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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

By: Dean Hilario Justino F. Morales

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW is that branch of public law under which the executive branch of the government, acting in a quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial function, interferes with the conduct of the individual for the purpose of promoting the common good or general welfare. It fixes the organization of the government and determines competence of authorities who execute the law and indicates to the individual remedies for the violations of his rights.

ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES OR AGENCIES

An administrative agency is a body, other than the courts and the legislature, endowed with quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers for the purpose of enabling it to carry out laws entrusted to it for enforcement or execution. In Metro Construction Inc., vs. Chathau Properties Inc., 365 SCRA 697, the Supreme Court defined a quasi-judicial agency or body as an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making.

Manner of Creation

1. by constitutional provisions (Office of the President, COMELEC, COA, CSC);

2.by legislative enactment (NLRC, SEC, NAPOLCOM); and

3.by authority of law (EIIB, TFA).

The President can validly reorganize his office even without congressional authority because the Administrative Code of 1987 (EO 292) has empowered the President continuing authority to reorganize his office in order to achieve economy and efficiency.

The continuing power of the President to reorganize includes:

1. Restructuring the internal organization of the Office of the President, including its immediate offices by abolishing, consolidating or merging units therefor, or transferring functions from one unit to another;

2.Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other department or agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of the President from departments and agencies; and

3.Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other department or agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from other department or agencies. (Sec. 31, Chapter 10 Book III, EO 292)

Thus, the EIIB is subject to the Presidents continuing authority to reorganize. As far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department is concerned, the Presidents power of control may justify him to inactivate the function of a particular office, or certain law may grant him the broad authority to carry out reorganization measure.(Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB vs. Zamora, 360 SCRA 718)

However, the legislature has the concurrent power to reclassify or redefine the executive bureaucracy, including the relationship between various administrative agencies, bureaus and departments and ultimately, even the power to abolish executive departments and their components, subject only by constitutional limitations. Hence, the same Congress, which has the putative authority to abolish the Tariff Commission and the Department of Trade and Industry, is similarly empowered to alter or expand its functions through modalities which do not align with established norms in the bureaucratic structure. Assuming there is a conflict between the specific limitation in Section 28(2), Article VII of the Constitution and the general executive power of control and supervision, the former prevails in the specific instance to safeguard measures such as tariff and imports. (Southern Cross Cement, supra)

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW /P02

Constitutional objections to the creation of administrative agencies

1. possible violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.

2. possible violation of the doctrine of non-delegation of legislative powers.

3. possible violation of due process and equal protection clauses.

The equal protection clause was violated when the Philippine Truth Commission singled out only the officials and employees of the Arroyo Administration but not the other officials of previous administrations who are similarly situated. (Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, GR No. 192935, December 10, 2010)

Types of administrative bodies as to hierarchy

1. Office of the President and Cabinet

2. Independent constitutional commissions COMELEC, CSC, COA, Ombudsman

3.Other constitutional bodies Office of the Special Prosecutor, Central Monetary Authority, Economic and Planning Agency, Commission on Human Rights, National Language Commission, NaPolCom, Commission on Indigenous Cultural Communities

4.Regulatory Commissions SEC, NLRC, Office of the Insurance Commissioner, Bureau of Customs, BIR, LTFRB

POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES

1. Quasi-legislative or rule making power;

2. Quasi-judicial or adjudicatory power; and

3. Determinative powers.

Scope of power of administrative agencies

Generally, administrative bodies, as mere creations of Congress, can only perform powers and duties as are conferred to them by the Constitution and statutes and those which are necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. (Republic vs. CA, 200 SCRA 226) The extent to which an administrative entity may exercise powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provision of the statute creating or empowering such agency. (City of Baguio vs. Nino, 487 SCRA 216) While Congress may delegate powers to administrative bodies, such delegation must respect constitutional restrictions like the doctrine of separation of powers and the non-delegation of power principle.

A.QUASI-LEGISLATIVE OR RULE-MAKING POWER

Nature and scope of the power

The legislative power has been described generally as the power to make , alter and repeal laws. The details and manner of carrying out the law are left to the administrative agency charged with its implementation in this sense, the rules and regulations promulgated by an administrative agency are the product of delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions that will have the effect of law. Quasi-legislative power is exercised by administrative agencies through the promulgation of rules and regulations within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegation of certain powers flowing from the separation of the great branches of the government. (Abellar vs. CSC, 442 SCRA 507) The grant of express power to formulate implementing rules and regulations must necessarily include the power to amend, revise, alter or repeal the same. (Yazaki vs. Torres Manufacturing, Inc. vs. 493 SCRA 86)

Administrative agencies are endowed with powers legislative in nature, i.e., the power to make rules or regulations. Delegated rule-making power has become a practical necessity in modern governance due to increasing complexity and variety of public functions. In the exercise of delegated legislative power, administrative bodies have no discretion to determine what the law shall be. They have merely the authority to fix details in execution or enforcement of a policy set out in the law itself. Thus, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional Administrative Order No.308 as it did not merely implement the Administrative Code. It established a national computerized identification reference system which requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies, the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy against dossier-gathering by the government, and choices of policies. It deals with a subject that should be covered by law. (Ople vs. Torres, 293 SCRA 141)

The express grant of rule-making power to an administrative agency necessarily includes the power to amend, revise, alter or repeal the same. It is a standard provision in administrative rules that prior issuances of administrative agencies that are inconsistent therewith are declared repealed or modified. (Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines vs. Duque III,535 SCRA 265)


Kinds of administrative rules and regulations

1. Legislative regulation

a.Supplementary or detailed legislation, e.g., Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code. LEGISLATIVE REGULATION affects the substantial rights of the general public and has the force and effect of a law.

b.Contingent regulation

2. Interpretative legislation or internal rules, e.g., BIR Circulars

INTERPRETATIVE RULE merely clarifies the meaning of a pre-existing law by inferring its implication. the court may review the correctness of the interpretation of the law given by the administrative body, and substitute its own view of what is correct to that of the administrative body. It does not have to be published because it is not a law itself.

INTERNAL RULE is only an instruction from a higher officer to a lower officer within the same office concerning the rules and guidelines to be followed by subordinates in the performance of their duties. It has no effect of law because no clear legal right which can be invoked by a third person emanates from it. It does not have to be published to be effective.

Subordinate Legislation

This is the power of administrative agency to promulgate rules and regulations with force and effect of a law on matters of their own specialization. Administrative authorities are vested with the power to make rules and regulations because it is impracticable for lawmakers to provide general regulations for various varying details of management. PNOC vs. CA, 457 SCRA 32)

As subordinate legislation, the power to make rules and regulations so passed by administrative agencies are only of the nature of implementing rules and regulations, which are tested by their conformity to the standards set by, and their ability to carry out the legislative intent contained in the primary law.

Subordinate legislation, a principle practiced by advanced and developed countries, means that the delegation of greater powers by the legislature to administrative bodies is demanded by the growing complexities of modern life, the multiplication of subjects of the regulatory power of the State and compounded by the increasing difficulty of administering the affairs of the State. (Pangasinan Transportation Co. vs. PSC, 70 Phil 221)

In Commission on Internal Revenue vs. Bicolandia Drug Corp., 496 SCRA 176, it was held that Revenue Regulations No 2-94 is still subordinate to RA7432 and in cases of conflict, the implementing rule will not prevail over the law it seeks to implement. Thus, the said regulation is null and void for failing to conform to the law it sought to implement. Administrative rules, regulations and orders have the efficacy and force of law so long as they do not contravene any statute or the Constitution.

