balane - jurisprudential doctrines reviewer

8/13/2019 Balane - Jurisprudential Doctrines Reviewer

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/balane-jurisprudential-doctrines-reviewer 1/26

Balane Jurisprudence Reviewer; by Neil Eustaquio, ALS2014B 1

SUCCESSION OUTLINE

Chapter 1: General ProvisionsUnion Bank v. Santibañez (2005)Estate of K.H. Hemady v. Luzon Surety (1956) Alvarez v. Intermediate Appellate Court (1990)Uson v. Del Rosario (1953)De Borja v. De Borja (1972)Bonilla v. Barcena (1976) Alfonso v. Sps. Andres (?)Balus v. Balus

Chapter 2: Testamentary SuccessionSection 1 – Wills

Subsection 1 - Wills in GeneralVitug v. Court of Appeals (1990)

Subsection 2 – Testamentary Capacity and Intent

Subsection 3 – Forms of WillsSuroza v. Honrado (1981) Abangan v. Abangan (1919)Payad v. Tolentino (1936) Matias v. Salud (1958)Garcia v. Lacuesta (1951)Barut v. Cabacungan (1912)Nera v. Rimando (1911)Icasiano v. Icasiano (1964)Cagro v. Cagro (1953) Javellana v. Ledesma (1955)Cruz v. Villasor (1973)Garcia v. Vasquez (1970) Alvarado v. Gaviola, Jr. (1993)Caneda v. Court of Appeals (1993)Roxas v. De Jesus (1985)Labrador v. Court of Appeals (1990) Azaola v. Singson (1960)Codoy v. Calugay (1999)Gan v. Yap (1958)Rodelas v. Aranza (1982)Kalaw v. Relova (1984)

Subsection 4 – Witnesses to Wills

Gonzales v. Court of Appeals (1979)Subsection 5 – Codicils and Incorporation by ReferenceSubsection 6 – Revocation of Wills and Testamentary Dispositions

Adriana Maloto v. Court of Appeals (1988)Gago v. Mamuyac (1927) Molo v. Molo (1951)Diaz v. De Leon (1922)Guevara v. Guevara (1943)




De la Cerna v. Potot (1964)Gallanosa v. Arcangel (1978)Nepomuceno v. CA (1985)De la Cerna v. Potot (1964)

Subsection 7 – Republication and Revival of WillsSubsection 8 – Allowance and Disallowance of Wills

Section 2-Institution of Heir Austria v. Reyes (1970)Reyes v. Barretto-Datu (1967) Aznar v. Duncan (1966) Acain v. IAC (1987)Nuguid v. Nuguid (1866)

Section 3-Substitution of HeirsPalacios v. Ramirez (1982)Phil. Commercial & Industrial Bank v. Escolin (1974)

Section 4-Conditional Testamentary Dispositions and Testamentary Dispositionswith a term

Rabadilla v. Court of Appeals (2000)Section 5-Legitime

Rosales v. Rosales (1987)Lapuz v. Eufemio (1972)Baritua v. Court of Appeals (1990)Tumbokon v. Legaspi (2010)

Article 891-reserva troncal Solivio c. Court of Appeals (1990)Padura v. Baldovino (1958)Florentino v. Florentino (1919)Edroso v. Sablan (1913)Sienes v. Esparcia (1961)Gonzales v. CFI (1981)Cano v. Director (1959)Vizconde v. Court of Appeals (1998)

Section 6-DisinheritanceSection 7-Legacies and Devises

Chapter 3 – Legal or Intestate SuccessionSection 1-General Provisions

Subsection 1-RelationshipsTumbokon v. Legaspi (2010)

Subsection 2-Right of Representation

Teotico v. Del Val (1965)Section 2-Order of Intestate Succession

Subsection 1-Descending Direct LineSayson v. Court of Appeals (1992)

Subsection 2-Ascending Direct LineSubsection 3-Illegitimate Children

Corpus v. Administrator (1978)Leonardo v. Court of Appeals (1983)



SUCCESSION CASE DOCTRINES1

Chapter 1: General ProvisionsUnion Bank v. Santibañez (2005)

[Claims must be made in probate court.]

Estate of K.H. Hemady v. Luzon Surety (1956)

[Surety is a transmissible obligation]

Alvarez v. Intermediate Appellate Court (1990)

[Although the sale of the land was not valid, the money was still devoted to the estate,therefore the estate is liable for the value by reason of equity.]

Uson v. Del Rosario (1953)

[Article 2253 applies only when there is no prejudice to vested rights.]

De Borja v. De Borja (1972)

[The probate of will is not inconsistent with compromise agreement by successors toconvey property after decedent’s death.]

Bonilla v. Barcena (1976)

[Civil action to quiet title vests upon heirs upon death of decedent, provided it wasinstituted prior to death of the decedent.]

Alfonso v. Sps. Andres

[Extrajudicial Settlement does not require publication.]

Balus v. Balus

[Extrajudicial settlement should not include land foreclosed during life of decedent.]

Chapter 2: Testamentary SuccessionSection 1 – Wills

Subsection 1 - Wills in GeneralVitug v. Court of Appeals (1990)

“A personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a capacitated person disposes ofhis property and rights and declares or complies with duties to take effect after hisdeath.” [American definition quoted into Philippine jurisprudence.] “In other words, the

1 Those in brackets are jottings by Prof. Ruben Balane, except for those in Chapter 1:General Provisions, as

those are my own.




bequest or devise must pertain to the testator.” … “The validity of the [survivorship]contract seems debatable by reason of its “survivor-take-all” feature, but in reality, thatcontract imposed a mere obligation with a term, the term being death. Such agreementsare permitted by the Civil Code.” [as an aleatory contract]

Subsection 2 – Testamentary Capacity and IntentSubsection 3 –Forms and Wills

Suroza v. Honrado (1981)

[The provisions of Article 8042 are mandatory. Consequently, failure to comply with thetwo requirements nullifies the will.] [Neither the will nor the attestation clause needstate compliance with this requirement. This can be proved by extrinsic evidence. {Lopezv. Liboro, 1948}]

Abangan v. Abangan (1919)

[It may sometimes be presumed that the testator knew the language in which the will

was written.] “In order for the presumptions to apply, the following must appear: (1) thewill must be in a language or dialect generally spoken in the place of execution; and (2)the testator must be a native or resident or the said locality.” [Properly speakingcompliance with the language requirement is not then presumed but proved by theseattendant circumstances.]

Payad v. Tolentino (1936) and Matias v. Salud (1958)

[Is the placing of the testator’s thumbprint, for instance, a signature within thecontemplation of this article? Does it comply with the statutory requirement?] [On theauthority of these rulings, therefore, the testator’s thumbprint is always valid andsufficient signature for the purpose of complying with the requirement of the article.]

