Ballistic Missile Defense:Ballistic Missile Defense:Different Dimensions, Different ImplicationsDifferent Dimensions, Different Implications

Bruce W. MacDonaldBruce W. MacDonaldFederation of American ScientistsFederation of American Scientists

Johns Hopkins University/Johns Hopkins University/ School of Advanced International StudiesSchool of Advanced International Studies

June 6, 2013June 6, 201311

Different Dimensions of BMDDifferent Dimensions of BMD

Mission, Technical/Performance, Strategic, Mission, Technical/Performance, Strategic, Geopolitical/Deterrence Dynamics – all importantGeopolitical/Deterrence Dynamics – all important

Mission Dimensions: Mission Dimensions: Sub-TheaterSub-Theater Theater (non-nuclear/nuclear)Theater (non-nuclear/nuclear) Thin StrategicThin Strategic Counter-China/Counter-RussiaCounter-China/Counter-Russia

Implications of Emerging TechnologiesImplications of Emerging Technologies Strategic Dimensions: Strategic Stability, Crisis Stability, Strategic Dimensions: Strategic Stability, Crisis Stability,

Targeting, Arms Control, and MoreTargeting, Arms Control, and More Geopolitical/Deterrence Dynamics: Russia, China, North Geopolitical/Deterrence Dynamics: Russia, China, North

Korea, Middle East, Far EastKorea, Middle East, Far East

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Mission DimensionsMission Dimensions Sub-Theater, e.g. Iron Dome: less challenging; Sub-Theater, e.g. Iron Dome: less challenging;

effective but not perfect; politically useful; non-effective but not perfect; politically useful; non-WMD nature of attacking rockets a plusWMD nature of attacking rockets a plus

Theater: At least somewhat effective, especially Theater: At least somewhat effective, especially where attacks are non-WMD. Geopolitically where attacks are non-WMD. Geopolitically valuable: at-risk U.S. allies seeking such protection. valuable: at-risk U.S. allies seeking such protection. Basing can be expensive.Basing can be expensive.

Thin Strategic: Current (future?) U.S. policyThin Strategic: Current (future?) U.S. policy Counter-Russia/Counter-China: Would they allow Counter-Russia/Counter-China: Would they allow

U.S. to negate their strategic nuclear deterrent? U.S. to negate their strategic nuclear deterrent? Would we allow them to negate ours?Would we allow them to negate ours?

Focus on “Thin Strategic”Focus on “Thin Strategic”33

Strategic Posture Review CommissionStrategic Posture Review Commissionon Missile Defense (2009)on Missile Defense (2009)

Perry-Schlesinger panel got it right on missile defensePerry-Schlesinger panel got it right on missile defense::

““Ballistic missile defense capabilities can play a useful role in support of Ballistic missile defense capabilities can play a useful role in support of the basic objectives of deterrence, broadly defined, and damage the basic objectives of deterrence, broadly defined, and damage limitation limitation against limited threats against limited threats … …

““For more than a decade the development of U.S. [BMD] has been For more than a decade the development of U.S. [BMD] has been guided by the principles of (1) protecting against limited strikes while (2guided by the principles of (1) protecting against limited strikes while (2 ) ) taking into account the legitimate concerns of Russia and China about taking into account the legitimate concerns of Russia and China about strategic stabilitystrategic stability.” These remain sound guiding principles. Defenses .” These remain sound guiding principles. Defenses sufficient to sow doubts in Moscow or Beijing about the viability of their sufficient to sow doubts in Moscow or Beijing about the viability of their deterrents could lead them to take actions that increase the threat to the deterrents could lead them to take actions that increase the threat to the United States and its allies and friends… United States and its allies and friends…

““China may already be increasing the size of its ICBM force in response China may already be increasing the size of its ICBM force in response to its assessment of the U.S. missile defense program.”to its assessment of the U.S. missile defense program.”

[emphasis added][emphasis added] America’s Strategic PostureAmerica’s Strategic Posture2009, pp. 31-322009, pp. 31-32

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There is a “Rogue Nation” Threat Out There:There is a “Rogue Nation” Threat Out There:Taepo Dong 2 ballistic Missile and Unha 2&3 Taepo Dong 2 ballistic Missile and Unha 2&3

Space Launch VehicleSpace Launch Vehicle

Unha-3SLVUnha-3SLV Taepo Dong 2Taepo Dong 2

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DPRK Nuclear Test SiteDPRK Nuclear Test SiteSource: ISIS (2012)Source: ISIS (2012)

• October 2006 October 2006 – Very small – Very small yield, a partially failed yield, a partially failed ““fizzlefizzle”” (>1 kt?) (>1 kt?)

