barth & sen on freedom!

8/13/2019 Barth & Sen on Freedom!

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'T h e Imperative Inherent in the Gift ofFreedom :Kari Barth and Amartya Sen onHuman FreedomChrisBarrigar

I am deeply disturbed by the immense suffering and oppression that exisso endem ically in theworld.The p/7ys/ca/toll of back-breaking labour, for lonhours day after day, under dangerous conditions, with no me dical attentiowhenneeded,at exploitive'wages';the re/a tona /toll of drunkenmenwho beatheir family because 'deep inside' they have neither purpose nor hope for thfuture; thepsychological \o\\of childhood lost to labour, of dignity and hoplost to opp ression , and of being unable to provide for one 's family; the socitoll of community fighting comm unity, not only ma jorities oppressing minoritiebut also oppressed m inorities who oppress o therm inonties;thetollofignorancthat comes from the inabil ity to read or to recognize the lies that keep thexploitation justified.The list, of course , goes endlessly o n .

I am deep ly disturbed by all this not simply be cause I am hum an, butIamdisturbed because I am a follower of Jesus the Naza rene. M y discipleship t


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Asia Journa l o f Theo logyJesus has shaped me such that my heart responds w ith com pass ion, indeedw ith greatpain,to the suffering and oppression around m e. And this m akesme w ant to do som ething about it, to take action. Yet I am also a theologian,which m eans, in part, thatIbelieve that action is linked not simp ly to behaviourbut also to ideas , and thus that effective action requires,interalia,right ideas.So I want to respond to hum an suffering a nd oppression by thinking throughthe ideas that will enable effective action for sustained chan ge.1 . Resources for Freedom : Barth and Sen

Overthepast thirtyyears,the dominant form of theological idea concem ingoppression and suffering has been called 'Liberation T h e o lo g /. Yet, in recentyears Liberation Theology has fallen on hard times. Other types of liberationaltheologies having taken the limelightfeminist, womanist, Dalit, Minjung, post-colonial,left-wing evangelical, and the like. Yet, despite the flaws of LiberationTheology as a movem entandm ethod (or set of m ethods),Icontinuetofind the'liberation'motif a useful/ocus aroundwhich to discuss the ideas and practk:esnecessary for responding to the suffering and oppress ion around us. In effect,' l iberation' should remain a foundatkinal theological locus for responding toissues of oppression.

It may be inferred thatIwill now make a defence of Liberation Theologyyet in fact, whileIsh are the motivating concerns of Liberation The obgy ,Ishallnot make such a defence, and in fact I do not count myself a LiberationTheologian.^ Indeed, I want to develop a liberating, freeing theology for theoppressed and exploited by means of resources different from those usuallyemployed by Liberation Theologieswhich I propose to do by way of KarlBarth's theology of 'freedom'. But why choose 'freedom', and why chooseBarth?

In terms of 'why freedo m? ',Icontend that issues of justice and oppressionneed to be embedded in a broader social-political-economic framework. Social-political theology cannot be limited to issues of justice and liberation alone,crucially important as these arerather, social-political theology must bedevelopedinthe light ofacomprehensive theological vision for hum an societiesat largepre-parousia,which necessarily includes the full expanse of social-


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Asia Journal of Theologyaccount of modern human societies that issues of justice, oppression, anexploitation can then be adequately ad dressed.

What biblical-doctrinal categories then do we invoke for this broader, preparousia social-political theology? There are many that must be deployecollectively^Trinity, the life ofJesus,shalom , reconciliation. Chu rch, justicelove,freedom, and so forth.C ollectively, such categories provide a theologicamap,a systematic framework, by which to inferanddevelop the contours of aovera ll social-political theology, including implications for the full expanse osocial-political-econom ic issues mentioned above.

For purposes of this discussion, though, limitations of space dictate thamy p roposal be tested by use of a single theological category, eventhough,aI have justindicated,a who le panoply of doctrinalloc i areneeded to do the fujob.Thus I have chosen 'freedom ' for this discussion - partly beca use of thcentrality of'freedom 'w ithin the political ideas of modernity, and partly becausit is a m ore comp rehensive concept than 'liberation', thereby offering m orexpan sive social-political possibilities than 'liberation' wh ile at the sam e timincluding liberation w ithin its purview.

As forBarth,I choose him for two reasons. First, because his theologicacorpus providesasubstantive theology offreedom .Second,he hasatheologicperspective that I think is rightthough one which is 'counter-intuitive' anhence frequently opposednamely that theology proper comes prior tanthropology.Yet the idea of a we ll-formed theology being 'counter-intuitivemay seem peculiar. Thus let me give an analogyfromscience,by citing NanceMurphy:

One of Newton's great discoveries was his laws of motion,,,But why didit take so long to discover this law? Why was it not understood muchearlier by Greekphilosophers,such as Aristotle, orbysuch great intellectsas Galileo, Francis Bacon, or Rene Descartes? The answer is becausethe laws are apparently contradicted by all our experience in everyday life[i,e,, the laws are 'counter-intuitive']. Newton's laws say that the naturaltendency of a body is to keep moving forever; but our experience is thatmoving bodies on Earth always come to a stop, usually verysoon,unlesswe keep pushing them. The explanation of this paradox (in Newton'stemns) is simple: friction acts to prevent the body's doing what its natural


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Asia Jou rnal of Theolog yaround, forexample).Both tendencies are there; we have to discern whichis the more fundamental. Before Newton, the greatest minds failed to seewhich was the essential feature.^

The parallel with theology is this: that what appears to us as the mostjDrobable, most natura l, or most intuitive, interpretation o f something may actuallybe very wrong, for the truth m ightwellbe deep ly hidden , even if rightinfront ofoureyes.This is the epistemological core of Lu ther'sfheologia crucisJesus'death on the cross appears, by normal human interpretive reason, to beweakn ess, de feat, and hum iliation, yet in fact the deeper, hidden truth is thatJesus' death on the cross is actually the place of God's victory and glory.

What has this to do with Barth? Within both modern and post-moderntheology, the usual tendency, derived from our experience of everyday life,is tofocus on, or begin our theology with, human experience; yet Barth is l ikeNewton and Luther, helping us to see that the more fundamental reality, thetrue nature of theological reality, isinfact deeplyhidden,despite being right infront of us: namely, to begin our theologizing not with anthropology but w ithGod and G od's Word even though this begins our theology with that wh ichgoes against all our usual hum an, including academ ic, intuitions. As we w illsee , I am no Barthian in the sense of wan ting to be h is disciple in the details ofhis theology ," butIdo think that in this regard Barth orients us properlyG od'sW ord (in both senses, as Jesus C hrist and as Scripture) comes before, andindeed properly establishes the basis of, our anthropology.^ With this priorcondition in place ,Iwanttoexplore the na ture ofhumanfreedom based on thisprioritization. In short, Barth offers us a sub stantive theology o f freed om , yetone which begins with God and only then moves to humanity.