[While in most of these cases, the testator was suffering from some infirmity whichmade the writing of the testator’s name difficult or impossible, there seems to be nobasis for limiting the validity of thumbprints only to cases of illness or infirmity.]

Garcia v. Lacuesta (1951)

[Cross as signature?] “The cross cannot and does not have the trustworthiness of athumbmark.” [A sign of the cross, therefore, placed by the testator does not comply withthe statutory requirement of signature, unless it is the testator’s usual manner ofsignature or one of his usual styles of signing.]

Barut v. Cabacungan (1912)

[Two requirements for signing by the agent: (1) must sign in testator’s presence, and (2)by his express direction.] [What agent must write:] [The essential thing, for validity, is thatthe agent write the testator’s name, nothing more.] [It would be a good thing, but not

2 Article 804. Every will must be in writing and executed in a language or dialect known to the testator. (n)




required, for the agent to indicate the fact of agency or authority as: “For the testator Juan de la Cruz, by Jose Santos.” Barut, however, is clear on what is essential.”]

Azuela v. CA (2006)

[Surely signing at the physical end3 is always permissible; but equally permissible issigning at the logical end.4 The non-dispositive portions are not essential parts of thewill.]

“The provision requires that the testator and the instrumental witnesses sign each and every pageof the will on the left margin, except the last; and that all the pages shall be numberedcorrelatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page. In this case, the decedent, unlike thewitnesses, failed to sign both pages of the will on the left margin, her only signature appearing atthe so-called "logical end"5 of the will on its first page. Also, the will itself is not numberedcorrelatively in letters on each page, but instead numbered with Arabic numerals. There is a lineof thought that has disabused the notion that these two requirements be construed asmandatory.6 Taken in isolation, these omissions, by themselves, may not be sufficient to denyprobate to a will. Yet even as these omissions are not decisive to the adjudication of this case, they

need not be dwelt on, though indicative as they may be of a general lack of due regard for therequirements under Article 805 by whoever executed the will. … All told, the string of mortaldefects which the will in question suffers from makes the probate denial inexorable.”

Nera v. Rimando (1911)

[Signing in the presence of witnesses.] [As explained in Nera quoting the Jaboneta ruling,actual seeing is not required, but the ability to see each other (i.e.) the testator and withwitnesses) “by merely casting their eyes in the proper direction.”]

Taboada v. Rosal (1982)

[Re: (2) attested and subscribed by at least three credible witnesses in the presence of thetestator and of one another: (a) two distinct things are required of the witnesses here: (1)attesting7 and (2) subscribing.8] [Both must be done.]

[Does Article 805 require the witnesses to sign at the end of the will? … The witnessessignatures however, were not found at the end but on the lefthand margin of that page.

3 [where the writing stops]

4 [where the last testamentary disposition ends]5 To use the term adopted by eminent civilists Prof. Balane and Dr. Tolentino, who distinguish "the

physical end – where the writing stops" from "the logical end – where the last testamentary disposition

ends." See Balane, supra note 29 at 60; Tolentino, supra note 35, at 70. … 29 [G.R. No. 103554, 28 May1993, 222 SCRA 781, at 794; citing Lawyer’s Journal, November 30, 1950, 566. In the same article, Justice

J.B.L. Reyes suggested that Article 809 be reworded in such a manner that the will would not be rendered

invalid if the defects and imperfections in the attestation "can be supplied by an examination of the will

itself and it is proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with all therequirements of Article 805." See R. Balane, Jottings and Jurisprudence in Civil Law (1998 ed.) at 87,

citing Lawyers Journal, November 30, 1950.6 45 See e.g., Balane, supra note 28 at 63, 67; Tolentino, supra note 34, at 104.

7 [which is the act of witnessing.]

8 [which is the act of signing their names in the proper places of the will.]




Taboada ruled that the will fully satisfied the statutory requirement.] [Querendum: Maythe witness like the testator, affix his thumbmark, in lieu of writing his name? The point,until ruled upon squarely, is debatable.”]

[(b) Signing in the presence of the testator and of one another: The Nera ruling applieshere.]

[Re: (3) the testator, or his agent, must sign every page, except the last, on the left marginin the presence of the witnesses. (a) The last page need not be signed by the testator onthe margin beause, being the page where the end of the will is, it already contains thetestator’s signature. (b) there is a mandatory and a directory part to this requirement: (1)the mandatory part – the signing on every page in the witnesses presence; and (2) thedirectory part – the place of signing, i.e., the left margin; the signature can be affixedanywhere on the page.]

Abangan v. Abangan (1919)

[(c) If the entire document consists of only two sheets, the first containing the will andthe second, the attestation clause, there need not be any marginal signatures at all.]

Icasiano v. Icasiano (1964)

“Since they opposed probate of original because it lacked one signature in its third page,it is easily discerned that oppositors-appellants run here into a dilemma; if the original isdefective and invalid, then in law there is no other will but the duly signed carbonduplicate, and the same is probatable.” [Re: (4) the witnesses must sign every page,except the last, on the left margin in the presence of the testator and of one another; [… acavalier disregard of the formal requirements of wills in reliance on Icasiano is notrecommended.]

Cagro v. Cagro (1953)

[The signatures of the witnesses must be at the bottom of the attestation clause.] “Thereis no question that the signatures of the three witnesses to the will do not appear at thebottom of the attestation clause, although the page containing the same is signed by thewitnesses on the left-hand margin. … If an attestation clause not signed by the threewitnesses at the bottom thereof, be admitted as sufficient, it would be easy to add suchclause to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence of the testator and any or allof the witnesses.”

Javellana v. Ledesma (1955)

[Re: (7) acknowledgment9 before a notary public.] [The certification of acknowledgmentneed not be signed by the notary in the presence of the testator and the witnesses. Obiter :

9 an acknowledgment is evidence by textual proof, under oath, that the testator and instrumental witnesses

executed or signed the will as their own free act or deed. It is not the same as a jurat which is that part of

the affidavit where the notary certifies that the document was subscribed and sworn to by the executor

before him or her.




Article 806 does not require that the testator and the witnesses must acknowledge on thesame day that it was executed.] [Logical inference: Neither does the article require that thetestator and the witnesses must acknowledge in one another’s presence.] [If theacknowledgment is done by the testator and the witnesses separately, all of them mustretain their respective capacities until the last one has acknowledged.]

