on various subjects concerning foreign and enemy military forces.

These studies usually are detailed, technical in nature and provide a wealth of special information not otherwise

available.

1230. The ORBAT analyst uses various recording aids in organization and cataloguing ORBAT information.

He creates ORBAT rerecords and files through a compilation of information available in the references

discussed above. Subsequently, these are used continuously to produce current intelligence and to update other

intelligence records, like the situation map and IPB products. ORBAT files facilitate easy reference and

comparison of ORBAT information collected at various times from various sources. Each intelligence-

processing element decides, which aids to maintain. The type used depends on the echelon of command and the

local situation.

1231 – 1300. Reserved.

SECTION - 13

MILITARY CAPABILITY ANALYSIS

General

1301. Intelligence analysts advise military commanders about enemy rather than about direct combat

operations. Yet, the value of intelligence in warfare is great. The Chinese military theorist, Sun Tzu, summarised

the importance of intelligence this way: ―Now the reason the enlightened prince and the wise general conquer

the enemy whenever they move and their achievements surpass those of ordinary men is foreknowledge. An

army without secret agents (or modern intelligence resources) is exactly like a man without eyes or ears.‖

1302. Seeing and hearing the truth is the goal of all intelligence analysis. The national interest requires that

Bangladesh Army acts quickly and wisely. To act quickly, they must have the benefit of foreknowledge, and to

act wisely they require information that is as free from bias and distortion as possible.

1303. The most important role of intelligence analysts is to advise military commanders and other decision

makers about the military strengths and weaknesses of potential adversaries. Military capability analysis

provides the foundation for providing such ―advice‖. It includes tangible aspects like military hardware and size

of forces and intangible, attributes like training, spirit de corps, and educational expertise.

Types of Analysis

1304. The nature of intelligence from a strategic standpoint is to provide processed information on broad

patterns and trends that is used by hostile nation's policy makers and its command authority. Military capability

analysis are of three types :

a. Strategic Military Capability Analysis. It orients on indications and warning based on

capabilities of opposing force and commitment of opposing leadership to their strategic goals and

objectives.

b. Operational Military Capability Analysis. It orients of the gathering of information to provide

analytical support in order to reveal and identify capabilities, activities and interrelationships between

formations and units.

c. Tactical Military Capability Analysis. It provides actionable information on current or

imminent location, movement and activity. It is time critical information requiring immediate

dissemination and responses. It is not analysed in a comprehensive manner.

STRATEGIC MILITARY CAPABILITY ANALYSIS

Factors

1305. When analysing a country‘s military capability, four areas usually surface. Force structure,

modernisation, readiness and sustainability. These areas are known as the four pillars of military capability

analysis. Following factors are required to be considered :

a. Force Structure. The number, size and composition of a unit which comprise a military force,

e.g. Divisions, Ships, Air Wings or Squadrons, their command, control, communication and battle field

functions are discussed.

b. Modernisation. The technical sophistication of forces, units, weapons systems and equipment

including training and education. This also includes hardware production and replacement capabilities.

c. Readiness. The technical sophistication of forces, units, weapons systems and equipment to

deliver the outputs for which they were designed, including the ability to employ/deploy without

delays, mobilisation, etc.

d. Sustainability. This is the ability to maintain the necessary level and duration of operational

activity to obtain military objectives. It is a function of providing for and maintaining those levels of

ready forces, material and consumables necessary to support the military effort. This also includes

people‘s participation and support, reinforcement, production or replacement or stocking capabilities.

1306. Force structure and modernisation is the least dynamic and most stable pillar. It is most easily predicted

at strategic and operational levels. Force structure can be most critical and dynamic at tactical levels. Readiness

and sustainability govern the degree to which force structure and modernisation can be exploited. They can be

the most dynamic and critical factor throughout the strategic, operational and tactical analysis. Readiness can be

however, the hardest factors to quantify and measure and can be the most difficult to predict. Force structure and

modernisation together with organisational structures and doctrine constitute a theoretical maximum force

potential, while readiness and sustainability act as enablers and constrainers on the maximum forces potential.

Intentions Analysis

1307. Will a hostile armed force threaten retention and capabilities of our nation such as the stability of

government? Where and when are these threatened actions likely to occur?. Intention is as much a political

question as military one. Thus, analysts must begin by studying the political conditions underlying the war.

Sensitivity to underlying political situation separates military intelligence from normal military operations.

1308. One can learn the enemy‘s intentions by studying his actions, by reading his statements including

encrypted messages and through analysing his troop movements. Enemy statements and troop deployments

often are themselves political (non-violent) posturing, as well as indicators of imminent combat.

1309. This first question of intention is studied in terms of grand strategy. That is, what are a hostile nation‘s

political goals-including reasons they would initiate war, as well as what they hope to achieve after the war. All

components of strategic intelligence are involved in grand strategy. Should threatening actions actually begin,

will the hostile armed force achieve its goal (i.e... defeat, resist or conquer our forces) despite our own military

actions, is the most fundamental question to be addressed to determine intention.

1310. The second question, that of a hostile military‘s capability to defeat or confound its enemies, requires

the simultaneous comparison of two military forces (friendly and enemy). Analysing military capability requires

the study of both strategy and the operational art. A net of all these factors is an assessment of potential war

fighting capabilities.

Doctrine of Capabilities

1311. The commanders must be certain that they base their actions, dispositions and plans upon the

appreciation of the enemy capabilities rather than upon the appreciation of enemy‘s intentions. An appreciation

of the enemy capabilities can be objectively formulated because it is based upon the knowledge of enemy

strength, disposition, activities, organisations and morale. But the enemy intentions can seldom be determined

easily. The enemy commanders may change their orders. Furthermore the enemy may promulgate false orders

and rumours which in themselves would indicate an action different from that which he actually intends. The

enemy may also take measures to give false information for him to do this than to spread false information about

his intentions.

The Initial Planning Process

1312. Intelligence specialists analyse information and communicate findings which satisfies the requestor‘s

needs. The analyst must use his time and resources well to determine followings :

a. What ? What is the task? Whether this task be redefined to be made more clear? Am I answering

the underlying question ?

b. When ? When must the project be completed? Will all the milestones, from intelligence

collection and production through distribution, be completed in time ? Is there sufficient time for

thorough analysis ?

c. How ? What collection and analytical methodologies are appropriate to this project ?

d. To Whom ? Who is the ultimate consumer ? What are the appropriate methods for

discriminating or communicating this information ?

1313. The analyst‘s challenge is to reach a net assessment of the military situation– that is, simultaneously to

consider the capabilities and intentions of both the enemy and own forces. Net assessments force the intelligence

officer to view the situation differently than do operations officers.

Hypothesis Generation

1314. Intelligence officers analyse a military problem by separating the whole into its component parts and

they do this for both enemy and friendly forces. Armed with heaps of data about an enemy military force,

intelligence officers must now answer the consumer‘s question. Complex problems rarely have simple answer,

nor can one rely on a single information source. Yet, one must conceive or sometimes guess at the correct

answer. Hypotheses are possible answers to a question. Implicitly or explicitly, intelligence analysts make use of

hypotheses.

1315. An important difference between intelligence analysis and operational analysis is that the intelligence

analyst must ―role play‖, that is, think like the enemy. Optimally, you must know enough about enemy military

operations to empathise with the enemy‘s situation to the degree that you can think like the enemy commander.

At a minimum, however, you need to broadly understand military operations, as well as understand the political,

economic, geographic and demographic issues involved, for both friendly and enemy forces.

1316. Intelligence analysts use at least two hypotheses: viz the most likely course of actions by the enemy

and the most dangerous action the enemy could take. Both of these hypothesis estimate the military result (or net

assessment) of these hypothetical enemy actions. Two hypotheses are a minimum because; fundamental

intelligence errors result from the failure to hypothesise all possible enemy courses of action.

Other Steps of Analytical Process

1317. Gathering and Listing Evidence. Most strategic analysts love data, and are most conscious about

gathering evidence. Bias can distort the selection of evidence. They should be sure to collect information that

may be pertinent to the least likely hypothesis.

1318. Prepare the Evidence/Hypotheses Matrix. At a minimum, contrast at least two hypothesis, viz what

the enemy prefers to do and what the enemy must do.

1319. Refine the Matrix. Refinement requires removal of evidence with diagnostic value. Additionally,

here one may employ additional techniques, such as mathematical analysis and comparison with base rate data.

1320. Draw Tentative Conclusions. Let truth, rather than personal preference, be the guide at all times.

1321. Sensitivity Analysis. Strategic intelligence typically relies on huge sources of data which makes

sensitivity analysis singularly important. Moreover, not all sources are of equal significance.

1322. Report Conclusions. The strategic planner must receive intelligence reports on time and in a usable

form. Intelligence improperly communicated is worthless.

1323. Identify Milestones. You must communicate your judgments and identity those factors that could

cause you to alter your judgment.

OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL CAPABILITY ANALYSIS

General

1324. Commanders base their plans and actions on the enemy's operational and tactical capabilities and the

probability of their adoption. Enemy capabilities can be appeared objectively because these are based on

knowledge of the area of operations, the enemy's time and space factors and others pattern of deployment .The

enemy may practice cover and deception to indicate actions different from those which he actually intends. In

considering enemy capabilities actions which are generally disadvantageous to the enemy or unreasonable are

not included. For example, the enemy may be physically capable of disengaging troops committed outside our

area in order to employ them against us. However, in most circumstances the intelligence staff does not consider

this to be a capability which is unreasonable.

1325. Definition Military capabilities at operational and tactical level are those courses of action of which

the enemy is physically capable and which if adoptable will effect the accomplishment of our operational and

tactical mission. The enemy capabilities must fulfil the following requirements :

a. Time and Space. The enemy must be physically capable of adopting the particular course of

action within time and space dimensions.

b. Own Mission. The course of action if adopted must effect the accomplishment of our mission.

1326. Meaning of Effects. It is readily understood that all possible enemy courses of action that might

interfere with the accomplishment of the mission are of interest to the commander. Their considerations in

conjunction with other factors assist greatly in making correct plans and decision. However, in some instance

the enemy courses of action that would actually favour the accomplishment of our mission may prepare the

commander to take advantage of a weakness developing in the enemy situation. This may enable him to save his

men, time and material. He may also be able to gain a more favourable position from which to continue the

action against the enemy. The enemy capabilities may have an important bearing on our action. Therefore,

enemy capability that favours the accomplishment of our mission must not be overlooked.

Determination of Enemy Capabilities

1327. General. The statement of enemy capabilities must provide the answers to what, where, in what

strength and when. In dealing with the capabilities to attack or defend, reinforced are invariably expressed.

When concerned with the delay and withdrawal capabilities the what strength and 'when' are often omitted

which implies that the operation can be executed with the entire command at any time in reference to the air

capabilities. Omission of when implies that it can be excited at any time. The factors for the determination of

enemy capabilities are discussed subsequently.

1328. What. It implies followings :

a. Courses of Action. Here we discuss what general types of tactical courses of action are usually

possible. The enemy can attack, defend reinforce or execute a retrograde movement. These operations

are usually drivable into a variety of specific courses of action. Example of an attack may be a

penetration, envelopment, turning movement or pursuit. A defence may be in one position or in

successive positions either static or mobile.

b Specific Action. The specific actions which the enemy can physically adopt depend upon the

available means and conditions under which those means can be used. Consequently the ‗what‘ of each

of the enemy capabilities determined by the characteristic of the area of operation, the order of battle of

the opposing forces and time and space factors. Characteristics of the area of operations, friendly

situation and means available to the enemy usually indicate that the enemy is physically capable of

certain actions. For example, the enemy can envelop only when we have a physically not capable flank.

He can conduct airborne operation only when he has the necessary troops and aircrafts.

1329. When. The determination of the ‗when‘ of any enemy capability implies :

a. Time. Here time means the time required for the enemy to employ his combat power. This

capability depends upon the disposition of his forces and equipment. Forces deployed near the

operational area may be committed without significant delay. Considerable time may be required to

commit other resources.

b. Displacement of Forces. An enemy capability involving displacement of forces cannot be put

into effect until sometime after the force has started to move. Reserves cannot reinforce an attack or

defence until they have been moved to appropriate locations such as attack position or forward

assembly areas.

1330. Where. It designates the point or area of the possible activity of the enemy. This is determined from

three factors i.e. the areas of operations including terrain and weather. Enemy dispositions and own dispositions.

Exception arises in the case of reinforcement or withdrawal. In reinforcement ―what― is some logically chosen

point where reserves must reach in order to reinforce the enemy or to affect our mission. The factors in

determining the possible area of activity are :

a. Climate and Weather. Under the existing and predictable conditions of weather, the terrain may

provide approaches or avoidable routes of entry into our position from the flank. Two certain type

terrains possibly in conjunction with weather may have effect on certain type of enemy action e.g. an

armoured attack or motorised cross country movement. If sub divisions of the terrain are made then

each sub division of the terrain in conjunction with a specific course of action will be covered. The

number of areas of tactical significance selected must not be so great that the enemy capabilities

become confusing.

b. Enemy Disposition. Known enemy dispositions may emphasise certain areas even though such

emphasis may violate logical ground sub divisions. The direction point of an attack and the location of

a defensive position might be indicated from the enemy disposition.

1331. In What Strength. It implies followings :

a. Order of Battle. The strength the enemy can use in any particular capability depends primarily

upon the composition, disposition and strength of his available forces. Order of battle intelligence

furnishes these data. Detailed of the order of Battle is discussed separately.

b. Employment of Forces. The forces which the enemy has committed against friendly units can be

chosen to adopt. If six brigades are committed against a division, the enemy can attack with brigades

supported by all available artillery and air. He also can defend in his present position with the same six

brigades and the same support. In addition to the forces committed the enemy also can use the reserves

available at any echelon. If the enemy has six brigades committed and a brigade in reserve he usually

can reinforce either his attack or his defence with the reserve brigade. A partial statement of this

capability could be ―attack now to envelop our north flank with six brigades supported by all available

artillery and air, reinforced by one brigade at the following times and places‖.

Statement of Enemy Capabilities

1332. This is where we list those courses of action of which the enemy is physically capable and which, if

adopted, will affect the accomplishment of our mission. This paragraph contains intelligence vital to the

commander and his staff in determining friendly courses of action. Here we discuss what the enemy can do, will

not do to have a negative impact on our mission. Both general and specific capabilities are addressed. General

capabilities are listed using the time-tested acronym DRAW-DS‖ as a guide.

a. Defend

b. Reinforce.

c. Attack

d. Withdraw.

e. Delay

f. Support (optional).

1333. When a general capability is assumed, the estimate will then address specific capability. For example,

when it is assumed that the enemy will attack, the estimate will list viable capabilities for conducting that attack.

The viable specific capabilities will answer the question, like what the enemy is physically capable of doing ,

when he can execute the action, where he can carry it out and in what strength he can do it. An example of a

specific capability statement is given below :

Delay now along successive positions to prepare defensive strongpoint on the high ground north and northeast

of objective A with four mechanized battalions reinforced with artillery and attack helicopters.

1334. We addressed what the enemy can do, now we will state our analysis of what he will do, in the same

sequence as they are listed in paragraph above. The analysis is conducted with an eye toward determining the

enemy commander‘s most probable course of action. Using the under mentioned figures (or something similar

to it) as a guide, each capability is dissected on the points of indications, advantages/disadvantages to the enemy

and the effect on our mission :

Capabilities Indications Advantages to

Enemy

Disadvantages to

Enemy

Effect on our

Mission

Attack

Defend

Delay

Withdraw

Reinforce

Support

Facilitate

Delay

Jeopardise

Deny

1335 – 1400. Reserved.

SECTION - 14

COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS OF ENEMY STRENGTH

General

1401. Enemy strength undergoes a continuous fluctuation between authorised strengths and varying levels of

force, unit, equipment and personnel strengths during the course of a battle, campaign or war. These fluctuations

are a result of unit, personnel and equipment losses and the enemy‘s ability or inability to provide suitable

replacements quickly and consistently. Enemy strength computations provide a method for estimating the level

of combat effectiveness of enemy forces. It is computed in terms of committed forces, reinforcing and

supporting units and the number of nuclear weapons and chemical and biological delivery systems suspected or

identified as being deployed within the friendly commander‘s Area of Operation or Area of Interest.

1402. Based on the analyst‘s knowledge of enemy doctrine, order of battle and current information and

intelligence on enemy disposition, locations, and capabilities, the numbers of committed, reinforcing and

supporting forces are computed. Once these enemy forces are determined individual enemy units can be

identified or located and enemy strength computed. Personnel and equipment strengths are based upon reported

enemy personnel and equipment losses and known or estimated rates of replacement.

Definitions

1403. Numerical Strength. It is the expression of unit or force in terms of numbers or personnel, weapons

and equipment.

1404. Initial Strength. It is the strength of an enemy unit or force which comprises of the number of

personnel, weapons and equipment authorised by established and approved tables of organisation and equipment

(TO&E).

1405. Effective Strength. It is the strength of an enemy unit or forces which consists of that part including

logistics components of its initial strength of combat complement. It is the strength minus losses plus

reinforcement/ replacement.

1406. Strength by Type of Unit. It is the expression of units or forces in terms of numbers of units by type

such as infantry, amour, artillery and air.

1407. Committed Force. Committed forces are those enemy ground units, currently in contact or with

which imminent contact is expected, whose area of employment is not expected to change to counter the

specific course of action selected by the friendly commander. Committed forces may change disposition within

their area of employment but no significant delay is involved in their employment. Designation of enemy forces

as committed forces primarily depends upon their disposition, location at the time of the estimate, the echelon at

which the estimate is being prepared and enemy doctrine. Committed forces are located, unallocated, identified

or unidentified units.

1408. Reinforcement. Reinforcements are those enemy forces whose area of possible employment against

the friendly force depends on the friendly selection of a specific course of action and on enemy capabilities.

Reinforcements include all known enemy forces which are neither committed against a friendly force nor

committed outside the friendly zone or sector but which reasonably are considered capable of closing with the

friendly force in time to affect the accomplishment of the mission.

Computation of Enemy Strength

1409. Ingredients. Enemy strength is computed in terms of committed forces, reinforcement, air, nuclear

weapons, chemical and biological warfare capabilities. Since doctrinal differences allow for the holding of

specific units in a reserve and reinforcement role it is extremely important to study the enemy‘s doctrine prior to

computing strength. Enemy strength is normally presented in terms of numerical strength by type of unit.

Nuclear weapons capabilities are expressed in terms of weapons delivery systems and yields. Chemical and

biological capabilities are expressed in terms of the type, persistency, lethality and delivery systems.

1410. Circumstances. Prior to and at the onset of hostility, effective strength is compiled from intelligence

appreciations based on the martial strength and such circumstances are :

a. Degree of Initial Strength. The degree to which the enemy unit is up to initial strength at that

time.

b. Standing Force. Whether the enemy maintained large standing forces before the outbreak of

hostilities ?

c. Warning. Whether any warning of war was issued or would be received ?

d. Preparation. Whether the preparation for war was done because it was premeditated ?

e. Other Commitment. Whether the enemy was to or would be committed in other theatres ?

f. Movement. Movement facilities and means of communication be adequate of land, air and sea

facilities.

1411. Basic Consideration. Following basic considerations are made :

a. Appreciation. A consideration of the previous appreciations (if any) of effective strength as well

as more recent reliable intelligence is made.

b. Casualties Estimate. The incidence of casualties, reinforcements and replacements can be

estimated based on standard procedures.

1412. Elementary Method. The calculations which are to be expressed as percentages of the initial strength

are computed as under :

a. Attrition Rate. A percentage attrition rate is deducted from the initial strength when experience

has enabled this to be established for the circumstances. This rate is based on those men, weapons and

equipment which are temporarily not available to a unit for reasons other than battle casualties or

losses.

b. Subtractions/Additions. These are made in the light of reliable intelligence. Any items having

only a temporary significance should have their time lapse noted on the estimate. The following should

be physically counted where possible :

(1) Personnel. Killed in action, Prisoners of war and Wounded in action /non effectives.

(2) Weapons and Equipment. Destroyed, Captured and Damaged requiring base repair.

c. Reinforcements. Reinforcement of personnel and replacement of weapons and equipment is then

added in accordance with the strength estimated or the strength justified by reliable intelligence, where

this is different. In the absence of other guidance and where the enemy has secure lines of

communication to the main base, it is assumed that personnel reinforcement can be completed within

maximum 72 hours. Small weapons and light equipment can be replaced within 12 hours and other

weapons and equipment can be replaced within 72 hours.

Computation of Strength by Type - Uncommitted Troops

1413. Importance of Estimation by Types of Units. The commander and the operation officer use the

information the intelligence officer provides on enemy committed forces and reinforcements for planning and

conducting tactical operations. Accurate information is particularly important during the commander‘s analysis

of opposing courses of action. For example, in planning for an attack, an overestimation of committed enemy

forces and an underestimation of enemy reinforcements could cause the friendly commander to attack with a

small reserve. The intelligence officer‘s error in computing committed and reinforcing forces could allow the

enemy to counterattack with an unexpectedly strong force, inflicting unacceptable casualties upon the friendly

force.

1414. Committed Number of Units. The Designation of enemy units as committed forces depends

primarily on their disposition and location at the time the appreciation is made. Enemy unit identification may

facilitate in determining if a particular unit is the reserve of the elements in contact with the brigade or battalion.