• May 2009 May 2009 – Small yield – Small yield estimated 2-6 kilotonsestimated 2-6 kilotons

• February 2013 February 2013 - Early - Early evidence suggests more evidence suggests more powerful explosion – powerful explosion – ““several several kilotonskilotons”” (James Clapper, (James Clapper, director of U.S. intelligence,) director of U.S. intelligence,) 6 to 7 kilotons (South Korea 6 to 7 kilotons (South Korea Defense Ministry)Defense Ministry)

North KoreaNorth Korea’’s Nuclear Weapons Testss Nuclear Weapons Tests

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North Korean Nuclear Weapons MaterialNorth Korean Nuclear Weapons Material

““ I estimate it has only 24 to 42 I estimate it has only 24 to 42 kilograms of plutonium, kilograms of plutonium,

sufficientsufficient..for 4 to 8 primitive for 4 to 8 primitive nuclear devices, with no more nuclear devices, with no more in the pipeline. Yet, with only in the pipeline. Yet, with only

two plutonium tests, one two plutonium tests, one successful and only one successful and only one

partially successful, they need partially successful, they need more tests to have confidence more tests to have confidence

they can build a smaller nuclear they can build a smaller nuclear warhead.warhead.””

““The next test, however, The next test, however, could just as well be could just as well be

designed to demonstrate a designed to demonstrate a highly enriched uranium highly enriched uranium

(HEU)-fueled bomb…I (HEU)-fueled bomb…I believe the amount of HEU believe the amount of HEU

produced to date is produced to date is relatively small, but quite relatively small, but quite

likely sufficient for a likely sufficient for a nuclear test.nuclear test.””

Source: Sigfried Hecker, former Source: Sigfried Hecker, former Director of Los Alamos National Director of Los Alamos National

Laboratory Laboratory http://www.foreignpolicy.com/http://www.foreignpolicy.com/

articles/2013/02/04/articles/2013/02/04/what_to_expect_from_a_north_korean_what_to_expect_from_a_north_korean_

nuclear_testnuclear_test

BMD Perceptions and BMD Perceptions and Deterrence Dynamics Deterrence Dynamics

Key to understanding BMD and deterrence Key to understanding BMD and deterrence dynamics is to recognize that dynamics is to recognize that confidence in BMD is confidence in BMD is not a zero-sum gamenot a zero-sum game

To the extent U.S. confidence in its BMD falls short To the extent U.S. confidence in its BMD falls short of perfection, adversary confidence in its ability to of perfection, adversary confidence in its ability to penetrate U.S. missile defenses penetrate U.S. missile defenses does not increase does not increase by a corresponding amount, or anywhere near itby a corresponding amount, or anywhere near it

PerceptionsPerceptions of possible BMD performance are at of possible BMD performance are at least as, if not more, important to deterrence than least as, if not more, important to deterrence than real capabilityreal capability

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The Key Role of Risk AversionThe Key Role of Risk Aversion

Most U.S. adversaries, and many allies, have very Most U.S. adversaries, and many allies, have very high respect for U.S. military technologyhigh respect for U.S. military technology

When considering nuclear weapons use, countries When considering nuclear weapons use, countries are usually strongly risk averseare usually strongly risk averse

Other countries may, but U.S. does not see its Other countries may, but U.S. does not see its BMD as an attack shield, to mop up after a U.S. BMD as an attack shield, to mop up after a U.S. first strike – U.S. is risk averse, toofirst strike – U.S. is risk averse, too

This nuclear risk aversion inhibits escalation in a This nuclear risk aversion inhibits escalation in a crisis, giving rise to a phenomenon I call “missile crisis, giving rise to a phenomenon I call “missile defense hysteresis”defense hysteresis”

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What is Missile Defense Hysteresis? What is Missile Defense Hysteresis?

Facing a threat from a small nuclear power, and Facing a threat from a small nuclear power, and aware of its limitations, the U.S. cannot count on aware of its limitations, the U.S. cannot count on its BMD working reasonably well.its BMD working reasonably well.