Cruz v. Villasor (1973)

[Querendum: Should the notary public be present when the will is executed? {No he isnot a witn’ess. Furthermore,} The notary public cannot be counted as one of the attestingwitnesses.] “Furthermore, the function of the notary public is, among others, to guardagainst any illegal or immoral arrangements. … That function would be defeated if thenotary public were one of the attesting or instrumental witnesses.” … “Will is not validand hereby set aside.”

(Gabucan v. Manta 1980)

[Affixing of documentary stamp is not required for validity.]

Garcia v. Vasquez (1970)

[Provision of Article 80810 mandatory.]

Lee v. Tambago (200)

{Will void for absence of residence certificate as required for notarization. Will notnotarized and invalid.} {Furthermore, only two witnesses, void.}

Guerrero v. Bihis (2007)

{Will void as notary acknowledged outside his notarial jurisdiction. Notary wasperpetually disqualified from notarization.}

Alvarado v. Gaviola, Jr. (1993)

[The requirement {of Article 808} has been liberally applied, the Supreme Courtdeclaring substantial compliance sufficient.] “The purpose is to make known to theincapacitated testator the contents of the document before signing and to give him anopportunity to object if anything is contrary to his instructions.” … {will read once inmultiple occasions in the presence of multiple witnesses, and testator affirmed that the

will was in accordance with his wishes, corresponded with his instructions, and were ofhis own free will} “Substantial compliance suffices when the purpose has been served.”

[… burden of proof is on the proponent of the will … that the special requirement …was complied with. At the same time, there is no requirement that compliance with therequirement be stated either in the will or the attestation clause.]

10 Article 808. If the testator is blind, the will shall be read to him twice; once, by one of the subscribing

withnesses, and again, by the notary public before whom the will is acknowledged. (n)




[If Article 808 is mandatory, by evident analogy11 Article 807 would also be mandatory.Failure to comply with either would result in nullity and denial of probate.]

Azuela v. CA (citing Caneda)

{No number of pages, void.} [I’m not of the same opinion with the decision in Azuela. {In J.B.L. Reyes’s suggested wording for Article 809: …shall not render the will invalid “ifsuch defects and imperfections can be supplied by an examination of the will itself.”]

Caneda v. Court of Appeals (1993)

[A failure by the attestation clause to state that the witnesses sign in one another’spresence should be considered a more serious, indeed a fatal, flaw, since the attestationclause is the only textual guarantee of compliance.]

“Attestation is the act of the senses, while subscription is the act of the hand. The former

is mental, the latter, mechanical, and to attest a will is to know that it was published assuch and to certify the facts required to constitutie an actual and legal publication; but tosubscribe a paper published as a will is only to write on the same paper the names of thewitnesses for the sole purpose of identification.” … “What is fairly apparent upon acareful reading of the attestation clause herein assailed is the fact that while it recitesthat the testator indeed signed the will and all its pages in the presence of the threeattesting witnesses and states as well the number of pages that were used, the same doesnot expressly state therein the circumstance that said witnesses subscribed theirrespective signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other.” …“What is then clearly lacking is the statement that the witnesses signed the will and every pagethereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.”

[J.B.L. Reyes’ suggestion has been adopted in Caneda.] “It may thus be stated that therule, as it now stands, is that omission which can be supplied by an examination of thewill itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic evidence, will not be fatal and,correspondingly, would not obstruct the allowance to probate of the will being assailed.However, those omissions which cannot be supplied except by evidence aliunde wouldresult in the invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself.

Roxas v. De Jesus (1985)[II. The three requirements12: A. Entirely handwritten by the testator – If the testatorexecutes only part of the will in his handwriting, and other parts of the will are not sowritten, the entire will is void, because then the article would be violated.] {If a part of

the will is written by another, it is also entirely void.}

[B. dated by the testator.] [Date is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as the “specificationor mention, in a written instrument, of the time (day, month and year) when it was

11 If X is Y, then Z; then if A is Y, then also Z.

12 Article 810. A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and signed

by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the

Philippines, and need not be witnessed. (678, 688a)




made (executed).” Roxas states: “As a general rule, the ‘date’ in a holographic willshould include day, month, and year of its execution.” The point can be raised whetherthe Roxas ruling was not being far too liberal in allowing “FEB/61” as a sufficient date,even granting that there was no fraud, bad faith, undue influence or duress.]

Labrador v. Court of Appeals (1990)

[A less controversial liberal interpretation by the Court of this requirement is found inLabrador ] {The date was in the body of the second page as “this being in the month ofMarch, 17th day, in the year 1968 ….”} “{The will was allowed probate.}

Azaola v. Singson (1960)

[The three witness provision in case of contested holographic will is directory, notmandatory.] {Only one witness in holographic will.}

We agree with the appellant that since the authenticity of the will was not contested,

he was not required to produce more than one witness; but even if the genuinenessof the holographic will were contested, we are of the opinion that Article 811 of ourpresent Civil Code can not be interpreted as to require the compulsory presentationof three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator, under penalty ofhaving the probate denied. Since no witness may have been present at the executionof a holographic will, none being required by law (Art. 810, new Civil Code), itbecomes obvious that the existence of witness possessing the requisite qualificationsis a matter beyond the control of the proponent. For it is not merely a question offinding and producing any three witnesses; they must be witnesses "who know thehandwriting and signature of the testator" and who can declare (truthfully, ofcourse, even if the law does not so express) "that the will and the signature are in thehandwriting of the testator". There may be no available witness of the testator'shand; or even if so familiarized, the witnesses may be unwilling to give a positive

opinion. Compliance with the rule of paragraph 1 of Article 811 may thus become animpossibility. That is evidently the reason why the second paragraph of Article 811prescribes that —

in the absence of any competent witness referred to in the preceding paragraph,and if the court deems it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to.

As can be seen, the law foresees the possibility that no qualified witness may befound (or what amounts to the same thing, that no competent witness may bewilling to testify to the authenticity of the will), and provides for resort to expertevidence to supply the deficiency.

It may be true that the rule of this article (requiring that three witnesses be presented

if the will is contested and only one if no contest is had) was derived from the ruleestablished for ordinary testaments (cf. Cabang vs. Delfinado, 45 Phil., 291;Tolentino vs. Francisco, 57 Phil., 742). But it can not be ignored that the requirementcan be considered mandatory only in the case of ordinary testaments, preciselybecause the presence of at least three witnesses at the execution of ordinary wills ismade by law essential to their validity (Art. 805). Where the will is holographic, nowitness need be present (Art. 10), and the rule requiring production of threewitnesses must be deemed merely permissive if absurd results are to be avoided.