Strength by type of unit includes the total number of enemy units listed by category and type. Normally,

intelligence staff account for enemy units down to and including two echelons below their own level of

command. For example, Intelligence staff at division level would express enemy strength at battalion level.

1415. Contact with Adjacent Units. When an enemy unit of the size used is accounted for committed

forces is in contact with two adjacent friendly units, the entire enemy unit is considered to be the committed

force by the intelligence staff of both the formations. For example, if an enemy battalion is in contact with the

elements of two adjacent divisions, the intelligence staff of both the divisions will consider the entire battalion

as committed against their respective divisions. It points out the need for correct identification and accurate

strength computation at each echelon.

1416. Protective Detachments. When enumerating enemy forces, enemy protective detachments forward

of the main defensive position are normally considered reinforcements of the main defensive position until

contact with that protective detachments is made. The intelligence staff must correctly identify the enemy‘s

main defensive position and must not be deceived by protective detachments. The protective detachments will

normally become reinforcements for the main defence after completing their mission.

1417. Fire Support. All ground fire support weapons organic to the enemy units are usually referred to as

normal artillery and are always considered to be in support of committed forces. That is, each committed unit is

assumed to have available to its normal proportion of the available supporting weapons organic to the regiment.

These weapons, therefore, need not to be enumerated unless desired. Fire support weapons not organic to enemy

battalions or brigades, which are identified as within supporting range are enumerated as if in support of

committed forces. In the event that the forces committed against the brigade or battalion have on known TO&E

(that is, volunteer or irregular-type units), all fire support weapons which are identified are enumerated.

1418. Level to Count. Strength by type of unit includes the total number of enemy units listed by category

and type. Normally, enemy units are counted down to and including two echelons below the friendly force‘s

level of command. Some special purpose units may also be counted for three echelons below :

a. At Higher Level. Usually, an intelligence officer accounts for committed enemy forces by the

size of the enemy unit which is opposing the friendly elements. At the most basic level, state the actual

number of weapons systems. Against an enemy army corps, a division Intelligence Staff usually counts

committed forces in terms of battalions and at corps level in terms of brigade. All Fire Support weapon

systems available including tanks, infantry fighting vehicles (IFVS), and artillery also are listed and

expressed in terms of total numbers.

b. The Brigade Level. He considers as committed forces the first and second echelon companies of

enemy mechanised, tank or reconnaissance battalions in contact with the brigade. Although the enemy

company is the basic sized unit used by the brigade in accounting for committed forces, the staff also

accounts for smaller units which have been located as separately employed.

c. The Battalion Level. He considers as committed forces the first and second echelon platoons of

the enemy mechanised, tank or reconnaissance companies in contact with the battalion. Although the

enemy platoon is the basic unit used by the battalion staff in accounting for committed forces, available

intelligence frequently does not enable the individual platoons composing the enemy company to be

located. Therefore, the battalion staff considers that a located enemy company normally consists of

three platoons composing (-) consists of two platoons.

1419. When 3rd Unit Not Known. When only two elements of a unit are located, they are counted as they

appear. By templating, it is possible to determine the approximate location of the third element. Although this

unit should not be counted, the commander is advised as to its possible location. An exception to this rule

occurs, however, in situations where enemy doctrine normally precludes elements of unit operating

independently of each other. For example, if a brigade staff detects the presence of one mechanised company of

Wolf Land, then the remaining elements of the mechanised are counted as committed but unallocated, enemy

forces. This is because Wolf Land doctrine normally precludes the mechanised companies of a mechanised

battalion from operating independently of each other.

Computing Enemy Reinforcement / Uncommitted Forces

1420. General. All uncommitted enemy forces are considered as reinforcements if they are committed in

time to affect the accomplishment of the mission. If there is doubt as to whether an enemy unit is committed or

reinforcing, it is considered as reinforcement. This reduces the risk of surprise.

1421. How to Count. Reinforcements are stated conveniently and meaningfully. For example, if the

opposing division has a mechanised force in reserve, this reinforcement is referred to as a mechanised force in

actual size. When enemy units either committed forces or reinforcements are very much under strength, the

estimated remaining strength is expressed. Two divisions, each at half strength, are usually more formidable

than a single division at full strength because of the added flexibility of employment and the additional combat

support probably available. A half strength field artillery battalion is more than half as effective as a full strength

battalion. Factors derived from analysis of past similar enemy movements determine the time required for an

enemy to move troops from one place to another and commit them. The considerations described in subsequent

paragraphs are applicable in training and as a point of departure for the development of experience factors in

operations against an enemy force.

1422. Time Calculation. To determine the time when the enemy employ an uncommitted unit, the travel

time from the unit location to a logical point where the unit can be committed is calculated. To the travel time,

add the closing time (pass time of a column). Except when observation of enemy units is continuous, it is

assumed that any unit could have started to move immediately after its last reported location. Therefore, to

determine the earliest time at which the enemy can reinforce, add the travel plus closing time to the time last

observed. For example, if an enemy reinforcement was last observed at 0800 hours, and it can deploy to envelop

the northern flank in one hour, it is assumed that the attack can be launched as early as 0900 hours (0800 plus

one hour). In the exceptional case involving piecemeal commitment of enemy reinforcements, consider only

travel time. Forces which are committed piecemeal do not close into an assembly area or attack position.

1423. Start and Completion Time. Because observation of reinforcements is rarely continuous, statements

of enemy reinforcing capabilities should include both the earliest time and that time after starting movement

when the reinforcement is accomplished. For example, ‗the enemy reinforces the attack with the 45th

Mechanised Brigade at 0900 hours or one hour after starting movement. ―When the time since the last report is

greater than the time after starting movement, only the time after starting movement is given. For example, ―the

enemy reinforces the attack with the 45th

Mechanised Brigade now or one hour after starting movement. ― When

the number of reinforcements is large or the enemy is capable of reinforcing in several areas, reinforcing

capabilities are presented in tabular form. Table given below is an example of this. It shows the enemy

reinforcing the attack or defence with all or part of the following units at the places and times indicated :

EXAMPLES OF ESTIMATION REINFORCEMENTS

UNIT PLACE MECHANISED FOOT REMARKS

45th

Mechanised

Brigade

Square 6382 Now or 1 hr after

starting.

091205 Jun or

4 hr 5 min starting

movement

Square 8884 090930 Jun or 1 hr

30 min after starting

movement.

091605 Jun or

4 hr 5 min after

starting movement

37th

Mechanised

Brigade

Square 6382 090800 Jun or

2 hr after starting

movement

090730 Jun or

23 hr 40 min after

starting movement

Square 8884 090920 Jun 1 hr

20 min after starting

movement

091430 Jun or

7 hr after starting

movement

1424. Location. In selecting a logical point for reinforcement, consider the effects of Area of Operation

characteristics, such as Avenue of Approach. For reinforcement of an attack capability, select locations for

commitment of second echelon and reserve forces for enemy battalions and regiments and forward assembly

areas for enemy divisions and larger units. For enemy units moving to reinforce a defence, select defence or

counterattack positions. For movements by aircraft, select logical Landing Zones and Drop Zones from which

the enemy forces can materially affect the accomplishment of the mission.

1425. Simultaneous Work. The time required by the enemy to issue extra ammunition, make detailed

reconnaissance, issue orders, and deploy to a line of departure is not normally considered because all these

actions are completed before starting the operation or simultaneously with movement.

1426. Guidance. The following guidance's are applicable until you develop experience factors against a

particular enemy :

a. Compute foot marching time for all appropriate reinforcements. Compute motor movement time

only for distances greater than 10 kilometres (6 miles). If a unit is observed in trucks, compute only the

motor movement time.

b. Consider a foot march of more than 32 kilometres (20 miles) as a forced march. Consider a motor

movement of more than 280 kilometres (175 miles) as a forced march for mechanised units and a

movement of more than 224 kilometres (140 miles) as a forced march for tank units.

c. Compute closing time at the night rate of march if a column begins to close before the night

closing time: if a column begins to close at or shortly after sunset, use the day rate of march. If a

column begins to close before the sunset use the day rate of march: if a column begins to close at or

shortly after sunrise, use the night rate of March.

d. Move and close the entire unit to move an enemy infantry battalion. To move unit of brigade or

larger size, move and close two-thirds of the combat elements; that is, two battalions of an infantry

brigade, two brigades of an infantry division, etc.

1427. How to Express. Expressing strength in number of units, by type, within an enemy force is stressed

because it is a simple, reliable and readily understood method of computing enemy strength. At the same time,

the order of battle analyst can not ignore individual unit strength computations. This is particularly important in

arriving at a true picture of the enemy‘s strength.

Effectiveness Rating

1428. Form of Expression. Resultant calculations are expressed as percentage of TO&E strength where

possible. However, numerical expression may be necessary to present a better understanding of the fighting

capability of a force and to provide a commander with a basis for comparison.

1429. Conventional Warfare. The ratings given below do not take into account unit leadership and morale

which are both important factors in determining a unit combat effectiveness. Generally, however, the higher

ratings imply good leadership and morale both in peace time and after initiation of hostilities. The two lower

ratings may reflect a poor leadership and morale but may also reflect either a unit build up or after repeated

engagements in wartime, obvious combat ineffectiveness due to losses. Following ratings are normally used :

a. Combat Effective (C-I). Any unit or force at 80 to 100% TO&E strength in a high state of

training.

b. Marginally Combat Effective (C-2). Any unit or force at 70 to 80% TO&E strength in an

acceptable state of training.

c. Limited Combat Effective (C-3). Any unit or force at 50 to 70% TO&E strength in an only

partially trained state.

d. Non Effective (C-4). Any unit or force below 50% TO&E strength and seriously lacking in

training.

1430. Nuclear- Capability Rating. Estimates of enemy Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC)

capabilities usually are prepared at field army and higher headquarters. Units below field army level usually lack

the means to gather the information to make such estimates. They use the estimates of the higher headquarters

and modify them with available information. The determination of enemy NBC operation capabilities is

primarily based on estimates of numbers and types of weapons and amount and types of agents available,

knowledge of enemy doctrine, past experience and estimates of enemy capabilities involving the employment of

ground troops. It is rarely possible to estimate what portion of the available enemy NBC effort may be used

against a division or corps within a field army or a command in the communication zone. It is also rarely

possible to estimate the number of nuclear weapons the enemy is capable of using within period as short as one

day. The period selected is a month or longer, depending on the available information and past experience. The

statement of the enemy‘s capability of using chemical and biological agents includes the amount, type and

delivery means of available agents. This rating scheme may be expanded to include delivery capability. The

ratings are as under :

a. N-I. Possesses strategic and tactical nuclear weapons.

b. N-2. Possesses tactical nuclear weapons.

c. N-3. Maintains a nuclear weapons development capability but is not believed to posses

nucleate weapons.

d. N-4. Unit is nuclear non capable and is not a nuclear threat.

1431. Combined Ratings. By combining the above system, a total rating of unit capability can be achieved

i.e. C-1 N-1 etc. This system provides the analyst with an additional tool in determining strength in terms of

combat readiness and capability by consideration of effective strength, training, morale, leadership and nuclear

capability. As automatic data processing systems come into use as intelligence data handling means, this rating

system will lend itself readily to computerisation.

1432. Strength Comparison. Expressing strength in terms of number of units by type within an enemy force

is stressed because it is simple, reliable and a readily understood method of computing enemy strength. At the

same time, the intelligence staff cannot ignore individual unit strength computations. This is particularly

important in arriving at a true picture of the enemy‘s strength compared to friendly forces. The enemy may have

eight battalions of infantry in a given area and only five friendly battalions may be located in the same area.

However, because of differences in organisation, the total friendly strength may exceed that of the enemy force.

Conclusion

1433. Ancient military thinker Sun Tzu suggested conducting accurate estimate of enemy capabilities. He

even suggested that it might even lead to victory in hundred battles. Now it is the intelligence staff who is

responsible to conduct accurate computation to determine relative combat effectiveness of enemy formation.

This when done very religiously is likely to open avenue before commander to exploit a fluid situation which

otherwise he would over look.

1434 – 1500. Reserved.

SECTION - 15

RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE

General

1501. Surveillance is the systematic observation of aerospace, surface or subsurface area, place, persons or

this by visual aerial, electronic, photographic or other means. Surveillance is normally used to gain information

on the subject over a long period of time to note any changes that may take place. Because of the

interrelationship reconnaissance and surveillance, the same assets used to execute reconnaissance missions may

also be used for surveillance tasks.

1502. Reconnaissance is undertaken to obtain by visual observation or other detection method, information

about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy or to obtain data concerning the

meteorological, hydrographical or geographic characteristics of a particular area. Reconnaissance is a directed

effort to obtain information on a subject at a particular time.

Planning Reconnaissance and Surveillance

1503. Planning for surveillance operations is conducted after determining the general mission of the tactical

force. Surveillance mission are often developed as a joint effort involving all of the intelligence organisations

having an interest in the same area of operations. This is due to the limited availability of surveillance systems

and the large number of overlapping requests that could be generated in a joint or combined operation.

1504. A reconnaissance mission seeks to obtain information by visual or other detection means and is

characterised by limitations of coverage to one or more specific target areas at a particular time without the

requirement for systematic coverage. Reconnaissance missions are conducted by human intelligence, imagery

intelligence and signal intelligence resources and are designed to:

a. Collect specific, detailed information at a particular location and time.

b. Support current or planned operations.

1505. Most reconnaissance requests are planned before the operation. However, once operations begin many

reconnaissance requests will be immediate. The time constraints of the typical reconnaissance request will not

allow for elaborate planning or coordination. A request that would be classified as a requirement for a

reconnaissance mission might be for urgent photographic coverage of a proposed helicopter landing some zone

distance beyond the forward defended locality.

1506. Valid justification is particularly important for immediate surveillance or reconnaissance requests. This

is critical because national systems may be required to collect the information. Such systems are in high demand

and the restructuring of programmed national collection plans requires adequate justification.

1507. Requests for support from national systems cannot be so easily categorised as pre-planned or

immediate or as surveillance or reconnaissance. This is , in part, because of the many national agencies involved

and the diverse missions and performance characteristics of individual collection resources. In the case of the

national imagery intelligence, the collection manager must be familiar with the mission, the commander‘s

intention, the operational plan, and the Imagery Reconnaissance Directives list associated with the area of

interest.

1508. The inter service (also national) signal intelligence system also operates against long-term and standing

requirements. In the case of signal intelligence the tactics commander‘s crisis or combat requests will be termed

time sensitive and handled expeditiously. Requests for national human intelligence support ultimately go

through Armed Forces Division and Directorate General of Forces Intelligence coordination procedures have

been completed.

1509. It is essential to gather information in the field for accomplishment of the mission by the commander.

The process of collection of information is under taken by the elements of the army and they are given the

specific tasks. During the operations, reconnaissance is one of the primary means of obtaining information vital

to the intelligence effort. Superiority of the reconnaissance may prove the deciding factor in an obscure situation

by providing the commander such information that is necessary to make sound decisions. The reconnaissance

elements must, therefore, carry out their assigned missions diligently.

1510. Reconnaissance is a directed effort in the field to collect information about the terrain and enemy or

resources undertaken by an appropriate element of the armed forces. Battle reconnaissance it is the directed

effort by individuals and small patrols to gather information of the immediate battlefield area. Every fighting

unit executes battle reconnaissance for itself.

Type of Reconnaissance

1511. Close Reconnaissance. It is the collection of information of the area of current operations. It furnishes

the commander with information upon which he can base his tactical plan. Close reconnaissance may consist of

mounted or dismounted patrolling. In the armoured formation, this is carried out by the reconnaissance troops or

medium tanks of the armoured regiments. In the infantry formation, this is the primary role of the division

support battalions.

1512. Medium Reconnaissance. It is the collection of information in an area which is beyond the reach of

the normal reconnaissance elements of a division and beyond the range of the supporting artillery. In the

armoured division it is performed by the divisional reconnaissance regiment and in infantry divisions by

elements of corps reconnaissance regiment if available or the division support battalions.

1513. Deep Reconnaissance. It is the exploration of objectives deep in the enemy territory and the air force

is assigned with this task. It could be entrusted to commando battalion under certain circumstances.

1514. Armed Reconnaissance. It is of two types:

a. Ground. An offensive mission conducted to search for an attack target of opportunity in a

designated area or along designated routes.

b. Air. An air mission flown with the primary task of locating and attacking opportunity targets in

assigned general areas or along assigned routes and not for the purpose of attacking specific target.

1515. Reconnaissance by Fire. A method of reconnaissance in which fire is placed on a suspected enemy

position to cause the enemy to disclose his presence by movement or return of fire.

1516. Reconnaissance in Force. It is an attack to discover and test the enemy's position and strength.

Though its primary aim is reconnaissance, it may discover weaknesses in the enemy dispositions, which could

promptly be exploited.

1517. Air Reconnaissance. It is the acquisition of the information by aircraft. It may be either photo or

visual.

Principle for Reconnaissance

1518. Aim. The aim of the reconnaissance must be understood and remembered throughout. In the multitude

of information that becomes available during the reconnaissance, the aim should not be confused or lost sight of.

1519. Gaining and Maintaining Contact. Gain contact as soon as possible and maintain it throughout the

operations. The information about the location, strength and movement of the enemy troops must be gained at

the earliest practicable moment. Contact with the enemy, once gained, must be continuously maintained. Nearer

to the enemy, the more intensive is the reconnaissance. The ground reconnaissance elements gain and maintain

contact with the enemy by working through the gaps, around the flanks and the rear. They endeavour to

ascertain the strength, movements, composition and dispositions of the enemy's force and the approach of the

enemy reinforcements. The air force and army aviation aircraft may be employed to supplement the execution of

reconnaissance by the ground units with due regard to their vulnerability to the enemy action.

1520. Early Reporting with all Details. Much of the information has significance that may not be readily

apparent at the time of its collection or to the individual collecting it. All items of information must be reported.

It is important to receive negative information in order to know what the enemy is not doing or where he is not

at a given time. The information helps in determining the enemy capabilities and his probable courses of action.

Small bits of seemingly irrelevant or unimportant information may be the key to the entire picture in higher

headquarters. No information should be over looked or cast aside.

1521. Movement and Observation. It is neither possible to maintain contact with the moving enemy by

staying in one place nor can maximum information be obtained if the reconnaissance is confined to canalised

routes only. Reconnaissance agencies must freely move about in the area in order to keep pace with the activity

of the enemy and holding him under constant observation.

1522. Fighting for Information. Fight only either when it is desired to force the enemy to reveal his

position or when the mission requires it. It is costly both in time and manpower for a reconnaissance agency to

engage in a fight. Fighting should be resorted to only when necessary to save the reconnaissance forces from

annihilation/capture or when the mission requires that the enemy be forced to reveal his dispositions through

fighting. Normally, reconnaissance should be conducted by stealth. Patrols that engage in useless fighting delay

the return of information to their commanders and often reveal their own dispositions. Reconnaissance activity

if known to the enemy, may reveal the intentions of the own commander.

1523. Reporting in Time. Report information in time to be of value. The most valuable information may be

utterly worthless if received too late. Planning and executing an operation requires a certain minimum time. The

reconnaissance agency must, therefore, return the information to the commander in time for him to make his

decision. There may appear to be conflict between this principle and that of reconnaissance by stealth or that of

avoiding battle with the enemy, however, the principle of time is paramount.

1524. Planning Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance must be planned well, otherwise time will be wasted, the

information will be staled and the required information will not be obtained.

1525. Determination of Mission. The intelligence staff must prepare suitable mission in order to obtain the

desired information. Missions are usually derived from the collection plan. In determining any mission, the

following must be borne in mind :

a. Capabilities and Limitations of Agency. Missions must be assigned according to the

capabilities and limitations of the agency employed.

b. Specific Mission. There should be no doubt as to the type of information desired, therefore, the

mission must be specific. The assignment of a vague reconnaissance mission will result in vague and

unsatisfactory information. Broad generalisation such as, report strength and dispositions of the enemy

should be avoided. Furthermore, the specific time by which the information is desired should be clearly

stated.

c. Priority. It is quite likely that more than one reconnaissance mission may be assigned to any one

agency at a given time. Such situations should be avoided. However, in the event of such a case, there

must be a definite priority assigned to these missions. This priority is determined by the importance of

the information sought and the time by which it is desired. By indicating the priorities, the intelligence

staff ensures proper attention to the most important missions.

d. Co-ordination. In order to avoid needless duplication of effort and the possibility of battle

between friendly units particularly at night, all reconnaissance missions are co-ordinated through the

intelligence staff. This does not present many difficulties in as much as; there should be an overall

reconnaissance scheme and close liaison among the intelligence staff at various echelons as well as

with the operational staff.

e. Vital Task. In preparing and assigning the reconnaissance missions, the bulk of agencies should

be assigned to the vital tasks. It is not desirable to spread the available agencies thinly over a wide area

on a series of missions. The critical mission should be selected and concentrated upon, until it is

satisfactorily completed. This does not imply that all other missions should be neglected for a single

task. However, a reasonable concentration of a majority of the agencies on the important missions will

achieve better results in a shorter time without prejudicing the necessary coverage.

f. Reserve. It is a good practice to keep a few agencies in reserve for entrusting them with some

unforeseen assignments.