Having saidthis,unlike BarthIam con cem ed to identily specificpractices,proposals foraction in specific times and places, in response to poverty andoppression. My rationale for this is simply personal experience: in my owninvolvementingrassroots workonbehalf of the poorandexploited, I have seenthe necessity of identifying and implementing spec/ffc pracf/ces if change isactually to take placew ithout such intentional, strategic, specific practices,change simply does nothappen.Yet John W ebster, Barth's leading interpreterin the Ang lo-Ame rican w orld today, points out, 'Barth's reluctance to discussin detail the concrete instruments and ends of political comm unity'.^ Th is


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Asia Journal of Theologyon behalf oft he poor and oppressed , but I also mean the formation of publpolicy, economic policy, bureaucratic policy,andjudicial policy, along with thlegal-political means for their implementation. This then requires engagem enwith the relevant scholarly-theoretical disciplines foreachof these domains osocial-political life.

My objective then is foexpbre whether a U)eologyx)f freedom can guide ouseofexfemalsociai-economic resourcesfordisceming concreteinstrumenand actionfor achievingiiberafionfrom poverfy and oppression.Ihave identiBarth as my theological protagonist for this; now wh ere to turn for externsources for this? W ithin contemporary social-econom 'ctheory,the work whichas most extensively employed the concept of freeoom is that of the Indiascholar AmartyaSen.ForSen,the concep t of freedom is a central pillar of thsocial and econom ic theory forwhich he wonthe Nobel Prize for Econom ics 1998,andso ,on thfs basis,Iw ill turn to Sen as myfoiltoBarth.My conclusiowh ich will no doubt surprise many, will be that a Barthian use of Am artya Seprovides a persuasive proposal for Christian action in response to poverty anoppression.

However, a me thodological issue must be addressed: can Barth even bused for such a project? There are two angles from w hich to ask this: firswhether he is relevant to issues of poverty and oppress ion; second , wh ethehe would consider it valid to em ployanon-theological resource, such as Senin conjunction with theology.2. Barth on Poverty, Oppression, and Political Action

Does Barth have anything of value to say to situations of poverty anoppression? Some w ould certainly sayNo.This response can be representeby James Cone, thedoyenof American Black Theology, who did his Ph.Ddissertation on B arth but later repudiated Barth as being ofnouse to the socirealities of racism in America;^ analogously, one might argue that, likewisBarth has little or nothing o f value to say to situations o f povertyandoppressioin such places as the Two-Thirds World ortheformer Soviet bloc nations. Thinterpretation may be further supported by Barth's general reluctance, amentioned earlier, to engage in discussion of the concrete means aninstruments of social-political activity.


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Asia Journa l of Theologyforth'.An d as R on Sider points out, the shee r volume of ma terial in the B ibletha t pertains to questions of hunger, justice and the poor is 'astonish ing' yetone could not say the same about the volume of material or emphasis onthese issues in Ba rth's w riting.^

Nonetheless, another response is that Barth does have relevance to issuesof povertyandoppression. Hunslngerhas noted a number of similarities betweenBarth and Liberation Theologians. For one, they both 'share a belief thattheologica l integrity is subject to certain practical and political tests ':

[F]orBarth,from the beginning ofhiscareertothe veryend,even the mostdoctrinally correct theologians were considered unworthy of their callingto the extent that they aligned themselves in practice with the forces ofpolitical reaction....Like today's liberation theologians, Barth believed thatreactionary politics was a sign that the gospel had been left behind.^"Aswell,both Barth and Liberation Theo logy refuse to indulge in wholesale

condemnation of communism. 'Western anticommunism general ly struck[Barth] as self-righteous, hypocritical, irresponsible, and irrelevant...Barthbelieved tha tintheir quest for wo rld domination, the two supe rpowerswerethemirror image of each other'.Third,Barth

stands with the liberation theologians against the neoconservatives onthe crucial matter of capitalism....The salient point about capitalism forBarth was not, as neoconservatives would contend, that it decentralizespower and therefore stands as a bulwark against totalitarian 'drives' ofsociety. On the contrary, Barth rightly insisted that capitalism generatesenormous disparities in wealth and power, concentrating life-and-deathdecisions 'in the hands of the relatively few,who pull all the strings... in away completely outside the control of the vast majority'.^^Furthermore, Barth and the Liberation theologians cou ld concur with Barth's

words from Church Dogmatics thatthecommand of God is "in all circumstancesa call for counter-m ovem ents on behalf of humanity and aga inst its den ial inanyform,and therefore a championing of the weak against every encroachmenton the part of the strong."^^ Th is is a particularly strong s tatem ent by B arth,one w hich gives him greater credibili ty on these issues , especially w hen setagainst his own activity against Bolshe vism , Fascism , and nuclear w eapo ns.


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Asia Journal of Theology3. Barth on 'Faith and Reason'

The other angle from which to ask if Barth can be used for this projecconcerns Barth's valuation of non-theological resourcesinthe task of theologythe fai th and reason ' issue, to use more traditional tenninology, though 'reasonnot in the narrow sense of philosophy alone, but in the bro ad , and modern itybiased,sense of ideas and concep ts from any discipline outside of C hristia

One interpretation sees Barth's response to the possibility of faith usin'reason'asNein.Support forthisinterpretation cancome fromBarth's oppositioto the 'Social Gospel', along with his supposed opposition to philosophy. Ithe former case, Barth was opposing, rightly, equating social transformatiow ith the Kingdom of God;in the lattercase,his famous Nein was in oppositioto natural theology as a basis for the knowledge ofGod.Furtherm ore, thoswh o are aware of Barth's strident use of 'the com mand ofGod'as the centratheme for his ethics may infer from such an assertive phrase that Barth'ethics is impervious to 'extem al' voices. From these perceptions, the implicatiois frequently drawn that Barth opposed the use of human abilities or nontheological resources in Christian theology, whether these serve reaso(attempts at knowledge ofGod'snature orw ill),moral action (social or individuatransformation), or any other theological purposes. In consequence of thiview, there is no need for 'reason' to be employed by faith,and certainly nneed for theologians to discuss concrete means and instruments.

Another response comes,though,from a different reading ofBarth,namelthat he was open to the use of 'reason' with faith. The following commenproves illustrative:

understanding of m an from the Word of G od wil l be always effectedin practice in the language, categories and framework of the possibilitiesof human self-understanding. In it we shall always and inevitably havebefore us the phenomena of the human, and to that extent make use ofnaturalistic, idealistic, existential, historical, psychological and similarthoughts and expressions. '"

Given the stereotypical view s that exist ofBarth,many theologians w oulbe surprised to read such words from him.Yet, Barth makes numerous sim ila


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Asia Journal of Theologyorabit original,old or new, coherent or incoherent. N o one speaks exclusivelyin biblical terms'.^^ In fact, similar examples from Barth's writing could beendlessly piled on top of each other. For the sake of illustration, one moreexam ple will suffice. In his discuss ion of criteriaby whichto determine whetherwe are obedient or nottothe command o fGod,Barth contends thattheChristian

will find himself addressed by the existence of many others.... Thisorientation by others [i.e., non-theologicals], this readiness to learn, tofollow, or to oppose, is fundamentally legitimate. It is not for nothing thatboth in the Church and the world we live alongside others.... Each mustknow openness to the ways of others. This is in the last resortindispensable. We should be fools if in making use of our opportunitieswe did not look for examples and teachers, for comrades and brothers[among our non-theological neighbours].... Indeed, since small or largeconrections and completions are absolutely necessary for all of us in thismatter right up to the very last moment, none can ever be too open to theways of others'.'^

Again,such a quote calls for an openne ss that confounds the stereotypesofBarth.This is seen also in the realm o f social-political though t:The Christian community both can and should espouse the cause of thisor that branch of social progress or even socialism in the form mosthelpful at a specific time and place and in a specific situation. But itsdecisive word cannot consist in the proclamation of social progress orsocialism.It can consist only in the proclamation of the revolution of God'against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of man' (Rom.1:18), i.e.,in the proclamation of his kingdom as it has already come and comes. ^

Barth's logic hereisthattheChurch'sdec/s/Ve wordmustbethe proclamationof theG ospel,yet the churchshouldespouse (Ba rth's own words ), in a critical,provisional, non-decisive way, non-theological resources in this case, thesocial-economic-political proposals of secular social progress and evensocialism^for purposes of being 'helpful at a specific time and place andsituation'.In effect, Barth does not merely passively or grudgingly accep t theuse of non-theological resourcesintheology he actuallyespousessuch use.