[The Azaola statement seems to have been reversed in a more recent case.] {Allegation offorgery? Azaola – yes, Codoy –no.}

Codoy v. Calugay (1999)

“We are convinced based on the language used, that Article 81113 of the Civil Code ismandatory. The word ‘shall’ connotes a mandatory order. … the goal to achieve is togive effect to the wishes of the deceased and the evil to be prevented is the possibilitythat unscrupulous individuals who for their benefit will employ means to defeat thewishes of the testator.”

[Therefore the basis of the ruling was that evidence for authenticity was not adequate,not failure to present three witnesses[,] [w]hich, if analyzed closely, is in accord with Azaola, which stated that the decisive factor is not quantity, but quality.] [If one goesbeneath the surface, Codoy, rather than reversing Azaola, may have affirmed it.]

Gan v. Yap (1958)

[IV. In the probate of a holographic will, the document itself must be produced {as a ruleof evidence, to which the court is entitled}. Therefore, a lost holographic will cannot beprobated.]

Taking all the above circumstances together, we reach the conclusion that theexecution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not beproved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read suchwill.[footnote 8]14

Rodelas v. Aranza (1982)

{Rodelas affirms the footnote in the Gan ruling.} “But a photostatic copy or Xerox copy ofthe holographic will may be allowed because a comparison can be made with thestandard writings of the testator.” … “’The law regards the document itself as materialproof of authenticity.’ But in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that “Perhaps it may beproved by a photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy orby other similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of thedeceasd may be exhibited and tested before the probate court.”

Kalaw v. Relova (1984)

13 Article 811. In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one witness who

knows the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in

the handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three of such witnesses shall be required.In the absence of any competent witness referred to in the preceding paragraph, and if the court deem it

necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to. (619a)14

8 Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic or photostatic copy. Evena mimeographed or carbon copy;

or by other similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be

exhibited and tested before the probate court.




[II. Effect of non-compliance with this article15 - The change (insertion, cancellation, etc.)is simply considered not made. “The will is not thereby invalidated as a whole, but atmost only as regards the particular words erased, corrected or inserted[,]” unless the portion involved is an essential part of the will, such as a date.]

[Comments on Kalaw: (1) The holding that the insertion of the name of Gregorio cannotbe given effect for not having been done in accordance with the requirement ofArticle814 (i.e., authentication with the testator’s full signature) is beyond question. (2)Why, however, was the cancellation of the original testamentary institution given effect,as it was in this decision?]

Subsection 4 – Witnesses to WillsGonzales v. Court of Appeals (1979)

[II. Competence and credibility distinguished.] “In fine, We state the rule that theinstrumental witnesses in Order to be competent must be shown to have thequalifications under Article 820 of the Civil Code and none of the disqualifications

under Article 821 and for their testimony to be credible, that is worthy of belief andentitled to credence, it is not mandatory that evidence be first established on record thatthe witnesses have a good standing in the community or that they are honest andupright or reputed to be trustworthy and reliable, for a person is presumed to be suchunless the contrary is established otherwise. In other words, the instrumental witnessesmust be competent and their testimonies must be credible before the court allows theprobate of the will they have attested. We, therefore, reject petitioner's position that itwas fatal for respondent not to have introduced prior and independent proof of the factthat the witnesses were "credible witnesses that is, that they have a good standing in thecommunity and reputed to be trustworthy and reliable.”

Subsection 5 – Codicils and Incorporation by ReferenceSubsection 6 – Revocation of Wills and Testamentary Dispositions

Adriana Maloto v. Court of Appeals (1988)

[Corpus 16 and animus 17 must concur. One without the other will not produce therevocation.] “It is clear that the physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in thiscase, does not per se constitute an effective revocation, unless the destruction is coupledwith animus revocandi on the part of the testator. It is not imperative that the physicaldestruction be done by the testator himself. It may be performed by another person butunder the express direction and in the presence of the testator. Of course, it goes withoutsaying that the document destroyed must be the will itself.”

Gago v. Mamuyac (1927)

15 Article 814. In case of any insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a holographic will, the testator

must authenticate the same by his full signature. (n)16

[corpus-the physical destruction itself; there must be evidence of physical destruction] 17

[animus-(a) capacity and intent to revoke; {and} (b) the testator must have completed everything he

intended to do.]




[The loss or unavailability of a will may, under certain circumstances, give rise to thepresumption that it had been revoked by physical destruction.]

“Where a will which cannot be found is shown to have been in the possession of thetestator, when last seen, the presumption is, in the absence of other competentevidence, that the same was cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption arises

where it is shown that the testator had ready access to the will and it cannot befound after his death. It will not be presumed that such will has been destroyed byany other person without the knowledge or authority of the testator. The force of thepresumption of cancellation or revocation by the testator, while varying greatly,being weak or strong according to the circumstances, is never conclusive, but maybe overcome by proof that the will was not destroyed by the testator with intent torevoke it.”

Molo v. Molo (1951)

[I. The efficacy of the revocatory clause does not depend on the testamentarydispositions of the revoking will, unless the testator so provides. Revocation is, generally

speaking, an absolute provision, independent of the acceptance or capacity of the newheirs.]

[II. An obvious exception to this is an instance where the testator provides in thesubsequent will that the revocation of the prior one is dependent on the capacity oracceptance of the heirs, devisees, or legatees instituted in the subsequent will. Thisbecomes an example of “dependent relative revocation.”

…

[IV. Is the rule of dependent relative revocation applicable if the revocation of the will isphysical destruction? In Molo, the Supreme Court held, in an obiter, that the physicaldestruction of the will did not revoke it, on the inference drawn by the Court, that thetestator meant the revocation to depend on the validity of a new one. {So how will thecourt refer to the old will if it was destroyed? In Molo, there was a ‘duplicate’ copy.}]

[Apart from the fact that the statement is obiter (the facts did not clearly show that thewill had been destroyed), it is arguable whether the prior will should be deemed tosubsist despite its physical destruction. Can it not be argued that the act of the testator indestroying the will in fact confirmed his intent to revoke it? Was the Supreme Court notdrawing too remote an inference? The case if Diaz v. De Leon might be more instructive.]

Diaz v. De Leon (1922)

“The instrument was returned to the testator who ordered his servant to tear thedocument. This was done in his presence and before a nurse who testified to this effect.After some time, the testator, being asked by Dr. Cornelio Mapa about the will, said thatit had been destroyed. The intention of revoking the will is manifest from the establishedfact that the testator was anxious to withdraw or change the provisions he had made inhis first will. … The original will herein presented for probate having been destroyed




with animo revocandi, cannot now be probated as the will and last testament of Jesus deLeon.”

Guevara v. Guevara (1943)

[I. Probate of a will is mandatory.]