Battlefield Surveillance

1526. To make the best use of our limited resources it is essential that we gain sufficient information to allow

the intelligence staff to determine the enemy‘s dispositions, capabilities and intentions and to do so in a manner

that will allow us sufficient time to react. This information will come from our reconnaissance and surveillance

systems but much will still come from other sources, including contact reports from our troops either observing

or fighting the enemy. The introduction of radars, remotely piloted vehicles (RPV), night fighting and other

ground surveillance devices has or will greatly increase the real time information available to commanders and

staffs. We must learn how to manage this information for it to be useful. The aim of this chapter is to explain the

battlefield surveillance and target acquisition (STA) systems now in use in Bangladesh Army.

1527. Battlefield Surveillance is the continuous, all weather, day and night systematic observation of the

battle area to provide timely information. It involves a mission to obtain, by visual observation or other

detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy or to produce

data covering the meteorological conditions or the terrain in a particular area.

1528. The watch must be continuous and must be effective by day and night, in all weather (rain, fog, haze,

mist, cloud etc) and when battlefield obscurity is present (smoke, dust etc). This requirement dictates the types

of systems and sensors to be used. The watch must also be systematic, covering the whole area in a manner that

allows regular updating of information.

1529. Finally information must be obtained in sufficient time to allow us to react. It may take a lot of time to

interpret the information acquired, to assess it and from this formulate plans, issue orders and carry out

deployments. This requirement for timely information dictates the response times for systems and can also

determine the range at which they must be effective.

1530. With the many resources these are available, careful co ordination and tasking are of vital importance,

as is the recording and storing of the mass of information that they will produce. In doing this intelligence staffs

must keep in mind the following :

a. The sources available to each agency including those of other formations.

b. The capability and limitations of each source.

c. The need to provide full and continuous cover in depth for the battle area.

d. The need to be able to store and rapidly retrieve the information produced.

1531. The need for forward planning combined with clear and accurate tasking of the appropriate agency

cannot be under stressed and serves to emphasis the need for all staffs to be aware of the capabilities of the

available assets within specific time frames.

Counter Reconnaissance

1532. General. Counter reconnaissance and surveillance includes all measures taken to prevent hostile

observation of a force, area or place. One method is to seek out and destroy enemy reconnaissance elements and

other are to deny the enemy access to certain areas. In both cases, counter reconnaissance becomes more

difficult as the dispersion of units increases. All units have reconnaissance and counter reconnaissance

capabilities and responsibilities. These responsibilities may be limited to short patrols or defensive counter

reconnaissance measures during the conduct of normal mission activities, or they may extend to offensive

operations involving specific reconnaissance or counter reconnaissance tasks. Certain units are specifically

organised for such operations.

1533. Principles. Counter reconnaissance is based on different principles than reconnaissance and these are

:

a. Destruction/Neutralisation. Hostile reconnaissance elements must be destroyed or neutralised by

fighting.

b. Prevention. The centre of gravity of counter reconnaissance forces is the friendly forces being

screened and not the enemy force. Its aim is to prevent the enemy reconnaissance force from nearing

the friendly force for carrying out observation.

c. Depth. The screening force should be echeloned in depth. This would permit natural support and

prevent any deep penetration by the enemy reconnaissance force into the area being screened.

1534. Relation with Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance and counter reconnaissance are inter related as under

:

a. While the aim of reconnaissance is to gather information the aim of counter reconnaissance is to

deny information to the enemy. Good reconnaissance assists a certain amount of security also. On the

other hand the activity of counter reconnaissance provides a certain amount of information as well.

b. When the unit are assigned simultaneously the tasks of reconnaissance as well as counter

reconnaissance, the order must state capacity which of the two has precedence, in course of sufficient

size. Each task may be assigned to one force only.

c. Reconnaissance and counter reconnaissance cannot be completely separated. This is so because

effective reconnaissance helps security and counter reconnaissance activities also provide

reconnaissance information. Forces executing reconnaissance missions may be employed

simultaneously on both types of missions. Orders given to the unit should, however, state which one of

the two missions is to receive priority.

Using Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield for Counter Reconnaissance

1535. General. Once again, the IPB process can help in planning. The two most important products will be

developed in counter reconnaissance (CR) are situation templates and event templates. It will be helpful to

develop a series of situation templates which depict enemy reconnaissance movement. Such templates allow

developing event template and letting operational staff to visualise how the enemy is expected to conduct their

reconnaissance battle.

1536. Situation Template. The mistakes should not be made in thinking that the enemy‘s reconnaissance

will use the same Avenue of Approaches (AAs) as the enemy main force. It must be remembered that the enemy

reconnaissance elements most likely to operate by two or three vehicles. Such small elements can traverse

almost any kind of terrain. It should be kept in mind that the mission of reconnaissance is to seek and report

information, not to fight. Therefore, enemy reconnaissance will use routes that have plenty of concealment and

cover. It should also be remembered that enemy reconnaissance is looking, the enemy may decide that attacking

over rough terrain is preferable to attacking open but heavily defended country. For this reason, it has to be

considered the entire Area of Interest (AI) when situation templates are developed. 'Tunnel vision' should not be

considered the only obvious AAs or MCs. It has to think always that how the enemy can enter in own sector

including using severely restricted terrain. As a general rule, the more concealment or protection a route

provides, the more likely it will be used by reconnaissance elements. The outcome of well prepared situation

templates is the indication of what the enemy will look like on the battlefield. This eventually will save

Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S) assets and many hours of unnecessary reconnaissance or surveillance.

1537. Event Template. Based on situation templates event template is developed. Event template will show

where on the battlefield the enemy reconnaissance elements are expected to see. Then R&S attention is

concentrated on those areas (NAI) to detect enemy reconnaissance activity. The key to CR intelligence support

is finding those enemy reconnaissance units before they can discover friendly positions and report back.

Therefore, the effects of weather and terrain on enemy reconnaissance must be carefully studied to determine at

what point the enemy can observe friendly positions. Usually, this is a function of observation and visibility in

own unit‘s Area of Interest (AI). These limits should be compared with the enemy‘s known reconnaissance

observation capabilities (such as infrared, thermal, light enhancement, and telescopic). As it is done, it will

begin to identify a limit of enemy advance (LOEA). Essentially, the enemy must be prevented from going

beyond this limit because past that limit, the enemy can observe friendly positions.

1538. Focus. R&S assets should be focused forward of the LOEA to identify enemy reconnaissance before

they can spot own unit‘s positions. Additionally, the analysis of the terrain may indicate there are isolated terrain

features forward of the LOEA which must be controlled to prevent enemy observation of own unit‘s position.

For example, It might have to be determined, based on general terrain and weather conditions, that LOEA is 5

kilometres in front of FEBA. However, two hills were discovered approximately 7 to 8 kilometres in front of

FEBA which allow observation of own unit‘s positions. Essentially, those three hills become key terrain for the

CR battle. The enemy must be prevented from occupying those hills. By integrating LOEA and key terrain with

event template, the battlefield is barrowed to specific points or areas where R&S assets can be focused

determining. Surveillance, Intelligence and Reconnaissance (SIR), matching R&S assets can be focused.

Determining surveillance, intelligence and Reconnaissance (SIR) matching R&S assets with SIR and NAI and

developing detailed R & S instructions. can be gone through.

1539. Tasking. Normally operational staff will actually task units for the CR mission based on input. Of

course, this may differ depending on unit SOP. Because of the importance of winning the CR battle, many units

use a large CR force. Sometimes this force may be up to one third of the entire unit.

1540 – 1600. Reserved.

SECTION - 16

COMBAT INDICATIONS FOR VARIOUS OPERATIONS OF WAR

Introduction

1601. Indicators are any positive or negative evidence of enemy activity or any characteristic of the Area of

Operation (AO) that points towards enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, intention or those activities which

influence commander‘s selection of a Course of Action (COA). Individual indicator cannot stand alone. Each

indicator is integrated with other factors and indicators. Indicators are developed by the intelligence analysts

who are assisted by other elements in the headquarters. All indicators are developed to answer the commanders

Essential Elements of Information (EEI) and Other Information Requirement (OIR). The analysts use indicators

to relate particular events or activities with probable enemy COA. These are also used in the collection

worksheet in the form of tasking.

Fundamentals of Intelligence Indicators

1602. Responsibilities of Intelligence Staff. A necessary step in directing the collection effort is to

determine those enemy activities which will indicate the answer to the EEI. The ability of intelligence staff to

read ‗indicators‘ including recognition of enemy deception and counter deception, indicators may contribute to

the success of friendly operations.

1603. Actions Influence Indicators. Indicators include conditions and circumstances of the enemy situation

which result from the previous enemy action or from the enemy‘s failure to take action. For example, the current

enemy disposition may indicate a particular enemy capability or vulnerability. The enemy‘s logistic situation

may favour the adoption of a particular capability or may influence friendly selection of a COA. Direction of

river crossing means in one area may lead as faint to own forces and the enemy may cross elsewhere. The

presence of obstacles such as areas of poor traffic-ability may influence the adoption or rejection of a COA by

either side.

1604. Determinations of Indicators. The intelligence staff will determine the indicators by the application

of sound tactical principles and by the knowledge of the enemy, his organisation and methods of fighting. For

example, if a brigade commander has been given the mission to attack in the next morning, what are the other

actions he may do? He may move his artillery forward, dispose units on another front, increase his patrolling

effort, dominate the no man's land and other preliminary operations prior to attack.

1605. Indicators Based on Physical Action. Indicators are based on the physical action which will have to

be accomplished by the enemy prior to his adoption of a particular COA. The indications based on the habitual

activities of the enemy prior to the adoption of a particular COA is dependent upon the production of good order

of battle, intelligence concerning the enemy‘s tactical doctrine and the personality of the enemy commander.

Information related to a few indications will normally be insufficient to justify a sound conclusion. Therefore, it

is mandatory that the intelligence staff must analyse an EEI for all possible valid indications.

Analysis of Indications

1606. Factors. The EEI is analysed to determine the indications which by their existence or non existence

provide an answer to the requirement. Normally, these are indications which are likely to exist when the enemy

prepares to adopt or does adopt any particular COA..

1607. Capability. An EEI which asks in part, ''will the enemy attack,'' is analysed by determining the

indications of attack which may exist during the preparation or launching of offensive actions. These indications

frequently include reconnaissance, forward move of hostile troops, forward displacement of artillery,

identification of air operations, increased activity in rear area, forward displacement of command posts,

logistical installations and stepping up of patrolling activities.

1608. Vulnerability. The EEI concerning enemy vulnerabilities are analysed by intelligence through

determining the indications which are :

a. Low Morale. Abnormal number of incidents of suicide, desertions, and cases of murder or

attempt to murder may be indications of low morale.

b. Intelligence Deficiencies. The failure of the enemy to exploit our vulnerabilities may be an

indication of the intelligence deficiencies.

c. Logistic Deficiencies. A marked reduction in the expenditure of ammunition may be an

indication of logistic deficiencies.

d. Civilian Hostility. A diversion of enemy fighting forces to police duties in the rear areas may be

an indication of the civilian hostility toward the enemy.

1609. Knowledge. Intelligence analyst requires a thorough knowledge of the enemy and the characteristics of

the AO which can effect military operation. Particularly detailed knowledge of the enemy is valuable regarding :

a. Organisation.

b. Equipment.

c. Tactical doctrine.

d. Logistic methods.

e. Enemy knowledge of the area under friendly control.

f. Personalities of the opposing enemy commanders.

g. Past performance of the opposing enemy.

1610. Basis of Order /Requests. Having identified indications which reveal answers to the EEI, the

intelligence staff determines those specific activities which by their very nature and location will establish each

of the pertinent indications. These specific Information constitute a basis for orders/requests against enemy

indication which also prevent the use of false indications by the enemy against own force.

1611. Deceptive Indicators. Intelligence agencies must believe the fact that indications presented by the

enemy may be false. The enemy will go to great efforts to deceive us by portraying indications, which point to

the adoption of a COA which he does not intend to adopt. Enemy deception operations provide indicators in an

attempt to create false or misleading patterns of enemy intentions. Analysts detect these false indicators and then

determine what actual COA, the enemy is attempting to initiate. Enemy attempts at deception are discovered by

comparing indicators and combat information from all sources to arrive at an accurate picture of the battlefield.

Operation Wise List of Indicators

1612. General. The lists of combat indicators are by no means complete nor are they intended to apply to all

situations or all types of enemy forces. They give some types of indicators which, when incorporated with other

indicators, create patterns or suggests a series of activities which point to typical enemy COA. Analysts are

prepared to develop their own indicator lists for the specific situations, which confront them.

1613. List of Indicators – Offensive Operations. For Bangladesh Army the main concerned will be how

enemy forces will attack our force. A list of attack and advance indicators is as follows :

COMBAT INDICATION ATTACK – VARIOUS TYPES

CONVENTIONAL ATTACK

Indications Explanation

1. Increased air reconnaissance

2. Air borne surveillance

3. Patrol (especially engineer and armoured).

4. Probing actions.

5. Deep patrol activity.

1. Early Indications of reconnaissance.

2. Direction and intensity of

reconnaissance might lead to direction

of attack.

1. Fwd dumping, especially ammunitions, bridging

and mine breaching equipment.

2. Increased medical installation.

1. Administration build-up for attack.

2. Preponderance on artillery build up

is expected.

3. Development of roads and bridging, increased line

of communication and base.

4. Arrival of reinforcement.

5. Increased communication on administration and

traffic control net.

3. H hour is unlikely before artillery

build up is completed.

1. Re-grouping of troops.

2. Withdraw of forward troops for preparation.

3. Arrival of Special units, e.g., amphibious

engineer.

4. Forward control of infantry, armour or

amphibious forces.

5. Control of air borne-troops and aircraft near to

airfields.

1. Tactical build-up late indications.

2. Indication of River crossing

3. Indication of bridge head with

armour.

4. Like to have Para troops / helicopter

drop as a link up operation.

Indications Explanation

6. Increase in artillery control and ammunition

stocking.

7. Changed pattern of wireless traffic (increase

wireless silence).

8. Move of headquarters.

1. Registration.

2. Move of artillery to firing position.

Late indications of fire plan.

1. Gapping of minefields, wire and other obstacle.

2. Preparation of own side of obstacles.

3. Opening of traffic control communication.

4. Signing of routes.

5. Move of assault echelon.

Move of troops late indications.

ATTACK BY INFILTRATION

Indications Explanation

1. Most of the indications for attack by infiltration

are the same as that of attack. The indications which

are peculiar to attack by infiltration are given in

succeeding paragraphs.

_

1. Recruitment of guides.

2. Hiring of local ponies / animals.

3. Stress on Infiltration training.

4. Reconnaissance on the entire front and flanks.

5. Reconnaissance in the inter formation/inter

battalion gaps.

1. Early indications for attack by

infiltration.

2. Absence of adequate armour and

mechanised force.

3. Instead of registration artillery

covering move of troops.

6. Concentration of small forces at various places.

7. Air reconnaissance of depth areas.

8. Dispersal of artillery.

9. Security of firm base.

Indications Explanation

1. Increase in sabotage and subversion activities.

2. Uprising by the locals.

3. Move of Infiltration force through gaps.

4. Feint attack on wide front.

5. Securing of firm base and blocking position in

depth.

6. Use of attack helicopters at a large scale.

1. Late Indications for infiltration

attack.

2. Attack on depth with blocking

position established, feint in the

Forward Defended Localities (FDL)

initially and finally attempt to assault

from front is a likely COA.

7. Shelling and serial bombardment of depth

objectives.

8. Attack on the depth objectives.

9. Infiltration move of stores.

10. Major attacks on Forward Defended Locality

(FDL) and attempting to establish bridge head for

link up.

OPPOSED RIVER CROSSING

Indications Explanation

1. Increase in ground and air reconnaissance.

2. Concentration of troops.

3. Move forward of Infantry and engineers.

4. Move forward of artillery to gun areas closer to

water obstacle.

5. Construction and/or improvement of roads and

tracks from the main axis of enemy‘s advance to the

waterway.

6. Securing of firm base(s) on the enemy side of the

waterway.

7. Move of engineer stores.

8. Increased radio traffic in the earlier stages and

complete radio silence prior to assault.

9. Establishment of ammunition dumps require for

assault in the forward areas.

10. Opening of additional medical units close to the

likely sites of crossing control.

11. Establishment of traffic circuits for control of

traffic near the water way.

1. Early Indications for river crossing

operations.

2. Location of brigade will indicate

likely direction of brigade and possible

break out route.

3. Location of follow up brigade is vital

for predicting next phase.

4. Securing firm base and preliminary

action will indicate location of O-1 and

O-2 line.

Indications Explanation

1. Neutralisation of objectives on the far bank. 1. Late Indications of assault.

2. Move of assaulting echelons to water line and

preparation of water craft for crossing.

3. Expansions and build up bridgehead.

4. Construction of bridge.

2. Location of brigade will indicate O-3

line.

BREAK OUT BY DIVISION /CORP SIZE FORCE

Indications Explanation

1. Concentration of the force including mechanised

forces.

2. Increased aerial reconnaissance.

3. Increase of patrolling activity on very wide front.

4. Bridging forward and dumping of artillery and

engineer equipment (bridge equipment and trawling

equipment )

5. Digging and occupation of artillery positions.

6. Move forward of logistic installations.

7. Concentration of air defence resources.

1. Early indications for break out.

2. Concentration of armour and

mechanised force in an area will

indicate likely break out and fast

moving battle.

COMBAT INDICATIONS ADVANCE

Indications Explanation

1. Ground and air reconnaissance.

2. Anti national propaganda.

3. Take over by static units to relieve active units for

advancing.

4. Air reconnaissance and air borne surveillance over

routes and obstacle.

5. Deep patrol.

Early indications of reconnaissance

1. Construction of forward airfields.

2. Forward move of maintenance facilities.

3. Forward dumping of fuel.

4. Increase in traffic control organisation.

5. Forward move of engineer stores.

Admin build-up –early stage

Indications Explanation

1. Opening of reserve formation headquarters.

2. Changes in command nets.

3. Move of Special troops between formation

4. Take-over by static units.

5. Withdraw of mobile units to rear.

6. Move of air borne troops to airfields.

Tactical build up – early stage.

7. Route clearing action by air borne troops /

partisans/ saboteurs.

Late indications of tactical build up.

8. Increase depth of target.

9. Air borne patrols on pursuit routes.

Fire Plan – Late indications.

1614. Combat Indication Defensive Operation. Conventional and Unconventional forces will relentlessly

endeavour to force enemy to go for defensive operation such as Conventional Defence, Withdrawal, Delaying

Action, Reinforcement, etc. A list of Defensive Operations indications are below :

CONVENTIONAL DEFENCE

Indications Explanation

1. Ground and air reconnaissance.

2. Concentration of troops in depth.

3. Digging and procure freshly dug earth.

4. Mines, wire and cable lying.

5. Armour concentration in rear (either for counter

penetration or counter attack).

6. Preparation of artillery positions.

7. Improvement of roads and tracks.

8. Constructions of pill boxes and bunkers for

headquarters.

9. Dumping of stores and ammunitions.

10. Establishment of workshops, hospitals and other

facilities well in depth to keep them out of battle.

Early Indications.

Indications Explanation

1. Aggressive patrolling.

2. Development of defence works.

3. Gradual development in all aspects covered in early

indications.

Late indications.

MOBILE DEFENCE

Indications Explanation

1. Most of the indications for mobile defence are the

same as that of conventional defence. The indications

which are peculiar to mobile defence are given in the

succeeding paragraphs.

1. Reconnaissance on very wide front.

2. Extensive digging in echelons.

3. Langer gapes between difficulties / areas.

4. Extensive mine fields by mechanised means.

5. Occupation of artillery positions.

6. Dumping of ammunition and stores.

7. Forward deployment of administrative installation.

Early Indications.

1. Gapping of wires and obstacle.

2. Outflanking moves by combat groups.

3. Increase in radio traffic.

4. Move of assault echelons.

Late Indications.

COMBAT INDICATION TACTICAL REDEPLOYMENT (TRD)

Indications Explanation

1. Rundown of stocks includes demolitions.

2. Evacuation of nonessential troop.

3. Forward control of mechanised force.

4. Rearward move of administrative installation.

5. Back loading/destruction of stocks.

Early indication of administrative

preparations.

Indications Explanation

1. Mining and demolitions of non essential routes.

2. Mining on previous patrol routes.

Route denial - early indications.

1. Withdraw of reserve.

2. Adjustment of boundary.

3. Artillery layout for route protection.

4. Rearward movement of headquarters.

Grouping - early indications. Grouping – early indications.

1. Increase in artillery activity to cover noise of

withdraw.

2. Predominance of auto weapon with the rear guards.

3. Smoke screens during day withdraw.

Late Indications fire sp.

1. Tanks mechanised force covering former infantry

localities.

2. Absence of patrol.

3. Local counter attack.

4. Thinning out of forward troops.

Move – Late indications.

1. Prep of intermediate position in rear.

2. Detonating the reserve demolitions.

3. Aerial Bombardment beyond a line.

Late Actions.

Conclusion

1615. At every headquarters, lists of enemy activities peculiar to each indication is compiled. The lists are

then circulated to higher, lower and adjacent headquarters. These should not be accepted as rigid set of

indications applicable under all conditions as these are of general nature. It must be fully understood that a

potential enemy may not follow all the indications but he may, in addition give other unexpected indications as

well.