Requisites for valid exercise of rule-making power

1.the rule must be issued under the authority of law or its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;

The rule-making power of an administrative agency may not be used to abridge the authority given to it by Congress or the Constitution. Nor can it be used to enlarge the power of the administrative agency beyond the scope intended. Hence, the Department of Agrarian reform has no power to regulate livestock farms which have been exempted by the Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. (DAR vs. Sutton, 473 SCRA 392)

2.the administrative issuance must be within the scope and purview of the law; or authority given by the legislature

RA 8177 authorized the Secretary of Justice in conjunction with the Secretary of Health and the Director of the Bureau of Corrections to issue the implementing rules and regulations which, in turn, authorized the Director of the Bureau of Corrections to prepare a manual setting forth the details of the proceedings prior to, during and after the administration of the lethal injection. The regulation does not provide for approval by the Secretary of Justice. Being a mere constituent unit of the Department of Justice , the Bureau of Corrections cannot promulgate a manual that does not bear the approval of the Secretary of Justice as to the rule-making authority under RA 8177. Such abdication of authority renders the regulation invalid. (Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice, 297 SCRA 754)

In Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Appeals 240 SCRA 368, the Supreme Court held that administrative rules and regulations must not override but must remain consistent and in harmony with the law they seek to apply and implement.


Section 5(a) of the Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of the 13th month Pay Law is void, because it unduly expanded the concept of basic salary as defined in PD 851. Basic salary is the rate of pay for a standard work period exclusive of additional payment as bonuses and overtime. The DOLE order included the commission paid its sales representatives in the computation of the 13th pay due them. (Boie-Takeda Chemicals, Inc. vs. De la Serna, 228 SCRA 329)

The HDMF Board has rule-making power as provided in Section 5 of RA7742 and Section 13 of PD 1752. However, rules and regulations which are the products of a delegated power to create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It is required that the regulation be germane to the object and purposes of the law, and not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law. (Romulo, et al vs. HDMF, GR No. 131082, June 19, 2000, 333 SCRA 37)

It is elementary in statutory construction that an administrative circular cannot supersede, abrogate, modify or nullify a statute. Hence, the Local Budget Circular issued by the Department of Budget outrightly prohibiting local government units from granting allowances to judges whenever such allowances are also granted by the national government, violates Section 447 (a) (1) (xi) of the Local Government Code. (Leynes vs. COA, 418 SCRA 180)

It is well settled that rules and regulations which are the product of a delegated power to create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It is required that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law, and that it be not in contradiction to, but in conforminty, with the standards prescribed by law. (Commissioner of Customs v. Hypermix Feeds Corporation, GR No. 179579, February 1, 2012)

3.the rule must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure, including public participation, filing and publication; Interpretative rules and those merely internal in nature are not required to be published and filed with the UP Law Center. (ASTEC v. ERC, GR No. 192117, September 18, 2012) As a general rule, prior notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of rules and regulations promulgated to govern future conduct. (Abella vs. CSC, 442 SCRA 507); and

4.the rules must be reasonable (KMU vs. Director-General, NEDA, GR No.167798, April 19, 2006) .

Additional requisites if rules contain penal sanctions

1. Law itself must declare as punishable the violation of administrative rule or regulation (People vs. Maceren, 79, SCRA 450); and

2.Law should define or fix penalty therefor.

In Perez vs. LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines, 492 SCRA 638, the Supreme Court cited two requisites for an administrative regulations to have force and effect of penal law, to wit:

1. the violation of the administrative regulation must be made a crime by the delegating statute itself,

2.the penalty for such violation must be provided by the statute itself.

Publication, filing and effectivity

a. Publication is essential to the effectivity of any law or regulation as a requirement of due process. Publication is required as a condition precedent to the effectivity of a law to inform the public of the contents of the law or rules and regulations before their rights and interests are affected by the same. (Philippine International Trading Corp. vs. COA, 309 SCRA 177)

b. What must be published: rules and regulation of administrative agencies which have the force and effect of law. All legislative rules and regulations, not only those of penal character, must be published. (Tanada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446)

c. Where published: Either in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general circulation. (EO 200, amending Art. 2 of the Civil Code) Hence, DBM-CCC No. 10 which was issued by the DBM pursuant to Sec. 23 of RA 6758 is of no force and effect due to the absence of publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. (PITC vs. COA, supra)

d.How published: In full, not just the title but the entire rule, if it is to serve the purpose of due process.

e.Filing: administrative rules and regulations must be filed with the National Administrative Register (UP Law Center) as required by Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII, EO 292.


f.Effectivity: If a rule or regulation does not provide for a date of effectivity, it shall become effective 15 days after publication. If it provides otherwise, then the period provided applies, but in no case before publication. Exception: in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule.

Necessity of Publication. DOLE Order No. 16-91 and POEA MC Nos. 30 and 37, suspending temporarily the deployment of OCWs abroad until better working conditions are made by employers, while recognized as valid exercise of police power as delegated to the executive department, were declared legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of proper publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register. (Philippine Association of Service Exporters vs. Torres, 212 SCRA 298)

Considering that POEA Administrative Circular No. 2 Series of 1983, which enumerated the allowable fees which may be collected from applicants, has not yet been published or filed with the National Administrative Register, the same is ineffective and may not be enforced. An Administrative Circular that was never filed with the NAR cannot be used as basis for the imposition of administrative sanctions. The fact that POEA Administrative Circular No. 2 is addressed only to specified group-namely private employment agencies or authority holders, does not take it away from the ambit of the ruling in Tanada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27, which is clear and categorical administrative rules and regulations must be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. (Philsa International Placement and Service Corporation vs. Secretary of DOLE, 356 SCRA 174)

Since the Electric Cooperative Election Code applies to all electric cooperatives in the country, and it is not a mere internal memorandum, interpretative regulation, or instruction to subordinate, then it should comply with the requirements of the Civil Code and Administrative Code of 1987 relative to the publication requirement. (Nea vs. Gonzaga, 539 SCRA 388)

Publication Not Necessary. Memorandum Order No. 20-87, which provided for the automatic review of the decisions of the Collector of Customs if it is adverse to the government, does not require publication. It is merely in the nature of an internal rule, since it is only an administrative order of the Commissioner of Customs addressed to his subordinates. (Yaokasin vs. Commissioner of Customs, 180 SCRA 591)

Where petitioners challenged the validity of Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 30-67, which interpreted the Tobacco Inspection Law, on the ground that it was not published in the Official Gazette, the Supreme Court ruled the same is for the internal administration of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. It also interpreted the law. No publication is necessary for its validity. (La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Factory vs. CA, 134 SCRA 29)

Likewise, OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 is merely an internal circular between the Department of Justice and the Office of the Ombudsman, outlining authority and responsibilities among prosecutors of the DOJ and the Office of the Ombudsman in the conduct of preliminary investigation. The circular DOES NOT regulate the conduct of persons or the public in general. Internal regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instruction issued by administrative superiors concerning rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. (Honasan vs. Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the DOJ, GR no. 159747, April 13, 2004)

In Veterans Federation of the Philippines vs. Reyes, 483 SCRA 526, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of Department Circular No. 04 despite its lack of publication, the same being an internal regulation. It is meant to regulate a public corporation under the control of the Department of National Defense, and not the public in general. What has been created as a body corporate by RA 2640 is not the individual membership of the affiliate organizations of the VFP, but merely the aggregate of the head of the affiliate organizations. Consequently, the individual members of the affiliate organizations who are not public officers, are beyond the regulation of the circular. Sections 2, 3, and 6 of the assailed circular are additionally interpretative in nature. They add nothing to the law. They do not affect substantive rights of any person, whether he is a party to the case at bar or not.

