battle of caralis (215 bc)

8/6/2019 Battle of Caralis (215 BC)

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Rome Threatens Sardiniain the First Punic War

'The First Punic War began in 264 as acontest between Rome, Syracuse andCarthage for control of eastern Sicily.Rome defeated Syracuse early on,and the war expanded as a clashbetween the Carthaginian and Romanempires. However, as long as Romelacked a fleet, she could threaten onlySicily. Sardinia, and Africa, were safebehind the patrols of theCarthaginian navy. Punic raids werelaunched from Sardinia against theItalian coast, while the Punic navybrought support to beleaguered cities

on the Sicilian coast. Within theRoman Senate, the realization camethat this war could never be wonunless Carthage was challenged atsea. So, in 260 Rome built her firstbattle fleet, and with ingeniousboarding ramps (the corvus) defeatedthe Punic navy at Mvlae.

In 259 the consul Lucius CorneliusScipio led the first Roman expedition

against Corsica and Sardinia. He hadsome success against the garrisons,

before being driven off by a reinforc -ing fleet Under H annibal, son of Gisgo. In the following year, theconsul Gaius Sulpicious Palerculuscampaigned with a Roman fleet inSardinian waters, defeating Hannibaland capturing or destroying all hisships. Hannibal was crucified by hisown officers for his repeated failures.Another Punic Fleet under Hannoarrived to restore the situation, andthe Romans departed.

As the long war dragged on, Roman

interest in Sardinia waned. Theimmediate objective of ending navalraids on Italy had been accomplished.Rome turned to a more directstrategy of invading Africa. Whenthis effort was foiled by disaster onland (the Battle of the Bagradasfeatured in SPQR) and sea (256-55),Rome reverted to a strategy of attrition on Sicily. Sardinia wasnever again threatened during the

First Punic War. Rome finally won

the long war with a naval victory atthe Aegates Islands in 241. In thePeace of Lutatius that ended the warCarthage lost Sicily and had to pay anenormous indemnity, but retainedcontrol of Sardinia and Corsica.

The Rape of SardiniaThe end of the First Punic Warbrought no relief to Carthage. Hardon the heels of this war came therevolt of the mercenaries, theTruceless War, 240-238 (featured inC3i Nr. 7). While this brutal war

raged in Africa, the contagion of rebellion spread to Carthage'smercenary garrison on Sardinia in239. These soldiers of fortune roseup, and slew their Carthaginiancommander Bostar and his officers.In response, Carthage sent anexpedition under (another) Hanno topunish the rebels, but his troopsdeserted and joined the mutineers.The rebels crucified Hanno, then ranrampant over the island, slaying allthe Carthaginian settlers. Once theeuphoria of the initial uprising hadworn off, these mercenaries began todread retribution from Carthage. Sothey sent an offer to Rome to surren-der Sardinia to them.

The Roman Senate refused the offer.The senators decided to honor theterms of the Peace of Lutatius, whichexpressly forbid taking as an ally anyally of the other power. Meanwhile,on Sardinia the mutinous mercenariesturned on the local populace. Theirdepredations at length drove thenative tribes to rise up and attack them. The mercenaries were expelledfrom the island in 238, and Sardiniawas briefly independent. Carthage,as soon as the rebel mercenaries inAfrica had been suppressed, beganpreparing an expedition tore-conquer the island.

In Rome, however, there was achange of heart. The senate reverseditself and proclaimed the annexation



of Sardinia and Corsica, in flagrantdisregard of the Treaty of Lutatius.When Carthage complained, Romethreatened war and increased theindemnity Carthage had to pay tokeep the peace. This aggressionbecame known as the Rape of Sardinia.Rome may have gained a valuableprovince, but she also earned theundying hatred of Hamilcar Barcaand his sons (Hannibal, Hasdrubaland Mago), a matter of no smallconsequence.

The Roman ProvinceVictory in the First Punic Warbrought Rome her first two overseasprovinces, Sicily and Sardinia. Thehighly civilized island of Sicilybecame a profitable and peacefulpossession. Wild, untamed Sardiniawas another story. Carthage hadnever conquered the entire island,content with coastal enclaves anddiplomatic, commercial and culturaldomination of the island. Romanways were different. A series of expeditions were sent to the island topacify it completely. Both consulsfought on the island in 238, and aftera brief interlude consular armies weredispatched every year for five years,from 235-231. The first of theseexpeditions was led by the consulTitus Manlius Torquatus, of whommore will be heard anon.