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Asia Journa l of TheologyDelimitations

Of course, having pointed out Barth's espousal of using non-theologicaresources in theology, the story does not end there, for the stereotypes arecorrect in one sense, namely that Barth was not open to 'every wind odoctrine' his numerous statements of openness are almost always qualifiedin the light of two c riteria: such resources must be doctrinally-circumscribedand,such resources m ust also be instrumentally-provisional.

For an example of the first criterion, being do ctrinally-circum scribed, w emay cite his com me nts on the indebtedness of theolog ians to philosophy, inwhich he describes the proper relationship between theology and philosophyoneinwhich theologynormsphilosophy:'Thetheologian stands readytosubmthe coherence of his concepts and formu lations to the coherence ofthedivinerevelation and not con versely....his ontology w ill be subject to criticism andcontrol by his theology, and not conversely.He willnot necessarily feel obligatedto the philosophicalkairos,the latest prevailing philosophy....'^*Inother wordsBarth's openness to, and use of, non-theological resources is delimited, ocircumscribed by the results of exeges is and the content of doc trine.

The second qualification Is that, use of extra-theological resources musalso beinstrumentally provisional instrumental in the sense of being used foChristian purpose s, and provisional in the sense that such resources m ust beheld w ith a certain lightness, unrigidity, etc. The reasons fo r provisionality areimportanttonote:non-theological resources are not confessional to the Christianfaith; such resources are incomplete because they are the product of postlapsarian reason; and the creational te/os of such resources is insufficientlaccounted forinGod's creative, redemptive p urposes .

In summary, we may call Barth's position on the use of non-theologicaresources in theologydoctnnally-circumscribed and instrumentally-provisionaespousal.To my theologica l intuitions, this seems to m e to get the issue righIt is w ithin these cons traints that Barth would be willing to explore the use oSen in ord erfo r B arth to achieve his desired actions by the stronge ronbehalof the w eaker.4. Karl Barth on Hum an Freedom


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Asia Journa l of Theo logystatus in Barth's anthropology, secondary to more primary and developedthemes such asfaith,hope,love,justification and sanctification.^' O n the otherhand,Clifford Green considers freedom of such importance in Barth that helabels Barth a 'Theologian ofFreedom '.^My own viewissomewhereinbetweenthese, though perhaps closer to Green: freedom' and 'liberation' are termsthat Barth emp loys w ith regularity throughout hiswnting,and Barth's theologywould look quite different without the emphasis on freedo m and liberation thatis foundinhiswork.Freedom can claim at least astrong secondary or supportivestatus in Barth's anthropology.

Given the diverse locations of Barth's writings o nf reedom ,for purposes o fthe following discu ssionIwill employ the same three-part structure that Barthused for his final study on this theme, 'The Gift of Freedom 'G od's Freedom(under the doctrine ofGod),M an's Freedom (under the doctrine of Creation),and the D ivine Call to Action (i.e, Ethics).The Freedom of God

First,then,Goc/'sfreedom:'God's freedom is His very own.[God's freedom]is the sovereign grace wherein God chooses to commit H imselftoman.' ^ForBarth, God's freedom is, not unexpectedly, the standard against which tounderstand hum anf reedom.Not that human freedom willbe an exac t replicaofdivinef reedom ,but hum an freedom w ill not be properly understood withoutfirst understanding God's freedom. 'Where else can we learn that freedomexists and what itis,exceptinconfrontation with God's ow n freedom offered tous as the source and m easure ofallfreedom?'^*

God's freedom isrelational, which is notsu rprising,given God 's T rinitariannature: 'Go d'sownfreedom isTrinitarian,embracing grace, thankfulness, andpeace.Only in this relational freedo m is God sove reign, almighty, the Lord ofall.'^^ In effect, "God's freedom is not merely unlimited possibility or formalmajesty and om nipotency, [nor is it] empty, naked sovereignty". Tha tis,God'sfreedom is not the hypothetical political or philosophical freedom of pure poweror omnipotenceto dowhateverGodfeels like doing itisnot some self-indulgent


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Asia Journal of TheologyThe Freedom of Hum anity

Hum anity's freedom is certainly not identical to God's freedom , yet we firunderstand human freedomthroughGod'sfreedom . Negatively,God'sfreedois not certain modernist proposals for freedom. Modernity has advocatefreedom in various forms, such as: the freed om of indifference', w hereby onchooses indifferently between various possibilities or options unconstraineby competing interests; 'negative freedom ', w herein freedom is seen primarias freedo m from freedom from interference by other individuals, as well afreedom from structures and systems (such as Locke's 'govemm ent', W eber'bu reau cra c/, etc.), thus the individual is supposedly left fre e ' from interferencby others to choose as theywilland to m ake of themselves w hat they w il l;an'positive freedo m', in wh ich freedom is unde rstood to be the ability or right tassert, preserve, and save one self (perhaps even the cost of others). Ba rprovides particular responses to each of these as to why they are erroneouaccounts of hum an freed om , but under all of them lie the same found ationproblemnamely that these are not what constitutes God's freedom, thuthese arenotwhat constitutes humanity's freedom. But if m od em it/s accounof human freedom arefalse,then w hat is Barth's own constructive account ofreedom?

Abo ve a ll, hum anity's freedom is foremo st to be seen as God's g raciougift:'Hum an freedom is thegiftofGodin the free outpouring o f His grace . Tcall a m an free is to recognize that G od hasgiven him freedom.'^^ No doubcertain forms o f freedom are hum anly ach ieved, but their ultimate origin m ube recogn ized: 'What else can w e say to w hat God gives us but stamm erinpraise of this gift and Giver?' ^This gift exists for all in two waysas 'promised freedom', which is thfreedom of eternal life, and as 'natural freedo m ', w hich is 'hum an existence its creatureliness.'^ The proper standard fornaturai human freedom is nosom e criteria independent of God's ow n action or nature;rather, "The sourcof m an's freedom is also its yardstick".^" The //Ved standardof human freedois the freedom ofth e Christian,for it is the C hristian w ho , at least ideally, liveinthe ideal pattern forallhumanfreedom , namely free dom for thewillofGod'Th is will ofGodis forthanksgiving,obedience and responsibility.So,freedom