The constitutional doctrine that outlaws an ex post facto law generally prohibits the retrospectivity of penal laws. Penal laws are those acts of the legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment. The subject administrative and memorandum orders clearly do not come within the shadow of


this definition. Administrative Order No. 13 creates the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, and provides for its composition and functions. It does not meet out penalty for the act of granting behest loans. Memorandum Order No. 61 merely provides a frame of reference for determining behest loans. Not being penal laws, Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 cannot be characterized as ex post facto laws. (Salvador vs. Mapa, GR 135080, November 28, 2007)

Notice and Hearing Not Necessary. As a general rule, prior notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of rules and regulations promulgated to govern future conduct. (Equi-Asia Placement, Inc. vs. DFA, 502 SCRA 295)

B. QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER

Quasi-judicial power is defined as a term applied to the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action, and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. Where a power rests in judgment or discretion, so that it is of judicial nature or character, but does not involve the exercise of functions of a judge, or is conferred upon an officer other than a judicial officer, it is deemed quasi-judicial or adjudicatory. (Patalinghug vs. COMELEC, 543 SCRA 175)

In administrative law, a quasi - judicial proceedings involves: (a) taking and evaluation of evidence; (b) determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or decisions supported by the facts proved. (Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion, 322 SCRA 160)

The action of an administrative agency in granting, or denying, or in suspending or revoking, a license, franchise, or certificate of public convenience and necessity is administrative or quasi-judicial. (Sanado vs. CA, 356 SCRA 546)

Investigation and adjudication

That an administrative agency has the power to conduct investigations and recommendations thereon, is a settled point, since these are inherent in their functions as administrative agencies. What is not inherent, and therefore require an explicit grant from law, is their adjudicative power, that is the power to decide controversies involving rights and obligations of third persons appearing before them, or the power to pass upon legal questions, which involves the application of the law to the facts.

The investigatory power of administrative agencies consist of a) the issuance of subpoena, b) swearing in of the witnesses, c) the interrogating of witnesses, d) the calling for production of books, papers and records, e) requiring that books, papers and records be made available for inspection, f) inspecting premises, requiring written answers to questionnaires, g) requiring reports, periodic or special, and h) requiring the filing of statements. The authority to take testimony shall include the power to administer oath, summons witnesses and issue subpoena duces tecum. (Book I, Sec. 37)

An administrative agency may employ other persons, such as a hearing officer, examiner or investigator, to receive evidence, conduct hearing and make reports on the basis of which the agency shall render its decision. The term administrative body or agency includes subordinate official upon whose hand the body or agency delegates a portion of its authority. (Mollaneda vs. Umacob, 358 SCRA 537)

Except in the case of agencies with specific grant of adjudicative power (NLRC, COMELEC, CBAA) most other administrative agencies only have the power to investigate and not of adjudication.

Investigation and adjudication distinguished

INV: mere ministerial and may be delegated by an officer to a hearing officer who shall receive testimonial, documentary and other evidence and submit findings of facts and recommendations.

ADJ: it involves decision-making which is discretionary in nature and cannot be delegated; the decision remains with the agency.

Administrative interpretation of the law

Rule. Administrative bodies may interpret the law they are tasked to implement. To otherwise deprive administrative bodies the duty, at the first instance, to interpret the laws which they are mandated to execute would make them impotent bodies. The construction and interpretation given by administrative officers possessed of the necessary special knowledge, expertise and experience of what the law is deserves greatest respect and can only be set aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion. (PLDT vs. NTC, 190 SCRA 717).


Rationale. It is the general policy of the Supreme Court to sustain the decision of administrative authorities not only on the basis of separation of powers but also for their presumed knowledgeability and even expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce. (Santiago vs. Dep. Exec. Secretary, 192 SCRA 199)

Use. The interpretation of an administrative government agency, which is tasked to implement a statute, is accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the construction of the courts. When an administrative agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre - existing law and the administrative interpretation is at best advisory for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means. (Melendres, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 319 SCRA 262 and Baltazar vs. COMELEC, 350 SCRA 518)

Administrative searches & seizures; warrant of arrest

The constitutional requirements for search and seizure also apply even to administrative searches. This means that explicit provisions of laws authorizing inspection, notwithstanding, a warrant would still be necessary in those cases where no consent to the inspection is given.

The rule has been that an administrative agency cannot arrest an individual. Only a judge can order the arrest of a person, at least the arrest for the purpose of making him answer a charge against him. The Commissioner of Immigration has no power to issue warrants of arrest ordering an alien to appear and show cause why he should not be deported, although he has the power to issue an order of arrest to carry out an order of deportation. The arrest for the purpose of carrying out a deportation order is another matter.

Award of damages

Powers of administrative agencies are limited and usually administrative in nature. In case of injury or inconvenience suffered by a person because of breach of contractual obligation arising from negligence, the proper forum for him to ventilate their grievances for possible recovery of damages should be in the courts and not in administrative agencies. Being a creature of the legislature, administrative agencies can exercise only such jurisdiction and power as are expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it by statute. (RCPI vs. Board of Communications, L-43653, L-45378, November 29, 1977)

Exceptions. However, the National Housing Authority (now the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board) has been conferred by PD 1344, the competence to award damages including attorneys fees which are recoverable either by agreement of the parties or under Article 2208 of the Civil Code. (Solid Homes vs. Payawal, 177 SCRA 72) And so with the National Labor Relations Commission in labor cases, by virtue of the provisions of the Labor Code.

While regular courts are possessed of general jurisdiction over action for damages, where wrongful acts complained of and upon which the damages prayed for are based have to do with the operation and ownership of cable companies, these factual matters undoubtedly pertain to the National Telecommunications Commission and not the regular courts. Thus, it would be proper for the courts to yield its jurisdiction in favor of an administrative body when the determination of underlying factual issues requires the special competence or knowledge of the latter. (GMA Network, Inc. vs. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. 470 SCRA727)

Imposition of fines and penalties

Rules penalizing certain acts are valid only if the primary law pursuant to which the rule was issued also provides that the act be penalized. But if the primary law does not make the act criminal, then the rule which makes it criminal is void. (People vs. Maceren, 79, SCRA 450) The penalty for such violation must also be provided by the statute itself. (Perez vs. Refillers Association of the Philippines, 492 SCRA 638)

Power to grant immunities from criminal and civil prosecutions

The rule is that administrative bodies in the performance of their quasi- judicial functions cannot grant criminal and civil immunities to persons unless the law explicitly and specifically confers such prerogative or power. However, insofar as the Presidential Commission on Good Government is concerned, it is conferred such power under Sec. 5 of EO No. 14. (Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 173 SCRA 72)

Also, the COMELEC may give transactional immunity to those who have committed election offenses but volunteer to give information and testify on any violation of said law in any official investigation, or proceeding. The testimony of a voluntary witness in accord with his sworn statement operates as a


pardon for the criminal charges to which it relates. If such witness later refuses to testify or testifies but contrary to his affidavit, he loses his immunity from suit and may be prosecuted for violation of Sec. 261 (a) and (b) of the OEC, perjury under Art. 183 of the Revised Penal Code, or false testimony under Art. 180 of the same Code. (COMELEC vs. Espanol, 417 SCRA 554)

Such power to grant exemption is vested solely on the COMELEC. This power is concomitant with its authority to enforce election laws, investigate election offenses and prosecute those committing the same. The exercise of such power should not be interfered with by the trial court. Neither may the Supreme Court interfere with the COMELECs exercise of its discretion in denying or granting exemptions under the law, unless the COMELEC commits a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. (Ibid.)