Facing U.S. missile defenses, a small nuclear Facing U.S. missile defenses, a small nuclear power cannot count on U.S. BMD power cannot count on U.S. BMD not not working working reasonably wellreasonably well

Each side is deterred by the combined effects of Each side is deterred by the combined effects of confidence/outcome uncertainty and risk aversion, confidence/outcome uncertainty and risk aversion, an important island of stability in a chaotic crisisan important island of stability in a chaotic crisis

Is this hysteresis robust? No. Is it resilient over Is this hysteresis robust? No. Is it resilient over time? Probably not. Will it work vis-à-vis time? Probably not. Will it work vis-à-vis China? Very unlikely. But it’s not trivial, and it’s China? Very unlikely. But it’s not trivial, and it’s better than nothing, and it should not be ignored. better than nothing, and it should not be ignored. 1010

Observations on “Thin Strategic” BMDObservations on “Thin Strategic” BMD

The deterrent endurance of thin strategic BMD has The deterrent endurance of thin strategic BMD has elements of both fragility and robustness:elements of both fragility and robustness:• Not affected by small changes in either offense or defenseNot affected by small changes in either offense or defense• Is affected by large offense increasesIs affected by large offense increases• Could be affected by technology changesCould be affected by technology changes• Could be eroded by perceptions of regime survival (“what Could be eroded by perceptions of regime survival (“what

have I got to lose?”)have I got to lose?”) More robust against technological change against a More robust against technological change against a

DPRK than an Iran – Iran can bring far more DPRK than an Iran – Iran can bring far more resources to the “game” than DPRKresources to the “game” than DPRK

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Thin BMD and Geopolitical AdThin BMD and Geopolitical Advantagevantage

Earlier this year, U.S. thin BMD likely played an Earlier this year, U.S. thin BMD likely played an important role in getting China to “persuade” North Korea important role in getting China to “persuade” North Korea to halt its super-heated rhetoric and provocative actionsto halt its super-heated rhetoric and provocative actions

For years, China claimed it could do little to curb Korean For years, China claimed it could do little to curb Korean behavior despite repeated Bush/Obama demarches – and behavior despite repeated Bush/Obama demarches – and did littledid little

U.S. finally forced China’s hand by announcing plans to U.S. finally forced China’s hand by announcing plans to deploy 14 more GBI’s, a proportionate response to deploy 14 more GBI’s, a proportionate response to Korean threats. Suddenly, China saw North Korean Korean threats. Suddenly, China saw North Korean behavior directly threatening a core Chinese interest: the behavior directly threatening a core Chinese interest: the viability of its small-ish nuclear deterrent.viability of its small-ish nuclear deterrent.

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Thin BMD and Geopolitical AdThin BMD and Geopolitical AdvantagevantageWithin days of this announcement:Within days of this announcement:

• North Korea’s harsh rhetoric stoppedNorth Korea’s harsh rhetoric stopped• North Korean border forces were stood downNorth Korean border forces were stood down• In a 180-degree turnaround, North Korea expressed strong In a 180-degree turnaround, North Korea expressed strong

willingness to return to Six-party talks as urged by China with few willingness to return to Six-party talks as urged by China with few preconditions, unlike previous statementspreconditions, unlike previous statements

Coincidence? Could be – but more likely, this move, made Coincidence? Could be – but more likely, this move, made possible by U.S. thin BMD deployment, allowed U.S. to signal possible by U.S. thin BMD deployment, allowed U.S. to signal China in a direct, rational, proportionate way, that China China in a direct, rational, proportionate way, that China would pay a strategic price if it did not reign in its neighborwould pay a strategic price if it did not reign in its neighborObama Administration has received none of the credit it Obama Administration has received none of the credit it deserves for this very significant key breakthrough for U.S. deserves for this very significant key breakthrough for U.S. security interestssecurity interests

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BMD performance and capabilities are very BMD performance and capabilities are very important, but they are not the only metric by which important, but they are not the only metric by which BMD should be assessedBMD should be assessed

Missile defense hysteresis is a stabilizing strategic Missile defense hysteresis is a stabilizing strategic factor that requires at least some strategic BMD factor that requires at least some strategic BMD

No strategic BMD would deny U.S. certain strategic No strategic BMD would deny U.S. certain strategic and geopolitical benefits that have already advanced and geopolitical benefits that have already advanced U.S. security interestsU.S. security interests

Going beyond a thin U.S. strategic missile defense Going beyond a thin U.S. strategic missile defense posture should only be considered when a good posture should only be considered when a good answer can be provided as to how China and Russia answer can be provided as to how China and Russia can be persuaded to turn their backs on decades of can be persuaded to turn their backs on decades of policy and behavior and accept a serious degradation policy and behavior and accept a serious degradation of their strategic deterrent capabilitiesof their strategic deterrent capabilities

Observations on Missile DefenseObservations on Missile Defense