“…and it was only during the trial of this case that she presented the will to the court,not for the purpose of having it probated but only to prove that the deceased Victirino L.Guevara had acknowledged her as his natural daughter. … We cannot sanction theprocedure adopted by the respondent Rosario Guevara, it being in our opinion inviolation of procedural law and an attempt to circumvent and disregard the last will andtestament of the decedent. … It will readily be seen from the above provisions of the lawthat the presentation of a will to the court for probate is mandatory and its allowance bythe court is essential and indispensable to its efficacy. To assure and compel the probateof will, the law punishes a person who neglects his duty to present it to the court with afine not exceeding P2,000, and if he should persist in not presenting it, he may be

committed to prision and kept there until he delivers the will.”

RULE 74Summary Settlement of Estate

Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. — If the decedent leftno will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented bytheir judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the partiesmay without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselvesas they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register ofdeeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. Ifthere is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of anaffidavit filled in the office of the register of deeds. The parties to an extrajudicialsettlement, whether by public instrument or by stipulation in a pending action forpartition, or the sole heir who adjudicates the entire estate to himself by means of anaffidavit shall file, simultaneously with and as a condition precedent to the filing ofthe public instrument, or stipulation in the action for partition, or of the affidavit inthe office of the register of deeds, a bond with the said register of deeds, in anamount equivalent to the value of the personal property involved as certified tounder oath by the parties concerned and conditioned upon the payment of any justclaim that may be filed under section 4 of this rule. It shall be presumed that thedecedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of administrationwithin two (2) years after the death of the decedent.

The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a

newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the nest succeedingsection; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who hasnot participated therein or had no notice thereof.

De la Cerna v. Potot (1964)

[Once a decree of probate becomes final in accordance with the rules of procedure, it isres judicata.]




“It appears that on May 9, 1939, the spouses, Bernabe de la Serna and Gervasia Rebaca,executed a joint last will and testament, Bernabe dela Serna died on August 30, 1939, andthe aforesaid will was submitted to probate by said Gervasia and Manuela before theCourt of First Instance of Cebu which, after due publication as required by law and therebeing no opposition, heard the evidence, and, by Order … [became final]. [After thedeath of Gervacia] another petition for the probate of the same will insofar as Gervasiawas concerned was filed on November 6, 1952 … but for failure of the petitioner,Manuela R. Potot and her attorney, Manuel Potot to appear, for the hearing of saidpetition, the case was dismissed. … public policy and sound practice demand that at therisk of occasional errors judgment of courts should become final at some definite datefixed by law. … public policy and sound practice demand that at the risk of occasionalerrors, judgments of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by the law.Interest rei publicae ut finis set litium … the probate decree in 1939 could only affect theshare of the deceased husband, Bernabe de la Cerna. It could not include the dispositionof the share of the wife, Gervasia Rebaca, who was then still alive … Be it rememberedthat prior to the new Civil Code, a will could not be probated during the testator'slifetime. … Therefore, the undivided interest of Gervasia Rebaca should pass upon her

death to her heirs intestate, and not exclusively to the testamentary heir, unless someother valid will in her favor is shown to exist, or unless she be the only heir intestate ofsaid Gervasia.”

Gallanosa v. Arcangel (1978)

[A final decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution of the will; i.e., as to thewill’s extrinsic or formal validity only.] “After the finality of the allowance of the will,the issue as to the voluntariness of its execution cannot be raised anymore.” “Thatmeans that the testator was (1) of sound and disposing mind at the time when heexecuted the will and; (2) was not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undueinfluence; and (3) that [the formal requirements of the law have been complied with, i.e.,Articles 804-808 and 820-821 for an attested will, or Articles 804 and 810-814 if the will isholographic, and Articles 818-819], and (4) that the will is genuine and is not a forgery.”

[Another way of defining the scope of a final decree of probate is to refer to Article 83918 …]

Nepomuceno v. CA (1985)

[2. Exception to the rule: A decree of probate, therefore, does not concern itself with thequestion of intrinsic validity and the probate court should not pass upon that issue. This

18

Article 839. The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;

(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a will, at the time of its

execution;

(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary

or of some other person;

(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud;

(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he signed should be his

will at the time of affixing his signature thereto. (n)




general rule, however, “is not inflexible and absolute xxx. The probate of a will mightbecome an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practicalconsiderations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even beforeit is probated, the court should meet the issue.”

Subsection 7 – Republication and Revival of WillsSubsection 8 – Allowance and Disallowance of Wills

Section 2-Institution of Heir Austria v. Reyes (1970)

[I. General Rule-The falsity of the stated cause for the testamentary institution does notaffect the validity or efficacy of the institution. Reason for the general rule-Testamentarydispositions are ultimately based on liberality. II.Exception-The falsity of the statedcause for the institution will set aside the institution, if certain factors are present.]

“Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of the Civil Code, thefollowing requisites must concur: First, the cause for the institution of heirs must be

stated in the will; second, the cause must be shown to be false; and third, it must appearfrom the face of the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he hadknown the falsity of the cause.”… “One fact prevails, however, and it is that thedecedent's will does not state in a specific or unequivocal manner the cause for suchinstitution of heirs. We cannot annul the same on the basis of guesswork or uncertainimplications.”

Reyes v. Barretto-Datu (1967)

[II. Omission that Constitutues Preterition: A. If the heir in question is instituted in thewill but the portion given to him by the will is less than his legitime-there is nopreterition.] [There was no total omission, inasmuch as the heir received something fromthe inheritance. The heir’s remedy is not found in Article 854 but in Articles 906 19 and907,20 for completion of the legitime.

Aznar v. Duncan (1966)

[If the heir is given a legacy or devise-There is no preterition.]

Acain v. IAC (1987)

[E. Adopted Children. Acain’s logic is the soul of simplicity: since an adopted child isgiven by law the same rights as a legitimate child, vis-à-vis the adopted, then the

19 Article 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has left by any title less than the legitime

belonging to him may demand that the same be fully satisfied. (815)20

Article 907. Testamentary dispositions that impair or diminish the legitime of the compulsory heirs shall

be reduced on petition of the same, insofar as they may be inofficious or excessive. (817)




adopted child can, in proper cases, invoke Article 85421 in the same manner that alegitimate child can.]

[Effect of Preterition-… annulment of the institution of heir but validity of the legacies anddevises to the extent that these latter do not impair legitimes.

Nuguid v. Nuguid (1866)

[meaning of annulment of institution of heir] “The effect of annulling the institution ofheirs will be, necessarily, the opening of a total intestacy except that proper legacies anddevices must, as already stated above, be respected.