1616 – 1700. Reserved.

CHAPTER - IV

ELECTRONIC WARFARE AND INFORMATION OPERATION

SECTION - 17

INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE SYSTEM

General

1701. Commanders require intelligence about the enemy and the battle space prior to engaging in operations

in order to execute battles, engagement and operations. Intelligence assists commanders in visualising the battle

space, organising his forces and controlling tactical objective and end-state. Intelligence also support other

related factions such as electronic warfare (EW) and counter intelligence. Intelligence and Electronic Warfare

(IEW) system as a whole helps a commander in using intelligence as a force multiplier by dealing with enemy

overt and covet threat and assist operational staff in conducting electronic warfare both in offensive and

defensive manner.

1702. While there are no simple formulas for winning any battle, there are certain key factors for success on

the modern battlefield. One key factor is the support provided to the various commanders through IEW

operations. IEW operations, in both peace and war, support the winning of conventional and unconventional

battles and campaigns- the focus of the doctrine described in GSTP 0032. The mission of IEW operations is to

provide any level of commander with three key forms of support intelligence, EW and counter intelligence.

Functional Structure

1703. The IEW system design philosophy is embedded in a common IEW structure at each level of

command. Each command has directors, coordinators, producers and executors who perform critical IEW

functions. Commanders play a significant role in the design philosophy of the IEW system. Their requirements

must be satisfied, their direction moves the system to respond and their personal involvement keeps the system

on track.

1704. The coordinators are the intelligence staff and operational staff. They have staff responsibility for

coordinating the IEW effort. They respond to commander as the functional experts in IEW, supervise and direct

the operations of producers and coordinate the efforts the executors with supports from higher, lower and

adjacent commands. Salient of the functional structure are already discussed at section 4.

Intelligence Staff

1705. The intelligence staffs are the commanders‘ principal advisors for intelligence, counter intelligence

operations and protective security policy. They plan and manage operations in each of these functional areas.

The intelligence staffs coordinate the intelligence effort. They identify intelligence requirements based on the

commander‘s guidance and concept of the operation. They manage the collection effort, supervise all source

analysis and ensure rapid dissemination of needed intelligence and combat information. They, through the

division and brigade‘s command post support elements task or field intelligence unit (FIU) and other elements

of the command with collection missions. Common IEW System structure is shown below :

1706. The intelligence staff request support and receive intelligence from higher echelons, adjacent units,

other services allies and national sources. They integrate intelligence from all sources to meet the commander‘s

information and operational needs. They are responsible for information regarding the enemy, weather and

terrain. They use their expertise to reduce battlefield uncertainties, providing commanders with estimates and

other critical intelligence in support of unit operations.

1707. Generally, the responsibilities of the intelligence staff are similar at each level of command. These are :

a. Recommends intelligence requirements and priorities.

b. Prepares plans, orders and requests for intelligence, electronic support measures and counter

intelligence.

c. Supervises and coordinates the command's intelligence collection electronic support measures

and counter intelligence activities to support situation development and target development.

d Processes information from all available sources to produce intelligence.

e Assesses enemy intentions and predict likely courses of action.

f Develops document and personnel security policy for the command.

g Supervises and directs the efforts of the engineer terrain team under his operational control and

coordinates support from other teams.

h Exercises staff supervision of the weather officer from locating battery.

j Supervises and coordinates predictions of fallout from enemy -employed nuclear weapons and

chemical dispersion.

COMMAND

Direct and control

organic assets to

satisfy requirement

DIRECTOR

FORCE COMMANDER

COORDINATORS

EXECUTORS

Intelligence Staff

Intelligence

Counter Intelligence

COMMANDERS

FIU

Armour

Artillery

Manoeuvre

Operation Staff

Operations

Electronic Warfare

Operation Security

Deception

PRODUCERS

* Collection Management

Prepare collection plans

Manage collection activities

* Analysis

IPB

Processing

Intelligence analysis of

Enemy, weather and terrain

data bases

* ESM

Technical data base support

* Operation Security

Data base support

Vulnerability analysis

Countermeasures

Recommendation

* Dissemination

Reports

Briefings

Estimates

COMMON IEW STRUCTURE

Figure 17.1 : Common IEW Structure.

k Disseminates combat information and intelligence.

l Provides information and intelligence to other staff sections.

m Assesses enemy intelligence capabilities and procedures, their vulnerability to deception and the

effectiveness of friendly deception operations.

n. Provides counter intelligence support to operational security

p. Prepares intelligence estimates and annexes.

Operational Staff

1708. The operational staff has staff responsibility for planning and directing the operation security deception

and electronic warfare operations of the command. They advise and assist other staff officers on the operations

and training aspects which impact on their respective areas of responsibility. They are responsible for :

a. Plans and coordinates electronic warfare operations.

b. Directs electronic countermeasures actions needed to support planned and ongoing operations.

c. Identifies, in coordination with the intelligence staff as appropriate, requirements to support

electronic support measures.

d. Coordinates and establishes ECCM to protect friendly counter electronic operations.

e. Prepares the electronic warfare annex to operations plans and orders.

f. Identifies and recommends essential elements of friendly information (EEFI).

g. Implements operation security measures to frustrate the enemy intelligence collection effort.

h. Plans and coordinates deception operations to support the commander's scheme of fire and

manoeuvre

Producer and Executors

1709. The producers support the coordinators at each echelon. They perform collection management,

information processing and dissemination, Counter intelligence analysis, and electronic warfare management.

The intelligence office; various combat, combat support and combat service support units, give the unit

intelligence staff the capability to effectively manage his part of the IEW system. They are not a separate

element but an integral part of the intelligence section.

1710. Intelligence officers provides the detailed control and coordination of intelligence collection,

production and dissemination. They play a limited role in electronic warfare and operation of security. It not

only expand the capabilities of the intelligence sections, but free the intelligence staff from routine tasks so he

can better manage the overall intelligence effort.

1711. The executors command the units which provide IEW support and direct and control them to satisfy

assigned IEW missions. They deploy, maintain, train and sustain their units to carry out assigned missions.

Executors include the commanders of military intelligence, armour, artillery and manoeuvre units and all other

organisation capable of executing IEW operations. Military intelligence unit commanders are the command's

primary IEW executors.

Coordination Structure

1712. The key players in fusing IEW into the overall tactical concept are the intelligence and operations

staffs. Their mission is to serve the commander and assist subordinate commanders. The senior intelligence and

operations officers must think like the commander in order to anticipate requirements. Both require a solid

foundation in tactics to accomplish their missions. Their functions are reciprocal; both should be able to do the

other's job. Their functions are complementary, requiring very close cooperation and coordination. Common

perspectives enable them to communicate with precision. The senior intelligence and operations officers of the

command assist in the development and training subordinate unit intelligence and operations staffs.

1713. In coordinating various operations and battles, commanders demand complementing capabilities from

their intelligence and operational staff as shown in the following illustration :

HOW STAFFS ORCHESTRATE IEW OPERATIONS

PLANNING

ORGANISING

DIRECTING

CONTROLLING

COORDINATING

1. Determine current

and future needs.

2. Study situation

and limitations.

3. Make reasonable

assumptions.

4. Perform detailed

planning.

5. Determine time

and resource

requirements to

support plan.

6. Ascertain

requirement/resource

balance.

7. Adjust plan If

necessary.

8. Develop alternate

plans.

9. Establish

policies/procedures

to support plan.

10. Use SOPs for

communications and

promote

understanding.

1. Determine

requirements to

support mission.

2. Establish

work

breakdown

structure of

tasks, Subtasks.

3. Establish

organisational

relationships.

4. Select/ assign

resources to

accomplish

mission.

5. Assign

mission

responsibilities.

6. Emphasize

essentiality,

balance,

cohesion

flexibility and

efficiency.

1. Determine

extent of

direction

necessary.

2. Issue timely

instructions

and mission

tasking and

ensure they

are

understood.

1. Determine

extent, type and

method of control

necessary to

accomplish

mission.

2. Establish

criteria for

measuring results.

3. Establish

minimum variance

from criteria that

is acceptable.

4. Take corrective

action.

5. Supervise

execution.

Monitor resource

performance and

sustainability.

1. Promote

cooperation's and

mutual under

standing.

2. Cross-train

supervisors and

keep them

informed.

3. Encourage lateral

and vertical

communication

through out the

organisation.

4. Synchronise

requirements with

external activities.

1714. They along with intelligence unit commander comprise the IEW team. The staff officers plan, organise,

direct, coordinate and control while the intelligence commanders execute the directives. The IEW team is held

together by the force commander who gives the team leadership, motivation, focused perspective and direction.

Each member of the IEW team has a full array of vital responsibilities. All of these responsibilities must be

integrated, mutually supporting and focused on the commander's concept for accomplishing the mission. Close

and continuous coordination among all members of the teams is essential.

1715. The following chart provides a graphic illustration of responsibilities and the coordination required to

assure a fully intergraded IEW operation :

IEW STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES

FUNCTIONS

STAFF RESPONSIBILITY

IN COORDINATION

INTELLIGENCE

IPB

Collection Management

Situation Development

Target Development

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

ESM

ECM

ECCM

OPERATIONAL SECURITY

CI Support

Intelligence Staff

-do-

-do-

-do-

-do-

Operation Staff

Intelligence Staff

Operation Staff

Operation Staff

Operation Staff

Intelligence Staff

Operation Staff

-do-

-do-

-do-

-do-

Intelligence Staff

Operation Staff

Intelligence Staff

-do-

Intelligence Staff

Operation Staff

1716. No single level of command is capable of meeting all of its requirements with organic resources. Each

is dependent on higher lower, and adjacent commands to complete the intelligence picture of the battlefield, to

meet electronic warfare requirements or the support the security needs of the command. Therefore, commanders

at each echelon must ensure that their resources are integrated into the overall IEW effort. For example, division

depends on brigades and battalion for some information about first echelon enemy battalions and brigades. It

also depends on higher echelon such as army headquarters for information about second echelon division. The

interdependencies between echelons create the need for detailed interfaces. Such interfaces exist between the

coordinators at successive echelon between producers at division and higher levels and between executors at

division and higher level. Additional interfaces are established laterally and at various level with other services,

national agencies and allied forces.

Situation and Target Development

1717. Situation development is the basic process by which intelligence is developed. Information is collected,

then integrated into an all source product to provide an enemy intentions in sufficient time to permit the

commander to select the most effective friendly course of action. Situation development provides :

a. Knowledge of the weather and terrain throughout the areas of operations and interest.

b. Knowledge of the enemy to include enemy organisation, equipment and tactics-how the enemy

fights; the strengths and weaknesses of enemy dispositions; the capabilities, limitation and patterns of

particular enemy units; the enemy's operational, technical and human weaknesses and personalities; the

enemy's intentions and the enemy's probable reactions.

1718. Weather and terrain have more impact on the battle than any other physical factor, including weapons,

equipment or supplies. The terrain on which battles are fought presents opportunities to both sides. Most battles

have been won by the side that used terrain to protect itself and to reinforce fires to destroy the enemy.

Commanders must understand the nature, uses and reinforcement of terrain to be effective in order to use it as a

force multiplier.

1719. IEW operations assist commanders in selecting and understanding the battlefields on which they

choose to fight. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), a systematic approach to the analysis of enemy,

weather and terrain, is the principal tool used. It clearly portrays what enemy forces can and cannot do on the

battlefield and the probability of the adoption of a specific course of action. It also is used to clearly show the

effects of weather and terrain on friendly forces and courses of action. IPB begins long before the battle and is

updated continually.

1720. To succeed in battle, commander must avoid enemy strengths and exploit weaknesses. They must

surprise enemy forces catching them at a disadvantage as often as possible IPB provides the basis for the

situation and target development tasks which make this possible. Situation development reduces battlefield

uncertainty and provides the confident to generate superior combat power.

1721. Target development, based on situation development, is the process of providing direct combat

information, targeting data and correlated targeting information to commanders and fire support means. It

provides the commander with timely and accurate locations of enemy weapons systems, units, and activities

which may impact on current or projected operation. Targeting data must be sufficiently timely and accurate to

support effective attack by fire, manoeuvre or electronic means.

1722. Situation and target development provide commanders with the intelligence they need to fight the air

land battle, both are distinct tasks, yet they must be integrated totally to provide an accurate picture of the

battlefield and to assist in successful accomplishment of the friendly commander's intent. Both tasks focus the

area of operations and interest.

Division of Areas

1723. The battlefield is comprised of the area of operations (AO) and the area of interest (AI). Commanders

and staffs view these areas in terms of width, depth, airspace and time.

a. The AO is defined as "that portion of an area of conflict necessary for military operations. Higher

commanders consider the factors of mission, enemy, terrain, troops and time available (METT-T) when

assigning AOs‖.

b. The area of interest is defined as "that of concern to the commander, including the area of

operations, area adjacent thereto and extending into enemy territory to the objectives of current or

planned operation. This area also includes area occupied by enemy forces which could jeopardise the

accomplishment of the mission". The area of interest overlaps those of adjacent and higher units, to

include areas of the area of operations.

1724. Area of Operations and area of interest help to focus the information requirements of commander from

battalion to Army Headquarter. Specific information requirements are dependent on the mission and the tactical

situation. Usually, in conventional battles, information requirements are based on the one -up-and-two-down

formula. Commanders require detailed information about enemy forces at their equivalent levels of command as

well as at one level above and two levels below their own. For example, brigade commanders need information

about enemy brigades (equivalent level), enemy divisions (one up) and enemy battalions and companies (two

down), Generally, the enemy forces of concern to each commander are found within the command's area of

operation and area of interest.

Electronic Warfare

1725. EW exploits, disrupts and deceives the enemy command and control system while protecting friendly

use of communications and non-communications systems. It is a significant force multiplier when integrated and

employed with fire and manoeuvre.

1726. Offensive part of EW known as Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) represents significant contributor

to command, control and communications countermeasures which is the integrated use of operations security

(OPSEC), military deception, jamming and physical destruction to disrupt enemy command and control. ECM

protects friendly command control and communications (C3), influences, degrades or destroys enemy C3

capabilities and denies the enemy own information of intelligence value.

1727. Electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) or defensive EW, are the responsibility of all soldiers

who use or who supervise the use of communications electronics equipment. ECCM are passive in nature and

are used to protect friendly C3 systems against enemy radio electronic combat activities. Passive ECCM include

both anti-intercept and locate (for example, emission control, terrain masking and avoidance) procedures and

anti jam or kill features. ECCM also include the immediate identification and reporting of beaconing, intrusion,

jamming and interference on a friendly C3 facility.

1728. Electronic warfare support measures (ESM) can provide commander the capability to intercept,

identify and locate enemy emitters. They represent a sources of information required for jamming, deception,

ECCM, targeting and other tactical employment of combat forces. ESM support the destruction and jamming of

enemy C3 systems through acquisition and reporting of targeting data. ESM also support the commander's

efforts to counter enemy operation security and deception.

1729. In extreme situations, electronic counter measures can be used to protect friendly C3. Jamming systems

may be used as high -powered radios to transmit a key message through enemy jamming. Additionally, jammers

may protect friendly communications by using directional antennas to jam known enemy signal intelligence

(SIGINT) systems on the same frequency as key friendly communications to screen and prevent enemy

intercept. This option takes multiple jammers to cover the deployed enemy collectors and can place our jammers

at great risk. Expandable jammer may also be used to screen friendly communications if their emplacement near

enemy signal intelligence sites is feasible.

1730. The offensive components of EW, passive ESM and active ECM, provide commanders :

a. Intelligence to plan, direct, coordinate, support and conduct their deep and close operations.

b. Combat information and targeting data to manoeuvre their forces and target their weapons

systems.

c. ECM no lethal attack capability to systematically disrupt the C3 systems of enemy first and

second -echelon units.

1731. Command and control warfare in air-land combat operations is complex when viewed as a maze of

intangible electronic signals criss-crossing above and over the battle field. Command and control warfare,

however, can be reduced to the simplest terms of reference and understanding. It is composed of both tangibles

and intangibles. The tangibles are the C3 "nodes" which present visual signatures for commanders to see and

shoot. The intangibles are the "information links" between the nodes which can be intercepted, identified and

jammed. There are also nodes which can be intercepted, identified and jammed. There are also nodes and links

which must be seen and monitored, but neither shot nor jammed. Simply speaking we jam and kill the fighters

and sustainers and collect information from the planners and coordinators.

Counter Intelligence

1732. IEW operations must include specific actions which support the protection of the force, through

counter intelligence, IEW operations support actions which :

a. Counter the hostile intelligence acquisition threat.

b. Safeguard the command from surprise.

c Deceive the enemy commander.

d. Counter enemy sabotage, subversion and terrorism.

1733. The need for commanders to know the enemy is not restricted to friendly force commanders. Enemy

commanders, to succeed against us, must employ all - sources intelligence systems to collect information about

our forces. Depriving enemy commanders of this information is important, even crucial to friendly force success

on the battlefield. It supports the operational security of the command to achieve this objective.

1734. Safeguarding the command from surprise includes two elements of IEW support. The first is

intelligence which enables the commander to know the enemy's activities and intentions. The second is counter

intelligence support to operational security which helps to deprive the enemy commander of the intelligence he

needs to create situations in which the friendly force can be taken by surprise.

SYSTEM ELEMENTS FOR IEW

General

1735. The IEW system includes combat, combat support and combat service support elements. While

military intelligence units provide dedicated IEW support, all units in the combat force, by virtue of their

mission, capabilities and AOs, have an implied mission of collecting and reporting information. The IEW

mission is accomplished through the integrated effort of all elements of the force. In turn, every element relies

on supports form the IEW system to accomplish its mission.

Manoeuvre Unit

1736. Manoeuvre units are among the best eyes and ears of the command. Individual soldiers and leaders

provide a great deal of real-time targeting and combat information. Manoeuvre unit conduct patrols, capture

prisoners and documents, operate observation post and observe enemy forces with whom they are in contact.

They report information about the activity of enemy first-echelon forces, patrols and reconnaissance elements.

Combat information and targeting data collected by manoeuvre units are normally used by the collecting units to

engage the enemy. Pertinent information is introduced into the IEW system by the intelligence staffs of the

collecting units. By collecting and reporting information, manoeuvre units support the IEW effort. They, in turn,

receive intelligence, EW and counter intelligence support from other elements of the system.

1737. Armour reconnaissance troops and composite platoons of support battalions are combined arms combat

reconnaissance force mounted in ground vehicles. They constitute the primary reconnaissance capability at

division and brigade level. They uniquely organised equipped, and trained to find the enemy and prevent the

friendly main body from being engaged under adverse circumstance. While conducting these tasks,

reconnaissance elements provide the IEW system information about terrain, effects of weather on the terrain and

the presence or absence of the enemy. In turn, they rely heavily on the IEW system for support to plan and

accomplish its mission.

Artillery

1738. Field artillery units provide the IEW system with valuable information about enemy activity. The

tactical fire direction system has markedly enhanced the field artillery capability to collect, analyse and

disseminate targeting data. Organic target acquisition resources provide information concerning the enemy

through, visual observation, combat observation teams, moving target locating radar, weapon-locating radars

and aerial observers. Artillery fire support teams operating with manoeuvre units are a major source of targeting

and other combat information. Combat information and targeting data are exchanged constantly between

operation and intelligence staffs and the field artillery. This exchange takes place through each tactical echelon.

1739. The principal function of the artillery intelligence staff is to provide data and co-ordination, within the

artillery organisation, for target acquisition with particular reference to enemy batteries and weapon systems.

However, in collecting information on enemy artillery, mortars and tactical missiles, the artillery intelligence

staff acquires information of great interest and value to the intelligence staff. This information gives the pattern

of enemy artillery deployment, which can produce vital intelligence when processed with other information in

the possession of the intelligence staff. For this reason there must be close and constant liaison between them,

and if at all possible they must be co-located side by side in headquarters. Commanders and staff must accept

this as a priority. Artillery-acquired information of value to intelligence may include :

a. Locations of enemy artillery.

b. Types of enemy artillery.

c. Details of enemy batteries.

1740. Air defence artillery elements, equipped with target acquisition radars, provide surveillance

information to the commander. In addition to organic target acquisition radar, these elements have direct access

to and utilize long –range Air Force assets. They provide information about air routes into the friendly area and

enemy air activity throughout the area of interest. They also provide statistical data about the destruction of

enemy aircraft.

Engineers

1741. Engineers routinely conduct reconnaissance of route, rivers , bridge, obstacle, air landing facility, and

support area. Units operating with forward-deployed forces provide intelligence, tactical information and other

terrain data of value to the commander. Terrain teams at division, brigades and units provide terrain and

trafficability studies and route overlays. Given sufficient time overprinted maps may be produced by the survey

of Bangladesh and supplied by Engineer Company under Engineer Brigade.

1742. Engineer Intelligence is produced primarily for terrain intelligence purpose. The officer at divisional

headquarters, who is responsible for it, is concerned mainly with information on going, routes, communications,

obstacles, enemy demolition, areas suitable for landing zones, enemy engineer resources and local resources.