Finding the administration of overseas provinces a burden on thelimited officers of the Roman govern-ment, the number of praetors wasexpanded from two to four in 227.The first praetor of Sardinia in thatyear was Gains Flaminius, destinedto meet his end at Hannibal's handsby Lake Trasimene. In 225 the consulGaius Atilius Regulus was dispatchedwith his arm' to quell anotheruprising on Sardinia. His colleague,Lucius Anielius Papus remained inItaly to guard against an expectedCeltic invasion. Atilius Regulussuppressed the Sardinian revolt andreturned to Italy in tine to take partin the Battle of Telamon (featured inC3i Nr. 6). On the eve of the Second

Punic War Sardinia was a provincebarely pacified. A generation of Roman commanders and legionnaireshad their chief battle experience fromcampaigns on this island.

The Second Punic WarSardinia did not figure prominentlyin the opening campaigns of theSecond Punic War. The island washeld for Rome only by a garrison of allied troops, probably no more than5,000 men. Hannibal's surprisecrossing of the Alps, and his firstmajor victory at Trebbia, convincedthe Romans that this war would beneither easy nor short. The Romansenators knew that Carthage wouldattempt to regain Sardinia at the firstopportunity. Therefore, early in 217the praetor Aulus CorneliusMammula was sent to reinforce theisland's garrison with Legion V, afull-strength double legion with some1),000 foot and 800 horse. CorneliusMammula maintained a tenuouscontrol of Sardinia over the next twoyears, as Hannibal's continuing stringof victories over Rome excited theanti-Roman passions of the nativetribes. The praetor had to exact everincreasing taxes and tribute from hisprovince to support the war, whichcontributed greatly to the risingdiscontent.

The council in Carthage also took more direct action to break Sardinia



away from Rome's grasp. A general,Hanno, infiltrated onto the island asan agent provocateur, to fomentrebellion. Hanno soon made conl111011 cause with Hallipsicora, tileleading Sardinian chieftain, toprepare a massive island-wide

insurrection. Cornelius Mammlula,however, was a wary and circum-spect governor. Even after the Battleof Cannae, when much of southernItaly rebelled, Hanno andHampsicora bided their time. Theyawaited a more favorable moment toraise the cry of 'freedom from Rome!'.

The opportunity they sought camesoon enough. At the end of 216, thepropraetor Cornelius Mammula wasrecalled to Rome, pending the arrivalof his successor. The praetor QuintusMucius Scaevola arrived early in 215,and immediately came down with aserious, incapacitating illness.

Cornelius Mammula, alarmed by theturn of events, hurried back to Rometo make his report. Leaderless, theRoman garrison was unable to reactas Hanno and Hampsicora nowunleashed the long simmeringrebellion. The insurrection quicklyspread across the island. Legion Vhunkered down in its bases andwaited.

Hanno and CorneliusPlea forReinforcementThe opposing generals, Hanno andCornelius Mammula, both hurried toget urgent pleas for reinforcingexpeditions to their home govern-ments. Cornelius Mammula reportedin person to the senate on theimpending revolt and the incapacita-tion of Mucius Scaevola. Rome,unfortunately, had just about scrapedthe bottom of her manpower barrel.After Cannae in the fall of 216, Rome

had barely managed to conscript onenew consular army of two legions.Additional armies were formed fromthe survivors of Cannae and a force aslave and convict volunteers, thevolones . Then another disaster befellRome in the winter of 216-215. Thepraetorian artily of two legion, inCisalpine Gaul leas ambushed andannihilated in the Litani forest byCeltic tribes, instigated by Hannibal.

legions completely destroyed so far inthe war. The senate had reluctantlyconcluded in early 216 that noadditional forces could be raised, andthat the Litani ambush must go un-avenged for now. It was in thissituation that Cornelius Mammula

made his plea for reinforcements.Despite their many difficulties, thesenate ordered a levy to be raised.Somehow, the urban praetor, QuintusFulvius Flaccus, managed to scrapeup a reinforced Roman legion, theXIV. Its strength was 5,000 foot and400 horse. It was most likely composed of teen-agers, old men andthose earlier rejected as unfit forservice. But Legion XIV would haveto do.