Section 3-Substitution of HeirsPalacios v. Ramirez (1982)

[Re: #3-the secomd heir must be one degree from the first heir; The requirement of onedegree: There is no question that only one transmission is allowed in the fideicomisaria,

from the first heir to the second heir. But, on top of that, does the term “one degree”mean that the second heir must be in the first degree of relationship with the first heir, asthe word “degree” is used in Articles 963, 964 and 966? In other words, must the secondheir be either a child or a parent of the first heir? Yes, ruled the Supreme Court in effectin Palacios v. Ramirez.]

What is meant by "one degree" from the first heir is explained by Tolentino asfollows:

Scaevola Maura, and Traviesas construe "degree" as designation, substitution,or transmission. The Supreme Court of Spain has decidedly adopted thisconstruction. From this point of view, there can be only one tranmission orsubstitution, and the substitute need not be related to the first heir. Manresa,Morell and Sanchez Roman, however, construe the word "degree" asgeneration, and the present Code has obviously followed this interpretation. byproviding that the substitution shall not go beyond one degree "from the heiroriginally instituted." The Code thus clearly indicates that the second heir mustbe related to and be one generation from the first heir.

From this, it follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a child or aparent of the first heir. These are the only relatives who are one generation ordegree from the fiduciary (Op. cit., pp. 193-194.)

Phil. Commercial & Industrial Bank v. Escolin (1974)

[Re: #4 the dual obligation imposed upon the fiduciary to preserve the property and to

transmit it after the lapse of the period to the fideicommissary heir; This requisite is theessence of fideicomisaria. (Crisologo v. Singson, 1962). This makes the position of the

21 Article 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,

whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the

institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.

If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual, without

prejudice to the right of representation. (814a)




fiduciary basically that of a usufructuary, with the right to use and enjoy the propertybut without the jus disponendi.]

[Effect if there is no absolute obligation to preserve and transmit.] [Thus if no absoluteobligation is imposed upon the first heir to preserve the property and to transmit it tothe second heir, there is no fideicommisaria. The institution is not necessarily void; it maybe valid as some other disposition, but it is not a fideicomisaria. In PCIB, the Court heldsuch an institution to be a simultaneous institution-on the one hand, of Hodges subject toa resolutory condition, on the other, of his brothers-and sisters-in-law subject to asuspensive condition; but not a fideicomisaria “because no obligation is imposed therebyupon Hodges to preserve the estate or any part thereof for anyone else.”] [Summary ofManresa’s comments re:tenure of fiduciary: A. Primary rule-the period indicated by thetestator. B.Secondary rule-if the testator did not indicate a period, then the fiduciary’slifetime.

Section 4-Conditional Testamentary Dispositions and Testamentary Dispositionswith a term

Rabadilla v. Court of Appeals (2000)

[I. The first paragraph of this article22 defines a mode obliquely. In brief, a mode is anobligation imposed upon the heir, without suspending-as a condition does- theeffectivity of the institution. (1) A mode must be clearly imposed as an obligation inorder to be considered as one. Mere preferences or wishes expressed by the testator arenot modes. (2) A mode functions similarly to a resolutory condition. In fact, modes couldvery well have been absorbed in the concept of resolutory conditions.

“The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known inthe law of succession as an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. In a modalinstitution, the testator states (1) the object of the institution, (2) the purpose orapplication of the property left by the testator, or (3) the charge imposed by the testatorupon the heir.[18] A "mode" imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it doesnot affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession.[19] On the other hand, in aconditional testamentary disposition, the condition must happen or be fulfilled in orderfor the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The condition suspends but does notobligate; and the mode obligates but does not suspend.[20] To some extent, it is similarto a resolutory condition.[21]23” … “The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadillaunder subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon theinstituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy of such institution.”

22

Article 882. The statement of the object of the institution, or the application of the property left by thetestator, or the charge imposed by him, shall not be considered as a condition unless it appears that such

was his intention.

That which has been left in this manner may be claimed at once provided that the instituted heir or his heirs

give security for compliance with the wishes of the testator and for the return of anything he or they mayreceive, together with its fruits and interests, if he or they should disregard this obligation. (797a)23

[18] Tolentino, supra, pp. 241-242.

[19] Ibid., p. 242.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Jottings and Jurisprudence in Civil Law, Ruben Balane, p. 249.




Section 5-LegitimeRosales v. Rosales (1987)

[The surviving spouse referred to here24 is the spouse of the decedent, not the spouse ofa child who has predeceased the decedent.]

[2. The marriage between the decedent and his/her surviving spouse must be eithervalid or voidable; if voidable, there should have been no final decree of annulment at thetime of the decedent’s death.]

Lapuz v. Eufemio (1972)

[2.3 Death of either spouse during the pendency of a petition for legal separation-dismissal of the case.] [Note that in the Lapuz ruling, it does not matter who dies,whether it be the offending or the innocent spouse.]

Baritua v. Court of Appeals (1990)

[2.1 Mere estrangement is not a ground for the disqualification of the surviving spouseas heir. 2.2 Effect of decree of legal separation: (a) on the offending spouse-disqualification (b) on the innocent spouse-nothing.]

[The term “legitimate parents” includes, in the proper cases, legitimate ascendants otherthan parents.]

Tumbokon v. Legaspi (2010)

{Case is a simply a literal application of Article 887.}

Article 891-reserva troncal Solivio c. Court of Appeals (1990)

[3. Third transfer-from the transferee in the second transfer to the relatives –reservatarios.]

The persons involved in reserva troncal are:

24 Article 887. The following are compulsory heirs:

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;

(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate childrenand descendants;

(3) The widow or widower;

(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;

(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287.Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4, and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2; neither do they

exclude one another.

In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.

The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned, shall inherit from them in the

manner and to the extent established by this Code. (807a)




1. The person obliged to reserve is the reservor (reservista)—the ascendant whoinherits by operation of law property from his descendants.

2. The persons for whom the property is reserved are the reservees (reservatarios)—relatives within the third degree counted from the descendant (propositus), andbelonging to the line from which the property came.

3. The propositus—the descendant who received by gratuitous title and died withoutissue, making his other ascendant inherit by operation of law. (p. 692, Civil Law byPadilla, Vol. II, 1956 Ed.)

Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not reservableproperty, for Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant, but the descendant of his mother,Salustia Solivio, from whom he inherited the properties in question. Therefore, hedid not hold his inheritance subject to a reservation in favor of his aunt, CeledoniaSolivio, who is his relative within the third degree on his mother's side. The reservatroncal applies to properties inherited by an ascendant from a descendant whoinherited it from another ascendant or 9 brother or sister. It does not apply toproperty inherited by a descendant from his ascendant, the reverse of the situation

covered by Article 891.