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Asia Journal of Theo logy

ours' (other peoples, both nearandfar) being another.in fellowsh ip' means freedom to be w ith and actfor others,that is,goodofothers.It is clear from these first two elements that, contrary to

ityandgeneral human self-interest, freedom is nof primarily freedomlimitations, norprimarily freedom foroneself, but ratherfreedom forothers

rGodand then for hum anity.After freedom forGod'andfreedom forothers',human freedomthen consists

forone s own life^thatis, reedomorchoiceforoneself and freedom[non-divine]limitations. Such freedom is often the primary freedom in our

is also the gift ofGod,and in fact isthe means through which the enacted. In other words, this is the point at

hich one's own personhood and individuality enterin:"[Jlhe freedom of man [i.e., with and for God and others] includes the

for existenceas this[i.e.,particular, individual] human creature....[The himself in these relationships."^^ It is precisely in this

of who one is in one's own individuality that choices and decisions arehowto be forGod,howto be for others, and howto beforoneself.becomes free and is free bychoosing,deciding, and determining himself

n accordance w ith the freedom ofGod . '^Thus, despite freedom -for-oneselfority, there rem ains within this a broad range of opportunity

The f inal tone of Barth's account though lies with the l imitation of"Hum an life is to be lived as man 's activity, not to be enduredood as a mere happe ning. It is to be accepted and accomplished

freedo m in limitation must be verified and practiceds] own reedomnresolve and act...On allsides he hasopportunity...The

n^ust be grasped. This is what the com man d of God requires of * 'Every act of man, therefore, must be measured and tested by the

isa seizing o r neglecting o f the unique opportunity presentedis only found in this G od - and others-focused pattern; nonetheless,


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Asia Journa l of Theologyan appeal to [man's] freedom: not, of course, to a freedom of his choicepreference, orselection;but to his realfreedom ,which consists in his freedomforGod,in his freedom to obeyFreedom and Ethics

Barth's account ofhumanfreedom lies at the intersection of three doctrinaloci, namely God, Creation, and Ethics, so it is impossible to discuss hiaccount of freedom w ithout a constant interactionwithethics. In recent yearsthere has been a salutary recovery ofthecentrality of ethics to Barth's ove ratheological programme.^ ForBarth,ethics p e rs e 'is theory and not practicethough it is the theory abou t practice. Its m ain problem is predsely the questioof the ethos, of the right and wrong, in human action.'"" In that case, whaconstitutes specificallyCh ristianethics? Chnstian ethics is 'the reflection upoth edivine call to human actionwh ich is implied by the gift offreedom,'"^ thais ,'ho w w e are obedient to the comm and ofGod'.Elsewhere, Barth describeethics as 'what w e do with our freedom '. These vanous descriptions may bcom bined into a single Barthian definition of Christian ethics asthe theory ohow we rightlyuse our freedom in obedience to the command of God.

InChurch Dogm atics,Barth places his whole discuss ion of freedom (c.60pages) w ithin the theme o f ethics, that is, w ithin 'The C omm and of God thCreator*. 'W hat is the com mand of God? It is the authentic interpretation in thimperative mood of man's being and nature by its Creator and Lord';"^ 'thimperative o fthecomm and. ..isthe freedom ofmanwithin the limitation of hnature and being'."^ Indeed, the com mand ofGodis an 'imperative summ onto freedom forhumanexistence'."" Ethical freedom is exercised then in rtovvwact for,w ithin our individuality and our historicity there are m any wa ys tact forthe w ill and glory ofGodand forthe good of others as well as also foourselves. This is true human freedom .

5. Am artya Sen on Human FreedomAm artya Sen became widely know n to the general public when in 1998 h

w as aw arded the Nobel Prize forEconom ics.Nonetheless, he was w ell-knoww ithin thefieldof economics long before w inning the Prize, having to that poinhad a prolific publishing careerspanningmore than 4 0 years. M ore importantl


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Asia Journal of TheologySen is the prime figure behind the m ethodology oftheUnited Nations' annualHuman DevelopmentReport.

It w ill help if w e give a b rief overview of Sen's career. His ultimate concernhas always bee n the poor and oppressed , those wh ose lives are marked byinequalityanddeprivation. This ultimate concern is see n in his early interest ineconomic growth an d planning, in his famous investigations o fthecauses offamines a nd of globally-endemic gender discrimination againstwomen,in hisnumerous s tudies of many countries but ofIndiain particular, and in his rejectionof classical values of, and methods form easuring,economicgrowth.Sen hasconsistently con tributed to both empirical research an d theoretical proposalsin both macro- and micro-economics that run against the grain, indeed thatscrutinize thefou nda tiona l values of, mainstream econom ic theory, especiallyneo-classicism and 'techno-economicsinthe service ofthe freemarket, privateproperty and footloose finance'.*^ This is not to imply that Sen is againstcap italism, or in favou r of iteither, for he is far too soph isticated a thinker tomake sweeping approvals or condemnations of any system o fideaor practices.Rather, his style is to analyse for complexity, seeking the benefits and thedeficits, the good and the bad, in the ideas or systems w ith which he engages.On this basis, capitalism is seen to bring both blessing and curse, and soneeds to be analysed as suchas seen, for instance, in his efforts to'meticulously to bring out the interaction between market and non-marketphenomena, and between private and public action'."' ' Nonetheless, Senstridently opposes capitalism as the criterion of 'the sociai good', or as thebasis ofsocialordera critique, we m ight note in passing , some what similarto that of Barth. Bagchi obse rves that by the 1970s , the net effect of Sen'swo rk was that he had

dem onstrated the surprising po verty of the so-called funda men tal theoremof economics^* .. . .About the same time he was also demonstrating theinformational, ethical, and behavioural deficiencies of an approach thattakes individuals maximizing their utility as its sole foundation....Sen wasbreaching the ramparts of the narrowly confined space of tradit ionalwelfare economics and choice theory and allowing ethical considerationsand interpersonal value judgem ents to enter that spac e. He was enga ged,at the same time, in a closer examination of the nature and stmctures of


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Asia Journal of Theologythe comp lexity ofhumanarrangements w ithin which econom ics exists. A largpar t of th is complex i ty concerns human mot ives, goals , needs, anrestrictions in other words, the elem ents ofacomprehensive or substantivtheory o fhumannature, including econom ics, yet elementswhichare felladousomitted from orthodox economic theory. This ability to recognize humacomplexity, and to thereby develop a substantive an thropology, is due not onlto his training as an econom ist, but especially to his career-long engagemenwith philosophical and e thical thought. From earlyinhis career, he has engagethe thought of such philosophers as David Hum e, Jean-Jacques R ous seauKarl Popper, Isaiah Berlin, Martha Nussbaum , and Bernard Williams. Alonw ith his conce rn for poverty and thepoor, his engagem ent with such thinkerhas enabledhimto put economicswithina broader conception ofhumanaffairThis integration of econom ics w ith social and m oral philosophy can be seen ia statement such as this: 'Ultimately, the focus has to be on what life w e leaand w hat we can or cannotdo,can or cannot be. I have elsewhere called thvarious living conditions we can or cannot achieve, our "functionings," and ouability to achieve them,our "cap ab ilities"'.*

This brings us to the key concepts ofSen'scounter-proposal'capabilitiesand 'freed om ', for, in conjunction w ith the concep t 'rationality', these providthe lynch-pins of Sen's moral-philosophical grounding of social theory aneconom ics: the propercriterionof social welfare judgm ents,andthe appropriaobjective of policy interventions, is thefullest attainment of human capabilitiein order that people can lead the lives they have reason to value.Note howvastly different a criterion and objec tive this is than various trad itiona l criterifor udg ing social improvement, such as 'GDP growth'or 'wealth accumulationor 'the greatest good for the greatest num ber of peop le' or even 'ow nership othe means of production'. In other w ords , governments and others are m oseffectiveIntheir role of social-economic developm entwhentheir developmenpolicies are directed at enhancing these capacities. But how is this expansioof individual capacities actually to be accomplished?