Much of this is of intelligence interest, specially going, route classification, locations of minefields and other

obstacles and resources. The sources of engineer intelligence include :

a. Intelligence reports from forward units and formations.

b. Engineer reconnaissance parties and patrols.

c. Basic topographical intelligence extracted from publications issued by various organisations.

d. Records maintained by local government departments, such as public works, transportation,

inland waterways and forestry.

e. Through terrain analysis conducted in peace time taking all terrain factors into consideration.

Signal

1743. Signal Intelligence and Electronic warfare (EW) measures are discussed separately. In war they are a

major source of tactical and strategic intelligence. Also in war, EW cell will be located with certain formation

headquarters so as to maintain close liaison between EW resources and the intelligence staff. Signal elements

provide specific support to EW operations by processing and reporting enemy beaconing, intrusion, tanning and

interference reports.

Combat Services Support (CSS)

1744. These units make extensive use of road networks and provide valuable information about line of

commutation, guerrilla activity, weather and terrain condition. Ordnance, medical, units provide assistance in

their technical areas of expertise by evaluating captured enemy materiel. Medical units provide intelligence by

evaluating captured enemy medical materiel and also by providing information concerning the state of health of

the enemy by medically evaluating selected enemy prisoners, refugees, defectors and escapees. Resulting

information is processed and entered in the intelligence data base.

1745. Military Police are responsible for good order, discipline and the collection, movement and control of

enemy prisoners. Alert and well trained MP personnel can provide valuable information on prisoner behaviour,

rear area activities and terrorism. MP provides information useful in resource and refugee control and rear

operations.

Civil Affairs and Psychological Elements

1746. Civil Affairs Elements. They deal with people, equipments and documents which are prime sources

of valuable information. They significantly aid intelligence and counter intelligence operations by :

a. Detecting and warning of sabotage activity.

b. Detecting and reporting the transmission of information and supplies to enemy forces in the rear

area, unfriendly partisan and guerrillas.

c. Locating and securing various records, periodical file, local publications, official documents,

technical equipment, blueprints, plans or other information of interest to intelligence analysts.

1747. Psychological Operation (PSYOP). These elements use intelligence as the basis for all operations.

The objective of psychological operation is to modify the behaviour and decrease the combat effectiveness of

enemy soldiers and units psychological operation intelligence personnel collect information on the attitudes,

susceptibilities and vulnerabilities of enemy force. These units provide intelligence and in turn depend on the

IEW system for intelligence to support their operations.

Army Aviation and Air Force

1748. Army Aviation and Air Force resources, which range over the entire battlefields, have unique

capabilities to observe both friendly and enemy activities. All aviation elements have the mission to cover the

battlefield and report what they see. They provide tactical information and intelligence about enemy locations,

equipment and movement. They also provide weather observations and information about the terrain. Aviation

elements are particularly well suited to support operational security by detecting weaknesses in friendly

camouflage and light discipline. Bangladesh Air Force assets flying close air support missions have a similar

capability and may be contacted through the air liaison officer.

1749 – 1800. Reserved.

SECTION - 18

ELECTRONIC WARFARE AND INTELLIGENCE

General

1801. Electronic Warfare (EW) is defined as military actions involving the use of electromagnetic energy to

determine, exploit, reduce or prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic spectrum and actions which retain

friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum.

1802. Electronic Warfare (EW) is an essential element of combat power. Its contribution lies in exploiting

enemy weakness, protecting friendly freedom of action, and reducing security and communications

vulnerabilities. A modern military force depends on electronics for command and control of forces and

employment of weapons systems. Because of this dependence on electronic devices, both friendly and enemy

forces are vulnerable to action which can reduce the effectiveness of these devices or gain intelligence from

them. It may be helpful to consider the subject in a less rigorous way working from acceptance of the following

basic ideas :

a. Electronic Warfare should be considered as a Weapon System.

b. The various techniques of Electronic Warfare are indivisible, each supporting the others.

c. Electronic Warfare is a dynamic subject in which equipment, techniques and capabilities are

changing.

d. Electronic Warfare is intimately related to Signal Intelligence (SIGINT).

1803. EW cannot physically destroy a target. It can, however, when integrated into the overall concept of the

operation, confuse, deceive, delay, disorganize, and target the enemy. When other considerations are equal,

victory may go to the force that used EW most effectively. EW is a command responsibility. It is a combat

power element having two facts – offensive and defensive. The offensive components of EW are Electronic

Support Measures (ESM), Electronic Counter Measures (ECM), Electronic Counter Counter Measures (ECCM).

1804. Offensive EW is the employment of EW to disrupt or deny the enemy‘s effective use of their electronic

systems. An understanding of its functions is essential for planning, managing and directing the employment of

EW. As with all offensive operations, the EW process followed is basically a sequence of actions shown below

diagrammatically :

THE EW PROCESS

Figure 18.1 : The EW Process.

COLLECTION, RECORDING,

ANALYSIS & REPORTING

STEER-AGE

JAMMING & DECEPTION

INTELLIGENCE

SEARCH, INTERCEPT &

DIRECTION FINDING

1805. A chart of all branches of EW process is shown below :

EW FUNCTIONS

Figure 18.2 : EW Function.

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

Military action involving the use of electromagnetic energy to determine exploit, reduce, or prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic spectrum and

action that retains friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum.

ELECTRONIC SUPPORT

MEASURES (ESM)

That part of EW involving actions taken (under direct control of

operational commander) to search for

intercept, locate, and identify sources

of related electromagnetic energy for

the purpose of immediate threat

recognition thus. ESM provides source of information required for actions

involving ECM, ECCM, Avoidance

targeting, and other tactical

employment of forces

ELECTRONIC

COUNTER COUNTER

MEASURES (ECCM)

The part of EW involving

actions taken to retain

effective friendly use of the

electromagnetic spectrum.

ANTI-ESM ANTI-ECM

EMISSION

CONTROL

AVOIDANCE

SYSTEM

DESIGN

SYSTEM DEPLOYMENT

FREQUENCY CONTROL

OPERATOR TRAINING

ELECTRONIC JAMMING

The deliberate radiation and reflection of

electromagnetic energy with the object of

degrading the effectiveness of electronic devices, equipment or systems being used by a

hostile forces.

ELECTRONIC DECEPTION

The deliberate radiation, re-radiation, alteration, absorption,

enhancement or reflection of electromagnetic energy in a

manner intended to mislead hostile forces in the interpretation or use of information received by their

electronic system.

SIMULATIVE ELECTRONIC

DECEPTION (SED)

The creation of electromagnetic

emissions to represent friendly notional or actual capabilities to

mislead hostile forces.

MANIPULATIVE ELECTRONIC

DECEPTION (MED)

The alteration of friendly electromagnetic

emission characteristics, patterns or

procedures to eliminate revealing or convey misleading , telltale indicators that may be

used by hostile forces.

IMITATIVE

ELECTRONIC

DECEPTION (IED)

The introduction of radiations into unfriendly

channels that imitate

hostile emissions.

ELECTRONIC

COUNTER MEASURES

(ECM)

The part of EW involving

actions taken to prevent or

reduce effective use of the

electromagnetic spectrum by

hostile forces.

ELECTRONIC SUPPORT MEASURES (ESM)

1806. Definition. It is that division of EW involving actions taken to search for intercept, locate, record and

analyse radiated electromagnetic energy for the purpose of exploiting such radiations. The aims of ESM are

production of operational and tactical intelligence and production of steerage for other EW activities.

1807. ESM and SIGINT. ESM include essentially the same functions as SIGINT but are focused on the

more immediate requirements of the tactical commander. The relationship of ESM to SIGINT is similar to the

relationship of tactical information to intelligence. Tactical resource performing SIGINT may perform ESM

simultaneously with or a part of SIGINT missions. The primary difference between ESM and SIGINT is how

the information is used. Generally, ESM is a producer of tactical information that can be used for ECM. Fire,

manoeuvre, or threat avoidance with little systematic analysis or processing. SIGINT, however, requires

separate processing to produce the desired product. ESM and SIGINT are mutually supporting. Information

collected through ESM may be processed to produce SIGINT. SIGINT is essential to support EW.

1808. Feasibility of Search and Intercept

a. The lower the frequency the easier it is to acquire signals and the more generalised the intercept.

b. Conversely, the higher the frequencies the more difficult it becomes very localized to intercept.

c. At radio relay and radar frequencies it may be necessary to employ air borne platforms for

effective intercept.

d. The number of communications facilities and radars employed by an enemy will present a

formidable intercept task.

e. This problem of selection means that automation of intercept is a subject worthy of attention and

further development.

f. Message content is not essential since much of value can be gained from such things as traffic

flow and its pattern, the frequency employed, the type of modulation and the configuration of the net.

g. Many forward communication nets use clear speech, therefore direct intercept possible.

1809. Operational Value of Search and Intercept

a. Intercept of enemy radio nets by ground based stations can provide intelligence leading to such

things as identification of units, axes, inter-formation boundaries and arrival and deployment of reserve

forces.

b. Intercept by sensors mounted on airborne platforms can provide information on supporting

forces, redeployment of reserves and the movement of helicopter borne troops.

c. Intercept of air defence radars can reveal the pattern of deployment of air defence units and

hence, possibly the location of vulnerable points such as headquarters and airstrips.

d. Intercept of other radars and electro-optical signals may give indication of the presence of the

enemy and valuable localized warning of imminent attack.

1810. Feasibility - Direction Finder (DF)

a. Accuracy increases with rise of frequency and equipment tends to get smaller.

b. However, at higher frequencies airborne DF stations may be necessary. Accuracy will suffer if the

location of these platforms cannot be exactly defined.

c. Speed of operation can be very good. In communication terms, 4 or 5 working stations on a net

can all be located in 3 minutes. A radar can give 20 to 30 position fixes per second.

1811. Direction Finder Operational Value. Operational value depends on the accuracy that can be

achieved. At present accuracies are not sufficient for acquisition without the assistance of information from

other intelligence.

ELECTRONIC COUNTER MEASURES

General

1812. ECM includes electronic jamming and deception. One function of jamming is to degrade the enemy‘s

combat power by denying effective operations in the electromagnetic spectrum. Another function of jamming is

to reduce the signal security of enemy operators and thereby gain information through ESM. Jamming may be

subtle and difficult to detect or it accomplished from both ground and aerial platforms.

1813. Electronic deception is integrated with an extends and reinforces tactical deception operations. It

requires specific training and planning and must be well controlled if it is to be effective. The objective of

electronic deception is to deceive enemy forces through their electronic systems.

1814. This is the division of EW involving actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy‘s effective use of the

electro-magnetic spectrum. Electronic deception may be divided into two major parts :

a. Imitative Electronic Deception (IED). Which involves intrusion into enemy‘s net or channels

and impersonate as a station of that net passing false information to confuse or harass the enemy.

b. Manipulative Electronic Deception (MED). This encompasses own fake or true net where false

information's are passed. When this information's are intercepted by the enemy analyst can cause her

into wrong interpretation of the received messages.

c. Simulative Electronic Deception (SED). The creation of electromagnetic emissions to represent

friendly notional or actual capabilities to mislead hostile forces.

Imitating Enemy Sub Station

1815. This enemy could use the call sign of a friendly station to answer call-ups and accept traffic. If the

station to which the call sign is assigned fails to answer, the imitating station may accept the message and

acknowledge receipt. Moreover by doing so the operator may suppress high priority traffic which no enemy

station could copy completely and correctly. If the transmitting operator is careless he may accept this false

receipt and close down. In case the enemy suspects and thereby request for authentication, it can be avoided by

own operators who may call other station and pretending to have high priority traffic.

1816. Delaying Tactics. The reduction of available time for transmission of authentic traffic may be

achieved by several means.

a. Offering False Coded Messages. One of the tactics of reducing the operational capacity of

enemy communication personnel‘s could be by offering false coded messages that is not capable of

being decrypted. If the enemy operator can be induced to waste his time in copying such messages and

attempting to decrypt them, the purpose is accomplished. Lifting a message, including authentication

from one net and interdicting it into another net under a different heading or piecing parts of several

messages together simply to waste time and create confusion, are ways of delaying traffic.

b. Offering Important Traffic. Another tactic is to pretend to have important traffic so as to cause

delays and create confusion. The deception operator may induce several stations to answer with a go

ahead signal. He then pretends not to hear their signal and calls repeatedly. The resulting confusion can

be quite effective in delaying authentic traffic. A deception operator may also disrupt important traffic

by claiming to have emergency messages to transmit.

1817. Frequent Request for Signal Strength. Unnecessary requests for signal strength can be used for own

advantage. The deceptions operators can in such situation ask the enemy operator for his signal strength and

thereby adjust for better results. Deception operators on EW circuits should be able to change their tone keying

characteristic and frequency to resemble the station they are imitating.

1818. Transmission of False Orders. A high degree of confusion can be created by the transmission of

false orders and instructions. In addition to this, amendment can be issued specially at critical hours of combat.

1819. Use of Obscene Language. When the enemy is on radio silence, in order to know his location distress

signals may be made. If such calls are answered it may give out the location of enemy stations. Use of insults

and obscene language may instigate the enemy operator in breaking his radio silence and thereby giving out his

location.

Signals Tactics in Manipulative Deception

1820. Screening Move Leaving back a significant sample of a brigade of battalion net in a place, the brigade

or battalion moves to a new location. This false net acts as a screen to cover the move to the formation or unit.

The enemy as such cannot assess the situation properly and their commanders may get wrong picture.

1821. Broadcasting False Information. By broadcasting false information in both existing and false nets

the enemy can be lead into drawing of inconclusive assessment. When such information are collected they give

out unintelligible conclusions confusing the enemy strategists and analysts.

1822. Exchanging Operators. Those operators whose characteristics are likely to be detected by the enemy

analysts may be changed from time to time. When such operators with peculiarities and idiosyncrasy are

exchanged, may cause the enemy intercepting agency to conclude that the units are on move. Such changes at

irregular frequency may create confusion amongst the enemy analysts who may feel that their deductions are not

free of fault. This may render the enemy analysts ineffective; alternatively force them to increase their effort to

gain more accurate information thereby stretching their capabilities and resources.

1823. Multi channel Communication. Multi channel equipment are usually located with headquarters of

higher formations. If these multi channel equipment are used at headquarters of smaller units they lead the

enemy intercepting agency to confuse them for larger headquarter. If such a net is established at a lower

headquarters the enemy can be made to believe that the net is of a higher formation.

1824. Using Number of Call Sign and frequency. Sub-station may be issued two more call signs, use of

this, projects a net to be large one. The enemy is approached to draw a similar deduction and would lead them

into incorrect net structures. Changing frequency by own forces very frequently would cause the enemy

resources to be overstretched which would mean the enemy will have to increase its effort to find which

frequency is the actual operating frequency.

1825. Observing Radio Silence. The observance of radio silence is an indication of an unusual activity

designed to deny the enemy about intending action. The enemy is therefore likely to draw similar conclusions.

Since radio silence is normally observed before an attack, the enemy is going to react. If it is observed in a false

net at a different location the enemy would divert its resources on that particular front while own forces can

strike at a place where the enemy least expects.

Jamming

1826. General. Jamming is the deliberate radiation, re-radiation or reflection of electromagnetic energy

with the object of impairing the use of electronic devices, equipment or systems being used by an enemy. There

are basically two types of Jamming –barrage jamming and spot jamming.

1827. Barrage Jamming. 'When a band of frequencies are jammed simultaneously it is called barrage

jamming'. Barrage jamming is the transmission of a side band signal to interfere simultaneously with as many

frequencies of channels as possible. This is accomplished by spreading the transmitted signal power

continuously over a wide band of frequencies. It ensures that all frequencies encompassed within the band are

subjected to interference, though the magnitude of interference may vary. Some of its advantages and

disadvantages are :

a. Advantages. Maximum frequencies can be jammed simultaneously. More effective and

minimum information of the jamming frequency is required.

b. Disadvantages. Maximum power is required; wastage of unused power, limitation on use of the

frequency spectrum by friendly forces and more vulnerable to enemy‘s direction finding equipments

are major disadvantages.

1828. Variation of Barrage Jamming. In barrage jamming a complete band is jammed and has many

disadvantages. To overcome these disadvantages some variations of barrage jamming has been developed. The

simultaneous multi spot method is the use of a single jamming signal against multiple frequencies on a power

sharing basis. In this method, a number of frequencies can be jammed at one time, with the jamming power

divided equally among the frequencies. This method is essentially a more sophisticated form of barrage

jamming. This type of jamming can jam a number of pre-selected frequencies at the same time but does not jam

an entire band of frequencies as does the barrage jamming, therefore, power is not wasted on frequencies where

no one is operating.

1829. Spot Jamming. Spot Jamming is the transmission of a narrow band of signal to interfere with a

specific frequency or channel. In other words, when only one particular frequency is jammed it is called spot

jamming. This type of jamming is best for a high jamming to signal ratio. It is useful in the sense that it jams the

selected frequency accurately, effectively and under controlled conditions. The advantages and disadvantages

are :

a. Advantages. Minimum power required, maximum concentration of power, own net is not

disturbed and no wastage of power are its advantages.

b. Disadvantages. Only one single frequency is jammed, accurate information about the frequency

to be jammed is required and a little variation in tuning by the enemy can render it ineffective.

1830. Variation in Spot Jamming. There are a number of variations of the spot method of transmitting a

jamming signal. The Sequential Multi-spot method uses a single jamming signal against multiple frequencies on

a timesharing basis, which is several predetermined frequencies are each jammed in rapid order. Each frequency

receives the full power output of the jamming for a short period of time but the cycling may be so rapid as to

appear that each frequency is being jammed continuously.

1831. Feasibility of Jamming. Jamming requires careful control as it can interfere with our own

communications, surveillance and intercept. Jamming is a power battle in which the unwanted signal must blot

out the wanted signal. In Communication EW the jamming is usually at a disadvantage since it has to operate at

longer range than the transmitter radiating the wanted signal. The reverse should apply in Non-communications

EW, where the jamming should find it easy to radiate more power than the weak echo of a reflected signal.

However, the directional nature of the radar receiving antenna often negates this advantage in the land

environment. Jamming, therefore, tend to be large, thirsty for power and are inherently vulnerable themselves.

1832. Operational Value of Jamming.

a. Communications Jamming. In order to have any significant effect on command and control, it

must be complete (i.e. HF and VHF radio & radio relay) at the level attacked. Effective radio relay

jamming may require airborne platforms. As speech security become more widespread, jamming may

become a more desirable option. Because of its inherent problems jamming may be regarded as a

weapon to be used only when the probability of success is very high.

b. Non-Communications Jamming. Non communication jamming is likely to be of value in a

protective role.

ELECTRONIC COUNTER COUNTER MEASURES

1833. Defensive EW or ECCM are those actions taken to ensure friendly effective use of the electromagnetic

spectrum. Commanders rely on electronic emitters for command and control and for many other critical

battlefield functions. The first priority of defensive EW is to protect these emitters from enemy detection,

location and identification. Command posts or weapon systems cannot survive on the modern battlefield if they

can be located through their electronic emissions. Friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum and the location

of critical installations and systems are protected through ECCM.

1834. ECCM are protective in nature and are planned around the commander‘s mission and concept of the

operation. Planning begins with the identifications of essential friendly emitters and sensitive communications

that must be protected. Friendly electronic emitters, signatures and profiles are evaluated based on their

vulnerability to enemy signal intelligence capabilities. ECCM are then planned to overcome these

vulnerabilities.

1835. ECCM are closely related to signal security. The primary difference lies in the type of information that

is protected from enemy collection. ECCM protect friendly emitters from enemy detection. location and

identification. ECCM conceal electromagnetic signatures or deceive the enemy as to the location and

identification of the emitter. Signal security, on the other hand, protects the information that is transmitted

through friendly counter electronic systems from enemy exploitation. Many operator techniques may serve as

both ECCM and signal security measures.

1836. ECCM under the direction of the counter electronic officer, begin with training and are executed by

every element of the combat force that uses or is responsible for the use of electronic emitters. The

responsibility for ECCM starts with commanders and extends to supervisors and operators at all levels.

Techniques for reducing friendly vulnerabilities to enemy EW efforts are directed through the Communications-

Electronics Operating Instruction (CEOI), Communications-Electronic Standing Instructions, Standing

Operating Procedures (SOPs) and other instructions. The effectiveness of defensive EW is continually assessed

to validate existing ECCM and to determine the necessity for additional measures.

1837. Technical Factors. Technical ECCM is mainly involved in the design of communications and

surveillance equipments. The following factors assist survivability of ECCM :

a. Power Variability. The ability to operate on minimum power in order to make enemy ESM

more difficult, coupled with the ability to switch to high power to combat jamming.

b. Frequency Agility. It is a product of the range of frequency available to the number of channels

that can be changed.

c. Antennas. Directional or automatic steer able antennas give the best ECCM characteristics.

Transmit antennas can then be aligned to beam power in the required direction and reduce that

available to enemy intercept and directing finding receive antennas can be aligned to accept the wanted

signal and reject the unwanted jamming.

d. Reduce Transmission Time. Any characteristic (e.g. burst transmission) which reduces

transmission time aids ECCM.

e. Choice of Modulation. Dependent on the frequency used, some types of modulation have better

ECCM characteristics.