Padura v. Baldovino (1958)

[4. Preference among reservatarios.]

In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the part ofone alleging his right as reservatario who is not within the third degree ofrelationship, nevertheless there is right of representation on the part of reservatarioswho are within the third degree mentioned by law, as in the case of nephews of thedeceased person from whom the reservable property came. ... . (Florentino vs.Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, 489-490) (Emphasis supplied) See also Nieva and Alcala vs.

Alcala and de Ocampo, 41 Phil. 915)

Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of ordinaryintestate succession; so is the rule that whole blood brothers and nephews areentitled to a share double that of brothers and nephews of half blood. If indetermining the rights of the reservatarios inter se, proximity of degree and the rightof representation of nephews are made to apply, the rule of double share forimmediate collaterals of the whole blood should be likewise operative.

In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group of relativesreservatarios to whom the property should be returned; but within that group, theindividual right to the property should be decided by the applicable rules ofordinary intestate succession, since Art. 891 does not specify otherwise. This

conclusion is strengthened by the circumstance that the reserva being an exceptionalcase, its application should be limited to what is strictly needed to accomplish thepurpose of the law. As expressed by Manresa in his Commentaries (Vol. 6, 6th Ed.,p. 250):

… The restrictive interpretation is the more imperative in view of the new CivilCode's hostility to successional reservas and reversions, as exemplified by thesuppression of the reserva viudal and the reversion legal of the Code of 1889 (Art.812 and 968-980).




There is a third point that deserves consideration. Even during the reservista’slifetime, the reservatarios, who are the ultimate acquirers of the property, canalready assert the right to prevent the reservista from doing anything that mightfrustrate their reversionary right; and for this purpose they can compel theannotation of their right in the Registry of Property even while the reservista is alive.

… This right is incompatible with the mere expectancy that corresponds to thenatural heirs of the reservista. It is likewise clear that the reservable property is nopart of the estate of the reservista, who may not dispose of them by will, so long asthere are reservatarios existing ( Arroyo v. Gerona , 58 Phil. 237). The latter, therefore, donot inherit from the reservista, but from the prepositus, of whom the reservatarios arethe heirs mortis causa, subject of the condition that they must survive the reservista. Had the nephews of the whole and half-blood would undoubtedly receive a doubleshare compared to those of the half blood. (Arts. 1008 and 1006, jam cit.), why thenshould the latter receive equal shares simply because the transmission of theproperty was delayed by the interregnum of the reserva? The decedent (causante) theher heirs and their relationship being the same, there is no cogent reason why thehereditary portions should vary.

… But as we have seen, the Supreme Courts of Spain and of the Philippines haverejected that view, and consider that reservable property should be succeeded to bythe reservatario who is nearest in degree, according to the basic rules of intestacy.

[Thus, conformably to the Padura ruling, which subjects the choice of reservatarios to therules of intestate succession, those reservatarios nearer in degree of relationship to thePrepositus will exclude those remotely related.]

Florentino v. Florentino (1919)

[5. Representation among the reservatarios: As in intestate succession, the rule ofpreference of degree among reservatarios is qualified by the rule of representation.]

Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there arerelatives of the descendant within the third degree, the right of the nearest relative,called reservatario, over the property which the reservista (person holding it subjectto reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one more remote. The rightof representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming same as a reservatario ofthe reservable property is not among the relatives within the third degree belongingto the line from which such property came, inasmuch as the right granted by theCivil Code in article 811 is in the highest degree personal and for the exclusivebenefit of designated persons who are the relatives, within the third degree, of theperson from whom the reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourthand the succeeding degrees can never be considered as reservatarios, since the law

does not recognize them as such.

In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the part ofone alleging his right as reservatario who is not within the third degree ofrelationship, nevertheless there is right of representation on the part of reservatarioswho are within the third degree mentioned by law, as in the case of nephews of thedeceased person from whom the reservable property came.




[Actually, there will be only one instance of representation among the reservatarios, i.e., acase of the Prepositus being survived by brothers/sisters and children of a predeceasedor incapacitated brother/sister.]

Edroso v. Sablan (1913)

[VIII. Juridical Nature. The juridical nature of reserve troncal may be viewed from twoaspects-from that of the reservista and that of the reservatarios.]

[From Edroso, the following may be derived:1. The reservista’s right over the reserved property is one of ownership.2. The ownership is subject to a resolutory condition, i.e., the existence of

reservatarios at the time of the reservista’s death.3. The right of ownership is alienable, but subject to the same resolutory condition

(reiterated in Nono v. Nequia, 93 Phil. 120, (1953)4. The reservista’s right of ownership is registrable.]

Sienes v. Esparcia (1961)

[2. Nature of resrvatarios’ right.][From Sienes, the following may be derived or implied:

1. The reservatarios have a right of expectancy over the property.2. The right is subject to a suspensive condition, i.e., the expectancy ripens into

ownership if the reservatarios survive the reservista.3. The right is alienable, but subject to the same suspensive condition. (Note: Sienes

erroneously refers to the condition as “resolutory”).4. The right is registrable.

Gonzales v. CFI (1981)

[3. Whether the reservista may, by will, prefer some reservatarios over others: The rule,laid down in Florentino, that the reservista had no power to appoint by will, whichreservatarios were to get the reserved property, was confirmed in Gonzales v. CFI.]

[The rule in this jurisdiction, therefore, is that, upon the reservista’s death, the propertypasses by strict operation of law (according to the rules of intestate succession, declaredPadura), to the proper reservatarios. Thus, the selection of which reservatarios will get theproperty is made by law and not by the reservista.]

Cano v. Director (1959)

[C. Reserved property not part of the reservista’s estate upon his death.] [The Cano rulingis perfectly consistent with the principle that the reserved property, upon the reservista’sdeath, passes to the reservatarios by strict operation of law. It may be stated, relevantly,that as a consequence of the rule laid down in Cano, since the reserved property is notconputed as part of the reservista’s estate, it is not taken into account in determining thelegitimes of the reservista’s compulsory heirs.]




Vizconde v. Court of Appeals (1998)

Collation is only required of compulsory heirs succeeding with other compulsoryheirs and involves property or rights received by donation or gratuitous title duringthe lifetime of the decedent. The purpose for it is presumed that the intention of thetestator or predecessor in interest in making a donation or gratuitous transfer to a

forced heir is to give him something in advance on account of his share in the estate,and that the predecessor’s will is to treat all his heirs equally, in the absence of anyexpression to the contrary.Collation does not impose any lien on the property or thesubject matter of collationable donation. What is brought to collation is not theproperty donated itself, but rather the value of such property at the time it wasdonated, the rationale being that the donation is a real alienation which conveysownership upon its acceptance, hence any increase in value or any deterioration orloss thereof is for the account of the heir or donee.