Likewise, the Commission on Human Rights, in the course of its investigation, may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. (Carino vs. CHR, 204 SCRA 483)

C.DETERMINATIVE POWERS

1. Enabling permits the doing of an act which the law undertakes to regulate.

2. Directing - orders the doing or performance of particular acts to ensure compliance with the law and are often exercised for corrective purposes.

3. Dispensing to relax the general operation of a law or exempt from general prohibition, or relieve an individual or a corporation from an affirmative duty.

4. Examining also called investigatory power.

5.Summary power to apply compulsion or force against persons or property to effectuate a legal purpose without judicial warrants to authorize such action.

Fixing rates, wages, prices; double nature of rate-fixing

Rate is defined as a charge, payment, or price fixed according to ratio, scale, or standard, or an amount paid or charged for a good or service; Rates are fixed on the basis of the investment amount or property value that the public utility is allowed to earn an amount value otherwise called rate base. (NPC vs. PEPOA, 468 SCRA 577)

The grant of the power to fix rates, wages and prices is allowed because this function usually requires technical knowledge which the legislature does not have. But the administrative agency cannot further delegate this to another entity. (Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center vs. Garcia, 239 SCRA 386)

Rate fixing calls for the technical examination and specialized review of specific details which the court are ill-equipped to enter such matters are primarily entrusted to the administrative or regulating authority. (MERALCO vs. Lualhati, 510 SCRA 455)

Generally, the power to fix rate is a quasi-legislative function. But if the rate is applicable only to an individual, then the function becomes quasi-judicial. When an administrative body performs rate-fixing in a quasi judicial capacity, the valid exercise of this power demands previous notice and hearing. The rate fixing order, even if temporary, is not exempt from the requirements of notice and hearing (PHILCOMSAT vs. Alcuaz, 180 SCRA 218)

The function of prescribing rate by an administrative agency may either be legislative or an adjudicative function. If it were a legislative function, the grant of prior notice and hearing to the affected parties is not a requirement of due process. As regards rates prescribed by an administrative agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function, prior notice and hearing are essential to the validity of such rates.

Where the rules and the rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the country, they may partake of a legislative character. But if they apply exclusively to a particular party, based upon finding of fact, then its function is quasi-judicial in character. Hence, the necessity of prior notice and hearing. (The Philippine Consumers Foundation vs. Secretary, DECS, 153 SCRA 622)

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES

A. PROMULGATION OF RULESAND REGULATIONS

Filing. Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force not filed within three months from the date of effectivity of this Code shall not be the basis of any sanction. (Book VII, Sec. 3) (See also Philsa International Placement and Service Corporation vs. Secretary of DOLE, 356 SCRA 174)


Publication.The University of the Philippines Law Center shall publish a quarterly bulletin setting forth the text of rule filed with it. (Book VII, Sec. 5) Every rule establishing an offense or defining an act subject to a penalty shall be published in full. [Book VII, Sec. 6 (2)]

Public Participation. If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable, published notice of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their view, [Book VII, Sec. 9 (1)]

B.ADJUDICATION

Notice & Hearing; Records of Proceedings. In any contested case, all parties shall be entitled to notice of hearing. The notice shall be served at least five days before the date of the hearing. [Book VII, Sec. 11(1)] The parties shall be given an opportunity to present evidence and argument on all issues. [Book VII, Sec. 11 (2)] The agency shall keep an official records of its proceedings. [Book VII, Sec. 11 (3)]

Two necessary conditions

1. Jurisdiction; and

2. Due Process

Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction is essential to give validity to the determinations of quasi-judicial bodies (administrative authorities.) Without jurisdiction, their acts are void and open to collateral attack. Any decision rendered without justification is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time even on appeal. The only exception is where the party raising the issue is barred by estoppel. (Solid Homes vs. Payawal, supra)

Nature of proceedings

Quasi-judicial proceedings have been held to partake of the nature of a judicial proceedings. A proceeding requiring the taking and weighing of evidence, the determination of facts based upon the consideration of evidence, and the making of an order supported by findings and quality resembling that of a judicial proceeding.

Procedure before a quasi-judicial body

In the administration of the quasi-judicial power of a body, the strict rules of evidence are not applicable. However, in disregarding the rules of evidence, the body should be guided by the criteria of fair play, justice and accountability. A reading of Section 1, Article III on Bill of Rights of the Constitution, the observance of due process in all cases either judicial, legislative or administrative must not be denied to any person.

Procedures are adopted for safeguarding the rights of parties to a complaint so that the investigation will separate the innocent from the guilty. Investigation and hearing are conducted to look into the facts of each alleged violation, and then the law applicable is applied to the facts as found by the investigator or hearing officer. The environment of a quasi-judicial bodies may be of expeditiousness, expertise, or liberally conceived remedies and generally unrestricted by the technical rules of procedure which govern trials before courts.

Administrative proceedings are not strictly bound by formal rules of evidence, but the liberality of procedure in administrative actions is still subject to limitations imposed by the fundamental requirements of due process. (Limbona vs. Limbona, 404 SCRA 6)

The Administrative Code does not require that the investigation of the quasi-judicial body be in the nature of a court trial. In deciding administrative cases in the exercise of their quasi-judicial power, the bodies or officials generally enjoy wide discretion. Technical rules of procedure are not strictly enforced and due process of law in the strict judicial sense is not indispensable. It is sufficient that the substantive due process requirement of fairness and reasonableness be observed.

Rules of procedure; rationale; how interpreted

The quasi-judicial body may promulgate its own rules of procedure as they may see them fit and proper to govern their proceedings, provided they do not increase, diminish or modify substantive rights, and subject to disapproval by the Supreme Court. The adoption of certain rules of procedure by a body is necessary to govern their proceedings on cases filed before them for disposition. Procedural law has its own rationale in the orderly administration of justice, namely, to ensure the effective enforcement of substantive rights by providing for a system that obviates arbitrariness, caprice, despotism, or whimsicality in the settlement of disputes. Hence rules of procedure must be faithfully followed except only for persuasive reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure. (PNOC-EDC vs. Veneracion, 509 SCRA 93)


Rules of procedure should be construed liberally in order to promote their objective and to assist in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determinations of the respective claims and defenses.

Subdelegation of authority

Nature. Subdelegation of authority is the transmission of authority from the heads of agencies to subordinates.

Rationale. This is permissible in administrative proceedings because subdelegation of power is dictated by sound management principles and the exigencies of the service. By subdelegation of authority which is demanded by administrative efficiency, the leaders in the hierarchy of an organization must be able to concentrate their attention upon a larger and more important questions of policy and practice, and their time free, as much as possible, from the consideration of a smaller and far less matters of details unless by provision of law it is withheld. (American Tobacco Co. vs. Director of Patents, 67 SCRA 287)

Subdelegation of authority is permissible in order to achieve prompt and expeditious discharge of public functions and responsibilities. To withhold such power to subdelegate the authority would be to impair administrative efficiency.

Settled is the rule that a delegate may exercise his authority through persons he appoints to assist him in the performance of his functions as long as the decision remains within the scope of his jurisdiction and is made by said officer. Moreover, the 1987 Constitution commands public officers and employees to serve with utmost efficiency, hence to insure compliance with this constitutional mandate, subdelegation must, perforce, be allowed to attain prompt and efficient service.