1838. Operating Factors. Communications and surveillance equipment are operated by all arms. ECCM is

not therefore a matter purely for specialists. The important operating factors are operating drills; sensible sitting;

training; and communication security. If has two components :

a. Functional. Functional ECCM is involved in the operation of communications and surveillance

equipments.

b. Tactical. Tactical ECCM is involved among other things like, EW staff duties; operational

grouping; levels of command; and deployment of forces, communications and surveillance equipment

to support these forces.

EW IN BANGLADESH ARMY

1839. EW is an essential element of combat power. We acquire EW assets for active defence and attacks

against enemy EW capabilities. EW can adopt passive means to protect our command, control and

communication (C3) system. Protecting C3 is the number one priority for EW. Action taken to deny, influence,

degrade or destroy enemy C3 capabilities by lethal fire (Artillery, air etc) is also equally important.

1840. ECCM or defensive EW are the responsibility of all soldiers who use or supervise the use of

communications and electronic equipments. ECCM is passive in nature and are used to protect friendly C3

system against enemy ECM. Passive ECCM includes both anti-intercept and locating procedures such as

emission control. terrain masking and avoidance and locating procedures such as emission control, terrain

masking and avoidance and anti-jam features such as equipment design with built-in ECCM capabilities. ECCM

also includes the immediate identification and reporting of intrusion jamming and interference on friendly C3

facility.

1841. Limited EW support measures are provided by monitoring platoon of the Divisional Signal Battalion

and the unconventional force provide commander the capability to intercept, identify and locate enemy emitters.

Electronic support measures (ESM) represent a source of information required for deception, ECCM targeting

by lethal weapon systems and jamming (when EW assets are made available). It supports the destruction of

enemy C3 systems by skilful employment of both long-range delivery assets and the unconventional forces. It

also supports the commander‘s efforts to counter enemy‘s operational security and deception.

1842. When jammers are available, these can support other combat actions :

a. By disrupting key command and control nets, thus slowing or disorganizing the enemy in critical

sections.

b. By denying the enemy the ability to react to changes on the battlefield.

c. By reducing the effectiveness of enemy fire support and air control nets.

d. By denying the enemy the use of his air defence fire control nets.

e. By disrupting the enemy‘s flow of critical supplies such as ammunition and POL.

1843 – 1900. Reserved.

SECTION - 19

INTELLIGENCE IN INFORMATION OPERATION

GENERAL

1901. History indicates that the speed and accuracy of information available to military commanders is the

significant factor in determining the outcome in the battlefield. Information Operation enables the accuracy and

timeliness of information required by our military commanders by defending our systems from exploitation by

adversaries. Information operations are used to deny adversaries access to our Command, Control, Intelligence

and other supporting automated infrastructures.

1902. Adversaries from both state and non state actors are increasingly exploring and testing Information

Operation actions as asymmetric warfare that can be used to thwart our military objectives. This requires our

military to employ defensive technologies and utilize leading-edge tactics and procedures to prevent our forces

and systems from being successfully attacked.

1903. Information is a strategic resource, vital to national security and military operations depend on

information and information systems for many simultaneous and integrated activities. Information Operations

(IO) are described as the integrated employment of Electronic Warfare (EW), Computer Network Operations

(CNO), Psychological Operations (Psy Ops), Denial and Deception (D&D) and Operations Security (OPSEC) in

concert with specified supporting and related capabilities to influence, disrupt or corrupt, adversarial human and

automated decision making while protecting our own.

THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

Dimension

1904. General. The information environment is the aggregate of individuals, organisations, and systems that

collect, process, disseminate or act on information. The actors include decision makers, junior leaders,

individuals and organizations. Resources include the materials and systems employed to collect, analyse, apply

or disseminate information. The information environment is where humans and automated systems observe,

orient, decide and act upon information and is therefore the principal environment of decision making. Even

though the information environment is considered distinct, it resides within each of the four domains like land,

air, sea and space. The information environment is made up of five interrelated dimensions: physical,

informational, cognitive, technological as well as time and resource.

1905. The Physical Dimension. The physical dimension is composed of the command and control (C2)

systems and supporting infrastructures that enable individuals and organizations to conduct operations across the

air, land, sea and space domains. It is also the dimension where physical platforms and the communications

networks that connect them reside. This includes the means of transmission, infrastructure, technologies, groups

and populations. Examples include :

a. Geographic coordinates of adversary's information infrastructure and capabilities.

b. Organisation of infrastructure and capabilities as well as identification of critical links, nodes and

redundant communication infrastructure.

c. Types, quantity and configuration of information infrastructure and capabilities (with specific

makes, models and numbers).

d. Organisational planning, decision and execution processes.

e. Enemy intelligence/feedback mechanism for gaining battle space awareness, information and

knowledge.

f. Enemy computer attack, defence and exploitation capabilities.

1906. The Informational Dimension. The informational dimension is where information is collected,

processed, stored, disseminated, displayed and protected. It is the dimension where the C2 of modern military

forces is communicated and where commander‘s intent is conveyed. It consists of the content and flow of

information. Consequently, it is the informational dimension that must be protected. Informational properties of

the information environment include those systems and networks where information is created, processed,

manipulated, transmitted and shared. It includes those properties relevant to the electronic collection,

transmission, processing, storage and display of information. These properties may be electronic or human-to-

human or a combination of both. Examples of informational properties include :

a. Specification, capacity, configuration and usage of information infrastructure and capabilities.

b. Technical design of information infrastructure.

c. Networks of human-to-human contact used for the transmission of information (life drops, dead-

drops, etc).

1907. The Cognitive Dimension. The cognitive dimension encompasses the mind of the decision maker and

the target audience (TA). This is the dimension in which people think, perceive, visualise, and decide. It is the

most important of the three dimensions. This dimension is also affected by a commander‘s orders, training and

other personal motivations. Battles and campaigns can be lost in the cognitive dimension. Factors such as

leadership, morale, unit cohesion, emotion, state of mind, level of training, experience, situational awareness, as

well as public opinion, perceptions, media, public information and rumours influence this dimension. Cognitive

properties of the information environment are the psychological, cultural, behavioural and other human

attributes that influence decision making, the flow of information and the interpretation of information by

individuals or groups at any level in a state or organisation. Cognitive properties may include :

a. Cultural and societal factors affecting attitudes and perceptions such as language, education,

history, religion, myths, personal experience and family structure.

b. Identity of key individuals and groups affecting attitudes and perceptions, whether in the same or

a different country as those they influence.

c. Identity and psychological profile of key decision makers, their advisers, key associates, and/or

family members who influence them.

d. Credibility of key individuals or groups and specification of their sphere of influence.

e. Laws, regulations and procedures relevant to information and decision making processes,

capability employment doctrine, timeliness and information content.

f. How leaders think, perceive, plan, execute and assess outcomes of their results and actions from

their perspectives.

g. Identify key historical events between the target country and Bangladesh, which may affect an

individual or group‘s attitudes and perceptions of Bangladesh, whether in the same or different country

as those they influence.

1908. Technological Dimension. Advancements in technology have enabled information to be collected,

processed, stored, disseminated, displayed and protected outside the cognitive process in quantities and at

speeds that were previously incomprehensible. While technology makes great quantities of information

available to audiences worldwide, perception-affecting factors provide the context which individuals use to

translate data into information and knowledge.

1909. Time and Resource Dimension. The finite amount of time and resources available to obtain

information must be considered. Whether decisions are made cognitively or pre-programmed in automated

systems, the limited time and resources to improve the quality of available information leaves decision making

subject to manipulation. Additionally, there are real costs associated with obtaining quality information - that is,

information well-suited to its purpose - such as those to acquire, process, store, transport and distribute

information. The overall impact of successful IO improves the quality of friendly information while degrading

the quality of adversary's information, thus, providing friendly forces the ability to make faster, more accurate

decisions.

Principles of IO

1910. Success in military operations depends on collecting and integrating essential information while

denying it to the adversary and other Target Audience. IO encompasses planning, coordination and

synchronisation of the employment of current capabilities to deliberately affect or defend the information

environment to achieve the commander‘s objectives :

a. Core Capabilities. EW, CNO, Psy Ops, D&D and OPSEC are integrated into the planning and

execution of operations in the information environment.

b. Supporting Capabilities. Information assurance [IA], physical security, physical attack and

counter intelligence have military purposes other than IO but either operates in the information

environment or have impact on the information environment.

c. Related Capabilities. Civil Military Operations [CMO] and defensive support to public

diplomacy may be constrained by our policy or legal considerations. While these capabilities have

common interfaces with Information Operation, their primary purposes and rules make them separate

and distinct. As a result, it is essential that commanders and their staffs coordinate their efforts when

exercising their functions within the information environment.

1911. IO are primarily concerned with affecting decisions and decision-making processes, while at the same

time defending friendly decision-making processes. Primary mechanisms used to affect the information

environment include: influence, disruption, corruption or usurpations.

Fundamental Assumptions

1912. IO ability to affect and defend decision making is based on five fundamental assumptions. Although

each of these assumptions is an important enabling factor for IO, they will not all necessarily be true for every

operation. For any specific operation where one or more of these assumptions are not met, the risk assessment

provided to the commander would be adjusted accordingly :

a. Generally, the quality of information that is considered valuable to human and automated

decision makers is universal. However, the relative importance of each quality criterion of information

may vary based on the influences of geography, language, culture, religion, organisation, experience or

personality.

b. Decisions are made based on the information available at the time.

c. It is possible, with finite resources, to understand the relevant aspects of the information

environment to include the processes decision makers use to make decisions.

d. It is possible to affect the information environment in which specific decision maker's act

through psychological, electronic or physical means.

e. It is possible to measure the effectiveness of Information Operation actions in relation to an

operational objective.

IO Support for Military Operations

1913. Since human activity takes place in the information environment, it is potentially subject to IO.

However, only mission-related critical psychological, electronic and physical points in the information

environment should be targeted directly or indirectly, by IO. The planning methodologies used to identify and

prioritise such points in planning IO are discussed separately.

1914. IO capabilities can produce effects and achieve objectives at all levels of war and across the range of

military operations. The nature of the modern information environment complicates the identification of the

boundaries between these levels. Therefore, at all levels, information activities, including IO must be consistent

with broader national security policy and strategic objectives.

1915. Because IO are conducted across the range of military operations and can make significant

contributions before major operations commence, the IO environment should be prepared and assessed through

a variety of engagement and intelligence activities, all designed to make IO more effective. In addition to

impacting the environment prior to the onset of military operations, IO are essential to post combat operations.

Therefore, integration, planning, employment and assessment of core, supporting, and related IO are vital to

ensure a rapid transition to a peaceful environment.

1916. Objectives. The ultimate strategic objective of IO is to deter a potential or actual adversary or other

target audience from taking actions that threaten our national interests. Additionally, IO actions executed

through civilian controlled portions of the global information environment or which may cause unintended

reactions from our or foreign populaces, must account for our policy and introduction of legal issues, as well as

potentially disruptive infrastructure issues, through civil-military coordination at all levels.

a. Target for IO. IO may target human decision making or automated decision support systems

with specific actions. Technology allows automated decision making to be targeted with increasing

precision and affords more sophisticated ways to protect it. However, targeting automated decision

making, at any level, is only as effective as the human adversary‘s reliance on such decisions.

b. The Focus of IO. The focus of IO is on the decision maker and the information environment in

order to affect decision making and thinking processes, knowledge and understanding of the situation.

Information Operation can affect data, information and knowledge in three basic ways :

(1) By taking specific psychological, electronic, or physical actions that add, modify, or

remove information from the environment of various individuals or groups of decision makers.

(2) By taking actions to affect the infrastructure that collects, communicates, processes and/or

stores information in support of targeted decision makers.

(3) By influencing the way people receive, process, interpret and use data, information and

knowledge.

1917. IO in Military Operations. All IO capabilities may be employed in both offensive and defensive

operations. Commanders use IO capabilities in both offensive and defensive operations simultaneously to

accomplish the mission, increase their force effectiveness and protect their organisations and systems. Fully

integrating IO capabilities for offensive and defensive operations requires planners to treat IO as a single

function. Commanders can use IO capabilities to accomplish the following :

a. Destroy. To damage a system or entity so badly that it cannot perform any function or be

restored to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt is the ultimate goal.

b. Disrupt. To break or interrupt the flow of information for meeting IO objective.

c. Degrade. To reduce the effectiveness or efficiency of adversary's Command and Control or

communications systems and information collection efforts or means. IO can also degrade the morale

of a unit, reduce the target‘s worth or value or reduce the quality of adversary's decisions and actions.

d. Deny. To prevent the adversary from accessing and using critical information, systems, and

services.

e. Deceive. To cause a person to believe what is not true. D&D seeks to mislead adversary decision

makers by manipulating their perception of reality.

f. Exploit. To gain access to adversary's Command and Control systems to collect information or to

plant false or misleading information.

g. Influence. To cause others to behave in a manner favourable to our forces.

h. Protect. To take action to guard against espionage or capture of sensitive equipment and

information.

j. Detect. To discover or detect the existence or fact of an intrusion into information systems.

k. Restore. To bring information and information systems back to their original state.

l. Respond. To react quickly to an adversary‘s or others‘ IO attack or intrusion.

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO INFORMATION OPERATIONS

Current State of Information Environment to be Evaluated

1918. Like all other aspects of operations, IO requires effective intelligence support. IO is intelligence

intensive in particular and therefore successful planning, preparation, execution and assessment of IO demand

detailed and timely intelligence.

1919. Before military activities in the information environment can be planned, the current 'state' of the

dynamic information environment must be collected, analysed and provided to commanders and their staffs.

This requires intelligence on relevant portions of the physical, informational and cognitive properties of the

information environment, which necessitates collection and analysis of a wide variety of information and the

production of a wide variety of intelligence products as discussed below.

1920. In order to understand the adversary or other TA, a decision-making process and determination of

appropriate capabilities are necessary to achieve operational objectives. Commanders and their staffs must have

current intelligence for doing so very effectively. This includes relevant physical, informational and cognitive

properties of the information environment as well as assessment of ongoing IO activities.

Intelligence Support Planning

1921. Planning Considerations. Intelligence support is an integral part of IO planning. In particular, the

intelligence preparation of the battle field (IPB) process provides a valuable methodology for identifying

capabilities, vulnerabilities and critical nodes within the information environment. A sequential overview of

intelligence support to Information Operation planning includes actions to :

a. Identify adversary information value, use, flow and vulnerabilities relevant to specific types of

decision making.

b. Identify individual systems and target sets relevant to specify adversary or other Target

Audiences decision making.

c. Identify desired effects appropriate to individual systems and target sets.

d. Predict the consequences (non-objective related outcomes) of identified actions.

e. Coordinate with planning personnel to establish priority of intelligence requirements.

f. Assist in developing IO assessment criteria during planning and then assist in monitoring and

assessing IO during execution (which may extend before and after execution of conventional

operations).

g. Tailor assessment/feedback methodologies to specific operations.

h. Evaluate the outcome of executed IO activities/tasks.

j. Provide assessment for IO actions relative to commander‘s objectives and mission.

1922. Information Environment Impact on Intelligence Support. The nature of the information

environment has profound implications for intelligence support to IO. Members of the operational community

and the intelligence community must understand these implications in order to efficiently request and provide

quality intelligence support to IO. These implications are listed below.

a. Intelligence Resources are Limited. Information collection requirements are almost limitless,

specially for many types of IO. Commanders and their intelligence and operations staff must work

together to identify IO intelligence requirements and ensure that they are given high enough priority in

the commander‘s requests to the intelligence community.

b. Collection Activities are Legally Constrained. The nature of the information environment

complicates compliance with legal constraints and restraints. Thus the Intelligence Community must

implement technical and procedural methods to ensure compliance with the law. Additionally,

intelligence may be supplemented with information legally provided by law enforcement or other

sources. Specially in the area of CNO, where the application of different domestic and international

laws may be unclear, close coordination among the operational, legal and law enforcement

communities is essential.

c. IO Intelligence Often Requires Long Lead Times. The intelligence necessary to affect

adversary or other Target Audiences decisions often requires that specific sources and methods be

positioned and employed over time to collect the necessary information and conduct analyses required

for IO planning. Commanders and their staffs, including IO planners, must be aware of the relative lead

times required to develop different types of intelligence both for initial planning and for feedback

during operations. To deal with these long lead times, the commander must provide detailed initial

guidance to the staff during the mission analysis and estimate processes.

d. The Information Environment is Dynamic. The information environment changes over time

according to different factors. Physical changes may occur more slowly and may be easier to detect

than informational or cognitive changes. Commanders and their staffs must understand both the

timeliness of the intelligence they receive and the differing potentials for change in the dimensions of

the information environment. The implication is that we must have agile intellects, intelligence systems

and organisational processes to exploit this dynamic environment.

e. Properties of the Information Environment Affect Intelligence. Collection of physical and

electronic information is objectively measurable by location and quantity. While intelligence support to

IO identification of key individuals and groups of interest may be a relatively straightforward challenge

the relative importance of various individuals and groups, their psychological profiles and how they

interact is not easily agreed upon nor quantified. Commanders and their staffs must have an

appreciation for the subjective nature of psychological profiles and human nature. They must also

continue to pursue effective means of trying to measure subjective elements using measure of

effectiveness and other applicable techniques.

1923. Coordination of Planned IO with Intelligence. Coordination should occur among intelligence,

targeting, IO and collection management personnel. The requirement for accurate intelligence gain/loss and

political/military assessments, when determining targets to attack and means of employment is central to the

integration of IO.

1924. Priority of Effort. The requirement to collect, analyse and produce detailed intelligence required for

IO currently exceeds the resources of the Intelligence Community. Assigning intelligence resources to IO as

with all operations is regulated based on established requirements and processes within the Intelligence

Community. It is imperative that intelligence requirements be coordinated and prioritised at each level of

command.

1925. Sources of Intelligence Support. Through the intelligence staff, IO planners and supporting

organisations have access to intelligence from the national and formation level intelligence producers and

collectors. At the formation level, intelligence centre supports IO planning and execution and provides support

to Commander‘s through established intelligence support elements. In multinational operations, when

appropriate, the operational staff should share information and assessments with allies and coalition partners.

The operational staff normally assigns specific personnel to coordinate with IO planners and capability

specialties through the IO cell or other IO staff organisations established by the Commander‘s.

1926 – 2000. Reserved.

SECTION - 20

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATION

FUNDAMENTALS

General

2001. Although the term 'psychological operation (Psy Ops)', is of a fairly recent origin but it is not new. It

was practiced as early as 500 BC by SUN TZU and all successful national and military leaders in the past. In the

recent past the Germans and British practiced it during 1914-18 war; by the Germans, British and Americans in

the 1939-45 war, by the Americans in the Gulf War, recent Afghan and Iraq war. The terms used to define this

type of operation have been varying from time to time but in the more recent past the expressions 'propaganda'

and 'political operation' have been used which are now replaced by the term 'Psy Ops'.

2002. Man has thus known the art of Psy Ops since the earliest time. Recent advancement in the fields of

communication and social sciences, however, has increased its scope. Consequently nations are making a

special study of this kind of operation and to create an organisation for dealing with it more efficiently and

smoothly.

Psy Ops Related Terms

2003. Propaganda. 'It is any information, ideas, doctrines or special appeals disseminated to influence the

opinions, emotions, attitudes or behaviour of any specified group in order to benefit the sponsor either directly

or indirectly'.

2004. Psy Ops. 'It is the planned use of propaganda and other measures that have the primary purpose of

influencing the opinions, emotions, attitudes and behaviour of the enemy, neutral, or friendly groups, in such a

way as to support the accomplishment of national aims and objects.' In other way it can be said that, 'Psy Ops is

the pre-war or wartime use of propaganda directed primarily at confusing or demoralizing enemy populations or

troops putting them off guard in the face of coming attacks, or inducing them to surrender.'

2005. Indoctrination. This term usually means intensive political indoctrination. It may involve long

political lectures or discussions, long compulsory reading assignments, and so forth. Sometimes it can be done

in conjunction with efforts to reduce the audience resistance by exhausting him either physically through torture,

overwork, or denial of sleep or psychologically through solitary confinement, threats, emotionally disturbing

confrontations with interrogators or defected persons, humiliation in front of fellow citizens, etc. The term

brainwashing has been widely used in sensational journalism to refer to such activities conducted by communist

China, Russia and elsewhere.

2006. Education. It tries to present various sides of an issue, the grounds for doubting as well as the grounds

for believing the statements it makes, and the disadvantages as well as the advantages of every conceivable

course of action. Education aims to induce the audience to collect and evaluate evidence for him and assists him

in learning the techniques for doing so.

2007. Advertising. Another related word, to propaganda advertising. It has mainly commercial connotations,

though it needs not be restricted to this; political candidates, party programs and positions on political issues

may be 'packaged' and 'marketed' by advertising firms.' The word 'promotion' and public relations have wider

connotations and are often used to avoid the implications of 'advertising' or 'propaganda'. 'Publicity' often

implies merely making a subject known to a public, without educational, propagandistic, or commercial intent.

Varying Role of Psy Ops

2008. Psy Ops can be effectively used in three conditions: in peacetime, in times of crisis and during war. In

these three scenarios, Psy Ops plays a vital role in ensuring that the Army‘s mission is successfully

accomplished :

a. During peace, Psy Ops can be used as an instrument of public Information and to secure the

support of the populace for the government‘s development programs.

b. During crisis, Psy Ops assets can be deployed to warn people of impending disasters and what to

do in an emergency, complementing other government agencies and mass media particularly in the

remote areas.

c. During war, Psy Ops can be employed to cause enemy defection and surrender and render the

enemy‘s combat power ineffective.