… Thus, the probate court’s order of collation against petitioner is unwarranted forthe obligation to collate is lodged with Estrellita, the heir, and not to hereinpetitioner who does not have any interest in Rafael’s estate. As it stands, collation ofthe Parañaque property is improper for, to repeat, collation covers only propertiesgratuitously given by the decedent during his lifetime to his compulsory heirs whichfact does not obtain anent the transfer of the Parañaque property. Moreover, Rafael,in a public instrument, voluntarily and willfully waived any “claims, rights,ownership and participation as heir” in the Parañaque property.

Section 6-DisinheritanceSection 7-Legacies and Devises

Chapter 3 – Legal or Intestate Succession

Section 1-General ProvisionsSubsection 1-Relationships

Tumbokon v. Legaspi (2010)Subsection 2-Right of Representation

Teotico v. Del Val (1965)

[The rationale for the rule barring an adopted from representing and being representedis that the legal relationship created by adoption is strictly between the adopter and theadopted. It does not extend to the relatives of either party.]

Section 2-Order of Intestate SuccessionSubsection 1-Descending Direct Line

Sayson v. Court of Appeals (1992)

“The philosophy underlying this article is that a person's love descends first to hischildren and grandchildren before it ascends to his parents and thereafter spreadsamong his collateral relatives. It is also supposed that one of his purposes in acquiringproperties is to leave them eventually to his children as a token of his love for them andas a provision for their continued care even after he is gone from this earth.”

… “In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia and Edmundo as the adoptedchildren and Doribel as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro Sayson and Isabel Bautista,




are their exclusive heirs and are under no obligation to share the estate of their parentswith the petitioners. The Court of Appeals was correct, however, in holding that onlyDoribel has the right of representation in the inheritance of her grandparents' intestateestate, the other private respondents being only the adoptive children of the deceased Teodoro .”

[The private respondents, as well as the Court, seem to have overlooked the fact that asfar as Eleno’s estate was concerned, there was no question of representation, sinceTeodoro survived Eleno.]

Subsection 2-Ascending Direct LineSubsection 3-Illegitimate Children

Corpus v. Administrator (1978)

[This 25 is the well-known, and much criticized, successional barrier between thelegitimate and the illegitimate relatives of a decedent.]

Leonardo v. Court of Appeals (1983)

Diaz v. IAC (1987)

“Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibitsabsolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimatechildren and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have anatural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Art. 992,Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be anintervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefullylooked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in turn, hated by theillegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and theresources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimatechild nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; thelaw does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment.”

Diaz v. IAC (1990)

“Needless to say, the determining factor is the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the person tobe represented. If the person to be represented is an illegitimate child, then hisdescendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, may represent him; however, if theperson to be represented is legitimate, his illegitimate descendants cannot represent himbecause the law provides that only his legitimate descendants may exercise the right ofrepresentation by reason of the barrier imposed Article 992.” {Prof. Balane is quotedextensively here.}

Suntay v. Suntay (2010) (621 SCRA 442)

“Indeed, the factual antecedents of this case accurately reflect the basis of intestatesuccession, i.e., love first descends, for the decedent, Cristina, did not distinguish

25 Article 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and

relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the

illegitimate child. (943a)




between her legitimate and illegitimate grandchildren. Neither did her husband,Federico, who, in fact, legally raised the status of Emilio III from an illegitimategrandchild to that of a legitimate child. The peculiar circumstances of this case,painstakingly pointed out by counsel for petitioner, overthrow the legal presumption inArticle 992 of the Civil Code that there exist animosity and antagonism betweenlegitimate and illegitimate descendants of a deceased.”

“Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that judicial restraint impels us to refrain frommaking a final declaration of heirship and distributing the presumptive shares of theparties in the estates of Cristina and Federico, considering that the question on who willadminister the properties of the long deceased couple has yet to be settled.”

Subsection 4-Surviving SpouseSantillon v. Miranda (1965)

[This rule26 holds even if there is only on legitimate child, in which case the child and thesurviving spouse will divide the estate equally.]

Subsection 5-Collateral RelativesSubsection 6-The State

Chapter 4: Provisions Common to Testate and Intestate Succession

Section 1-Right of AccretionSection 2 – Capacity to Succeed by Will of Intestacy

Parish Priest of Roman Catholic Church of Victoria Tarlac v. Rigor (1979)

“We hold that the said bequest refers to the testator's nearest male relative living at thetime of his death and not to any indefinite time thereafter. ‘In order to be capacitated toinherit, the heir, devisee or legatee must be living at the moment the succession opens,except in case of representation, when it is proper’ (Art. 1025, Civil Code). … Inasmuchas the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a priest, the unavoidableconclusion is that the bequest in question was ineffectual or inoperative. Therefore, theadministration of the ricelands by the parish priest of Victoria, as envisaged in the wiltwas likewise inoperative.”

Section 3- Acceptance and Repudiation of InheritanceSection 4-Executors and AdministratorsSection 5-CollationSection 6-Partition and Distribution of Estate

Subsection 1-Partition

Legasto v. Verzosa (1930)

PThis case, and Alsua-Betts, and Dimayuga were under the Spanish Code.} [{under thecurrent code} The only way a partition without a will can be valid is by following strictlythe intestate portions provided by law…]

26 Article 996. If a widow or widower and legitimate children or descendants are left, the surviving spouse

has in the succession the same share as that of each of the children. (834a)



Tuason v. Tuason, Jr. & Gregorio Araneta, Inc. (1951)

[Constructive partition. 27] “By virtue of the document Exh. 6, the parties theretopractically and substantially entered into a contract of partnership as the best and mostexpedient means of eventually dissolving the co-ownership, the life of said partnershipto end when the object of its creation shall have been attained.”

Garcia v. Calaliman (1989)

[III. Requirement of written notice-The article gives the co-heirs the right of redemption,which can be exercised within one month from written notice to them by the vendor.Written notice, therefore is required; without it the period does not commence to run.The Supreme Court has, as a rule, interpreted this requirement of written notice strictly.]

“this Court had stressed that written notice is indispensable, actual knowledge of thesale acquired in some other manners by the redemptioner, notwithstanding.” …

“However as already discussed, petitioners have not lost their right to redeem, for in theabsence of a written notification of the sale by the vendors, the 30-day period has noteven begun to run.”

Subsection 2 –Effects of PartitionSubsection 3-Rescission and Nullity of Partition

27 Article 1082. Every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or

devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, and exchange, a compromise,

or any other transaction. (n)

balane - jurisprudential doctrines reviewer

Documents