Sen's a nsw er is not any of the usual ans we rs, w hether interventionist olaissez-faire. Rather, Sen contends that some sort of intermediate guidinprinciple is needed bywhichto determine what sorts of policies will be effectivand ineffective for achieving increased capacities. Of course, the issue o


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Asia Journal of Theolog ythe capabilities people require in order to live the lives they have reason tovalue.Thus freedom isthe crucial concept for achieving effective socio-economicdevetopment.Human Freedom

Sen's writing on freedom is so clearandsuccinct that itisalmost impossibleto summarize itone would prefer simply to reproduce the first 50 pages ofDevelopment as Freedom.Nonetheless, despite the clarity of his explanation,our task here necess itates tha t w e give some sum mary, be it ever so brief.

Sen's focus on human freedoms at the basis for social-economicdevelopment 'contrasts with narrower views of developm ent, such as identifyingdevelopment with the growth of gross national product, or with the rise inpersonal incom es, or with industrialization, or w ith technological advance, orwith social modernization'.^ Because Sen conceives of development morebroadly than do traditional development the ories, he also recognizes broaderimpediments to such development, impediments w hich he calls 'unfreedom s':

Developmentrequires theremoval of major sources of unfreedom: povertyas well as tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as systematicsocial deprivation, neglect of public facilities as well as intolerance oroveractivity of repressive states...Sometimes the lack of substantivefreedoms relates directly to economic poverty, which robs people of thefreedom to satisfy hunger, or to achieve sufficient nutrition, or to obtainremedies for treatable illnesses, or the opportunity to be adequatelyclothed or sheltered, or to enjoy clean water and sanitary facilities. Inothercases,the unfreedom links closely to the lack of public facilities andsocial care, such as the absence of epidemiological programs, or oforganized arrangements for health care or educational facilities, or ofeffective institutions for the maintenance of local peace and order. In stillother cases, the violation of freedom results directly from a denial ofpolitical and civil liberties by authoritarian regimes and from imposedrestrictions on the freedom to participate in the social, political andeconomic life of the community'."

We see here exp licit illustrations of what freedom is or is not within contextsof social-economic development. But, being philosophically inclined. Senprovides a more substantive analysis of freedom tha n simply saying T his andthis are freedom s, but this Is not... ' His analysis recognises hum an freedom


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Asia Journal of Theologywithin development as consWuf/Vfreedom (freedom as an end in itself) andinstmmentaiUeedom ( freedom as a means to that end ). However, Se n alsoobserves another pairing of freedom-types, nam ely freedom s of process, whichal low freedom of act ions and decisions, and freedoms of opportunityUnfortunately, he does not tell us how these two pairs fit together, so I wildescribe them and then make a proposal below.Constitutive and Instruments^Freedoms

CbnsWtrf/Vefreedom refers to freedom as itself the very ob jective, or end,odevelopme nt. In political theory. Sen's concep t of 'freedom as an end In itselwould be considered a n account of ' the socialgood' ,or ' the ideal so cie t/ . BuSen's interest is not to provide a comprehensive accoun t of 'the good societyfor his interest is rather more limited, namely to indicate the conditions of a'developed ' society. 'The success of a society is to be evaluated primarily bythe substantive freedom s that the mem bers of that society enjoy'*^.

In effect. Sen's account of consti tutive freedom is of freedom fromdeprivations and forpersonal agency. This is different from how econom istsusually view the 'social good', which they usually tie to some measure owealth. Sen quotes Aristotle, that 'wealth is evidently not the good we areseeking, for it is merely useful and for the sake of something else' (p.14Nichomachean Ethics, Bk 1,sctn 5). In Sen 's view , that 'som ething else' is 'tolive the kind of l ives we have reason to value ', to 'make ou r l ives richer andmore unfettered...tobe fuller soc ial perso ns, exercising our ow n volitions andinteracting withand influencingthe world in which we live.^ Wealth andfreedom are not inherently the end initself, but rather serve thisend.In effecconstitutive freedom s are importantontheirown,and do not need tobejustifiedin terms of their economic contribution to society. They are simp ly how humansseek to live and interact, and that alone is their justification .

Ach ieving constitutive freedom requiresinstrumentalireedom s,forit isthesthatgivedirect guidancetothe formation of govem mental development policieand practices.Infact.Sen identifiesfivedifferenttypesof instrumental freedomsLet us quickly look at each of them inturn.*^

Political freedom sreferto' the opportunities people ha ve to determine w hoshould govern and on what principles, and also includes the possibil ity to


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Asia Journa l of TheologyEconomic facilitiesrefer to 'the opportunities that individuals respectively

enjoy to util ize economic resources for the purpose of consumption, orproduction,or exchange'.* For instance, one of many poss ible exam ples wouldbe 'freedom of labour contractasopposed to slavery or the enforced exclusionfrom the labour market. [One of] the crucial challenges in many developingcountries today is the need forfreeingof labor from explicit or implicit bondagethat denies access to the op en labor m arket. Similarly, the den ial of access toproduct markets is often among the deprivations from which many smallcultivators and struggling producers suffer under traditional a n^ngem ents andrestrictions. The freedom to participate in econom ic interchange has a basicrole in social living'.*^

Social opportunitiesrefertothe freedoms gained by 'the arrangements thatsociety makes for education, health care, and so on, which influence theindividual's substantive freedom to livebetter. These facilities are important notonly for the conduct o f private lives (such as living a healthy life and avoidingpreventable morbidity and premature mortality), but also for more effectiveparticipation in economic and po litical activities'. For insta nce , illiteracy is anunfreedom because it not only constrains possibilities in one's personal life(such as the freedom to read for pleasure or for self-protection, eg., legaldocuments, etc), but it also greatly constrains one 's ability to participate andinfluence economicandpolitica l activity,reedonfis and capabilities ga ined whensocial restrictions areremoved,such as discnminations on the basis of gender,caste,tribe, etc.

Transparency guarantees refer to the freedoms and capabilities gainedthrough 'openness that people can expect [within society, government,business,etc.]: the freedom to deal with one another under guarantees ofdisclosure and lucidity'. In other words, societies are most effective atdevelopment if they operate with some basic presumptions of trust amongagents and participants: 'When that trust is seriously violated, the lives ofmany people both direct parties and third parties may be adverse ly affectedby the lack of openness. Transparency guarantees (including the right todisclosure).. .have a clear instrumental role in preventingcorruption,financialirresponsibility and underhanded dealings'.


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Asia Jou rna l o f Theo logyindigent as we ll as ad hoc arrangem ents such as fam ine relief or emergencypublic employm ent to gene rate income for des titutes'.