2009. Objectives. Ops is combat multiplier in both conventional and unconventional operations. In

conventional operations, it is used to prepare the battlefield psychologically, to demoralize enemy troops and

increase friendly troop‘s morale. Ops is employed to win popular support while at the same time, reduce the

combat effectiveness of the enemy troops. The aim of Psy Ops is firstly to demoralise the enemy and

population. Secondly, eradicates the doctrine in which they have been taught to believe on his own side and

finally, to indoctrinate them with the positive doctrine we wish them to possess. Following are the objectives of

Psy Ops :

a. Reduce the combat efficiency of the enemy by exploitation of all political, economic, social and

moral aspect of the enemy.

b. Facilitate reorganisation and control of occupied or liberated areas.

c. Produce cumulative affects upon the opinions, emotions, attitudes and behaviour of the target

audiences that will assist in the defeat of the enemy.

2010. Tasks. Like military operations, Psy Ops objectives are achieved by assigning tasks to lower levels.

The tasks may be any one or more of the following for various target audience depending upon the situation and

the level to which the task(s) is assigned :

a. Towards Enemy Military Forces.

(1) To induce malingering, desertion, mutiny and surrender.

(2) To create distrust in the existing enemy leadership, arms and equipments.

(3) To create confusion as to the correctness of enemy war aims.

(4) To install a lack of faith in the enemy's ultimate victory.

b. Towards Enemy Population.

(1) To develop resistance to the political ideologies of the enemy government.

(2) To drive a wedge between the enemy's government and the people.

(3) To create dissension within specific enemy groups.

(4) To encourage resistance move within enemy areas.

c. Towards Foreign Groups.

(1) To gain co-operation of foreign groups within occupied areas.

(2) To deny the co-operation of foreign groups within areas occupied by the enemy.

d. Towards Allies of Own and Enemy

(1) To increase the friendship and co-operation among the allies.

(2) To cause a split between the enemy and his allies.

e. Towards Neutral Groups.

(1) To build goodwill and friendship with neutral countries and groups.

(2) To deny to the enemy the economic or political collaboration of neutral countries.

PLANNING PROCESS AND INTELLIGENCE

General

2011. The need for long range detailed and imaginative planning is as critical for Psy Ops as it is for any

other operation. Psy Ops requires a fluid planning system. Targets of psychological opportunity must be

exploited as they arise. Opportunities to exploit unexpected target vulnerabilities must not be lost by inflexible

insistence upon implementation of original plans.

2012. Vulnerabilities, conditions, target audiences, objectives, and appropriate themes often change swiftly

with shifts in policies or in the balance of political or military events. Psy Ops officers must continuously update

present plans, anticipate future developments and plan for the future. Planning may precede the decision to carry

out a particular propaganda campaign, with the decision coming only after a study of the proposed Ops estimate.

Whether the planning precedes or follows the decision, the ingredients are essentially the same for all Psy Ops.

Psychological Operation Planning Process

2013. Plan Ingredients. Psy Ops plan ingredients include following :

a. Realistic objectives that can be achieved within prescribed policy.

b. Analysis of the situation.

c. Sources of information.

d. Deliberation of the target and its accessibility.

e. Themes to be used to achieve objectives.

f. Media to be employed.

g. The formal staffing and co-ordination required to effect the plan.

h. A determination whether the plan is usable for strategic or tactical operations or both.

2014. Prerequisites. The prerequisites for successful psychological operations are :

a. Complete, accurate and timely planning.

b. Optimum employment of all available time, space, manpower, funding and material.

c. A complete, detailed and accurate information base arranged for ease of extraction of relevant

information.

d. Appropriate direction, control, training, intelligence, co-ordination, co-operation and motivation

to ensure attainment of assigned objectives and accomplishment of the mission. Exceptional

communicative skills, timely and accurate intelligence, logistical planning for non-standard supplies

and maintenance are essential. Psy Ops planning are a continuous, long-range process requiring

imagination, determination and detailed implementation at all levels.

2015. Contingency plans. Contingency plans which treat events reasonably expected to occur, follow the

same pattern. These plans must be implemented immediately upon order when the anticipated event occurs.

Contingency Psy Ops plans cover a variety of situations, such as the end of hostilities; third country

intervention; the use of new weapons; major changes in the country, allies and third country political conditions

and reversal of major operations.

2016. Intelligence Requirements for Psy Ops. Psy Ops units and staffs constantly assemble intelligence in

support of Psy Ops, relevant to designated areas of operation. This intelligence is focused on groups presumed

to be of Psy Ops interest. The basic material gathered form numerous sources are placed into a basic Psy Ops

study. These are :

a. Target Analysis. Target analysis systematically studies the tentative targets selected from those

discussed in the area study.

b. Media Selection. Media selection must take into account pertinent factors about the target

audience which are surfaced in the target analysis as well as resource capabilities.

c. Conceptualisation. Conceptualisation is the translation of the target analysis and media selection

outputs into a workable plan for transmission to the target audience.

d. Impact Analysis. A pretext to determine the probable impact of Psy Ops material should be

accomplished using the appropriate techniques.

e. Reduce the Time and Effort. Psy Ops planning and preparation of propaganda material down to

and including the pretext may take place prior to receipt of a Psy Ops mission. The extent to which

psychological operation staffs and units are correct in gathering relevant data, planning and unit

preparation of propaganda material should materially reduce the time and effort required to implement

a decision requiring Psy Ops support.

f. Transmitting Mission. The Psy Ops mission can be transmitted to the Psy Ops support unit at

anytime during the Psy Ops flow prior to campaign control. Upon receipt of a Psy Ops support mission,

both unit and staff Psy Ops officers follow the routine steps.

g. Prepares the Psy Ops Estimate. The Psy Ops staff officer prepares the Psy Ops estimate of the

situation in support of the commander‘s mission with information from the Psy Ops support unit.

Target analyses are annexes to the Psy Ops estimate. The commander's decision regarding Psy Ops

support of his mission is made using the Psy Ops estimate. In addition to all else, the estimate should

make clear the psychological impact of the commander's courses of action.

h. Psy Ops Staff Prepares Plans. After the commander issues his decision, the Psy Ops staff

prepares his plans. When the plans are approved, the Psy Ops units are tasked with requirements. There

is a continuous interaction between the Psy Ops units and the supported units Psy Ops staffs.

j. Campaign Control. The next step in the Psy Ops flow is campaign control. This involves both

the productions of Psy Ops materials and dissemination.

k. Post-Test. The last block reflected is the post-test.

l. Feedback. The most crucial element of the flow is the element of feedback. It provides the basis

for modification of plan and operations at all points and is critical to the conduct of Psy Ops.

2017. Managerial Decisions. The planned use of propaganda in any conflicting environment requires a

series of managerial decisions. These decisions must be made within the framework of policy and objectives and

with fullest possible intelligence about the target.

2018 – 2100. Reserved.

SECTION - 21

DECEPTION AND DENIAL

GENERAL

2101. Until the 20th

century, military forces never fully understood the psychology behind successful

Deception techniques. It was more of an ―art‖ than a science. In the 12th

century BC, example, the Greeks found

themselves in a war with Troy. Although Homer‘s Iliad was fictionalized this confrontation as a chase caused by

meddling gods and the love of a woman, i.e., Helen of Troy, control of a lucrative trade route between Greece

and Asia Minor was probably the true reason for the nine year war. Legend says the Greeks finally captured

Troy through the use of deception ―the Trojan Horse‖. Although history dose not identify who thought of the

Trojan Horse deception, intelligence analysts are often integral in developing and planning such operations.

2102. Denial includes all measures taken by a government or military forces to prevent a potential adversary

from obtaining sensitive or compromising information. In other words, counter deception attempts to make a

person, unit, or activity ―invisible‖ to the seeing eyes of an enemy. When successful, it provides a distinct

advantage, making effort to identify key activities, facilities, and capabilities by an adversary‘s reconnaissance

more difficult over the past 100 years, deception and denial programs have become more sophisticated and

complicated. It is definitely a force multiplier, when used effectively; it can change the momentum of a battle of

war. The idea behind deception and counter deception is simple :

a. Convince the enemy that friendly forces are not present when they are; or.

b. Convince the enemy that friendly forces present when they are not.

2103. Most dictionaries define deception as ―the employment of trickery or guile‖. It is an effort to cause

another to believe what is not true in order to mislead an adversary into accepting a misperception and pack

understanding of the opponent's mindset. Here the intelligence analyst can play an important role because the

analyst should know the strengths and vulnerabilities of the adversary i.e., what action can best exploit the

enemy‘s interests, intentions, fears, and capabilities.

2104. Deception takes many forms. It might be explicit or implied, may involve concealing what is true or

displaying what is false, or be a combination of both. In conflict and war deception is widely perceived to be

both. At the strategic level, deception aims to influence deception-making processes that influence national

policy and broad (threat) military operations. At the tactical level, it may seek to fool the soldier over the next

hill.

DECEPTION AND MILITARY OPERATION

Objectives

2105. Military deception can be strategic, operational or tactical :

a. Strategic deception is an extension of political deception by using military activities. It is large

scale, long –term projections of false intelligence to assist in the attainment of theatre objective.

b. Deception at the operational level seeks to facilitate the prosecution of a major operation or

campaign by manipulating enemy‘s perceptions and expectations.

c. Tactical deception is deliberate action to achieve surprise on the battlefield. Its aim is to induce

enemy to do something counter to his interests.

Although the line between strategic, operational and tactical deception is not always clear, one can safely onside

the scale and tempo at which these are conducted to differentiate between these three levels.

2106. Deception is conceived and execute to help multiple combat power through surprise and security.

Successful execution requires imagination in the analysis of tactical situations. The decision to deceive or not to

deceive is based on four fundamental questions. These are :

a. Is the enemy susceptible to deception ?

b. Is there an opportunity for deception ?

c. Are resources including time available for deception ?

d. And how is the enemy likely to react in this situation? Being satisfied with the answers and

having decided to deceive the enemy, the commander selects the deception objective, the deception

target and the deception story.

2107. The Deception objective is the desired result of what the enemy is to do or not to do at a critical time

and/or place in the course of the campaign or battle. It can be directed to influence any aspect of the enemy‘s

organization or operation- for example, his reserves, fire support, communications etc. The deception target is

the enemy commander with the authority to make to decision that will achieve our deception objective.

Generally, It is the commander who has the authority to make broad adjustments to enemy dispositions and

plans. The deception story is false information provided to the enemy to lead him to an incorrect appreciation of

friendly forces and plans. The story involves a believable intent or capability so that the enemy makes a decision

which puts him at a disadvantage.

2108. In the indications and warning process, covers the ―cry wolf syndrome‖, which occurs when too many

warnings of a potential devastating development desensitize a decision-maker into not taking action at an

appropriate time. The ―cry wolf syndrome‖ in deception has a similar effect, but now those people who make

decisions for the adversary may fall into the trap. For this work, the adversary believes that :

a. Friendly activities follow a consistent or uniform pattern.

b. Departure from the pattern-a surprise-is unlikely; and,

c. The predictability of future activities reduces jeopardy or concern.

2109. Deception is rarely an end to itself, and most often occurs in conjunction with a greater objective. The

goal friendly forces may want to accomplish can range from simple survival of a country (or army) to gaining

strategic surprise. The deception activity, therefore, must address what the adversary will do if the deception is

successful, and how the deception relates to the overall plan.

2110. Mission objectives dictate deception methodologies. Since successful completion of a mission is the

desired end state, any effort to deceive an adversary should accomplish the mission or goal. To avoid working at

cross purposes, the planning process for a deception effort moves in a reverse direction. In other words, a

deception ―story starts at the end‖.

Categorization of Deception Methods

2111. Physical Deception Methods. Involve military activities designed to either deny or convince an

opponent of pending operations, and can include dummy equipment and devices, logistic actions, ―exercises‖,

and tests.

2112. Technical Deception Methods. Involve the deliberate, re-radiation, alteration, absorption, or

reflection of energy designed to convey or deny information about an actual or pending activity.

2113. Administrative Deception Methods. Involve oral, pictorial, or documentary data designed to

mislead or deny to adversary information of an impending activity or operation.

Selected “Tools” of Deception

2114. Four types of deception are used to present the deception story; feint, demonstration, ruse and display.

a. The feint is limited objective attack varying in size form a raid to a supporting attack. It

contributes to the overall accomplishment of the mission as well as misleading the enemy. A

supporting attack is a feint when it is presented to the enemy as a main effort.

b. Demonstrationist use a show of force on the battlefield where a decision is not sought. It is similar

to a feint with one exception – no contact with the enemy is intended.

c. Ruses are tricks of war. They are characterized by deliberate placing of false information into the

hands of the enemy. Ruses range form simple tactical tricks employed by soldiers to strategic actions

employed by nations.

d. Finally, displays are activities to simulate, disguise or portray various facts to enemy‘s

surveillance system.

e. Simulations are projection of objects or systems that actually do not exist on the battlefield. A

disguise is altering an object to make it look like something else.

f. A portrayal on the other hand s presenting to the enemy a unit which does not exist or which is of

a different type than actually does exist.

2115. To manipulate an adversary to act or react in a particular fashion, the deception planner must consider

who or what can galvanize the response. Obviously intelligence about the adversary is key to precipitating the

desired reaction. In creating a story which the adversary will believe, the plan may use a variety of ―tools‖. The

listing below, however, merely illustrates the broad range of instruments available to the deception planner.

2116. Camouflage and Concealment. Earlier in this section has emphasised the linkage between

camouflage, concealment, and deception. Camouflage is the use of natural or artificial material to evade

detection, and concealment is the judicious use of cover and terrain to hide from observation.

2117. Demonstration, Feints, and Diversions. These operations draw an adversary‘s attention away from

an area or activity. Demonstrations make no contact with adversary, while feints and diversions do. The

Normandy invasion in 1944, the amphibious landing at Inch on in 1950, and the preparations for an amphibious

assault on Kuwaiti beaches in 1991 are good examples of demonstrations, feints, and diversions.

2118. Displays, Decoys, and Dummies. These activities involve the placement of tangible (physical)

fabrications made of natural or artificial components to simulate the presence of real equipment or units, or to

suggest that an activity is not taking place.

2119. Mimicry or Spoofing. This is the use of intangible (signals) fabrications to portray an entity or object

of significance. In the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, for example, the Israelis released a large number of

remote-control drone aircraft to confuse Syrian radar‘s and to collect data on the radio and radar frequencies

used by the Syrians. Then the Israelis sent out Electronic Warfare (EW) aircraft to jam or confuse the Syrian

radar‘s. The Israeli EW aircraft false signals which interfered with the Syrian radar guided missiles. A detailed

procedure for EW deception is at Annex A.

2120. Dazzling or Sensory Saturation. This is the overloading of an adversary sensory processing abilities

with an abidance of stimuli. The principal idea is to raise the ―noise‖ level high enough to drown out the target

signal.

2121. Disinformation or Ruse. This involves the ―doctoring‖ of printed, electronic, or photographic media

passed to an adversary with the intent to mislead or deceive. Today manipulating open source data is a method

which evens the relatively unskilled deception practitioner can use to reinforce a particular position. when

motivated, some countries and non-state actors have had little difficulty creating or perpetuating a false story,

diverting attention to another issue, or influencing public opinion at home or abroad. The increased use of the

Internet has also created even more deception opportunities. Verifying the source and veracity of information

obtained from the internet is sometimes difficult, if not impossible.

2122. Conditioning and Exploiting. This involves two elements: 1st taking advantage of an adversary‘s pre-

existing bias, belief, habit, or 2nd generating and then taking advantage of a bias, belief or habit. Whether the

adversary‘s bias, belief, or habit is naturally acquired or induced by the deceiver is incidental.

2123. Deception as a “Two-Edged Sword”. Deception when successfully used by friendly forces can

prove most rewarding and save lives, but an adversary may also employ deception. Like a double-edged sword,

a successful deception operation against friendly forces can prove devastating. The intelligence analyst has an

important obligation to recognize any enemy deception activity, and to remain constantly on guard for new

deception projects. Failure to identify an aggressor‘s deception efforts and to accept erroneous data on such

items like troops movements, equipment locations, combat objectives, defence positions, or conditions of

targets, could place friendly forces in jeopardy.

2124. Contradictory Requirement and Failure Option. Additionally, the analyst must also inform

decision-makers if a failure has occurred with a friendly deception activity. This will require careful analysis of

incoming data and close monitoring of an adversary‘s activities. The intelligence analyst involved with the

planning of a deception operation should also consider the legal issues. The generation and dissemination of

patently false or misleading information is a complex and murky under current guidelines, the government

reserves the right to use deception against hostile forces, but policy does not allow for the deliberate use of false

information to misinform or mislead citizens and decision makers. Many grey areas exist between these two

policy positions. What if deceptive information targeted against an adversary leaks to the international news

media, and then is fed back to the public? Can employ deception against non combatants who are friendly to an

enemy? What about employing deception against a neutral or unfriendly force (or country) not directly involved

in the confrontation? The answer to these and other similar questions are unclear, but that doesn‘t mean the

intelligence analyst should avoid asking them.

Some Basic Considerations

2125. With an increased understanding of camouflage, concealment, and deception (CC&D), a growing

availability of CC&D materials, and the rapid advancement of technology, the job of the intelligence analyst has

become more challenging and more important. The intelligence analyst cannot afford to ignore deception, no

matter what the sophistication level of a state or non state player happens to be. For sure, militaries and non-

state players will incorporate the technologies of deception into future operations. The task for the intelligence

analyst in the 21st century thus becomes one of providing a unique insight for planning friendly deception

activities while simultaneously detecting D&D effort employed by an adversary.

2126. Deception requires the provision of false indicators to the enemy. Thus if the supporting attack is to be

portrayed as a main attack, the units conducting the supporting attack, must give the enemy evidence that it is

the main attack. Information passes back and forth between the opposing forces on a battlefield by what is seen,

hared, smelled and picked up by communications and electronic. The types of deception measures are therefore

classified as visual, sonic, olfactory and electronic.

2127. For planning deception. it is essential to identify the threat to deception operations. It is encompassed

within the enemy intelligence collection effort. Hence, deception planning requires familiarity with enemy

intelligence operations. The commander planning deception needs detailed information on the enemy‘s

intelligence capabilities in the battle area. It is on this information that he bases his plans for projecting the

deception story. The prevention of enemy having prior knowledge of the planned deception is the major concern

during planning and preparation for the operation.

2128. The most important factor in deception planning is time; its availability and its use form both the

friendly and enemy point of view. In planning, the commander must perceive the sequence of activities through

the entire duration of the deception. The commander must determine the appropriate time to begin and end each

action. This is done by visualizing the false situation being projected and sequencing the deception actions as if

they were real. The controlling factor throughout is the timing of the true operations. To control the deception

sequence, and implementing schedule or a chronological listing of events and activities must be prepared.

2129. Deception measures must relate to past and future battlefield activities. To avoid detection by the

enemy the tactical plan must be flexible enough o allow discontinuance of nay deception effort. Deception

activities should terminate in a logical manner. At times, the enemy will blame his own systems for failing to

provide timely and accurate intelligence, rather than accept the fact that he was deceived. The aim at all stages

should be to remain undetected, or, if detected, to be discovered too late for the enemy to recover adequately.

2130. Patterns of various battlefield activities can be used for deception purposes. Units battlefield habits

know to enemy intelligence can be fit into the deception story to make it more believable to the enemy

commander. Similarly, previous deceptions must be reviewed to avoid establishing a deception pattern which

would cause compromise. Repeated employment of a particular pattern degrades it usefulness. Deception is not

achieved by following a rigid or stereotyped pattern. Commanders must ensure that deceptions by the

subordinates do not become predictable to the enemy intelligence staff.

DENIAL

General

2131. For an adversary to accept either premise as true, the deception planner must use a creative

combination of camouflage, concealment, and deception (CC&D). In the military sense camouflage means to

fool, concealment means to hide, and deception means to bluff. These three terms are closely intertwined; and

many references on the subject address CC&D, the derivation of the word ―camouflage‖ is right on target. It

comes from the French term camouflage, which means ―to play a practical joke‖.

2132. Making something indistinguishable from its background is the art of camouflage. Because a human

being sees an object as a single unit, when they don‘t recognize the single unit, they simply don‘t see it. While

making an object totally invisible is not possible, deception planners can make it difficult to identify by using

random patterns or covers. Camouflage falls into there categories: strategic, operational and tactical.

Types of Camouflage

2133. Strategic Camouflage. It involves measures taken to conceal strategic intentions and activities from

an enemy. This camouflage is organized at the highest levels of command.

2134. Operational Camouflage. It involves the concealment of troop's movements, including weapons, to

prevent an adversary from knowing the nature, objectives, scale, and timing of a campaign.

2135. Tactical Camouflage. It is the effort to hide the assembly of military forces, troop contingents, the

deployment of forces, and conditions of other tactical targets and the activities of units.

Technological Developments

2136. In all three categories, the deception planner must consider technological developments and the

sophistication of the adversary in using various reconnaissances and targeting systems. Most countries and even

non-state actors-now have surveillance and acquisition technologies that use entire electro-magnetic spectrum.