The following instances of subdelegation of power have been sustained as valid:

a)the President under the doctrine of qualified political agency delegates power and authority to the members of his official family who are considered as his alter ego. (Carpio vs. Executive Secretary, 206 SCRA 290) and

b)The Securities and Exchange Commission may delegate to subordinate officials the authority to exercise the specific powers assigned to it by law. (Skyworld Condominium Owners Association vs. SEC, 211 SCRA 565)

Delegation to division

A division of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, not necessarily by the board en banc, can render a valid decision pursuant to its adjudicative powers. Nothing in EO 648 denies the regulatory agency the power to delegate its adjudicatory functions to a division. It may do so since it is authorized to adopt rules on procedure which authorizes to delegate its adjudicative powers to a division. (Realty Exchange Venture Corp. vs. Sendino, 233 SCRA 655)

Concept of due process

Administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental procedural principles, such as the right to due process in investigations and hearings. (CSC vs. Lucas, 301 SCRA 560)

The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied in administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. (Arboleda vs. NLRC, 303 SCRA 38 and Adiong vs. CA, 371 SCRA 373)

Where the party has the opportunity to appeal, or seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of, defects in procedural dues process may be cured. (Autencio vs. Manara, 449 SCRA 46)

Such process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation in an oral argument, but also and perhaps even many times more creditably and practically through pleadings. So long as the parties are given the opportunity to explain their side, the requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied with. Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of an action or ruling. (Garcia vs. Pajaro, GR No. 141149, July 5, 2002)

Administrative due process is recognized to include the right to:

A.Procedural Due Process

1. Notice, be it actual or constructive, of the institution of the proceedings that may affect a persons legal right;

2. Reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his rights, and to introduce witnesses and relevant evidence in his favor;


B.Substantive Due Process

3. A tribunal so constituted as to give him reasonable assurance of honesty and impartiality, and one of competent jurisdiction;

The POEA is vested with both quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. Hence, its adjudication on the basis of its own regulation does not violate due process. (Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. POEA, 166 SCRA 533)

4.And a finding or decision by that tribunal supported by substantial evidence presented at the hearing, or at least ascertained in the records or disclosed to the parties. (Air Manila, Inc. vs. Balatbat, 38 SCRA 489; Fabella vs. CA, 282 SCRA 256; Domingo vs. Ryala, 545 SCRA 90 )

Notice and hearing, as the fundamental requirements of due process, are essential only when an administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial function, but in the performance of its executive or legislative functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an administrative body need not comply with the requirements of notice and hearing, except when it involves revocation of a license. (Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Philippines, 283 SCRA 31)

General Rule. Due process in administrative context does not require trial type-proceedings similar to those in the courts of justice. (UP Board of Regents, vs. CA, 313 SCRA 404) Administrative due process cannot be fully equated to due process in its strict judicial sense since it is enough that the

party is given the chance to be heard before the case against him is decided. (Ocampo vs . Office of the Ombudsman, 322 SCRA 17; Ledesma vs. CA, 541 SCRA444) A formal trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential to due process it is enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy and to present evidence on which a fair decision can be based. (Melendres vs. COMELEC, 319 SCRA 262)

The requirement of hearing is complied with as long as there is opportunity to be heard, and to submit any evidence one may have in support of his defense, and not necessarily that an actual hearing was conducted. (Busuego vs. CA, 304 SCRA 473)

Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also perhaps many times more creditably and predictable than oral argument, through pleadings xxx. A formal type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirement are satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is the absolute lack of notice and hearing. (Barot vs. COMELEC, 404 SCRA 352) It is not legally objectionable for being violative of due process for an agency to resolve a case based solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the parties affidavits of witnesses may take the place of their direct testimony. (Lastimoso vs. Asayo, 539 SCRA 381)

Where the litigants are given the opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, there is no denial of procedural due process. (Domingo, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 313 SCRA 311; Ablera vs. NLRC 215 SCRA 476) A party who chooses not to avail of the opportunity to answer the charges cannot complain of denial of due process. (Ocampo vs. Office of the Ombudsman, supra) There can be no denial of due process where a party had the opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed do so. (DBP vs. CA, 302 SCRA 362; Tiomico vs. CA, 304 SCRA 216)

Exceptions. In administrative cases, the requirement of notice and hearing does not connote full adversarial proceedings, as actual adversarial proceedings become necessary only for clarification or when there is a need to profound searching questions to witnesses who give vague testimonies. (Artezuela vs. Maderazo, 381 SCRA 49) Also in labor cases, actual adversarial proceedings becomes necessary only for clarification or when there is a need to profound searching questions to unclear witnesses, a procedural right which the employee must ask for. It is not an inherent right. If petitioner requested that an investigation be conducted but respondents vehemently refused, clearly the petitioner was deprived of his right to due process. (Lavador vs. J Marketing Corporation, 461 SCRA 497)

Violation of due process is a personal defense that can only be asserted by the persons whose rights have been allegedly violated. (Napere vs. Barbarona, 543 SCRA 376)

In judicial proceedings, when from a consideration of the pleadings it appears that there are ISSUES OF FACT which cannot be decided without a trial of the case on the merits, and no trial is had, there is denial of due process. Dismissal of an action upon a motion to dismiss constitute a denial of due process if, from a consideration of the pleadings, it appears that there are issues that cannot be decided without a trial of the case on the merits. (Robern Devt Corp. vs. Quitain, 315 SCRA 150)


In quasi-judicial proceedings, the counterpart rule is that when an ADJUDICATIVE FACT IS AT ISSUE, a trial-type hearing ought to be held. (Mabuhay Textile Mills Corp. vs. Ongpin, 141 SCRA 437)

Evidence in quasi-judicial proceedings

As a matter of general rule, quasi-judicial bodies are not bound by the strict or technical rules of evidence governing court proceedings. They are given macro leeway in hearing and considering a variety of material evidence and the receipt and consideration of incompetent evidence do not constitute a denial of due process. However, the exemption from strict rules of evidence does not empower a quasi-judicial body to act arbitrarily.

In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof required to establish the administrative liability of a respondent is substantial evidence, not proof beyond reasonable doubt. Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. (Mariano vs. Roxas, 385 SCRA 500)

Relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency in reason to prove any material matter. Material matter means a matter the existence or non-existence of which is provable in action according to substantive law and the pleadings. Evidence may be said to be relevant when it relates directly to a fact from which, by the process of logic, an inference may be made as to the existence of the fact in issue.

Rules of evidence under EO 292

*The agency may admit evidence commonly accepted by reasonably prudent men. [Book VII, Section 12 (1), EO 292]

*Documentary evidence may be received in the form of copies or excerpts is the original is not available, a certified true copy of documents in the official custody of a public officer may be accepted. [Book VII, Section 12 (2), EO 292]

*Every party shall have the right to cross-examine witnesses presented against him and to submit rebuttal evidence. [Book VII, Section 12 (3), EO 292] But disciplinary cases involving students need not necessarily include the right to cross- examination. (UP Board of Regents vs. CA, 313 SCRA 404)

*The agency may take notice of judicially cognizable facts and generally cognizable technical or scientific facts within its specialized knowledge. The parties shall be notified and afforded an opportunity to contest the facts so noticed. [Book VII, Section 12 (4), EO 292]

In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint. (Lorena vs. Encomienda, 302 SCRA 632 and Sinott vs. Barte, 372 SCRA 282) In the absence of contrary evidence, what will prevail is the presumption that the respondent has regularly performed his duties. (Tan Tac Chiong vs. Cosico, 385 SCRA 509)

The rules of evidence in administrative agencies are more relaxed than in judicial tribunals, in at least three areas:

1. Admissibility: Generally, administrative agencies are not bound by the technical rules of admissibility.

2. Judicial Notice: Administrative bodies may take into account not only such evidence as may be presented by the parties in the determination of the case. They may also make their own inquiry into facts at issue, and take judicial notice of certain other matters.