With these five forms of instrumental freedom, it is important to note thatthey are not discrete and unconnected, but rather are highly interconnectedand complimentary, supplemen ting and reinforcing each other.Freedoms of Process and Opportunity

Sen observes that 'unfreedoms can arise either through inadequateprocesses (such as the violation of voting p rivileges or othe r political or civilrights), or through inadequate opportunities for achieving wha t they minimallywou ld like to achieve (including the absence of such elementary opportunitiesas the capability to escape premature mortality or preventable morbidity orinvoluntary starvation)'.Senobsen/es that Libertarians en-oneouslyfocussolelyon freedom as process (they fai l to 'worry at al l about whether somedisadvantaged people suffer from systematic deprivation of substantiveopportun ities'), and that Consequentialists erroneously focus so lelyonfreedomas opportunity (they fail to 'worry about the nature of the processes that bringtheopportunities aboutor the freedomof choice peoplehave').Ineffect, emphasiofone at theexpense oftheotherinhibits freedom, indeed creates unfreedomsthusboth freedonnsof process and of opportunityare essential to full humanfreedom and hencetosocial-economic developmen t.

How do these two types of freedoms fit with constitutive and instrume ntafreedoms? Surprisingly, Sen fails to address this,and thus leaves behind som econfus ion. Nonetheless, it seem s that constitutive and instrumental freedom sinclude both freedoms of process and freedoms ofopportunity.In other wo rds,consf/fuf/Ve freedom s would be the freedoms of process and opportunity whichwe havereason to valuefor ourselves, andeachofthe fiveinstrumented freedopossesses both process and opportunity elements. For instance, 'politicalfreedom s' would include freedom s of process such as freedom of elections orof publicpoliticaldebate,as we ll as freedoms of opportunity such as opportunityto vo te, or to speak or to run for election. 'Econom ic facilities' would includefreedoms of process such as to open a bank account or to sell one's producein the local market, as well as freedoms of opportunity such as to actually


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Asia Journ al of Theology\Nhy Is Analysis by 'Freedom' Helpful?

Se n has provided us w ith his four-fold framew ork of freedom constitutiveand instmm ental freedoms constituted by freedom s of opportunity and process.But what has this proposal gained for us? He contends that his 'freedom'proposa l is helpful for two reasons.

First, it provides the basis for developmentaleffectiveness, thatis, for formingeffective policies and practices for social-economic development. That is,recognition ofthese variouscomponents ofhumanfreedom provides substantiveprinciples by which politicians, bureaucrats, businesses, NGOs, and othergroups and organizations can develop specific po licies, laws, regulations, andguidelines for achieving enhanced individual capabilitiesin other words , forovercoming economic suffering and social oppression. Ofcourse,the specificforms s uch policies w ill take will be depe nden t on local or regional factors.None theless, if this account of freedom is deployed as the guiding framew orkby wh ich principles of legislation and policy formation are deve loped, and bywhich practices for their implementation are enacted , then social-econom icdevelopmen t w ill be the inevitable outcome .

Second, the freedom perspective provides a basis for evaluation ofdevelopment policies, methods, and practices: to what extent are existingpolicies actually enhancing peop le's freedoms? Third,the freedom perspectivehighlights the issues of individual rationality and responsibility, that is,respons ibility for thewaysof action needed to achieve developm ent. H ere heidentifies two distinct ways:

One isassertion (or, more precisely, self-assertion) of the underprivilegedthrough political organization.TheotherissolidaritywWh the underprivilegedon the part of other members of society, who are...often better placed toadvance the cause of the disadvantaged by virtue of their own privileges(e.g.,formal education, accesstothe media, economic resources, politicalconnections). Both self-assertion and solidarity may be regarded asimportant parts of the creation of social opportunities.^^6. A Barthian Critique and Appropriation of Annartya Sen

We now arrive at our destination: a theology and p ractice of freedom for thepoorandoppressed.From Barth's perspective, it might look som ething like this:


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Asia Journa l o f Theo logy(forthisearthlylife).Naturalreedoms primarilyree omo / = f r e e d o m ochooseto act and how to actforGod, thenfor others,then foroneself. This freedom isecondarily freedom from from the impositions ofsin,o foneself, of othersBut it is always and unavoidably freedom withinwithin the constraints oreality, of being historically situa ted , of our h um an limitations, of God 'swill.

Freedom /or G od means giving God our gratitude and oar obed ience, aswell as using our freedom responsibly before God.Freedom forothers meansusing our agency for the freedom of others, doing this for two reasons. Firstbecause of them odel oiGod:just as God has actedfo rus by gran ting us thegift of freedo m, so too we are to do likew ise for others; and s eco nd, on thecommand of God: God commands us to love others, and to do justice forothers, wh ich must necessarily include acting for both the prom ised and na turafreedoms of others.

Which particular natural freedoms are needed and by whom will alwaysdepend on individual circumstances and conditions.Howwe (individuals or theChurch) then act for the sake of freedom and justice (whether of others or oourselves) will begin withproclamation pronouncement of God's truth, orjudgem ent, or justice, or love, or whatever is the divine m essage needed at aparticular time and p lace. Ifinou rfreedomw e decide that further action shouldbe taken beyond proc lama tion, then any particular action will be de terminedby our own choices, preferences, decisions, and moral resolve within thedelimitations of reality and of G od's w ill as understood throu gh S cripture anddoctrine.

In his ow n freedo m to choos e, Barth resolved to obey G od's comm and toresist evil and love his ne ighbourbyhis efforts for particular freedom s foro the rsand for hinfiselfparticularly freedom from fascism , freedom from the threat onuclear war, freedom from the exploitation of capitalism, freedom from thepolitical myths of the Cold War. To achieve these, Barth chose to actinparticulaways, primarily byproclamationby framing such documents as 'The BarmenDec laration' (1934) and 'The P etition oftheBruderschaftenonAtomic Weapons(1958 ). Yet, although Barth's cho ice for himself w as to focus o n proclam ationhe none theless advocated other forms of action by others. For instance, heheld that there sho uld be Christians who enter po litics, 'to act in accordancewiththe Christian approach and who will thereby prove themselves unassuming


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Asia Journal of TheologyFor Barth,whose w orld was primarilyEurope,the threat of nuclear weapons

as the greatest social concern of his dayindeed, of such seriousence that he considered oppos ition to nuclear wa r a doctrinal status Yet the horrors and the scale of economic suffering and social

of econom ic suffering and social status confessionis. Nonetheless, within his

n theological terms , his call for action on behalf of the we ak against theis anexample of whathe calledfreedom for nearanddistant neighbours'.^

In effect, Barth's theology for the poor and oppressed amounts to this:are severe,sinful,and unjust limitations on the giftofGod hasgivenhumanity and whidi God deeplydesires for hum anity

ully possess and enact.The Church, which is called to obedience to theand of God withinthe totality of its members'lives, is calledtocarry ou t

of proclamation to proclaim the sinfulness of such injustice,to proclaimin God to the poor andoppressed,andtoproclaim both udgement

oppressor.The Church is also called to identify thosefar, who live in poverty and oppression; and the C hurch istoprovide

bers, who are God's agents of ustice and freedom, every supportintheir resolve and ac tion on behalf of the poor andoppressed.But wha t sort of freedoms do the poorandoppressed need? And w hat sort

ions should be undertaken for them? This is wh ere w e begin to engageartya S en. At a superficial, verbal level, Barth could agree w ith S en

freedom is an end in itself; however, Barth and Se n wou ld disagree on theof such constitutive freedom, to use Sen's term. Here is where theent of Barth's view of faith-and-reason comes into

n's proposa ls for the content offreedom .Barth would see constitutive freedom s as 'the freedoms

for God , forothers,fo roneself, in thatorder. This is in direct contrast to' for our individualselves.ForBarth,humans do 'the good'when

rding to the imperativetodo good inherentinthe gift of freedom '.^Sen,there is no inherent imperative within freedom to do goo d; doing


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Asia Journal of Theologyadvocates an externally-determined set of freedoms as constitutive freedomsNot surprisingly, my own sympathies lie w ith Ba rth.