As a result, camouflage today is interdisciplinary in that it is a combination of equipment specialties and human

creativity.

2137. Reconnaissance and weapon sensors identify targets by recognizing signatures or physical features

unique to targets or target systems. Concealing equipment or installations in future conflicts will require

camouflage systems that simultaneously address following :

a. Visual. In ground to ground and air to ground close combat the mark-1 eyeball remains an

important sensor. For this reason, visual camouflage plays a significant role on CC&D. In the

Electro- magnetic spectrum, visual camouflage involves wavelengths ranging from 380-760 mm (or

that region of the spectrum known as visual light). This type of camouflage works to conceal real

targets or to display false ones by reducing or imitating the contrast between a target and its

background.

b. Infrared (IR). Today‘s camouflage however must consider the entire Electro-magnetic spectrum,

not just visible light. For example, camouflage netting in the 21st century must look right to non-human

sensors. Vegetation poses a particular problem. If camouflage netting resembles foliage in a forest or

jungle, it must address the signature of those environments.

c. Signatures. Radar and sonar are the main threat for such camouflage. Radar is a kind of light

energy, and operates between 1 mm and 10 meters in the Electro-magnetic spectrum. Unlike visual or

infrared reconnaissance systems which are passive, radar can only detect what it itself has transmitted.

In other words, radar emits a signal, which is then reflected from the target back to the radar. In radar

camouflage, the idea is to reduce or eliminate the signal echoing back to the signals. Targets which

employ many 90 degree angles produce strong radar echoes, called Radar Cross Section.

d. Acoustic Signatures. Acoustic camouflage deals with sound waves, works by eliminating,

reducing, or imitating sounds between a target and its background. Because ideal atmospherics (for

sound in the air) or sea conditions (for sound in water) can result in impressive detection ranges, sound

has become both a weapon and an enemy.

2138 – 2200. Reserved.

CHAPTER - V

UNCONVENTIONAL WAR AND TOTAL PEOPLE‟S WAR

SECTION - 22

INTELLIGENCE FUNCTION

FUNDAMENTALS

Unconventional Warfare and Intelligence

2201. GSTP 0032 states that the popular concept of fighting unconventional war on termination of

conventional war no longer stands valid as it deprives both the war efforts of significant advantages that can be

gained by blending them together. This doctrine strongly advocates their concurrent conduct although one

would always dominate a particular phase of the campaign. For example, during the initial stages of the

campaign, conventional war will remain the principle means of seeking a decision with the unconventional war

as its adjunct. Later, as the conventional power diminishes, unconventional war will assume the major role,

relegating conventional war effort to a supporting status. Whatever is the case; both conventional and

unconventional war must be blended together to achieve the combined effects that would produce the desired

end state on conflict termination.

2202. Unconventional war is not necessarily an aimless fighting by a handful of guerrilla bands. The

unconventional force normally operates behind the enemy lines along with a well established chain of command

within the framework of a well conceived plan. They generally merge with the population and operate in small

groups with the local help and normally live off the land. They also concentrate rapidly for a task which means

that they can be involved in both major and minor actions deep inside enemy line with the purpose of creating a

significant impact on the conduct of campaigns and battles along the traditional front. Simultaneity of operations

and non-linear engagement of enemy forces throughout the length and width of the theatre/battlefield saturate

enemy‘s command and control system with a surge of events that make the enemy commander incapable of

taking right and timely decisions.

2203. The area of operation of a small unconventional warfare force will be much larger than equivalent

conventional forces since they mainly operate behind the enemy line. Thus they need very sound intelligence for

following operational tasks :

a. They threaten enemy in the rear areas, tie up a sizeable portion of his force to protection duties,

extend the battle space and disrupt his plan by interdicting the movement of follow up formations. The

cumulative effect of all these actions creates a gradual deterioration in enemy‘s cohesion and destroys

the mental balance of the enemy commander.

b. As enemy advances through friendly territory, the engagement areas grow in size and the enemy

force in the expanded theatre present a target rich environment to the unconventional forces. In such

circumstances, the enemy commander is confronted with threat both from the front and rear. When he

finds himself incapable of tackling both, he gives up his fight along the conventional front in favour of

securing his rear.

c. The unconventional forces usually concentrate on key enemy capabilities such as his command

and control centres, fire support systems, air bases, and logistic installations, lines of communication,

air defence equipment, mobility assets and troop and armour concentrations. The purpose is to

eliminate or severely degrade these capabilities so that these can‘t be used against friendly forces at the

decisive time and place.

d. When large-scale operations such as interdiction of enemy follow up formations or destruction of

a vulnerable portion of enemy force are contemplated, the unconventional forces make rapid

concentrations by pre-arranged methods and battle drills.

e. Unconventional forces are also useful for reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition

tasks.

f. They can provide real time information concerning enemy dispositions and movements when

equipped with suitable communications.

g. When properly trained, they can acquire targets for engagement by friendly air and artillery

systems.

j. They can also act as pathfinders for air borne and air mobile operations and do the job of forward

air controllers by directing friendly aircraft on high value targets.

Total Peoples' War and Intelligence

2204. According to GSTP 0032, apart from blending conventional and unconventional war during the

prosecution of the national war effort, Bangladesh may have to resort to total people‘s war after its conventional

power diminishes. This is likely to happen when enemy closes round friendly centre of gravity and the latter lay

exposed and vulnerable to enemy attack. The decision to switch over to total people‘s war must be accurately

timed. If it is too early, the political fallout might put the Army in the midst of an unfriendly population. If it‘s

too late, the Army may find itself in great disorder, thereby making the transition from conventional to

unconventional war a difficult one.

2205. Generally the situation described above would occur when enemy is in such close proximity of friendly

centre of gravity that continuing further conventional war would be a fruitless exercise. However, the Army at

this point of time would still remain intact with substantial organic cohesion and will make a smooth transition

to unconventional war upon being ordered by the Government.

2206. Smooth transition from conventional to unconventional war would be one of the major challenges

faced by the commanders at all levels. Success will greatly be measured by how quickly the Army can disperse

itself into the civil population. Usually, the transition plan will be prepared by the formations and units

beforehand as one of their contingency plans. On receipt of the orders from the Army Headquarters, the plan

will be activated and the formations and units will move into their allocated sectors. The divisions will usually

be operating within their own geographical areas; brigades will be responsible for allocated sub-sectors, while

the infantry units would be operating in various administrative districts with companies deployed in various

thanas.

2207. The unconventional forces that were operating behind the enemy lines would be quickly absorbed by

the sectors basing on a pre-conceived plan. The plan must cater for their quick absorption without displacement.

These forces should remain in place and continue to harass the occupation forces so that there is no operational

vacuum during the transition period. Exposing to total people's war demands a very good intelligence system in

place for following tasks :

a. Selection of target demands detailed study of not only the ground, but the prevailing political and

economic situation as well. Each operation must be weighed against the psychological value it is going

to gain or lose; at times it is advisable to accept tactical defeat with the hope of achieving operational or

strategic success. However, forces must not be squandered every now and then just to enhance the

political image as it is quite difficult to raise units in an operationally constrained environment.

b. Exposing and attacking enemy‘s centre of gravity remains important even in unconventional war.

The commanders at the operational level should identify enemy centre of gravity and devise the way to

attack it. They must direct the sector operations in a way so that it is exposed and becomes vulnerable

to friendly attack at the earliest. While the core of the enemy army or important terrain feature is

usually identified as centre of gravity in conventional war, breaking enemies will to fight becomes the

principal focus for all unconventional operations. Enemy‘s will is broken when he finds that he is

entangled in a long drawn battle of attrition, there is no visible enemy to settle the score on his own

term, he is being hit at every opportunity without being given the chance to strike back, the physical

losses are mounting with every passing day and he is surrounded by a hostile population. However, to

infuse such psyche in enemy‘s mind is not an easy task. Enemy commanders would make every effort

to minimise their effects as much as possible, which in turn might lead to severe pressure on friendly

forces with concurrent deterioration of morale. It is, therefore, highly essential to judiciously formulate

plans for attacking enemy‘s centre of gravity and to pursue them aggressively.

c. The unconventional force will mostly bank upon the local population for obtaining intelligence

regarding enemy dispositions, movements, intentions and target areas. An elaborate intelligence

network must be built to collect first hand intelligence for conducting prompt and swift operations so

that enemy is unable to discover friendly intent before he is struck. The unconventional force should

also take adequate measures to defeat enemy intelligence operation.

Principles of Intelligence Applied

2208. General. Intelligence is vital and pivotal for successful unconventional warfare and total people's war

situation. Commanders responsible must have timely and accurate intelligence and to get timely and accurate

intelligence, he must have efficient and well integrated intelligence system. The idea of conducting intelligence

by untrained personnel with no knowledge on enemy tactics, equipment and function should not be encouraged.

All principles of intelligence will more or less equally apply to unconventional warfare and total people's war

situation. Both conventional and unconventional forces must understand each others intelligence need and

should develop a common system of intelligence acquisition and processing based on certain sound principles.

2209. Centralized Control. For conventional war normally centralization will occur at the highest

practicable level to ensure the widest possible coverage for the resources available. Contrary to this in

unconventional warfare and total people's war the centralization of intelligence should occur at every possible

level.

2210. Objectivity. Once collected, information must be processed with conscious objectivity. There is often

a temptation to distort information to fit preconceived ideas or previous assessments. This must be avoided at all

costs. Without proper objectivity, resource utilization will never be rational rather more wastage will take place

in an unconventional warfare and total people's war situation.

2211. Systematic Exploitation. Sources and agencies must be exploited systematically and logically by

methodical tasking at all level. In an unconventional warfare and total people's war situation, personnel must be

trained to do so accurately.

2212. Accessibility. Relevant information and intelligence must be readily available to an unconventional

warfare force. Proper communication suitable for local situation is a pre requisite for success.

2213. Continuous Review. Intelligence must be reviewed continuously and wherever necessary revised

taking into account all new information which should be compared with that already known.

2214. Timeliness. The most accurate and reliable information or intelligence is useless unless it reaches the

user in an unconventional warfare forces in time to serve as a basis for appropriate action.

2215. Vision. Intelligence operations require imagination and foresights. Clear vision about future enemy

course of action will take the operation a long way in a in an unconventional warfare and total people's war

situation.

2216. Source Protection. Sources must be given protection in commensuration to their value and their

vulnerability to detection in a very fluid situation.

2217. Co-operation. Co-operation is essential amongst the intelligence staffs, branches, agencies and

services involved in an unconventional warfare forces as well as conventional forces.

2218. Security. Unauthorised personnel must be denied information about operations of intelligence

agencies, sources of information and the intelligence products.

Limitations of Intelligence

2219. Following limitations in the acquisition of information and dissemination of the intelligence may be

faced in the field while conducting unconventional war and total people's war :

a. Security Measures. The enemy will take extensive security measures to deny the information

collection by own personnel concerning his true intentions and future course of action.

b. Resources. Limitation of resources in the field may force to derive the conclusion from a single

piece of information that may not provide conclusive evidence.

c. Time. The time factor may also limit the accuracy and utility of the information.

d. Change in Enemy‟s Plan. The enemy is free to choose her courses of action and to vary the

course of action when he so desires.

e. Training of Personnel. The performance of the intelligence staff in an unconventional war and

total people's war situation is likely to vary due to their aptitude, training and individual characteristics.

Remedial Measures to Overcome Limitations

2220. General. The intelligence personnel/staff in an unconventional war must take certain remedial

measures in order to overcome the inherent limitations in the field of acquisition and dissemination of

information and intelligence. These are discussed in the subsequent paragraphs.

2221. Selection and Training of Personnel. The intelligence personnel who are employed to carry out the

intelligence task in an unconventional war and total people's war situation must be selected carefully, keeping in

mind their education, aptitude and individual characteristics. The intelligence personnel must be trained

thoroughly so that they can carry out skilful and enthusiastic interpretation of the information that will help them

to carry out the intelligence task. The peace time training of intelligence personnel should not be conducted for

period less than 4 weeks time. The training may be conducted along with division level collective exercises

which should include:

a. Special training on under cover intelligence gathering procedure.

b. General training on enemy organization, equipment, tactics and behaviour.

c. Special training on reporting and clandestine communications.

d. General training on language used by enemy.

2222. Access to Conventional War Intelligence. The intelligence personnel of Unconventional Warfare

(UCW) must have a direct access to the Conventional Intelligence so that all information can be shared and

passed speedily and decisions obtained promptly.

2223. Transmission of Information/Intelligence. Extensive and thorough arrangements for the

transmission of information and dissemination of intelligence must be made. This can be ensured by the

availability of good communication system and set procedures for passing the information and disseminating the

intelligence between conventional and unconventional forces. However due to paucity of resources,

improvisation and use of local resources having duplication may have to be resorted to.

INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS IN UNCONVENTIONAL WAR AND

TOTAL PEOPLE'S WAR

2224. War Time Reality. Before understanding about employment of unconventional warfare intelligence

team during war, it is important to understand the likely wartime reality :

a. Preparation for war starts much before the actual war starts. For example observation in the

bordering areas, troops movement in the rear, dumping of logistics, extensive training for war, civil

defence, psychological war, etc.

b. Once the hostility begins, though the refugees and displaced persons start moving towards both

direction but the entire population does not vacate the whole battle front. This may allows some body

to stay within population and conduct clandestine activities.

c. Existing communication system available near the battlefield may be totally or partially

disrupted. Therefore dedicated wireless or improvised communication like special courier, man to man

communication (gonoline) or along with some clandestine communication like dead drop,

accommodation addressees, safe houses etc may have to be used.

2225. Basic Concept of Intelligence Operations. In absence of adequate and functional technical

acquisition means, the total endeavour for unconventional warfare and total people's war intelligence operation

will revolve around employment of human intelligence resources. Thus the requirement of quality of selection,

training and employment will matter much. Without quality, there will be every chance to hit around the bush

and producing fabricated report by personnel employed for such job. Extensive exploitation of human sources

and agencies must also be done at all level.

2226. Exploitation of Directed Source. Unlike conventional force, unconventional forces will have some

different types of sources which will be very useful in the planning and executing intelligence collection task.

These are as followings :

a. Specially Manned Observation Post/ Listening Post. Unconventional force must cater for

specially manned Observation Post/ Listening Post all along the enemy axis of advance. For convenient

they should be under cover of any suitable identity that gives them the chance to survive enemy

challenges. They should operate without weapon and any insignia which should be dedicated enough to

go as close to the enemy as possible. They should use clandestine radio or available communication for

passage of information. Clandestine intelligence training is a pre-requisite for their success.

b. Roving/ Fighting Patrol. Unconventional force should organize roving/fighting patrol for

intelligence purpose. They normally should operate away from the enemy for own safety but gather

information by observation and elicitation of local habitants.

c. Uncommitted Village Defence Party (VDP)/ Ansar. Since every village of Bangladesh has the

presence of good number of Ansar and VDP members, they should be integrated in the intelligence

collection and passage of information process if they have not participated in the war effort directly.

They should be encouraged to live in their own village and act as the intelligence collector. A Gono-

line may be organized with available and intelligence trained Ansar and VDP members.

d. Local Journalists. Due to the professional need, local journalists may have to travel a long away

for collecting news for there own media. They should be tasked and exploited for intelligence

collection if trustworthiness is not doubtful. .

e. Local Merchants and Suppliers. Even in the thick of the battle, many local merchants and

suppliers will continue performing their own job. They are likely to come across much enemy

information. Some of them might have access to the enemy deployed areas for meeting casual or

regular enemy need. They should also be recruited, trained and employed for intelligence job.

f. Local Government Members/Officials. Due to their appointment enemy commanders may call

them to provide support in order to bring normal life in the enemy held territory. In all over the

country they should also be exploited to the fullest for intelligence purpose.

g. Local Transport Drivers/ Workers. It is also likely that local communication system such as

bus, truck, rickshaw, rickshaw van, tractor, boat, baby taxi, etc may not seize functioning during war. It

is therefore important for unconventional force to cater for employment of such transport drivers and

workers for intelligence purpose.

h. Local Doctors or Paramedics. Due to professional requirements doctors and paramedics may

have to move to other places for attending patients. It is therefore easy for them to come across enemy

movements and activities which may be exploited by intelligence persons.

j. Local Telephone Operators/Postmen. Similarly telephone operators and postmen will come

across enemy personnel in course of their normal activities which may also be exploited for

intelligence purpose.

k. Tactical Intelligence Team. Tactical Intelligence Team of Local Field Intelligence Unit (FIU)

should also be employed along with unconventional force following strict security measures.

2227. Exploitation of Undirected Sources. There are other persons who cannot be directed or recruited for

intelligence purpose but they might have seen or heard about the enemy movement or might have knowledge of

enemy‘s significant activities. Following casual or undirected sources should also be exploited at the fullest :

a. Refugees. Refugees and internally displaced persons often come across enemy movement. Some

of them due to own background may have better understanding of enemy equipments and other

identifications. Intelligence personnel form conventional and unconventional forces should regularly

encourage and interview such person for valuable information.

b. Smugglers. This is unlikely that smuggling across the frontier will seize due to war. Smugglers

will have very good knowledge about enemy movements and other important aspects. They should also

be exploited for intelligence purpose.

c. Enemy Suppliers. During war a good numbers of enemy suppliers will also be available in

enemy held territory. Trained intelligence personnel can exploit them for intelligence purpose through

friendly elicitation.

d. Enemy Soldiers. There will be good number of casual enemy soldiers who may pass down vital

information during casual talk with local civilians. Trained intelligence person should look for such

opportunity or create situation for such opportunity. .

e. Enemy Prisoners of War. If unconventional force can capture enemy personnel as prisoners of

war, then they should look for vital information from them, before they are handed over to

conventional forces. However without training this may not bring satisfactory result.

2228. Chain of Unconventional War Intelligence Effort. A probable chain of intelligence effort in

unconventional war is suggested below :

Employment of Tactical Intelligence Teams with Unconventional Forces

2229. Bangladesh Army being technically inferior needs to have dependency on employment of human

sources like long range penetration group or under cover team working behind enemy lines or in the enemy held

territories. For example a division commander needs to know the location and activities of follow up division

and reserve troops of enemy corp. Only tactical intelligence team of Field Intelligence Unit (FIU) is capable to

send their teams under cover to a long distance and gather worth while intelligence about follow up formation

and reserve at enemy crop level. These teams also need to support forward brigades it division commander feels

it necessary. They should be employed for gathering intelligence through unconventional forces.

2230. Each formation should employ tactical intelligence team out of the manpower available in respective

FIU in order to provide guidance, support, communication and liaison to Unconventional Warfare Intelligence

Team in respective area. However individual security should be maintained at all times so that under cover

operation is not compromised and the clandestine operation can achieve significant success. Mutual trust and

cooperation will not mean compromise of security. Both teams can get best out of other teams if peacetime

training and understanding of the intelligence business is well achieved and catered for. Each unconventional

warfare force company should form a intelligence cell with the support of the FIU Team.

2231. Basic Principles for Employment. Following principles are followed for employment of Tactical

Intelligence Team along with unconventional forces :

a. There should be teams dedicated for covering areas deep inside the enemy territory through agent

operations.

UNCONVENTIONAL

PLATOON

OTHER

COMPANY

CELL UNCONVENTIONAL

COMPANY AND FIU TEAM

OTHER

COMPANY

BRIGADE /DIVISION

INTELLIGENCE STAFF

HIGHER INTELLIGENCE

STAFF

UNDIRECTED

SOURCES

MANNED

POST

ROVING/

FIGHTING

PATROL

FIU TEAM GONOLINE /LOCAL

SOURCE

UNDIRECTED

SOURCE

b. There should be teams for supporting forward brigades and some team as reserve.

c. There should be team for carrying out under cover long range surveillance for getting answer

related to essential element of information like location and details of follow up formation.

d. There should be teams employed along likely enemy axis of advance but having distinct area of

responsibility.

e. Minimum two members should form a team and be employed under suitable cover which support

their employment.

f. Their cover should normally be inhabitant of the locality which should allow them to move

without arousing suspicion. Cover thus selected should be deep in nature and may also allow them to

earn their livelihood.

g. Selection and training of personnel is very critical for success. There should be good reward for

good job done.

2232. Method of Operations. Following method of operation should be followed :

a. Each team should employ adequate sources and agent depending upon their capabilities. However

extreme caution must be exercised in their selection and subsequent employment.

b. Significant information should be collected personally and in other cases also verified personally

by the team leaders.

c. All personal discipline, security drills and communication security must be maintained.

d. They must work being logistically self contained and live off the land.

e. Clandestine radio set may be used for one way communication only. Available cell phone,

telephone communication may be used with caution. A workable chain of courier (gono line) should

also be place.

f. Unconventional forces may be used extensively for intelligence gathering and passage of

information. There could be joint cell composed of Tactical Intelligence Team and Unconventional

Warfare Persons.

Conclusion

2233. Basic purpose of employment of unconventional warfare forces is to have force multifunction effect on

the conventional operation. Without professional training there will be tendency to hit every insignificant target

avoiding important and high value one. Selection and training of the personnel at grass route level is therefore a

prerequisite for success. However both conventional and unconventional forces must learn to survive with all

odds likely to be encountered for executing respective mission.

2234 – 2300. Reserved.