Hanno's message met an entirelydifferent response in Carthage, Theway had been paved by Mago Barca'smission to the council followingCannae in the autumn of 216. Magohad poured a bushel basket of goldrings cut from the fingers of deadRoman nobles and knights onto thecouncil chamber floor. Mago'srequest for 20,000 infantry and 4,000cavalry was readily approved. WhenHanno s emergency dispatch arrived,Mago Barca was on the point of sailing for Italy with the first contin-gent of this levy, 12,000 foot, 1,500horse and 20 elephants. Arriving atnearly the same time as Hanno's pleato re-conquer Sardinia came news of HasdrubaI Barca's disastrous defeatat Dertosa in Spain (featured in C3iNr. 4). The council was forced toallocate resources amongst threecompeting theaters - Italy, Spain andSardinia. The councilors' decisionrevealed their strategic priorities.Mago and his army were diverted toprotect Spain. A mere 4,000 cavalryand 40 elephants were sent withBomilcar and the home fleet toreinforce Hannibal in Italy. (It wasthe only reinforcement lie everreceived.) A new army of 12,000infantry, 1,500 cavalry and 20elephants was prepared for anexpedition to Sardinia.

The expeditionary army was prob-ably formed of a core of sonic sixthousand solid Libyan spearmen,supported by over 1,000 superbNumidian light cavalry and heavy

Carthaginian horse. There was alsoavailable a force of 13,850 Iberianinfantry and 1,200 cavalry from theThersitae, Mastiani, Oretes andOlcades tribes. ']'his unit had beenposted to Africa in 218 by Hannibal,in keeping with his policy of defend-

ing Spain with African troops andAfrica with Iberians. Probably aboutsix thousand of these Iberian foot,with supporting cavalry wereassigned to the Sardinia bound army.This Iberian contingent was by nowwell drilled, after three years of garrison duty in Africa.

The CommandersSo both Carthage and Rome preparedexpeditions for Sardinia in the springof 215. But these armies neededcommanders, and this posed aproblem for both empires. TheRoman Senate habitually turned toexperienced consulares (formerconsuls) to lead her armies inemergencies of this nature, however,few were available. Fives consulareshad already been slain in the firstthree years of this war: GaiusFlaminius (Trasimene); LuciusAemilius Paullus, Marcus Minuciusand Gnaeus Servilius Geminus(Cannae); and Lucius PostumiusAlbinus (Litani). TiberiasSempronius Longus (Trebbia) andGains Terentius Varro (Cannae) werein disgrace. Quintus Fabius Maximusand Tiberias Sempronius Gracchus asconsuls, and Marcus ClaudiusMarcellus as proconsul facedHannibal, while Gnaeus and PublicsCornelius Scipio were in distantSpain. There were few triedleaders left. The praetor FulviusFlaccus, charged with designating atemporary commander for Sardinia,chose Titus Manlius Torquatus.

Manlius was one of the elder statesman of Rome, a stern, harsh man

known for his conservative, tradi-tional views. His intransigenceplayed a key role in the rejection of Hannibal's offer to ransom the 8,000Roman prisoners taken at Cannae,condemning these men to a life of slavery. He was probably alreadyover 60 years of age, and likeMarcellus, he had probably served asa junior officer against HamilcarBarca in Sicily. His first consulship



had been served in Sardinia in 235.His second consulship had been in224, leading a punitive expeditionagainst the Celts after the invasion of Telamon. 'tradition dictated that noman serve more than two consulships. Even though Fabius, Marcellus

and others ignored this provision andserved multiple consulships duringthe Second Punic War, Manliuswould have none of it. Later, in 210,after the leading century had electedhim, he forced them to annul the voteand begin anew. Again in 207 liewould refuse to stand for the consulship when it was offered. But in thiscase he agreed to serve temporarilyas the deputy of the stricken praetorMucius, probably as a propraetor.Manlius would return to Sardinia afull two decades since hi, firstcommand on the island.

Carthage had as yet lost no seniorcommanders in this war. Neverthe-less, Carthage was also short of experienced generals. The veterancommanders of the Iberian conquesthad all accompanied Hannibal.Hasdrubal, his chief of staff, Hanno,son of Bomilcar, Maharbal, MagoSaunites, Hamilcar and Carthalowere all with the army in Italy.Hasdrubal Barca, his deputy Himilcoand his brother Mago were engagedin Spain. With the best commandersalready committed, the council in

Carthage selected Hasdrubal the Baldto lead the Sardinian expedition. Hedoes not seem to have been a veteranof the Iberian campaigns, butHasdrubal may have campaignedagainst the tribes on Carthage'sAfrican frontier. The council assigned Hasdrubal a deputy com-mander, Mago. This general was saidto be a close relative of Hannibal,probably a cousin. Hasdrubal couldalso rely on the support of the generalHanno, already in Sar dinia.