3. Quantum of Evidence: Only substantial evidence is required to support a decision.

The fact that administrative bodies are not bound by technical rules of procedure in adjudicating cases does not mean that basic rules of proving allegation should be entirely dispensed with any decision based on unsubstantiated allegation cannot stand as it will offend due process. (Aya-ay Sr. vs. Arpaphil Shipping Corporation, 481 SCRA 282)

Power to issue subpoena

and cite for contempt

Subpoena. A subpoena is a process directed to a person requiring him to attend and to testify at the hearing or trial of an action or at any

investigation conducted under the laws of the Philippines, or for the taking of his deposition. A subpoena ad testificandum is used to compel a person to testify, while a subpoena duces tecum is used to compel the production of books, things or documents therein specified.


Well settled is the rule that before a subpoena duces tecum may issue, the court must first be satisfied that the following requisites are present: (1) books, documents or other things requested must appear prima facie relevant to the issue subject of the controversy (test of relevancy); and (2) such books must be reasonably described by the arties to be readily identified (test of definiteness) (Roco vs. Contreras, 461 SCRA 505)

As a general rule, the power to issue subpoena and cite a person in contempt is not inherent to an administrative agency and thus depends on a statutory grant. To allow administrative bodies to issue subpoenas without express legislative authority violates the doctrine of separation of powers. The usual procedure is for these administrative bodies to apply to a court for an order enforcing an administrative order or subpoena. EO 292 grants administrative agencies in general the power to issue subpoenas by requiring the attendance of witnesses or the production of documents. (Book VII, Sec. 13), but only as an incident of their power to investigate.

The power of an agency to issue a subpoena is not confined solely to quasi-judicial functions as this will nullify the investigatory function of the agency An administrative subpoena differs from a judicial subpoena. Its purpose is not to prove a pending charge but to discover evidence on the basis of which a charge may be filed if the evidence discovered so justifies. A subpoena may be enforced if the inquiry is within the authority of the agency, the demand is not too definite, and the information is reasonably relevant. (Evangelista vs. Jarencio, 68 SCRA 99)

Contempt. The power to punish persons for contempt is essentially a judicial power. The power to punish contempt must be expressly granted to the administrative body; and when so granted may be exercised only when the administrative body is actually performing quasi-judicial functions. The COMELEC, SEC and the Insurance Commissioner are granted these powers by special statutory grant. The COMELEC has the power to cite for contempt,

but this power may be exercised only while the COMELEC is engaged in the performance of quasi-judicial functions. (Guevara vs. COMELEC, 104 Phil. 269) However, the Commission on Human Rights, an agency without

quasi-judicial power, in cases of violation of its rules of procedure may cite a person for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. (Carino vs. CHR, 204 SCRA 483) Likewise, the authority to conduct hearings or inquiries and the power to hold any person in contempt may be exercised by another agency not conferred with quasi-judicial power, the Cooperative Development Authority but limited only in the performance of its administrative functions. (CDA vs. Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative Inc, 382 SCRA 552)

However, a committee of a sanggunian panlungsod cannot issue a subpoena to the chairman and general manager of an electric cooperative ordering them to testify during the investigation of inefficient power lines, nor cite them for contempt for their failure to appear. There is no provision in the Constitution or in the Local Government Code granting local legislative bodies the power to issue subpoena and the power to cite them for contempt. Such powers cannot be implied from the grant of legislative power. Neither can they exist as mere incidents of the performance of legislative functions. Since the existence of the power of contempt in connection with the power to issue subpoena poses a potential derogation of individual rights. Besides, inquiry upon the efficiency of the service of the electric cooperative is beyond the jurisdiction of the sanggunian. Such power is within the jurisdiction of the National Electrification Administration. (Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative, Inc. Vs. Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete, 155 SCRA 421)

Purpose. The power to cite for contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not vindictive principle, and on the corrective and not retaliatory idea of punishment The courts and other tribunals vested with the power of contempt must exercise the power to punish for contempt for purposes that are impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judge as persons but for the functions that they exercise. In this case, the charge of contempt partakes the nature of a criminal offense. The exoneration of the contemner from the charge amounts to an acquittal from which an appeal would not lie. (Yasay vs. Recto, 313 SCRA 739)

Form and promulgation of quasi-judicial determination

Form and Content. Every decision of an agency shall be in writing and shall state the facts and the law on which it is based. (Book VII, Section 14) The mandate of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution requiring courts to state clearly and distinctly the facts and the legal basis of their decisions is equally applicable to administrative bodies. (Naguiat vs. NLRC, 269 SCRA 564 and Pilipinas Kao Inc. vs. CA, 372 SCRA 548))


In order to effectively buttress the judgment arrived at, it is imperative that a decision should not be simply limited to the dispositive portion but must state the nature of the case, summarize the facts with references to the record, and contain a statement of the applicable laws and jurisprudence and the tribunal assessments and conclusion on the case. (People vs. Baring, GR No. 137933, January 28 2002)

Rationale. This vital requirement is similarly required to give basis for all their decisions, rulings or judgments pursuant to the Administrative Code whose roots may also be traced to the constitutional mandate. This practice would better enable the courts to make an appropriate consideration of whether the dispositive portion of the judgment sought to be enforced is consistent with the findings of facts and conclusions of law by the tribunal that rendered the decision. (Id.)

Likewise, the requirement is demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution, and of fair play. It is also designed to enable an appellant to pinpoint the possible errors of the tribunal for review by a higher tribunal. It also gives assurance to the parties that in reaching judgment, the tribunal did so through the processes of legal reasoning.

The decision shall become final 15 days after receipt of the party unless an administrative appeal or judicial review is perfected. One motion for reconsideration, which shall suspend the said period, may be filed. (Book VII, Section 15, EO 292)

Licensing procedure under EO 292

a. The procedure concerning contested cases shall apply. [Book VII, Section 17(1), EO 292]

b. Except in cases of willful violation of laws, rules and regulations or when public security, health or safety require otherwise, no license may be suspended or revoked without notice and hearing. [Book VII, Section 17(2)]

Thus, the administrative order of the Philippine Ports Authority which provided that all licenses of harbor pilots shall be for a term of one year only subject to yearly renewal after an evaluation of performance will unduly restrict the harbor pilots to practice their profession before their compulsory retirement. Under the order, their appointment ipso facto expire at every year. Renewal is dependent on evaluation of performance after the license have been cancelled. Pilotage as a profession is a property right. Before harbor pilots can earn a license to practice their profession, they have to pass five examinations, each followed by training and practice. Their appointment allows them to engage in pilotage until they retire at the age of seventy. This is a vested right. The pre-evaluation cancellation makes the order unreasonable. It is a deprivation of property without due process. (Corona vs. UHPAP, 283 SCRA 31)

Administrative sanctions, which are distinct and separate from the money claims, may still be properly imposed by the POEA despite findings in another case absolving the recruitment agency from the money claims. The fact that the claims for salary deduction was not raised by complainants for illegal deduction or withholding of salaries as a ground for the suspension or cancellation of a recruitment agencys license. Under the POEA Rules and Regulations, the POEA, on its own initiative, may conduct the necessary proceeding for the suspension or cancellation of the license of any private placement agency or any of the grounds mentioned therein. (Philsa International Placement and Service Corp. vs. Secretary of DOLE, 356 SCRA 174)

c. Where the license made a timely and sufficient application for renewal, the existing license shall not expire until the application has been finally determined by the agency. (Book VII, Section 18, EO 292)