Thus it may see m that Barth and Sen are like a whale and an elephant thastare inquisitively at each other from shore and from water, then turn aw ay topursue their separate interests (to borrow Barth's description of himself andBultmann). But such a view wou ld be a m istake, for we recall that Barth ialso, though secondarily, concerned w ith freedom fromand this is whereBarth and Sen can meet eachother, for the poorandoppressed need many othe freedom s from', freedom from those constraints and impositions whichkeep them bound in poverty and opp ress ion. This is the point at which B arthcan happily borrow from Am artya Sen as a particularly helpful resource, for is here that Sen's proposed instrumentai freedoms, including freedoms oprocess and opportunity, fulfill Barth's criteriathere appears to be little inChristian doctrine thatwouldconstrain Sen 's proposals concerning instrumentafreedoms.

Here we may reca ll that Barth's provisiona l borrowing of socialism as hifavoured form of political life was a life-long borrow ing, socialism proving to bea robust ideological partner for Barth's political theoiogy. Likewise I suspecSen's proposals concerning instrumental freedoms w ould prove an equallrobust partner for Barth's social-economic theology. In effect, Barth's theologof poverty a nd oppression, as defined abo ve, can espou se Sen's account oinstrumental freedo ms, and Christians who a re in governme nt, bureaucracyNG Os, etc., having to form policies and procedures for, and assessments ofaction on behalf of the poor and oppressed, can do well to employ Sen'proposals concerning instrumental freedom s. In short, Barth would suggesthat Sen's account of 'constitutive freedoms' fails to provide any ground fomoral responsibility or any imperative for moral action; yet Barth would alsosuggest that Christians can faithfully and fruitfully employ Sen's account o'instrumen tal freedo ms' as a provisional-yet-valuab le means of guidance foachieving greater freedom forthepoorandoppressed.

Here I am usinglocusin the h istorical Reformation sense of locicommunes, litera'common p laces' butinessence meaning top ics' or them es'aroundwhichatheologicdiscussion isshaped. See,for instance, Meianchthon's Loci Communes,B ''ed.(Gr


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Asia Journ al of Theologyprovide;third, the range of theological topics which interest me is much wider thanLiberation alone(I aminterested in suchissues ashistoricaitheology,dogmatic theoiogy,and theological engagement with such areas as philosophy, natural science, sociaiscience,culture, etc.); fourth,the theologicalmeaning of'liberation'is muchwider than itssenseinLiberation Theology,thus true 'LiberationTheoiogy' should include liberation notonlyfromthe 'pathologies of povertyandoppression'inthe Two-ThirdsWorld,but alsofrom allhuman pathologies, including the 'pathologies of prosperity'inthe Westem Worldand ourspiritualpathologies aswell.Ofcourse,povertyandoppression are aiso foundin the WestemWorld,andeconomic prosperityisaisofound inmany parts of the deveiopingworid.Nancey MurphyandGeorge F.R. Eliis,On theMoralNatureofthe Cn/verse (Minneapoiis:Fortress,1996),43-44.I do not want to be a Barthian because I disagree with him on a range of issues: i seenaturai theoiogy, whiie not saivif c, asadA)oc/yusefuifor evangeiism;Isee naturallawasavalidtheologicai resource iffiiteredthrough Christian doctrineandvirtue;Isee greatervaluein virtueethicsthctndoesBarth,and,atthe sametime,I alsosee validityin'secondary'casuistry; being a 'gender equaiitarian', i disagree with Barth's construal of genderrelationships; aswell,Barth is f requentiy seen to be eitherauniversalist oranagnosticon soteriology, neither of which I am. Furthermore, we will see thatIdifferfromhim incertain methodological respects also.For one of Barth's many articuiations of this point, we may cite his essay T he Gift ofFreedom'(1956): I , too, have heard the news that we can speak abou tGodonly byspeaking about man....This general statement is hardly disputed among Christiantheologians. Thereis, however, sharp disagreementasto the priority ofthetwo daims.Itis myfirm conviction thatthecounter-claim [namely thatwe canspeak aboutmanonlyby first speaking about God]is thetrue claim and must come first. Why deny priority toGodin the reaimof knowing whenit Is uncontested in the realmofbeing?IfGod is thefirstreality, howcanmanbe thefirsttruth?'(italicsoriginal); KarlBarth,T he Gift of Freedom',in Karl Barth,TheHumanity ofGod(Ridtitnond, VA: John KnoxPress,1960), 69-70.See JohnWebster, Barfh(London: Continuum,2000);JohnWebster,ed..The CambridgeCompaniontoBarth (Cambridge: Cambridge University P ress, 2000); John Webster,Barth sMoralTheo/ogy (Edinburgh: T&T C lark 1998); John Webster,Barth s Ethics ofRecondliaOon(Cambridge: Cetmbridge UniversityPress, 1995).Webster isaiso theleadingEnglish-language interpreter ofthe Germantheologian EberhardJungel,having writtenand edited several volumesonJungel.Webster is Lady Margaret P rofessor of Divinity,University ofOxford,thus Indian readersshould notethatthisis notJohnC. W ebster ofDalit theology repu te.Webster,Barth,p.161.Note Hunsinger's similarcomm entthat, t he laterBarthsimply didnot deveiop a fuii-fledged doctrine of the state, or of Christian participation in its