The Race is OnCarthaginian and Roman expeditionswere both prepared for Sardinia inthe spring of 215. The question was,which would arrive first? Hasdrubalset out first from Carthage, his armyof 13,500 escorted by 60 quinqueremes.If he could arrive first, he could jointhe rebel Sardinian army to his own

and besiege the leaderless Romantroops in their bases. But fate took ahand. When in the open sea betweenCarthage and Sardinia, Hasdrubal'sfleet was caught by a savage stormand hurled some 300 miles west ontothe Balearic Islands. Loss of life was

not severe, but Hasdrubal found hehad to repair many of his ships beforecontinuing the journey. Hasdrubaltook advantage of this unexpecteddiversion to reinforce his army with astrong body of the renowned Balearicslingers.

While the Carthaginians cooled theirheels in the Balearics, Manlius set outwith his 5,400 men escorted by some40 quinqueremes. The Romanvoyage to Sardinia was uneventful,and Manlius put in at the provincialcapitol, Caralis (modern Cagliari).

The Romans had won the race, with ahelping hand from Neptune. ButManlius still faced a serious situation,with the island in full revolt and thegarrison disheartened and demoral-ized. Manlius took command of Mucius' Legion V and added the

original garrison allied troops to hisgreen Roman Legion XIV to form asecond double legion. This gave hima full consular army of about 18,000infantry, but with only 1,200 cavalry.Manlius was not satisfied. To swellhis ranks, he grounded his fleet and

pressed the marines and rowers intoservice as infantry. The crews of 40quinqueremes would provide over1,500 marines and 8,000 rowers.Manlius formed the marines intocohorts, and selected some 2,500 of the most capable rowers to serve aslightly armed velites. This added4,000 men to his army, bringing hisforce up to 22,000 foot and 1,200horse.

Manlius undoubtedly would haveappreciated some time to drill hisforce and develop more cohesion

amongst his V and XIV Legions,garrison troops and naval infantry,but there was no time to spare.Manlius had to suppress theSardinian rebellion, before therumored Carthaginian expedition



arrived. So Manlius led his disjointedarmy out of Caralis, seeking the mainrebel concentration. As fate wouldlave it, when Manlius came upon therain rebel host, Hampsicora wasaway, recruiting amongst the Goatskintribes of the mountains. He had lefthis son Hostus in command of thearmy, which may have numbered15,000 men. Hostus was young andreckless and immediately attackedthe larger Roman army when itapproached. Manlius predictablyrouted the rebel army. Its losses wereonly 3,000 killed and 800 takenprisoner, indicating that most of therebels fled before the fighting got toohot.

Hasdrubal and Company ArriveHampsicora established a new base atCornus with his Goatskin lightinfantry and began collecting thescattered remnants of his army.Manlius, as soon as lie learned of Hampsicora's location, advanced onCornus to finish off the insurrection.The war in Sardinia would have beenover, but just then word came that aCarthaginian fleet had landed on theWestern coast. Hasdrubal the Baldquickly disembarked his force of over14,000 men, then dismissed his fleet.Manlius chose a cautious course,abandoned the field and withdrewback to his base at Caralis.Hasdrubal joined with Hampsicora,who by now had rallied an army of over 12,000 Sardinian tribesmen toreinforce the Carthaginian expedi-tion. The combined armies nownumbered nearly 27,000 men.

Manlius' hasty retreat seems a hitpremature in retrospect. A moreaggressive commander could haveheld the field and possibly preventedthe juncture of Hasdrubal andHampsicora. Manlius, however, was

not chosen for his aggressiveness. Itwas his steady, cautious nature thatthe Roman senate counted on.Manlius knew well that ten Romanlegions had already been lost in thiswar. He wasn't about to lose twomore. A younger noble, in his firstpraetorship or consulship, mighthave felt compelled to risk battle toestablish his reputation. Manliusalready had his share of glory, and

battle of caralis (215 bc)

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