Administrative determinations

where notice and hearing are

NOT necessary for due process

1. Grant of provisional authority for increased rates (only pursuant to quasi-legislative power), or to engage in a particular line of business;

2. Summary proceedings of distraint and levy upon the property of a delinquent taxpayer;

3. Cancellation of a passport where no abuse of discretion is committed by the Foreign Secretary;

4. Summary abatement of nuisance per se which affects the immediate safety of persons or property.

5. Summary sequestration of ill-gotten wealth by the PCGG.

6. Preventive suspension of a public officer pending investigation.


CASES ON ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS

Right to Notice

Due process does not require sending of notice of the board meeting to respondent college student who was ordered suspended for one year by the Board of Regents. University rules do not require the attendance in board meeting of individuals whose cases are included in the agenda of the Board. (UP Board of Regents vs. Telan, 227 SCRA 342)

Right to Notice and Hearing in Labor Cases

The law requires that employers must furnish the worker sought to be dismissed with two written notices before termination of an employee can be legally effected:

1.notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and

2.the subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employers decision to dismiss him.

Apart from this, a hearing where the employee can explain his side is also necessary. The twin requirements of notice and hearing are indispensable for a dismissal to be validly effected. However, when the dismissal is effected for a just and valid cause, the failure to observe procedural requirements does not invalidate or nullify the dismissal of an employee. Hence, if the dismissal of an employee is for a just and valid cause but he is not accorded due process, the dismissal shall be upheld but the employer must be sanctioned for noncompliance of the requirements of due process (30-day notice requirement). Such sanction will make him liable for indemnity in the form of nominal damages but not to render his act void since no reinstatement is required. The measure for damages is the amount of wages (backwages) the employee should have received were it not for the termination of his employment without prior notice. (Dayan vs. DBP, 369 SCRA 712, GR No. 140692, Nov. 20 2001 and Lavador vs. J Marketing Corporation, 461 SCRA 497)

The decision of the Labor Arbiter not to schedule the case for another hearing cannot be considered arbitrary. The holding of a hearing is discretionary with the Labor Arbiter and is something which the parties cannot demand as a matter of right. It is entirely within the bounds of the Labor Arbiters authority to decide a case based on mere position papers, affidavits and supporting documents without a formal trial or hearing. The affidavits of witnesses in such case may take the place of their direct testimony. The requirements of due process are satisfied when the parties are given the opportunity to submit position papers where they are supposed to attach all

documents that would prove their claim in case it be decided that no hearing should be conducted or was necessary. (Mark Roche International vs. NLRC, GR No. 123825, August 31, 1999) The filing of position papers and supporting documents fulfills the requirements of due process. (Damasco vs. NLRC, GR No. 115755, December 4, 2000)

Opportunity to be heard

A decision is void for lack of due process, as when a party is deprived of the opportunity of being heard. A void judgment never acquires finality. (The Summary Dismissal Board vs. Torcito, GR No. 130443, April 6, 2000)

Right to Formal Investigation

In an administrative disciplinary case against a lawyer where no hearing was conducted pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the Supreme Court ordered an administrative case remanded to the IBP for further proceedings. A formal investigation is a mandatory requirement which may not be done away with except for valid and cogent reasons. (Baldomar vs. Paras, 348 SCRA 212)

The right of petitioner Governor to formal investigation as spelled out in Administrative Order No. 23 was not satisfied when the complaint was decided on the basis of position papers. Under the order, he has the right to appear and defend himself in person or by counsel, the right to confront the witnesses against him and the right to compulsory attendance of witnesses and the production of documentary evidence. (Joson vs. Torres, 290 SCRA 279)

Likewise, the 1999 Uniform Rules of Procedure of the Civil Service Commission guarantees the right to formal investigation to a respondent employee in the career service. But such right is applicable only to administrative cases filed with the Civil Service Commission. (Medina vs. COA, 543 SCRA 684)

Right to Assistance of Counsel

The right to counsel is not always imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measure against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service. As such, the hearing conducted by the investigating authority is not part of criminal prosecution. The right to


counsel attaches only upon the start of a custodial investigation. Therefore, the exclusionary rule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation. (Remolana, vs. CSC, GR No. 137473, August 2, 2001)

In Ledesma vs. CA, 541 SCRA 444, reiterated its ruling in Remolana that counsels participation is a proceeding similar to that of a courtroom trial is not required it is sufficient that he is allowed to submit in writing his observation on the investigation.

The Court amplified the above-cited ruling in Perez vs. People, 544 SCRA 532. Thus the Court said:

There is no law, jurisprudence or rule which mandates that an employee should be assisted by counsel in an administrative case. On the contrary, jurisprudence is in unison in saying that assistance of counsel is not indispensable in administrative proceedings.

While investigation conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of respondents capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. Thus, the right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service.

There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-litigation proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and that, without such representation, he shall not be bound by such proceedings the assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession was not engrafted in the due process clause such that without the participation of its members, the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated.

Right to Cross-examination

An employee, upon being notified of her termination has the right to demand compliance with the basic requirements of due process, and compliance entails the twin requirements of procedural and substantial due process. Ample opportunity must afforded the employee to defend herself either personally and/or with assistance of representative; to know the nature of her offense; and to cross examine and confront face to face the witnesses against her. (Gonzales vs. NLRC, 313 SCRA169) However, the proceedings in student discipline cases may be summary in nature but it does not include the right to cross examination. Due process in administrative context does not require trial type proceedings similar to those in the courts of justice. (UP Board of Regents vs. CA, 313 SCRA 404 and DLSU vs. CA, 541 SCRA 22)

A party cannot argue that she has been deprived of due process merely because no cross-examination took place due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy or given opportunity to move for reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. (Casimiro vs.Tandog, 459 SCRA 624)

Right against self-incrimination

The right against self-incrimination is available in all kinds of proceedings, whether civil, criminal or administrative or even legislative proceedings. (Galman vs. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 294) Thus, in Standard Charter Bank (Philippine Branch) vs. Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies, 541 SCRA 456, the Court reiterated its ruling in Galman, that the right of the accused against self-incrimination is extended in administrative proceedings that partakes of the nature of or analogous to criminal proceedings sanctioned by law and to all cases in which punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a party or not.

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

General Rule: Before a party can invoke the jurisdiction of the courts of justice, he is expected to have exhausted all means of administrative redress afforded to him by law. The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies applies only where there is an express legal provision requiring such administrative step as a condition precedent to taking action in court. (CSC vs. DBM, 464 SCRA 115) Thus, a detainer suit is premature if it fails to exhaust all administrative remedies, such as compliance with Section 412 of the Local Government Code on the need for prior barangay conciliation proceedings. (Villadar vs. Zabala,545 SCRA325)


Applicability. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable when there is competence on the part of the administrative body to act upon the matter complained of. Administrative agencies are not courts; they are neither part of the judicial system, nor are they deemed judicial tribunals. In Regino vs. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology, GR No. 156109, November 18, 2004, the Supreme Court ruled that the petitioners action for damages inevitably calls for the application and the interpretation of the Civil Code, a function that falls within the jurisdiction of the courts and not the CHED. Hence, petitioner could not have commenced her case before the Commission.