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Asia Journa l of Theo logyHunsinger, 'Karl Barth and Liberation Theo iogy', in George Hunsinger,DisruptiveGraceStudies in theTheoiogy of Karl Barth(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,2000),p.55;thecommfrom Sideris taken from RonaldJ.Sider,CryJustice (New York: PaulistPress, 1980),p.3Hunsinger, 'KarlBarth and LiberationTheology',42-59.ForBarth,these forcesof 'po liticareaction'or 'reactionary politics' included National Socialism (Nazism), communism,American messianism (ie ., those Christians who v iewed /Vmerica as God's specially-chosen nation),andanti-comm unism. (Barthcouldcondemn both communismandanti-communism sincet)othwere equaiiy reactionary against God's purposes). Theologianswho failed this 'political integrity test', to use Hunsinger'swords,included not only theGerman theologianswhosupported NationalSocialism,but also theologiansinAmericalike Reinhold Niebuhr who supported American messianism; George Hunsinger, 'KarlBarth and LiberationTh eolog /, pp.44-5.Foracontemporarycritiqueof Niebuhr,seealsoStanley Hauerwas,Within the Grainofthe Universe {Grand Rapids:Baker, 2001).Hunsinger,'Karl Barth and LiberationTheology",p.46,with quote fromChurch Dogmatic111/4,p.532.Barth statedthat Christianity I s fundamentallyonthesideofthe victimsof thidisorder[i.e.,thesodo-economic-political disordersinWestem society]andis to espousethei rcause" (111/4,p.544). FormoreofBarth's critiqueofbothMarxism andcapitalism,seChurchDogm aticsm/4,pp.531-544.Barth,Church Dogmatics, iii/4,p.544.In order to express myownrefusal to bow down to thefallaciousnessandarrogance ofsetting'reason'in contrast to 'faith'(as if reason is notanelement already withinfaith,and as if only the non-faithfui have the right to use the term 'reason'), when using theword 'reason"inthe traditional philosophy-of-religion sense of faith-and-reason"Ishallkeep 'reason'insingle quote marks.Barth,Church Dogmatics, III/4,p.44 (note the word 'effected', not'affected'). Asp er theconventions ofhisday,Barth usedthe 'man'to includeboth men andwomen;in mydirequotesfromBarth, I retain his use of 'man',though w hen writing in my ownwordsIuse'humanity" or 'peopie'.KariBarth,Th e Gift cfFreedom",92 (italics in o riginal).Barth,ChurchDogm atics\W4,p.585.Barth,Church Dogmatics\\\/A,544f; italicsadded.Frei,Types, p.81 (italics added). Interestingly, Freicalls this useof other non-theologicasources, third-level' language. I would suggestthishelps us understand Barth's use ofnormal and compressed fonts in his Church Dogmatics: the normal-font discussionsconstitute his second-order language, that is, his systematic theology, whereas thecompressed-tont discussions constitute his first-order (exegetical) and third-order(historicai and non-theological) language. Collectively, they constitute his dogmatictheoiogy.Barth,T he Gift ofFreedom',p.93.These substantial discussion are found particularly in certain sections ofTheWord of


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Asia Journal of TheologyJohnWebster, Barth s Moral Theology: Human Action in Barth s Thought {Grar\d Rapids:Eerdmans, 1998), p.99. As to why Barth gives freedom this secondary place, Websterstates Partly it is Barth s vision of the substance of the Christian faith, and thus hisleading concepts and vocabulary are much doserto those of classical Christian theologythan those of the dogmatics of modemity, in which freedom has enjoyed a much moreconspicuous role,. .But more importantly, the indirectness of Barth s handling of the themeof human freedom derivesfroma decision,, .which prescribes for human freedom corollaryratherthan axiomatic status ; p.99,

* Clifford Green,Karl Barth: Theologian of Freedom (London: Collins, 1989) Barth, The Gift of Freedom , p.69, Barth, The Gift of Freedom , p,71. Barth, The Gift of Freedom , p,72.^ Barth, The Gift of Freedom , pp.70-71.

Barth,The Gift of Freedom , p.75 (italics in original). Barth, Church Dogmatics, 111/4, p,564, Barth, The Gift of Freedom , p.75,

Barth, The Gift of Freedom , pp,78-77,' Barth, Church Dogmatics, III/4, p.45 Barth, Church Dogmatics, III/4, p.325 (italics added).

3 Barth, The Gift of Freedom , pp.76-77 Barth, Church Dogmatics, III/4, p,336. Barth,ChurchDogm at ics,III/4,p.58O.

ChurchDogmat ics,III/4,p,584,it is by no mea ns the case that God w ith his dema nd for obedience overtakes and

tramples m an to the detriment ofh is human nature and being, so that the m an upon w homthis claim is to be m ade is to be pit ied' 566 . Barth, Church Dogm atics, l l l /4,p .13 . In addit ion to the wo rks by W ebster,see a lso N igel Biggar,The Hastening that Awaits:Karl Barth's Ethics {Oxford: Claren don, 1993) and P,D, Matheny,D ogmatics and Ethics:The Theological Realism and Ethics of Karl Barth's 'Church Dogm atics' (FrankfurtamMain:Laing, 1990). Barth ,The GiftofFreedom' ,p.87.

Barth, 'Th e Gi ftofF reedom' ,p.69(italics in original). Mo re accurately, Barth gives thisasthe definition ofvanre//ca/(Protestant) ethics. None theless, B arth extends this view of


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Asia Journa l of TheologyBarth,Church Dogmatics, III/4,p.326.The following overview of Sen's careerisprovided by Am iya KumarBagchi,'AmartyaKumarSen andthe Human Science of Development', inEconomic andPolitical WeekVcl.XXXIII,No.49 (Dec.5-11,1998),pp.3139-49. Bagchi'sphrase is th e human scienceof human developm ent'; however, wide as Sen's purview is,Ifind Bagchi's phrase toowide,for there are many areas of human development into which Sen does notenter,suchas resolution ofindividualpsychopathologies, developing creativearts,or enhancingone's spirituality and relationship w ith God (Sen isanatheist), i find my m odification ofBagchi's phrase amoreaccurate description of S en's enterprise.Bagchi,'Amartya KumarSen',p.3139.Bagchi,'Amartya KumarSen',p.3148.Thisfundam ental theorem being that 'every Pareto-efficient system can beshown to beconsistent w ith an equilibrium in a model of pure competition and conversely that everypurely competitive system has an equilibrium configuration which is Pareto-efficient';Bagchi,'Amartya KumarSen',p.3144.Bagchi,'Amartya KumarSen',p.3144.AmartyaSen,On EthicsandEconomics (Oxford:B laokwell,1987),p.16'What can be justifiably seen as overactivity in some fields has been inseparablyaccompanied by thoroughgoing underactivityinothers.Itis,thus,notasimple matter o'more'or'less'govemment.Rather, it is a question of the type of govemance tohaveanofseeingtheroleof publicpolicies inpromotingas wellas repressing social opportunitiesAmartyaSen andJean Dreze,India:ParticipationandDevelopment(Ue\NDe lhi:OxfUniversityPress, 2002),p.21 (italicsinoriginal).AmartyaSen,Developmentas Freedom (New Delhi:Oxford UniversityP ress, 1999),pSen,Developmentas Freedom,3-4. Note Sen's repeated point that 'Poverty is theunfreedom of deprivation of basic capabilities (rather than merely low income)'{DevelopmentasFreedom,20).The use of ther term "agency" calls for a little clarification. The expression "agent" issometimesemployed inthe literature of economicsandgame theoryto denotea personwho is actingonsomeoneeise's beha(perhapsbeing led onbya"principal"),andwhoachievements are tobeassessedinthe light of someone else 's (the principal's)goals.am suing the term "agent" notinthissense,butinits olderand "grander"sense assomeonewhoactsandbrings aboutchange,and whoseachievementscanbe judged iterms ofsome extemalcriteriaaswell.This work[Developmentas Freedom]isparticulconcemedwiththe agencyroleof the individual member ofthepublicand as aparticipanineconomic,social,and politicai actions'(Sen,DevelopmentasFreedom,p.19).Sen,DevelopmentasFreedom,p.18.Sen,DevelopmentasFreedom,p. 15.


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Asia Journal of TheologySen,DevelopmentasFreedom,p.17.AmartyaSen,India:Development andParticipation(New Delhi:Oxford University Press,2002),p.29.KarlBarth,The Christian CommunityandtheCivilCommunity', sctn.34.Barth,Church Dogmatics 111/4,sctn.54,3,Barth,The gift ofFreedom,p,84See Gary Gutting,P ragmatic Liberalism and the Critique of Modernity(CambridgeUniversity P ress, 1999),


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barth & sen on freedom!

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