The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power. Where the act assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation is issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative functions, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. (Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. vs. Defensor, 497 SCRA 581)

Rationale. One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the separation of powers which enjoins upon the judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with matters coming primarily within the competence of other department. The legal reason is that the courts should not act and correct its mistakes or errors and amend its decision on a given matter and decide it properly. (Lopez vs. City of Manila, 303 SCRA 448) And the practical reason is that the administrative process is intended to provide less expensive and more speedy solution to disputes. However, only those decisions of administrative agencies made in the exercise of quasi-judicial powers are subject to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. (Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators vs. PCA, GR No. 110526, February 10, 1998)

Effect of failure to exhaust administrative remedies

Failure to exhaust administrative remedies will not affect the jurisdiction of the courts. Non-compliance with the doctrine will deprive the complainant of a cause of action which is a ground for a motion to dismiss the case. However, if no motion to dismiss is filed on this ground, there is deemed to be a waiver. (Rosario vs. CA, 211 SCRA 384 and Baguioro vs. Basa, 214 SCRA 437)

Under the Doctrine of Primacy of administrative remedies, an error in the assessment must be administratively pursued to the exclusion of ordinary courts whose decision would be void for lack of jurisdiction. (MERALCO vs. Barlis, 317 SCRA 832)

Exceptions to the Doctrine

1. doctrine of qualified political agency, when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter.

No appeal need be taken to the Office of the President from the decision of a department head because the latter is in theory the alter ego of the former. There is greater reason for not requiring prior resort to the Office of the President in this case since the administrative decision sought to be reviewed is that of the President himself. (Secretary of Justice vs. Bacal, GR No. 139382, December 6, 2000)

Exception to the exception: where the law expressly provides for exhaustion. Hence, the failure of the petitioner to appeal the order to the Secretary of Natural Resources to the President was deemed fatal to the petition. The Supreme Court ruled that even if the respondent was a Department Secretary, an appeal to the President was proper where the law (Executive Proclamation No. 238) expressly provided for exhaustion. (Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 125 SCRA 302)

Likewise, in Valencia vs. CA, 401 SCRA 666, the Supreme Court ruled that an appeal to the Office of the President from the Department Secretary pursuant to DAR Memo. Circ. No. 3, series of 1994 is proper under the doctrine of administrative remedies. The said circular, which expressly provides for an appeal to the Office of the President, is a valid exercise of the DAR Secretarys rule-making power to issue internal rules of procedure.

2. issue involved is purely legal and well within the jurisdiction of the trial court (Regino vs. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology, GR No. 156109, November 18, 2004)

3. administrative remedy is fruitless;

4. where there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency;

5. administrative action is patently illegal, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;


6. where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction;

7. where there is irreparable injury, or threat thereof, unless judicial recourse is immediately made

8.in land cases, where the subject matter is a private land, including those acquired by purchase or resale to individuals;

9.where law does not make exhaustion a condition precedent to judicial recourse;

10.where observance of the doctrine will result in nullification of claim;

11.where there are special reasons or circumstances demanding immediate court action;

12.when due process of law is clearly violated;

13.When, in extreme cases, there is no plain, adequate and speedy remedy available except to seek judicial protection;

14.when the issue is rendered moot and academic (Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 318 SCRA 144)

15.when public interest is involved. (Indiana Aeronautics University vs. CHED, 356 SCRA 367)

Primary Jurisdiction or Preliminary Resort

The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction applies when a claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of technical issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special competence of an administrative body. In such case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of the issues to the administrative body for resolution.

In other words, primary jurisdiction means that judicial action of a case is deferred pending the determination of some issues which properly belong to an administrative body because their expertise, specialized skills, knowledge and resources are required for the resolution of factual and non-legal matters. In such a case, relief must first be sought and obtained in the administrative body concerned before the remedy will be supplied by the Court. Where a statute lodges exclusive original jurisdiction in an administrative agency, the courts will refuse to take up a case unless the agency has finally completed its proceedings. (Industrial Enterprises, Inc. vs. CA, 184 SCRA 426)

Courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. (Mita Pardo de Tavera vs. Philippine Tuberculosis society Inc. 243 SCRA 112 cited in Paloma vs. Moral, 470 SCRA 711)

Where jurisdiction has been correctly assumed by the Director of Lands over the parties conflicting claims, the case should, in accordance with law, remain there for final adjudication. While title issued on the basis of a patent is as indefeasible as one judicially secured, such indefeasibility is not a bar to an investigation conducted by the Director of Lands as to how such title has been acquired, if the purpose of such investigation is to determine whether or not fraud had been committed in securing such title, in order that the appropriate action for reversion may be filed by the Government. The courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the question demands the special knowledge, expertise and services of the tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. (Sherwill Development Corporation vs. Sto. Nino Residents Association, 461 SCRA 517)

The doctrine does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. (Roxas & Co. Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 106 and Province of Zamboanga del Norte vs. Court of Appeals, 342 SCRA)

Effect of Failure to Avail of the Doctrine. The application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not call for the immediate dismissal of the case pending before the court. The case is merely suspended until the issues resolvable by the administrative body are threshed out and fully determined. (Industrial Enterprises, Inc. vs. CA, 184 SCRA 426)

Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction administrative remedies are neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial review where such review is available to the aggrieved parties and the same has not been resolved with finality. Thus, complaints for breach of contract or specific performance with damages filed by a subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the owner or developer fall under the quasi-judicial power of the Housing Land Use Regulatory Board. (Larucom vs. Jacoba, 484 SCRA 206)


The DOCTRINE OF FINALITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION postulates that no resort to courts will be allowed unless administrative action has been completed and there is nothing left to be done in administrative structure. (Sta. Rosa Mining vs. Leido, 156 SCRA 1) Because the petitioner did not take an appeal from the order of the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations to the Secretary of Labor and Employment, but went directly to court, it was held that the court action was made prematurely and the petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies. (SSS Employees Association vs. Batha-Velasco, GR No. 108765, August 27, 1999)

An administrative decision must first be appealed to administrative superiors up to the highest level before it may be elevated to a court of justice for review. The power of judicial review may therefore be exercised only if an appeal is first made by the highest administrative body in the hierarchy of the executive branch of the government. Hence, an appeal to the Office of the President from the decision of the Department Secretary in an administrative case is the last step that an aggrieved party should take in the administrative hierarchy, as it is a plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to the petitioner. (Valencia vs. CA, 401 SCRA 666)

A party seeking an administrative remedy must not merely initiate the prescribed administrative procedure to obtain relief, but also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial intervention in order to give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide the matter itself correctly and prevent unnecessary and premature resort to court action. (CIR vs. Acosta, 529 SCRA 177)

Administrative appeal and review

Pursuant to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party litigant can seek judicial intervention, he must exhaust all means of administrative redress available under the law, subject to the exceptions provided for by law or jurisprudence.

Nature of the Right to Appeal. Right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right- it is a statutory privilege and of statutory origin and, therefore, available only if granted or provided by statute. (Dela Cruz vs. Ramiscal, 450 SCRA 449). Where provided by law, appeal from an administrative determination may be made to a higher or superior administrative officer or body.

By virtue of the power of control of the President over all executive department, the President, by himself or through the Department Secretaries (pursuant to the alter ego doctrine), may affirm, modify, alter, or reverse the administrative decision of subordinate officials and employees. Unless otherwise provided by law, an appeal from a decision of an agency may be taken to the Department Head (Book VII, Sec. 20, EO 292) The President has the power to review decisions of department heads pursuant to the Presidents power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices. (Land Car, Inc. vs. Bachelor Express, 417 SCRA 307)

Reglementary Period and General Administrative Appeal Procedure. shall be perfected within fifteen days after receipt of the copy

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